Crim Pro Digest 4

8/3/2019 Crim Pro Digest 4

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Criminal Procedure a2010 page 57 Prof.Rowena Daroy Morales

CASTILLO v CA (ROSARIO)176 SCRA 591

FERNAN; August 21, 1989

NATURE

Petition for review on certiorariFACTS- May 2, 1965: Parties figured in a vehicular accidentwhich caused injuries to their persons and damage totheir respective vehicles. They had conflictingversions of the accident.- June 30: Petitioners instituted a civil case for therecovery of damages for the injuries sustained andfor the damage to the vehicle in CFI Manila.- September 29: While this case was pending, theProvincial Fiscal filed an information against Rosario,private respondent, for double physical injuries;double less serious physical injuries; and damage toproperty thru reckless imprudence, in CFI Urdaneta.

- Rosario was prosecuted and convicted by the trialcourt in the criminal case. CA acquitted him from thecrime charged on the ground that his guilt has notbeen proved beyond reasonable doubt.- April 3, 1972: Respondents filed a "Request forAdmission" in the civil case, requesting petitioners toadmit the truthfulness of the facts set forth as well asthe correctness and genuineness of the documentsattached.- May 5,1972: Petitioners filled a "Manifestation",admitting the allegations in the "Request forAdmission" with some qualifications. Later, bothparties submitted their respective memoranda.- December 28, 1972: On the basis of the testimoniesand evidence submitted by the petitioners, as well as

the records of the criminal case attached in the"Request for Admission" of the private respondents,CFI Manila rendered a decision, dismissing thecomplaint of the petitioners against privaterespondents as well as the counterclaim of privaterespondents against the petitioners.- February 13, 1978: CA affirmedPetitioners Version Bernabe Castillo was drivinghis jeep on the northbound lane of the McArthurHighway with his wife, father, and child at the rate of25 kph. Just past San Nicolas bridge, he noticed, froma distance of 120 meters more or less, a speedingoncoming car along the same lane he was driving,overtaking a cargo truck ahead of it.- He switched on his headlights to signal the car to

return to its own right lane as the way was not clear

for it to overtake the truck. The signal wasdisregarded, as the car proceeded on its direction.- To evade the collision, he swerved his jeep to theright towards the shoulder and applied on thebrakes, leaving his feet on it, even, immediately afterthe impact. The car rested on the shoulder of the

right lane. The jeep's rear left wheel was on the road,leaving short tire marks behind it; while the car leftlong tire marks, specially its left rear wheel.Respodents Version Juanito Rosario who wasdriving the car, with his wife and daughter, werealong MacArthur Highway going southwards. Theysaw ahead of them a big heavily loaded cargo truck.

The truck was moving very slowly because of itsheavy load so that Rosario decided to overtake it.But before doing so, he first saw to it that the roadwas clear and as additional precautionary measure,he blew his horn several times at the time he wasovertaking the truck.- As the car was about to overtake the slow movingcargo truck, the car's front left tire suddenly burst

due to pressure causing the car to swerve to the leftand naturally making steering and control difficult.- Because of the tendency of the car to veer towardsthe left due to the blown out tire, the driver steeredthe car towards the direction where he could find asafe place to park and fix the tire. He finally broughtthe car to a halt at the left shoulder of the road.- Just as he was about to get off to fix the flat tire, thecar was suddenly bumped by the jeep which camefrom the opposite direction

ISSUEWON petitioners were deprived of due processbecause their civil action was decided on the basis ofprivate respondent Juanita Rosario's acquittal in the

criminal case for reckless imprudence

HELDNORatio Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals areconclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court,unless (1) the conclusion is a finding groundedentirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures;(2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3)there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgmentis based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Courtof Appeals went beyond the issues of the case andits findings are contrary to the admission of bothappellant and appellee; (6) the findings of facts ofthe Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial

court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusionswithout citation of specific evidence on which they

are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition aswell as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs arenot disputed by the respondent; and (9) when thefinding of facts of the Court of Appeals is premisedon the absence of evidence and is contradicted byevidence on record.

Reasoning- The subject action for damages, being civil innature, is separate and distinct from the criminalaspect, necessitating only a preponderance ofevidence.- A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legalinstitution under the Civil Code, with a substantivelyall its own, and individuality that is entirely apart andindependent from a delict or crime. A distinctionexists between the civil liability arising from a crimeand the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damagesmay produce civil liability arising from a crime underthe Penal Code, or create an action for quasidelictosor culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.

Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminalcase is entirely irrelevant in the civil case.- But this rule is not without exception. Thus, Section2 (c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides:

Extinction of the penal action does not carry with itextinction of the civil, unless the extinctionproceeds from a declaration from a final judgmentthat the fact from which the civil action might arisedid not exist.

- In a previous case, CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR, People v.Rosario, the CA after a painstaking analysis of. (a)the testimonial evidence; (b) the relative positions ofthe two vehicles as depicted in the sketches; (c) thedistance of each of the two vehicles from thecemented edge of the road; (d) the point of impact;

(e) the visible tire marks, and (f) the extent of thedamage caused upon each of the two vehicles, ruledthat it was the driver of the jeep and not the accuseddriver of the car who was negligent and accordinglyacquitted the latter.- Negligence, being the source and foundation ofactions of quasi-delict, is the basis for the recovery ofdamages. In the case at bar, the CA found thatcollision was not due to the negligence of Rosario butrather it was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep tothe shoulder of the road where the car was, whichwas actually the proximate cause of the collision.With this finding, the CA exonerated Rosario fromcivil liability on the ground that the allegednegligence did not exist.

- During the trial of the case before the CFI,respondents were not present because they were


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against Manuel Laconico. The complaint charged thelatter with estafa in the amount of P1K. Preliminaryinvestigation (now in question) was conducted byrespondent Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, andthereafter issued a warrant of arrest. He orderedProvincial Fiscal to file the corresponding information

against the respondent before the court ofcompetent jurisdiction within 24 hours from receiptof said order.- Provincial Fiscal failed to file the informationrequired within the time appointed, or at any timethereafter. Consequently, he was directed by HisHonor to explain within 10 days "why he should notbe punished for contempt of court for delaying thespeedy administration of justice for disobeying alawful order of the Court." Fiscal filed a MFR, but wasdenied. Hence, this petition for certiorari andprohibition was presented by petitioner Fiscal,seeking annulment of the aforesaid orders.

ISSUES

1.WON respondent judge had no jurisdiction toconduct preliminary investigations, because the lawcreating Circuit Criminal Courts, R.A. 5179, did notconfer on said courts the power to conductpreliminary investigations2. WON judge erred in compelling fiscal undersanction of contempt, to file an information in courtwithout conducting his own preliminary investigation

HELD1. YESRatio: The conduct of a preliminary investigation isnot a judicial function but part of the fiscals job, afunction of the executive. Wherever there areenough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary

investigations, courts are counseled to leave this jobwhich is essentially executive to them, and the factthat a certain power is granted does not necessarilymean that it should be indiscriminately exercised.Reasoning: [a] Sec. 37 of BP. 129 reiterated theremoval from Judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts inthe National Capital Region of the authority toconduct preliminary investigations and Sec 2 of Rule112 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure no longerauthorizes RTC Judges to conduct PIs. [b] Theassignment of PI function to judges of inferior courtsand to a very limited extent to courts of first instancewas dictated by necessity and practicalconsiderations, and the consequent policy, was thatwherever there were enough fiscals or prosecutors to

conduct preliminary investigations, courts were toleave that job which is essentially executive to them.

It follows that the conclusions derived by a judgefrom his own investigation cannot be superior to andconclusively binding on the fiscal or publicprosecutor, in whom that function is principally andmore logically lodged.2. YES

The power to conduct PI is lodged in the fiscal. It isgrave abuse of discretion on a judge to seek toforeclose the fiscal's prerogative to conduct his ownpreliminary investigation to determine for himself theexistence or non-existence of probable cause, and torequire him to show cause for not filing theinformation within 24 hours, on the sole basis of the

Judge's conclusions. The fiscal has the duty to satisfyhimself of the existence of probable cause, and couldnot shirk or be made to evade it by an unreasoningand indiscriminate reliance on the judge'sinvestigation.Dispositive: Petition GRANTED. Challenged Ordersannulled and set aside.

SEPARATE OPINION

CRUZ [concurring]- The fiscal prevails over the judge only in thedetermination of the existence of a prima facie caseto justify the filing of a complaint or information. Thistask is executive.- But the determination of probable cause to justifythe issuance of a search warrant or a warrant ofarrest is the constitutional prerogative of the judgeand may not be withdrawn from him or even onlylimited by statute or ROC. This task is judicial. Thefindings of fiscal in the PI do not control or foreclosethe exercise of the power conferred personally on the

judge under Sec. 2 the Bill of Rights. That power ishis alone.

SAMULDE v SALVANI165 SCRA 734

GRIO-AQUINO: September 26, 1988

NATUREAppeal from the decision of the RTC

FACTS- Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminaryinvestigation upon a complaint for robbery. Aftermaking a preliminary investigation based on the

affidavits of the complainant and her witnesses andcounter-affidavits of the respondent and hiswitnesses, Judge Samulde transmitted the records of

the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his findingthat "there is prima facie evidence of robbery ascharge in the complaint". The fiscal returned therecords on the ground that Judge Samulde failed toinclude the warrant of arrest against the accused asprovided in Sec 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on

Criminal Procedure. Judge Samulde sent back therecords to Fiscal Salvani. He pointed out that underSec 6, Rule 112, he may issue a warrant of arrest ifhe is satisfied "that a probable cause exists and thatthere is a necessity of placing the respondent underimmediate custody in order not to frustrate the endsof justice, " implying that, although he found that aprobable cause existed, he did not believe that theaccused should be immediately placed undercustody. Hence, he refused to issue a warrant ofarrest.- A special civil action of mandamus was filed in theRTC by Provincial Fiscal Salvani against JudgeSamulde to compel the latter to issue a warrant ofarrest. The RTC dismissed the petition but

nevertheless ordered Judge Samulde to issue awarrant of arrest, and to transmit the warrant to theProvincial Fiscal for appropriate action. He furtheradvised the Municipal Judge "that henceforth headheres to the same rule in similar cases where heconducts a preliminary investigation with a finding ofaprima facie or probable cause." Unconvinced, JudgeSamulde appealed to this Court.

ISSUEWON a judge may be compelled to issue a warrant ofarrest upon a finding of probable cause

HELDNO

Ratio 3 conditions must concur for the issuance ofthe warrant of arrest. The investigating judge must:(a) have examined in writing and under oath thecomplainant and his witnesses by searchingquestions and answers;(b) be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and(c) that there is a need to place the respondentunder immediate custody in order not to frustrate theends of justice.Reasoning The mandatory provision that theinvestigating judge "must issue a warrant of arrest" ifhe finds probable cause that the respondentcommitted the crime charged, found in all previousrules of criminal procedure, from General Orders No.58 down to Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of

Court, is absent in Section 1 of the 1985 Rules onCriminal Procedure. It is not obligatory, but merely


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discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue awarrant for the arrest of the accused, for thedetermination of whether a probable cause existsand whether it is necessary to arrest the accused inorder not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to hissound judgment or discretion. In this particular case,

since the robbery charge was the offshoot of aboundary dispute between two property owners, theinvestigating judge did not believe there was anydanger of the accused absconding before the filing ofthe information against him by the fiscal, hence, hefound no need to place him under immediatecustody.DispositiveThe appealed decision is SET ASIDE.

CALLANTA v VILLANUEVA77 SCRA 377

FERNANDO; June 20, 1977

NATURE

Original petitions in the Supreme Court, certiorariwith preliminary injunction

FACTS- Judge Villanueva of Dagupan refused to grant themotions to quash two complaints for oral defamationagainst Callanta.- Callantas counsel argued that there was an issuewith regard to the validity of Villanuevas issuance ofthe warrants of arrest on the ground that it shouldhave been the City Fiscal who conducted thepreliminary investigation.- After the warrants were issued (with bail pegged atP600), Callanta posted the required bail bonds andwas granted her provisional liberty.

- The City Fiscal had manifested his intent toprosecute the case.- February 25, 1965 After the Court had conductedpreliminary investigation and had acquired

jurisdiction over the case, the Court referred the caseto the Fiscal.- March 4, 1965 The arraignment was postponedbecause the Fiscal was still doing his investigation.- In the proceedings of April 20, 1965, the Fiscalentered his appearance for the government andmanifested that he was ready for trial.

ISSUEWON Callanta can contest the validity of his arrest

HELDNO

Ratio Posting of a bail bond constitutes waiver ofany irregularity attending the arrest of a person andestops him from discussing the validity of his arrest.Reasoning- In the case of Luna vs. Plaza, the Court held thatwhere petitioner has filed an application for bail and

waived the preliminary investigation proper, hewaived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in thepreliminary examination conducted, prior to theissuance of a warrant of arrest.- This doctrine has been upheld in a number of casesincluding People vs. Olandar, Zacarias vs. Cruz,Bermejo vs. Barrios, People vs. La Caste, Manzano vsVilla and People vs. Obngayan which stated thatwhere the accused has filed bail and waived thepreliminary investigation proper, he has waivedwhatever defect, if any, in the preliminaryexamination conducted prior to the issuance of thewarrant of arrest.- The city fiscal had been quite active in theinvestigation and in the prosecution of the accused.

It was he who manifested his readiness to appear inthe trial.Obiter- With regard to the issue of whether or not the onlyperson vested with authority to conduct apreliminary investigation is the city fiscal, the Charterof the City of Dagupan provides that the City Courtof Dagupan City may also conduct preliminaryinvestigation for for any offense, without regard tothe limits of punishment and may release or commitany person charged with such offense to secure hisappearance before the proper court.Dispositive WHEREFORE, these petitions forcertiorari are dismissed. The restraining order issuedby this Court is lifted and set aside. Costs against

petitioner.

SEPARATE OPINION

AQUINO [concurring]- Sec. 77 of the Dagupan City charter expresslyempowers its city court (formerly municipal court) toconduct preliminary investigation for any offense,without regard to the limits of punishment.- Every justice of the peace, municipal judge(meaning city judge), city or provincial fiscal, shallhave authority to conduct preliminary examination orinvestigation in accordance with these rules of alloffenses alleged to have been committed within his

municipality, city or province, cognizable by theCourt of First Instance (Sec. 87 of the Judiciary Lawand Sec. 2, Rule 112).

RODRIGUEZ v VILLAMIEL65 Phil 230

IMPERIAL; DEC 23, 1937

FACTS-Victor Villamiel, special agent for the Anti-UsuryBoard, made two affidavits for the purpose ofobtaining search warrants against Rodriguez andEvangelista. The text of both affidavits reads asfollows: "Victor D. Villamiel having taken the oathprescribed by law, appears and states: that he hasand there is just and probable cause to believe andhe does believe that the books, lists, chits, receipts,documents, and other papers relating to theactivities of Juan Evangelista, as usurer, are beingkept and concealed in the house of said JuanEvangelista situated at Lucena, Tayabas, all of whichis contrary to the statute of law."-The justice of the peace of the provincial capital

issued the two search warrants against thepetitioners (see original for the wording of thewarrant)-Villamiel, with other agents and a constabularysoldier, executed the warrants, went to theresidences of the petitioners, searched them andseized documents and papers belonging topetitioners. Villamiel issued a receipt to each of thepetitioners, without specifying the documents andpapers seized by him, which were taken to his officein Manila, keeping them there until he was orderedby the CFI to deposit them in the office of the clerk ofcourt.-Petitioners filed a petition praying that the searchwarrants be declared null and void and illegal; that

Villamiel be punished for contempt of court forhaving conducted the searches and for having seizedthe documents and papers without issuing detailedreceipts and for not having turned them over to thecourt, and that said documents and papers beordered returned to the petitioners.-the CFI found Villamiel guilty of contempt of courtand fined him P10. The court declared the searchwarrants and the seizure of the documents andpapers VALID, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to examine them and retain those thatare necessary and material to whatever criminalaction they may wish to bring against the petitioners.-Petitioners appealed. They contend that the searchwarrants issued by the court are illegal because they

have been based on the affidavits of special agentVillamiel wherein he affirmed and stated that he


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had no personal knowledge of the facts thatwere to serve as basis for the issuance of thesearch warrants, but merely confined himselfto asserting that he believed and there wasprobable cause to believe that the documentsand papers were related to the activities of the

petitioners as usurers. As has been seen, thespecial agent's affirmation in this respect consistedmerely in the following: "that he has and there is justand probable cause to believe and he does believethat the books (etc) relating to the activities of . . . asusurer, are being kept and concealed in the house. . .all of which is contrary to the statute of law."

ISSUEWON the search warrant and the seizure were illegal

HELDYES-Reason 1: it appears that the affidavits, whichserved as the exclusive basis of the search warrants,

are insufficient and fatally defective by reason of themanner in which the oaths were made and,therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrantsin question and the subsequent seizure of thedocuments and papers are illegal and do not in anyway warrant the deprivation to which the petitionerswere subjected.-The oath required must refer to the truth ofthe facts within the personal knowledge of thepetitioner or his witnesses, because thepurpose thereof is to convince the committingmagistrate, not the individual making theaffidavit and seeking the issuance of thewarrant, of the existence of probable cause.The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to

warrant issuance of a search warrant iswhether it has been drawn in such a mannerthat perjury could be charged thereon andaffiant be held liable for damages caused.-Sec 1, par 3, of Art III, Constitution: "The right of thepeople to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,and effects against unreasonable searches andseizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shallissue but upon probable cause, to be determined bythe judge after examination under oath or affirmationof the complainant and the witnesses he mayproduce, and particularly describing the place to besearched, and the persons or things to be seized."Sec 97 of General Orders No. 58: "A search warrantshall not issue except for probable cause and upon

application supported by oath particularly describing

the place to be searched and the person or thing tobe seized."- Both provisions require that there be not onlyprobable cause before the issuance of a searchwarrant but that the search warrant must be basedupon an application supported by oath of the

applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In itsbroadest sense, an oath includes any form ofattestation by which a party signifies that he isbound in conscience to perform an act faithfully andtruthfully.-Reason 2: At the hearing of the case, it was shownthat the documents and papers had really beenseized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct aninvestigation and later use all or some of them asevidence against the petitioners in the criminal casesthat may be brought against them. The seizure ofbooks and documents by means of a searchwarrant, for the purpose of using them asevidence in a criminal case against the personin whose possession they were found, is

unconstitutional because it makes the warrantunreasonable, and it is equivalent to aviolation of the constitutional provisionprohibiting the compulsion of an accused totestify against himself Therefore, it appearingthat the documents and papers were seized for thepurpose of fishing for evidence to be used againstthe petitioners in the criminal proceedings forviolation of the Anti-Usury Law which might beinstituted against them, this court holds that thesearch warrants issued are illegal and that thedocuments and papers should be returned to them.- Definition and rationale ofsearch warrant:A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in thename of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed

by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to apeace officer, commanding him to search forpersonal property and bring it before the court.Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greaterimportance or more essential to his peace andhappiness than the right of personal security, andthat involves the exemption of his private affairs,books, and papers from the inspection and scrutinyof others. While the power to search and seize isnecessary to the public welfare, still it must beexercised and the law enforced without transgressingthe constitutional rights of citizens, for theenforcement of no statute is of sufficient importanceto justify indifference to the basic principles ofgovernment.

BURGOS v CHIEF OF STAFF

133 SCRA 800

PEOPLE v BURGOS144 SCRA 1

GUTIERREZ; Sept.4, 1986

NATUREAppeal from RTC decision convicting Ruben Burgos ofthe crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms inFurtherance of Subversion

FACTS- Prosecution version: Upon obtaining informationfrom one Cesar Masamlok, who personally andvoluntarily surrendered to the Davao del Sur policeHQ stating that accused Ruben Burgos forciblyrecruited him to join the NPA with the use of afirearm against his life, a team was dispatched thefollowing day to arrest Burgos. Through the help ofPedro Burgos, the brother of accused, the team was

able to locate Ruben Burgos, who was plowing hisfield at the time.- When asked about the firearm, the accused deniedpossession of it, but after questioning the accusedswife, the police were able to locate and retrieve thesaid firearm, a .38 caliber S & W, buried in theground below their house. The police, after accusedpointed them to the location, were also able toretrieve alleged subversive documents (a notebookand a pamphlet) hidden underground a few metersaway from the house.- To prove accuseds subversive activities, Masamloktestified that accused came to his house and told himto join the NPA or his family will be killed along withhim. The threat to his life and family forced

Masamlok to join the NPA. He later attended an NPAseminar where Burgos, the first speaker, said verydistinctly that he is an NPA together with hiscompanions, to assure the unity of the civilian. Thathe encouraged the group to overthrow thegovernment. To prove illegal possession, a person incharge of firearms and explosives of the PC HQ inDavao testified that accused was not among the listof firearm holders- On the other hand, accused-appellants claims thathe was taken to the PC barracks and when he deniedownership of the gun, he was beaten, tortured,mauled and subjected to physical agony. He wasforced to admit possession or ownership of the gun.2 witnesses as well as Rubens wife Urbana, were

presented by the defense in support of the accuseds


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denial of the charge against him. Urbana claimedthat it was Masamlok who left the firearm there.- The RTC after considering the evidences presentedby both prosecution and defense convicted accusedRuben Burgos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of thecrime of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance

of subversion. The RTC justified the warrantlessarrest as falling under one of the circumstanceswhen arrests may be validly made without a warrant,under Rule 113 Sec.6 of the Rules of Court. It statedthat even if there was no warrant for the arrest ofBurgos, the fact that the authorities received anurgent report of accused's involvement in subversiveactivities from a reliable source (report of CesarMasamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, evenwithout judicial warrant, is lawfully within the ambitof Sec. 6(a) of Rule 113 and applicable jurisprudenceon the matter. If the arrest is valid, the consequentsearch and seizure of the firearm and the allegedsubversive documents would become an incident toa lawful arrest as provided by Rule 126, Sec. 12. A

person charged with an offense may be searched fordangerous weapons or anything which may be usedas proof of the commission of the offense.

ISSUES1. WON the arrest was lawful and WON the search ofhis house and the subsequent confiscation of afirearm and documents conducted in a lawfulmanner.2. WON there is enough evidence to prove his guiltbeyond reasonable doubt.

HELD1. NO

Art.III Sec.2 of the Constitution safeguards against

wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacyand liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers andeffects. In this case, the arrest was made withoutwarrant and since it does not fall within theexceptions of arrests that can be made without awarrant, it is unlawful and therefore, the fruit of thepoisonous tree doctrine applies.Reasoning Under Sec.6 (a) of Rule 113, the officerarresting a person who has just committed, iscommitting, or is about to commit an offense musthave personal knowledge of that fact. The offensemust also be committed in his presence or within hisview. There is no such personal knowledge in thiscase. Whatever knowledge was possessed by thearresting officers, it came in its entirety from the

information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. Thelocation of the firearm was given by Burgos wife. At

the time of arrest, Burgos was not in actualpossession of any firearm or subversive document.Neither was he committing any act which could bedescribed as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing hisfield at the time.- The SolGen believes that the arrest may still be

considered lawful under Sec.6(b) using the test ofreasonableness. The SolGen submits that the infogiven by Masamlok was sufficient to induce areasonable ground that a crime has been committedand that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Inarrests without a warrant under Sec.6(b), however, itis not enough that there is reasonable ground tobelieve that the person to be arrested has committeda crime. A crime must in fact or actually have beencommitted first. That a crime has actually beencommitted is an essential precondition. It is notenough to suspect that a crime may have beencommitted. The fact of the commission of the offensemust be undisputed. The test of reasonable groundapplies only to the identity of the perpetrator. In this

case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis ofMasamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led theauthorities to suspect that the accused hadcommitted a crime. They were still fishing forevidence of a crime not yet ascertained. Thesubsequent recovery of the subject firearm on thebasis of information from the lips of a frightened wifecannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest withoutwarrant is unlawful at the moment it is made,generally nothing that happened or is discoveredafterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisonedtree is necessarily also tainted. More important, Wefind no compelling reason for the haste with whichthe arresting officers sought to arrest the accused.We fail to see why they failed to first go through the

process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeedthey had reasonable ground to believe that theaccused had truly committed a crime. There is noshowing that there was a real apprehension that theaccused was on the verge of flight or escape.Likewise, there is no showing that the whereaboutsof the accused were unknown.- The basis for the action taken by the arrestingofficer was the verbal report made by Masamlok whowas not required to subscribe his allegations underoath. There was no compulsion for him to statetruthfully his charges under pain of criminalprosecution. Consequently, the need to go throughthe process of securing a search warrant and awarrant of arrest becomes even more clear. The

arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field isillegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and

seizure which transpired afterwards could notlikewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents toa valid arrest. Neither can it be presumed that therewas a waiver, or that consent was given by theaccused to be searched simply because he failed toobject. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first

that the right exists; secondly, that the personinvolved had knowledge, actual or constructive, ofthe existence of such a right; and lastly, that saidperson had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

The fact that the accused failed to object to the entryinto his house does not amount to a permission tomake a search therein.2. NO.Since the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, andthe alleged subversive documents are inadmissiblein evidence, the only remaining proof to sustain thecharge is the testimony of Masamlok, which isinadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonabledoubt.Reasoning Although it is true that the trial court

found Masamloks testimony credible and convincing,the SC is not necessarily bound by the credibilitywhich the trial court attaches to a particular witness.As stated in People v Cabrera (100 SCRA 424): Whenit comes to question of credibility the findings of thetrial court are entitled to great respect upon appealfor the obvious reason that it was able to observethe demeanor, actuations and deportment of thewitnesses during the trial. But We have also said thatthis rule is not absolute for otherwise there would beno reversals of convictions upon appeal. We mustreject the findings of the trial court where the recorddiscloses circumstances of weight and substancewhich were not properly appreciated by the trialcourt. In the instant case, Masamloks testimony was

totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamloksurrendered to the military, certainly his fatedepended on how eagerly he cooperated with theauthorities. Otherwise, he would also be chargedwith subversion. Masamlok may be considered as aninterested witness. His testimony cannot be said tobe free from the opportunity and temptation to beexaggerated and even fabricated for it was intendedto secure his freedom. Moreover, despite the factthat there were other persons present during thealleged NPA seminar who could have corroboratedMasamlok's testimony that the accused used the gunin furtherance of subversive activities or actuallyengaged in subversive acts, the prosecution neverpresented any other witness.


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Dispositive Judgment of conviction is REVERSEDand SET ASIDE. Accused Burgos is ACQUITTED ongrounds of reasonable doubt.

ALIH v CASTRO151 SCRA 279

CRUZ; June 23, 1987

NATUREPetition for prohibition and mandamus withpreliminary injunction and restraining order

FACTS- On November 25, 1984, a contingent of more thantwo hundred Philippine marines and elements of thehome defense forces raided the compound occupiedby the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, ZamboangaCity, in search of loose firearms, ammunition andother explosives.- The military operation was commonly known and

dreaded as a "zona," which was like the fearedpractice of the kempeitai during the JapaneseOccupation of rounding up the people in a locality,arresting the persons fingered by a hooded informer,and executing them outright (although the last partis not included in the modern refinement).- The initial reaction of the people inside thecompound was to resist the invasion with a burst ofgunfire. The soldiers returned fire and a bloodyshoot-out ensued, resulting in a number ofcasualties.- 16 male occupants were arrested, later to be finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over theirobjection. The military also inventoried andconfiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle

grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found inthe premises.- On December 21, 1984, the petitioners came to thisCourt. Their purpose was to recover the articlesseized from them, to prevent these from being usedas evidence against them, and to challenge theirfinger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing asviolative of their right against self-incrimination.- The petitioners demand the return of the arms andammunition on the ground that they were takenwithout a search warrant as required by the Bill ofRights. This is confirmed by the said report and infact admitted by the respondents, "but withavoidance.

ISSUEWON the search of petitioners premises was illegal.

HELDYES.Ratio Even if were assumed for the sake ofargument that they were guilty, they would not havebeen any less entitled to the protection of the

Constitution, which covers both the innocent and theguilty.Reasoning

Article IV, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution: Theright of the people to be secure in their persons,houses, papers, and effects against unreasonablesearches and seizures of whatever nature and forany purpose shall not be violated, and no searchwarrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except uponprobable cause to be determined by the judge, orsuch other responsible officer as may be authorizedby law, after examination under oath or affirmationof the complainant and the witnesses he mayproduce, and particularly describing the place to besearched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Article IV, Section 4(2): Any evidence obtained inviolation of this or the preceding section shall beinadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.-The respondents, while admitting the absence of therequired such warrant, sought to justify their act onthe ground that they were acting under superiororders. There was also the suggestion that themeasure was necessary because of the aggravationof the peace and order problem generated by theassassination of Mayor Cesar Climaco.- Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermandthe Constitution. The fact that the petitioners weresuspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse theconstitutional short-cuts the respondents took.- Zamboanga City at the time in question certainly

did not excuse the non-observance of theconstitutional guaranty against unreasonablesearches and seizures. There was no state ofhostilities in the area to justify, assuming it could, therepressions committed therein against thepetitioners.- The record does not disclose that the petitionerswere wanted criminals or fugitives from justice. Atthe time of the "zona," they were merely suspectedof the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even beeninvestigated for it. As mere suspects, they werepresumed innocent and not guilty as summarilypronounced by the military.- lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty need thearmor of the Constitution, to protect them, not from

a deserved sentence, but from arbitrary punishment.Every person is entitled to due process. It is no

exaggeration that the basest criminal, rangedagainst the rest of the people who would condemnhim outright, is still, under the Bill of Rights, amajority of one.- The respondents cannot even plead the urgency ofthe raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew

where the petitioners were. They had everyopportunity to get a search warrant before makingthe raid. If they were worried that the weapons insidethe compound would be spirited away, they couldhave surrounded the premises in the meantime, as apreventive measure.- Conceding that the search was trulywarrantless, might not the search and seizurebe nonetheless considered valid because it wasincidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all thelaw enforcement authorities have to do is force theirway into any house and then pick up anything theysee there on the ground that the occupants areresisting arrest, then we might as well delete the Billof Rights as a fussy redundancy.

- If the arrest was made under Rule 113,Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connectionwith a crime about to be committed, beingcommitted, or just committed, what was thatcrime? There is no allegation in the record of such a

justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed thatunder the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officermaking the arrest must have personal knowledge ofthe ground therefor.- It follows that as the search of the petitioners'premises was violative of the Constitution, all thefirearms and ammunition taken from the raidedcompound are inadmissible in evidence in any of theproceedings against the petitioners. These articlesare "fruits of the poisonous tree.

Dispositive WHEREFORE, the search of thepetitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, ishereby declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seizedas a result thereof are inadmissible in evidenceagainst the petitioners in any proceedings. However,the said articles shall remain in custodia legispending the outcome of the criminal cases that havebeen or may later be filed against the petitioners.

POSADAS v CA (PEOPLE)188 SCRA 288

GANCAYCO; August 2, 1990

NATURE

Petition for review


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FACTS- Pat. Ursicio Ungab and Pat. Umbra Umpar, bothmembers of the Integrated National Police (INP) ofthe Davao Metrodiscom assigned with theIntelligence Task Force, were conducting asurveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao City on

October 16, 1986 at about 10:00 o'clock in themorning. They spotted petitioner carrying a "buri"bag and they noticed him to be acting suspiciouslywhile they were within the premises of the RizalMemorial Colleges

They approached the petitioner and identifiedthemselves as members of the INP. Petitionerattempted to flee but his attempt to get away wasthwarted by the two notwithstanding his resistance.

They then checked the "buri" bag of the petitionerwhere they found one (1) caliber .38 Smith & Wessonrevolver with Serial No. 770196 two (2) rounds oflive ammunition for a .38 caliber gun a smoke (teargas) grenade,and two (2) live ammunitions for a .22caliber gun. They brought the petitioner to the police

station for further investigation. In the course of thesame, the petitioner was asked to show thenecessary license or authority to possess firearmsand ammunitions found in his possession but hefailed to do so.- He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom officeand the prohibited articles recovered from him wereindorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. Hewas prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms andammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of DavaoCity wherein after a plea of not guilty and trial on themerits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987finding petitioner guilty of the offense. (It appearingthat the accused was below eighteen (18) years oldat the time of the commission of the offense (Art. 68,

par. 2), he was sentenced to an indeterminatepenalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1)DAY ofprision mayorto TWELVE (12) Years, FIVE (5)months and Eleven (11) days ofReclusion Temporal,and to pay the costs. The firearm, ammunitions andsmoke grenade are forfeited in favor of thegovernment and the Branch Clerk of Court is herebydirected to turn over said items to the Chief, DavaoMetrodiscom, Davao City.)- The petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court ofAppeals wherein in due course a decision wasrendered on February 23, 1989 affirming theappealed decision with costs against the petitioner.Hence, this petition for review, the main thrust ofwhich is that there being no lawful arrest or search

and seizure, the items which were confiscated from

the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible inevidence against him.

ISSUEWON the warrantless search imposed on thepetitioner is valid

HELDNORatio- The argument of the Solicitor General that when thetwo policemen approached the petitioner, he wasactually committing or had just committed theoffense of illegal possession of firearms andammunitions in the presence of the police officersand consequently the search and seizure of thecontraband was incidental to the lawful arrest inaccordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985Rules on Criminal Procedure is untenable. At the timethe peace officers in this case identified themselvesand apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to

flee they did not know that he had committed, or wasactually committing the offense of illegal possessionof firearms and ammunitions. They just suspectedthat he was hiding something in the buri bag. Theydid now know what its contents were. The saidcircumstances did not justify an arrest without awarrant.However, there are many instances where a warrantand seizure can be effected without necessarilybeing preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the"stop and search" without a search warrant atmilitary or police checkpoints, the constitutionality orvalidity of which has been upheld by this Court inValmonte vs. de Villa (to quote: Not all searches andseizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable

are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to bedetermined by any fixed formula but is to beresolved according to the facts of each case. Where,for example, the officer merely draws aside thecurtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the

public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle orflashes a light therein, these do not constituteunreasonable search. True, the manning ofcheckpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse bythe men in uniform in the same manner that allgovernmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, atthe cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort andeven irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints duringthese abnormal times, when conducted withinreasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an

orderly society and a peaceful community.Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to

thwart plots to destabilize the government in theinterest of public security. In this connection, theCourt may take judicial notice of the shift to urbancenters and their suburbs of the insurgencymovement, so clearly reflected in the increasedkillings in cities of police and military men by NPA

"sparrow units," not to mention the abundance ofunlicensed firearms and the alarming rise inlawlessness and violence in such urban centers, notall of which are reported in media, most likelybrought about by deteriorating economicconditions ? which all sum up to what one can rightlyconsider, at the very least, as abnormal times.)- In this case, the warrantless search and seizure ismore reasonable considering that unlike in theformer, it was effected on the basis of a probablecause. The probable cause is that when thepetitioner acted suspiciously and attempted to fleewith the buri bag there was a probable cause that hewas concealing something illegal in the bag and itwas the right and duty of the police officers to

inspect the same. It is too much indeed to requirethe police officers to search the bag in thepossession of the petitioner only after they shall haveobtained a search warrant for the purpose. Such anexercise may prove to be useless, futile and muchtoo late.- In People vs. CFI of Rizal, the Court held as follows:. . . In the ordinary cases where warrant isindispensably necessary, the mechanics prescribedby the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules ofCourt must be followed and satisfied. But We neednot argue that there are exceptions. Thus in theextraordinary events where warrant is not necessaryto effect a valid search or seizure, or when the lattercannot be performed except without warrant, what

constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search orseizure becomes purely a judicial question,determinable from the uniqueness of thecircumstances involved, including the purpose of thesearch or seizure, the presence or absence ofprobable cause, the manner in which the search andseizure was made, the place or thing searched andthe character of the articles procured. Clearly, thesearch in the case at bar can be sustained under theexceptions heretofore discussed, and hence, theconstitutional guarantee against unreasonablesearches and seizures has not been violated.DispositiveThe petition is denied

ALLADO v DIOKNO

[supra, page]


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MALALOAN v CA (FINEZA)232 SCRA 249

REGALADO; May 6, 1994

NATURE

Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA.FACTS- 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM NorthernSector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional

Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for searchwarrant. The search warrant was sought for inconnection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866(Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions)perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner MarlboroSt., Fairview, QUEZON CITY. On March 23, 1990,respondent RTC Judge of KALOOKAN CITYissued Search Warrant No. 95-90.- On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members ofthe CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant,

proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to,where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute forLabor Education and Research (EILER) was thentaking place. According to CAPCOM's 'Inventory ofProperty Seized,' firearms, explosive materials andsubversive documents, among others, were seizedand taken during the search. And all the sixty-one(61) persons found within the premises searchedwere brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City butmost of them were later released, with the exceptionof the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who wereindicted for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal CaseNo. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional

Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over byrespondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco.

- On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a 'Motion forConsolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Forthe Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence'before the Quezon City court; and a 'SupplementalMotion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal ofSearch Warrant and Exclusion of evidence IllegallyObtained'.- On September 21, 1990, the respondent QuezonCity Judge issued the challenged order, consolidatingsubject cases but denying the prayer for the quashalof the search warrant under attack, the validity ofwhich warrant was upheld; opining that the samefalls under the category of Writs and Processes,within the contemplation of paragraphs 3(b) of theInterim Rules and Guidelines, and can be serve not

only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing

court but anywhere in the judicial region of theissuing court (National Capital Judicial Region).- Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment,in effect affirming that of the trial court, by denyingdue course to the petition for certiorari and lifting thetemporary restraining order it had issued on

November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now impugned inand sought to be reversed through the presentrecourse before us.

ISSUEWON a court may take cognizance of an applicationfor a search warrant in connection with an offensecommitted outside its territorial jurisdiction and toissue a warrant to conduct a search on a placelikewise outside its territorial jurisdiction.

HELDYES- No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search

warrants, in the same manner that no suchrestriction is provided for warrants of arrest. Thearguments of petitioners are not inferable bynecessary implication from the statutory provisionswhich are presumed to be complete and expressiveof the intendment of the framers. A contraryinterpretation on whatever pretext should not becountenanced.- A bit of legal history on his contestation will behelpful. The jurisdictional rule heretofore was thatwrits and process of the so-called inferior courtscould be enforced outside the province only with theapproval of the former court of first instance. Underthe Judiciary Reorganization Act, the enforcement ofsuch writs and processes no longer needs the

approval of the regional trial court. On the otherhand, while, formerly, writs and processes of thethen courts of first instance were enforceablethroughout the Philippines, under the Interim or

Transitional Rules and Guidelines, certain specifiedwrits issued by a regional trial court are nowenforceable only within its judicial region.- PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS The Court cannotbe blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, as itundeniably is, to detect or elicit informationregarding the existence and location of illegallypossessed or prohibited articles. The Court isaccordingly convinced that it should not make therequisites for the apprehension of the culprits andthe confiscation of such illicit items, once detected,

more onerous if not impossible by imposing furtherniceties of procedure or substantive rules of

jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For that matter,we are unaware of any instance wherein a searchwarrant was struck down on objections based onterritorial jurisdiction.- We do not believe that the enforcement of a searchwarrant issued by a court outside the territorial

jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched islocated would create a constitutional question. Norare we swayed by the professed apprehension thatthe law enforcement authorities may resort to whatcould be a permutation of forum shopping, by filingan application for the warrant with a "friendly" court.It need merely be recalled that a search warrant isonly a process, not an action. Furthermore, theconstitutional mandate is translated into specificallyenumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of asearch warrant, and all these have to be observedregardless of whatever court in whichever region isimportuned for or actually issues a search warrant.Said requirements, together with the ten-day lifetime

of the warrant would discourage resort to a court inanother judicial region, not only because of thedistance but also the contingencies of travel and thedanger involved, unless there are really compellingreasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it doesseem odd that such constitutional protests have notbeen made against warrants of arrest which areenforceable indefinitely and anywhere although theyinvolve, not only property and privacy, but personsand liberty.- On the other hand, it is a matter of judicialknowledge that the authorities have to contend nowand then with local and national criminal syndicatesof considerable power and influence, political orfinancial in nature, and so pervasive as to render

foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant inthe very locale under their sphere of control. Norshould we overlook the fact that to do so willnecessitate the transportation of applicant'switnesses to and their examination in said places,with the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, afurther well-founded precaution, obviously born ofexperience and verifiable data, is articulated by thecourt a quo, as quoted by respondent court:

"This court is of the further belief that the possibleleakage of information which is of utmostimportance in the issuance of a search warrant issecured (against) where the issuing magistratewithin the region does not hold court sessions inthe city or municipality, within the region, where

the place to be searched is located."


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- The foregoing situations may also have obtainedand were taken into account in the foreign judicialpronouncement that, in the absence of statutoryrestrictions, a justice of the peace in one district ofthe county may issue a search warrant to be servedin another district of the county and made returnable

before the justice of still another district or anothercourt having jurisdiction to deal with the mattersinvolved. In the present state of our law on thematter, we find no such statutory restrictions bothwith respect to the court which can issue the searchwarrant and the enforcement thereof anywhere inthe Philippines.- NONETHELESS, TO PUT DOUBTS TO REST, THESUPREME COURT LAID DOWN THE FOLLOWINGPOLICY GUIDELINES;1. The Court wherein the criminal case is pendingshall have primary jurisdiction to issue searchwarrants necessitated by and for purposes of saidcase. An application for a search warrant may befiled with another court only under extreme and

compelling circumstances that the applicant mustprove to the satisfaction of the latter court whichmay or may not give due course to the applicationdepending on the validity of the justification offeredfor not filing the same in the court with primary

jurisdiction thereover.2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, amotion to quash the same may be filed in and shallbe resolved by said court, without prejudice to anyproper recourse to the appropriate higher court bythe party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuingcourt. All grounds and objections then available,existent or known shall be raised in the original orsubsequent proceedings for the quashal of thewarrant, otherwise they shall be deemed waived.

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrantwas filed in or resolved by the issuing court, theinterested party may move in the court where thecriminal case is pending for the suppression asevidence of the personal property seized under thewarrant if the same is offered therein for saidpurpose. Since two separate courts with differentparticipations are involved in this situation, a motionto quash a search warrant and a motion to suppressevidence are alternative and not cumulativeremedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, amotion to quash shall consequently be governed bythe omnibus motion rule, provided, however, thatobjections not available, existent or known duringthe proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may

be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress.The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress

shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy in theappropriate higher court.4. Where the court which issued the search warrantdenies the motion to quash the same and is nototherwise prevented from further proceedingthereon, all personal property seized under the

warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to thecourt wherein the criminal case is pending, with thenecessary safeguards and documentation therefor.5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed wherethe same criminal offense is charged in differentinformations or complaints and filed in two or morecourts with concurrent original jurisdiction over thecriminal action. When the issue of which court will trythe case shall have been resolved, such court shallbe considered as vested with primary jurisdiction toact on applications for search warrants incident tothe criminal case.Dispositive WHEREFORE, on the foregoingpremises, the instant petition is DENIED and theassailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. SP No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SEPARATE OPINION

DAVIDE [concurring and dissenting]- The absence of any express statutory provisionprohibiting a court from issuing a search warrant inconnection with a crime committed outside itsterritorial jurisdiction should not be construed as agrant of blanket authority to any court of justice inthe country to issue a search warrant in connectionwith a crime committed outside its territorial

jurisdiction. The majority view suggests or impliesthat a municipal trial court in Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, orBatanes can validly entertain an application for asearch warrant and issue one in connection with acrime committed in Manila. Elsewise stated, allcourts in the Philippines, including the municipal trialcourts, can validly issue a search warrant inconnection with a crime committed anywhere in thePhilippines. Simply put, all courts of justice in thePhilippines have, for purposes of issuing a searchwarrant, jurisdiction over the entire archipelago.- I cannot subscribe to this view since, in the firstplace, a search warrant is but an incident to a maincase and involves the exercise of an ancillary

jurisdiction therefore, the authority to issue it mustnecessarily be co-extensive with the court'sterritorial jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be toadd an exception to the statutory provisions definingthe territorial jurisdiction of the various courts of thecountry, which would amount to judicial legislation.

The territorial jurisdiction of the courts is determinedby law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129discloses that the territorial jurisdiction of regionaltrial courts, metropolitan trial courts, municipal trialcourts and municipal circuit trial courts are confinedto specific territories. In the second place, the

majority view may legitimize abuses that wouldresult in the violation the civil rights of an accused orthe infliction upon him of undue and unwarrantedburdens and inconvenience as when, for instance, anaccused who is a resident of Basco, Batanes, has tofile a motion to quash a search warrant issued by theMetropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection withan offense he allegedly committed in Itbayat,Batanes.- Nor can Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383) be anauthoritative confirmation of the unlimited orunrestricted power of any court to issue searchwarrants in connection with crimes committedoutside its territorial jurisdiction. While it may be truethat the forty-two search warrants involved therein

were issued by several Judges ---- specifically Judges(a) Amado Roan of the City Court of Manila, (b)Roman Cansino of the City Court of Manila, (c)Hermogenes Caluag of the Court of First Instance ofRizal (Quezon City Branch), (d) Eulogio Mencias ofthe Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig Branch),and (e) Damian Jimenez of the City Court of QuezonCity (Footnote 2, page 387) ---- there is no definiteshowing that the forty-two search warrants were forthe searches and seizures of properties outside theterritorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. Thewarrants were issued against the petitioners andcorporations of which they were officers and some ofthe corporations enumerated in Footnote 7 haveaddressed in Manila and Makati. (pp. 388-89). Rizal

(which includes Makati) and Quezon City bothbelonged to the Seventh Judicial District. Thatnobody challenged on jurisdictional ground theissuance of these search warrants is no argument infavor of the unlimited power of a court to issuesearch warrants.- I have serious misgivings on the majority decisionon the matter where another court may, because ofextreme and compelling circumstances, issue asearch warrant in connection with a criminal casepending in an appropriate court. To illustrate thisexception, the Municipal Trial Court of Argao, Cebu,may validly issue a warrant for the search of a housein Davao City and the seizure of any property thereinthat may have been used in committing an offense in

Manila already the subject of an information filedwith the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. I submit


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that the exception violates the settled principle thateven in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the firstcourt which acquires jurisdiction over the caseacquires it to the exclusion of the other. (People vs.Fernando, 23 SCRA 867, 870 [1968]). This being so,it is with more reason that a court which does not

have concurrent jurisdiction with the first which hadtaken cognizance of the case does not also have theauthority to issue writs or processes, includingsearch warrants, in connection with the pendingcase. Moreover, since the issuance of a searchwarrants is an incident to a main case or is anexercise of the ancillary jurisdiction of a court, thecourt where the main case is filed has exclusive

jurisdiction over all incidents thereto and in theissuance of all writs and processes in connectiontherewith. Furthermore, instead of serving the endsof justice, the exception may provide room forunwarranted abuse of the judicial process, wreak

judicial havoc and procedural complexities whicheffective law enforcement apparently cannot justify. I

cannot conceive of any extreme and compellingcircumstance which the court that first acquiredjurisdiction over the case cannot adequately meetwithin its broad powers and authority.- In the light of the foregoing, and after re-examiningmy original view in this case, I respectfully submitthat:1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction acrime was committed may validly entertain anapplication for and issue a search warrant inconnection with said crime. However, in the NationalCapital Judicial Region, Administrative Circulars No.13 of 1 October 1985, and No. 19 of 4 August 1987must be observed.2. After the criminal complaint or information is filed

with the appropriate court, search warrants inconnection with the crime charged may only beissued by said court.

PEOPLE v CA (CERBO)301 SCRA 475

PANGANIBAN; January 21, 1999

NATUREPetition for Review under Rule 45.

FACTS- Rosalinda Dy was shot at pointblank range by

Jonathan Cerbo in the presence and at the office of

his father, Billy Cerbo

- Elsa B. Gumban (eyewitness) identified JonathanCerbo as the assailant.- The 3rd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Nabunturan-Mawab, Davao, after a preliminary investigation,found "sufficient ground to engender a well-foundedbelief" that the crime of murder has been committed

by private respondent Jonathan Cerbo and resolvedto forward the entire records of the case to theprovincial prosecutor at Tagum, Davao.- After an information for murder was filed against

Jonathan Cerbo, petitioner Alynn Plezette Dy,daughter of the victim Rosalinda Dy, executed anaffidavit-complaint charging private respondent BillyCerbo of conspiracy in the killing , supported by asupplemental affidavit of Elsa B. Gumban, allegingthat the shooting was done in the office and in thepresence of Billy Cerbo who after the shooting didnothing (did not apply first aid nor bring the victim tothe hospital) After a reinvestigation the prosecutionfiled an amended information including Billy Cerbo inthe murder case. A warrant for his arrest was later

issued.- Private respondent Billy Cerbo then filed a motionto quash warrant of arrest arguing that the same wasissued without probable cause.Respondent Judge issued the first assailed orderdismissing the case against Billy Cerbo for lack ofprobable cause and recalling the warrant for hisarrest and ordered the withdrawal of the amendedinformation and the filing of a new one charging

Jonathan Cerbo only.- Private Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsiderationwhich was denied by the respondent judge.- The Court of Appeals held that Judge Eugenio Vallesdid not commit grave abuse of discretion in recallingthe warrant of arrest issued against Private

Respondent Billy Cerbo and subsequently dismissingthe Information for murder filed against the privaterespondent, because the evidence presented thus fardid not substantiate such charge.

ISSUEWON the Trial Court had the authority to reverse thepublic prosecutor's finding of probable cause toprosecute accused and thus dismiss the case filed bythe latter on the basis of a motion to quash warrantof arrest

HELDNORatio The determination of probable cause

during a preliminary investigation is a functionthat belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an

executive function, the correctness of theexercise of which is matter that the trial courtitself does not and may not be compelled topass upon.- If the information is valid on its face and there is noshowing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion

or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor,courts should not dismiss it for 'want of evidence,'because evidentiary matters should be presentedand heard during the trial. The functions and dutiesof both the trial court and the public prosecutor in"the proper scheme of things" in our criminal justicesystem should be clearly understood.Reasoning:Executive Determination of Probable Cause- The Separate (Concurring) Opinion of former Chief

Justice Andres R. Narvasa in Roberts v. Court ofAppeals :xxxthe Court is being asked to examine and assesssuch evidence as has thus far been submitted by theparties and, on the basis thereof, make a conclusion

as to whether or not it suffices "to engender a wellfounded belief that a crime has been committed andthat the respondent is probably guilty thereof andshould be held for trial."- It is a function that this Court should not be calledupon to perform. It is a function that properlypertains to the public prosecutor., one that, as far ascrimes cognizable by a Regional Trial Court areconcerned, and notwithstanding that it involves anadjudicative process of a sort, exclusively pertains,by law, to said executive officer, the publicprosecutor. It is moreover a function that in theestablished scheme of things, is supposed to beperformed at the very genesis of, indeed, prefatorilyto, the formal commencement of a criminal action.

The proceedings before a public prosecutor, it maywell be stressed, are essentially preliminary,prefatory and cannot lead to a final, definite andauthoritative adjudgment of the guilt or innocence ofthe persons charged with a felony or crime. Whetheror not that function has been correctly discharged bythe public prosecutor is a matter that the trial courtitself does not and may not be compelled to passupon. It is not for instance permitted for an accused,upon the filing of the information against him by thepublic prosecutor, to preempt trial by filing a motionwith the Trial Court praying for the quash ordismissal of the indictment on the ground that theevidence upon which the same is based isinadequate. Nor is it permitted, on the antipodal

theory that the evidence is in truth inadequate, forthe complaining party to present a petition before


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the Court praying that the public prosecutor becompelled to file the corresponding informationagainst the accused.xxx xxx xxx- Indeed, the public prosecutor has broad discretionto determine whether probable cause exists and to

charge those whom he or she believes to havecommitted the crime as defined by law. Otherwisestated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority todetermine whether or not a criminal case list be filedin court.- Crespo v. Mogul:It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actionseither commenced by complaint or by informationshall be prosecuted under the direction and controlof the fiscal. The institution of a criminal actiondepends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. Hemay or may not file the complaint or information,follow or not follow that presented by the offendedparty, according to whether the evidence, in hisopinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of

the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reasonfor placing the criminal prosecution under thedirection and control of the fiscal is to preventmalicious or unfounded prosecutions by privatepersons.Judicial Determination of Probable Cause- The determination of probable cause to hold aperson for trial must be distinguished from thedetermination of probable cause to issue a warrant ofarrest, which is a judicial function. The judicialdetermination of probable cause in the issuance ofarrest warrants has been emphasized in numerouscases.- The rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. wereiterated in Allado v. Diokno, where we explained

again what probable cause means. Probable causefor the issuance of a warrant of arrest is theexistence of such facts and circumstances that wouldlead a reasonably discreet and prudent person tobelieve that an offense has been committed by theperson sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge,before issuing a warrant of arrest, "must satisfyhimself that based on the evidence submitted, thereis sufficient proof that a crime has been committedand that the person to be arrested is probably guiltythereof." At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the

judge is not yet tasked to review in detail theevidence submitted during the preliminaryinvestigation. It is sufficient that he personallyevaluates such evidence in determining probable

cause.

- As held in Inting, the determination of probablecause by the prosecutor is for a purpose differentfrom that which is to be made by the judge. Whetherthere is reasonable ground to believe that theaccused is guilty of the offense charged and shouldbe held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon.

The judge, on the other hand, determines whether awarrant of arrest should be issued against theaccused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placinghim under immediate custody in order not tofrustrate the ends of justice.- Verily, a judge cannot be compelled to issue awarrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is noprobable cause for doing so. Corollary to thisprinciple, the judge should not override the publicprosecutor's determination of probable cause to holdan accused for trial on the ground that the evidencepresented to substantiate the issuance of an arrestwarrant was insufficient, as in the present case.Inapplicabilty of Allado and Salonga- Allado and Salonga constitute exceptions to the

general rule and may be invoked only if similarcircumstances are clearly shown to exist. However,the present case is not on all fours with Allado andSalonga. First, Elsa Gumban, the principal eyewitnessto the killing of Rosalinda Dy, was not a participationor conspirator in the commission of the said crime. InAllado and Salonga, however, the main witnesseswere the confessed perpetrators of the crimes,whose testimonies the court deemed 'tainted'.Second, in the case at bar, the private respondentwas accorded due process, and no precipitate hasteor bias during the investigation of the case can beimputed to the public prosecutor. On the other hand,the Court noted in Allado the "undue haste in thefiling of the Information and in the inordinate interest

of the government" in pursuing the case; and inSalonga, " . . . the failure of the prosecution to showthat the petitioner was probably guilty of conspiringto commit the crime, the initial disregard ofpetitioner's constitutioner rights and the massive anddamaging publicity against him." The rulings in thetwo aforementioned cases cannot apply to it.

PEOPLE v USANA323 SCRA 754

PEOPLE v DORIA301 SCRA 668

PEOPLE v ELAMPARO329 SCRA 404

QUISUMBING; March 31, 2000

NATUREAppeal from judgment of RTC.

FACTS

- Acting on a report by an informant, police officersconducted a buy-bust operation (of marijuana) inCaloocan. They arrested the person who sold themthe marijuana (Spencer), but the same was able toescape. Then: the buy-bust team pursued Spencer,who ran inside a bungalow-type house. Havingtrapped Spencer inside the house, the police officersfrisked him and recovered the marked money. Theofficers also found Elamparo repacking 5 bricks ofmarijuana inside the houses sala Elamparo was thenarrested and were taken to a precinct anddelivered to an inquest fiscal for furtherinvestigation. The buy-bust operation and arresthappened on the same day (12 Feb 1995), while theinformation for illegal possession of drugs was filed

on 15 Feb 1995.- Arraignment: plea of not guilty.- Trial: prosecution presented the ff witnesses: policeofficer who was also poseur-buyer, another officerwho took part in buy-bust, and NBI chemist whoexamined and confirmed the confiscated drugs to bemarijuana.Defense presented as witnesses boarders ofElamparos house, saying that Elamparo was attheir house when somebody knocked at their door.His father opened the same and was informed thatsomebody was looking for him. He went out and sawSpencer with handcuffs and being held by anarresting officer. When Elamparo persistentlyquestioned Spencer as to why he was arrested, the

arresting officers got mad at him prompting them tolikewise bring him to the police station where he wasdetained. The officers demanded P15,000.00 for hisrelease which he did not give. On the other hand,Spencer gave the sum and was released.- RTC: Guilty, under RA 6425. penalty of reclusionperpetua and fine of P9million. Elamparo appealed.

ISSUE:1. WON RTC was correct in the assessment ofcredibility of witnesses2. WON the arrest of Elamparo was valid3. WON the penalty imposed was correct

HELD:

1. YES


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Ratio: Unless the trial court overlooked substantialfacts which would affect the outcome of the case, weaccord the utmost respect to their findings of facts.Reasoning:-Elamparo contends that it is highly unusual forarresting officers to act on an information of an

unknown source without confirming the veracity ofthe report, and that it is incredible that a peddler ofmarijuana would be so brazen as to approach totalstrangers and offer to sell them marijuana. He insiststhat he was charged with illegal possession ofmarijuana because he failed to pay the police officersP15,000.00 for his release.- it is well-settled that the assessment of credibility ofwitnesses is within the province of the trial courtwhich had an opportunity to observe the witnessesand their demeanor during their testimonies. Ascompared to the baseless claims of Elamparo, theversion of the prosecution witnesses appears worthyof belief, coming as it does from law enforcers whoare presumed to have regularly performed their duty

in the absence of proof to the contrary.-in many cases, drug pushers did sell their prohibitedarticles to prospective customers, be they strangersor not, in private as well as in public places, even inthe daytime. Indeed, some drug pushers appear tohave become exceedingly daring, openly defiant ofthe law. Hence, what matters is not the existingfamiliarity between the buyer and the seller, or thetime and venue of the sale, but the fact ofagreement as well as the act constituting sale anddelivery of prohibited drugs2. YESRatio: The arrest was within the purview of Sec5 (a),Rule 113, Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:

Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer

or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest aperson:(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrestedhas committed, is actually committing, or isattempting to commit an offense;Reasoning:-Elamparo assails the legality of his arrest for failureof the apprehending officers to secure a searchwarrant.- for warrantless arrests, 2 elements must concur: (1)the person to be arrested must execute an overt actindicating the he has just committed, is actuallycommitting, or is attempting to commit a crime; and(2) such overt act is done in the presence or withinthe view of the arresting officer. Thus, when he was

seen repacking the marijuana, the police officers

were not only authorized but also duty-bound toarrest him even without a warrant.Re: warrantless seizures:-However, not being absolute, the right againstunreasonable searches and seizures is subject toexceptions. Thus, for example, Sec.12, Rule 126,

Rules on CrimPro, provides that a person lawfullyarrested may be searched for dangerous weaponsor anything which may be used as proof of thecommission of an offense, without a search warrant.-5 generally accepted exceptions to the right againstwarrantless searches and seizures have also been

judicially formulated, viz: (1) search incidental to alawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3)seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5)waiver by the accused themselves of their rightagainst unreasonable search and seizure.- this case falls squarely under the plain viewdoctrinePeople v Doria: Objects falling in plain view of anofficer who has a right to be in the position to have

that view are subject to seizure even without asearch warrant and may be introduced in evidence.The "plain view" doctrine applies when the followingrequisites concur: (a) law enforcement officer insearch of the evidence has a prior justification for anintrusion or is in a position from which he can view aparticular area; (b) discovery of the evidence in plainview is inadvertent; (c) immediately apparent to theofficer that the item he observes may be evidence ofa crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

The law enforcement officer must lawfully make aninitial intrusion or properly be in a position fromwhich he can particularly view the area. In the courseof such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertentlyacross a piece of evidence incriminating the accused.

The object must be open to eye and hand and itsdiscovery inadvertent.- members of the buy-bust team were justified inrunning after Spencer (when he escaped) andentering the house without a search warrant for theywere hot in the heels of a fleeing criminal. Onceinside the house, the police officers corneredSpencer and recovered the buy-bust money fromhim. They also caught Elamparo in flagrantedelictorepacking the marijuana bricks which were in fullview3. YESRatio: Minority serves as a privileged mitigatingcircumstance to a crime, thus entitling the accusedto a reduction of penalty one degree lower than that

imposable (by virtue of art.13 (2) RPC)Reasoning:

- contends that if found guilty, the privilegedmitigating circumstance of minority should beappreciated in his favor.- In drug cases, the quantity of prohibited drugsinvolved is determinative of the imposable penalty.Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section

17 of R.A. No. 7659, provides that when the quantityof indian hemp or marijuana is 750 grams or more,as in this case, the penalty shall be reclusion

perpetua to death and fine ranging from five hundredthousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten million pesos(P10,000,000.00).- Appellant having been born on January 9, 1978, wasonly 17 years, 1 month, and 3 days old, at the timeof the commission of the crime on February 12,1995.- being a minor over 15 and under 18 at the time ofthe commission, he is entitled to a reduced penaltydue to the privileged mitigating circumstance- Thus, penalty should be reduced to reclusiontemporal. No fine is imposable in this case, for it is

imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penaltyis reclusion perpetua to death.Dispositive Petition AFFIRMED with modification.

PEOPLE v MANES303 SCRA 231

PARDO; February 17, 1999

NATUREAn appeal taken by accused Sergon Manes and RamilManes from the judgment of RTC Iloilo City,convicting them of murder and sentencing them toeach "suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua withthe accessory penalties as provided in Article 41 of

the Revised Penal Code" and "to indemnify the familyof their victim in the amount of P50,000.00 plusP21,250.00 as expenses for the burial, wake andother related matter and to pay the costs.

FACTS- July 12, 1991, Provincial Prosecutor of I loilo Provincefiled with RTC Iloilo City, an INFORMATION chargingthe accused with MURDER:"That on or about the 23rd of June, 1991, in theMunicipality of Badiangan, Province of Iloilo,Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable court, the above-named accused,conspiring, confederating and mutually helping oneanother to better realize their purpose armed with a

knife and a .38 caliber revolver respectively, withtreachery and/or evident premeditation, did then and


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there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault,attack, stab and shot Nicanor Tamorite with the knifeand .38 caliber revolver with which they were thenprovided, inflicting upon the said Nicanor Tamoritestab wounds and gun shot wounds on the differentparts of his body which caused his death

immediately thereafter."- prosecution recommended NO BAIL for theprovisional liberty of the accused.- July 22, 1991 - TC issued a WARRANT OF ARRESTagainst the accused- October 18, 1991 TC ordered the case ARCHIVEDfor failure to locate the two accused- June 24, 1992 - Sergon and Ramil Manes wereARRESTED in Romblon, Romblon- September 17, 1992 - Upon ARRAIGNMENT, bothaccused pleaded NOT GUILTY to the information- August 25, 1992 - accused filed a PETITION FORBAIL which was opposed by the prosecution. TC didnot hear the petition for bail. Neither did the accusedinvoke the right to bail at any stage of the trial.

- January 13, 1995 - TC convicted the accused ofmurder- February 10, 1995 - both accused appealed to SCwhere accused questioned TCs failure(a) to hear the petition for bail(b) to consider defense of relative in favor of RamilManes and(c) to take note that Sergon Manes was a merevictim of Tamorite's unlawful aggressionAccording to the prosecution> June 23, 1991 5 in the afternoon, ALANCatequista with NICANOR Tamorite and JOSE Cubita,went to see a basketball game at the barangayplaza. When the game was over, Alan approachedand invited Nicanor to go home; at that time, he was

still seated. Accused RAMIL Manes approachedNicanor and pointed a 38 caliber revolver at him,saying "It is a bad luck you did not kill me during thefiesta in Barangay Cabayugan. Now I will be the oneto kill you." Nicanor ran to Alan and used him as ashield from Ramil. At that point, Alan heard a thudand as he looked back, he saw accused SERGONManes with a gory knife and he also saw Nicanorrunning away, with blood on his back. Ramil Manespursued Nicanor and shot him hitting him at theback, just above the waistline. Both accusedcontinued to chase Nicanor who ran towards thepremises of the house of ADING Ablado. Ramil Manesfired two more shots. It could not be determinedwhether those shots hit Nicanor as he and the

accused were already inside the premises of thefence of Ading. Jose who was near Nicanor when the

two accused chased him did not render assistance tohim. After Alan heard the two shots, he and Jose ranhome. Alan told his father and uncle that Sergonstabbed Nicanor and that Ramil shot him. Alan, hisfather, uncle, Jose and the mother of Nicanor thenwent to where the body of Nicanor was in the

downhill portion of the premises of the house ofAding. Nicanor was lying on his back, with 2 woundson the breast, 1 gunshot wound and 1 stab wound.According to the accused(Ramil)> June 23, 1991 in the afternoon, he was at homecooking. At around 5:00 to 5:30, he heard shoutscoming from the direction of the barangay basketballcourt, which was about ten (10) meters away fromhis house. He went to the window to check what itwas. He saw his younger brother Sergon lying on theconcrete pavement and several persons wereganging up on him, three of whom he identified asNicanor, Alan and Jose. They kept on boxing andkicking his brother prompting him to come to thelatter's aid. On his way out, he saw a gun on top of

the table and brought it with him to the basketballcourt.> While on his way to the basketball court, Ramilfired a warning shot to prevent Nicanor fromstabbing his brother Sergon. Nicanor persisted in thepursuit of Sergon, with a knife in his hand. Sergonwas about three meters ahead of Nicanor who wasabout ten meters ahead of the pursuing Ramil. Ramilfired another shot that hit Nicanor who,, fell to theground. Meanwhile, Sergon managed to flee. Ramilalso fled to the direction of the sugarcane field assoon as he fired the second shot because he saw thegroup of Alan approaching,, armed with guns .12Ramil and his brother Sergon went into hiding andonly surfaced a year later when they were arrested in

Romblon.- prosecutions set of facts was favored by the court

ISSUEWON petitioner has a right to bail

HELDNORatio When an accused is charged with a capitaloffense, or an offense punishable by reclusionperpetua, or life imprisonment or death, andevidence of guilt is strong, bail must be denied, as itis neither a matter of right nor of discretionReasoning- In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life

imprisonment or death, the accused has no right tobail when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must

hear a petition for bail to determine whether theevidence of guilt is strong before deciding to grant ordeny bail to the accused. While the accused canapply for bail and have the court hear his applicationsummarily and promptly, such right may be waivedexpressly or impliedly. In this case, the trial court

proceeded to try the case without resolving thepetition for bail that appellants filed. However, thelatter did not call the attention of the trial court totheir unresolved application for bail. It wa

Documents

Crim Pro Digest 4