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CRIM PRO DIGEST SEC 110
PEOPLE vs IBAÑEZ
Zaldy Ibañez y Francisco was charged with three counts of Rape under three informations, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cavite, Branch 21.
When arraigned, appellant entered pleas of not guilty. Whereupon, trial on the merits ensued.
On the first charge of rape, AAA testified that she was in their home at xxx, Cavite in June 1997. On the second charge of rape, AAA testified that appellant raped her eight times from January to December 1998 in their home and she did not tell her mother because she was afraid of appellant. AAA testified that the third rape happened sometime in the morning of April 1999 in their house while her mother was at work.
Appellant denied raping his daughter. As alibi, he claimed that he was often away from home and usually returned only four days after because he was hooked on gambling and drugs. He would usually return home in the morning after his wife had gone to work to avoid quarrels. By then, AAA would already be in school. He admitted being in a rehabilitation center for sometime, but continued to take drugs upon his release. He also admitted that he would beat and threaten his wife if she did not give him money for drugs. He testified further that in January 1999, he left the house, stayed in Pasig and returned home only to steal his wife’s car. his cousin to return it minus the stereo. When he returned home, his family After trial, the lower court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape in the first and last but was acquitted on the second.
ISSUE
should the precise dates of the commission of the rape be alleged in the information?
Ibanez: informations are not explicit and certain as to the dates of the rape. Such uncertainties run afoul of the constitutionally protected right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
HELD:
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of the crime charged. Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape, not the time of its commission. The gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. The precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its commission. Therefore, it is not essential that it be alleged in the information with ultimate precision.
Also, it cannot be seriously asserted that appellant was deprived of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him when the prosecution failed to state the exact date of the commission of the offense. At any rate, it is now too late for appellant to question the sufficiency of the criminal informations regarding the dates of the commission of the offense. Appellant could have filed a motion for a bill of particulars before his arraignment22 or a motion to quash on the ground that the informations alleged erroneous dates prior to his entry of plea. However, he did not. Instead, he had himself arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the crime of rape. Such being the case, appellant has waived his right to object to the informations on the ground of an error as to the time of the alleged rape.
MACASAET vs PEOPLE
In an Information dated 10 July 1997, Alfie Lorenzo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas Quijano, Jr., and Roger Parajes, columnist, publisher, managing editor, and editor, respectively of the newspaper 'Abante were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, with the crime of libel against JOSELITO MAGALLANES TRINIDAD a.k.a. JOEY TRINIDAD a.k.a. TOTO TRINIDAD, to his damage and prejudice.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the libel case on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the offense charged. According to petitioners, as the information discloses that the residence of private respondent was in Marikina, the RTC of Quezon City did not have jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.
The public prosecutor argued that the RTC, Quezon City, had jurisdiction over the case. He maintained that during the time material to this case, private respondent (private complainant below) was a resident of both 28-D Matino St. corner Malumanay St., Sikatuna Village, Quezon City and Karen St., Paliparan, Sto. Nio, Marikina, Metro , as shown in his Reply-Affidavit.
For their part, the petitioners and their co-accused countered that it was incorrect for the public prosecutor to refer to the affidavit purportedly executed by private respondent as it is 'axiomatic that the resolution of a motion to quash is limited to a consideration of the information as filed with the court, and no other. Further, as both the complaint-affidavit executed by private respondent and the information filed before the court state that private respondent's residence is in Marikina City, the dismissal of the case is warranted for the rule is that jurisdiction is determined solely by the allegations contained in the complaint or information.
Petitioners presented certifications issued by barangay captainsof Barangay Malaya, Quezon City and Barangay Sto. Nio, Marikina City showing that no records exist for P as a resident and another one showing that Trinidad is a resident of Marikina and also presented was the editorial box appearing in page 18 of Abante indicating that the tabloid maintains its editorial and business offices at Rm. 301/305, 3/F BF Condominium Bldg., Solana cor. A. Soriano Sts., Intramuros, .
In his Rejoinder to Supplemental Reply,[14] private respondent contended that the certification issued by thebarangay captain of Barangay Malaya was issued after he had already moved out of the apartment unit he was renting in
Sikatuna Village, Quezon City; that owners of residential houses do not usually declare they rent out rooms to boarders in order to avoid payment of local taxes; and that there is no showing that a census was conducted among the residents of Barangay Malaya during the time he resided therein.
On 24 November 1997, the trial court rendered an Order dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction.[15]The court a quo noted that although the information alleged the venue of this case falls within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, the evidence submitted for its consideration indicated otherwise.
Private respondent insist that at the time the alleged libelous article was published, he was actually residing in Quezon City. According to him, he mistakenly stated that he was a resident of Marikina City at the time of publication of the claimed defamatory article because he understood the term 'address' to mean the place where he originally came from. Nevertheless, the error was rectified by his supplemental affidavit which indicated Quezon City as his actual residence at the time of publication of the 13 July 1996 issue of Abante. He attached an affidavit executed by a certain Cristina B. Del Rosario, allegedly the owner of the house and lot in Sikatuna Village, Quezon City, where private respondent supposedly lived from July 1996 until May 1997
tuallawlibrary
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY HAS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ADMITTING THE AFFIDAVIT OF CRISTINA B. DEL ROSARIO.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENT TRINIDAD'S PERSONALITY TO APPEAL A
CRIMINAL CASE.[24]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
HELD
We find merit in the petition and therefore grant the same..
In criminal actions, it is a fundamental rule that venue is jurisdictional. Thus, the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.
The law, however, is more particular in libel cases. The possible venues for the institution of the criminal and the civil aspects of said case are concisely outlined in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4363.
We summarized the foregoing rule in the following manner:
1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First
Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense.
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be
filed in the Court of First Instance of .
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of , the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.[39]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In the case at bar, private respondent was a private citizen at the time of the publication of the alleged libelous article, hence, he could only file his libel suit in the City of where Abante was first published or in the province or city where he actually resided at the time the purported libelous article was printed.
A perusal, however, of the information involved in this case easily reveals that the allegations contained therein are utterly insufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC of Quezon City. Other than perfunctorily stating 'Quezon City at the beginning of the information, the assistant city prosecutor who prepared the information did not bother to indicate whether the jurisdiction of RTC Quezon City was invoked either because Abantewas printed in that place or private respondent was a resident of said city at the time the claimed libelous article came out. As these matters deal with the fundamental issue of the court's jurisdiction, Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, mandates that either one of these statements must be alleged in the information itself and the absence of both from the very face of the information renders the latter fatally defective. Sadly for private respondent, the information filed before the trial court falls way short of this requirement. The assistant city prosecutor's failure to properly lay the basis for invoking the jurisdiction of the RTC, Quezon City, effectively denied said court of the power to take cognizance of this case.
In order to obviate controversies as to the venue of the criminal action for written defamation, the complaint or
information should contain allegations as to whether, at the time the offense was committed, the offended party was a
public officer or a private individual and where he was actually residing at that time. Whenever possible, the place where the
written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was printed and first
published is used as the basis of the venue of the action.[40]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Anent private respondent and OSG's contention that the supplemental affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation of this libel suit cured the defect of the information, we find the same to be without merit. It is jurisprudentially settled that jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information.[41] In resolving a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction, the general rule is that the facts contained in the complaint or information should be taken as they are.[42]The exception to this rule is where the Rules of Court allow
the investigation of facts alleged in a motion to quash[43] such as when the ground invoked is the extinction of criminal liability, prescriptions, double jeopardy, or insanity of the accused.[44] In these instances, it is incumbent upon the trial court to conduct a preliminary trial to determine the merit of the motion to dismiss. As the present case obviously does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions, the trial court correctly dismissed this action..
(regards the Affidavit of Del Rosario) By the very nature of a supplemental pleading, it only seeks to reinforce and augment the allegations contained in the principal pleading. It does not serve to supplant that which it merely supplements; rather, it ought to co-exist with the latter. Further, the admission of a supplemental pleading is not something that parties may impose upon the court for we have consistently held that its admittance is something which is addressed to the discretion of the court.
Explicit in the aforequoted provision of the Rules of Court is the requirement that the contents of a supplemental pleading should deal with transactions, occurrences or events which took place after the date of the pleading it seeks to supplement. A reading of the supplemental motion for reconsideration filed by private respondent discloses no additional or new matters which transpired after he filed his original motion for reconsideration.
Finally, we come to the issue of whether the private prosecutor and the public prosecutor had the personality to file the notice of appeal before the trial court.
Petitioners insist that the OSG should have been the one to file said notice in its capacity as the 'sole representative of the [g]overnment in the Court of Appeals in criminal cases.
Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases. In such capacity, it only takes over a criminal case after the same has reached the appellate courts. The next question should then be: when does the jurisdiction of the trial court end and that of the Court of Appeals commence? Happily, the Revised Rules of Court is clear on this point. Rule 41, Section 9 of the Rules states that '(i)n appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.[49] When a party files a notice of appeal, the trial court's jurisdiction over the case does not cease as a matter of course; its only effect is that the appeal is deemed perfected as to him.[50] As explained by our former colleague, Justice Florenz Regalado '
. . . [I]n the meantime, the trial court still retains jurisdiction over the case. However, where all the parties have either thus perfected their appeals, by filing their notices of appeal in due time and the period to file such notice of appeal has lapsed for those who did not do so, then the trial court loses jurisdiction over the case as of the filing of the last notice of appeal or the
expiration of the period to do so for all the parties.[51]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Applied to the case at bar, we deem it proper that the notice of appeal was filed by the private and the public prosecutors before the trial court. The Rules cannot be any clearer: until the filing of the last notice of appeal and the expiration of the period to perfect an appeal by all the parties, the lower court still has jurisdiction over the case. It is only after the occurrence of these two incidents when the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals begins and at which time the OSG is supposed to take charge of the case on behalf of the government.
BANAL vs PANGANIBAN
A complaint was filed by respondents against P for his articles entitled “House of the Rising Sun” and “Heist Cold Beer” which appeared in P “ Breaktime” column in the August 1 and August 12, 2000 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Six informations were filed and upon arraignment,
“published in English in the City of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and of general circulation in the Philippines and abroad:
P entered a plea of not guilty. He filed a motion to quash the six informations on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He argued that the informations failed to allege the actual residence of the R at the time of the commission of the offense or the place where the article was printed and first published.
TC granted the motion to quash.
R: it was merely a formal defect
Issue
Whether the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense YES
Whether the amendment was formal or substantial FORMAL
HELD
We find that the original information is sufficient in form. Allowing the amendment does not alter the defense of the accused. Indeed, it only states with precision that which is already contained in the original information.
it was clearly stated in the information that the newspaper is published in Makati City but circulated throughout the country, which allegation accordingly vests jurisdiction over the offense charged in the RTC of Makati City.
Moreover, the amendment in the informations was one of form. Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. In the instant case, the amendment was done after petitioner's arraignment and with prior leave of court. The amendment which states, 'That the libelous article above-quoted was printed and first published in the City of Makati, more particularly at 3817 Mascardo street, Makati City and/or at 1098 Chino Roces Avenue (formerly Pasong Tamo) corner Yague and Mascardo Streets, Makati City,is merely formal.
An amendment is only in form when it merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.
A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an amendment to an information introduced after the accused has pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge which could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance ' not prejudicial to the accused, and therefore, not prohibited by Section 13, Rule 110 (now Section 14) of the Revised Rules of Court
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs DOJ
R Martels are directors of R SENCOR, an information technology firm. P is a GOCC which provides financial benefits to private sector employees.
P filed a complaint against R for non payment of contributions from January 1991 to May 1997. R offered to assign to P a parcel of land in Tagaytay City. P accepted the offer subject to the condition that R will settle their obligation either by way of dacion en pago or through cash settlement within a reasonable time.
R then wrote to P offering in lieu of Tagaytay property, computer related services. P filed with the Pasay Prosecutor Office a complaint against R this time from Feb 1991 to Oct 2000.
R: P is stopped because it already accepted the offer of assignment as payment. The relationship was converted into an ordinary debtor-creditor relationship.
Pasay Prosecutor Puti found probable cause.
R appealed to the DOJ which set aside Puti’s resolution.
CA agreed with DOJ.
ISSUE
Whether the concept of novation serves to abate the prosecution of R Martels
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the DOJ’s rulings because (1) respondent Martels were charged not with Estafa but with violation of Section 22(a) and (b) in relation to Section 28(e) of RA 1161, as amended, a special law impressed with public interest; (2) petitioner did not agree to settle respondent Martels’ criminal liability; and (3) novation serves only to negate civil, but not criminal, liability.
Petitioner contended that although respondent Martels attempted to pay SENCOR’s overdue contributions through dacion en pago, no payment took place, as evidenced by respondent Martels’ alternative offer to provide computer related services to petitioner instead of assigning the Tagaytay Cityrealty. On respondent Martels’ partial payment of SENCOR’s liability, petitioner contended that such does not preclude the resolution of this petition.
In their Comment, respondent Martels countered that the DOJ correctly applied the concept of novation as they had settled SENCOR’s liability. Respondent Martels added that as of the filing of their Comment, they had already paid P17,887,442.54 of SENCOR’s liability.
HELDWe rule in the negative and accordingly grant the petition.
It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means recognized by the Penal Code whereby criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of novation may only be to either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction, whether or not it was such that its breach would not give rise to penal responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to
The facts of this case negate the application of novation. In the first place, there is, between SENCOR and petitioner, no original contract that can be replaced by a new contract changing the object or principal condition of the original contract, substituting the person of the debtor, or subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. The original relationship between SENCOR and petitioner is defined by law – RA 1161, as amended – which requires employers like SENCOR to make periodic contributions to petitioner under pain of criminal prosecution. Unless Congress enacts a law further amending RA 1161 to give employers a chance to settle their overdue contributions to prevent prosecution, no amount of agreements between petitioner and SENCOR (represented by respondent Martels) can change the nature of their relationship and the consequence of SENCOR’s non-payment of contributions.
Prosecutors’ Findings Not Conclusive
In dismissing petitioner’s petition, the Court of Appeals held:
[T]his Court has no power to determine whether probable cause to warrant prosecution exist or not. x x x [T]he determination of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the prosecution in court of [respondent Martels] should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of Justice as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutor x x x.
In this Petition, We are being asked to assume the function of Public Prosecutor by determining whether probable cause exists or not. Such is a function that this Court should not be called upon to perform x x x.
This is a misstatement of the law. This Court and the Court of Appeals possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations.[ Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutor’s findings, courts should never shirk from exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine whether the prosecutor’s findings are supported by the facts, or as in this case, by the law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary, exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial rules to settle cases and controversies. Indeed, the exercise of this Court’s review power ensures that, on the one hand, probable criminals are prosecuted and, on the other hand, the innocent are spared from baseless prosecution.
PINOTE vs AYCO
Facts
Judge Ayco allowed the defense in People vs Vice Mayor Salvador to present evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses even in the absence of State Prosecutor Pinote who was prosecuting the case.
Pinote was undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center hence his absence. On the subsequent hearings, he refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses despite being ordered by the judge, he maintaining that the bbproceedings conducted in his absence were void.
Judge considered the prosecution to have waived it right to cross examine. Hence, an administrative complaint was lodged by Pinote against Ayco.
R: considering the prosecution to have waived presenting evidence, respondent justifies the same on complainant’s failure to formally offer the evidence for the prosecution despite several extensions of time granted for the purpose. No substantial prejudice was suffered by the prosecution for complainant was permitted to cross examine the two defense witnesses but he refused to do so.
Office of the Court Administrator: finds respondent to have breached Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure and accordingly recommends that he be reprimanded therefor, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and direction of the public prosecutor.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness. It is on this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial
of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people.
Respondent’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence of complainant public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the purpose is thus a clear transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.
Respondent’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.
PEOPLE vs DIMAANO
Facts
Maricar Dimaano charged her father with two counts of rape and one count of attempted rape in the complaints.
R pleaded not guilty. R was born on August 26, 1983 and was 10 yrs old when she was first sexually abused.
Maricar executed and signed a Compromise Agreement and a Salaysay sa Paguurong ng Sumbong but wasn’t assisted by a lawyer then.
Issue
w/n the voluntary and due execution of the affidavit of desistance by the private complainant should have been duly considered as a factor which put to doubt the reasons behind the filing of the criminal charges of rape against accused
HELD
SIR: Practical Side
Who is assigned to the judge of the numerous prosecutor? Should he be the same judge who executed preliminary investigation?
IS the one who endorses the information necessarily the one to file the information in court? Not necessarily but it is possible
Is there a conflict of interest? No, coz its raffled. NO COI in prosecutors who conducted PI and same also prosecuted
A case is filed and raffled. Prosecutor conducts PI If he prepares a resolution, it doesn’t mean he will prosecute. All the prosecutors are assigned for a distinct judge. It is possible that one PI, he will also prosecute. Kasi naraffled.
Appellant;s reliance on complainant’s affidavit of desistance deserves scant consideration. A survey of our jurisdicition reveals that the court attaches no persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought. The unreliable character of this document is shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that a victim, after going through the trouble of having the appellant arrested. Too, complainant repudiated the affidavit stating that no lawyer assisted her when she affixed her signature. A criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereign State and to the State belongs the power to prosecute and punish crimes. By itself, an affidavit of desistance is not a ground for dismissal.
CRIM PROC relevance:
The complaint for attempted rape quoted:
“xxx the above name accused, TRY and ATTEMPT to rape xxx”
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense, the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was committed.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. Whet facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the crimes. This is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
The complaint upon the accused does not allege specific acts or omission constituting the elements of rape. The allegation that R “tried and attempted to rape” does not satisfy the test of sufficiency of a complaint but is merely a conclusion of law by the one who drafted the complaint. The insufficiency thereof violated the right of the appellant to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
SASOT vs PEOPLE
The NBI conducted an investigation pursuant to a complaint by the NBA Properties, Inc against P for possible violation of Art. 189 of the RPC on unfair competition.
Prosecution Gutierrez recommended the filing of an Information against P.
P moved to quash the information arguing that the fiscal should have dismissed the complaint because under the rules, it must be sworn to before the prosecutor and the copy on record appears to be only a fax transmittal. It also contended that the complainant is a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines and cannot be protected by Phil patent laws. Also they have been using the business name ALLANDALE SPORTLS LINE Inc and their designs are original.
Prosecutor filed an opposition and contented that the State is entitled to prosecute the offense even without the participation of the private offended party, as the crime charged is a public crime
TC sustained the prosecution’s arguments.
P filed an action for certiorari. CA dismissed the action
Petitioners reiterate the argument that the complaint filed by Rick Welts of the NBA Properties, Inc., is defective and should have been dismissed by the fiscal because it should have been personally sworn to by the complainant before the investigating prosecutor. They also reiterate the claim that Welts failed to show any board resolution showing his authority to institute any action in behalf of the company, and that the NBA’s trademarks are not being actually used in the Philippines, hence, they are of public dominion and cannot be protected by Philippine patent laws. Petitioners further contend that they have not committed acts amounting to unfair competition.[18]
The Office of the Solicitor General appeared in behalf of the People, and filed its Amended Comment to the petition, praying for its dismissal, arguing that the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for reasons stated in its Decision dated January 26, 2000
HELD
Petition denied
We do not find any justification for the quashal of the info
Nowhere in section 3 Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of CRIMPRO is there any mention of the defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainant’s capacity to sue as grounds for a motion to quash.
For another, under Section 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint is substantially sufficient if it states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by complainant’s affidavit and his witnesses and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood their affidavits. All these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed before Prosecution Attorney Aileen Marie S. Gutierrez. It must be noted that even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily render it invalid. Want of oath is a mere defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights of the defendant on the merits
In this case, Welts’s Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by Notary Public Nicole Brown of the State of New York that the same has been subscribed and sworn to before her on February 12, 1998, duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate. While the copy on record of the complaint-affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosecution Attorney Gutierrez stated that complainant’s representative will present the authenticated notarized original in court, and Prosecutor Guray manifested that the original copy is already on handIt is apt to state at this point that the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy
Moreover, records shoes that there are other supporting documents from which the prosecutor based his recommendation.
Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court should respect such determination
More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code is a public crime. It is essentially an act against the State and it is the latter which principally stands as the injured party. The complainant’s capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial.
If prosecution follows after the completion of the preliminary investigation being conducted by the Special Prosecutor the information shall be in the name of the People of the Philippines and no longer the petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is essentially an act against the State. It is the latter which is principally the injured party although there is a private right violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue would become, therefore, of not much significance in the main case. We cannot allow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to escape prosecution upon a far-fetched contention that the aggrieved party or victim of a crime has no standing to sue.
LASOY vs ZENAROSA
An information was filed against the accused for unlawfully selling a total of “42.410 grams of marijuana”. On arraignment, they entered a plea of guilty.
The Prosecutor filed two separate motions 1. To admit the amended information and 2. To set aside the arraignment of the accused. The amended information changed the weigh from GRAMS to KILOS. For failing to reflect the true quantity of
drugs caught in the possession of the accused, the first information is invalid.
Both accused filed a motion to quash. Tc denied the motion to quash and scheduled the arraignment of the accused under the amended information.
TC: This fraudulent alteration necessarily vitiated the integrity of the proceedings such that despite the plea of guilt made by the accused it would not bar a subsequent prosecution for the correct offense.
Generally speaking to entitle accused to the plea of former jeopardy, the prior proceedings must have been valid, and the lack of any fundamental requisite which would render void the judgment would also make ineffective a plea of jeopardy based on such proceedings.
Fraudulent or collusive prosecution. A verdict of acquittal procured by accused by fraud and collusion is a nullity and does not put him in jeopardy; and consequently it is no bar to a second trial for the same offense.
Similarly, a conviction of a criminal offense procured fraudulently or by collusion of the offender, for the purpose of protecting himself from further prosecution and adequate punishment, is no bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense, either on the ground that the conviction is void because of the fraud practiced, or that the state is not in any sense a party to it and therefore not bound by it.
It is impossible to believe that the accused were not aware of the deceitful maneuvering which led to the erasure of the true weight of the marijuana fruiting tops as alleged in the information.
They cannot pretend not to know the exact amount of prohibited stuff for which they were charged before the information was tampered with.
They could not feign innocence when they participated in that charade when they pleaded guilty upon arraignment.
Consequently, their plea to the lesser offense considering the decreased weight in the now altered information which merited a much lighter penalty was irregularly obtained. Hence, they cannot be considered as put in jeopardy by the proceedings in court which was tainted with fraud.
Issue
After an information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned, pleaded guilty and were convicted and after they had applied for probation, may the information be amended and the accused arraigned anew on the ground that the information was allegedly altered/tampered with?
P: WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO VALID
INFORMATION AND, THEREFORE, THE ACCUSED CANNOT CLAIM THE RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY
HELD
To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
WE DO NOT AGREE WITH THE TRIAL COURT
First question to ask is whether the first information is invalid: No
An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.[35]
In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by law.[36]
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is reasonably complied with.
Furthermore, the first information, applying Rule 110,[37] Section 6, shows on its face that it is valid.
Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
Second, and with respect specifically to the trial court’s point of view that the accused cannot claim their right against double jeopardy because they “participated/acquiesced to the tampering,” we hold that while this may not be far-fetched, there is actually no hard evidence thereof.[38] Worse, we cannot overlook the fact that accused were arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and convicted under the first information. Granting that alteration/tampering took place and the accused had a hand in it, this does not justify the setting aside of the decision. The alleged tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by the accused may well be the subject of another inquiry.
Indeed, the belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the information amended defies procedural rules, the decision having attained finality after the accused applied for probation and the fact that amendment is no longer allowed at that stage.
Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure is emphatic:
Sec. 14. Amendment. – The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham.
The Constitution is very explicit. Article III, Section 21, mandates that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. In this case, it bears repeating that the accused had been arraigned and convicted. In fact, they were already in the stage where they were applying for probation. It is too late in the day for the prosecution to ask for the amendment of the information and seek to try again accused for the same offense without violating their rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of an information by motion of the prosecution and at the time when the accused had already been convicted is contrary to procedural rules and violative of the rights of the accused.
RICARZE vs COURT OF APPEALS
P was collector-messenger by City Service Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in messengerial services. He was assigned to the main office of Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati City. His primary task was to collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier.
Caltex filed a criminal complaint against P for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. It was discovered that a check payable to Dante Gutierrez had been cleared through PCIB. It was also found out that two checks were missing and that the signatures were forgeries. The checks were deposited at BDO in the name of a regular customer of Caltex named Gutierrez. Gutierrez however disowned the savings account. Further investigation revealed that the account was actually opened by P.
In the meantime, PICB credited the amount of the check to Caltex. However, the city prosecutor was not informed of this development. After the requisite PI, two informations for estafa was filed.
Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded not guilty to both charges.[6] Pre-trial ensued and the cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented its witnesses, after which the Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offices (SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of Evidence.[7]Petitioner opposed the pleading, contending that the private complainant was represented by the ACCRA Law Offices and the Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial, and it was only after the prosecution had rested its case that SRMO entered its appearance as private prosecutor representing the PCIB. Since the ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had not withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no personality to appear as private prosecutor. Under the Informations, the private complainant is Caltex and not PCIB; hence, the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should be stricken from the records.
Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the private complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out, however, that the Informations can no longer be amended because he had already been arraigned under the original Informations.[8] He insisted that the amendments of the Informations to substitute PCIB as the offended party for Caltex would place him in double jeopardy.
PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended that the PCIB had re-credited the amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant. Consequently, the PCIB is entitled to receive any civil indemnity which the trial court would adjudge against the accused. Moreover, the re-credited amount was brought out on cross-examination by Ramon Romano who testified for the Prosecution. PCIB pointed out that petitioner had marked in evidence the letter of the ACCRA Law Office to PCIBank dated October 10, 1997 and the credit memo sent by PCIB to Caltex
Petitioner filed a Motion to Expunge the Opposition of SRMO. In his Rejoinder, he averred that the substitution of PCIB as private complainant cannot be made by mere oral motion; the Information must be amended to allege that the private complainant was PCIB and not Caltex after the preliminary investigation of the appropriate complaint of PCIB before the Makati City Prosecutor.
In response, the PCIB, through SRMO, averred that as provided in Section 2, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the erroneous designation of the name of the offended party is a mere formal defect which can be cured by inserting the name of the offended party in the Information.
P: THE SUBSTITUTION OF PCIBANK WILL SUBSTANTIALLY PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER HENCE, IT IS PROHIBITED BY SEC. 14 OF RULE 110.
: CHARGES SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE THE ALLEGATIONS FAILED TO NAME PCIB AS TRUE OFFENDED PARTY
HELD
Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Rules, all criminal actions covered by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal acts is impliedly instituted, and the offended party has not waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it separately or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, the prosecution of the action (including the civil) remains under the control and supervision of the publicprosecutor. The prosecution of offenses is a public function. Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the criminal action personally or by counsel, who will act as private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. The multiplicity of suits must be avoided
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the following are the civil liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. – The civil liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103 of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
On the other hand, Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
Thus, before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.[24] The following have been held to be mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged.[25]
The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.[26]
In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.
Petitioner’s argument on subrogation is misplaced. The Court agrees with respondent PCIB’s comment that petitioner failed to make a distinction between legal and conventional
subrogation. Thus, petitioner’s acquiescence is not necessary
for subrogation to take place because the instant case is one of legal subrogation that occurs by operation of law, and without need of the debtor’s knowledge
Thus, being subrogated to the right of Caltex, PCIB, through counsel, has the right to intervene in the proceedings, and under substantive laws is entitled to restitution of its properties or funds, reparation, or indemnification
Petitioner’s gripe that the charges against him should be dismissed because the allegations in both Informations failed to name PCIB as true offended party does not hold water.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was committed.
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the complaint or information.
On the other hand, Section 12 of the same Rule provides:
Section. 12. Name of the offended party. –The complaint or information must state the name and surname of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known. If there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
(a) In offenses against property, if the name of the offended party is unknown, the property must be described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged.
(b) If the true name of the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed is thereafter disclosed or ascertained, the court must cause such true name to be inserted in the complaint or information and the record.
(c) If the offended party is a juridical person, it is sufficient to state its name, or any name or designation by which it is known or by which it may be identified, without need of averring that it is a juridical person or that it is organized in accordance with law.
In Sayson v. People,[33] the Court held that in case of offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified:
TORRES vs AGUINALDO
Facts
R spouses filed a complaint against P for falsification of public document. They alleged that titles to their properties were transferred without their knowledge and consent in the name of Torres through a forged Deed of Sale.
Torres denied the allegations of forgery and claimed that Aguinaldo sold the subject properties to him as evidenced by the Deed of Absolute Sale
Finding probable cause, the OCP recommended the filing of an information for falsification of public document against Torres
On appeal, the Secretary of Justice reversed the findings of the investigating prosecutor and ordered the withdrawal of the information.
A Motion to Withdraw Information] was filed which the MTC granted It should be noted that petitioner has not been arraigned
Meanwhile, Aguinaldo filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari which was granted in the assailed decision
ISSUE
I. Whether the order of the MTC-Manila dated June 11, 2003 granting the motion to withdraw the information rendered moot the petition for certiorari filed by Aguinaldo for the purpose of reinstating the resolution of the OCP of Manila; and in the alternative, whether the rule on provisional dismissal under Section 8, Rule 117 applies. NO
II. Whether Aguinaldo committed forum shopping. NO, distinct causes of action
III. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in reinstating the April 30, 2001 order of the OCP of Manila finding probable cause against petitioner. YES
HELD
I. A motion to withdraw information differs from a motion to dismiss. While both put an end to an action filed in court, their legal effect varies. The order granting the withdrawal of the information attains finality after fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof, without prejudice to the re-filing of the information upon reinvestigation.
On the other hand, the order granting a motion to dismiss becomes final fifteen (15) days after receipt thereof, with prejudice to the re-filing of the same case once such order achieves finality
In the case at bar, a motion to withdraw information was filed and not a motion to dismiss. Hence, Bañares II v. Balising would not apply. Unlike a motion to dismiss, a motion to withdraw information is not time-barred and does not fall
within the ambit of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Even assuming that the Motion to Withdraw Information is the same as a Motion to Dismiss, we do not find that it complied with the above requisites. The Motion to Withdraw Information was filed by the Assistant City Prosecutor and approved by the City Prosecutor without the conformity of the accused, herein petitioner Torres. Thus, it cannot be said that the motion was filed with his express consent as required under Section 8, Rule 117.
III
In sum, prosecutors control and direct the prosecution of criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by the Secretary of Justice. While his resolution is persuasive, it is not binding on the courts. The trial court must at all times make its own independent assessment of the merits of each case.
Thus, it is only where the decision of the Justice Secretary, or the trial court, as the case may be, is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that the Court of Appeals may take cognizance of the case in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure whose decision may then be appealed to this Court by way of a petition for review on certiorari.
The Court of Appeals held that the Justice Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion because he based his findings on the lack of probable cause on the 1991 Deed of Sale when what was assailed was the 1979 Deed of Sale.[30] It ruled that the defenses raised by Torres should not have been considered during the preliminary investigation but should be threshed out only during trial.[31] Only the evidence presented by the complainant should be considered in determining probable cause or the lack thereof.
We are not persuaded.
The Court of Appeals erred in relying solely on the affidavit-complaint and the NBI report[32] and disregarding totally the counter-affidavit and documentary evidence of petitioner.
It is well to note that Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure not only requires the submission of the complaint and the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, as well as other supporting documents, but also directs the respondent to submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for his defense. Section 4 thereof also mandates the investigating prosecutor to certify under oath in the information that the accused was informed of the complaint and the evidence against him, and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence.
Thus, in determining the existence or absence of probable cause, the investigating officer shall examine the complaint and documents in support thereof as well as the controverting
evidence presented by the defense. While the validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation and the admissibility of the testimonies and evidence are best ventilated in a full blown trial, still, in a preliminary investigation, a proper consideration of the complaint and supporting evidence as well as the controverting evidence, is warranted to determine the persons who may be reasonably charged with the crime. The determination must be based on the totality of evidence presented by both parties.
Prescinding from these premises, we find that the Justice Secretary did not abuse his discretion in examining both the evidence presented by the complainant and the accused in determining the existence or the lack of probable cause.
There is basis in his finding that no probable cause exists. The complaint and the 1979 Deed of Sale do not connect petitioner with the crime of falsification. While the NBI report showed that the 1979 Deed of Sale was falsified, there is no showing that petitioner was the author thereof. We cannot discern direct and personal participation by the petitioner in the alleged forged deed. While a finding of probable cause rests on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and was committed by the accused, the existence of such facts and circumstance must be strong enough to create a rational and logical nexus between the acts and omissions and the accused.
The allegation that petitioner effectuated the illicit transfer of the disputed properties in his name is without factual basis. He was not in possession of the alleged forged deed which does not even bore his signature. We find merit in his contention that the subject properties were sold to him on March 10, 1991 considering that the new TCTs were issued in his name only on March 26, 1991. His address mentioned in the 1979 Deed of Sale was non-existent yet in 1979, thus giving the impression that it was executed on a later date. It would be absurd for petitioner to use the 1979 Deed of Sale to facilitate the transfer on March 26, 1991 considering his possession of the March 10, 1991 Deed of Sale.
Torres has no reason to falsify the 1979 Deed of Sale when he had in his possession the 1991 Deed of Sale which he claims to be authentic. By presenting the alleged forged deed of sale, respondents cast a cloud of doubt on petitioner’s title. While motive is not reasonable basis in determining probable cause, the absence thereof further obviates the probability of petitioner’s guilt.
The Secretary of Justice did not whimsically and capriciously exercise his discretion. His findings was grounded on sound statutory and factual basis. Chief Justice Andres Narvasa in his separate opinion in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals[37] declared that the determination of probable cause to warrant the prosecution in court should be consigned and entrusted to the Department of Justice, as reviewer of the findings of the public prosecutors. To do otherwise is to usurp a duty that exclusively pertains to an executive official.
"the power of control therein contemplated means to alter, modify, or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." For, while it is the duty of the fiscal to prosecute persons who, according to evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime, the Secretary of Justice is likewise bound by his oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless, false or serious prosecution. He would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he orders or sanctions the filing of an information based upon a complaint where he is not convinced that the evidence warrants the filing of the action in court.
SOBERANO vs PEOPLE
Facts
The prominent Public relations practitioner, Salvador Dacer, together with his driver was abducted along Zobel Roxas St. Manila. They were killed by strangulation and their charred remains were later found in Cavite.
An information was filed by the prosecutors charging a number of accused some of whom are public officers of double murder.
The prosecution filed a motion to admit amended information which was granted and admitted by the trial court.
The Amended information read:
xxx “,abduct SALVADOR (Bubby) DACER and EMMANUEL CORBITO at the corner of Osmeña Highway (formerly South Super Highway) and Zobel Roxas Street in Manila, and later brought them to Indang, Cavite”
Meanwhile, Villanueva filed a motion for reinvestigation asserting that he was mistakenly identified as a participant in the double murder. This was granted.
A Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended Information[13] dated 17 September 2001 was filed by the prosecution. The Amended Information ---
(1) discharged accused Jimmy L. Lopez, Alex B. Diloy, William L. Lopez and Glen Dumlao as they are now witnesses for the State;
(2) substituted SPO3 Allan Villanueva for P/Insp. Danilo Villanueva; and
(3) charged as additional accused P/Supt. Michael Ray Aquino, P/Supt. Cezar Mancao II and P/Sr. Supt. Teofilo Viña.
ISSUE
the fundamental issue that must be resolved concerns the duty of a trial court judge when confronted with a motion to admit amended information excluding some of the accused named in
the original information for utilization as witnesses for the State.
HELD
The key lies in the correct interpretation of two pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e., Section 14 of Rule 110 on amendment of information and Section 17 of Rule 119 on the discharge of an accused as state witness.
Section 14, Rule 110 states
Section 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.
On the other hand, Section 17, Rule 119 provides:
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness. – When two or more persons are jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence.
There can be no quarrel as to the fact that what is involved here is primary an amendment of an information to exclude some accused and that the same is made before plea. Thus, at the very least, Section 14, Rule 110 is applicable which means that the amendment should be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. What seems to complicate the situation is that the exclusion of the accused is specifically sought for the purpose of discharging them as witnesses for the State. The consequential question is, should the requirements for discharge of an accused as state witness as set forth in Section 17, Rule 119 be made as additional requirements (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 and Section 17, Rule 119) or should only one provision apply as ruled by the trial court and the Court of Appeals (i.e., Section 14, Rule 110 or Section 17, Rule 119)?
An amendment of the information made before plea which excludes some or one of the accused must be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court in compliance with Section 14, Rule 110. Section 14, Rule 110 does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of the accused. Thus, said provision applies in equal force when the exclusion is sought on the usual ground of lack of probable cause, or when it is for utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this case, or on some other ground.
At this level, the procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on the need for the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge do not yet come into play. This is because, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the determination of who should be criminally charged in court is essentially an executive function, not a judicial one. [29] The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.[30] By virtue of the trial court having granted the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation, the former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of the Government.[31] Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion -- wide and far reaching – regarding the disposition thereof.
Thus, as in almost all things, the prosecution’s discretion is not boundless or infinite. The prosecution must satisfy for itself that an accused excluded from the information for purposes of utilizing him as state witness is qualified therefor.
The situation is different in cases when an accused is retained in the information but his discharge as state witness is sought thereafter by the prosecution before it rests its case, in which event, the procedural (in addition to the
substantive) requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 apply. Otherwise stated, when no amendment to the information is involved as a by-product of reinvestigation and trial proceeds thereafter, the discharge of the accused falls squarely and solely within the ambit of Section 17, Rule 119.
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is in a situation where the accused to be discharged is included in the information that the prosecution must present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge in order to convince the judge, upon whom discretion rests, as to the propriety of discharging the accused as state witness.
Having thus ruled, it now behooves upon this Court to determine whether the Court of Appeals was correct in admitting the amended information insofar as the discharge of JIMMY L. LOPEZ, WILLIAM LOPEZ and ALEX B. DILOY is concerned.
It is undisputed that the motion to admit amended information seeking the exclusion of the above-named accused (together with P/Sr. Supt. GLEN G. DUMLAO) was with notice to the offended party and was set for hearing. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s grant of the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation operates as leave of court to amend the information, if the situation so warrants.
Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we agree with the Court of Appeals considering that we do not perceive here any impairment of the substantial rights of all the accused or the right of the people to due process.
As we have discussed earlier in this decision, the trial court is with discretion to grant or deny the amendment of the information. In general, its discretion is hemmed in by the proscription against impairment of the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law. In this case, in denying the motion to admit amended information, the trial court simply said that the same was violative of Section 17, Rule 119 without stating the reasons therefor. And for this lapse, the trial court has indeed erred
One final point. In the Decision of the Court of Appeals, it held that the discharge or exclusion of P/Sr. Supt. Glen Dumlao from the Amended Information finds no legal basis under Republic Act No. 6981[35] for he is a law enforcement officer. The original information, according to the Court of Appeals, should stand insofar as Dumlao is concerned.
Section 3, Rep. Act No. 6981 provides:
SEC. 3. Admission into the Program. – Any person who has witnessed or has knowledge or information on the commission of a crime and has testified or is testifying or about to testify before any judicial or quasi-judicial body, or before any investigating authority, may be admitted into the Program:
Provided, That
a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the Revised Penal Code, or its equivalent under special laws;
b) his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
c) he or any member of his family within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity is subjected to threats to his life or bodily injury or there is a likelihood that he will be killed, forced, intimidated, harassed or corrupted to prevent him from testifying, or to testify falsely, or evasively, because or on account of his testimony; and
d) he is not a law enforcement officer, even if he would be testifying against other law enforcement officers. In such a case, only the immediate members of his family may avail themselves of the protection provided for under this Act.
If the Department, after examination of said applicant and other relevant facts, is convinced that the requirements of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations have been complied with, it shall admit said applicant to the Program, require said witness to execute a sworn statement detailing his knowledge or information on the commission of the crime, and thereafter issue the proper certification. For purposes of this Act, any such person admitted to the Program shall be known as the Witness.
It must be stressed that Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 6981 enumerates the requirements before a person may be admitted to the WPP. It does not state that if an accused cannot be admitted to the WPP, he cannot be discharged as a witness for the state. Admission to the WPP and being discharged as an accused are two different things. Dumlao’s being a law enforcement officer and, thus, disqualified to be under the WPP, do not in any way prohibit him to be discharged from the information.
