Spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching Teng vs. Vicente BalboaG.R. No. 158177

Facts:

Vicente Balboa filed a civil case for collection of money against Caroline Siok Ching Teng with the Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. It was rooted to the three (3) post-dated checks issued by Caroline in the total amount of Php5,175,250.00.

A separate criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 were filed against Caroline Ching Teng before the Branch 10 Municipal Trial Court of Manila covering the said three (3) checks.

The Regional Trial Court found the Spouses liable and ordered them to pay the amount, however the Spouses were acquitted in the criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

The Spouses Benito Lo Bun Tiong and Caroline Siok Ching now comes to court charging Balboa with forum-shopping.

Issue:

Whether or not the Balboa's act of filing civil and criminal cases constitute forum-shopping.

Held:

Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the supposition that one or the other court would render a favorable disposition. It is usually resorted to by a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek and possibly to get a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.

There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.

In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp., the Court ruled that there is identity of parties and causes of action between a civil case for the recovery of sum of money as a result of the issuance of bouncing checks, and a criminal case for the prosecution of a B.P. No. 22 violation. Thus, it ordered the dismissal of the civil action so as to prevent double payment of the claim.

In the said case, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 effective September 16, 1997, which provides that "the criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such action separately shall be allowed or recognized."

This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

The foregoing, however, is not applicable as the civil and criminal case were filed on February 24, 1997 and on July 21, 1997, respectively, prior to the adoption of Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on September 16, 1997. At the time of filing of the cases, the governing rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Since Balboa instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then the civil case may proceed independently of the criminal cases and there is no forum shopping to speak of. Even under the amended rules, a separate proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in cases of violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the civil case is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases.

PAULINO S. ASILO JR. vs THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPOUSES VISITACION and CESAR C. BOMBASIG.R. No. 159017-18

Facts:

Marciana Vda De Coronado, the late mother of Visitacion C. Bombasi and the Municipality of Nagcarlan Laguna represented by Mayor Crisostomo Manalang entered into a lease contract allowing the former the use and enjoyment of property comprising of a lot and store located at the corner of Coronado Nagcarlan, Laguna from March 15, 1978 to March 15, 1998. The lease contract provide the the late Coronado is allowed to build a firewall on the lease premises.

Visitacion took over the store when her mother Coronado died sometime in 1984. Unfortunately in year of 1986 the public market where the store is erected was guttered nad gazed by fire, luckily because of the firewall the said store remained intack and stood strong. One day she received a letter from Mayoy Comendador directing her to demolish the store.

Visitacion replied in the said letter of the mayor contesting that she validly occupied the said lease premises.

A resolution was issued authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish the said store, Engr. Winston Cabrega estimated the cost of the demolish property amounting to Php437,900.

The respondent spouses filed damages with preliminary injunction against Mayor Comendador before the RTC San Pablo, Laguna and later on filed a criminal case against Mayor Comendador, Paulino Asilo and Angeles for Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices. An information was filed against the three (3), and upon arraignment they pleade not guilty.

During the pendency of the case, Alberto Angeles died and followed by the death of Mayor Comendador.

In the civil casse filed by the Spouses, Mayor Comendador and Paulino Asilo are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the Spouses.

Counsel of the late Mayor Comendador and counsel of Asilo filed a motion for reconsideration but denied by Sandigang Bayan.

Petitioner Asilo argues that in order to sustain conviction under Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," the public officer must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross negligence. He also contended that he and his co-accused acted in good faith in the demolition of the market and, thereby, no liability was incurred.

While, Petitioner Victoria argues that the death of Mayor Comendador prior to the promulgation of the decision extinguished NOT ONLY Mayor Comendador’s criminal liability but also his civil liability. She also asserted good faith on the part of the accused public officials when they performed the demolition of the market stall. Lastly, she contended that assuming arguendo that

there was indeed liability on the part of the accused public officials, the actual amount of damages being claimed by the Spouses Bombasi has no basis and was not duly substantiated.

Issue:

WON the late Mayor Comendador and Paulino is civilly liable?

Held:

The demolition of plaintiff’s store was carried out without a court order, and notwithstanding a restraining order which the plaintiff was able to obtain. The demolition was done in the exercise of official duties which apparently was attended by evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as there is nothing in the two (2) resolutions which gave the herein accused the authority to demolish plaintiff’s store.

Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have extinguished the civil liability if the same arose directly from the crime committed. However, in this case, the civil liability is based on another source of obligation, the law on human relations.The pertinent articles follow:

Art. 31 of the Civil Code states:

When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

And, Art. 32(6) states:

Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely based on due process violations was filed even ahead of the criminal case, is complemented by the fact that the deceased plaintiff Comendador was substituted by his widow, herein petitioner Victoria who specified in her petition that she has "substituted him as petitioner in the above captioned case. The Sandiganbayan was correct when it maintained the separate docketing of the civil and criminal

cases before it although their consolidation was erroneously based on Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 which deals with civil liability "arising from the offense charged."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NELSON BAYOT Y SATINAG.R. No. 200030

Facts:

Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with rape. On arraignment he pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued. He was found guilty with the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of Php40,000 as indemnity with costs.

Nelson Bayot y Satina appealed the aforesaid decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals whoch affirmed his conviction with mofification increasing the award of indemnity from Php40,000 to Php.50,000 on May 9, 2006. It likewise awarded to AAA in the amount of Php50,000.

However, Dr. Juanito S. Leopando, Penal Superintendent IV of the New Bilibid Prison informed the Court of Appeals that the appellant died on December 2004 at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital.

Issue:

Is the Death of accused Nelson Bayot y Satina before the promulgation of the decision which convicts him for rape extinguished his both criminal and civil liability?

Held:

Yes,

This is for the reason that the source of civil liability of the accused is based solely on his criminal liability. As opined by Justice Regalado, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability directly arising and based solely on the offense committed. The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused if the same may also predicate on a source of obligation other thank delict. However in this case, the claim for civil liability is attached to the criminal liability. In addition, par 1 of Art. 89 provides that the death of the convict extinguished the criminal liabilities and as to pecuniary penalties liability, when the death occurs before the final judgment. Based from the records, the judgment was promulgated only on 2006, two (2) years after the death of the accused in 2004, therefore, both his criminal and civil liability is extinguished.

It is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. TIRSO D. C. VELASCO and HONORATO GALVEZG.R. No. 127444

Facts:

Mayor Honorato Galvez of San Ildefonso and his bodyguard Godofredo Diego were charged of murder and frustrated murded in the alleged shooting transpired at San Ildefonso Bulacan that took the life of Alex Vinculado and seriously wounded Levi and Miguel Vinculado Jr..

The venue of the case was transferred at the court of Judge Tirso D.C. Velosco of Branch 89 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Manila. The RTC found Godofredo Diego guilty while Mayor Honorato Galvez is acquitted to the crime charged. A petition for certiorari was giled by the prosecutor.

Issue:

WON a review of the case will not transgress the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy?

Held:

For it may be argued from a historico-analytical perspective that perhaps none of the constitutionally ensconced rights of men has followed a more circuitous and tortuous route in the vast sea of jurisprudence than the right of a person not to be tried or prosecuted a second time for the same offense.

Private respondent remonstrates against the propriety of petitioner’s certiorari as a mode of impugning the judgment of acquittal not only as a strategy to camouflage the issue of double jeopardy but also for the fact that, contrary to petitioner’s assertions, evidence in the case at bar was subjected to scrutiny, review, assessment and evaluation by respondent trial judge. By reason thereof, there cannot be perceived grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to warrant issuance of the great writ of certiorari.

The office of the common law writ of certiorari is to bring before the court for inspection the record of the proceedings of an inferior tribunal in order that the superior court may determine from the face of the record whether the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction, or has not

proceeded according to the essential requirements of the law. However, the original function and purpose of the writ have been so modified by statutes and judicial decisions. It is particularly so in the field of criminal law when the state is applying for the writ and problems arise concerning the right of the state to appeal in a criminal case. As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment in favor of the defendant in a criminal case in the absence of a statute clearly conferring that right. The problem comes into sharper focus when the defendant contends, in effect, that the prosecution is attempting to accomplish by the writ what it could not do by appeal, and that his constitutional rights are being thus encroached upon.

Philippine jurisprudence has been consistent in its application of the Double Jeopardy Clause such that it has viewed with suspicion, and not without good reason, applications for the extraordinary writ questioning decisions acquitting an accused on ground of grave abuse of discretion.

SAMSON CHING vs. CLARITA NICDAO and HON. COURT OF APPEALSG.R. No. 141181

Facts:

Nicdao was charged of eleven (11) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22. The MTC pronounced her guilt which was affirmed by the RTC. On appeal, the decision was reversed by the CA and consequently, Nicdao was acquitted. Aggrieved, Ching now interposes his appeal before the Supreme Court with regard the civil aspect of the case.

Ching vigorously argues that notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA, the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction and authority to resolve and rule on her civil liability. He anchors his contention on Rule 111, Sec 1B: The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. Moreover, under the above-quoted provision, the criminal action for violation of BP 22 necessarily includes the corresponding civil action, which is the recovery of the amount of the dishonored check representing the civil obligation of the drawer to the payee.

Nicdao’s defense: Sec 2 of Rule 111 — Except in the cases provided for in Section 3 hereof, after the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final judgment in the criminal action. According to her, CA’s decision is equivalent to a finding that the facts upon which her civil liability may arise do not exist. The instant petition, which seeks to enforce her civil liability based on the eleven (11) checks, is thus allegedly already barred by the final and executory decision acquitting her.

Issue:

1. WON Ching may appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period?

2. WON Nicdao civilly liable?

Held:

1. Yes, Ching is entitled to appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period.

“Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

Petitioner Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may appeal the civil aspect of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did not reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.

If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.

GENERAL RULE:

Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal:

1. where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt;

2. where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and

3. where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.

2. No, A painstaking review of the case leads to the conclusion that respondent Nicdao’s acquittal likewise carried with it the extinction of the action to enforce her civil liability. There is simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to petitioner Ching.

CA’s acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on the finding that she did not commit the act penalized under BP 22. In particular, the CA found that the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check which was never issued nor delivered by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching.

CA did not adjudge her to be civilly liable to petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly stated that she had already fully paid her obligations. The finding relative to the P20,000,000.00 check that it was a stolen check necessarily absolved respondent Nicdao of any civil liability thereon as well.

Under the circumstances which have just been discussed lengthily, such acquittal carried with it the extinction of her civil liability as well.

COMMUNITY RURAL BANK OF GUIMBA (N. E.), INC., Represented by OLGA M. SAMSON vs. JUDGE TOMAS B. TALAVERA, Regional Trial Court (Branch 28), Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija

Facts:

The Community Rural Bank of Guimba represented by its chief officer Olga M. Samson filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cabanatuan charging several persons (the accused, for brevity) with the offense of Estafa in relation to P.D. Nos. 818 and 1689. A preliminary investigation was conducted and the Investigating Fiscal recommended the filing --of six (6) Informations for Estafa against the accused. These were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 8760 to 8765. Judge Talavera was the presiding judge of Branch 28 to whom Criminal Case Nos. 8761 and 8763 were raffled.

The accused appealed the findings of the Investigating Fiscal to the Department of Justice but the DOJ denied their petition. A Motion for Reconsideration were filed but was also denied by the DOJ. Hence, Judge Talavera issued a Warrant of Arrest fixing no bail against the accused.

Later on, the accused filed a Motion for Reinvestigation and to Lift the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest. No copy of the said motion was furnished to the bank as well as to its counsel. Judge Talaverna granted the motion without any hearing. When the reinvestigation was conducted, the Bank and its counsel were still not notified.

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Caballero, in his Joint Resolution dated 28 December 2000, reversed the earlier findings of the previous Investigating Fiscal. On the same day, a Motion to Dismiss was filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Caballero. But again the bank and its counsel were not notified about the said Motion and no hearing thereon was held to afford the Bank an opportunity to oppose the same. Judge Talaverna granted the Motion to Dismiss and ordered the release of the accused.

The Bank, filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Opposition/Comment to the Motion to Dismiss and Omnibus Motion for the Reinstatement of the Criminal Information and for the Recall of Order for Release but Judge Talavera denied the afore-mentioned Motion of the Bank for lack of merit.

The Community Rural Bank of Guimba represented by its chief operating officer, Olga M. Samson filed a complaint against Judge Tomas B. Talavera of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 28) of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija.

Issue:

WON Judge Talaverna committed gross ignorance?

Held:

Yes, In the present case, the gross ignorance of respondent judge and his notorious violation of simple legal precepts were clearly shown by his issuance of the Orders granting the Motion for Reinvestigation of the accused and granting the prosecutor’s Motion to Dismiss.

First, Judge Talaverna should not have entertained the Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the accused. The former was fully aware that the latter had appealed the unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor to the Department of Justice (DOJ). Respondent judge must have in fact taken that appeal into consideration when he issued a warrant of arrest against all the accused after Justice Secretary Serafin R. Cuevas had denied their Petition for Review and affirmed the presence of prima facie evidence against them. Under Depertment order No. 223 (Rules Governing Appeals from Resolutions in Preliminary Investigation or Re-investigation), a motion for reinvestigation may be filed before DOJ Secretary rules on an appeal from the resolution on preliminary investigation. In the present case, the said motion for re-investigation was filed three (3) months after the DOJ Secreatary already denied their appeal with finality. Moreover, considering that prima facie case was found to exist against the accused during the preliminary investigation, Judge Talavera should have exercised great restraint in granting the reinvestigation.

Second, in granting the Motion to Dismiss, respondent relied solely on the Resolution of the prosecutor who had conducted the reinvestigation and recommended the dismissal of the case for alleged insufficiency of evidence. The perfunctory Order does not demonstrate an independent evaluation or assessment of the evidence against the accused. The dismissal of the case was not shown to be based upon the judge’s own individual conviction that there was no viable case against them. The Judge acted with undue haste when he granted the Motion on December 29, 2000, only a day after the reinvestigation was concluded on December 28, 2000. Coupled with the absence of the required evaluation in the Resolution granting the dismissal of the case, this hasty action leads to the indubitable conclusion that the judge did not personally evaluate the parties’ evidence before acting on the Motion.

Furthermore, when respondent judge issued the warrants of arrest without bail against all the accused, it is presumed that he had studied the Information and the Resolution of the prosecutor and agreed with the latter’s findings of probable cause. Consequently, the grant of the Motion for Reinvestigation and of the Motion to Dismiss for alleged insufficiency of evidence posed a serious contradiction of the earlier finding of probable cause.

Third, respondent granted the Motions despite the obvious lack of notice to complainant and lack of hearing. This lapse effectively deprived it of its day in court.

SEBASTIAN SERAG, LINO NAPAO, THOMIX SEGUMALIAN, JOSE OLIVER SEGUMALIAN, RODOLFO TALANQUINES, ROQUE SANMILLAN, EDGAR STA. CRUZ, ELEAZAR SAÑOL, NEMESIO PANUGOT, TEODORICO DELA CRUZ, VICENTE DELA CRUZ, ABRAHAM DELA CRUZ and MARILYN SILFAVAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. DAISY SIBYA G.R. No. 163818 October 20, 2005

Facts:

On May 11, 2001 Atty. Jesus Sibya, Jr. a mayoralty candidate in San Joauin, Iloilo and his driver Norberto Salamat III was shot to death in front of Sibya’s residence. The Criminal Investigation and Detention Group filed a criminal compliant for murder nad attempted murder against Lino Napao, then incumbent mayor of San Jaoquin and Sebastian Serag. Provincial Prosecutor filed two Informations before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimbal, Iloilo: (1) for Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearms, and (2) Attempted Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearms against Serag and Napao and seven unidentified persons.

Norberto Salamat III and Ma. Daisy Sibya, the widow of deceased Atty. Jesus Sibya Jr. filed a before the Provincial Prosecutor a supplemental complaint for murder and frustrated murder and violation of PD no. 1866 against Serag and Lina Napao.

On July 26, 2001, the Provincial Prosecutor issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause for murder and attempted murder with the use of unlicensed firearms against Serag, Lino Napao, Juan Napao and 14 other accused, including those whose identities were earlier unknown.

The Provincial Prosecutor filed, in the RTC of Guimbal, Iloilo, an Amended Information for Murder and an Amended Information for Attempted Murder with the use of unlicensed firearm against the said accused.

Accused Juan Napao and the 14 other additional accused filed a petition for review of the Joint Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor before the Department of Justice (DOJ).

The trial court found probable cause for murder and attempted murder against the accused. Consequently, the court issued an Order for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused who were still at large.

A day before the arraignment, the Secretary of Justice affirmed with modification the resolution and downgraded the charges from murder to homicide and from attemted murder to attempted homicide. The Prosecutor likewise ordered to amend the information.

Ma. Daisy Sibya, likewise, received, the said Resolution and filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution, serving copies thereof on the RTC and the accused-petitioners by registered mail.

In compliance with the said Resolution of the Secretary of Justice, the Provincial Prosecutor filed before the RTC a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Information for homicide and attempted homicide in the two cases, and for the court to admit the said second Amended Informations. The motion was set for hearing at 2:00 p.m. of June 6, 2002. During the said hearing, the private prosecutors opposed the motion and moved for deferment, contending that the private complainant had earlier filed a motion for reconsideration of Resolution and that it would be premature for the Provincial Prosecutor to file a motion for the admission of the Second Amended Information and for the court to admit the same.

However, the RTC verbally granted the motion of the Provincial Prosecutor, and admitted the Second Amended Information for Homicide. Criminal Case No. 926 for the attempted homicide was, likewise, dismissed on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the said case. The court forthwith arraigned the accused for homicide, who pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.

The RTC granted the motion of the Provincial Prosecutor for the admission of the Second Amended Information for Homicide, and ordered the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 926 without prejudice to its re-filing in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Accordingly, the Information was re-filed in the MTC, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1604. The accused were arraigned for the said cases. The court held that the finding of probable cause for murder against the accused did not bar it from admitting the Second Amended Information for Homicide. Likewise, the pendency of the private complainant’s motion for the reconsideration of the May 20, 2002 Resolution of the Secretary of Justice was not a valid reason for the deferment of the arraignment of the accused for homicide. The private prosecutors moved for the reconsideration of the order of the trial court which, however, denied the motion.

She insisted that the admission by the RTC of the Second Amended Information downgrading the crime charged therein to Homicide and the arraignment of the accused therein on June 6, 2002 were premature since the Secretary of Justice had not yet resolved her motion for reconsideration of the May 20, 2002 Resolution.

On November 22, 2002, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the RTC from proceeding with Criminal Case Nos. 925 and 926.

The Secretary of Justice issued a Resolution granting the motion for reconsideration of the private complainant, setting aside Resolution No. 258. Consequently, the May 26, 2001 and July 26, 2001 Resolutions of the Provincial Prosecutor were reinstated. The Secretary of Justice opined that the killing of the deceased was, after all, qualified by treachery. He further declared that he was not proscribed from taking cognizance of and resolving the private complainant’s motion for reconsideration notwithstanding the arraignment of the accused. He directed the Provincial Prosecutor to withdraw the Second Amended Information for Homicide and Attempted Homicide and to file, in lieu thereof, separate Informations for Murder and Attempted Murder, respectively, against the said accused.

The accused-petitioners filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said Resolution. They argued that, with their arraignment in the RTC and the MTC, the Secretary of Justice should have denied the private complainant’s motion for reconsideration, conformably with Section 7(2) of DOJ Circular No. 70. However, the Secretary of Justice denied the said motion.

The Court of Appeals eventually issued an order nullifying the order downgrading the offense charge to the abovementioned accused and the arraignment.

Issue:

WON the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in nullifying and downgrading the offense charge and the arraignment.

Held:

The appellate court’s nullification of the June 6, 2002 and July 26, 2002 Orders of the RTC and the arraignment of the petitioners on June 6, 2002 are well-founded. Section 13 of DOJ Circular No. 70 reads:

SECTION 13. Motion for reconsideration.— The aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution on appeal, furnishing the adverse party and the Prosecution Office concerned with copies thereof and submitting proof of such service. No second or further motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

The private respondent received a copy of Resolution of the Secretary of Justice downgrading the charges from murder and attempted murder to homicide and attempted homicide. She had the right to file a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution on or before June 6, 2002. Indeed, she filed such motion, through the private prosecutors, by personal delivery to the DOJ on June 4, 2002. Thereafter, it behooved the RTC to suspend the proceedings until after the Secretary of Justice had resolved such motion with finality, including the consideration of the motion of the Provincial Prosecutor for the admission of the Second Amended Information for homicide, the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 926, and the arraignment of the petitioners for homicide. It was, in fact, premature for the Provincial Prosecutor to file such motion for the

admission of the Second Amended Information since the Secretary of Justice had not yet resolved the said motion; after all, he may still reconsider Resolution No. 258, which he did on November 18, 2002, effectively reversing his previous ruling affirming the assailed Resolutions of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 26, 2001 and July 26, 2001, and thus reverting to the original charges of murder and attempted murder.

The trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused’s motion for review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor’s finding or on a motion to dismiss based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken therefrom to the Department of Justice.

The pendency of an appeal before the DOJ is enough reason for the deferment of any proceedings in the trial court and petitioner, through the private prosecutors, correctly moved for the deferment of the admission of the second amended informations for homicide and attempted homicide. It should be considered that the motion to defer was even with the conformity of the public prosecutor and the appearance of the private prosecutors is pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused had already been arraigned. Any arraignment made after the filing of the petition shall not bar the Secretary of Justice from exercising his power of review.

HILARIO P. SORIANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP), PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC), PUBLIC PROSECUTOR ANTONIO C.BUAN, and STATE PROSECUTOR ALBERTO R. FONACIERG.R. No. 162336 February 1, 2010

Facts:

Sometimes in 2000, the Office of Special Investigation (OSD) of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas through its officers, send a letter with five affidavits attached there on to Jovencito Zuno, Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ. The letter serve as bases for filing criminal charges for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents, and for Violation of Sec. 83 of RA 337 as amended by Pd 1795 against Hilario P. Soriano. The 5 affidavits along with other documents, stated that Sps. Enrico ana Analia Carlos appeared to have an outstanding loan of 8 Million with Rural Bank of San Miguel Inc. but had never applied for nor received the said amount. It also stated that it was Hilario Soriano (President of RBSM) who ordered, facilitated and received the proceeds of the loan and the 8 million loan had never been authorized by RBSM Board at Directors and no report thereof had ever been submitted to the Department of Rural Banks, Supervision and Examination of BSP.

The said letter was not subscribed under oath, ended with a request that a Preliminary Investigation be conducted and Criminal charges be filed against Hilario Soriano. Acting on the letter request and its annexes, State Prosecutor Albert R. Fonacier proceeded with the Preliminary Investigation he issued a subpoena with the witnnesses affidavits and required Hilario Soriano to file his counter affidavit. After finding probable cause State Prosecutor Fonacier filed two (2) separate information against Hilario Soriano before the RTC of Malolos Bulacan.

Hilario Soriano filed a Motion to Quash and argued flat the letter by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas constituted the complaint and hence was defective for failure to be subscribed nad sworn to as requirement of Sec. 3 (a) rule 112 of the Rules of court.

Issue:

Which was the complaint, the letter or the affidavits? Was there compliance with rule 112 of the Rules of Court?

Held:

The letters merely transmitted for preliminary investigation the affidavits of the people who had personal knowledge of the acts of the petitioner. The affidavits not the letter initiated the preliminary investigation. Since the affidavits were subscribed and sworn to before a notary public, then it complied with section 3 rule 112 of the rules of court.

A preliminary investigation can validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit of any competent person, without the referral document having been sworn to by law enforcer as the nominal complainant. To require otherwiseis a needless exercise. After all, what is required is to reduce the evidence into affidavits for while reports and even raw information may justify the iniatiation of an investigation, the preliminary investigation stage can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluatedwhich may warrant the eventual prosecution of the case in court.

SAMUEL U. LEE and MAYBELLE LEE LIM vs. KBC BANK N.V.G.R. No. 164673 January 15, 2010

Facts:

Midas Diversified Export Corporation (MDEC) obtained a $1,400,000 loan from KBC Bank a Belgian corporation license to do business in the Philippines. Samuel U. Lee, assistant treasurer and director of MDEC, executed a promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of assignment transferring all of MDEC’s rights over Confirmed Purchase Order No. MTC-548 to KBC Bank issued by Otto Versand, a company based in Germany, and covered a shipment of girl’s basic denim jeans amounting to $1,863,050

Another loan was obtained amounting to $65,000, from KBC Bank by Maybelle L. Lim (Lim), treasurer and assistant secretary of MDEC, she executed a promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of assignment transferring all of MDEC’s rights over Confirmed Purchase

Order No. WC-128 to KBC Bank issued by Otto Versand, and covered a shipment of boy’s bermuda jeans amounting to $841,500.

MDEC failed to pay the said loans. KBC filed a complaint for estafa upon learning through facsimile message from Otto Versand that the latter did not issue the purchase order, did not order items covered by the purchase order and did not pay any amount. The said case was filed with the Regional Trial Court and upon finding probable cause, Judge Winlove M. Dumayas issued a warrant of arrest against Lee and Lim.

Lee and Lim filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice challenging the resolution issued by State prosecutor Subia. DOj Secreatary Hernando Perez directed the withdrawal of the information filed against Lee and Lim holding that the facsimile message constituted hearsay evidence. Tereafter Prosecutor Sibucao filed a motion to withdraw the information against Lee and Lim to which grabted by the RTC.

Issue:

WON the issue of admissibility of the facsimile message may be properly ventilated during the full blown trial and not during the preliminary investigation.

WON Judge Dumayas in ordering the withdrawal of the information against Lee and Lim, ailed to make his own evaluation and merely relied on DOJ recommendation.

Held:

Yes, the facsimile messages should be ventilated during the full blown trial and not during the preliminary investigation.

The trial judge was tasked to evaluate the secretary’s recommendation finding the absence of probable cause to hold petitioner criminally liable for libel. He failed to do so. He merely relied to recommendation of DOJ.

In the present case, Judge Dumayas, in his 26 March 2003 Order, did not (1) positively state that the evidence against Lee and Lim is insufficient, (2) include a discussion of the merits of the case, (3) assess whether Secretary Perez’s conclusion is supported by evidence, (4) look at the basis of Secretary Perez’s recommendation, (5) embody his assessment in the order, and (6) state his reasons for granting the motion to withdraw the informations.

Judge Dumayas’ failure to make his own evaluation of the merits of the case violates KBC Bank’s right to due process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Judge Dumayas’ 26 March 2003 Order granting the motion to withdraw the informations is void.

TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE vs. HON. PEDRO DE LEON GUTIERREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Pasay City, Branch 119; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and CECILIA MARUYAMAG.R. No. 150185 May 27, 2004

Facts:

On December 29, 1999, Cecilia Marayuma filed a case for estafa against Lorna Tanghal and Tetesita Tanghal Okabe. In her complaint affidavit, she allege that on December 11, 1998 she entrysted Y11,410 with peso equivalent of P3,3993,500 to Teresita Tanghal Okabe who was enaged in the business of door to door delivery from Japan to Philippines. It was allege that Teresita Tanghal Okabe failed to deliver the money as agreed upon.

Cecilia Marayuma submitted the affidavits of her witnesses during the preliminary investigation, she likewise submitted her reply to the counter affidavit of Teresita Tanghal Okabe. An information against Okabe was filed in the RTC of Pasay which was raffled to Branch 119 were Judge Pedro De Leon Gutierrez is the presiding Judge.

Attached to the information forwarded to the RTC is the complaint affidavit of Cecilia Marayuma and the resolution of prosecutor Vibandor. The trial court issued a warrant of arrest against to Teresita Tanghal Okabe with Bail amount of P40,000. Okabe was able to post a bail.

Teresita Tanghal Okabe filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause. According to her the resolution submitted to the RTC is insufficient to warrant a finding of probable cause for not having the copies of the affidavits of the witness complainant, counter affidavit of Teresita Tanghal Okabe and those of her witnesses, TSN taken during preliminary investigation and other documents presented during the said investigation.

Issue:

WON the trial court judge should have required copies of the affidavits of the witness complainant, counter affidavit of Teresita Tanghal Okabe and those of her witnesses, TSN taken during preliminary investigation and other documents presented during the said investigation for the purposes of determining probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest.

WON posting of bail bars him from questioning the legality of the arrest or the conduct of preliminary investigation.

Held:

Yes, as embodied in section 8 of Rule 112 which mandates that an information filed in court shall be supported by affidavits of the witness complainant, counter affidavit of Teresita Tanghal Okabe and those of her witnesses, TSN taken during preliminary investigation and other documents presented during the said investigation because the law aims not only to acquit innocent but to like insulate the clearly innocent from the strong arm of the law.

No, Section 26 of the Rule 114 says that an application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued to him. Being curative and procedural in nature, it applies retroactively. It must favor Okabe. In this case, the series of acts by Okabe point to the conclusion that she was insistent about the fact that the arrest was ordered with insufficient finding of probable cause. In fact she filed a motion for determination of probable cause.

CASE DIGESTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDUREKALAYAAN ALLAN L. MANGUBAT

JD 2

PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONRule on filing fees in civil action deemed instituted with criminal actionBun Tiong vs BalboaAsilo vs PeoplePeople vs BayotPeople vs Tirso VelascoChing vs Nicdao

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONCommunity Rural Bank vs TalaveraSerag vs Court of AppealsSoriano vs PeopleSamuel Lee vs KBC BankOkabe vs Gutierrez