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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,

deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.

REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural Guardian of said

minor, defendants-appellees.

Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.

Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.

BARREDO, J .:

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civi

Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of

defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,

married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was

living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito

Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his

act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is

now Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;

3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was

relieved as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of

such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965

and after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the

same to be meritorious and well-founded.



WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by

ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.

SO ORDERED.

Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)

Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolutionthe following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE

CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -

I

THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF

SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT

AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;

II

THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-

ADJUDICTA;

III

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL

CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and

IV

THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT

MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER

DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald

Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon

City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack ofintent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of

the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the

basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees

Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the

motion to dismiss above-referred to.

As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Ou

resolution are:



1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case

wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,

notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,

though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?

The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of thedual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly

established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated,

on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation

to culpa criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme

Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same

given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus,

the opinion holds:

The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under

both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killethunjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal

action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article

1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the

employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a

criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by

the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being

a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising

from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or

negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate

individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and

clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could

have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a

conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617,

73 Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902

of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminallyprosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made

civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded

damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the

Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient

to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been

little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.



Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also

simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer

only to fault or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article

1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little

scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property-

through any degree of negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified

only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs,

what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute tothe lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are

we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than

the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and

render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development

as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles

1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond

reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is

sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal

negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a

preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made

responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise.

there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified

remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the

Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of

spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacyof the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek

damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that

there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code

Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered

practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based

on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual . In the present case, we are asked to help

perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms

done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence

under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the

stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that itswaters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it

is believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an

ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civi

action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution,

and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure

adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)



Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the

opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to

contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would

reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually

extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the

Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a

negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,

provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault ornegligence, not punishable by law , intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book

(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law",

that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of

the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the

literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and

such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made

enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was

Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be

noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11

not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which

are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the

corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,

"Obligations derived fromquasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of

this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the

new code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely

separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal

Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission ofthe defendant.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight

startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil

negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or

quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from

criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or

"cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear,

sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed

Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or notshall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but

for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.",

(Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same

argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that

which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And

considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely



establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character

(under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the

Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,

contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice,

and more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs

Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to

"fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,

whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against theoffender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,

provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover

damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the

two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability

referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100

of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-

delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the

criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We

here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, thatculpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which

may be punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his

liability for quasi-delict , hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the

possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of

appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civi

Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,

however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really

full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental

authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he

were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent

of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his

father, mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's

own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, incase of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or

incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their

company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with

his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually

therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not

unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability

of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to



supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On

the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage

may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such

emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise

to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else

invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of

the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of

money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor marriedchild without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the

emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of

age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in

accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.

Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.

Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J , concurring:

Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged byaccepted legal standards. "The Idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any

rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in

Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code

and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same

manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs.

Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).




SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 127107 October 12, 1998

PETER PAUL DIMATULAC and VERONICA DIMATULAC, petitioners,

vs.

HON. SESINANDO VILLON in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of

Pampanga, Branch 54; HON. TEOFISTO GUINGONA, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice;

MAYOR SANTIAGO YABUT, SERVILLANO YABUT, MARTIN YABUT and FORTUNATO

MALLARI, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The issues raised by petitioners in their Memorandum 1 and by the Office of the Solicitor General in its

Comment 2 in this special civil action for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the

Rules of Court filed by petitioners, children of the deceased Police Officer 3 (PO3) Virgilio Dimatulac

of Masantol, Pampanga, may be summarized as follows:

A. WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN: (1) GIVING DUECOURSE TO THE MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION BY PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS AGAINST WHOM WARRANTS OF ARREST WERE

ISSUED BUT WHO HAD NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE

CUSTODY Of THE LAW; and (2) FILING THE INFORMATION FOR

HOMICIDE DESPITE KNOWLEDGE OF THE APPEAL FROM SAID

PROSECUTOR'S RESOLUTION TO THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

OF JUSTICE.

B. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION IN PROCEEDING WITH THE ARRAIGNMENT AND INDENYING PETITIONERS' MOTIONS TO SET ASIDE ARRAIGNMENT

AND RECONSIDERATION THEREOF DESPITE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF

THE PENDENCY OF THE APPEAL AND THE SUBMISSION OF VITAL

EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT MURDER AND NOT HOMICIDE WAS

COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED.

C. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENT SECRETARY OF JUSTICE

COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN RECONSIDERING



HIS ORDER FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS MURDER

AND DIRECTING THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR TO AMEND THE

INFORMATION FROM HOMICIDE TO MURDER.

The records and the pleadings of the parties disclose the antecedents.

On 3 November 1995, SPO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Barangay San

Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga.

On 5 November 1995, a complaint for Murder was filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court

(MCTC) of Macabebe-Masantol in Macabebe, Pampanga, by SPO1 Renato Layug of the Masanto

Police Station against private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut

Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan Magat, Arturo Naguit

Fortunato Mallari, Jesus de la Cruz, Joselito Miranda, SPO3 Gilberto Malabanan, Aniano Magnaye,

Vladimir Yumul, a certain "Danny," and a certain "Koyang/Arding." The complaint was docketed as

Criminal Case No. 95-360. After conducting a preliminary examination in the form of searching

questions and answers, and finding probable cause, Judge Designate Serafin B. David of the MCTC

issued warrants for the arrest of the accused and directed them to file their counter-affidavits.

Only accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Francisco Yambao were arrested

while only Francisco Yambao submitted his counter affidavit. 3

On 1 December 1995, after appropriate proceedings, Judge David issued a Resolution 4 in Crimina

Case No. 95-360 finding reasonable ground to believe that the crime of murder had been committed

and that the accused were probably guilty thereof. His findings of fact and conclusions were as

follows:

That on or about November 3, 1995, all the accused under the leadership of MayorSantiago "Docsay" Yabut, including two John Does identified only as Dan/Danny and

Koyang/Arding, went to Masantol, Pampanga for the purpose of looking for a certain

PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac.

At first, the accused, riding on [sic ] a truck, went to the Municipal Hall of Masantol

Pampanga inquiring about PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac. Thereafter, they went to the house of

Mayor Lacap for the purpose of inquiring [about] the [the location of the] house of PO3

Virgilio Dimatulac, until finally, they were able to reach the house of said Virgilio

Dimatulac at San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga.

Upon reaching the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, the truck the accused were all

riding, stopped and parked in front of the house of said PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac, some of

the accused descended from the truck and positioned themselves around the house

while others stood by the truck and the Mayor stayed [in] the truck with a bodyguard.

Accused Billy Yabut, Kati Yabut and Francisco Yambao, went inside the house of

Virgilio Dimatulac [and] were even offered coffee.



[A]ccused Yabut brothers (Kati and Billy) strongly suggested to Virgilio Dimatulac to go

down to see the Mayor outside in front of his house to say sorry.

[W]hen Virgilio Dimatulac went down his house, suddenly [a] gun shot was heard and

then, the son of Virgilio Dimatulac, Peter Paul, started to shout the following words

"What did you do to my father?!"

One of the men of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut shot Virgilio Dimatulac, and as aconsequence, he died; and before he expired, he left a dying declaration pointing to the

group of Mayor "Docsay" Yabut as the one responsible.

That right after Virgilio Dimatulac was shot, accused "Docsay" Yabut ordered his men to

go on board the truck and immediately left away leaving Virgilio Dimatulac bleeding and

asking for help.

On their way home to Minalin, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut gave money to

accused John Doe Dan/Danny and Francisco "Boy" Yambao was asked to bring the

accused John Doe to Nueva Ecija which he did.

Further, accused Santiago "Docsay" Yabut told his group to deny that they ever went to

Masantol.

The court, after having conducted preliminary examination on the complainant and the

witnesses presented, [is] satisfied that there is a [sic] reasonable ground to believe that

the crime of murder was committed and that the accused in conspiring and

confederating with one another are probably guilty thereof.

Circumstantial evidence strongly shows the presence of conspiracy.

That in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, warrants of arrest were issued against

Santiago Yabut, Martin Yabut, Servillano Yabut, Francisco Yambao, Avelino David

Casti David, Catoy Naguit, Fortunato Mallari, Boy dela Cruz, Lito Miranda and Juan

Magat with no bail recommended.

However, with respect to accused Dan/Danny and Koyang/Arding, the court directed the

police authorities to furnish the court [a] description personae of the accused for the

purpose of issuing the needed warrant of arrest.

The accused were furnish [sic ] copies of the complaint and affidavits of witnesses for

them to file their counter-affidavits in accordance to [sic ] law.

As of this date, only accused Francisco "Boy" Yambao filed his counter-affidavit and al

the others waived the filing of the same.

A close evaluation of the evidence submitted by the accused Francisco Yambao which

the court finds it [sic ] straightforward and more or less credible and seems to be



consistent with truth, human nature and [the] natural course of things and lack of

motives [sic ], the evidence of guilt against him is rather weak [compared to] the others,

which [is why] the court recommends a cash bond of P50,000.00 for his provisional

liberty, and the court's previous order of no bail for said accused is hereby reconsidered

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Clerk of Court is directed to forward he entire

records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for further

action, together with the bodies of accused Francisco Yambao and Juan Magat to beremanded to the provincial Jail of Pampanga. 5 (emphasis supplied)

In a sworn statement, 6 petitioner Peter Paul Dimatulac narrated that Mayor Santiago Yabut

accompanied by a number of bodyguards, went to the residence of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac to talk

about a problem between the Mayor and Peter Paul's uncle, Jun Dimatulac. Virgilio warmly welcomed

the group and even prepared coffee for them. Servillano and Martin Yabut told Virgilio to come down

from his house and apologize to the Mayor, but hardly had Virgilio descended when Peter Paul heard

a gunshot. While Peter Paul did not see who fired the shot, he was sure it was one of Mayor Yabut's

companions. Peter Paul opined that his father was killed because the latter spoke to the people of

Minalin, Pampanga, against the Mayor, Peter Paul added in a supplemental statement (Susog na

Salaysay) 7 that he heard Mayor Yabut order Virgilio killed.

It his Sinumpaang Salaysay , 8 Police Officer Leopoldo Soriano of the Masantol Municipal Police

Station in Masantol, Pampanga, declared that on 3 November 1995, between 3:30 and 4:00 p.m.,

while he was at the polite station, three men approached him and asked for directions to the house of

Mayor Epifanio Lacap. Soriano recognized one of the men as SPO1 Labet Malabanan of Minalin,

Pampanga. The group left after Soriano gave them directions, but one of the three returned to ask

whether PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was on duty, to which Soriano replied that Dimatulac was at home.

The group left on board a military truck headed for San Nicolas, Masantol, Pampanga. Later that day,

SPO2 Michael Viray received a telephone call at the police station reporting that someone had shot

Virgilio Dimatulac.

Thereafter, Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Q. Alfonso-Flores conducted a

reinvestigation. However, it is not clear from the record whether she conducted the same motu

proprio or upon motion of private respondents Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut

(hereafter YABUTs). All of the accused who had not submitted their counter-affidavits before the

MCTC, except accused "Danny" and "Koyang/Arding," submitted their counter-affidavits to Assistan

Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso Flores.

In her Resolution dated 29 January 1996, 9 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores found that

the YABUTs and the assailant Danny, to the exclusion of the other accused, were in conspiracy with

one another, but that the offense committed was only homicide, not murder. In support of such

finding, Alfonso-Flores reasoned thus:

The complainant in this case charges the crime of Murder qualified by treachery. It must

be noted that to constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, to wit, 1) the

employment of the [sic ] means of execution were give [sic ] the person attacked no



opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and 2) the means of execution were

deliberately or consciously adopted . . . .

In the instant case, the presence of the first requisite was clearly established by the

evidence, such that the attack upon the victim while descending the stairs was so

sudden and unexpected as to render him no opportunity to defend himself or to

retaliate. However, the circumstances, as portrayed by witness Peter Paul Dimatulac

negate the presence of the second requisite. According to the said witness, the victimwas already descending when Mayor Yabut commanded the assailant to shoot him, and

immediately thereafter, he heard the gunshot. This would therefore show that the

assailant did not consciously adopt the position of the victim at the time he fired the fatal

shot. The command of Mayor Yabut to shoot came so sudden as to afford no

opportunity for the assailant to choose the means or method of attack. The act of Mayor

Yabut in giving the command to shoot further bolster[s] the fact that the conspirator did

not concert the means and method of attack nor the manner thereof. Otherwise there

would have been no necessity for him to give the order to the assailant. The method

and manner of attack was adopted by the assailant at the spur of the moment and the

vulnerable position of the victim was not deliberately and consciously adopted.

Treachery therefore could not be appreciated and the crime reasonably believe[d] to

have been committed is Homicide as no circumstance would qualify the killing to

murder.

Alfonso-Flores then ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that:

1. An information be filed with the proper court charging

Santiago, Servillano and Martin all surnamed Yabut, and one

John Doe alias Danny as conspirators in the crime of

Homicide;

2. The case be dismissed against accused Evelino David

Justino Mandap a.k.a. Casti David, Francisco Yambao, Juan

Magat, Arturo Naguit, Bladimir Dimatulac, Fortunato Mallari

Aniano Magnaye, Gilberto Malabanan, Jesus dela Cruz and

Joselito Miranda.

Bail of P20,000.00 for each of the accused is likewise recommended.

The Resolution discloses that Alfonso-Flores conducted a hearing on 11 January 1996 and

clarificatory questions were propounded only to Peter Paul Dimatulac.

On 23 February 1996, before the Information for homicide was filed, complainants, herein petitioners,

appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of the Department of Justice

(DOJ). 10 They alleged in their appeal that:



1. THE ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR NOT ONLY ERRED

IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO TREACHERY TO QUALIFY THE

CRIME TO MURDER, BUT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING

THE PRESENCE OF OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES, TO WIT:

(A) THAT THE ACCUSED COMMITTED THE CRIME WITH

THE AID OF ARMED MEN AND WITH THE USE OF A

PERSON TO INSURE OR AFFORD IMPUNITY;

(B) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN

CONSIDERATION OF A PRICE, REWARD, OR PROMISE;

(C) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED ON THE

OCCASION OF A DESTRUCTIVE CYCLONE, WHEN THE

SUPER-TYPHOON "ROSING" WAS RAGING ON

NOVEMBER 3, 1995;

(D) THAT THE CRIME WAS COMMITTED WITH EVIDENTPREMEDITATION;

2. THAT THE HONORABLE INVESTIGATING ASSISTANT

PROSECUTOR ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT AGAINST

FORTUNATO MALLARI AND FRANCISCO YAMBAO BY RULING OUT

CONSPIRACY WITH THE YABUT BROTHERS AS AGAINST

FORTUNATO MALLARI AND NOT CHARGING FRANCISCO YAMBAO

AS AN ACCESSORY TO MURDER.

To refute Alfonso-Flores' finding that the means of execution were not deliberately adopted,petitioners asserted that the meeting of the accused and the victim was not accidental as the former

purposely searched for the victim at the height of a typhoon, while accused Mayor Santiago Yabut

even remarked to his co-accused "Danny," "Dikitan mo lang, alam mo na kung ano ang gagawin mo,

bahala ka na" (Just stay close to him, you know what to do). Thus, Danny positioned himself near the

stairs to goad the victim to come out of his house, while Fortunato Mallari represented to the

deceased that the latter was being invited by a certain General Ventura. When the victim declined the

invitation by claiming he was sick, accused Servillano Yabut persuaded the victim to come down by

saying, "[T]o settle this matter, just apologize to the Mayor who is in the truck." In view of that

enticement, the victim came down, while Danny waited in ambush. To emphasize the accused's

resolve to kill the deceased, petitioners further narrated that when the deceased ran away after the

first shot, the gunman still pursued him, while Mayor Santiago Yabut, who was a doctor, kept away at

a safe distance and told everyone in the truck, "Tama na, bilisan ninyo," (That's enough, move

quickly) without giving medical assistance to the deceased and without exerting any effort to arrest

the gunman.

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga was furnished with a copy of the Appeal.



On 26 February 1996, Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang issued a Resolution 11 ordering the

release of accused Evelino David, Justino Mandap, Juan Magat and Arturo Naguit (who were then

detained) in view of the aforementioned resolution of Alfonso-Flores, which, as stated in the order, the

Provincial Prosecutor approved "on February 7, 1996."

On 28 February 1996, an Information 12 for Homicide, signed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor

Flores and Provincial Prosecutor Jesus Y. Manarang, was filed before Branch 55 of the Regional Tria

Court (RTC) in Macabebe, Pampanga, against the YABUTs and John Doe alias "Danny Manalili" anddocketed as Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). The accusatory portion of the information read as

follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1995, in the municipality of Masantol

province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court

the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping

one another, with deliberate intent to take the life of PO3 Virgilio A. Dimatulac, did then

and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot the said PO3 Virgilio A. Dimatulac on

his abdomen with the use of a handgun, thereby inflicting, upon him a gunshot wound

which cause[d] the death of the said victim.

All contrary to law.

The Information, although dated 29 January 1996 was signed by Provincial Prosecutor Manarang on

"2/27/96 ",i.e., a day before its filing in court.

On 28 February 1996, Judge Reynaldo V. Roura, presiding judge of Branch 55, approved the cash

bonds of the YABUTs, each in the amount of P20,000.00, and recalled the warrants for their arrest. 13

On 29 February 1996, Atty. Amado Valdez, who had entered his appearance as private prosecutor,filed two (2) motions with the trial court: (1) a Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order Against All

Accuseds 14 [sic ]; and an (2) Urgent Motion to Defer Proceedings, 15 copies of which were furnished

the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga. The second motion was grounded on the

pendency of the appeal before the Secretary of Justice and a copy thereof was attached to the

motion. Judge Roura set the motions for hearing on 8 March 1996. 16

On 7 March 1996, Judge Roura ordered the arrest of the remaining accused, Danny Manalili. 17

On 8 March 1996, the YABUTs filed their opposition 18 to the Motion to Issue Hold Departure Order

and the Motion to Defer Proceedings. The YABUTs asserted that, as to the first, by posting bail

bonds, they submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court and were bound by the condition therein to

"surrender themselves whenever so required by the court, and to seek permission from the court

should any one of them desire to travel;" and, as to the second, the pendency of the appeal before

the Secretary of Justice was not a ground to defer arraignment; moreover, the trial court had to

consider their right to a speedy trial, especially since there was no definite date for the resolution of

the appeal. Then invoking this Court's rulings in Crespo v. Mogul 19 and Balgos v

Sandiganbayan, 20 the YABUTs further asserted that petitioners should have filed a motion to defer

the filing of the information for homicide with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, or sought, from



the Secretary of Justice, an order directing the Provincial Prosecutor to defer the filing of the

information in court.

In a Reply 21 to the opposition, the private prosecution, citing Section 20 of Rule 114 of the Rules of

Court, insisted on the need for a hold-departure order against the accused; argued that the accused's

right to a speedy trial would not be impaired because the appeal to the Secretary of Justice was filed

pursuant to Department Order No. 223 of the DOJ and there was clear and convincing proof that the

killing was committed with treachery and other qualifying circumstances not absorbed in treachery;and contended that the accused's invocation of the right to a speedy trial was inconsistent with their

filing of various dilatory motions during the preliminary investigation. The YABUTs filed a

Rejoinder 22 to this Opposition.

On 26 March 1996, Judge Roura deferred resolution of the Motion to Issue a Hold Departure Order

until "such time that all the accused who are out on bail are arraigned," but denied the Motion to Defer

Proceedings as he found no compelling reason therefor, considering that although the appeal was

filed on 23 February 1996, "the private prosecution has not shown any indication that [the] appeal

was given due course by the Secretary of Justice." Judge Roura also set the arraignment of the

accused on 12 April 1996. 23

It would appear that the private prosecution moved to reconsider the order denying the Motion to

Defer Proceedings since, on 12 April 1996, Judge Roura issued an Order 24 giving the private

prosecutor "ten (10) days from today within which to file a petition for certiorari questioning the order

of the Court denying his motion for reconsideration of the order of March 26, 1996." Arraignment was

then reset to 3 May 1996.

On 19 April 1996, petitioners filed a motion to inhibit Judge Roura 25 from hearing Criminal Case No

96-1667(M) on the ground that he: (a) hastily set the case for arraignment while the former's appeal in

the DOJ was still pending evaluation; and (b) prejudged the matter, having remarked in open court

that there was "nothing in the records of the case that would qualify the case into Murder." At the

same time, petitioners filed a petition for prohibition 26 with the Court of Appeals docketed therein as

CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, to enjoin Judge Roura from proceeding with the arraignment in Criminal

Case No. 96-1667(M).

On 24 April 1996, Public Prosecutor Olimpio R. Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment 27 with the

trial court wherein he opposed the motion to inhibit Judge Roura; manifested that "there is nothing in

the record . . . which shows that the subject killing is qualified into murder;" and announced that he

"will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle the prosecution of [the] case" inview of the latter's petition to inhibit Judge Roura.

On 29 April 1996, Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and ordered the case transferred to

Branch 54 of the RTC, presided over by herein public respondent Judge Sesinando Villon. 28

On 30 April 1996, the Branch Clerk of Court of Branch 54 of the RTC received the record of Criminal

Case No. 96-1667(M). 29



On 30 April 1996, petitioners filed with the trial court a Manifestation 30 submitting, in connection with

their Motion to Defer Proceedings and Motion to Inhibit Judge Roura, documentary evidence to

support their contention that the offense committed was murder, not homicide. The documents which

they claimed were not earlier submitted by the public prosecution were the following:

a. Counter-Affidavit of SPO1 Gilberto D. Malabanan.

b. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Vladimir Yumul y Dimatulac.

c. Counter-Affidavit of Francisco I. Yambao.

d. Counter-Affidavit of SPO2 Fortunato Mallari.

e. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Aniano Magnaye.

f. Sinumpaang Salaysay of Leopoldo Soriano.

g. Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the Preliminary Investigation ofCriminal Case No. 95-360, containing the testimony of:

a. Peter Paul Dimatulac

b. Vladimir D. Yumul

c. SPO1 Gilberto Malabanan

d. PO3 Alfonso Canilao

h. Investigation Report-dated November 4, 1995.

i. Dying declaration of Virgilio Dimatulac.

j. Sketch

k. Unscaled Sketch

Likewise on 30 April 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated, in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393, a

Resolution 31 directing respondent therein to file his comment to the petition within ten days from

notice and to show cause within the same period "why no writ of preliminary injunction should be

issued as prayed for in the petition." However, the Court of Appeals "deferred action" on the prayer

for a temporary restraining order "until after the required comment [was] submitted."

On 3 May 1996, petitioners filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation 32 with the RTC, furnishing the trial court

with a copy of the aforementioned resolution of the Court of Appeals and drawing the attention of the

trial court to the rulings of this Court in "Valdez vs. Aquilisan, (133 SCRA 150), Galman vs

Sandiganbayan, and Eternal Gardens Memorial Park Corp. vs. Court of Appeals . . . as well as the

decision in Paul G. Roberts vs. The Court of Appeals."



On 3 May 1996, Judge Villon issued an order resetting arraignment of the accused to 20 May

1996. 33 On the latter date, the YABUTs each entered a plea of not guilty. 34

Alarmed by the conduct of arraignment, petitioners filed, on 27 May 1996, an Urgent Motion to Set

Aside Arraignment, 35 citing the resolution of 30 April 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.

40393 which, inter alia, deferred resolution on the application for a temporary restraining order "until

after the required comment is submitted by the respondent;" stressed that the filing of the information

for the lesser offense of homicide was "clearly unjust and contrary to law in view of theunquestionable attendance of circumstances qualifying the killing to murder;" and asserted that a

number of Supreme Court decisions supported suspension of the proceedings in view of the

pendency of their appeal before the DOJ.

On 31 May 1997, Judge Villon issued an Order 36 directing the accused to file their comment on the

Urgent Motion to Set Aside Arraignment within fifteen days from notice.

In a letter 37 addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor dated 7 June 1996, public respondent Secretary

Teofisto Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of petitioners. Secretary Guingona ruled

that treachery was present and directed the Provincial Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga "toamend the information filed against the accused from homicide to murder," and to include Fortunato

Mallari as accused in the amended information. The findings and conclusions of Secretary Guingona

read as follows:

Contrary to your findings, we find that there is treachery that attended the killing of PO3

Dimatulac. Undisputedly, the victim was suddenly shot while he was descending the

stairs. The attack was unexpected as the victim was unarmed and on his way to make

peace with Mayor Yabut, he was unsuspecting so to speak. From the circumstances

surrounding his killing, PO3 Dimatulac was indeed deprived of an opportunity to defend

himself or to retaliate.

Corollarily, we are also convinced that such mode of attack was consciously and

deliberately adopted by the respondents to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal

objective. The admission of respondent Malabanan is replete with details on how the

principal respondent, Mayor Yabut, in conspiracy with the assailant and others, had

consciously and deliberately adopted means to ensure the execution of the crime

According to him, while they were on their way to the victim's house, Mayor Yabut

already instructed Danny, the assailant, that, "Dikitan mo lang, alam no na king ano ang

gagawin mo, bahala ka na" This explains why Danny positioned himself near the stairsof the victim's house armed with a handgun, such positioning was precisely adopted as

a means to ensure the accomplishment of their evil design and Mayor Yabut ordered

nobody else but Danny to shoot the victim while descending the stairs as his position

was very strategic to ensure the killing of the victim.

As has been repeatedly held, to constitute treachery, two conditions must be present, to

wit: (1) employment of means of execution that gives the person [attacked] no

opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were

deliberately or consciously adopted (People vs. Talaver, 230 SCRA 281 [1994]). In the



case at bar, these two (2) requisites are present as established from the foregoing

discussion. Hence, there being a qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime

committed herein is murder, not homicide (People vs. Gapasin, 231 SCRA 728 [1994]).

Anent the alleged participation of respondents Fortunato Mallari and Francisco Yambao

we find sufficient evidence against Mallari as part of the conspiracy but not against

Yambao. As can be gleaned from the sworn-statement of Yambao, which appears to be

credible, Mallari tried also to persuade the victim to go with them, using as a reason thathe (victim) was being invited by General Ventura. He was also seen trying to fix the gun

which was used in killing the victim. These actuations are inconsistent with the claim

that his presence at the crime scene was merely passive.

On the other hand, we find credible the version and explanation of Yambao. Indeed,

under the obtaining circumstances, Yambao had no other option but to accede to the

request of Mayor Yabut to provide transportation to the assailant. There being an actua

danger to his life then, and having acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear

reason dictates that he should be freed from criminal liability. 38

The YABUTs moved to reconsider the resolution, 39 citing Section 4 of "Administrative/Administration

Order No. 223 of the DOJ." 40

In an Ex-Parte Manifestation 41 dated 21 June 1996, petitioners called the trial court's attention to the

resolution of the Secretary of Justice, a copy of which was attached thereto. Later, in a Manifestation

and Motion 42 dated 1 July 1996, petitioners asked the trial court to grant their motion to set aside

arraignment. Attached thereto was a copy of the Manifestation and Motion 43 of the Solicitor Genera

dated 18 June 1996 filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393 wherein the Solicitor

General joined cause with petitioners and prayed that "in the better interest of justice, [the] Petition for

Prohibition be GRANTED and a writ of prohibition be ISSUED forthwith." In support of said prayer, the

Solicitor General argued:

2. There is merit to the cause of petitioners. If the Secretary of Justice

would find their Appeal meritorious, the Provincial Prosecutor would be

directed to upgrade the Information to Murder and extreme prejudice if not

gross injustice would thereby have been avoided.

3. Consequently, the undersigned counsel interpose no objection to the

issuance of a writ of prohibition enjoining respondent Judge from holding

further proceedings in Criminal Case No. 96-1667-M, particularly in

holding the arraignment of the accused, pending resolution of the Appeals

with the Secretary of Justice.

The YABUTs opposed 44 petitioner's Manifestation and Motion dated 1 July 1996 because they

had already been arraigned and, therefore, would be placed in double jeopardy; and that the

public prosecutor — not the private prosecutor — had control of the prosecution of the case.



In his letter 45 dated 1 July 1996 addressed to the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, the Secretary

of Justice set aside his order to amend the information from homicide to murder considering that the

appeal was rendered moot and academic by the arraignment of the accused for homicide and their

having entered their pleas of not guilty. The Secretary stated:

Considering that Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut had already been

arraigned on May 20, 1996 and had pleaded not guilty to the charge of homicide, as

shown by a copy of the court order dated May 20, 1996, the petition for review insofaras the respondents-Yabut are concerned has been rendered moot and academic.

However, the Secretary reiterated that Fortunato Mallari should be included in the information

for homicide.

On 30 July 1996, Public Prosecutor Jaime Bustos filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Information and

to Admit Amended Information. 46 The Amended Information 47 merely impleaded Fortunato Mallari as

one of the accused.

In his Order48

of 1 August 1996, Judge Villon denied petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment,citing Section 4, DOJ Department Order No. 223, and the letter of the Secretary of Justice of 1 July

1996. Petitioners forthwith moved for reconsideration 49 of the order, arguing that the Motion to Defer

the Proceedings filed by petitioners was meritorious and did not violate the accused's right to speedy

trial; and that the DOJ had ruled that the proper offense to be charged was murder and did not

reverse such finding. Petitioners also cited the Solicitor General's stand 50 in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393

that holding accused's arraignment in abeyance was proper under the circumstances. Finally,

petitioners contended that in proceeding with the arraignment despite knowledge of a petition for

prohibition pending before the Court of Appeals, the trial court violated Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the

Rules of Court on indirect contempt. The YABUTs opposed the motion on the ground that it raised no

argument which had not yet been resolved. 51

On 3 September 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment of Accused Fortunato

Mallari, 52 which the trial court granted in view of petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the court's

order denying petitioners' motion to set aside private respondents' arraignment. 53 As expected

Mallari moved to reconsider the trial court's order and clamored for consistency in the trial court's

rulings. 54

In an order 55 dated 15 October 1996, Judge Villon denied reconsideration of the order denying

petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment, citing the YABUTs' right to a speedy trial and explaining

that the prosecution of an offense should be under the control of the public prosecutor, whereas

petitioners did not obtain the conformity of the prosecutor before they filed various motions to defer

proceedings. Considering said order, Judge Villon deemed accused Mallari's motion for

reconsideration moot and academic. 56

On 16 October 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision 57 in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393

dismissing the petition therein for having become moot and academic in view of Judge Roura's

voluntary inhibition, the arraignment of the YABUTs and the dismissal, by the Secretary of Justice, of

petitioners' appeal as it had been mooted by said arraignment.



Judge Villon was later detailed to Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, and Judge Roura

was ordered by the Supreme Court to preside over cases pending in Branch 54 of the Regional Tria

Court of Macabebe, Pampanga, which was previously presided over by Judge Villon. 58 Judge Roura

informed the Office of the Court Administrator and this Court that he had already inhibited himself

from hearing Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M). 59

On 28 December 1996, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari /Prohibition and Mandamus

They urge this Court to reverse the order of respondent Judge denying their Motion to Set Aside Arraignment; set aside arraignment of private respondents; order that no further action be taken by

any court in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) until this petition is resolved; and order respondents

Secretary of Justice and the prosecutors concerned to amend the information from homicide to

murder.

Petitioners insist that the killing of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac was attended by treachery since private

respondents tricked the victim into coming out of his house and then shot him while he was going

down the stairs. There was, petitioners claim, "an orchestrated effort on the part of [private

respondents] to manipulate the rules on administrative appeals with the end in view of evading

prosecution for the [non-bailable] offense of murder," as shown by the following events or

circumstances:

(1) Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso-Flores downgraded the nature

of the crime committed to homicide, a bailable offense, on strength of a

motion for reinvestigation filed by the YABUTs who had not yet been

arrested.

(2) Respondent Mayor and his companions returned to Minalin after the

killing and went into hiding for four (4) months until the offense charged

was downgraded.

(3) The information for homicide was nevertheless filed despite notice to

the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of the appeal filed with the

Secretary of Justice and request to defer any action on the case.

(4) The Office of the Public Prosecutor of Pampanga disallowed the

private prosecutor from further participating in the case.

(5) Judge Roura denied the motion to defer proceedings and declared in

open court that there was no prima facie case for murder, notwithstanding

the pendency of petitioners' appeal with respondent Secretary of Justice.

(6) Even before receipt by petitioners of Judge Roura's order inhibiting

himself and the order regarding the transfer of the case to Branch 54

public respondent Judge Villon set the case for arraignment and, without

notice to petitioners, forthwith arraigned the accused on the information for

homicide on 20 May 1996, despite the pendency of the petition for

prohibition before the Court of Appeals and of the appeal before the DOJ.



(7) The Pampanga Provincial Prosecutor's Office did not object to the

arraignment nor take any action to prevent further proceedings on the

case despite knowledge of the pendency of the appeal.

(8) The Provincial Prosecutor did not comply with the resolution of 7 June

1996 of the Secretary of Justice directing the amendment of the

information to charge the crime of murder.

Petitioners argue that in light of Roberts, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, 60 respondent Judge acted in

excess of his jurisdiction in proceeding with private respondents' arraignment for homicide and

denying petitioners' motion to set aside arraignment. Moreover, although respondent Judge Villon

was not the respondent in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393; he should have deferred the proceedings just the

same as the very issue in said case was whether or not the RTC could proceed with the arraignment

despite the pending review of the case by respondent Secretary of Justice. Further, Judge Villon

unjustly invoked private respondents' right to a speedy trial, after a lapse of barely three (3) months

from the filing of the information on 23 February 1996; overlooked that private respondents were

estopped from invoking said right as they went into hiding after the killing, only to resurface when the

charge was reduced to homicide; and failed to detect the Provincial Prosecutor's bias in favor of

private respondents. Judge Villon should have been more circumspect as he knew that by proceeding

with the arraignment, the appeal with the DOJ would be rendered technically nugatory.

Finally, petitioners submit that the DOJ rule prohibiting appeals from resolutions of prosecutors to the

Secretary of Justice once the accused had already been arraigned applies only to instances where

the appellants are the accused, since by submitting to arraignment, they voluntarily abandon their

appeal.

In their comment, private respondents contend that no sufficient legal justification exists to set aside

private respondents' arraignment, it having already been reset twice from 12 April 1996 to 3 may

1996, due to petitioners' pending appeals with the DOJ; and from 3 May 1996 to 20 May 1996, due to

the transfer of this case to Branch 54. Moreover, as of the latter date, the DOJ had not yet resolved

petitioners' appeal and the DOJ did not request that arraignment be held in abeyance, despite the fact

that petitioners' appeal had been filed as early as 23 February 1996, at least 86 days prior to private

respondents' arraignment. They point out that petitioners did not move to reconsider the RTC's 26

March 1996 denial of the Motion to Defer, opting instead for Judge Roura's recusal and recourse to

the Court of Appeals, and as no restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals, it was but

proper for respondent Judge to proceed with the arraignment of private respondent, to which the

public and private prosecutors did not object.

Private respondents further argue that the decision of respondent Secretary, involving as it did the

exercise of discretionary powers, is not subject to judicial review. Under the principle of separation of

powers, petitioners' recourse should have been to the President. While as regards petitioners' plea

that the Secretary be compelled to amend the information from homicide to murder, private

respondents submit that mandamus does not lie, as the determination as to what offense was

committed is a prerogative of the DOJ, subject only to the control of the President.



As regards DOJ Department Order No. 223, private respondents theorize that appeal by

complainants is allowed only if the complaint is dismissed by the prosecutor and not when there is a

finding of probable cause, in which case, only the accused can appeal. Hence, petitioners' appea

was improper.

Finally, private respondents stress the fact that petitioners never appealed the withdrawal by the

public prosecutor of the private prosecutor's authority to handle the case.

In its comment for the public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays that the

petition be denied because: (a) in accordance with Section 4 of DOJ Order No. 223, upon

arraignment of the accused, the appeal to the Secretary of Justice shall be dismissed motu proprio

(b) the filing of the information for homicide was in compliance with the directive under Section 4(2),

D.O. No. 223, i .e., an appeal or motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause

shall not hold the filing of the information in court; (c) the trial court even accommodated petitioners

by initially deferring arraignment pending resolution by the Court of Appeals of the petition for

prohibition, and since said Court did not issue any restraining order, arraignment was properly had;

and (d) reliance on Roberts is misplaced, as there, accused Roberts and others had not been

arraigned and respondent Judge had ordered the indefinite postponement of the arraignment pending

resolution of their petitions before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.

We now consider the issues enumerated at the outset of this ponencia.

Plainly, the proceedings below were replete with procedural irregularities which lead us to conclude

that something had gone awry in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga resulting in

manifest advantage to the accused, more particularly the YABUTs, and grave prejudice to the State

and to private complainants, herein petitioners.

First, warrants for the arrest of the YABUTs were issued by the MCTC, with no bail recommended for

their temporary liberty. However, for one reason or another undisclosed in the record, the YABUTs

were not arrested; neither did they surrender. Hence, they were never brought into the custody of the

law. Yet, Asst. Provincial Fiscal Alfonso Reyes, either motu proprio or upon motion of the YABUTs

conducted a reinvestigation. Since said accused were at large, Alfonso-Reyes should not have done

so. While it may be true that under the second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of

Court, the provincial prosecutor may disagree with the findings of the judge who conducted the

preliminary investigation, as here, this difference of opinion must be on the basis of the review of the

record and evidence transmitted by the judge. Were that all she did, as she had no other option under

the circumstance, she was without any other choice but to sustain the MCTC since the YABUTs andall other accused, except Francisco Yambao, waived the filing of their counter-affidavits. Then, further

stretching her magnanimity in favor of the accused, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to submit

their counter-affidavits without first demanding that they surrender because of the standing warrants

of arrest against them. In short, Alfonso-Reyes allowed the YABUTs to make a mockery of the law in

order that they gain their provisional liberty pending trial and be charged with the lesser offense of

homicide.

Second, Alfonso-Reyes recommended a bond of only P20,000.00 for the YABUTs and co-accused

"Danny," despite the fact that they were charged with homicide and they were, at the time, fugitives



from justice for having avoided service of the warrant of arrest issued by the MCTC and having failed

to voluntarily surrender.

Third, Alfonso-Reyes was fully aware of the private prosecution's appeal to the DOJ from her

resolution. She could not have been ignorant of the fact that the appeal vigorously assailed her

finding that there was no qualifying circumstance attending the killing, and that the private prosecution

had convincing arguments to support the appeal. The subsequent resolution of the Secretary of

Justice confirmed the correctness of the private prosecution's stand and exposed the blatant errors of Alfonso-Reyes.

Fourth, despite the pendency of the appeal, Alfonso-Reyes filed the Information for homicide on 28

February 1996. It is interesting to note that while the information was dated 29 January 1996 , it was

approved by the Provincial Prosecutor only on 27 February 1996 . This simply means that the Office

of the Prosecutor was not, initially, in a hurry to file the Information. No undue prejudice could have

been caused to the YABUTs if it were filed even later for the YABUTs were still at large; in fact, they

filed their bonds of P20,000.00 each only after the filing of the Information. If Alfonso-Flores was

extremely generous to the YABUTs, no compelling reason existed why she could not afford the

offended parties the same courtesy by at least waiting for instructions from the Secretary of Justice in

view of the appeal, if she were unwilling to voluntarily ask the latter for instructions. Clearly, under the

circumstances, the latter course of action would have been the most prudent thing to do.

Fifth, as if to show further bias in favor of the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of

Pampanga did not even bother to motu proprio, inform the trial court that the private prosecution had

appealed from the resolution of Alfonso-Flores and had sought, with all the vigour it could muster, the

filing of an information for murder, as found by the MCTC and established by the evidence before it.

Unsatisfied with what had been done so far to accommodate the YABUTs, the Office of the Provincial

Prosecutor did not even have the decency to agree to defer arraignment despite its continuing

knowledge of the pendency of the appeal. This amounted to defiance of the DOJ's power of control

and supervision over prosecutors, a matter which we shall later elaborate on. Moreover, in an

unprecedented move, the trial prosecutor, Olimpio Datu, had the temerity, if not arrogance, to

announce that "he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate or handle the prosecution

of [the] case" simply because the private prosecution had asked for the inhibition of Judge Roura.

Said prosecutor forgot that since the offended parties here had not waived the civil action nor

expressly reserved their right to institute it separately from the criminal action, then they had the right

to intervene in the criminal case pursuant to Section 16 of Rule 1l0 of the Rules of Court.

It is undebatable that petitioners had the right to appeal to the DOJ from the resolution of Alfonso-

Flores. The last paragraph of Section 4 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court provides:

If upon petition by a proper party, the Secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the

provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to

file the corresponding information without conducting another preliminary investigation

or to dismiss or move for the dismissal of the complaint or information.



It is clear from the above, that the proper party referred to therein could be either the offended

party or the accused.

More importantly, an appeal to the DOJ is an invocation of the Secretary's power of control over

prosecutors. Thus, in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 16 we emphatically held:

Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the secretary of justice

who, under the Revised Administrative Code,62

exercises the power of direct controand supervision over said prosecutors; and who, may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or

modify their rulings.

Sec. 39, Chapter 8, Book IV in relation to Section[s] 5, 8, and 9, Chapter 2, Title III of

the Code gives the secretary of justice supervision and control over the Office of the

Chief Prosecutor and the Provincial and City Prosecution Offices. The scope of his

power of supervision and control is delineated in Section 38, paragraph 1, Chapter 7,

Book IV of the Code:

(1) Supervision and Control.—

Supervision and control shall includeauthority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or

regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the

commission of acts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions

of subordinate officials or units; . . . .

Supplementing the aforequoted provisions are Section 3 of R.A. 3783 and Section 37 of

Act 4007, which read:

Sec. 3. . . .

The Chief State Prosecutor, the Assistant Chief State Prosecutors, the

Senior State Prosecutors, and the State Prosecutors shall . . . perform

such other duties as may be assigned to them by the Secretary of Justice

in the interest of public service.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 37. The provisions of the existing law to the contrary notwithstanding

whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or activity is entrusted

to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the same shall beunderstood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shal

have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify, or

revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division or

service.

"Supervision" and "control" of a department head over his subordinates have been

defined in administrative law as follows:



In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or

authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.

If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, the former may take such action or

step as prescribed by law to make them perform such duties. Control, on

the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify

or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his

duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and

prosecutors finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which

holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an

administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher

administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. As a rule, only after administrative

remedies are exhausted may judicial recourse be allowed.

DOJ Order No. 223 of 30 June 1993 recognizes the right of both the offended parties and the

accused to appeal from resolutions in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations, as provided for in

Section 1 and Section 4, respectively. Section 1 thereof provides, thus:

Sec. 1. What May Be Appealed. — Only resolutions of the Chief State

Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Prosecutor or City Prosecutor dismissing a

criminal complaint may be the subject of an appeal to the Secretary of Justice except as

otherwise provided in Section 4 hereof.

While the section speaks of resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint, petitioners herein were not

barred from appealing from the resolution holding that only homicide was committed, considering that

their complaint was for murder. By holding that only homicide was committed, the Provincia

Prosecutor's Office of Pampanga effectively "dismissed" the complaint for murder. Accordingly

petitioners could file an appeal under said Section 1. To rule otherwise would be to forever bar

redress of a valid grievance, especially where the investigating prosecutor, as in this case

demonstrated what unquestionably appeared to be unmitigated bias in favor of the accused. Section

1 is not to be literally applied in the sense that appeals by the offended parties are allowed only in

cases of dismissal of the complaint, otherwise the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112, Rules of

Court would be meaningless.

We cannot accept the view of the Office of the Solicitor General and private respondents that Section

1 of DOJ Department Order No. 223 is the controlling rule; hence, pursuant to the second paragraphthereof the appeal of petitioners did not hold the filing of the information. As stated above, Section 4

applies even to appeals by the respondents or accused. The provision reads:

Sec. 4. Non-appealable cases. Exceptions. — No appeal may be taken from a

resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City

Prosecutor finding probable cause except upon a showing of manifest error or grave

abuse of discretion. Notwithstanding the showing of minifest error or grave abuse of

discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been



arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appea

shall be dismissed motu proprio by the Secretary of Justice.

An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however

shall not hold the filing of the information in court. (emphasis supplied)

The underlined portion indisputably shows that the section refers to appeals by respondents or

accused. So we held in Marcelo v. Court o Appeals, 63 that nothing in the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul , 64 reiterated in Roberts v. Court o

Appeals, 65 forecloses the power of authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his

subordinates in criminal cases despite an information already having been filed in court. The

Secretary of Justice is only enjoined to refrain, as far as practicable, from entertaining a petition for

review or appeal from the action of the prosecutor once a complaint or information is filed in court. In

any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the Secretary of

Justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court. In Roberts we wen

further by saying that Crespo could not have foreclosed said power or authority of the Secretary of

Justice "without doing violence to, or repealing, the last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules

of Court" which is quoted above.

Indubitably then, there was on the part of the public prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of the

information for homicide, depriving the State and the offended parties of due process.

As to the second issue, we likewise hold that Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion when

in his order of 26 March l996, 66 he deferred resolution on the motion for a hold departure order until

"such time that all the accused who are out on bail are arraigned" and denied the motion to defer

proceedings for the reason that the "private prosecution has not shown any indication that [the]

appeal was given due course by the Secretary of Justice." Neither rhyme nor reason or even logic

supports the ground for the deferment of the first motion. Precisely, immediate action thereon was

called for as the accused were out on bail and, perforce, had all the opportunity to leave the country if

they wanted to. To hold that arraignment is a prerequisite to the issuance of a hold departure order

could obviously defeat the purpose of said order. As to the second motion, Judge Roura was fully

aware of the pendency of petitioner's appeal with the DOJ, which was filed as early as 23 February

1996. In fact, he must have taken that into consideration when he set arraignment of the accused

only on 12 April 1996 , and on that date, after denying petitioners' motion to reconsider the denial of

the motion to defer proceedings, he further reset arraignment to 3 May 1996 and gave petitioners ten

(10) days within which to file a petition for certiorari to question his denial of the motion to defer and of

the order denying the reconsideration. In any event, the better part of wisdom suggested that, at thevery least, he should have asked petitioners as regards the status of the appeal or warned them that

if the DOJ would not decide the appeal within a certain period, then arraignment would proceed.

Petitioners did in fact file the petition with the Court of Appeals on 19 April 1996 and, at the same

time, moved to inhibit Judge Roura. These twin moves prompted Judge Roura to "voluntarily" inhibit

himself from the case on 29 April 1996 67 and to transfer the case to the branch presided by public

respondent Judge Villon. The latter received the records of the case on 30 April 1996. From that time

on, however, the offended parties did not receive any better deal. Acting with deliberate dispatch,

Judge Villon issued an order on 3 May 1996 setting arraignment of the accused on 20 May 1996. If



Judge Villon only perused the record of the case with due diligence, as should be done by anyone

who has just taken over a new case, he could not have helped but notice: (a) the motion to defer

further proceedings; (2) the order of Judge Roura giving petitioners ten days within which to file a

petition with the Court of Appeals; (3) the fact of the filling of such petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 40393;

(4) the resolution of the Court of Appeals directing respondents to comment on the petition and show

cause why the application for a writ of preliminary injunction should not be granted and deferring

resolution of the application for a temporary restraining order until after the required comment was

filed, which indicated a prima facieshowing of merit; (5) the motion to inhibit Judge Roura preciselybecause of his prejudgment that the crime committed was merely homicide; (6) Judge Roura's

subsequent inhibition; (7) various pieces of documentary evidence submitted by petitioners on 30

April 1996 supporting a charge of murder , not homicide; and (8) most importantly , the pending

appeal with the DOJ.

All the foregoing demanded from any impartial mind, especially that of Judge Villon, a cautious

attitude as these were unmistakable indicia of the probability of a miscarriage of justice should

arraignment be precipitately held. However, Judge Villon cursorily ignored all this. While it may be

true that he was not bound to await the DOJ's resolution of the appeal, as he had, procedurally

speaking, complete control over the case and any disposition thereof rested on his sound

discretion, 68 his judicial instinct should have led him to peruse the documents submitted on 30 April

1996 and to initially determine, for his own enlightenment with serving the ends of justice as the

ultimate goal, if indeed murder was the offense committed; or, he could have directed the private

prosecutor to secure a resolution on the appeal within a specified time. Given the totality of

circumstances, Judge Villon should have heeded our statement inMarcelo 69 that prudence, if no

wisdom, or at least, respect for the authority of the prosecution agency, dictated that he should have

waited for the resolution of the appeal then pending before the DOJ. All told, Judge Villon should not

have merely acquiesced to the findings of the public prosecutor.

We do not then hesitate to rule that Judge Villon committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the

arraignment of the YABUTs on the assailed information for homicide. Again, the State and the

offended parties were deprived of due process.

Up to the level then of Judge Villon, two pillars of the criminal justice system failed in this case to

function in a manner consistent with the principle of accountability inherent in the public trust

character of a public office. Judges Roura and Villon and prosecutors Alfonso-Flores and Datu need

be reminded that it is in the public interest that every crime should be punished 70 and judges and

prosecutors play a crucial role in this regard for theirs is the delicate duty to see justice done, i .e., no

to allow the guilty to escape nor the innocent tosuffer. 71

Prosecutors must never forget that, in the language of Suarez v. Platon, 72 they are the

representatives not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to

govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a

criminal prosecution is not that it shall win every case but that justice be done. As such, they are in a

peculiar and every definite sense the servants of the law, whose two-fold aim is that guilt shall not

escape or innocence suffer.



Prosecutors are charged with the defense of the community aggrieved by a crime, and are expected

to prosecute the public action with such zeal and vigor as if they were the ones personally aggrieved,

but at all times cautious that they refrain from improper methods designed to secure a wrongfu

conviction. 73 With them lies the duty to lay before the court the pertinent facts at the judge's disposal

with strict attention to punctilios, thereby clarifying contradictions and sealing all gaps in the evidence

with a view to erasing all doubt from the court's mind as to the accused's innocence or guilt.

The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibilityin the discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." 74 He must view himself

as a priest, for the administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same

devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge

must render service with impartiality commensurate with the public trust and confidence reposed in

him. 75 Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within his exclusive

jurisdiction and competence, 76 his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be exercised within

reasonable confines. 77 The judge's action must not impair the substantial rights of the accused, nor

the right of the State and offended party to due process of law. 78

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed for the accused

alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally

considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not

necessarily a triumph of justice, for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean

injustice. 79 Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and the

State and offended party, on the other.

In this case, the abuse of discretion on the part of the public prosecution and Judges Roura and Villon

was gross, grave and palpable, denying, the State and the offended parties their day in court, or in a

constitutional sense,due process. As to said judges, such amounted to lack or excess of jurisdiction,

or that their court was ousted of the jurisdiction in respect thereto, thereby nullifying as having been

done without jurisdiction, the denial of the motion to defer further hearings, the denial of the motion to

reconsider such denial, the arraignment of the YABUTs and their plea of not guilty.

These lapses by both the judges and prosecutors concerned cannot be taken lightly. We must

remedy the situation before the onset of any irreversible effects. We thus have no other recourse, for

as Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee pronounced in Galman v. Sandiganbayan: 80

The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice

to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts oflaw and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to

be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the

truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to

render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or

the prevention of redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the

pressures of politics and prejudice.



We remind all members of the pillars of the criminal justice system that theirs is not a mere

ministerial task to process each accused in and out of prison, but a noble duty to preserve our

democratic society under a rule of law.

Anent the third issue, it was certainly grave error for the DOJ to reconsider its 7 June 1996 resolution

holding that murder was committed and directing the Provincial Prosecutor to accordingly amend the

information, solely on the basis of the information that the YABUTs had already been arraigned. In so

doing, the DOJ relinquished its power of control and supervision over the Provincial Prosecutor andthe Assistant Provincial Prosecutors of Pampanga; and meekly surrendered to the latter's

inappropriate conductor even hostile attitude, which amounted to neglect of duty or conduct

prejudicial to the best interest of the service, as well as to the undue haste of Judge Roura and Villon

in respect of the arraignment of the YABUTs. The sins of omission or commission of said prosecutors

and judges resulted, in light of the finding of the DOJ that the crime committed was murder, in

unwarranted benefit to the YABUTs and gross prejudice to the State and the offended parties. The

DOJ should have courageously exercised its power of control by taking bolder steps to rectify the

shocking "mistakes" so far committed and, in the final analysis, to prevent further injustice and fully

serve the ends of justice. The DOJ could have, even if belatedly, joined cause with petitioners to set

aside arraignment. Further, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers over its personnel, the DOJ could

have directed the public prosecutors concerned to show cause why no disciplinary action should be

taken against them for neglect of duty or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service in

not, inter alia, even asking the trial court to defer arraignment in view of the pendency of the appeal,

informing the DOJ, from time to time, of the status of the case, and, insofar as prosecutor Datu was

concerned, in disallowing the private prosecutor from further participating in the case.

Finally, the DOJ should have further inquired into the vicissitudes of the case below to determine the

regularity of arraignment, considering that the appeal was received by the DOJ as early as 23

February 1996.

We then rule that the equally hasty motu proprio "reconsideration" of the 7 June 1996 resolution of

the DOJ was attended with grave abuse of discretion.

It is settled that when the State is deprived of due process in a criminal case by reason of grave

abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, the acquittal of the accused 81 or the dismissal of the

case 82 is void, hence double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused. If this is so in those cases,

so must it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void, as in this case as above

discussed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The orders of Judge Reynaldo Roura of 26 March 1996

denying the Motion to Defer Proceeding and of 12 April 1996 denying the motion to reconsider the

denial of said Motion to Defer Proceedings, and the orders of respondent Judge Sesinando Villon of 3

May 1996 resetting the arraignment to 20 May 1998 and of 25 October 1996 denying the Motion to

Set Aside Arraignment in Criminal Case No. 96-1667(M) are declared VOID and SET ASIDE. The

arraignment of private respondents Mayor Santiago Yabut, Servillano Yabut and Martin Yabut and

their separate pleas of not guilty are likewise declared VOID and SET ASIDE. Furthermore, the order

of public respondent Secretary of Justice of 1 July 1996 is SET ASIDE and his order of 7 June 1996

REINSTATED.



The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga is DIRECTED to comply with the order (letter) of

the Secretary of Justice of 7 June 1996 by forthwith filing with the trial court the amended information

for murder. Thereafter the trial court shall proceed in said case with all reasonable dispatch.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban and Quisumbing, JJ., concur


SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987

MARIO FL. CRESPO, petitioner,

vs.HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA

CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR

GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL., respondents.

GANCAYCO, J .:

The issue raised in this ease is whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case

filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case waselevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the

merits.

On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed

an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City which

was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCCIX-52 (Quezon) '77.1 When the case was set for arraigment

the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for

review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the

filing of the information. In an order of August 1, 1977, the presiding judge, His Honor, Leodegario L.

Mogul, denied the motion. 2 A motion for reconsideration of the order was denied in the order of August 5, 1977 but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford nine for petitioner to

elevate the matter to the appellate court. 3

A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the

accused in the Court of Appeals that was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 06978. 4 In an order of August

17, 1977 the Court of Appeals restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the

accused until further orders of the Court. 5 In a comment that was filed by the Solicitor General he

recommended that the petition be given due course. 6 On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by



the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat

to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally

resolved the petition for review. 7

On March 22, 1978 then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., resolving the petition

for review reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move

for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. 8 A motion to dismiss for

insufficiency of evidence was filed by the Provincial Fiscal dated April 10, 1978 with the trialcourt, 9 attaching thereto a copy of the letter of Undersecretary Macaraig, Jr. In an order of August 2,

1978 the private prosecutor was given time to file an opposition thereto. 10 On November 24, 1978

the Judge denied the motion and set the arraigniment stating:

ORDER

For resolution is a motion to dismiss this rase filed by the procuting fiscal premised on

insufficiency of evidence, as suggested by the Undersecretary of Justice, evident from

Annex "A" of the motion wherein, among other things, the Fiscal is urged to move for

dismissal for the reason that the check involved having been issued for the payment ofa pre-existing obligation the Hability of the drawer can only be civil and not criminal.

The motion's thrust being to induce this Court to resolve the innocence of the accused

on evidence not before it but on that adduced before the Undersecretary of Justice, a

matter that not only disregards the requirements of due process but also erodes the

Court's independence and integrity, the motion is considered as without merit and

therefore hereby DENIED.

WHEREFORE, let the arraignment be, as it is hereby set for December 18, 1978 at 9:00

o'clock in the moming.

SO ORDERED. 11

The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the

issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals

that was docketed as CA-G.R. No. SP-08777. 12 On January 23, 1979 a restraining order was issued

by the Court of Appeals against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused until further orders

from the Court. 13 In a decision of October 25, 1979 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and

lifted the restraining order of January 23, 1979. 14 A motion for reconsideration of said decision filed

by the accused was denied in a resolution of February 19, 1980. 15

Hence this petition for review of said decision was filed by accused whereby petitioner prays that said

decision be reversed and set aside, respondent judge be perpetually enjoined from enforcing his

threat to proceed with the arraignment and trial of petitioner in said criminal case, declaring the

information filed not valid and of no legal force and effect, ordering respondent Judge to dismiss the

said case, and declaring the obligation of petitioner as purely civil. 16



In a resolution of May 19, 1980, the Second Division of this Court without giving due course to the

petition required the respondents to comment to the petition, not to file a motiod to dismiss, within ten

(10) days from notice. In the comment filed by the Solicitor General he recommends that the petition

be given due course, it being meritorious. Private respondent through counsel filed his reply to the

comment and a separate conunent to the petition asking that the petition be dismissed. In the

resolution of February 5, 1981, the Second Division of this Court resolved to transfer this case to the

Court En Banc . In the resolution of February 26, 1981, the Court En Banc resolved to give due course

to the petition.

Petitioner and private respondent filed their respective briefs while the Solicitor General filed a

Manifestation in lieu of brief reiterating that the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals be

reversed and that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the information.

It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information

shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action

depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information,

follow or not fonow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence in his

opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 18 The

reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent

malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the

complainant. 20Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the

authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the

complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. 21 They

have equally the legal duty not to prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that

the evidence adduced is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. 22

It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation 23 that the fiscal determines the existence of a

puma facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the

fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not prudent or even permissible for a

Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding originally initiated by him on an information, if he

finds that the evidence relied upon by him is insufficient for conviction. 24Neither has the Court any

power to order the fiscal to prosecute or file an information within a certain period of time, since this

would interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. 25 Thus, a fiscal who

asks for the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that

grant the same commit no error.26 The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for

the dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his guilt

may not be established beyond reasonable doubt.27

In a clash of views between the judge who didnot investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant,

those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. 28 On the other hand, neither an injunction, preliminary

or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain a criminal

prosecution 29 except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do so for the orderly

administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and

vindictive manner. 30



However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is

subject to the approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe

and it may be elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who has the power to affirm, modify or

reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a

motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court. 31

The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires

jurisdiction over the case, which is the authority to hear and determine the case.32

When after thefiling of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trial court

and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the Court or was duly arrested, the Court

thereby acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. 33

The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima

facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the

information in the proper court. In turn, as above stated, the filing of said information sets in motion

the criminal action against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a

reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such

reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for

appropriate action. 34 While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine

whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought

to Court whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the rase thereafter should be

addressed for the consideration of the Court, 35 The only qualification is that the action of the Court

must not impair the substantial rights of the accused. 36or the right of the People to due process of

law. 36a

Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the

fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to the Court,

the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on

the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case.

However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal upon

the directive of the Secretary of Justice will there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? A state

prosecutor to handle the case cannot possibly be designated by the Secretary of Justice who does

not believe that there is a basis for prosecution nor can the fiscal be expected to handle the

prosecution of the case thereby defying the superior order of the Secretary of Justice.

The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is doneand not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite

of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence o

the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to

whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the

responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much

less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for

then the entire proceedings will be null and void. 37 The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to

appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private

prosecutor but still under his direction and control. 38



The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any

disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound

discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of

criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court.

The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the

case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the

fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not

matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after areinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the

investigation.

In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who

reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should

as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the

fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left

entirely for the determination of the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,

Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, C.J., took no part.




SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner

vs.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review1 of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21

March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.'s (petitioner's) petitionfor certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.2

The facts, as culled from the records, follow.

In 1992, Rodrigo Cawili (Cawili) borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from

petitioner. On 8 January 1993, Cawili and his business associate, Ramon C. Tongson (Tongson),

jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans. Significantly, all three

(3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18

March 1993, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the

account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts of the checks upon Cawili on 23 May1995 and upon Tongson on 26 June 1995, but to no avail.3

On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson 4 for violating Batas

Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)5 before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. During the

preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit.6 Tongson claimed

that he had been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to

Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili

and in appreciation of his services, he was

offered to be an officer of Roma Oil Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's businessassociate; in fact, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg.

22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that his signatures on

the said checks had been falsified.

To counter these allegations, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures

which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the checks.7 He also showed a copy of

an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.8

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In a resolution dated 6 December 1995,9 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause

only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson. Petitioner filed a partial appeal

before the Department of Justice (DOJ) even while the case against Cawili was filed before the

proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997,10 after finding that it was possible for Tongson

to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his signature in the pleadings

submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the

City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer

the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).

Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for lack of merit.

On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga) dismissed the

complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's

resolution. In her resolution,11 ACP Sampaga held that the case had already prescribed pursuant to

Act No. 3326, as amended,12 which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe

after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period started on the date the checks were

dishonored, or on 20 January 1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon

City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law

contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993 to 1998,

more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no information had as yet been filed against

Tongson, the alleged violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.13 Moreover

ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could

no longer be sanctioned under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the

initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating prosecutor .14 Finally, ACP

Sampaga found that Tongson had no dealings with petitioner .15

Petitioner appealed to the DOJ. But the DOJ, through Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee

dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed pursuant to Act No

3326.16Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ resolution. On 3 April 2003,17 the DOJ

this time through then Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, ruled in his favor and declared

that the offense had not prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office

interrupted the running of the prescriptive period citing Ingco v. Sandiganbayan.18 Thus, the Office of

the City Prosecutor of Quezon City was directed to file three (3) separate informations against

Tongson for violation of B.P. Blg. 22.19 On 8 July 2003, the City Prosecutor's Office filed an

information20 charging petitioner with three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.21

However, in a resolution dated 9 August 2004,

22

the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion forreconsideration filed by Tongson, ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered

"the withdrawal of the three (3) informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying

its sudden turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do

not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a special act,

does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act No. 3326 applies to it

and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the prescription of offenses penalized

thereunder .23 The DOJ also cited the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.,24 wherein the Supreme Court

































































ruled that the proceedings referred to in Act No. 3326, as amended, are judicial proceedings, and not

the one before the prosecutor's office.

Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorar i25 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9 August 2004

resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in view of petitioner's

failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum

shopping. The Court of Appeals also noted that the 3 April 2003 resolution of the DOJ attached to thepetition is a mere photocopy.26 Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the appellate court's

resolution, attaching to said motion an amended Verification/Certification of Non-Forum

Shopping.27Still, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion, stating that subsequent compliance

with the formal requirements would not per se warrant a reconsideration of its resolution. Besides, the

Court of Appeals added, the petition is patently without merit and the questions raised therein are too

unsubstantial to require consideration.28

In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in dismissing

his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition before it was patently without merit and

the questions are too unsubstantial to require consideration.

The DOJ, in its comment,29 states that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for

non-compliance with the Rules of Court. It also reiterates that the filing of a complaint with the Office

of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period for

violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It argues that under B.P. Blg. 22, a special law which does not provide for its

own prescriptive period, offenses prescribe in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326.

Cawili and Tongson submitted their comment, arguing that the Court of Appeals did not err in

dismissing the petition for certiorari. They claim that the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has

already prescribed per Act No. 3326. In addition, they claim that the long delay, attributable to

petitioner and the State, violated their constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.30

The petition is meritorious.

First on the technical issues.

Petitioner submits that the verification attached to his petition before the Court of Appeals

substantially complies with the rules, the verification being intended simply to secure an assurance

that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not a product of the imagination or a

matter of speculation. He points out that this Court has held in a number of cases that a deficiency in

the verification can be excused or dispensed with, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always

fatal. 31

Indeed, the verification is merely a formal requirement intended to secure an assurance that matters

which are alleged are true and correct –the court may simply order the correction of unverified

pleadings or act on them and waive strict compliance with the rules in order that the ends of justice

may be served,32 as in the instant case. In the case at bar, we find that by attaching the pertinent


































verification to his motion for reconsideration, petitioner sufficiently complied with the verification

requirement.

Petitioner also submits that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that

there was failure to attach a certified true copy or duplicate original of the 3 April 2003 resolution of

the DOJ. We agree. A plain reading of the petition before the

Court of Appeals shows that it seeks the annulment of the DOJ resolution dated 9 August 2004,33

acertified true copy of which was attached as Annex "A."34 Obviously, the Court of Appeals committed

a grievous mistake.

Now, on the substantive aspects.

Petitioner assails the DOJ's reliance on Zaldivia v. Reyes,35 a case involving the violation of a

municipal ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of the

information in court. According to petitioner, what is applicable in this case is Ingco v

Sandiganbayan,36 wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office for

preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. Petitioner also notes thatthe Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019

otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes.37 He argues tha

sustaining the DOJ's and the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him

since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control .38

There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for

Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is

the law applicable to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods

The pertinent provisions read:

Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,

prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after four years for those

punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) x x x

Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the

law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of

judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person,

and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting

jeopardy.

We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg.

22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one

year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4)

years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the

discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in

court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.


























It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary

investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the

law, "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,"39 and the prevailing rule

at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation,

the prescription of the offense is halted.40

The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating.41 Act No. 3226 was

approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigationof criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as

shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada42 and People v. Joson,43 is that the prescription of the offense is

tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation inasmuch as

the filing of the complaint signifies the

institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused.44 These cases were followed by our

declaration in People v. Parao and Parao45 that the first step taken in the investigation or examination

of offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the

offense.46 Subsequently, in People v. Olarte,47 we held that the filing of the complaint in the Municipa

Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and does,

interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint

or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the

complaint or information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already

represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender ,48 and hence, the prescriptive period

should be interrupted.

In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan49 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,50 which involved violations of the

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No

8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the

prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against

the accused. In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources

Corporation, et al.,51 the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the

Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act,52 another specia

law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus

effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.

The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:

While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326

appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in

set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of prosecution has become the

exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood

either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and

judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of

investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his

prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.54






























































Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on account of

delays that are not under his control.55 A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his

complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise

timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against

Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the

time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up

to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of nine (9) years hadelapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the

active prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the

DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially

those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to

suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused's

delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.

We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner 's filing of his complaint-

affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified the commencement of

the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive

period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite

finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any

impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October

2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of

Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is

ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.

No costs.







FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125066. July 8, 1998]

ISABELITA REODICA, peti t ion er, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondents .

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., J .:

On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doa

Soledad Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of he

recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained

physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.

Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of

Complaint[1] against petitioner with the Fiscals Office.

On 13 January 1988, an information [2] was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makat

(docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in

Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury. The information read:

The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless

Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,

Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, Isabelita

Velasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bearing plate no. NJU-

306, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a

reckless, careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without regard to traffic laws, rules and

regulations and without taking the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to property and

injuries to person, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to

bump/collide with a Toyota Corolla bearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol,

thereby causing damage amounting to P8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner, in the

aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.

That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries

which required medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9) days and incapacitated him from

performing his customary labor for the same period of time.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.

On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision [3] convicting petitioner

of the quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with slight physical

injuries, and sentencing her:

[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the complainant,

Norberto Bonsol y Atienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two

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(P13,542), Philippine Currency, without subsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to

pay the costs.[4]

The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:

As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight physical

injuries (Exhs. D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be

imposed is not fine, but imprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight

Edition 1988, p. 711). Slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished withpenalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28,

1960, cited in Gregorios book, p. 718).[5]

As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medica

expenses (P5,000.00).

Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-

G.R. CR No. 14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a

Motion to Withdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period

for Filing Appellants Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed

petitioner to file her brief .[6]

After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals

rendered a decision[7] on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.

Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration[8] raising new issues, thus:

NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY

AND MOVE THAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY

SUBMITTED TO BE ERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT

PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTH ARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE

RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION AND EVEN ASSUMING SUCHJURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS

AUTHORIZED BY LAW.[9]

. . . . . . . . .

REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION

OR LACK OF JURISDICTION.[10]

In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners motion for

reconsideration for lack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, thepresent petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the following

grounds:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE

SO ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY

ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS

AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN

SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THE BASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A

SECONDARY SOURCE.





























A IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR,[11] THE SAME CASE WHERE THE

COURT A QUO BASED ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED

THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN

THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THE PENALTY FOR SLIGHT

PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTO

MENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR . IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE

RESPONDENT COURT TO PUNISH PETITIONER MORE THAN SHE

SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF A CLERICAL ERRORCOPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.

B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS

IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT

PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY IN ITS

ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.

C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT

AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE

DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OF JURISDICTION.

Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title, but

likewise the ruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physical injuries

through reckless imprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but People

v. Aguilar; while the ruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense wasarresto menor not arresto

mayor .

As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have

pronounced that there were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudence

with slight physical injuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead ofconsidering them a complex crime. Two light felonies, she insists, do not rate a single penalty

of arresto mayor or imprisonment of six months, citing Lontok v. Gorgonio,[12] thus:

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage

to property amounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err

in filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for

the lesiones menos graves and damage to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31,

1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).

. . . . . . . . .

The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different from the

instant case because in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos

graves and damage to property which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore

constituted a complex crime.

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through

reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information.











She then suggests that at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their maximum

period and computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months as

imposed by the lower courts.

On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through

reckless imprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor , is a light offense; as such, it prescribes

in two months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three months

from the date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok

thus:

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones

leves through reckless imprudence should have been charged in a separate information. And

since, as a light offense, it prescribes in two months, Lontoks criminal liability therefor was

already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91, Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and

[f], Rule 117, Rules of Court). The trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion in not

sustaining Lontoks motion to quash that part of the information charging him with that light

offense.

Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional TrialCourts do not deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property and sligh

physical injuries are light felonies and thus covered by the rules on summary procedure; therefore,

only the filing with the proper Metropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute of limitations, this

time invoking Zaldivia v. Reyes.[13]

In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)

agrees with petitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum period

instead of arresto mayor , pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Buerano v. Court o

Appeals,[14] which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the trial court tocomplex reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries and damage to property because what the

law seeks to penalize is the single act of reckless imprudence, not the results thereof; hence, there

was no need for two separate informations.

To refute the third assigned error, the OSG submits that although the Municipal Trial Court had

jurisdiction to impose arresto menor for slight physical injuries, the Regional Trial Court properly took

cognizance of this case because it had the jurisdiction to impose the higher penalty for the damage to

property, which was a fine equal to thrice the value of P8,542.00. On this score, the OSG cites Cuyos

v. Garcia.[15]

The OSG then debunks petitioners defense of prescription of the crime, arguing that the

prescriptive period here was tolled by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three days after

the incident, pursuant to People v. Cuaresma[16] and Chico v. Isidro.[17]

In her Reply to the Comment of the OSG, petitioner expressed gratitude and appreciation to the

OSG in joining cause with her as to the first assigned error. However, she considers the OSGs

reliance on Buerano v. Court of Appeals[18] as misplaced, for nothing there validates the complexing

of the crime of reckless imprudence with physical injuries and damage to property; besides, in that

case, two separate informations were filed -- one for slight and serious physical injuries through

























reckless imprudence and the other for damage to property through reckless imprudence. She then

insists that in this case, following Arcaya v. Teleron[19] and Lontok v. Gorgonio,[20] two informations

should have been filed. She likewise submits that Cuyos v. Garcia[21] would only apply here on the

assumption that it was proper to complex damage to property through reckless imprudence with slight

physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v. Isidro[22] is likewise inapposite, for it deals

with attempted homicide, which is not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma[23] should not be given retroactive effect

otherwise, it would either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling

inZaldivia[24] favorable to her.

The pleadings thus raise the following issues:

I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.

II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in

the amount of P8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical

injuries are light felonies.

III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Codeapplies to the quasi offenses in question.

IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on

appeal.

V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.

VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.

I. The Proper Penalty.

We agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto

mayor imposed by the trial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However

we cannot subscribe to their submission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is

the proper penalty.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall

commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer

the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its mediumperiod; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its

minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony,

the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would

otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium

and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty

of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.






















When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to

the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount

equal to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be

less than 25 pesos.

A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by

simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would

have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without

regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two

paragraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than

that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence

resulting in slight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a

duration of 21 to 30 days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately

or with malice, it is penalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with a

duration of 1 day to 30 days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or

equal to the penalty prescribed under the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the

exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless

imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is public censure, this being the penalty next lower in

degree to arresto menor .[25]

As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third

paragraph of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since the reckless

imprudence in this case did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph

of Article 365, which provides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1

day to 4 months) for an act committed through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional,

would have constituted a less grave felony. Note that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were

caused deliberately, the crime would have been malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised

Penal Code, and the penalty would then bearresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2

months and 1 day to 6 months which is higher than that prescribed in the first paragraph of Article

365). If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lower than that provided for in the first

paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., the penalty next lower in degreewhich is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its minimum period or imprisonment

from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in

damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in its minimum and medium

periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a maximum of 4 months,

at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides that in the imposition of

the penalties therein provided the courts shall exercise their sound discretion without regard to the

rules prescribed in article 64.







I I. Classif icatio n of th e Quasi Offense in Question .

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means of fault

(culpa). There is deceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault

when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill .[26]

As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is punishable by public

censure only. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions oflaw carrying the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public

censure is classified under Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the

graduated scale provided in Article 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto menor , i

follows that the offense of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony.

On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is, as earlier

discussed, penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is

a correctional penalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a

less grave felony not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

I II. App l icabi l ity o f the Rule on Complex Cr imes.

Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the

Revised Code on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. -- When a single act constitutes two or more grave or

less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, the

penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum

period.Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave

felonies, a complex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio,[27] this Court declared tha

where one of the resulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no

complex crime, thus:

Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The

resulting offenses may be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the

grave felony. Thus, the light felonies of damage to property and slight physical injuries, both

resulting from a single act of imprudence, do not constitute a complex crime. They cannot be

charged in one information. They are separate offenses subject to distinct penalties (Peoplevs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona, 70 Phil. 513).

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage

to property amounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err in

filing a separate complaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for

the lesiones menos graves and damage to property [Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31,

1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].











Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complex crime: the less

grave felony of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount ofP8,542.00 and

the light felony of reckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.

IV. The Right to Ass ai l the Dup l ic i ty of the Informat ion.

Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless

imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information

because it is not covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer

question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the information, i.e.,charging two separate

offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2)

reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her

failure to raise it in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the information .[28] Under Section 3, Rule

120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or

information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as

many offenses as are charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them.

[29]

V. Which Court Has Jur isdict ion Over the

Quasi Offenses in Quest ion.

The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the

institution of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is

intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment.[30]

At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Section 32(2)[31]thereof provided

that except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of

the Sandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and

Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable

with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four

thousand pesos, or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other

penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of

kind, nature, value or amount thereof.

The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the

imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The question thus

arises as to which court has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless

imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries.

In Uy Chin Hua v. Dinglasan,[32] this Court found that a lacuna existed in the law as to which court

had jurisdiction over offenses penalized with destierro, the duration of which was from 6 months and

1 day to 6 years, which was co-extensive with prision correccional . We then interpreted the law in this

wise:























Since the legislature has placed offenses penalized with arresto mayor under the jurisdiction

of justice of the peace and municipal courts, and since by Article 71 of the Revised Penal

Code, as amended by Section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 217, it has

placed destierro below arresto mayor as a lower penalty than the latter, in the absence of

any express provision of law to the contrary it is logical and reasonable to infer from said

provisions that its intention was to place offenses penalized with destierro also under the

jurisdiction of justice of the peace and municipal courts and not under that of courts of first

instance.

Similarly, since offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months

were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized

with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale in Article 71 of

the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of

said courts. Thus, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said

courts.

As to the reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the

same was also under the jurisdiction of MeTCs, MTCs or MCTCs because the imposable penalty

therefor was arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods -- the duration of which was from 1

month and 1 day to 4 months.

Criminal Case No. 33919 should, therefore, be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the

RTC of Makati.

VI. Prescr ipt ion of th e Quasi Offenses in Quest ion.

Pursuant to Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physica

injuries, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. On the other hand, reckless imprudence

resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, being a less grave felony whose penalty

is arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, prescribes in five years.

To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to

determine whether the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three days after the incident in

question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.

Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. -- The period of prescription shall

commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, theauthorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or

information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the

accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not

imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)

Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period shall be interrupted by the

filing of the complaint or information, does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary

examination or investigation only or for an action on the merits.[33] Thus, in Francisco v. Court o







Appeals[34] and People v. Cuaresma,[35] this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with the

fiscals office suspends the running of the statute of limitations.

We cannot apply Section 9[36] of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases

covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the

instant case, the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the

MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that

in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by

information. However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted

only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to

Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not

allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.[37] Hence, in case of conflict between the

Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter

prevails.

Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein

was a violation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the RevisedPenal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for

Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription

Shall Begin to Run. Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only when

judicial proceedings are instituted against the guilty party.Accordingly, this Court held that the

prescriptive period was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincia

Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive

period there was only the filing of the information in the proper court.

In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91

thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period forthe quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office

three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We

cannot, therefore, uphold petitioners defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the

information in this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of respondent Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decision was

affirmed therein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.

Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug, Panganiban, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur .


















SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 102342 July 3, 1992

LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner,

vs.

HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,

Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondents

CRUZ, J.:

The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of

municipal ordinances.

The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation

of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.

The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. 1 The referral-complaint of the police was

received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. 2 The corresponding

information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3

The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the

motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the

respondent judge. 4

In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is

governed by the following provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure:

Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the

Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the following cases:



xxx xxx xxx

B. Criminal Cases:

1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations;

2. Violations of rental law;

3. Violations of municipal or city ordinances;

4. All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does not

exceed six months imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective

of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising therefrom. . . .

(Emphasis supplied.)

Sec. 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the scope of this

Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in court without need of a prior

preliminary examination or preliminary investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manilaand chartered cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further, That

when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding complaint shall be signed and

sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.

She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for

Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription

Shall Begin to Run," reading as follows:

Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts, prescribe in

accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by municipal ordinances shall prescribe

after two months.



Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law

and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicia

proceedings for its investigation and punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and

shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.

Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and penalizing violations

of law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)

Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the

two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the offense, the charge against

her should have been dismissed on the ground of prescription.

For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of

the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent

judge, the Solicitor General also invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Crimina

Procedure, providing as follows:

Sec. 1. How Instituted—

For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in speciacases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows:

a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint

with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation

therein;

b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal CircuitTrial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office.

However, in Metropolitan Manila and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the

office of the fiscal.

In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis

supplied.)



Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing of the complaint with

the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the phrase "such institution" and that the phrase

"in all cases" applies to all cases, without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on

Summary Procedure.

The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the following dictum in

Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench and Bar, this Court

has re-examined the question and, after mature consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the

true doctrine is, and should be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the

complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or

investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even

if the court where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several

reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaringthat the period of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information" without

distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary examination or investigation

merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is

filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the

proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain

vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may

do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.

It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two months before the

promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1, 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of

Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated therein with the revision of the Rules on Crimina

Procedure on January 1, 1985, except for the last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.

That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary

procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which

are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph

obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule

on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be

read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.

As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are

violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which

is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of

Rule 110.



Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the

Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of

B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceedingfour years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and

imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability

arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount

thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through crimina

negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed

twenty thousand pesos.

These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed

directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both

parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary

investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in

court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that

the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and

not on any date before that.

This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of

prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The

proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of

the Solicitor General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not

distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure andSection 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the specia

law. And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Crimina

Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is

not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the

Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. 7



Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the decision would have

been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense involved was grave oral defamation

punishable under the Revised Penal Code with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision

correccional in its minimum period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a

municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is thus covered by the

Rule on Summary Procedure.

The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is

filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the

necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a

misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably deduced from their plain

language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to

prevent the problem here sought to be corrected.

Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced fromits alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in

accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with

the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The

judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the

Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had

already prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby

DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado

Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

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