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G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995
ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO JACALAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, and SPS. FELIXBERTO
TIGOL, JR. and ROSITA TAGHOY TIGOL, respondents.
MENDOZA,J.:
This is a special civil action ofcertiorari to set aside orders of respondent Judge Rumoldo R.
Fernandez of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, at Lapu-Lapu City, denying petitioners
oral motion for the suspension of their arraignment in Criminal Case No. 012489, entitled:
"People of the Philippines v. Isabelo Apa; Manuel Apa and Leonilo Jacalan," as well as theirmotion for reconsideration.
Criminal Case No. 012489 is a prosecution for violation of P.D. 772 otherwise known as the
Anti-Squatting Law. The information alleges:
That on February 1990, or prior thereto, in Agus, Lapulapu City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused [herein petitioners Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionisio Jacalan],
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another, without
the knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the said owner by occupying or possessing a portion of her real
property, Lot No. 3635-B of Opon Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate ofTitle No. 13250, situated in Agus Lapulapu City, whereon they constructed
their respective residential houses against the will of Rosita Tigol, which acts
of the said accused have deprived the latter of the use of a portion of her
land, to her damage and prejudice because despite repeated demands the
said accused failed and refused, as they still fail and refuse to vacate the
premises above-mentioned.
Petitioners moved for the suspension of their arraignment on the ground that there was a
prejudicial question pending resolution in another case being tried in Branch 27 of the
same court. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2247-L and entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and
Vicente Apa versus Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.," concerns the ownershipof Lot No. 3635-B. 1In that case, petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity of TCT No.
13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of the lot in question among them and private
respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in
1990 by petitioners, three years before May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squattingwas filed against them.
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On August 25, 1993, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and proceeded with their
arraignment. Petitioners, therefore, had to enter their plea (not guilty) to the charge.
On September 2, 1993, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion wasdenied by the court in its order dated September 21, 1993. Hence, this petition.
The only issue in this case is whether the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635-B, which
was pending, in Civil Case No. 2247-L, is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
We hold that it is.
A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. To justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not
only that the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution is based but also that the decision of the issue or issues raised in the civil casewould be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 2 Rule 111, 5 provides:
Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a
prejudicial questions are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of land not
belonging to them but to private respondent and against the latter's will. As already noted,
the information alleges that "without the knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITATIGOL" petitioners occupied or took possession of a portion of "herproperty" by building
their houses thereon and "deprived [her] of the use of portion ofherland to her damage
and prejudice.
Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-B of the Opon cadastre
covered by TCT No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now pending in Branch 27 of
the RTC at Lapulapu City. The resolution, therefore, of this question would necessarily be
determinative of petitioners criminal liability for squatting.
In fact it appears that on February 23, 1994, the court trying the civil case rendered a
decision nullifying TCT No. 13250 of private respondent and her husband and declared thelot in question to be owned in common by the spouses and the petitioners as inheritance
from their parents Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. While private respondents claim that the
decision in that case is not yet final because they have filed a motion for new trial, the point
is that whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the question of ownership, such
resolution will be determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioners in the criminal case.
Surely, if petitioners are co-owners of the lot in question, they cannot be found guilty of
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squatting because they are as much entitled to the use and occupation of the land as are the
private respondent Rosita T. Tigol and her family. 3
Private respondents argues that even the owner of a piece of a land can be ejected from his
property since the only issue in such a case is the right to its physical possession.
Consequently, they contend, he can also be prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law.
The contention misses the case is the essential point that the owner of a piece of land can
be ejected only if for some reason, e.g., he has let his property to the plaintiff, he has given
up its temporary possession. But in the case at bar, no such agreement is asserted by
private respondent. Rather private respondent claims the right to possession based on her
claim of ownership. Ownership is thus the pivotal question. Since this is the question in the
civil case, the proceedings in the criminal case must in the meantime be suspended.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent judge is ordered to SUSPEND the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 012489 until the question of ownership in Civil Case No.
2247-L has been resolved with finality and thereafter proceed with the trial of the criminalcase if the civil case is decided and terminated adversely against petitioners. Otherwise he
should dismiss the criminal case.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-63198 June 21, 1990
VICENTE S. UMALI, BENJAMIN CALLEJA, JR., ALBERTO L. LEDESMA and EVANGELINE
U. LEDESMA,petitioners,vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND SPOUSES HONORIO and
SOLINA EDANO,respondents.
Vicente A. Garcia for petitioners.
Edano, Leynes Law Office for private respondents.
PADILLA,J.:
This petition seeks the review on certiorari of the decision * dated 23 September 1982 of
the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14504, affirming the Orders dated 29
April 1982 and 24 June 1982 issued in Criminal Case No. 1423-I by the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Zambales, Branch II (now Regional Trial Court, (RTC), Iba, Zambales,
Branch LXIX). ** The respondent court's decision ruled that the question raised in Civil
Case No. 8769 pending before the CFI of Quezon, Branch VIII (now RTC, Quezon, Branch
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LVII) re: annulment/ rescission of the sale 1 is not prejudicial to the issues involved in said
CR No. 1423-I as to warrant the suspension of proceedings in said criminal case.
The facts material to the present case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
... Petitioners are the officers of the Orosea Development Corporation,hereinafter referred to simply as OROSEA. Sometime on September 4,1979,
the petitioners, as officers of OROSEA, purchased from the spouses Honorio
and Solina Edano, Lot No. 49 of the Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, Bo. Casay,
Mulanay, Province of Quezon, covered by TCT No. RT-(T-36471), in the name
of spouses Edano, for the sum of P1,036,500.00 payable in four installments,as follows:
1st
Installment
and
downpayment
-
September
28, 1979
P225,000.00
2nd
Installment
- March
31, 1980
271,500.00
3rd
Installment
-
September
30, 1980
270,000.00
4th
Installment
- March
31, 1981
270,000.00
issuing for this purpose four checks drawn against the Chartered Bank,
Manila Branch. The first check for P225,000.00 was honored upon itspresentment.
By arrangement of the petitioners with the Edano spouses, a deed of absolute
sale was executed by the vendors, inspire of the fact that the purchase price
has not yet been Idly paid. Thus, TCT No. (T36471) was cancelled and a new
transfer certificate of title was issued in the name of OROSEA. Thereafter,
OROSEA secured a loan of P1,000,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bank
using this property as security.
When the check for the second installment fell due, petitioners asked, for two
times, deferment of its presentation for payment, the first to June 30, 1980,
and the second to July 31, 1980. In the first deferment petitioners issued a
check that matured on June 30, 1980 to replace the check that matured on
March 31, 1980. On the second deferment petitioners issued another check
dated July 31, 1980 to replace the check dated June 30, 1980. This second
renewal check was presented with the bank but it was dishonored due to
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lack of funds. So were the checks postdated September 30, 1980 and March
31, 1981. They were also dishonored upon their presentment for lack of
funds. As a consequence of the dishonor of these checks, the Edano spouses
filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners. The information was filed by
the Provincial Fiscal against petitioners on May 21, 1981, and it was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 1423-I. Arraignment was set on September 4,1981 but petitioners failed to appear. It was reset to October 5, 1981 but this
was postponed upon motion of petitioners.
On October 14, 1981, OROSEA filed a Complaint in the Court of First Instance
of Quezon against the Edano spouses, docketed as Civil Case No. 8769, for the
annulment/rescission of the Contract of Sale executed on September 4, 1979
by and between OROSEA and the Edano spouses covering Lot No. 49 of the
Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, and for which the petitioners issued the checks,
subject of Criminal Case No. 1423-1.
Criminal Case No. 1423-I was again set for arraignment on November 5,1980. This was postponed. With the entry of a new counsel, petitioners filed
a motion to quash Criminal Case No. 1423-I, on ground of improper venue,
but this motion was withdrawn by petitioners before it could be resolved.
The arraignment was again set for January 4, 1982 which was again
postponed; then to February 5, 1982, again postponed; then to March 23,
1982. However, before March 23, 1982, petitioners filed, in Criminal Case No.
1423-I, a 'Motion to Suspend Arraignment and Further Proceedings, with a
Supplemental Motion To Suspend Proceedings'. This was opposed by the
Provincial Fiscal of Quezon. Resolving the motion to suspend, respondentJudge issued his orders, now under question, denying the motion. 2
Acting on the "Motion to Suspend Arraignment and Further Proceedings," the Court of First
Instance of Zambales, Branch II, in said CR Case No. 1423-1 in its order dated 29 April
1982 3denied the same for lack of merit; and the motion for reconsideration of said order
was likewise denied in the Order dated 24 June l982. 4
A petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 14504, was then filed
by herein petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals. The appellate court, resolving
the said petition, rendered the now assailed decision dated 23 September 1982 affirming
the questioned orders of the trial court and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The
Court of Appeals ruled that, inasmuch as the issues in CV No. 8769 and CR No. 1423-I are
completely different from each other, and that the resolution of one is not necessary for theresolution of the other, the issue involved in CV No. 8769 is not a prejudicial question vis-a-
vis the issue in CR No. 1423-I so as to warrant the suspension of the proceedings in the
latter case, until the termination of the civil case. In its resolution dated 3 February 1983,
the Court of Appeals also denied for lack of merit the petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the said decision.
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In this present recourse, the principal issue to be resolved, as in the Court of Appeals, is
whether CV No. 8769 involves a prejudicial question in relation to CR No. 1423-I so as torequire a suspension of proceedings in the latter case, until the civil case is disposed of.
We find no merit in the petition.
In arguing that the principle of prejudicial question applies in the case at bar, petitioners
contend that, since in CV No. 8769 they seek to annul the deed of sale executed in their
favor by the private respondents, on the grounds that the latter committed fraud in
misrepresenting that the land they sold to petitioners is free from all liens and
encumbrances, and that it is not tenanted, when in truth and fact, as petitioners later
discovered, the land is covered by the land reform program and that vast portions thereof
are timber land, hence, allegedly indisposable public land, therefore, according to
petitioners, CV No. 8769 involves issues, the resolution of which will determine whether or
not petitioners are criminally liable in CR No. 1423-I. They further argue that, if and when
the court hearing CV No. 7869 annuls the subject deed of sale, then, their obligation to pay
private respondents under the said deed would be extinguished, resulting in the dismissalof CR No. 1423-I.
Petitioners, therefore, in CV No. 8969, in seeking the annulment of the deed of sale on the
ground of fraud or misrepresentation, are in effect saying that said deed is voidable,
vitiated consent being one of the grounds mentioned in Article 1390 5 of the Civil Code for
voiding or annulling contracts. Indeed the well-settled rule is that a contract where consent
is vitiated is voidable. 6
It can not be denied, however, that at the time the acts complained of in CR No. 1423-I were
committed, the deed of sale sought to be later annulled in CV No. 8769 was binding upon
the parties thereto, including the petitioners. The two (2) essential elements for aprejudicial question to exist are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue in thecivil action determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 7
Given the nature of a prejudicial question, and considering the issues raised in CV No. 8769
and CR No. 1423-I, we agree with the ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals that the
resolution of the issues in CV No. 8769 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
petitioners-accused in CR No. 1423-I, hence, no prejudicial question is involved between
the said two (2) cases.
As correctly observed by the appellate court, the issue in CR No. 1423-I is whether or notthe petitioners could be found guilty under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 8 or under Article 315,
No. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. 9
More specifically, what private respondents complained of in CR No. 1423-I is that the
checks issued by petitioners in their favor were dishonored for lack of funds upon due
presentment to the drawee bank. Undeniably, at the time of said dishonor, petitioners'
obligation to pay private respondents pursuant to the deed of sale, continued to subsist.
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And because petitioners' checks were dishonored for lack of funds, petitioners are
answerable under the law for the consequences of their said acts. And even if CV No. 8769
were to be finally adjudged to the effect that the said deed of sale should be annulled, such
declararion would be of no material importance in the determination of the guilt orinnocence of petitioners-accused in CR No. 1423-I.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated 23 September 1982 of the Courtof Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 14504 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988
RICARDO QUIAMBAO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA BERNARDO,
and FELIPE GAZA, respondents-appellees, LAND AUTHORITY, intervenor-appellant.
FERNAN,J.:
This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals as one involving pure questions of law
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The antecedents are as follows:
In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein private respondents Zenaida Gaza
Buensucero, Justina Gaza Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against herein petitioner Ricardo
Quiambao before the then Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal, docketed therein as Civil Case
No. 2526, it was alleged that private respondents were the legitimate possessors of a
30,835 sq. m. lot known as Lot No. 4, Block 12, Bca 2039 of the Longos Estate situated at
Barrio Longos, Malabon Rizal, by virtue of the Agreement to Sell No. 3482 executed in their
favor by the former Land Tenure Administration [which later became the Land Authority,
then the Department of Agrarian Reform]; that under cover of darkness, petitionersurreptitiously and by force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered into a 400 sq. m.
portion thereof, placed bamboo posts "staka" over said portion and thereafter began the
construction of a house thereon; and that these acts of petitioner, which were unlawful per
se, entitled private respondents to a writ of preliminary injunction and to the ejectment ofpetitioner from the lot in question.
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Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and upon denial thereof, filed his Answer
to the complaint, specifically denying the material allegations therein and averring that the
Agreement upon which private respondents base their prior possession over the
questioned lot had already been cancelled by the Land Authority in an Order signed by its
Governor, Conrado Estrella. By way of affirmative defense and as a ground for dismissing
the case, petitioner alleged the pendency of L.A. Case No. 968, an administrative case beforethe Office of the Land Authority between the same parties and involving the same piece of
land. In said administrative case, petitioner disputed private respondents' right of
possession over the property in question by reason of the latter's default in the installment
payments for the purchase of said lot. Petitioner asserted that his administrative case was
determinative of private respondents' right to eject petitioner from the lot in question;
hence a prejudicial question which bars a judicial action until after its termination.
After hearing, the municipal court denied the motion to dismiss contained in petitioner's
affirmative defenses. It ruled that inasmuch as the issue involved in the case was therecovery of physical possession, the court had jurisdiction to try and hear the case.
Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch XII, Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-1576 a petition for certiorari with injunction
against public respondent Judge Adriano Osorio of the Municipal Court of Malabon and
private respondents, praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
respondent judge to suspend the hearing in the ejectment case until after the resolution of
said petition. As prayed for, the then CFI of Rizal issued a restraining order enjoining
further proceedings in the ejectment case.
In his answer, respondent municipal judge submitted himself to the sound discretion of the
CFI in the disposition of the petition for certiorari. Private respondents, on the other hand,
filed a motion to dismiss the petition, maintaining that the administrative case did notconstitute a prejudicial question as it involved the question of ownership, unlike the
ejectment case which involved merely the question of possession.
Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case
No. C-1576 alleging the pendency of an administrative case between the same parties on
the same subject matter in L.A. Case No. 968 and praying that the petition for certiorari be
granted, the ejectment complaint be dismissed and the Office of the Land Authority beallowed to decide the matter exclusively.
Finding the issue involved in the ejectment case to be one of prior possession, the CFI
dismissed the petition for certiorari and lifted the restraining order previously issued.Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order, adopted in toto by
Intervenor Land Authority was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal filed by
petitioner Quiambao and intervenor Land Authority with the Court of Appeals, and
certified to Us as aforesaid.
The instant controversy boils down to the sole question of whether or not the
administrative case between the private parties involving the lot subject matter of the
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ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar to said
ejectment case.
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution
of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of
which pertains to another tribunal.1
The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into playgenerally in a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues
involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively
resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the existence of a
prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of
the latter pending final determination of the former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue in the criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue determineswhether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in
character, it is obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of. Equally
apparent, however, is the intimate correlation between said two [2] proceedings, stemming
from the fact that the right of private respondents to eject petitioner from the disputed
portion depends primarily on the resolution of the pending administrative case. For while
it may be true that private respondents had prior possession of the lot in question, at the
time of the institution of the ejectment case, such right of possession had been terminated,
or at the very least, suspended by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement
to Sell executed in their favor. Whether or not private respondents can continue to exercise
their right of possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the
pending administrative case assailing the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement toSell and the subsequent award of the disputed portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of
the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then private
respondents would have every right to eject petitioner from the disputed area. Otherwise,
private respondent's light of possession is lost and so would their right to eject petitioner
from said portion.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court to have
taken is to hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the
administrative case. Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move.
To allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's right of
possession being upheld in the pending administrative case is to needlessly require notonly the parties but the court as well to expend time, effort and money in what may turn
out to be a sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2dtells us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound
discretion, upon proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in
abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending in another court,
especially where the parties and the issues are the same, for there is power
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inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes on its dockets
with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.
Where the rights parties to the second action cannot be properly determined
until the questions raised in the first action are settled the second actionshould be stayed. 2
While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving two [2] court actions, the
existence in the instant case of the same considerations of Identity of parties and issues,
economy of time and effort for the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need to
resolve the parties' right of possession before the ejectment case may be properly
determined, justifies the rule's analogous application to the case at bar.
Fortich-Celdran, et al. vs. Celdran, et al., 19 SCRA 502, provides another analogous situation.
In sustaining the assailed order of the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental
ordering the suspension of the criminal case for falsification of public document against
several persons, among them the subscribing officer Santiago Catane until the civil case
involving the issue of the genuineness of the alleged forged document shall have beendecided, this Court cited as a reason therefor its own action on the administrative charges
against said Santiago Catane, as follows:
It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this
Court against Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by Us inabeyance, thus:
"As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly
forged by respondent attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77
[Richard Ignacio Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc., et al.] is
necessarily involved in Civil Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu Courtof First Instance, action on the herein complaint is withheld
until that litigation has finally been decided. ComplainantCeldran shall inform the Court about such decision." 3
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial question to an
administrative case, We see no reason why the reverse may not be so considered in the
proper case, such as in the petition at bar. Finally, events occuring during the pendency of
this petition attest to the wisdom of the conclusion herein reached. For in the Manifestation
filed by counsel for petitioner, it was stated that the intervenor Land Authority which later
became the Department of Agrarian Reform had promulgated a decision in the
administrative case, L.A. Case No. 968 affiriming the cancellation of Agreement to Sell No.3482 issued in favor of private respondents. With this development, the folly of allowing
the ejectment case to proceed is too evident to need further elaboration.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Civil Case No. 2526 of the thenMunicipal Court of Malabon, Rizal is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
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Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO,J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died
on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the
Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the
appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to
Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-
appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense
charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case ofPeople v. Sendaydiego 1insists that the
appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lowercourt on which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor
General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending
appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said
counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2which
held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and,therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is
rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of hisconviction extinguish his civil liability?
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In the aforementioned case ofPeople v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative.
This same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affectboth his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in
part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and
as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before finaljudgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is
plain. Statutory construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled
upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final
judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory
order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of
the Revised Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 ofthe Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales
siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a sufallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme."What is "sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: Itsays:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las
definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes litigantes
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recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos
legales concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite.
Because, it is only when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it,
the crime is confirmed
"en condena determinada;" or, in the words ofGroizard, the guilt of the accused becomes "una verdad legal." Prior
thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal
caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as
Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment
becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final judgment
whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for
the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised
Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in theRevised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term
"final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to
mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment
in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting
an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied orserved, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel
down to one positive conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the
Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a
judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said thatdefendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For
where, as in this case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not
reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the
criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9,
1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626,
634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly,
Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony
committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the death of the
offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability
is out. His civil liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal
liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the
civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby
we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source
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thereof criminal liability does not exist. And, as was well stated
in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally
liable in a civil suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce it fromthe criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3was adopted by the Supreme Court
in the cases ofPeople of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4People of the Philippines
v.Jaime Jose, et al. 5and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6by dismissing the appeal in
view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in theAlison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and
considering that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of
the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison
was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' CriminalLaw, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G.
4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases ofBuenaventura Belamala
v. Marcelino Polinar7andLamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8ruled
differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of
one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his
demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention
of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final judgment
extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in
view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act
No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code.
As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a
civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civilaction shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for
damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action
still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the
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civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction
of the criminal liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises
from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil
liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided,
of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle
does not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely
nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase andsale. (Emphasis ours)
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who
was charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the
property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded:
"Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal
liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations
remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused,notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of
his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the
following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court9requires the
dismissal of all money claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final
judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for
recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant
supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal,
"the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee
and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be substituted asdefendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule
established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be
predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil
liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely basedthereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
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However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10departed from this long-
established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and
convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only tothe extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was
clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already
extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's
conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he iscivilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability
survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him
of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and orderedhim to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be
P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the
criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a
separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for
the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People andManuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before
final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to beprosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had
been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives
him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336,
October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds
improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24
Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the
deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court
Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil
liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the
alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted
against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article
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30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform
this Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's
heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly
appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be
substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is
concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling
in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled
rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is
extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decisionin Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action
impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinctiondue to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the
Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego.Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction
over the accused's civil liability ex delictowhen his death supervenes during appeal. What
Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to
demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action.
In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil
case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is
compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil
action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether
civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted inthe criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by
the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised PenalCode is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
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1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death ofthe offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It
allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action
impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal
proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of
converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action
to an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the
filing of criminal proceedings. 12One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority
for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex
delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the
court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty
to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "everyperson criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the
criminal action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the
concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of
the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that
when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending
appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of
and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an
inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the
criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated underArticle 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does
not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977,
however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate
civil action referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary
judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent
one such as that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, theresolution of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his
criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estatewould be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld
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Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability.
Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of
Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already
extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon
death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil actioninstituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiegoresolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the
Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of
money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending
appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to beprosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of
Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had
been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action surviveshim. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural
law, this course taken inSendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by JusticeRegalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in
both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the provisions of Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that
where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had
already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now
the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise
appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment of the
component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has
been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonantto Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as being
clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions.
There is neither authority nor justification for its application in criminal
procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal
actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion from
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the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. .
. .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that
referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which
in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in
Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14are contractual money claims
while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of
personal or real property." 15Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what
claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last
illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is
clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration.
Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinarycontractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2)
allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused.
Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the
death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16(1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a
separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other
sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is
premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delictor may, by provision
of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action
must be filed against the executor or administrator 17of the estate of the accused pursuant
to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1.Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or
interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator;
but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from
the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for aninjury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18where we held that, in recovering
damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the
Civil Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of
deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule
explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the
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decedent, judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied.
Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other thanthose which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the
separate civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule86 of the Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this
regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and onlythe civil liability directlyarising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, ifthe same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19Article 1157
of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liabilitymay arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explainedabove.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file thisseparate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal
action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed
interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of
Article 115521of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription.22
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Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complainedof, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-51183 December 21, 1983
CARMEN L. MADEJA, petitioner,
vs.HON. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON, respondents.
Ernesto P. Miel for petitioner.
Gorgonio T. Alvarez for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS,J.:+.wph!1
In Criminal Case No. 75-88 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar, DR. EVAA. JAPZON is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto
Madeja after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased,
Carmen L. Madeja. The information states that: "The offended party Carmen L. Madeja
reserving her right to file a separate civil action for damages." (Rollo, p. 36.)
The criminal case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in
Civil Case No. 141 of the same court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross
negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which
reads:t.hqw
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included inthe preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted
separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action
can not be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal
action. ...
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According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of
Court, the instant civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been renderedin the criminal action." (Rollo, p. 33.)
The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 141 is highly impressed with merit.
Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the
applicable provision. The two enactments are quoted hereinbelow:t.hqw
Sec. 2. Independent civilaction. In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32,
33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case,
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence." (Rule 111, Rules of Court.)
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.(Civil Code,)
There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting,
namely:
1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifestfrom the provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal
prosecution." This conclusion is supported by the comment of the Code Commission,
thus:t.hqw
The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the
citizen to enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of
the action of the State attorney. It is not conducive to civic spirit and to
individual self-reliance and initiative to habituate the citizens to depend
upon the government for the vindication of their own private rights. It is true
that in many of the cases referred to in the provision cited, a criminal
prosecution is proper, but it should be remembered that while the State isthe complainant in the criminal case, the injured individual is the one most
concerned because it is he who has suffered directly. He should be permitted
to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects him. (Report, p.
46.)
And Tolentino says:t.hqw
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The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his
right to institute it separately; and after a criminal action has been
commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted.
The present articles creates an exception to this rule when the offense isdefamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be
filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no
reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes
such reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine
whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal
action has been terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent
of the result of the civil action." (I Civil Code, p. 144 [1974.])
2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical
injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but
consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide.t.hqw
The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical
injuries.' Defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense because
there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms
as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and
fraud must have been used not to impart to them any technical meaning in
the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent
circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not
have been used in its specific sense as a crime defined in the Revised Penal
Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have used
terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technicalsense. In other words, the term 'physical injuries' should be understood to
mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, bacause the terms used
with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission
recommended that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil
action for assault and battery in American Law, and this recommendation
must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article
intact as recommended. If the intent has been to establish a civil action for
the bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the civil action for
assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should lie
whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated
homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death," (Carandang vs. Santiago, 97Phil. 94, 96-97 [1955].)
Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, which states that reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence is not included in Article 33 of the Civil Code is not
authoritative. Of eleven justices only nine took part in the decision and four of them merely
concurred in the result.
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In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may
proceed independently of the criminal action against her.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the order dismissing Civil Case No. 141 ishereby set aside; no special pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.1wph1.t
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO,J., concurring:
I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil
action based on article 100 of the Penal Code or an action based on culpa aquiliana under
article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are assumed in article 2177 of the Civil
Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant"
(Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. SeeFormento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29 SCRA 437).
The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give riseto an independent civil action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence
is not included in article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it wasconcurred in by onlyfive Justices. Four Justices concurred in the result.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO,J., concurring:
I concur. Death due to a negligent act may be a delict or quasi-delict. It may create a civil
action based on article 100 of the Penal Code or an action based on culpa aquiliana under
article 2176 of the Civil Code. These alternatives are assumed in article 2177 of the Civil
Code "but the plaintiff cannot recover twice for the same act or omission of the defendant"
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(Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607 and Sudario vs. Acro Taxi and Yuson, 86 Phil. 1. See
Formento vs. CA, L-26442, August 29,1969,29 SCRA 437).
The term "physical injuries" in article 33 of the Civil Code includes death and may give riseto an independent civil action (Dyogi vs. Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095).
The rule in Corpus vs. Paje, L-26737, July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1062, that reckless imprudence
is not included in article 33 of the Civil Code, is not authoritative doctrine because it was
concurred in by onlyfive Justices. Four Justices concurred in the result.