SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 115719-26. October 5, 1999.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee, v. IRENE YABUT @ IRENE CORTEZ @ FLORENCE MADRID 1 (At-large), FERNANDO CORTEZ y VEGA,Accused-Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

QUISUMBING,J.:

On appeal is the decision dated February 16, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, convicting appellant Fernando Cortez y Vega of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, imposing upon him the penalty of life imprisonment, and ordering him to pay a fine of P100,000.00 and to indemnify private complainants in the following amounts

"a. Fely M. Casanova in the amount of P151,581.00;chanrobles.com : virtual law library

b. Arnel M. Diana in the amount of P50,000.00;

c. Reynaldo P. Claudio in the amount of P58,454.00;

d. German Aquino in the amount of P40,000.00;

e. Manolito Latoja in the amount of P45,000.00;

f. Alejandro P. Ruiz in the amount of P50,000.00;

g. Antonio S. Bernardo in the amount of P60,000.00; and,

h. Henry Ilar in the amount of P25,000.00; all with legal rate of interest reckoned from the filing of the Information until fully paid."cralaw virtua1aw library

Appellant is a former policeman while the co-accused, Irene Yabut, is his common-law wife. Both were charged with estafa and illegal recruitment in large scale, but only appellant stood trial as Yabut has eluded arrest and remains at-large.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

The facts, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, which we find to be duly supported by the records, are as follows: 2

On August 13, 1992, prosecution witness and private complainant Mr. Henry Ilar met for the first time the herein appellant, who was at that time a policeman, and his live-in partner and co-accused Irene Yabut, at Rm. 103 P.M. Apartelle, N. Domingo Street, San Juan, Metro Manila (TSN, June 9, 1993, pp. 3-7). Ilar handed over to the appellant and co-accused Irene Yabut the initial down payment of P10,000.00 for the processing of papers and visa for Japan where he was to work as a roomboy in a hotel (Ibid., p. 3-4, Exh. "A" Pros.). Appellant assured Ilar not to worry since he would be able to leave for Japan otherwise his money would be refunded (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 7). Additional amounts were given by Ilar to co-accused Irene Yabut thru her employee Butch Barrios, namely: P6,000.00, and P4,000.00 for the purpose of processing his papers (TSN, June 9, 1993, pp. 4-5; Exhs. "B" and "C" pros.). On September 26, 1993, Ilar handed over additional P5,000.00 to the appellant the amount to be used allegedly for the expenses to be incurred for Ilars training (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 5; Exh. "D" pros.). Finally, Ilar was made to sign a one (1) year contract but he was not furnished a copy of the same (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 4). Ilar was scheduled to leave for Japan on October 8, 1993 but this date was postponed allegedly due to problems (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 5). The second scheduled date for departure was again cancelled allegedly due to the necessity of applicants undergoing medical examination (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 6). After undergoing the medical examination, Ilar was again scheduled to depart on December 12, 1992 (Ibid). Prior to the scheduled departure, Ilar checked on Irene Yabut but she was no longer in her apartelle (Ibid) although he found the appellant who re-assured Ilar that he would be able to leave for Japan (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 7). Sensing fraudulent practice on the part of the appellant and his co-accused, Ilar verified from the POEA whether the appellant and his co-accused were authorized or licensed to engage in recruitment and placement activities. A certification was issued by the POEA stating that the appellant and co-accused Irene Yabut were neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 6; Exh. "E" pros). As expected, the last scheduled departure of Ilar on December 12, 1993 (sic) (1992) did not push through.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In the case of private complainant Mr. Reynaldo P. Claudio, on July 28, 1992, he went to Room 103 P.M. Apartelle, San Juan, Metro Manila, to apply for a job as hotel worker in Japan. Appellant and co-accused Irene Yabut, introducing themselves as husband and wife, told him that he could work in Japan provided he paid the fees (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 8-9, 26). Convinced by their assurances, (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 19) Claudio gave them an initial payment of P15,000.00 (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 9-10; Exhibits "A" and "G" pros.). Claudio was required to undergo training (June 15, 1993, p. 10-11, Exhs. "B" and "H" pros.). On August 18, 1992, Claudio paid P30,000.00 to co-accused Irene Yabut (June 15, 1993, p. 11; Exhs. "C" and "I" pros). On August 21, 1992, Claudio paid another P25,000.00 to the co-accused Irene Yabut (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 12, 22; Exhs. "J" and "D" pros.). The amounts he paid all in all totalled P70,000.00 which would allegedly be used for the processing of the visa, plane ticket expenses, medical tests and seminar costs for Claudio and his two (2) brothers (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 11, 13). Claudio was made to sign a recruitment contract but he was not furnished a copy of the same by the appellant and his co-accused (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 13). Yabut tried to convince Claudio not to appear at the preliminary investigation hearing scheduled the next day at the Department of Justice by refunding to him the amount of the plane ticket already paid for by Claudio. This proved futile as Claudio appeared at the hearing nonetheless (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 14-16). Claudio was scheduled to depart five (5) times but not one of those scheduled departures for Japan materialized for purportedly the following reasons: that there was no escort or that the contract had to be changed or that it was necessary for him to undergo a medical examination (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 18-19). Persistent follow-ups made by Claudio with the appellant and Yabut at their apartelle went for naught as Claudio was repeatedly told to wait as they were allegedly doing something about the delay (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 20).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

In the case of Mr. Arnel Diana, on July 20, 1992, he along with his brother-in-law, met the appellant and his co-accused Irene Yabut at their room in P.M. Apartelle, No. 26 N. Domingo Street, San Juan Metro Manila (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 30). Diana and his companion were assured by the appellant that they could leave for abroad (Ibid). The appellant and his co-accused asked Diana to pay the fee of P50,000.00 for the travel documents and POEA papers (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 31). Diana was made to sign an employment contract (Ibid; Exhs. "A" to "A-4" and "P" to "P-4") which convinced him to part with his money (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 40-42). The amount was paid on installments. Diana made the first payment on July 20, 1992 for P15,000.00 (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 33; Exhs. "B" and "Q" pros), handed over to the appellant and Irene Yabut (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 40-41). The second installment on July 24, 1992 for P25,000.00 (Ibid, Exhs. "C" and "R" pros) and the third installment was given on July 27, 1992 for P10,000.00 (TSN, July 15, 1993, p. 34; Exhs. "D" and "S" pros). Diana was first scheduled to leave on August 8, 1992 but his departure did not push through (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 35). Disappointed, Diana asked the appellant and his co-accused Irene Yabut for an explanation. Appellant cited lack of escort as the reason for his non-departure (Ibid).

The second scheduled date of departure was also cancelled for alleged unavailability of the Japanese who was to hire him (Ibid). Diana was scheduled five (5) times to depart but each time the departure went for naught, while appellant and co-accused Irene Yabut kept on assuring him that they were going to do something about it (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 36). Exasperated, Diana demanded for the return of his money from appellant (TSN, June 15, 1993, pp. 37-38). Despite the promises of the appellant, the money he paid was never refunded. Thereafter, Diana found out from another complainant Henry Ilar, that the appellant and his co-accused were not licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment (TSN, June 15, 1993, p. 38).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

In the case of private complainant Antonio S. Bernardo, he entered into an employment contract with appellants co-accused Irene Yabut (TSN, August 18, 1993, pp. 2-3). Bernardo was told by the appellant that he did not affix his signature on the employment contract because of his government employment i.e., a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), but appellant on several occasions promised Bernardo that he would be able to leave for abroad (TSN, August 18, 1993, p. 3).

Still another complainant, Fely Casanova testified that she first met appellant and his co-accused Irene Yabut who introduced themselves as Mr. and Mrs. Madrid on June 8, 1992 (TSN, August 18, 1993, p. 5). Casanova always saw the appellant at the P.M. Apartelle on Domingo Street, San Juan, Metro Manila whenever she made follow-ups on her papers (Ibid). Casanova also saw the appellant and his co-accused Irene Yabut at the Town and Country on December 18, and 22, 1992 when the two were already in hiding. They were talking to other applicants whom they promised to send abroad (TSN, August 19, 1993, p. 6). On those two occasions, appellant and his co-accused assured her about a job placement abroad or the return of her money (Ibid)."cralaw virtua1aw library

Realizing that their overseas jobs would never materialize, complainants hauled appellant and his co-accused to the Department of Justice, which conducted a preliminary investigation on the complaints. Both were subsequently charged with (1) Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale in Criminal Case No. 98224, and (2) eight (8) counts of Estafa in Criminal Case Nos. 98997-99004. The Information for Illegal Recruitment reads: 3chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

"The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice and Presidential Anti-Crime Commission hereby accuses Irene Yabut and Fernando Cortez for (sic) Illegal Recruitment as defined and penalized under Articles 38 and 39 of Presidential Decree No. 422 as Amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That during the period from June to September, 1992 or thereabouts, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused mutually confederating and conspiring with each other did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract, enlist and recruit for a fee, eight (8) persons for employment abroad without first obtaining the required license and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Manila, for Makati, Metro Manila, March 31, 1993

Francisco F. Benedicto, Jr.

State Prosecutor II"

Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all charges. 4 Accused Irene Yabut already fled and was not arraigned.

During joint trial, the prosecution presented as its witnesses three (3) of the complainants, namely: (1) Henry L. Ilar; (2) Reynaldo P. Claudio; and (3) Arnel M. Diana. The testimonies of the other five (5) complainants were dispensed with upon the agreement of the prosecution and the defense that affidavits would be offered as their testimonies. The corresponding receipts issued by accused Yabut for amounts received from complainants were marked as evidence for the prosecution. 5chanrobles.com : virtual law library

For the defense, appellant testified on his behalf. He admitted that accused Irene Yabut was his live-in partner with whom he has a child, but he washed his hands of any participation in her business activities. He further insisted that Yabut was not engaged in recruitment of workers for overseas employment but only in the processing of visas. He also denied any knowledge of the special power of attorney executed in his favor by Yabut for the refund of the PAL tickets of several recruits. Moreover, he claimed that he was not present at any given time when large sums of money were received by Yabut and that he never gave any assurances to complainants regarding their departure to Japan. 6

The prosecution then presented complainants Antonio S. Bernardo, Fely M. Casanova, and Henry L. Ilar as rebuttal witnesses to refute appellants denials and protestations of innocence regarding accused Yabuts recruitment activities.

On February 16, 1994, the trial court rendered a decision 7 acquitting appellant of eight (8) counts of estafa but convicting him of illegal recruitment in large scale. The dispositive portion of the decision states:chanrobles law library : red

"WHEREFORE,AccusedFernando Cortez is hereby Acquitted under Criminal Case Nos. 98997-99004 of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, on grounds of reasonable doubt.

Upon the other hand, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused Fernando Cortez under Criminal Case No. 98224 of the crime of Illegal Recruitment (in large scale) penalized under Art. 38(a) in relation to Art. 39(b) of P.D. 442, this Court hereby imposes upon accused Fernando Cortez as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. To suffer life imprisonment and pay a fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00);chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

2. To indemnify private complainants

a) Fely M. Casanova in the amount of P151,581.00;

b) Arnel M. Diana in the amount of P50,000.00;

c) Reynaldo P. Claudio in the amount of P58,454.00;

d) German Aquino in the amount of P40,000.00;

e) Manolito Latoja in the amount of P45,000.00;

f) Alejandro F. Ruiz in the amount of P50,000.00;

g) Antonio S. Bernardo in the amount of P60,000.00; and

h) Henry Ilar in the amount of P25,000.00; all with legal rate of interest reckoned from the filing of the Information until fully paid.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library

Hence, the present appeal. Appellant contends that the trial court 8

". . . ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED DURING THE TRIAL ON THE MERITS AND AS A RESULT IT ALSO ERRED IN CONVICTING FERNANDO CORTEZ OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT WHILE AT THE SAME TIME IT ACQUITTED HIM OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA BASED ON THE SAME EVIDENCE."cralaw virtua1aw library

Appellant anchors his bid for acquittal on the insufficiency of evidence, documentary and testimonial, to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. If at all, appellant argues, the sole person guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale should be Yabut since she was the only one who signed the receipts for the amounts received from the complainants. He contends that the mere fact that he is "romantically linked" with Yabut does not mean he acted in conspiracy with her.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The Office of the Solicitor General, in praying for the affirmance in toto of the trial court decision, insists that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused, as shown by the following acts: 9

". . . (1) He received deposits of money to defray travelling expenses (TSN, June 9, 1993, pp. 3-5; June 15, 1993, pp. 9-12, 22, 40-41; July 15, 1993, p. 34); (2) He informed the complainants that the money turned over would be used for the processing of papers and visas for Japan (TSN, June 9, 1993, pp. 3-5; June 15, 1993, pp. 11, 13, 31); (3) He gave assurance to the complainants that they would be able to leave for Japan otherwise their money would be refunded (TSN, June 9, 1993, p. 7; June 15, 1993, pp. 8-9, 20, 26, 30, 36; August 18, 1993, p. 3; August 19, 1993, p. 6); (4) He stayed at the apartelle office and manned the office by entertaining job seekers even after his co-accused Irene Yabut had gone into hiding (TSN, June 9, 1993, pp. 3-7; June 15, 1993, pp. 8-9, 20, 30; August 18, 1993, p. 5)"chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

The crux of the issue is whether appellant could be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale despite his acquittal of the crime of estafa. If so, did the prosecution prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of illegal recruitment in large scale insofar as appellant is concerned?

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. 10 The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. 11 Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. 12 Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2 (a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that ones acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.chanrobles law library : red

Article 13, par. (b) of the Labor Code enumerates the acts which constitute recruitment and placement as follows

"(b) Recruitment and placement refer to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."cralaw virtua1aw library

The acts of appellant consisting of his promises, offers and assurances of employment to complainants fall squarely within the ambit of recruitment and placement as defined above. The fact that he did not issue the receipts for amounts received from complainants has no bearing on his culpability for the complainants have shown through their respective testimonies and affidavits that appellant was involved in the prohibited recruitment. 13 It is immaterial that appellant ingeniously stated to one of the complainants that he (appellant) was a member of the PNP and a government employee, hence could not sign the receipts. 14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

Article 38 of the Labor Code renders illegal all recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides

"ARTICLE 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment (now Department of Labor and Employment) or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.

(b) Illegal Recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.cralawnad

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Thus, if the illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale, the Labor Code considers it an offense involving economic sabotage and imposes a stiffer penalty therefor in accordance with Article 39 of the Labor Code.

The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are:" (1) the accused undertakes any recruitment activity defined under Art. 13, par. (b), or any prohibited practice enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he does not have a license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and, (3) he commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group." 15chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Indisputably, all three (3) elements exist in the case at bar. First, the complaining witnesses have satisfactorily established that appellant had actively promised them employment, gave assurance of their placement overseas, and with his co-accused received certain sums as fees therefor. Second, the Licensing Division of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration issued a Certification dated March 1, 1993 that JAWOH GENERAL MERCHANDISING 16 represented by Irene Yabut and Fernando Cortez are neither licensed nor authorized by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment. 17 In fact, the defense even entered into a stipulation during trial that appellant is not authorized by the POEA to recruit overseas workers. 18 Third, appellant and co-accused undertook recruitment of not less than eight (8) workers complainants herein, who were recruited individually on different occasions. For purposes of illegal recruitment, however, the law makes no distinction whether the workers were recruited as a group or individually.

There is no showing that any of the complainants had ill-motive to testify falsely against appellant. And it is generally observed that it is against human nature and experience for strangers to conspire and accuse another stranger of a most serious crime just to mollify their hurt feelings. 19 Moreover, we have no reason to discount the trial courts appreciation of the complainants truthfulness, honesty and candor. For such appreciation deserves the highest respect, since the trial court is best-equipped to make the assessment of the witnesses credibility, and its factual findings are generally not disturbed on appeal. 20 Thus, after a careful review of the records, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court.chanrobles law library : red

As to the amounts to be refunded to complainants, we find the trial courts computations in accord with the evidence, except with respect to complainant Fely M. Casanova. Upon recomputation, the amount to be refunded for the failed promise of employment of her daughter and sister-in-law should be P150,781.00 instead of P151,581.00. 21

Lastly, it would not be amiss to stress that in these difficult times, many of our countrymen venture abroad and work even in hazardous places to ensure for themselves and their families a life worthy of human dignity. They labor overseas to provide proper education for their children and secure a decent future for them. Illegal recruiters prey on hapless workers, charge exorbitant fees that siphon their meager savings, then cruelly dash their dreams with false promises of lucrative jobs overseas. For this reason, illegal recruiters have no place in society. Illegal recruitment activities must be stamped out by the full force of the law.cralawnad

WHEREFORE, WE AFFIRM the Decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Fernando Cortez y Vega guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing him to life imprisonment, as well as to pay a fine of P100,000.00 and to indemnify complainants in the amounts stated therein, EXCEPT that only P150,781.00 instead of P151,581.00 should be paid to complainant Fely M. Casanova, with interest at the legal rate from the time of filing the information until fully paid. Costs againstAppellant.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza and Buena,JJ., concur.

Bellosillo,J., on official leave.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 107898. December 19, 1995.]

MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM,Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondents.

Pantaleon, Mendoza & Associates, forPetitioners.

The Solicitor General for publicRespondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22; BOUNCING CHECKS; ELEMENTS. Section 1, par. 1, of B.P. Blg. 22 punishes" [a]ny person who makes or draws and issues any cheek to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason. ordered the bank to stop payment . . ." The gravamen of the offense is knowingly issuing a worthless cheek. Thus, a fundamental element is knowledge on the part of the drawer of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such cheek in full upon presentment. Another essential element is subsequent dishonor of the cheek by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the. drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; VENUE, A VITAL INGREDIENT OF JURISDICTION. It is settled that venue in criminal cases is a vital ingredient of jurisdiction. (Sec. 14, par. [a], Rule 110, of the, Revised Rules of Sec. 15, par. [a], Rule 110 of the Court; 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure)

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE IN TRANSITORY CRIMES. If all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the court therein has the sole jurisdiction to try the case. There are certain crimes in which some acts material and essential to the crimes and requisite to their consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in another, in which event, the court of either has jurisdiction to try the cases, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case excludes the other. These are the so-called transitory or continuing crimes under which violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is categorized. In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In determining proper venue in these cases, the following acts material and essential to each crime and requisite to its consummation must be considered: (a) the seven (7) cheeks were issued to LINTON at its place of business in Balut, Navotas; (b) they were delivered to LINTON at the same place; (c) they were dishonored in Kalookan City; and (d) petitioners had knowledge of the insufficiency of their funds in SOLIDBANK at the time the cheeks were issued. Since there is no dispute that the checks were dishonored in Kaloocan City it is no longer necessary to discuss where the checks were dishonored. Consequently, venue or jurisdiction lies either in the Regional Trial Court of Kaloocan City or Malabon. Moreover, we ruled in the same Grospe and Manzanilla cases as reiterated in Lim v. Rodrigo that venue or jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the Information. The Informations in the cases under consideration allege that the offenses were committed in the Municipality of Navotas which is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Malabon.

5. COMMERCIAL LAW; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW; "ISSUE," CONSTRUED. Under Sec. 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law the term "issue" means the first delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person who takes it as a holder.

6. ID.; ID.; "HOLDER," CONSTRUED. On the other hand, the term "holder" refers to the payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof.

7. ID.; ID.; RECEIPT OF CHECKS BY A COLLECTOR, NOT THE ISSUANCE AND DELIVERY CONTEMPLATED BY LAW. Although LINTON sent a collector who received the checks from petitioners at their place of business in Kalookan City. they were actually issued and delivered to LINTON at its place of business in Balut, Navotas. The receipt of the checks by the collector of LINTON is not the issuance and delivery to the payee in contemplation of law. The collector was not the person who could take the checks as a holder, i.e. as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto. Neither could the collector be deemed an agent of LINTON with respect to the checks because he was a mere employee.

8. CRIMINAL, LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 22; PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF KNOWLEDGE OF INSUFFICIENT FUNDS; NOT OVERCOME BY FAILURE OF PARTY TO PAY THE AMOUNTS DUE ON THE CHECKS. Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 establishes a prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The prima facie evidence has not been overcome by petitions in the cases before us because they did not pay LINTON the amounts due on the checks; neither did they make arrangements for payment in full by the drawee bank within five (5) banking days after receiving notices that the checks had not been paid by the drawee bank. In People v. Grospe citing People v. Manzanilla we held that." . . knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another."

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO,J.:

MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM, spouses, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Malabon with estafa on three (3) counts under Art. 315, par. 2 (d), of The Revised Penal Code, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 1696-MN to 1698-MN. The Informations substantially alleged that Manuel and Rosita, conspiring together, purchased goods from Linton Commercial Company, Inc. (LINTON), and with deceit issued seven Consolidated Bank and Trust Company (SOLIDBANK) checks simultaneously with the delivery as payment therefor. When presented to the drawee bank for payment the checks were dishonored as payment on the checks had been stopped and/or for insufficiency of funds to cover the amounts. Despite repeated notice and demand the Lim spouses failed and refused to pay the checks or the value of the goods.

On the basis of the same checks, Manuel and Rosita Lim were also charged with seven (7) counts of violation of B.P. Big. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 1699-MN to 1705-MN. In substance, the Informations alleged that the Lims issued the checks with knowledge that they did not have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for payment in full of such checks upon presentment. When presented for payment within ninety (90) days from date thereof the checks were dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds. Despite receipt of notices of such dishonor the Lims failed to pay the amounts of the checks or to make arrangements for full payment within five (5) banking days.

Manuel Lim and Rosita Lim are the president and treasurer, respectively, of Rigi Built Industries, Inc. (RIGI). RIGI had been transacting business with LINTON for years, the latter supplying the former with steel plates, steel bars, flat bars and purlin sticks which it uses in the fabrication, installation and building of steel structures. As officers of RIGI the Lim spouses were allowed 30, 60 and sometimes even to 90 days credit.

On 27 May 1983 the Lims ordered 100 pieces of mild steel plates worth P51,815.00 from LINTON which were delivered on the same day at their place of business at 666 7th Avenue, 8th Street, Kalookan City. To pay LINTON for the delivery the Lims issued SOLIDBANK Check No. 027700 postdated 3 September 1983 in the amount of P51,800.00. 1

On 30 May 1983 the Lims ordered another 65 pieces of mild steel plates worth P63,455.00 from LINTON which were delivered at the place of business on the same day. They issued as payment SOLIDBANK Check No. 027699 in the amount of P63,455.00 postdated 20 August 1983. 2

The Lim spouses also ordered 2,600 "Z" purlins worth P41,800 which were delivered to them on various dates, to wit: 15 and 22 Apr 1983; 11, 14, 20, 23, 25, 28 and 30 May 1983; and, 2 and 9 June 1983. To pay for the deliveries, they issued seven SOLIDBANK checks, five of which were

Check No. Date of issue Amount

027683 16 July 1983 P27,900.00 3

027684 23 July 1983 P27,900.00 4

027719 6 Aug. 1983 P32,550.00 5

027720 13 Aug. 1983 P27,900.00 6

027721 27 Aug. 1983 P37,200.00 7

William Yu Bin, Vice President and Sales Manager of LINTON testified that when those seven (7) checks were deposited with the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation they were dishonored for "insufficiency of funds" with the additional notation "payment stopped" stamped thereon. Despite demand Manuel and Rosita refused to make good the checks or pay the value of the deliveries.

Salvador Alfonso, signature verifier of SOLIDBANK, Grace Park Branch, Kalookan City, where the Lim spouses maintained an account, testified on the following transactions with respect to the seven (7) checks:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

CHECK NO. DATE PRESENTED REASON FOR DISHONOR

027683 22 July 1983 Payment Stopped (PS) 8

027684 23 July 1983 PS and Drawn Against

Insufficient Fund (DAIF) 9

027699 24 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF 10

027700 5 Sept 1993 PS and DAIF 11

027719 9 Aug. 1993 DAIF 12

027720 16 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF 13

027721 30 Aug. 1983 PS and DAIF 14

Manuel Lim admitted having issued the seven (7) checks in question to pay for deliveries made by LINTON but denied that his companys account had insufficient funds to cover the amounts of the checks. He presented the bank ledger showing a balance of P65,752.75. Also, he claimed that he ordered SOLIDBANK to stop payment because the supplies delivered by LINTON were not in accordance with the specifications in the purchase orders.

Rosita Lim was not presented to testify because her statements would only be corroborative.

On the basis of the evidence thus presented the trial court held both accused guilty of estafa and violation of B.P. Big. 22 in its decision dated 25 January 1989. In Crim. Case No. 169-MN they were sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00 with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay the costs. They were also ordered to indemnify LINTON in the amount of P241,800.00. Similarly sentences were imposed in Crim. Cases Nos. 1697-MN and 1698-MN except as to the indemnities awarded, which were P63,455.00 and P51,800.00, respectively.

In Crim. Case No. 1699-MN the trial court sentenced both accused to a straight penalty of one (1) year imprisonment with all the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs. In addition, they were ordered to indemnify LINTON in the amount of P27,900.00. Again, similar sentences were imposed in Crim. Cases Nos. 1700-MN to A705-MN except for the indemnities awarded, which were P32,550.00, P27,900.00, P27,900.00, P63,455.00, P51,800.00 and P37,200.00 respectively. 15

On appeal, the accused assailed the decision as they imputed error to the trial court as follows: (a) the regional Trial Court of Malabon had no jurisdiction over the cases because the offenses charged ere committed outside its territory; (b) they could not be held liable for estafa because the seven (7) checks were issued by them several weeks after the deliveries of the goods; and, (c) neither could they be held liable for violating B.P. Blg. 22 as they ordered payment of the checks to be stopped because the goods delivered were not those specified by them, besides they had sufficient funds to pay the checks.

In the decision of 18 September 1992 16 respondent Court of Appeals acquitted accused-appellants of estafa on the ground that indeed the checks were not made in payment of an obligation contracted at the time of their issuance. However it affirmed the finding of the trial court that they were guilty of having violated B.P. Blg. 22. 17 On 6 November 1992 their motion for reconsideration was denied. 18

In the case at bench petitioners maintain that the prosecution failed to prove that any of the essential elements of the crime punishable under B.P. Blg. 22 was committed within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon. They claim that what was proved was that all the elements of the offense were committed in Kalookan City. The checks were issued at their place of business, received by a collector of LINTON, and dishonored by the drawee bank, all in Kalookan City. Furthermore, no evidence whatsoever supports the proposition that they knew that their checks were insufficiently funded. In fact, some of the checks were funded at the time of presentment but dishonored nonetheless upon their instruction to the bank to stop payment. In fine, considering that the checks were all issued, delivered, and dishonored in Kalookan City, the trial court of Malabon exceeded its jurisdiction when it tried the case and rendered judgment thereon.

The petition has no merit. Section 1, par. 1, of B.P. Blg. 22 punishes" [a]ny person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. . . ." The gravamen of the offense is knowingly issuing a worthless check 19 Thus, a fundamental element is knowledge on the part of the drawer of the insufficiency of his funds in 20 or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon presentment. Another essential element is subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 21

It is settled that venue in criminal cases is a vital ingredient of jurisdiction. 22 Section 14, par. (a), Rule 110, of the Revised Rules of Court, which has been carried over in Sec. 15, par. (a), Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Sec. 14. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.

If all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the court therein has the sole jurisdiction to try the case. 23 There are certain crimes in which some acts material and essential to the crimes and requisite to their consummation occur in one municipality or territory and some in another, in which event, the court of either has jurisdiction to try the cases, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case excludes the other. 24 These are the so-called transitory or continuing crimes under which violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is categorized. In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.25cralaw:red

In determining proper venue in these cases, the following acts material and essential to each crime and requisite to its consummation must be considered: (a) the seven (7) checks were issued to LINTON at its place of business in Balut, Navotas; (b) they were delivered to LINTON at the same place; (c) they were dishonored in Kalookan City; and, (d) petitioners had knowledge of the insufficiency of their funds in SOLIDBANK at the time the checks were issued. Since there is no dispute that the checks were dishonored in Kaloocan City, it is no longer necessary to discuss where the checks were dishonored.

Under Sec. 191 of the Negotiable Instruments Law the term "issue" means the first delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person who takes it as a holder. On the other hand, the term "holder" refers to the payee or indorsee of a b- or note who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof. In People v. Yabut 26 this Court explained

. . . The place where the bills were written, signed, or dated does not necessarily fix or determine the place where they were executed. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. An undelivered bill or note is inoperative. Until delivery, the contract is revocable. And the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means (t)he payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof. Delivery of the check signifies transfer of possession, whether actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to transfer title thereto . . .

Although LINTON sent a collector who received the checks from petitioners at their place of business in Kalookan City, they were actually issued and delivered to LINTON at its place of business in Balut, Navotas. The receipt of the checks by the collector of LINTON is not the issuance and delivery to the payee in contemplation of law. The collector was not the person who could take the checks as a holder, i.e., as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto. Neither could the collector be deemed an agent of LINTON with respect to the checks because he was a mere employee. As this Court further explained in People v. Yabut 27

Modesto Yambaos receipt of the bad checks from Cecilia Oue Yabut or Geminiano Yabut, Jr., in Caloocan City cannot, contrary to the holding of the respondent Judges, be licitly taken as delivery of the checks to the complainant Alida P. Andan at Caloocan City to fix the venue there. He did not take delivery of the checks as holder, i.e., as payee or indorsee. And there appears to be no contract of agency between Yambao and Andan so as to bind the latter for the acts of the former. Alicia P. Andan declared in that sworn testimony before the investigating fiscal that Yambao is but her messenger or part-time employee. There was no special fiduciary relationship that permeated their dealings. For a contract of agency to exist, the consent of both parties is essential. The principal consents that the other party, the agent, shall act on his behalf, and the agent consents so as to act. It must exist as a fact. The law makes no presumption thereof. The person alleging it has the burden of proof to show, not only the fact of its existence, but also its nature and extent . . .

Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 establishes a prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds as follows

The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the bank because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due thereon, or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) barking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

The prima facie evidence has not been overcome by petitioners in the cases before us because they did not pay LINTON the amounts due on the checks; neither did they make arrangements for payment in full by the drawee bank within five (5) banking days after receiving notices that the checks had not been paid by the drawee bank. In People v. Grospe 28 citing People v. Manzanilla 29 we held that." . . knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another."cralaw virtua1aw library

Consequently, venue or jurisdiction lies either in the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City or Malabon. Moreover, we ruled in the same Grospe and Manzanilla cases as reiterated in Lim V. Rodrigo 30 that venue or jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the Information. The Informations in the cases under consideration allege that the offenses were committed in the Municipality of Navotas which is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Malabon. 31

We therefore sustain likewise the conviction of petitioners by the Regional Trial Court of Malabon for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 thus

Accused-appellants claim that they ordered payment of the checks to be stopped because the goods delivered were not those specified by them. They maintain that they had sufficient funds to cover the amount of the checks. The records of the bank, however, reveal otherwise. The two letters (Exhs. 21 and 22) dated July 23, and August 10, 1983 which they claim they sent to Linton Commercial, complaining against the quality of the goods delivered by the latter, did not refer to the delivery of mild steel plates (6 mm x 4 x 8) and "Z" purlins (16 x 7 x 2-1/2 mts) for which the checks in question were issued. Rather, the letters referred to B.1. Lally columns (Sch. #20), which were the subject of other purchase orders.

It is true, as accused-appellants point out, that in a case brought by them against the complainant in the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City (Civil Case No. C-10921) the complainant was held liable for actual damages because of the delivery of goods of inferior quality (Exh. 23). But the supplies involved in that case were those of B.1. pipes, while the purchases made by accused-appellants, for which they issued the checks in question, were purchases of mild steel plates and "Z" purlins.

Indeed, the only question here is whether accused-appellants maintained funds sufficient to cover the amounts of their checks at the time of issuance and presentment of such checks. Section 3 of B.P. Big. 22 provides that notwithstanding receipt of an order to stop payment, the drawee bank shall state in the notice of dishonor that there were no sufficient funds in or credit with such bank for the payment in full of the check, if such be the fact.

The purpose of this provision is precisely to preclude the maker or drawer of a worthless check from ordering the payment of the check to be stopped as a pretext for the lack of sufficient funds to cover the check.

In the case at bar, the notice of dishonor issued by the drawee bank, indicates not only that payment of the check was stopped but also that the reason for such order was that the maker or drawer did not have sufficient funds with which to cover the checks. . . . Moreover, the bank ledger of accused-appellants account in Consolidated Bank shows that at the time the checks were presented for encashment, the balance of accused-appellants account was inadequate to cover the amounts of the checks. 32xxx

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18 September 1992 affirming the conviction of petitioners Manuel Lim and Rosita Lim

In CA-.G.R. CR No. 07277 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1699-MN); CA-G.R. CR No. 07278 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1700-MN); CA-G.R.- CR No. 07279 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1701-MN); - CR No. 07280 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1702-MN); CA-G.R. CR No. 07281 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1703-MN); CA-G.R. CA No. 07282 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1704-MN); and CA-G.R. CR No. 07283 (RTC Crim Case No. 1705-MN), the Court finds theAccused-Appellants.

MANUEL LIM and ROSITA LIM guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and are hereby sentenced to suffer a STRAIGHT PENALTY OF ONE (1) YEAR IMPRISONMENT in each case, together with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay the costs.

In CA-G.R. CR No. 07277 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1699-MN), both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P27,900.00.

In CA-G.R. CR No. 07278 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1700-MN) both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P32,550.00.

In CA-G.R. CR No. 07279 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1701-MN) both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P27,900.00.

In CA-G.R. CR No. 07280 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1702-MN) both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P27,900.00.

In CA-G.R. CR No. 07281 (RTC Crim. Case No. 1703-MN) both accused are hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P63,455.00.

In CA-G.R CR No. 07282 (RTC Crim. Case No. 17-MN) both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P51,800.O0, and

In CA-G.R. CR No. 07283 (RTC Crim. Case No. 170-MN) both accused-appellants are hereby ordered to indemnify- the offended party in the sum of P37,200.00. 33

as well as its resolution of 6 November 1992 denying reconsideration thereof, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC[G.R. No. 69863-65 :December 10, 1990.]192 SCRA 183LINO BROCKA, BENJAMIN CERVANTES, COSME GARCIA, RODOLFO SANTOS, VALENTINO SALIPSIP, RICARDO VEGA, ERIC MARIANO, JOSE EMMANUEL OYALES, RONNIE MATTA, ALFREDO VIAJE, RUBEN EUGENIO, REYNALDO ORTIZ, ORLANDO ORTIZ, NOEL REYES, EDUARDO IMPERIAL, NESTOR SARMIENTO, FRANCO PALISOC, VIRGILIO DE GUZMAN, ALBERTO REYES, JESSIE PINILI, ROMULO AUGUIS, DOMINADOR RESURRECION III, RONNIE LAYGO, ROSAURO ROQUE, CLARENCE SORIANO, OCTAVO DEPAWA, CARLITO LA TORRE, SEVERNO ILANO, JR., DOMINGO CAJIPE, ALAN ALEGRE, RAMON MARTINEZ, MA. GILDA HERNANDEZ, EDNA P. VILLANUEVA, DOLLY S. CANU, MELQUIADES C. ATIENZA, ELIGIO P. VERA CRUZ, ROGER C. BAGAN, ABUNDIO M. CALISTE, Petitioners,vs.JUAN PONCE ENRILE, MAJ. GENERAL FIDEL V. RAMOS, BRIG. GENERAL PEDRO BALBANERO, COL. ABAD, COL. DAWIS, SERGIO APOSTOL, P/LT, RODOLFO M. GARCIA and JUDGE RICARDO TENSUAN, Respondents.D E C I S I O NMEDIALDEA,J.:This petition was originally filed on February 13, 1985 to secure the release of petitioners on habeas corpus and to permanently enjoin the City Fiscal of Quezon City from investigating charges of "Inciting to Sedition" against petitioners Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia and Rodolfo Santos, (hereafter Brocka, et al.). On learning that the corresponding informations for this offense has been filed by the City Fiscal against them on February 11, 1985, a supplemental petition was filed on February 19, 1985 (p. 51, Rollo) to implead the Presiding Judge, 1 and to enjoin the prosecution of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo) and the issuance of warrants for their arrests, including their arraignment. Since then President Ferdinand E. Marcos had ordered the provisional release of Brocka, et al., the issue on habeas corpus has become moot and academic (p. 396, Rollo). We shall thus focus on the question of whether or not the prosecution of the criminal cases for Inciting to Sedition may lawfully be enjoined.:-cralawPetitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern Police District following the forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held in sympathy with the jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO). Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal Assembly in Criminal Cases Nos. 37783, 37787 and 37788 with Branch 108, Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Quezon City. 2Except for Brocka, et al. who were charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly and for whom no bail was recommended, the other petitioners were released on bail of P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent petition for bail for which daily hearings from February 1-7, 1985 were held.However, despite service of the order of release on February 9, 1985, Brocka, et al. remained in detention, respondents having invoked a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) allegedly issued against them on January 28, 1985 (p. 6, Rollo). Neither the original, duplicate original nor certified true copy of the PDA was ever shown to them (p. 367, Rollo).Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February 11, 1985 with Inciting to Sedition, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-38023, Q-38024 and Q-38025 (p. 349, Rollo), without prior notice to their counsel (p. 7, Rollo). The original informations filed recommended no bail (p. 349, Rollo). The circumstances surrounding the hasty filing of this second offense are cited by Brocka, et al. (quoting from a separate petition filed on their behalf in G.R. Nos. 69848-50 entitled "Sedfrey A. Ordoez vs.Col. Julian Arzaga, et al."), as follows:"xxx"6. The sham' character of the inquest examination concocted by all respondents is starkly bizarre when we consider that as early as 10:30 A.M. today, February 11, 1985, Benjamin Cervantes was able to contact undersigned petitioner by phone informing counsel that said Benjamin Cervantes and the 4 other persons who are the subjects of this petition will be brought before the Quezon City Fiscal at 2:30 for undisclosed reasons: subsequently, another phone call was received by petitioning counsel informing him that the appearance of Benjamin Cervantes et al. was to be at 2:00 P.M. When petitioning counsel arrived in the office of Assistant City Fiscal Arturo Tugonon, the complainants' affidavits had not yet been received by any of the panel of three assistant city fiscals, although the five persons under detention were already in the office of said assistant fiscal as early as 2:00 P.M. It was only at 3:00 when a representative of the military arrived bringing with him alleged statements of complainants against Lino Broka (sic) et al. for alleged inciting to sedition, whereupon undersigned counsel asked respondent Colonel Agapito Abad 'who ordered the detained persons to be brought to the office of Assistant Fiscal Arturo Tugonon since there were no charges on file;' and said Colonel Agapito Abad said aloud: 'I only received a telephone call from Colonel Arzaga about 11:00 A.M. to bring the detained persons today I am only the custodian.' At 3:15, petitioning counsel inquired from the Records Custodian when the charges against Lino Broka (sic) had been officially received and he was informed that the said charges were never coursed through the Records Office."7. Under the facts narrated above, respondents have conspired to use the strong arm of the law and hatched the nefarious scheme to deprive Lino Broka (sic) et al. the right to bail because the utterances allegedly constituting inciting to sedition under Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code are, except for varying nuances, almost verbatim the same utterances which are the subject of Criminal Cases No. 37783, 37787 and 37788 and for which said detained persons are entitled to be released on bail as a matter of constitutional right. Among the utterances allegedly made by the accused and which the respondents claimed to be violative of Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code are: 'Makiisa sa mga drivers, "Makiisa sa aming layunin, "Digmaang bayan ang sagot sa kahirapan,' Itigil ang pakikialam ng imperyalismo sa Pilipinas,' 'Rollback ng presyo ng langis sa 95 Centavos.' (See Annex B)"8. That when petitioning counsel and other members of the defense panel requested that they be given 7 days within which said counsel may confer with their clients the detained persons named above, the panel of assistant fiscals demanded that said detained persons should sign a 'waiver' of their rights under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for the grant of said request, which is a harassing requirement considering that Lino Broka (sic) et al. were already under the detention, albeit illegally, and they could not have waived the right under Rule 125 which they did not enjoy at the time the ruling was made by the panel of assistant city fiscals." (pp. 4-6, Rollo in G.R. 69848-50).They were released provisionally on February 14, 1985, on orders of then President F. E. Marcos. The circumstances of their release are narrated in Our resolution dated January 26, 1985, as quoted in the Solicitor General's Manifestation as follows:"G.R. Nos. 69848-50 (Sedfrey A. Ordoez, Petitioner, vs.Col. Julian Arzaga, et al., Respondents). Petitioner Sedfrey A. Ordoez filed this petition for habeas corpus in behalf of Lino Brocka, Benjamin Cervantes, Cosme Garcia, Alexander Luzano, and Rodolfo Santos, who were all detained under a Preventive Detention Action (PDA) issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on January 28, 1985. They were charged in three separate informations of the crime of illegal assembly under Art. 146, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 1834. On February 7, 1985, the Honorable Miriam Defensor Santiago, Regional Trial Judge of Quezon City, issued a resolution in the above criminal cases, directing the release of the five accused on bail of P6,000.00 for each of them, and from which resolution the respondent fiscals took no appeal. Immediately thereafter, the accused filed their respective bail bonds. This notwithstanding, they continued to be held in detention by order of the respondent colonels; and on February 11, 1985, these same accused were 'reinvestigated,' this time on charges of 'inciting to sedition' ** under Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code, following which corresponding cases were filed. The respondents complied with Our resolution requiring them, inter alia, to make a RETURN of the writ of habeas corpus. In their RETURN, it appeared that all the accused had already been released, four of them on February 15, 1985 and one February 8, 1985. The petitioner, nevertheless, argued that the petition has not become moot and academic because the accused continue to be in the custody of the law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition." (p. 395, Rollo).Hence, this petition.Brocka, et al. contend that respondents' manifest bad faith and/or harassment are sufficient bases for enjoining their criminal prosecution, aside from the fact that the second offense of inciting to sedition is illegal, since it is premised on one and the same act of attending and participating in the ACTO jeepney strike. They maintain that while there may be a complex crime from a single act (Art. 48, RTC), the law does not allow the splitting of a single act into two offenses and filing two informations therefor, further, that they will be placed in double jeopardy.The primary issue here is the legality of enjoining the criminal prosecution of a case, since the two other issues raised by Brocka, et al. are matters of defense against the sedition charge.We rule in favor of Brocka, et al. and enjoin their criminal prosecution for the second offense of inciting to sedition.Indeed, the general rule is that criminal prosecution may not be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary or final. There are however exceptions, among which are:"a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs.Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);"b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs.Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs.Albano, supra; Fortun vs.Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);"c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs.Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);"d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs.Gil, 67 Phil. 62);"e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs.Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs.Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);"f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs.People and Avendia, 109 Phil. 1140);"g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs.City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);"h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs.Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);"i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs.Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Raoa vs.Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf, Guingona, et al vs.City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577); and"j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs.Pao, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438)."7. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs.Castelo, L-6374, August 1, 1958)." (cited in Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)In the petition before Us, Brocka, et al. have cited the circumstances to show that the criminal proceedings had become a case of persecution, having been undertaken by state officials in bad faith.: nadRespondents, on the other hand, had invoked a PDA in refusing Brocka, et al.'s release from detention (before their release on orders of then Pres. Marcos). This PDA was, however, issued on January 28, 1985, but was invoked only on February 9, 1985 (upon receipt of the trial court's order of release). Under the guidelines issued, PDAs shall be invoked within 24 hours (in Metro Manila) or 48 hours (outside Metro Manila). (Ilagan v. Enrile, G.R. No. 70748, October 28, 1985, 139 SCRA 349). Noteworthy also is Brocka, et al.'s claim that, despite subpoenas for its production, the prosecution merely presented a purported xerox copy of the invoked PDA (par. 4, Counter-Rejoinder, p. 367, Rollo).The foregoing circumstances were not disputed by the Solicitor General's office. In fact they found petitioner's plight "deplorable" (par. 51, Manifestation, p. 396, Rollo).The hasty filing of the second offense, premised on a spurious and inoperational PDA, certainly betrays respondent's bad faith and malicious intent to pursue criminal charges against Brocka, et al.We have expressed Our view in the Ilagan case that "individuals against whom PDAs have been issued should be furnished with the original, and the duplicate original, and a certified true copy issued by the official having official custody of the PDA, at the time of the apprehension" (supra, p. 369).We do not begrudge the zeal that may characterize a public official's prosecution of criminal offenders. We, however, believe that this should not be a license to run roughshod over a citizen's basic constitutional lights, such as due process, or manipulate the law to suit dictatorial tendencies.We are impelled to point out a citizen's helplessness against the awesome powers of a dictatorship. Thus, while We agree with the Solicitor General's observation and/or manifestation that Brocka, et al. should have filed a motion to quash the information, We, however, believe that such a course of action would have been a futile move, considering the circumstances then prevailing. Thus, the tenacious invocation of a spurious and inoperational PDA and the sham and hasty preliminary investigation were clear signals that the prosecutors intended to keep Brocka, et al. in detention until the second offense of "Inciting to Sedition" could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew. As a matter of fact the corresponding informations for this second offense were hastily filed on February 11, 1985, or two days after Brocka, et al.'s release from detention was ordered by the trial judge on February 9, 1985.Constitutional rights must be upheld at all costs, for this gesture is the true sign of democracy. These may not be set aside to satisfy perceived illusory visions of national grandeur.: nadIn the case of J. Salonga v. Cruz Pao, We point out:"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution . . ." (G.R. No. L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438-at p. 448).We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies the filing of criminal charges, as in the instant case where Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying provisional release until such time that charges were filed, and where a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted, charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be enjoined.ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The trial court is PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from proceeding in any manner with the cases subject of the petition. No costs.SO ORDERED.FernanC.J.,Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino and Regalado,JJ.,concur.Feliciano,J.,is on leave.

FIRST DIVISION[G.R. NO. 158763 : March 31, 2006]JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON,Petitioners,v.VIRGILIO M. TULIAO,Respondent.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:This is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18 December 2002 Decision1of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003 Resolution denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the instant petition forcertiorari,mandamusand prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two (2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela; andcralawlibrary3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524.2The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts ofreclusion perpetuaexcept SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice.On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated 16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition forcertiorari,mandamusand prohibition with this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of respondent's cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the merits.Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it of respondent's petition forcertiorari, prohibition andmandamus.On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.Hence, this petition.The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following assignments of error:FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORWith all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16, 2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORWith all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORWit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued therein having become final and executory.Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals' ruling that:[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico v. Alfonso V. Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs.3Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their filing of the above Urgent Motion.In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for bail, petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado v. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul Roberts v. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson v. Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from the Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable cause.6In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused.8Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.10One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has commenced.11Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the will of the law.12Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but is not limited to, detention.The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr.,13cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the application for bail.13While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.15As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan,16we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, 'bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law.' " The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor.17There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included;18(2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:1. In Allado v. Diokno,19on the prayer of the accused in a petition forcertiorarion the ground of lack of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us.2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20upon the accused's Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the accused.3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21on the prayer of the accused in a petition forcertiorarion the ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of arrest.We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free. This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the case.Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of the day and night.22Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in the hierarchy of rights than property rights,23demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty must come before its taking and not after.Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed Petition for Review with the Secretary of Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of discretion.We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor's resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further proceeding with the case.After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the assistant prosecutor's resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but proper."24Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutor's resolution to the Secretary of Justice. But even if the Petition for Review was filed before the issuance of the warrants of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutor's resolution is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.In Webb v. de Leon,25we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground.The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true: violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by Judge Tumaliuan:Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.27However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad gravely abused his discretion.According to petitioners:In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determinati