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PETER PAUL DIMATULAC AND VERONICA DIMATULAC, PETITIONERS VS. HON. SENSINANDO VILLON

Facts:

SP03 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Pampanga. A complaint for murder was filed in the MTC and after preliminary investigation, Judge Designate David issued warrants of arrest against the accused. Only David, Mandap, Magat, and Yambao were arrested and it was only Yambao who submitted his counter-affidavit.

Judge David then issued a resolution finding reasonable ground that the crime of murder has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Though it was not clear whether Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Alfonso-Flores acted motu proprio, or upon motion of the private respondents, she conducted a reinvestigation and resolved that the Yabuts and Danny were in conspiracy, along with the other accused, and committed homicide.

Before the information for homicide was filed, the Petitioner appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of Justice. However, Provincial Proseutor Maranag ordered for the release of David, Mandap, Magat, and Naguit. An information for homicide was also filed before the Regional Trial Court. Judge Raura approved the cash bonds of the Yabuts and recalled the warrants of arrest against them.

Private Prosecutor Amado Valdez then filed a Motion to issue hold departure order and Urgent Motion to defer proceedings. Judge Roura deferred the resolution of the first Motion and denied the second. He also set the arraignment of the accused. The petitioners filed a Motion to inhibit Judge Roura for hastily setting the date for arraignment pending the appeal in the DOJ and for prejudging the matter.

They also filed a Petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals. Public Prosecutor Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment with the trial court and opposed the inhibition of Roura. He also stated that he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate. Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and was replaced by Judge Villon.The Petitioners filed with the RTC a Manifestation submitting documentary evidence to support their contention that the offense committed was murder. Judge Villon ordered for the resetting of the arraignment. The Yabuts entered a plea of not guilty. The petitioners then filed a Urgent Motion to set aside arraignment. Secretary Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of the petitioners. He also ruled that treachery was present.

The Yabuts opposed the Manifestation because they have already been arraigned and they would be put under double jeopardy. The Secretary of Justice then set aside his order and the appeal was held not and academic due to the previous arraignment of the accused for homicide. Judge Villon denied the Motion to set aside arraignment. The motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari/prohibition and mandamus.

Issues:

Whether the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion in reinvestigating the case without having the respondents within the custody of the law and for filing the information pending the appeal of the resolution with the DOJ.

Whether Hon. Villon acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with the arraignment and for denying the Motions to set aside the arraignment.

Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering his order.

Decision:

Petition is GRANTED.

Alfonso-Reyes was guilty of having acted with grave abuse of discretion for conducting a reinvestigation despite the fact that the Yabuts were still at large. Though Sec. 5, Rule 112 states that the prosecutor is not bound by the findings of the judge who conducted the investigation, the resolution should be based on the review of the record and evidence transmitted. Hence, she should have sustained the recommendation since all the accused, except Yambao, failed to file their counter-affidavits. It is impossible for Alfonso-Reyes to not have known the appeal filed with the DOJ. The filing of an appeal is provided in Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the filing of an appeal once an information is filed.

Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion for deferring the resolution to the motion for a hold departure order. Since the accused were out on bail, the Motion should have been granted since they could have easily fled. Though he is not bound to the resolution of the DOJ, he should have perused the documents submitted.

The DOJ was also in grave abuse of its discretion for setting aside its order. In doing so, it has relinquished its power of control and supervision of the Public Prosecutor. The state has been deprived of due process. Hence, the dismissal of the case is null and void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.ANTONIO ENRIQUE, JR.

FACTS:

An Information was file against Antonio Enrique stating that not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver five (5) sticks of marijuana cigarettes, as prohibited drug, to one Patrolman DaniloNatividad, a member of the Integrated National Police (INP) and assigned with the 2nd Narcotics Regional Unit, Narcotics Command, who was then posing as a buyer of the said prohibited drug for the consideration of TEN (P10.00) PESOS

Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged. The trial court then found Enrique, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

In this appeal, the accused-appellant vigorously insists in his innocence. He asserts that the arresting officers did not confiscate sticks of marijuana or any marked money from him and that evidences obtained from him should have not been admitted by the trial court since there was no confiscation receipt shown and were erroneous because the same were taken during custodial investigation, therefore, violative of the constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused is guilty despite his arguments regarding the inadmissibility of evidences against him

HELD:

Yes.

Appellant completely misses the whole point of his prosecution and ultimate conviction under RA 6425. He was caughtin flagrante delictoselling marijuana cigarettes to a poseur-buyer in exchange for money. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of marijuana requires merely the consummation of the selling transaction. The serial number of the marked money need not even be stated in the information. The non-presentation of the marked money at the trial is not indispensable to the conviction of the accused-appellant. What is important is the fact that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the appellant and that the said cigarettes were presented in court as evidence. Having been caught in the act of selling a prohibited drug, appellant's arrest was lawful. Hence, whatever is found in the accused-appellant's possession or in his control may be seized and used in evidence against him.

We hold that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused-appellant. The evidence on record has fully established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED subject to the modification as above-indicated.

TAN JR. V. GALLARDO(RULE 110)

FACTS:This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari with Prohibition; petitioners seek the annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in 2 Criminal Cases.

By Resolution of this Court dated August 27, 1975, the respondent Judge was required to file his answer within ten (10) days from notice, and in connection therewith, a temporary restraining order was issued to enjoin the respondent from further proceeding with the afore-mentioned criminal cases.

The petition was subsequently amended to include the People of the Philippines and thereafter, on January 14, 1976, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the petition. The Solicitor General informed this Court, thus: that they are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice and, therefore, the case should he remanded to the trial court for the rendition of a new decision.

On January 30, 1976, private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge BUT objected to the remand of said cases.

On February 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of the private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no standing in the instant proceedings before this Honorable Court and, hence, without any personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal.

The private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to adopt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor General.

ISSUE:Do the private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter in the present proceedings?

HELD:NO, To begin with, it will be noted that the participation of the private prosecution in the instant case was delimited by the SC in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings that may be required by this Court." To collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the Solicitor General.

The prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.

The role of the private prosecutors, upon the other hand, is to represent the offended parts, with respect to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense.

Therefore, although the private prosecutors may be permitted to intervene, they are not in control of the case, and their interests are subordinate to those of the People of the Philippines represented by the fiscal.

STA. ROSA MINING V. ZABALA (RULE 110)

FACTS:Petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property against private respondents Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of CamarinesNorte, then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.

After conducting the preliminary investigation, a resolution recommending that an information for Attempted Theft be filed against private respondents on a finding of prima facie case which resolution was approved by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre.

On October 29, 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance of CamarinesNorte an Information dated October 17, 1987 docketed as Criminal Case No. 821, charging private respondents with the crime of Attempted Theft.

In a letter dated October 22, 1974, the private respondents requested the Secretary of Justice for a review of the Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated August 26, 1974 and October 14, 1974.

On March 6, 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the records, reversed the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting officer to immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner sought reconsideration of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the same in a letter dated June 11, 1975.

A motion to dismiss dated September 16, 1975 was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal but the court denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima facie evidence against private respondents and set the case for trial on February 25, 1976.

Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the Court of First Instance of Albay and respondent Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of CamarinesNorte.

On April 19, 1976, respondent Fiscal filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the case. This second motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in an order dated April 23, 1976. Whereupon, respondent fiscal manifested that he would not prosecute the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor to appear therein. Hence, this petition for mandamus.

ISSUE:Should the Criminal Case be terminated on a motion filed by the prosecutor upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation, after an information has been filed to the court?

HELD:No, the rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.

The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

JOHN LONEY V. PEOPLE (RULE 110)

FACTS:Petitioners John Eric Loney, Steven Paul Reid, and Pedro B. Hernandez are the President and Chief Executive Officer, Senior Manager, and Resident Manager for Mining Operations, respectively, of Marcopper Mining Corporation (Marcopper), a corporation engaged in mining in the province of Marinduque.

Marcopper had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit in Mt. Tapian, Marinduque. At the base of the pit ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Boac and Makalupnit rivers. It appears that Marcopper had placed a concrete plug at the tunnels end. On 24 March 1994, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels end. In a few days, the Mt. Tapian pit had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Boac and Makalupnit rivers.

In August 1996, the Department of Justice separately charged petitioners in the Municipal Trial Court of Boac, Marinduque (MTC) with violation of the ff.: Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) National Pollution Control Decree of 1976 (PD 984) Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (RA 7942); and Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property.

Petitioners moved to quash the Informations among others that the informations were duplicitous as the Department of Justice charged more than one offense for a single act.

The MTC granted a partial reconsideration to its Joint Order and quashing the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984. The MTC maintained the Informations for violation of RA 7942 and Article 365 of the RPC.

The RTC, set aside the Consolidated Order in so far as it quashed the Informations for violation of PD 1067 and PD 984 and ordered those charges reinstated by reason that there can be no absorption by one offense of the three other offenses, as the acts penalized by these laws are separate and distinct from each other.

The CA, affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:Should the charges filed against petitioners, except one, be quashed for duplicity of charges and only the charge for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property should stand?

HELD:No Duplicity of Charges in the Present Case. Duplicity of charges simply means a single complaint or information charges more than one offense, as Section 13 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states:

Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.

In short, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one offense.

Under Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, duplicity of offenses in single information is a ground to quash the Information. The Rules prohibit the filing of such Information to avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense. Here, however, the prosecution charged each petitioner with four offenses, with each Information charging only one offense. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a ground to quash the Informations. On this score alone, the petition deserves outright denial.

Petitioners further contend that they should be charged with one offense only Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property because (1) all the charges filed against them proceed from and are based on a single act or incident of polluting the Boac and Makalupnit rivers thru dumping of mine tailings and (2) the charge for violation of Article 365 of the RPC absorbs the other charges since the element of lack of necessary or adequate protection, negligence, recklessness and imprudence is common among them.

The contention has no merit. As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.

Here, double jeopardy is not at issue because not all of its elements are present. However, for the limited purpose of controverting petitioners claim that they should be charged with one offense only, we quote with approval Branch 94s comparative analysis of PD 1067, PD 984, RA 7942, and Article 365 of the RPC showing that in each of these laws on which petitioners were charged, there is one essential element not required of the others.

PEOPLE V. TUMLOS(RULE 110)

FACTS:On or about November 21, 1937, eight cows belonging to MaximianoSobrevega and five belonging to his son-in-law, AmbrosioPecasis, then grazing together in the barrio of Libong-cogon, municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo, were taken by the herein defendant without the knowledge or consent of their respective owners.

The deputy fiscal of Iloilo filed on July 11, 1938, an information against the said defendant for the offense of theft of the eight cows belonging to MaximianoSobrevega, which resulted in his being sentenced on July 15, 1938, to an indeterminate penalty with the accessories prescribed by law and costs.

In the information filed in the present case the same defendant is charged with the theft of five cows belonging to AmbrosioPecasis, committed on November 21, 1937, the date of the commission of the theft to the eight cows of MaximianoSobrevega charged to the previous information.

In support of his appeal the appellant assigns as the only error allegedly committed by the lower court in the aforesaid judgment its failure to sustain the defense of "autrefois convict" or double jeopardy, interposed by said defendant.

ISSUE:Was there double jeopardy in the case at bar?

HELD:Yes, the theft of the thirteen cows committed by the defendant took place at the same time and in the same place; consequently, he performed but one act. The fact that eight of said cows pertained to one owner and five to another does not make him criminally liable for two distinct offenses, for the reason that in such case the act must be divided into two, which act is not susceptible of division.

The intention was likewise one, namely, to take for the purpose of appropriating or selling the thirteen cows which he found grazing in the same place. As neither the intention nor the criminal act is susceptible of division, the offense arising from the concurrence of its two constituent elements cannot be divided, it being immaterial that the subject matter of the offense is singular or plural, because whether said subject matter be one or several animate or inanimate objects, it is but one.

Therefore, as the five cows alleged to be stolen by Irineo Tumlos were integral parts of the thirteen cows which were the subject matter of theft, and as he had already been tried for and convicted of the theft of the other five.

JARANTILLA V. CA (RULE 111)

FACTS:The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped by a vehicle which was then driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla and that private respondent sustained physical injuries as a consequence.

Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. Private respondent, as the complaining witness therein, did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor. Petitioner was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt".

On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and which civil action involved the same subject matter and act complained of in the criminal case.

In his answer filed therein, the petitioner alleged as special and affirmative defense that the private respondent had no cause of action and, additionally, that the latter's cause of action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment in the criminal case inasmuch as when said criminal case was instituted the civil liability was also deemed instituted since therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively participated in the criminal case.

After trial, the CFI rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the herein private respondent and ordering herein petitioner to pay the former for the hospitalization, medicines, for other actual expenses, for moral damages, for attorney's fees, and costs.

The respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court and a motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent court.

ISSUE:Can the private respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal action for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and who participated in the prosecution thereof without reserving the civil action arising from the act or omission complained of, file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal?

HELD:Yes, although it was held that where the offended party elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through her intervention as a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the subsequent civil action based upon the same cause.

In the case under consideration, private respondent participated and intervened in the prosecution of the criminal suit against petitioner. Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronouncement on the civil liability of the accused and the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil action after such acquittal. This is allowed under Article 29 of the Civil Code.

Thus, when the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence.

Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable.

DAVID B. CAMPANANO, JR. vs. JOSE ANTONIO A. DATUINFACTS:

Seishin International Corporation, represented by its president-herein petitioner David B. Campanano, Jr. filed against respondent. An Information for violation ofB.P. Blg.22. respondent was convicted of Estafa by the Regional Trial Court, of Pasig City by Decision of May 3, 1999. Meanwhile, sometime in July 15, 2003when he vacated his office,found the cash voucher evidencing his cash payment of the two (2)road rollers, Sakai brand, which he purchased from Mr. Yasonobu Hirota, representing Seishin International Corporation, in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos. The cash voucher was dated June 28, 1993, and it was signed by respondent and Mr. Hirota.

Claiming that the complaint of Seishin International Corporation against him was false, unfounded and malicious respondent filed a complaint for Incriminating Against Innocent Persons, before the Office of the City Prosecutor ofQuezon cityagainst petitioner and a certain Yasunobu Hirota.

In filing the complaint for Estafa - fully knowing that it was baseless and without factual or legal basis, according to respondentMr. Campanano, Jr. and Mr. Hirota should be criminally liable for the crime of Incriminating Innocent Persons punishable under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code.

By Resolution of January 20, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon Citydismissed respondent's complaint for incriminating innocent personIt appearing that the case of estafa was filed in Pasig City , and the testimony given by respondent David Campano, Jr. was also made in Pasig City , this office hasno jurisdictionon the above-entitled complainant.ISSUE:

Whetherthe City prosecutor of Quezon City has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the respondent

HELD:

It is doctrinal that in criminal cases, venue is an essential element of jurisdiction;and that the jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.

The complaint-affidavit for incriminating innocent person filed by respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City on August 28, 2003 does not allege that the crime charged or any of its essential ingredients was committed in Quezon City . The only reference to Quezon City in the complaint-affidavit is that it is where respondent resides.Respondent's complaint-affidavit was thus properly dismissed by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City for lack of jurisdiction

The Court of Appeals' conclusion-basis of its reversal of the DOJ Resolutions that since petitioner's November 20, 2003 Counter-Affidavitto respondent's complaint for incriminating innocent person was executed in Quezon City, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City had acquired jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of the case is thus erroneous.In any event, the allegations in the complaint-affidavit do not make out a clear probable cause of incriminating innocent person under Article 363 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petition isGranted. The Court of Appeals Decision of December 9, 2005 isReversedand set aside. The complaint of respondent for Incriminating Innocent Person filed against petitionerDavid Campamano,Jr.isDismissed

ERNESTO M. FULLERO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:

In 1977, petitioner was employed as a telegraph operator at the Bureau of Telecommunications Office in Iriga City. In 1982, he became the Acting Chief Operator of the same office until 1994. A Personal Data Sheet (PDS) purportedly accomplished and signed by petitioner, states that he passed the Civil Engineering Board Examination. It appears that he submitted the PDS to the Bureau of Telecommunications Regional Office, Legazpi City (BTO, Legazpi City). A letter dated and signed by petitioner shows that he applied for the position of either a Junior Telecommunications Engineer or Telecommunications Traffic Supervisor with the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Region 5, Legazpi City. Upon inquiry made by Florenda B. Magistrado, a subordinate of petitioner in the BTO, Iriga City, with the PRC, it was verified that petitioner never passed the board examination for civil engineering and that petitioners name does not appear in the book of registration for civil engineers.

Petitioner denied executing and submitting the subject PDS containing the statement that he passed the board examination for civil engineering. He likewise disowned the signature and thumb mark appearing therein. He claimed that the stroke of the signature appearing in the PDS differs from the stroke of his genuine signature.He added that the letters contained in the PDS he accomplished and submitted were typewritten in capital letters since his typewriter does not have small letters. As such, the subject PDS could not be his because it had both small and capital typewritten letters. He further argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try him there being no evidence that the alleged falsification took place in Legazpi City.

After trial, the Legazpi City RTC rendered a Decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime of falsification. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the assailed Legazpi City RTC Decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC of Legazpi City has jurisdiction over the case

HELD:There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can acquire jurisdiction over criminal cases.First, the court must have jurisdiction over the offense or the subject matter.Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was committed. Andthird, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused.There is no dispute that the Legazpi City RTC has jurisdiction over the offense and over the person of petitioner. It is the territorial jurisdiction of the Legazpi City RTC which the petitioner impugns.The territorial jurisdiction of a court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint or information as regards the place where the offense charged was committed.It should also be emphasized that where some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province or city and some in another, the court of either province or city has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the court first taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others.In the case at bar, the information specifically and positively alleges that the falsification was committed in Legazpi City. Moreover, the testimonies and documentary evidence for the prosecution have sufficiently established that petitioner accomplished and thereafter submitted the PDS to the BTO, Legazpi City. The foregoing circumstances clearly placed thelocus criminisin Legazpi City and not in Iriga City.

ANTONIO MAGO and DANILO MACASINAG vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ROLANDO ASIS and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITYNATURE:This is an appeal bycertiorari. Petitioners pray for reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appealsaffirming the Orders of the RTC, denying their Motion to Intervene and Petition for Relief from Judgment in Civil Case Rolando Asis v. National Housing Authority.FACTS:Private respondent Rolando Asis filed with the RTC of Quezon City a Petition against public respondent NHA to prevent it from acting upon the recommendation for cancellation of the award in his favor and the lot be subdivided into two, one to him and the other to Antonio Mago and Danilo Macasinag as co-owners.This case relates to an erroneous award by the NHA of a parcel of land belonging to Francisco Mago, petitioner Antonio Magos predecessor-in-interest, to Asis. Francisco Mago complained to the NHA which acknowledged its mistake. As a result, the parties agreed on a Kasunduan ng Paghahati ng Lote, whereby the lot will be divided into two and split between petitioner Antonio Mago (to whom Francisco Mago sold his interest over the land) and respondent Asis. However, the NHA later, ironically executed a Deed of Sale with Mortgage over the land in favor of Asis. Antonio Mago again complained to the NHA and sued Asis in civil case for recovery of possession and damages. NHA eventually came up with the abovementioned Resolution.

The RTC dismissed Asiss petition in view of the NHAs admission and recognition of Asiss title to the land. 69 days after they learned of the above order, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and a Petition for Relief from Judgment/Order. RTC denied the motion and the petition. CA sustained the trial court and held that while the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of cases, the rules on reglementary periods must be strictly construed against the filer or pleader to prevent needless delays.

Applicable Law

Under Sec. 2, Rule 12, of the Rules of Court, a person may, before or during a trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.8As for the Petilion for Relief from Judgment/Order, the same was filed sixty-nine (69) days after movants learned of the order, or beyond the reglementary period of sixty (60) days from notice of judgment, under Sec. 3, Rule 38, of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES: 1. Whether petitioners shall be allowed to intervene.

2. Whether petitioners Petition for Relief from Judgment should be heard.

HELD: 1. YES. Under Sec 2, Rule 2, a person may, before or during trial, be permitted to intervene if:a. He has a legal interest in the matter under litigation; orb. He has a legal interest in the success of either parties or an interest against both; orc. When he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in custody of the court or an officer thereof.

In this case, petitioners motion for intervention was, admittedly, filed after the disputed order has become final. However, it must be noted that petitioners were unaware of the proceedings in the case between Asis and NHA. They were never impleaded therein. Worse, they were led into believing that all was well, by virtue of the Kasunduan. Asis acted in bad faith when he accepted the award erroneously made to him by NHA knowing full well that there was a previous perfected agreement between him and petitioners. NHA itself even admitted its mistake in one of its comments in the case between it and Asis.The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows that the intention of Rules was to give the court full discretion in permitting or disallowing the same. However, this discretion must be exercised judiciously and only after consideration of all the circumstances obtaining in the case. In this case, the lower courts only considered the technicalities, which worked injustice on the part of the plaintiffs. Therefore, petitioners Motion to Intervene should be granted.

2. YES. The time of filing said petition must satisfy both periods as indicated in the Ruleswithin 60 days after knowledge of order and not more than 6 months after entry. A few days in excess of the 60-day requirement is not fatal as long as it is filed within 6 months from issuance of the order. In this case, the petition was 9 days late of the 60-day deadline but still within the 6 month period.PRINCIPLE:Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides "these rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding," but jurisprudence qualifies it by enunciating the principle that rules on reglementary periods must be strictly construed against the filer or pleader to prevent needless delays.But it is apparent that the courtsa quoonly considered the technicalities of the rules on intervention and of the petition for relief from judgment. The denial of their motion to intervene arising from the strict application of the rule was an injustice to petitioners whose substantial interest in the subject property-cannot be disputed. We need not belabor the point that petitioners are indeed indispensable parties with such an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made in their absence without affecting, any injuring, and such interest.

THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY vs.THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL

NATURE:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac dismissing the action before it on motion of the plaintiff upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the controversy.

FACTS:

The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in the Court of First Instance of the province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real estate. After the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff took possession of the lands described therein, building its line, stations and terminals and put the same in operation. Commissioners were appointed to appraise the value of the lands so taken. They held several sessions, took a considerable amount of evidence, and finally made their report. After the said report had been made and fled with the court, the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that on a certain date it would make a motion to the court to dismiss action, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, having been recently ascertained by the plaintiff that the lands sought to be condemned were situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija instead of the Province of Tarlac as alleged in the complaint.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of one province has the power and authority to take cognizance of an action by a railroad company for the condemnation of real estate located in another province.

HELD:

The court holds that the terms of section 377 providing that actions affecting real property shall be brought in the province where the land involved in the suit, or some part thereof, is located, do not affect the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over the land itself but relate simply to the personal rights of parties as to the place of trial. They are of the opinion that what as they have said in the discussion of the effect of section 377 relative to the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over lands is applicable generally to the sections of law just quoted. The provisions regarding the place and method of trial are procedural. They touched not the authority of the court over thelandbut, rather, the powers which it may exercise over theparties. They relate not to the jurisdictional power of the court over the subject matter but to theplace wherethat jurisdiction is to be exercised. In other words, the jurisdiction is assured, whatever the place of its exercise. The jurisdiction is thething; the place of exercise its incident.

The principles which we have herein laid down we do not apply to criminal cases. They seem to rest on a different footing. There the people of the state are a party. The interests of the public require that, to secure the best results and effects in the punishment of crime, it is necessary to prosecute and punish the criminal in the very place, as near as may be, where he committed his crime. As a result it has been the uniform legislation, both in statutes and in constitutions, that the venue of a criminal action must be laid in the place where the crime was committed. While the laws here do not specifically and in terms require it, we believe it is the established custom and the uniform holding that criminal prosecutions must be brought and conducted, except in cases especially provided by law, in the province where the crime is committed.For these reasons the judgment below must be reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court with direction to proceed with the action according to law.

PEOPLE v MONTENEGRO

NATUREPetition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order

FACTS- The City Fiscal of Quezon City, thru Assistant Fiscal Virginia G. Valdez, filed an Information for "Robbery" before the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Antonio Cimarra, Ulpiano Villar, Bayani Catindig and Avelino de Leon. Said accused (now private respondents) were all members of the police force of Quezon City and were charged as accessories-after-the-fact in the robbery committed by the minor Ricardo Cabaloza, who had already pleaded guilty and had been convicted in a crimial case before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City. Ricardo Cabaloza was convicted for the robbery of the same items, articles and pieces of jewelry belonging to Ding Velayo, Inc. valued at P75,591.40.

- Upon arraignment, all of the accused (now private respondents) entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge filed against them.

- However, before the trial could proceed, the prosecuting fiscal filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information seeking to amend the original information by: (1) changing the offense charged from "Robbery" to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place," (2) alleging conspiracy among all the accused, and (3) deleting all items, articles and pieces of jewelry alleged to have been stolen in the original Information and substituting them with a different set of items valued at P71,336.80.

- Private respondents opposed the admission of the Amended Information. The respondent court resolved to deny the proposed amendments contained in the Amended Information. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the respondent court denied said motion; hence, this petition.

ISSUEWON the amended information should be admitted

HELD- Amendment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (formerly, Section 13, Rule 110 of the old Rules on Criminal Procedure) may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge. Thereafter and during the trial, amendments to the information may also be allowed, as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused.

- The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime.

- The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the instant case, are clearly substantial and have the effect of changing the crime charged from "Robbery" punishable under Article 209 to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place" punishable under Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby exposing the private respondents-accused to a higher penalty as compared to the penalty imposable for the offense charged in the original information to which the accused had already entered a plea of "not guilty" during their arraignment.- Moreover, the change in the items, articles and pieces of jewelry allegedly stolen into entirely different articles from those originally complained of, affects the essence of the imputed crime, and would deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in the amended information, in the preparation of their defenses to the charge filed against them. It will be observed that private respondents were accused as accessories-after-the-fact of the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in the original information. To charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime different from that committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by the Court.

- The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was not previously included in the original information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court. To allow at this stage the proposed amendment alleging conspiracy among all the accused, will make all of the latter liable not only for their own individual transgressions or acts but also for the acts of their co-conspirators.

Dispositive Petition is DISMISSED. Orders of the respondent court AFFIRMED. TRO lifted.

ELCANO V HILL

FACTS:Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.

ISSUE: Whether Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a matter of equity.

PEOPLE VS NAZARENO

Facts:Accused-appellants Narciso Nazareno and Ramil Regala were found by the trial court guilty of murder. However, on appeal, Ramil Regala contends that the failure of the prosecution to investigate Rey Taling, his alleged companion and Mang Doming, Mang Romy, and Nick Pealosa, as those who supplied the guns, raises doubt as to accused-appellants guilt.

Issue: WON Regalas contention is meritorious

HELD:The manner by which the prosecution of a case is handled is within the sound discretion of the prosecutor and the non-inclusion of other guilty parties is irrelevant to the case against an accused.

PEOPLE V RAMOS

Facts:Accused was charged with rape in its simple form, that is, having carnal knowledge of a woman by using force or intimidation, with the additional allegation that the victim was only 14 years of age at the time of the incident. However, the information failed to allege that the victim was his daughter. The relationship between the accused and the victim, was not laid down in the information. Despite this, the trial court convicted the accused with qualified rape with death as punishment.

Issue: Whether the trial court could hold the accused guilty of qualified rape.Held: No. As this qualifying circumstance was not pleaded in the information or in the complaint against appellant, he cannot be convicted of qualified rape because he was not properly informed that he is being accused of qualified rape.The Constitution guarantees the right of every person accused in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.This right finds amplification and implementation in the different provisions of the Rules of Court.Foremost among these enabling provisions is the office of an information. The facts stated in the body of the information determine the crime of which the accused stands charged and for which he must be tried.This recital of the essentials of a crime delineate the nature and cause of accusation against an accused. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be alleged in the complaint or information.The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be set out in an information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.An accused person cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that with which he is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried.It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried or is necessarily included therein.He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial.To convict an accused of a higher offense than that charged in the complaintor information on which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right.

SANTIAGO VS GARCHITORENANature:This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First division) and to declare Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from acting in said criminal case; and (b) the Resolution of said court promulgated onMarch 14, 1993, which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner.Facts:Santiago was charged by the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program. Santiago later on filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed.Petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena. The Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992. Subsequently she filed for a motion for a bill of particulars. The motion stated that while the information alleged that petitioner had approved the application or legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial. Consequently, although at the hearing where the prosecution stated categorically that they would file only one amended information, the prosecution filed a motion to admit the 32 Amended Information.

Issue: Whether or not there should only be one information to be filed against petitioner.Held: Yes, because it was a continued crime. Sc found that there is only one crime, hence there should only be one information. According to CuelloCalon, for delitocontinuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose. According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delitocontinuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152). Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).Applying the concept of delitocontinuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the following cases:(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the same time and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939] ).(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974] ).(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437 [1926] ).(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out of said benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). The collection of the legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under the same criminal impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The said acts were committed on two different occasions.(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications to conceal said offenses committed in August and October 1936. The malversations and falsifications "were not the result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354 [1938] ).(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the collector to turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from customers of the employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was legalized. The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.

PEOPLE VS. HONORABLE MIDPANTAO L. ADIL

FACTS:A criminal complaint (Case No. 3335) was first filed against respondent Margarito Fama alleged to have willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack and use personal violence upon one Miguel Viajar by then hurling the latter with a stone, hitting him in the right cheek, thereby inflicting physical injuries which would have required and will require medical attendance for a period from 5 to 9 days. Arraigned on July 7, 1975, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.

Meanwhile, complainant Viajar filed a letter-complaint (Case No. 5241) with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo chargingagainst same respondent arising from the same incident alleged in above Criminal Case No. 3335. Same accusations were made except for an allegation of hitting Viajar on the lower right eye which would heal from five (5) to nine (9) days barring complications but leaving a permanent scar and deforming on the right face.

Respondent Fama filed an urgent motion to defer proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5241, claiming that since he was already charged and pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 3335, he would be in double jeopardy, if Case No. 5241 were to be prosecuted. This motion was opposed by the Fiscal and the Court required both parties to file their respective memorandum on the issue of double jeopardy. In the meantime, the Fiscal after filing Case No. 5241, sought the dismissal of Case No. 3335, but the Municipal Court did not act on said motion. Instead, the case was set for hearing and was thereafter dismissed.

ISSUE:Whether or not the additional allegation of deformity in the information in Case No. 5241 constitutes a supervening element which should take this case outas one not of double jeopardy

HELD:The Court said No finding was made in the first examination that the injuries had caused deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand. As nothing was mentioned in the first medical certificate about the deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand, we presumed that such fact was not apparent or could have been discernible at the time the first examination was made. The course (not the length) of the healing of an injury may not be determined before hand; it can only be definitely known after the period of healing has ended. That is the reason why the court considered that there was a supervening fact occurring since the filing of the original information.In other words, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the plea of double jeopardy of private respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold. It was, therefore, a grave error correctible by certiorari for respondent court to have dismissed Criminal Case No. 5241.

PEOPLE VS MARIANO

FACTS:

The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an Informationagainst herein Private respondent Hermogenes Mariano accusing him of estafa for allegedly to have wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with grave abuse of confidence and with deceit, misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefits the items he received valued at $717.50 or P4,797.35, belonging to the USAID/NEC. Mariano has the duty of making delivery of said items to the said Municipal Mayor, but, in spite of repeated demands he failed to comply with his obligation. Respondent was appointed as Liaison Officer by the then incumbent Municipal Mayor, Constantino Nolasco, acting for and in behalf of the municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.

Mariano filed a motion to quash the Information on the ground, among others, that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction of the offense charged or of the person of the defendant. In his motion, he claimed that the items which were the subject matter of the Information were the same items for which Mayor Nolasco was indicted before a Military Commission under a charge of malversation of public property, and for which he had been found guilty. Inasmuch as the case against Mayor Nolasco had already been decided by the Military Tribunal, the CFI of Bulacan had lost jurisdiction over the case against him. The respondent Judge Geraldez granted the motion.

ISSUE:

Whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the offense ofestafaof goods valued at not more than six thousand pesos and allegedly committed by a civilian.

HELD:

"Jurisdiction" is the basic foundation of judicial proceedings.The word "jurisdiction" is derived from two Latin words "juris" and "dico" "I speak by the law" which means fundamentally the power or capacity given by the law to a court or tribunal to entertain, hear, and determine certain controversies. "Criminal Jurisdiction" is necessarily the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it.

SEC. 44. Original jurisdiction. Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction: xxx xxx xxx (f) In all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos, (emphasis supplied)

The offense ofestafacharged against respondent Mariano is penalized witharresto mayorin its maximum period toprision correccionalin its minimum period, or imprisonment from four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.By reason of the penalty imposed which exceeds six (6) months imprisonment, the offense alleged to have been committed by the accused, now respondent, Mariano, falls under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance.

Estafa and malversation are two separate and distinct offenses and in the case, the accused in one is different from the accused in the other. But more fundamental is the fact that the court does not have here a situation involving two tribunals vested with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime so as to apply the rule that the court or tribunal which first takes cognizance of the case acquires jurisdiction thereof exclusive of the other.The Military Commission as stated earlier is without power or authority to hear and determine the particular offense charged against respondent Mariano, hence, there is no concurrent jurisdiction between it and respondent court to speak of.

PEOPLE VS OLARTEFACTS:Defendant Olarte was charged with libel. It is alleged in the information that it was committed on or about the 24th day of February, 1954 against Ms. Meris. A complaint was filed on Feb 22, 1956 where dependant Olarte waived her right to Preliminary Investigation. The information was filed on July 3, 1956. Defendant moved to quash the information on the ground of that the offense charge prescribed which was dismissed by the CFI on the ground that the filing of the complaint interrupt the running of prescription. Defendant, citing the case of People vs. Coquia, argued that it is the date of the filing of the information that should be taken in determining prescription and not the filing of the complaint.

ISSUE:Whether or not filing of the complaint interrupt the running of prescription.HELD:

This Court has reexamined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.Considering the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby overrules the doctrine of the cases ofPeople vs. Del RosarioL-15140, December 29, 1960; andPeople vs. Coquia, L-15456, promulgated June 29, 1963.Having been finally decided in the previous appeal that the criminal action here was not barred, the issue of prescription is utterly foreclosed, and all that remains is to try and decide the case on the merits. It is expected that it will be done with the utmost dispatch, this case having been already pending for many years.

ISABELITA REODICA vs. COURT OF APPEALSFACTS:

On the evening of 17 October 1987, Petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doa Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00. Thus, on 20 October 1987, complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint against petitioner with the Fiscal's Office. Later, on 13 January 1988, an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati charging petitioner with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury." Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.

RULING OF RTC:The RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decisionconvicting petitioner of the "quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries," and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months ofarresto mayor, and to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen P13,542, representing the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses (P5,000.00) without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals

RULING OF COURT OF APPEALS:Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, where:Now that an acquittal seems impossible, may we revisit the penalty and move that it be reviewed and set aside since it is respectfully submitted to be error to complex damage to property and slight physical injuries, as both are light offenses, over which the respondent court had no jurisdiction and even assuming such jurisdiction, it cannot impose a penalty in excess of what is authorized by law.CA denied. Hence, this petitions before the Supreme Court for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the respondent court of appeals gravely abused its discretion when it complexed the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and slight physical injuries imposing a single excessive penalty

2. Whether or not the respondent court of appeals gravely erred when it affirmed the trial court's decision notwithstanding the defense of prescription and lack of jurisdiction.

3. Whether or not the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.

HELD:1. In the instant case, following the ruling in theTurlacase, the offense oflesiones levesthrough reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information.Reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law carrying the penalty of arresto menoror a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower thanarresto menor, it follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony.On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier discussed, penalized witharresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods. Sincearresto mayoris a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, thequasioffense in question is a less grave felony not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and thelight felonyof reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.

2. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over the Quasi Offenses in Question.

The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment.The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. Since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower thanarresto menorunder the graduated scale in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty therefor wasarresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods the duration of which was from 1 month and 1 day to 4 months.Therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC of Makati.Prescription of the Quasi Offenses in Question.Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty isarresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, andshall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint of information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.

In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof shall apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for thequasioffenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.

3. FollowingLontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that thequasioffense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the information,i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information.

Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO VS OMBUDSMANFACTS:An information was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The order of arrest was issued with bail for release fixed at Php. 15,000 so she filed a motion for acceptance of cash bail bond. On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution authorizing the petitioner to post cash bond which the later filed in the amount of Php.15, 000. Her arraignment was set, but petitioner asked for the cancellation of her bail bond and that she be allowed provisional release on recognizance. The Sandiganbayan deferred it. The Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure order against petitioner, by reason of the announcement she made that she would be leaving for the U.S. to accept a fellowship a Harvard. In the instant motion submitted for our resolution, petitioner argues among others that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner. He initially postulates that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over her person considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court.ISSUE:Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner

HELD:It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction there over, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether respondent court acquired jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and, correlatively, whether there was a valid posting of bail bond.We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "UrgentEx-parteMotion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR VS. HON. JOB B. MADAYAGFACTS:Petitioner was originally charged in an informationfor the crime of frustrated murder allegedly committed while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have caused her death. But it did not produce it by reason of cause or causes independent of her will, that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered which prevented her death.After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died. Consequently, private prosecutor filed an omnibus motionfor leave of court to file amended information to change the same from frustrated murder to consummated murder. At the scheduled arraignment, petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information for lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. When petitioner's counsel manifested that he would not take part in the proceedings because of the legal issue raised, the trial court appointed a counselde oficioto represent herein petitioner.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted

2. Whether or not a counsel de oficio may legally and validly be appointed to represent an accused who is represented by counsel of choice who refuses to participate in the proceedings because of a perceived denial of due process and after a plea for appellate remedies within a short period is denied by the trial court

HELD:1. To answer:

Q: Was there an amendment of the information or substitution when the information was changed from frustrated murder to consummatedmurder?

A: There is an amendment. There is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended information. What is involved here is not a variance of the nature of different offenses charge, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper.

Q: What kind of amendment? Is it formal or substantial?

A: Formal. Anobjective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death ofthe victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to be the prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever defense herein petitioner may adduce under the original information for frustrated murder equally applies to the amended information for murder.

Q: Is there a need of a preliminary investigation on the new charge?

A: No need because you have not changed the crime. If you change the crime or when there is substitution, there is a need of preliminary investigation. Since it is only a formal amendment,preliminary investigation is not necessary. The amended information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it charges essentially the same offense as that charged under the original information. Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary investigation is notnecessary.

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. Thus, the following have been held to be merely formal amendments, viz:

(1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event ofconviction;(2) an amendment whichdoes not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one;(3) additional allegationswhich do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has orwill assume; and (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused, such as his right toinvoke prescription.

2. The Court said We find nothing irregular in the appointment by the trial court of a counselde oficiofor herein petitioner whose counsel of record refused to participate in the proceedings because of an alleged legal issue. Such issue having been demonstrated herein as baseless, we apprehend his refusal to participate in the trial as causative of or contributive to the delay in the disposition of the case. And, finally, for as long as the substantial rights of herein petitioner and other persons charged in court are not prejudiced, the scheduling of cases should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.