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Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transferin Contemporary Policy-Making

DAVID P. DOLOWITZ* AND DAVID MARSH**

In recent years there has been a growing body of literature within politicalscience and international studies that directly and indirectly uses, discussesand analyzes the processes involved in lesson-drawing, policy convergence, policy diffusion and policy transfer. While the terminology and focus oftenvary, all of these studies are concerned with a similar process in whichknowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions andideas in one political setting (past or present) is used in the development of

policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another political setting.Given that this is a growing phenomenon, it is something that anyone

studying public policy needs to consider. As such, this article is divided into four major sections. The first section briefly considers the extent of, and rea-sons for, the growth of policy transfer. The second section then outlines a framework for the analysis of transfer. From here a third section presents acontinuum for distinguishing between different types of policy transfer.Finally, the last section addresses the relationship between policy transfer

and policy “failure.”

As the introduction to this collection emphasized, in recent years therehas been a growing body of literature within political science and interna-tional studies that directly and indirectly uses, discusses and analyzes theprocesses involved in lesson-drawing, policy convergence, policy diffu-sion and policy transfer. While the terminology and focus often vary, allof these studies are concerned with the process by which knowledgeabout policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one

political system (past or present) is used in the development of policies,administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in another politicalsystem.

Given that policy-makers appear to be increasingly relying upon policytransfer, it is something that anyone interested in, or studying, public pol-icy needs to consider. However, to date there has been little conceptualwork on the process: this article is one contribution to efforts to correct thisomission. More specifically, our aim is to develop further the conceptual

*University of Liverpool, England**University of Birmingham, England

Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration, Vol. 13, No. 1, January 2000(pp. 5–24). © 2000 Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main St., Malden MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cow-ley Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK. ISSN 0952-1895



framework found in Dolowitz and Marsh (1996): in particular, focusing onthe relationship between voluntary and coercive (forced) transfer and thelinks between policy transfer and policy “success” or failure. As such, thearticle is divided into four major sections. The first section briefly considers

the extent of, and reasons for, the growth of policy transfer. The second sec-tion then outlines our revised framework for the analysis of transfer beforethe third section presents a continuum for distinguishing among differenttypes of policy transfer, and the final section addresses the relationship between policy transfer and policy “failure.” This is particularly relevant because the majority of the studies using policy transfer, including thosereviewed in this article, either implicitly or explicitly take it for granted thatthe process has led, or will lead, to the successful implementation of a pol-icy, program or institution. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent

that policy transfer can, and often does, lead to policy failure. So, there is aneed to explore the relationship between transfer and policy success orfailure.

THE EXTENT OF, AND REASONS FOR, THE GROWTH

OF POLICY TRANSFER

While there is no denying that the process of policy transfer is not new,it nonetheless appears that over the past decade or so, as technological

advances have made it easier and faster for policy-makers to communicatewith each other, the occurrences of policy transfer have increased. To takeone example, welfare-to-work and workfare policies and programs clearlyhave been transferred from the United States to Britain since the early1980s (see Dolowitz, 1997, 1998, 2000). In fact, in response to Tony Blair’sand Bill Clinton’s “success” in using American-style welfare-to-work pro-grams to reduce levels of unemployment, many European governmentshave begun adopting British and American welfare-to-work policies them-selves. This iterative process, involving the adoption of policies across a

number of different nations, and subsequent adaptations within individualnations, illustrates: the prevalence of policy transfer; the role particularindividuals and institutions play within this process; and the difficultiesassociated with attempting to place any particular case of policy transferinto a single category on the policy transfer continuum presented in Table 1and discussed below.

There are a number of obvious reasons for the growth in transfer. Asthe globalization literature demonstrates, no nation in the industrializedor industrializing world can insulate its economy from global economic

pressures. As Parsons puts it (1996, 234):As the world economy in particular is transformed by new modes of productionand trade, and as transnational corporations and institutions come to exercisemore influence and power, so the capacity of national policy-makers to frametheir own agendas is diminished. Public policy now takes place in a world sys-tem as well as in national political systems.

6 DAVID P. DOLOWITZ and DAVID MARSH



However, global economic forces are not the only pressure toward pol-icy transfer; the rapid growth in communications of all types makesexchange of ideas and knowledge much easier. Similarly, as mentionedin the introduction to this collection, international organizations, such

as the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF)and the World Bank, advocate, and at times enforce, similar policiesacross diverse countries.

Taken together, these changes, by subjecting countries to similar pres-sures and expanding the amount of information available to policy-makers,have meant that policy-makers increasingly look to other political systemsfor knowledge and ideas about institutions, programs and policies andabout how they work in other jurisdictions.

A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING POLICY TRANSFER

Not surprisingly, the increase in the occurrence of policy transfer has ledstudents of comparative politics, public policy, organizational sociol-ogy1 and developmental studies to focus on the process. However, rela-tively few of these studies identify the process directly; that is, theydescribe the transfer of ideas or policies between countries but do notanalyze and explain the processes involved. In addition, there are evenfewer studies that attempt to put the process within a broader concep-

tual framework.As will be discussed below, placing policy transfer into a conceptual

framework can advance our understanding of concepts such as whatmotivates policy-makers to engage in the policy transfer process? (Forexample, is it ideological or practical?) Do different actors get involvedat different stages of the policy transfer process? When is policy transferlikely to occur within the policy-making cycle? How does the type of transfer vary depending upon when it occurs within the policy-makingcycle? (For example, is it more likely to be inspirational transfer during

the agenda-setting stage while a mixture during the policy-formulationstage?) Do different agents of transfer engage in different types of trans-fer? (For example, do politicians attempt to copy “foreign” modelswhile bureaucrats work at developing new programs based upon a mix-ture of different ideas and programs?) Thus, placing policy transfer intoa broader conceptual framework will help researchers examine the pro-cess of policy transfer and help themselves and practitioners evaluatethe “value added” aspect of the concept.

The Dolowitz and Marsh ModelThere have been a limited number of attempts to develop a framework toanalyze the process of policy transfer; most focusing on a series of ques-tions that studies of the process need to address (Bennett 1991, 1992b;Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Dolowitz 1998; Rose 1991, 1993). Here, we

LEARNING FROM ABROAD 7



build on our own framework, which is the most recent and is based ona critical appreciation of the attempts of others, especially Rose andBennett.2 Our current framework is organized around six questions (Seetable 1), five of which provided the focus of our original article: Why do

actors engage in policy transfer? Who are the key actors involved in thepolicy transfer process? What is transferred? From where are lessonsdrawn? What are the different degrees of transfer? What restricts or facili-tates the policy transfer process? Here we include a new question, whichhas arisen from our research: How is the process of policy transfer relatedto policy “success” or policy “failure”? In this article we further examinethe second, third, fourth and fifth questions in an attempt to move thedebate surrounding policy transfer forward. Then we focus on two crucialissues: the distinction between voluntary and coercive transfer and the

relationship between policy transfer and policy failure.However, another prior problem needs brief consideration. It could beargued that generating a series of questions is of limited utility; that, at best, it provides a way of organizing research but does not show that theconcept has explanatory power. We have problems with such an argu-ment. Of course, policy transfer can be treated as either a dependent or anindependent variable; we can seek to explain the process of policy transferor we can use policy transfer to explain policy outcomes. However, thetwo exercises are related. Put simply, if one wishes to use policy transfer

to explain policy outcomes, then one also needs to explain what causestransfer; so, a full analysis would treat transfer as both a dependent andan independent variable. This point is easily illustrated. Why a lesson isdrawn, where a lesson is drawn from and who is involved in the trans-ferring process all affect both whether transfer occurs and whether thattransfer is successful. So, for example, if a government searches hurriedlyfor a solution to an urgent problem, it is more likely that there will betransfer, because the need for a “solution” is imperative, but less likelythat the transfer will be successful, because limited time will inevitably

lead to a limited search for models, and thus probably to flawed transfer.Similarly, if the search for a policy involves not only politicians and bureaucrats but also interest groups that represent those people whom apolicy would affect, then there may well be fewer implementation prob-lems once the policy is transferred. These are merely examples. Our keypoint here is broader. In our view, in order to use policy transfer as anexplanatory variable, we also need to understand and explain the processof transfer; focusing on the questions that form the basis of our frameworkallows us to begin to understand that process.

Who Is Involved in the Policy Transfer Process?

While examining who is involved in the process might seem like a mun-dane research concern, it raises important empirical questions regardingthe degree to which transfer occurs and to what extent countries can




TABLE 1A Policy Transfer Framework

Why Transfer?Continuum

Want To.. . . . . . . . . . . . . Have To

WhoIs

Involved inTransfer?

WhatIs

Transferred? From Where

De

Tr

Voluntary Mixtures Coercive PastWithin-aNation

Cross-National

LessonDrawing

LessonDrawing

DirectImposition

ElectedOfficials

Policies Internal StateGovernments

InternationalOrganizations

Cop

(PerfectRationality)

(BoundedRationality)

(Goals)(content)(instruments)

InternationalPressures

BureaucratsCivil Servants

Programs Global CityGovernments

RegionalStateLocalGovernments

Emu

(Image) (Consensus) (Perceptions)Externalities Pressure

GroupsInstitutions Local

AuthoritiesMix

Conditionality PoliticalParties

Ideologies Insp

(Loans)(ConditionsAttached toBusinessActivity)

Obligations PolicyEntrepreneurs/Experts

Attitudes/Cultural Values

ConsultantsThink Tanks

NegativeLessons

Past Relations

TransnationalCorporationsSupranationalInstitutions



choose to engage in the process. For example, most prior research has,implicitly or explicitly, argued that there are borrowers and lenders andthat these roles seldom change (Robertson 1991; Robertson and Waltman1992; Rose 1993). However, this is not a universal rule; often countries

classified as lenders draw lessons while countries classified as borrowersact as models for other political systems. For example, it is clear thatCanada (a country normally described as a borrower; see Hoberg 1991)has acted as a model for American tobacco regulations. Similarly, and con-trary to the accepted wisdom, a modified version of the English Day Cen-ters for adult offenders was transferred to the United States from Britainduring the 1980s, even though this decade is seen as the quintessentialperiod for American exports to the U.K. (McDevitt and Miliano 1992).Thus, an examination of policy transfer must be tempered by an under-

standing of when and why such generalizations do not always hold true,which helps us recognize that the distinction between countries that arenormally lenders and countries that are usually borrowers should not beover-exaggerated.

In our initial conceptualization we identified nine main categories of political actors engaged in the policy transfer process: elected officials, poli-tical parties, bureaucrats/civil servants, pressure groups, policy entrepre-neurs and experts, transnational corporations, think tanks, supra-nationalgovernmental and nongovernmental institutions and consultants.

We dealt with the first six in our earlier works and Diane Stone dealswith the seventh in this volume. Hence, we shall concentrate here uponthe last two categories. First, it is becoming increasingly clear that policy-makers, at both the national and international levels, are relying on theadvice of consultants, whether individuals or firms, who act as policyexperts in the development of new programs, policies and institutionalstructures. Their role is particularly important because they tend to offeradvice based upon what they regard as the “best practice” elsewhere,often paying little attention to the particular context in the borrowing

political system. For example, Policy Management Groups (PMGs) are being set up in numerous African countries, with limited consideration of their appropriateness, simply because one particular consultancy firmhas been pushing this model into these countries. As a consultant fromthat firm argued: “The PMGs we have helped to set up in Zambia and arehelping to establish in Ghana and a number of other countries, typicallyconsist of about ten professionals . . . led by a permanent secretary andreporting to the cabinet through the cabinet secretary” (Garnett 1997).

Of course, political consultants are not involved simply in the harmo-

nization of political systems around the globe; their role in the policytransfer process is far more complex. For example, when internationalorganizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank, get involved in pol-icy transfer, they often recommend that particular consultants be hired.However, the governments that are forced to turn to these institutionsfor financial help often can decide which consultant to use, and different




consultants may, to an extent, make different policy recommendations.As such, even within a coercive situation, governments have a degree of freedom to choose the version of economic policy best suited to theirsituation, regardless of the particular preferences of the international

organization.The role of international consultants makes less clear the distinction between voluntary and coercive transfer. For example, while consultantsmay “force” a uniform model of market reform upon developing nations, if they are hired by a government, either as the agent of an international aidagency or “independently,” such a situation clearly has elements of bothvoluntary and coercive transfer. In fact, over time, as a relationship amongthe three institutions develops, the mixture of voluntary and coercive ele-ments may change, further complicating the study of policy transfer.

Second, international governing organizations (IGOs), such as the OECD,G-7, IMF and the UN and its various agencies, are increasingly playing arole in the spread of ideas, programs and institutions around the globe.These organizations influence national policy-makers directly, through theirpolicies and loan conditions, and indirectly, through the information andpolicies spread at their conferences and reports. In addition, internationalnongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are also increasing their influenceover global public policy through their ability to spread ideas and informa-tion on an international level. As Gordenker and Weiss (1996, 17–18) put it:

Nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) have in increasing numbers injectedunexpected voices into international discourse about numerous problems of global scope. Especially during the last 20 years . . . interests have become activein political work once reserved for representatives of states. . . . In their ownways, NGOs . . . grope . . . towards a modicum of global governance. . . . NGOshave now become an integral part of the process of setting agendas . . . and incarrying the results not only to governments but to other NGOs and individuals.

Clearly, IGOs and NGOs are acting as agents of coercive transfer. How-ever, they are also agents of voluntary transfer, which again complicates

any model of policy transfer that may be developed. For example, inOctober 1993 the British Department of Social Security (DSS) commis-sioned a research report to examine what lessons could be learned fromthe operation of social assistance programs in eighteen countries. As thestudy developed, the OECD became involved to such an extent that thefinal report was jointly issued by the DSS and the OECD and was entitledSocial Assistance in OECD Countries. Moreover, once the OECD becameinvolved, it was discovered that Professor Ian Gough of the University of Manchester in the U.K. was already conducting a similar study, and he

was also brought on board. This illustrates the difficulties involved inclassifying the actors or even the type of transfer involved in any particu-lar case. In addition, it shows how the roles of actors and institutions can,and do, change over time.

Clearly consultants, IGOs and NGOs, unlike most categories of actorsinvolved in the policy transfer process, act as agents of both voluntary




and coercive transfer. More important, both can be used by other actors tohelp in their efforts to transfer, or force others to transfer, policies. Thus,the activities of these institutions greatly complicate the policy transferprocess, particularly if we look at transfer across time, within a political

system, or across space, between several political systems.

What Is Transferred?

While almost anything can be transferred from one political system toanother, depending upon the issue or situation involved, we identify eightdifferent categories: policy goals, policy content, policy instruments, policyprograms, institutions, ideologies, ideas and attitudes and negative les-sons. These are essentially the same categories as in our earlier work butwith minor modifications, the main of which is the distinction between

policy (itself sub-divided into policy goals, policy content and policyinstruments) and programs. In most conceptions of the policy transfer pro-cess, including our original typology, programs and policies are conflatedinto a single category. This is clearly misguided. It is important to distin-guish between policies, which are seen as broader statements of intentionand which generally denote the direction policy-makers wish to take, andprograms, which are the specific means of the course of action used toimplement policies. As Pressman and Wildavsky (1973, xxii–xxiii) put it:“The word ‘program’ . . . can be conceived of as a system in which each

element is dependent on the other. . . . Policies imply theories. . . . Policies become programs when, by authoritative action, the initial conditions arecreated.” Thus, it should be clear that each policy can have multiple pro-grams, while a program is a complete course of action in and of itself.

From Where Are Lessons Drawn?

Finally, one of the major adaptations made to our original framework pre-sented in Table 1 involves a consolidation of the classification of the levels

of governance that actors look to for lessons. In essence, we argue thatpolicy-makers can look to three levels of governance: the international, thenational and the local. Within a nation, actors engaging in policy transfercan, and do, draw lessons from other political systems or units within theirown country. Not only can sub-national units of government draw lessonsfrom each other, but the national government can also draw lessons fromlower levels of government, while lower levels of government can drawupon the national government. It is also common for governments andagents to transfer policies from one nation to another. Furthermore, while

it is seldom examined, it should be stressed that when drawing lessonsfrom other nations, actors are not limited to looking at national govern-ments but can, and do, look to other sub-national levels and units of gov-ernment. Lastly, lessons can be drawn from, or forced upon a politicalsystem by, the international level.




Degrees of Transfer

Policy transfer is not an all-or-nothing process. While any particular casecan involve a combination of processes and agents, there are basically fourdifferent gradations, or degrees, of transfer: copying, which involves direct

and complete transfer; emulation, which involves transfer of the ideas behind the policy or program; combinations, which involve mixtures of several different policies; and inspiration, where policy in another jurisdic-tion may inspire a policy change, but where the final outcome does notactually draw upon the original (see also Rose 1993).

It is important to stress not only that the type of transfer will vary between different cases of policy transfer but that the type of transferinvolved in any particular case depends upon factors such as who isinvolved in the process and where within the policy-making process

transfer occurs. Thus, it is possible that, while politicians tend to look for“quick-fix” solutions and thus rely upon copying or emulation, bureau-crats, on the other hand, are probably more interested in mixtures. Simi-larly, it is possible that, while emulation is crucial at the agenda-settingstage, copying or combining several different policies or programs may be more applicable at the policy formulation or implementation stage of the policy-making process.

A POLICY TRANSFER CONTINUUM

To establish a simple distinction between voluntary and coercive trans-fer is to oversimplify the process. Rather, we suggest that it is betterto conceptualize transfer as lying along a continuum that runs fromlesson-drawing to the direct imposition of a program, policy or institu-tional arrangement on one political system by another (see Figure 1).


Lesson-Drawing(perfect rationality)

Lesson-drawing

(bounded rationality)

Obligated Transfer (transfer as a result of treaty obligations, etc.)

Coercive Transfer(direct imposition)

ConditionalityVoluntarily

but driven by perceivednecessity (such as the

desire for internationalacceptance)

FIGURE 1

From Lesson-Drawing to Coercive Transfer





national governments can be forced to adopt programs and policies aspart of their obligations as members of international regimes and struc-tures: obligated transfer. Few studies in the transfer literature have lookedat such cases to date. Of course, there are problems with such a classi-

fication. For example, within the European Union, the Court of Justicecan force member states to comply with European policy and directivesas part of their obligations to the Union (Shapiro 1992). However, sinceindividual nations voluntarily joined the Union, can any act of the EU beconsidered coercive in terms of policy transfer? At the same time, eachnation has influence over the adoption of all EU policies. As such, theyactively and voluntarily shape and adopt the edicts of the Union; it is forthis reason it is best viewed as obligated and, to an extent, negotiatedtransfer.

It should be clear from this review that many instances of policy trans-fer will lie somewhere in the middle of the continuum. However, it isclearly difficult to place particular cases, and the worth of the continuumwill only be shown if it is utilized by, and is useful to, researchers.

A brief examination of the development of the U.K. workfare systemover the past eighteen years in the context of our earlier discussions can be used to illustrate the use of the continuum and show how case studiescan be located in relation to it. In the mid-1980s the Thatcher govern-ment began facing mounting electoral pressures due to the rise in the

level of unemployment and Britain’s falling international competitive-ness in industrial output and education and training. The government’sinitial response was to adjust the unemployment statistics by develop-ing “make-work” programs. However, as it became apparent that thiswas not working they turned to policy transfer, initially developing theRestart program and opening Job Clubs. It should be clear that the impe-tus for turning to American welfare-to-work programs at this point wasa mix of voluntary and coercive forces. Certainly, the twin fears of losingthe next general election and of falling behind the international market

for jobs and products put pressure on the government to find solutions.The government had considerable autonomy as to both whether itresponded to such pressures and where it looked to for lessons. Over thecourse of the next ten years the Thatcher, Major and Blair governmentscontinued to borrow and implement various American-style workfarepolicies and programs, including: the Employment Training Scheme;Training and Enterprise Councils; the Job Seekers Allowance; and, mostrecently, the New Deals for 18–24 year olds, the long-term unemployedover 24 years of age and lone parents. Over this period, as unemploy-

ment statistics fell and the world economy transformed, the motivationunderpinning the borrowing of American policies and programs, andequally important the decision about which policies to borrow, altered.The coercive pressures decreased and voluntary factors became muchmore important. This can be seen in the Major government’s decisionto introduce the Job Seekers Allowance and the Blair government’s




decision to implement the American Earned Income Tax Credit, as theWorking Families Tax Credit (which falls as close to the purely rationalend of the continuum as a policy is ever likely to).

It should be stressed, though, that, while the motivation for trans-

ferring individual programs began to shift, the Blair government’s over-all motivations for continuing the Conservatives’ workfare policies stillreflected a response to perceived external coercive pressures. This isclearly illustrated in a speech to the Socialist Leaders’ Congress in Malmo,Sweden, 6 June 1997, in which Tony Blair argued that Britain needed toretain flexible labor market policies so that it would not be at a disadvan-tage in relation to the economic challenges presented by the “tiger econo-mies” of Southeast Asia.

As this review demonstrates, in order to understand policy transfer it is

necessary not only to see what was transferred but also to consider themotivations involved; the continuum helps in this task. First, the contin-uum demonstrates that generally it is not enough to examine transfer as if it were an all-or-nothing process. Rather, longitudinal studies are requiredto capture the shifting motivations involved. These studies illustratethat policies borrowed from other political systems, particularly when theyhave been borrowed in an attempt to transform an existing set of struc-tures, develop over time and that much of this development involves amixture of voluntary decisions and coercive pressures.

Second, in order to understand where a case falls upon the continuumit is important to identify the key actors because different actors will havedifferent motivations. So, as a general rule, it is probable that when politi-cians or policy entrepreneurs institute the process they will be doing itvoluntarily. While it will seldom be a completely voluntary or rationalprocess, it will be less coercive than if other actors institute the process.While politicians are likely to institute a search for new ideas voluntarily,when international organizations become involved in the process, it islikely to result in some form of coercive policy transfer. However, it

should be stressed that the particular activity in question must be under-stood. When aid agencies are making loans it is likely to lead to coercivepolicy transfer. At the same time, when these same organizations holdconferences or issue reports it is more likely to lead to a form of voluntarypolicy transfer.

Third, it should be clear that different policies and programs will natu-rally result from different motivations. For example, most of the pro-grams transferred in the development of the British workfare policy wereeither self-contained, such as Job Clubs, or could be established and con-

trolled by the government independently of outside actors or institutions,such as the Working Families Tax Credit. These types of policies are morelikely to be voluntarily transferred than those that depend upon outsideorganizations, particularly international organizations.




Finally, when policy transfer occurs it is likely to affect the motiva-tions of the actors engaging in the process. For example, if policy transferis undertaken during periods of social, political and economic stabilitywithin a nation such transfer is likely to be voluntary. However, if there is

some form of political crisis, then policy transfer is likely to have somecoercive elements. Equally, if there is some form of “global” crisis, such asthe economic downturn during the mid-1980s, actors are more likely tofeel some pressure to engage in transfer. This will also happen if there issome form of international movement toward an acceptable policy, suchas the global spread of privatization programs and workfare policies.Moreover, during wars, or in the immediate aftermath of a war, the losingpolitical system is more likely to have policies, programs and even insti-tutions imposed upon them from the outside; here the case of the imposi-

tion of a new constitution on Japan after World War II is illustrative.

POLICY TRANSFER AND POLICY FAILURE

While most studies of policy transfer concentrate upon success there is aneed to acknowledge that not all transfer is successful (for example, seeBennett 1992a; Dolowitz 1998; Rose 1991). In our view, it is important toexamine why some transfer is unsuccessful; that is, to identify whichfactors are related to successful or unsuccessful transfer. Obviously,

there is a problem with establishing what is “success” or “failure” andfuture research would need to acknowledge and address this problem(see Bovens and ’tHart 1998). However, at this stage, we shall restrictourselves to concentrating upon the extent to which policy transferachieves the aims set by a government when they engaged in transfer, oris perceived as a success by the key actors involved in the policy area.

In cases of lesson-drawing at least, governments borrow policies, insti-tutions, etc., with the expectation that this transfer will lead to policy “suc-cess” rather than policy “failure.” Of course, the underlying assumption is

that policies that have been successful in one country will be successful inanother. However, that is clearly not always the case. In particular, ourresearch suggests that at least three factors have a significant effect on pol-icy failure. First, the borrowing country may have insufficient informationabout the policy/institution and how it operates in the country from whichit is transferred: a process we call uninformed transfer. Second, althoughtransfer has occurred, crucial elements of what made the policy or institu-tional structure a success in the originating country may not be transferred,leading to failure: we call this incomplete transfer. Third, insufficient atten-

tion may be paid to the differences between the economic, social, politicaland ideological contexts in the transferring and the borrowing country: wecall this inappropriate transfer. We can illustrate these three processes by a brief consideration of the British Child Support Agency (CSA).

There were four key reasons the British government decided to trans-fer the structure of the CSA from the United States: The U.S. and Britain






the U.S. experience, then it is likely that the government would haverealized both some of the drawbacks of the Wisconsin system and howimportant the courts remained in the operation of the CSES in most U.S.states.

Incomplete Transfer: The Crucial Role of the Courts

The British government imposed the CSA into and over the preexistingsystem governing the granting and collection of child support mainte-nance. In particular, the legislation that established the CSA set asideprior court and DSS maintenance arrangements for those families fallingwithin the remit of the agency. This was bound to cause dissatisfaction,especially amongst couples who had agreed on their existing arrange-ments. More important, the agency replaced the courts and the DSS,

although this was not the case in either the United States or Australia. Indoing so, the Thatcher government failed to realize how important thecourts and the DSS were in serving as an escape valve for both the agencyand the individuals involved. For example, the agency had no discretionin the amount of child support an absent parent was required to pay.Moreover, the formula had to be used, even when couples had come to anequitable agreement within the courts. The impotence of the courts andthe DSS meant that individual circumstances could no longer be takenadequately into consideration. This problem was compounded by the

fact that, initially, the British formula, unlike that in the United States orAustralia, failed to take into account the actual circumstances of the indi-viduals involved. Overall, by failing to learn lessons from the U.S., thegovernment reduced the ability of individuals to comply with the settle-ments being imposed upon them by the CSA and increased the likelihoodthat all parties would be dissatisfied with the results of CSA decisions.

It should also be noted that in both the United States and Australia therevised child support enforcement systems were phased in so that anyproblems, particularly those involving discrepancies between the old and

new systems, could be reduced by making necessary changes. If the Brit-ish government had learned this lesson, instead of simply imposing theCSA immediately onto a preexisting system, the likelihood is that theCSA would have experienced fewer implementation problems.

Inappropriate Transfer: Different Values Lead to Different,Contradictory Aims

In developing the Child Support Agency the Thatcher government made

the agency’s prime objective the reduction in benefit expenditure on loneparents. This was part of the government’s overall strategy, inspired bytheir commitment to neo-liberalism, to reduce the PSBR by attackinggovernment spending, particularly in relation to welfare programs.Indeed, this emphasis was clear from the earliest days of the Conserva-tives’ interest in the American experience. This emphasis on the primacy






questions the model highlights concern either the characteristics of thetransfer or the reasons for the transfer. So, we ask two questions aboutthe characteristics of the transfer. What was transferred? What degree of transfer occurred? At the same time, we focus on three questions about

the reasons for transfer. Who transfers policy? Why is policy transferred?What factors constrain or facilitate policy transfer? However, as this arti-cle has clearly demonstrated, policy transfer is also a useful explanatoryvariable to explain policy outcomes.4

Let us be clear about what we are claiming. While the research pre-sented here certainly supports the position that policy transfer is a usefulexplanatory variable, it clearly doesn’t suggest that policy transfer is thesole explanation of any, let alone most, policy development. All we aresuggesting is that an increasing amount of policy development, and par-

ticularly policy change, in contemporary polities is affected by policytransfer. As such, when we are analyzing policy change we always needto ask the question: Is policy transfer involved?

Even our earlier brief consideration of the development of the Britishworkfare system and Child Support Agency indicates that it would beimpossible accurately to explain that development without recognizingthat a significant level of policy transfer was involved. In fact, it would beimpossible to understand the development of the British workfare poli-cies of both the Blair government and the previous Conservative ones

without appreciating the extent of the policy transfer from the UnitedStates involved (see Dolowitz 1997, 1998).

Thus, if governments are searching for policy solutions to new orchanging problems, then they are increasingly likely to look for “solu-tions” abroad. This is much easier than it was in the past because of the growth in all forms of communication; politicians and civil servantsfrom different countries now meet more frequently, in bilateral as well asmulti-lateral meetings. At the same time, policy entrepreneurs “sell” poli-cies around the world. International policy networks, advocacy coalitions

or epistemic communities develop and promote ideas. As such, there isno doubt that there is a great deal of transfer and that this transfer hasshaped policies. Certainly, when examining the development of policywe should always establish whether policy transfer has occurred.

Before concluding, however, it is important to stress that, as we sawin the last section, it is not inevitable that transfer will be successful. Assuch, while transfer may shape policy change, it may also lead to imple-mentation failure. This means that, even if we can regard policy transferas a key explanatory variable in the development of many policies, we

must also recognize that it is important to follow each policy through tosee whether uninformed, incomplete or inappropriate transfer leads topolicy failure.




Notes

1. For more information see: Thomas and Meyer, 1984, and DiMaggio andPowell, 1991.

2. For a much fuller defense of this framework see Dolowitz and Marsh, 1996.

3. Information relayed to the authors during a conference at the University of Manchester, 30 June 1997.4. While not the purpose of this article it should be stressed that the model of

policy transfer presented within this article can greatly expand our under-standing of the policy-making process. This signifies a potentially criticalturn in theories of public policy because it allows them to overcome theconfines of the rational-technocratic model which dominates the literatureassociated with both policy-making and policy transfer. Briefly, the ration-al conception of a policy process, involving rational actors pursuing cleargoals in the course of solving problems, does not reflect reality, and themodel, particularly the policy transfer continuum, helps illustrate and over-

come this limitation.

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Documents

Invatarea Si Transferul Dolowitz_Learning[1]