1. Laserna vs. DDB 157870 nov. 3, 20082. Pp vs. Nicolas 170324 feb. 8, 20073. Pp vs. laylo 192235 July 6, 20114. Pp vs. sta. Maria 171019 feb 23, 20075. Pp. vs. quikoit 175222 July 27, 20076. Pp. vs Tilao 170359 July 27, 2007

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila EN BANC SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), G.R. No. 157870 Petitioner, - versus - DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD andPHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENTAGENCY (PDEA), Respondents.x-----------------------------------------------xATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., G.R. No. 158633 Petitioner, - versus - DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD andPHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENTAGENCY, Respondents. x-----------------------------------------------xAQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., G.R. No. 161658 Petitioner, Present: PUNO, C.J., QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and BRION, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated: Respondent. November 3, 2008x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O N VELASCO, JR., J.: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing: x x x x

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school’s student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and employees of

public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

x x x x (f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense having an

imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local

government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides: SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—x x x x x x x (g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test. WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency; WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x. NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public office[:] SECTION 1. Coverage.—All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health. SEC. 3. x x x On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x. SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates.—Before the start of the campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate.—No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May 10, 2004 elections,[1] filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g)

of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of the

Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator. G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. DangerousDrugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency) In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions. G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency) Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees. The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions.[2]

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona

fide controversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. [3] But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought

before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it. [4] To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.[5] The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest. [6] There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of thePhilippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.The Consolidated Issues The principal issues before us are as follows: (1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and (2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Pimentel Petition(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 andCOMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,[7] or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared

as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.[8] In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.[9]

Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as

1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each

department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.[10]

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional

limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.[11] The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights [12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or

promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.[13]

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively

enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not

expressly state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.

While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer

enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is

rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

SJS Petition(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students

and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process “the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from

the harmful effects of dangerous drugs.” This statutory purpose, per the policy-declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of “an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs and projects.”[14] The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and

Rehabilitation.—A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.

x x x x Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program.

—A drug dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:

x x x x

School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.[15]

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by

the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure[16] under Sec. 2, Art. III[17] of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state-decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first impression.

US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug

testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County , et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),[18] both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court-decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.

In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their

respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the school’s athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in the football program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the school’s drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment[19] of the US Constitution.

The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non-athletes since the former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a student’s privacy since a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the Fourth[20] and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug-testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for

high school students desiring to join extra-curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug-testing policy made to apply to non-athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non-athletes are entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non-

athletes on the basis of the school’s custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction between a non-athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drug-testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory. Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens

the well-being of the people,[21] particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow fromVernonia, “[d]eterring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation’s laws against the importation of drugs”; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty.[22] Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test

prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that “subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,”[23] has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under

Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.[24] Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:

The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on

the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizen’s constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.[25]

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.[26] In context, the right to privacy means the right to be

free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities. [27] And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, “translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.[28] Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state’s exercise of police power.[29]

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held,

“reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion. [30] And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the individual’s privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest. [31] In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employees––and students for that matter––under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search needing what was referred to in Vernonia as “swift and informal disciplinary procedures,” the probable-cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon

which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees’ privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company’s work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law.

Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search “narrowly drawn” or “narrowly focused”?[32]

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules

and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to “random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.”

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much

as possible the employee’s privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the

procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.[33] In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the “need to know” basis;[34] that the “drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results.”[35] Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees’ privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.

To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect

the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test.[36] To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual’s privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and social- economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor’s dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to this modern-day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the

employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under

reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. [37] And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.[38]

Petitioner SJS’ next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of

power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into account the company’s work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are established.

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH,

Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore,

incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape. [39] In the

face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here. Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],[f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for

mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor’s

office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. [40] To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA

9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 170234 February 8, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.BERNARDO F. NICOLAS, Accused-Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Assailed before Us is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01191 dated 23 August 2005 which affirmed in toto the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 164, in Criminal Case No. 11566-D, finding accused-appellant Bernardo Felizardo Nicolas, a.k.a. Bernie, guilty of violation of Section 5,3 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In an Information dated 7 August 2002, accused-appellant Bernardo Felizardo Nicolas, a.k.a. Bernie, was charged with Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the accusatory portion thereof reading:

On or about August 6, 2002, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, who is not being authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO2 Danilo S. Damasco, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.42 gram of white crystalline substance which was found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.4

The case was raffled to Branch 164 of the RTC of Pasig City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 11566-D.

When arraigned on 30 September 2002, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not Gulity" to the charge.5 The Pre-Trial Conference of the case was terminated on the same day. Thereafter, the case was heard.

The prosecution presented two witnesses: PO2 Danilo S. Damasco6 and SPO2 Dante Zipagan,7 both members of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig Police Station. The testimony of Police Inspector Delfin A. Torregoza, Forensic Chemical Officer, Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office, was, however, dispensed with after both prosecution and defense stipulated that the specimen8 submitted in court is the same one mentioned in the Request for Laboratory Examination9 and in Chemistry Report No. D-1501-02E,10 and that same was regularly examined by said forensic chemical officer.

For the defense, appellant11 took the witness stand together with his common-law wife, Susan dela Cruz Villasoto,12 and brother, Jose Nicolas.13

The diametrical versions of the People and the accused are narrated by the trial court as follows:

VERSION OF THE PEOPLE

On August 6, 2002, at about 9:30 o’clock in the evening, a confidential informant stepped inside the office of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig Police Station, Pasig City and informed SPO4 Numeriano S. De Lara, Officer In-Charge of that unit, that a certain alias Bernie was selling shabu at his place along Santiago Street, in Barangay Bagong Ilog, Pasig City. Immediately, SPO4 De Lara organized a team to conduct a surveillance operation and the entrapment of alias Bernie, if warranted by the situation. The team was composed of PO2 Danilo S. Damasco, PO2 Montefalcon, PO2 Orig and SPO2 Zipagan who was the team leader. PO2 Damasco was designated to act as poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation while the other police officers would serve as his back-ups to assist in the possible apprehension of alias Bernie. After a short briefing, the team of police operatives, including the confidential informant, proceeded to the target place at Santiago Street, Bagong Ilog, Pasig City. SPO2 Dante Zipagan, the team leader, instructed the confidential informant to first check and look for the whereabouts of alias Bernie. The informant, after five minutes, returned and informed the team that he found alias Bernie in front of his house and the team decided to proceed with the planned entrapment of alias Bernie. PO2 Damasco and the informant then walked towards the house of alias Bernie while the back-up police officers placed themselves strategically in different positions where they could see PO2 Damasco and the informant in the act of negotiating

with alias Bernie. PO2 Damasco and the informant saw alias Bernie conversing with a male person in front of his house. After the informant greeted alias Bernie, he introduced PO2 Damasco to alias Bernie whose real name is Bernardo Nicolas, the accused herein, as a user of shabu and would like now to buy some Php500.00 worth of the substance from him. Alias Bernie, responded that he still had one piece of that stuff and was willing to sell it to poseur-buyer Damasco. Accused asked for the money which was pre-marked by Damasco with initials DSD (Exh. D-1) which stands for the name of Danilo S. Damasco. Damasco then handed the five hundred peso bill (Exh. D) to accused who accepted it. Accused, in return, gave Damasco one plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which looked like that of shabu. For a moment, PO2 Damasco examined the plastic sachet and its content and then announced to the accused he was a police officer and arresting him for violation of the drugs law. Accused Bernardo Nicolas alias Bernie got shocked and surprised. As Damasco was holding the accused, the back-up officers arrived and assisted him in handling the accused. Damasco recovered the buy-bust money and the police team took him away to their station, where he was turned over to a police investigator together with the small plastic sachet of suspected shabu that Damasco had purchased from the accused. SPO4 Numeriano S. De Lara sent the small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance which was then marked with EXH.-A BFN/080602 to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office at St. Francis St., Mandaluyong City, as per his letter memorandum dated August 6, 2002 (Exhs. B and B-1). The specimen was received at the EPD Crime Laboratory office by P/Insp. Delfin Torregoza, a Forensic Chemical Officer, who weighed and examined the specimen which he found to contain 0.42 gram of white crystalline substance which was tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride as per his Chemistry Report No. D-1501-02E (Exhs. C and C-1). Accused Bernardo F. Nicolas was consequently charged with Violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.

VERSION OF DEFENSE

x x x x

[Appellant] testified that on August 6, 2002 at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, he was outside of his house conversing with his brother, Jose Nicolas, and a friend named Arnold Mendez. He had just came (sic) out of his house in order to close the billiard salon that he owned. As they were then huddled in animated conversation, two motor vehicles stopped in front of his billiard parlor, a car and a van. The passengers of the van alighted and one of them pointed a gun at him. As accused was not familiar with the men, he could not recognize them. He learned, later on, that the man who poked a gun at him was PO2 Danilo Damasco who was accompanied by other persons numbering about four or five of them. Damasco warned him not to move, holding and waiving in his hand a plastic sachet which Damasco said he bought from accused Bernardo Nicolas. The police officers then proceeded to put handcuffs on the hands of the accused, in spite of his protest denying anything to do with the plastic sachet of alleged shabu being displayed by Damasco. The police officers also handcuffed and arrested Arnold Mendez. Jose Nicolas did not allow himself to be arrested and handcuffed. When he sensed that he would be handcuffed, he immediately fled and ran into his house, locking himself in. Luckily for him, the police officers did not pursue him any longer. He just watched the incident by peeping through the window of his house. Accused Bernardo Nicolas alias Bernie and Arnold Mendez, were then forced into the police vehicle and taken to the police station, although Nicolas showed resistance which forced the police officers to physically carry him into their vehicle. Accused Bernard Nicolas was then charged with Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165.

Appellant denies the charge. He insists that there was no buy-bust operation and that the shabu (methamphetamine hydrochloride) allegedly sold by him to the poseur buyer was planted evidence. He claims that the trumped-up charge is a way of getting even with him because he, together with his wife, had filed a case before the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) for grave misconduct against several policemen (PO2 Joel Tapec, PO1 Christopher Semana and five John Does) assigned at the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig Police Station, for entering and robbing their house on 5 February 2002. He further claims that the policemen who arrested him for allegedly selling shabu were the John Does mentioned in the complaint he and his wife filed with the NAPOLCOM.

In its decision dated 8 October 2003, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentenced him to life imprisonment. The dispositve portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the court finds accused BERNARDO F. NICOLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500.00),14 with the accessory penalties provided under Section 35 thereof.15

From the decision, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal informing the court that he is appealing the same to the Court of Appeals.16 Though the Notice of Appeal specified that the decision is being appealed to the Court of Appeals, the trial court nonetheless forwarded the records of the case to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.17

On 22 November 2004, appellant filed an appellant’s brief before the Supreme Court. On 31 March 2005, the Office of the Solicitor General filed the People’s brief.18

Since the penalty imposed by the trial court was life imprisonment, the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition pursuant to our ruling in People v. Mateo.19

On 23 August 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming in full the decision of the trial court.20Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal assailing the decision before the Supreme Court.21

With the elevation of the records of the case to the Supreme Court, the parties were required to submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire, within 30 days from notice.22 The parties opted not to file supplemental briefs on the ground that they have fully argued their positions in their respective briefs.23

Appellant assigns as errors the following:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN TOTALLY DISREGARDING THE VERSION OF THE DEFENSE.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Appellant observed that (1) the policemen did not conduct surveillance first; (2) they did not have any agreement as regards the money to be used in buying the shabu; and (3) they failed to talk about any signal to inform the back-up policemen that the transaction has been consummated. He contends that the absence of these things is unusual and that it made even more doubtful that the buy-bust operation really took place. 1avvphi1.net

These observations will not purge him of the charge.

Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test-buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers.24 A prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment.25 Flexibility is a trait of good police work.26 In the case at bar, the buy-bust operation was conducted without need of any prior surveillance for the reason that the informant accompanied the policemen to the person who is peddling the dangerous drugs.

Appellant faults the policemen because there was no agreement or discussion among themselves as regards the marked money and the pre-arranged signal.

From the records, it is clear that it was PO2 Damasco who prepared the marked money27 as shown by his initials on the top right corner of the P500.00 bill that was used in purchasing the shabu from appellant.28 The fact that the team leader and the other members of the team did not discuss or talk about the marked money does not necessarily mean that there was no buy-bust operation. As explained by SPO2 Zipagan, since PO2 Damasco was the designated poseur buyer it was the latter’s discretion as to how to prepare the marked money. It is not required that all the members of the buy-bust team know how the marked money is to be produced and marked inasmuch as they have their respective roles to perform in the operation. As this Court sees it, the other members of the team left the matter of the marked money to one person – the poseur buyer – because it was he who was to deal directly with the drug pusher.

As to the absence of a pre-arranged signal, same is not fatal to the cause of the prosecution. The employment of a pre-arranged signal, or the lack of it, is not indispensable in a buy-bust operation. What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law.29 The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore.30 What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.31

In the case under consideration, all these elements have been established. The witnesses for the prosecution clearly showed that the sale of the drugs actually happened and that the shabu subject of the sale was brought and identified in court. The poseur buyer (PO2 Damasco) categorically identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. His testimony was corroborated by SPO2 Zipagan. Per Chemistry Report No. D-1501-02E of Police Inspector Delfin A. Torregoza, the substance, weighing 0.42 gram, which was bought by PO2 Damasco from appellant in consideration of P500.00, was examined and found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).

We quote the material portions of the testimony of the poseur buyer that detailed the apprehension of appellant, as follows:

A: And we briefed and after a short briefing we proceeded to the alleged residence of Bernie and when we reached the place, I particularly saw the subject person in front of the alleged house.

Q: You said we, whom are you referring to as those who went with you to the house of Bernie?

A: The confidential informant.

Q: After reaching the house of Bernie, what happened there?

A: I saw the subject person infront of his alleged house talking to another male person.

Q: What was the general condition of that place outside the house of Bernie when you saw him?

A: Dim light, sir.

Q: After you first saw Bernie talking with somebody else, what did you do?

A: The confidential informant greeted alias Bernie and after greeting said person the other male person he was talking to went farther from us and they conversed.

Q: And after that conversation between your informant and Bernie, what happened?

A: The confidential informant introduced me as a shabu user and as a customer.

Q: How far were you from Bernie when you were introduced?

A: Only two (sic) away.

Q: Less than a meter?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was the response of Bernie as you were introduced as a shabu user?

A: He checked my personality first and he asked me if I will get the stuff, he asked me in tagalog, kukuha ka ba?

Q: And what did you tell him?

A: I answered him, kung mayroon kukuha ako.

Q: And what was his answer?

A: He answered me that, mayroon kaya tamang-tama kasi isa na lang itong natitira sa akin panggamit ko sana.

Q: At that very moment, after you were told by Bernie isa na lang ang natitira, what did you?

A: I asked him kung puwede pang bilhin and then he told me, isa na lang ito panggamit ko, magkano ba ang kukunin mo?

Q: What was your answer?

A: I told him, P500.00 worth.

Q: And what is [his] reply?

A: Okay, ibibigay ko na lang sa inyo.

Q: And what happened next?

A: He asked my payment first.

Q: And what did you do after he asked your payment?

A: I gave him the pre-marked money.

Q: What (sic) that bill made off?

A: P500.00 bill.

Q: Where did you put that marking in that bill?

A: I put the marking on the upper right portion of the bill inside the 500.

Q: What are the markings did you put there?

A: I put my initials DSD.

Q: Now after you gave him that P500.00 marked money, what else happened?

A: After he received the pre-marked money then he gave me one (1) plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance after receiving said I examined the plastic sachet.

Q: After that examination of yours, what did you do?

A: After a brief examination immediately I introduced myself as a police officer and subsequently, arrested alias Bernie.

Q: After you introduced yourself as a police officer, what was the reaction of alias Bernie?

A: He was shocked, sir.

Q: Did he tell you anything?

A: None, sir.

Q: And what did you do after arresting him immediately?

A: After informing his constitutional right I recovered the pre-marked money.

Q: You mean, you frisked him, Mr. Witness?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What else did you recover from him aside from the mark money?

A: Nothing more.32

Appellant tries to discredit PO2 Damasco and SPO2 Zipagan by showing an inconsistency in their testimonies regarding the condition of the scene of the incident. He points out that PO2 Damasco stressed that the place was dark while SPO2 Zipagan said that the area was well-lighted.33

After going over the testimonies of the two police operatives, we find no inconsistency in their testimonies. When asked about the general condition of the place outside the house of appellant, PO2 Damasco answered "dim light."34 On the other hand, SPO2 Zipagan said the place was "a lighted area."35 PO2 Damasco did not say that the place was dark nor did SPO2 Zipagan say that the place was well-lighted. What is clear is that the place was lighted. Thus, since both witnesses said that the place was lighted, the inconsistency is more apparent than real. Even assuming ad arguendo that this can be considered an inconsistency, same is trivial to adversely affect their credibility.

We now go to appellant’s contention that the policemen who arrested him were impelled by improper motive. He argues that he was merely talking to his brother and a friend when the policemen suddenly arrived and insisted that he had sold shabu to PO2 Damasco. He claims that the charge against him was driven by the policemen’s desire to get even with him for filing a case for grave misconduct against the said policemen with the NAPOLCOM. He added that the trial court should have considered the motive as to why he was charged and that the possibility of vengeance is not remote.

We find appelant’s imputation of ill motive on the police officers to be unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. We agree in the trial court’s ruling when it said:

The evidence does not show that Damasco and Zipagan were moved by ill-will in testifying against the accused. There was no ill feeling or personal animosity existing between the police officers and the accused at the time of the latter’s arrest. It is true that accused Bernardo F. Nicolas and his common-law wife Susan Dela Cruz Villasoto filed an administrative case against PO2 Joel Tapec and PO1 Christopher Semana, both of the Pasig City Police Station for grave misconduct before the National Police Commission which is docketed as ADM CASE No. 2003-008 (NCR). But the filing of this case against Tapec and Semana is not enough reason for Damasco and Zipagan to fabricate or plant evidence against the accused. There was absolutely no reason at all for them to risk their lives and career to go and plant evidence against the accused which is in violation of Section 29 of R.A. 9165 that imposes upon any person found guilty of planting any dangerous drug regardless of quantity and purity, the penalty of death. These police officers are presumed to know this law and the court believes that these police officers do not wish to lose their lives by fabricating evidence against innocent individuals. Accused Bernardo Nicolas, naturally, was expected to deny the accusation against him, for admission would automatically result in conviction. The testimony of his common-law wife, Susan Dela Cruz Villasoto is not much of help to the accused’[s] defense. Since she did not witness what transpired when accused went out of the house in the evening of August 6, 2002. All that she substantially testified to was that she heard shouting outside of their house and saw three persons forcibly carrying her husband to the other side of the road. (TSN, July 7, 2003, p. 4). Witness Jose F. Nicolas, to the mind of the court is not a credible witness. He claimed he was present at the time accused was arrested. He said he fled in order to avoid being handcuffed and arrested by the police when his brother alias Bernie was arrested. He did not even visit his brother in jail. He talked to him only on August 25, 2003 to discuss with him his testimony in court. (TSN, September 15, 2003, p. 13). Being accused’s close relative, Jose Nicolas is expected to testify favorably in behalf of the accused whose testimony, of course, is not sufficient to overthrow the strength and weight of the testimonies of the police officers Damasco and Zipagan.36

We likewise find appellant’s declaration that the policemen who arrested him were the very same ones who robbed his house on 5 February 2002 to be a mere afterthought in order that he may justify his claim of improper motive on the part of the policemen. How convenient, indeed, it is for him to make such a declaration. From the time of the alleged break-in in his house on 5 February 2002 until the time he was arrested on 6 August 2002 for selling shabu, he never lifted a finger to try and find out the identities of the alleged five John Does mentioned in his complaint with the NAPOLCOM. He could have easily gone to the Station Drug Enforcement Unit of the Pasig Police Station, but this he did not do. Only when he was arrested during an entrapment operation did he make such a claim. The timing thereof renders such declaration very dubious and unreliable.

Appellant’s contention that he was framed-up is made even more suspect by the fact that the statement 37 of his common-law wife that he had gone out of the house for only two minutes when the policemen arrived and took him away is belied by the statement38 of his brother that he had been outside the house for 30 minutes and was talking with his brother and Arnold Mendez when the policemen arrived.

Frame-up, like alibi, is generally viewed with caution by this Court, because it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. Moreover, it is a common and standard line of defense in prosecutions of violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.39 For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.40 In the case at bar, the presumption remained uncontradicted because the defense failed to present clear and convincing

evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive.

Prosecutions involving illegal drugs largely depend on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Considering that this Court has access only to the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings, it generally relies upon the assessment of the trial court, which had the distinct advantage of observing the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses during trial. Hence, factual findings of the trial courts are accorded respect absent any showing that certain facts of weights and substance bearing on the elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied.41 We have no reason to deviate from this rule. We affirm the factual findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The evidence presented by the prosecution proves to a moral certainty petitioner’s guilt of the crime of selling dangerous drugs.

The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Said section reads:

SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

Under said law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine of P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. For selling 0.42 gram of shabu to PO2 Damasco, the trial court, as sustained by the Court of Appeals, imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 in accordance with Article 63(2)42 of the Revised Penal Code.

Section 98 of Republic Act No. 9165, however, provides for the limited application of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on said law. This Section reads:

SEC. 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. – Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the case of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided herein shall be reclusion perpetua to death. (Underscoring supplied.)

With the aforesaid section, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer apply to the provisions of the Drugs law except when the offender is a minor. Thus, Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code shall not be used in the determination of the penalty to be imposed on the accused. Since Section 98 of the Drugs Law contains the word "shall," the non-applicability of the Revised Penal Code provisions is mandatory, subject only to the exception in case the offender is a minor.

In the imposition of the proper penalty, the courts, taking into account the circumstances attendant in the commission of the offense, are given the discretion to impose either life imprisonment or death, and the fine as provided for by law. In light, however, of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been prohibited. Consequently, the penalty to be meted on appellant shall only be life imprisonment and fine. Hence, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 were properly imposed on the accused-appellant.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01191 dated 23 August 2005 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 164, in Criminal Case No. 11566-D, finding accused-appellant Bernardo Felizardo Nicolas, a.k.a. Bernie, guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Appellee,

- versus -

ROLANDO LAYLO y CEPRES,

Appellant.

G.R. No. 192235

Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,*

BRION,

PEREZ, and

SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 6, 2011

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DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated 28 January 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03631. The CA affirmed the Decision2 dated 16 September 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, in Criminal Case No. 06-017, convicting appellant Rolando Laylo y Cepres (Laylo) of violation of Section 26(b), Article II (Attempted Sale of Dangerous Drugs)3 of Republic Act No. 91654 (RA 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

On 21 December 2005, two separate Informations against appellant Laylo and Melitona Ritwal (Ritwal) were filed with the RTC of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 06-017 and 06-018, respectively. The information against Laylo states:

Criminal Case No. 06-017That on or about the 17th day of December, 2005, in the Municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law to sell any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly attempt to sell, deliver, and give away shabu to PO1 Angelito G. Reyes, 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance contained in two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets which were found positive to the test for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, also known as shabu, a dangerous drug, thus commencing the commission of the crime of illegal sale but did not perform all the acts of execution which would produce such crime by reason of some cause or accident other than the accused’s own spontaneous desistance, that is, said PO1 Angelito G. Reyes introduced himself as policeman, arrested the accused and confiscated the two (2) above-mentioned sachets from the latter. CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the merits ensued. However, during the trial, Ritwal jumped bail and was tried in absentia. Thus, Ritwal was deemed to have waived the presentation of her evidence and the case was submitted for decision without any evidence on her part.

The prosecution presented two witnesses: Police Officer 1 (PO1) Angelito G. Reyes (PO1 Reyes) and PO1 Gem A. Pastor (PO1 Pastor), the poseur-buyers in the attempted sale of illegal drugs.

The prosecution summed up its version of the facts: In the afternoon of 17 December 2005, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, both wearing civilian clothes, were conducting anti-drug surveillance operations at Lozana Street,Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal. While the police officers were in front of a sari-sari store at around 5:40 p.m., appellant Laylo and his live-in partner, Ritwal, approached them and asked, “Gusto mong umiskor ngshabu?” PO1 Reyes replied, “Bakit mayroon ka ba?” Laylo then brought out two plastic bags containing shabu and told the police officers, “Dos (P200.00) ang isa.” Upon hearing this, the police officers introduced themselves as cops. PO1 Reyes immediately arrested Laylo. Ritwal, on the other, tried to get away but

PO1 Pastor caught up with her. PO1 Pastor then frisked Ritwal and found another sachet of shabu in a SIM card case which Ritwal was carrying.

PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor marked the three plastic sachets of shabu recovered from Laylo and Ritwal and forwarded them to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for forensic testing. Forensic Chemist Police Inspector Yehla C. Manaog conducted the laboratory examination on the specimens submitted and found the recovered items positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

The police officers charged Laylo for attempted sale of illegal drugs and used the two plastic sachets containing shabu as basis while Ritwal was charged for possession of illegal drugs using as basis the third sachet containing 0.02 grams of shabu.

The defense, on the other hand, presented different versions of the facts. The witnesses presented were: appellant Laylo; Laylo’s three neighbors namely Rodrigo Panaon, Jr., Marlon de Leon, and Teresita Marquez.

Laylo testified that while he and his common-law wife, Ritwal, were walking on the street, two men grabbed them. The two men, who they later identified as PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, dragged them to their house. Once inside, the police officers placed two plastic sachets in each of their pockets. Afterwards, they were brought to the police station where, despite protests and claims that the drugs were planted on them, they were arrested and charged.

To corroborate Laylo’s testimony, the defense presented Laylo’s three neighbors. Marlon de Leon (de Leon), also a close friend of the couple, testified that he was taking care of the Laylo and Ritwal’s child when he heard a commotion. He saw men, whom de Leon identified as assets, holding the couple and claimed that he saw one of them put something, which he described as “plastic,” in the left side of Laylo’s jacket.

Rodrigo Panaon, Jr. (Panaon) narrated that on 17 December 2005, at around 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., he was on his way home when he saw Laylo arguing with three men in an alley. He overheard Laylo uttering, “Bakit ba?Bakit ba?” Later, Panaon saw a commotion taking place at Laylo’s backyard. The three men arrested Laylo while the latter shouted, “Mga kapitbahay, tulungan ninyo kami, kami’y dinadampot.” Then Panaon saw someone place something inside the jacket of Laylo as he heard Laylo say, “Wala kayong makukuha dito.”

Teresita Marquez (Marquez) testified that while she was fetching water from the well on 17 December 2005, at around 5:00 or 6:00 p.m., she heard Laylo’s son shouting, “Amang, Amang.” Marquez then saw the child run to his father, who was with several male companions. Then someone pulled Laylo’s collar and frisked him. Marquez overheard someone uttering, “Wala po, wala po.” Marquez went home after the incident. At around 9:00 in the evening, Ritwal’s daughter visited her and borrowed money for Laylo and Ritwal’s release. Marquez then accompanied Ritwal’s daughter to the municipal hall, where a man demanded P40,000.00 for the couple’s release.

In its Decision dated 16 September 2008, the RTC found Laylo and Ritwal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of RA 9165. The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the police officers, who were presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner. The RTC stated that Reyes and Pastor were straightforward and candid in their testimonies and unshaken by cross-examination. Their testimonies were unflawed by inconsistencies or contradictions in their material points. The RTC added that the denial of appellant Laylo is weak and self-serving and his allegation of planting of evidence or frame-up can be easily concocted. Thus,Laylo’s defense cannot be given credence over the positive and clear testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

We thus find accused Rolando Laylo GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 26(b) of R.A. No. 9165 and sentence him to suffer a penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. We also find accused Melitona Ritwal GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165 and illegally possessing a total of 0.02 grams of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu and accordingly sentence her to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years and one day as minimum to 13 years as maximum and to pay a fine of P300,000.00. Let the drug samples in this case be forwarded to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper disposition. Furnish PDEA with a copy of this Decision per OCA Circular No. 70-2007. SO ORDERED.6

Laylo filed an appeal with the CA. Laylo imputed the following errors on the RTC:

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION WITNESS’ PATENTLY FABRICATED ACCOUNTS.

II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE APPREHENDING OFFICERS’ FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE INTEGRITY OF THE ALLEGED SEIZED SHABU.7

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Decision dated 28 January 2010, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The challenged decision of

the court a quo is AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant. SO ORDERED.8

Hence, this appeal.

The Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.9

In the present case, PO1 Reyes narrated in court the circumstances of the illegal sale:PROS. ARAGONES:Q: What time did you proceed to that place of surveillance?A: 5:40 p.m., Ma’am. Q: And what happened when you and PO1 Gem Pastor went there?A: When we were making standby at a nearby store there was a man talking with a woman, the man asked me if we want to have a shot of shabu. Q: What was your reply?A: “Bakit, meron ka ba?” Q: How did that other person react to that question, what did he tell you, if any?A: “Gusto mong umiskor ng shabu?” Q: What happened after that?

A: I replied, “Bakit meron ka ba?” then he showed me two small plastic bags containing shabu, Ma’am. Q: How big is that bag, Mr. Witness?A: Small, Ma’am. Q: Can you tell us the size?A: (Demonstrating) Almost one inch the size of a cigarette, Ma’am. COURT: It was in a plastic not in foil?A: Yes, your Honor. PROS. ARAGONES:Q: After showing you two plastic bags, what happened?A: I introduced myself as a police officer then I caught this man and confiscated the two small plastic bag containing shabu. Q: How about the lady?A: My partner caught the woman because she was intending to run away and he got from her right hand Smart SIM card case containing one small plastic.10

PO1 Pastor corroborated the testimony of PO1 Reyes:

PROS. ARAGONES:Q: Mr. Witness, while you were conducting surveillance on December 17, 2005, what happened?A: While we were conducting surveillance at Lozana Street, Calumpang, Binangonan, Rizal, while we were at the store, two (2) persons approached us, one male and one female, Ma’am. Q: Who were those persons? Did you come to know the name of those persons?A: At that time I don’t know the names but when they were brought to the police station I came to know their names, Ma’am. Q: What are the names of these two persons?A: Rolando Laylo and Melitona Ritwal, Ma’am. Q: At that time they approached you during the time you were conducting surveillance at Lozana Street, what happened?A: The male person approached PO1 Reyes and asked if “iiskor”, Ma’am. Q: What was the reply of PO1 Reyes?A: He answered “Bakit meron ka ba?” Q: When that answer was given by Reyes, what did that male person do?A: He produced two (2) small plastic sachets containing allegedly shabu and he said “dos ang isa.”

COURT: What do you mean by “dos ang isa”?A: Php 200.00, Your Honor. PROS. ARAGONES:Q: Where were you when that male person produced two (2) small plastic sachets?A: I was beside PO1 Reyes, Ma’am. Q: After he showed the plastic sachets containing drugs, what happened next?A: We introduced ourselves as policemen, Ma’am. Q: After you introduced yourselves, what happened next?A: PO1 Reyes arrested the male person while I arrested the female person, Ma’am. Q: Why did you arrest the woman?A: At that time, she was about to run I confiscated from her a SIM card case, Ma’am. COURT: What was the contents of the SIM card case?A: One (1) piece of alleged shabu, Your Honor.11

From the testimonies given, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they were the poseur-buyers in the sale. Both positively identified appellant as the seller of the substance contained in plastic sachets which were found to be positive for shabu. The same plastic sachets were likewise identified by the prosecution witnesses when presented in court. Even the consideration of P200.00 for each sachet had been made known by appellant to the police officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police officers introduced themselves as cops and immediately arrested appellant and his live-in partner Ritwal. Thus, the sale was not consummated but merely attempted. Thus, appellant was charged with attempted sale of dangerous drugs. Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165 provides:

Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. – Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the following unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the commission of the same as provided under this Act:x x x(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical;x x x

Here, appellant intended to sell shabu and commenced by overt acts the commission of the intended crime by showing the substance to PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor.12 The sale was aborted when the police officers identified themselves and placed appellant and Ritwal under arrest. From the testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution was able to establish that there was an attempt to sell shabu. In addition, the plastic sachets were presented in court as evidence of corpus delicti. Thus, the elements of the crime charged were sufficiently established by evidence.

Appellant claims that he was a victim of a frame up. However, he failed to substantiate his claim. The witnesses presented by the defense were not able to positively affirm that illegal drugs were planted on appellant by the

police officers when they testified that “they saw someone place something inside appellant’s jacket.” In Quinicot v. People,13 we held that allegations of frame-up and extortion by police officers are common and standard defenses in most dangerous drugs cases. They are viewed by the Court with disfavor, for such defenses can easily be concocted and fabricated.

Appellant asserts that it is unbelievable that he would be so foolish and reckless to offer to sell shabu to strangers. In People v. de Guzman,14 we have ruled that peddlers of illicit drugs have been known, with ever increasing casualness and recklessness, to offer and sell their wares for the right price to anybody, be they strangers or not. What matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement as well as the act constituting the sale and delivery of the prohibited drugs.

Further, appellant did not attribute any ill-motive on the part of the police officers. The presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers’ official duties should prevail over the self-serving denial of appellant.15

In sum, we see no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and CA. Appellant was correctly found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 January 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03631.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 171019 February 23, 2007

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs.RAFAEL STA. MARIA y INDON, Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

GARCIA, J.:

Under consideration is this appeal by Rafael Sta. Maria y Indon from the Decision1 dated November 22, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00802, denying his earlier appeal from and affirming the May 5, 2004 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, Branch 20, which found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime of violation of Section 5,3 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The indicting Information,4 docketed in the RTC as Criminal Case No. 3364-M-2002, alleges:

That on or about the 29th day of November, 2002, in the municipality of San Rafael, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law and legal justification, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away, dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting of one (1) heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing methylampetamine hydrochloride weighing 0.041 gram.

Contrary to law.

Duly arraigned on January 23, 2003, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged. Trial ensued thereafter.

The prosecution’s version of events which led to appellant’s arrest and subsequent prosecution under the aforementioned Information is as follows:

On November 27, 2002, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, P/Chief Insp. Noli Pacheco, Chief of the Provincial Drug Enforcement Group of the Bulacan Provincial Office based at Camp Alejo Santos, Malolos, Bulacan received an intelligence report about the illegal drug activities in Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan of a certain "Fael," who later turned out to be appellant Rafael Sta. Maria. P/Chief Insp. Pacheco formed a surveillance team to look for a police asset to negotiate a drug deal with appellant. In the morning of November 29, 2002, the surveillance team reported to P/Chief Insp. Pacheco that a confidential asset found by the team had already negotiated a drug deal for the purchase of P200 worth of shabu from appellant at the latter’s house at No. 123 Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan between 7:00 and 7:30 in the evening of November 29, 2002. The surveillance team then prepared for a buy-bust operation, with PO3 Enrique Rullan as team leader, and PO1 Rhoel Ventura, who was provided with two (2) marked P100-bills, as poseur-buyer. At the appointed time and place, PO1 Ventura and the confidential informant proceeded to appellant’s house and knocked at the door. Appellant opened the door and the confidential informant introduced to him PO1 Ventura as a prospective buyer. PO1 Ventura later handed the two (2) marked P100-bills to appellant who, in turn, gave him a plastic sachet of shabu. Thereupon, PO1 Ventura sparked his cigarette lighter, which was the pre-arranged signal to the other members of the buy-bust team that the sale was consummated. Appellant was arrested and the two marked P100-bills recovered from him. Also arrested on that occasion was one Zedric dela Cruz who was allegedly sniffing shabu inside appellant’s house and from whom drug paraphernalia were recovered. Upon laboratory examination of the item bought from appellant, the same yielded positive for methylampetamine hydrochloride or shabu weighing 0.041 gram.

The defense gave an entirely different account of what allegedly transpired prior to and at the time of appellant’s arrest on that evening of November 29, 2002.1awphi1.net

Appellant testified that on November 29, 2002, he was at home with a certain Zedric dela Cruz who was allegedly offering him a cellphone for sale and collecting payment on a loan of his wife. At that time, his wife was out of the house to pay their electric bill. While waiting for his wife, he and Zedric watched television when they heard the barking of dogs. Immediately, three (3) men suddenly barged into the house and announced that they were police officers while three other men stayed outside the house. The police officers frisked him and Zedric and searched the house. He tried to complain about what they were doing but the police officers got mad and accused him of selling shabu. He replied that he does not know anything about drugs. Afterwards, he and Zedric were brought out of the house and handcuffed. While on board the police vehicle, the police officers warned them to cooperate. The police officers also asked him to be their asset and when he said that he does not know anything about it, they told

him that they could file a case against him. The police officers also offered to buy drugs from him but he refused the offer because he knows that it is only a plan for them to arrest him.

In a decision5 dated May 5, 2004, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, and accordingly sentenced him, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1). xxx

2). xxx

3). In Criminal Case No. 3264-M-2002, the Court finds accused RAFAEL STA. MARIA Y INDON guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and is ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

The dangerous drug and drug paraphernalia submitted as evidence in these cases are hereby ordered to be transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA).

SO ORDERED.

From the aforesaid decision, appellant went directly to this Court. Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,6 which modified the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the Court transferred the appeal to the CA for appropriate action and disposition, whereat it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00802.

On November 22, 2005, the CA promulgated the herein assailed Decision7 denying the appeal and affirming that of the trial court, to wit:

xxx The Court sees no reason to disturb the finding of trial court. The evidence presented by the prosecution proves to a moral certainty appellant’s guilt of the crime of selling illegal drugs. What is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

The case is again with this Court following its elevation from the CA, together with the case records.

In his Brief, appellant contends that the trial court erred in convicting him because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He maintains that instigation, not entrapment, preceded his arrest. He also faults the appellate court in not finding that the evidence adduced by the prosecution was obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165.

It is appellant’s submission that what transpired on that fateful evening of November 29, 2002 was instigation and not a valid buy-bust operation. He would make much of the fact that the transaction between him and the police informant occurred on November 27, 2002, while the buy-bust operation took place on November 29,

2002. To appellant, the informant, by pretending that he was in need of shabu, instigated or induced him to violate the anti-dangerous drugs law. He adds that the prosecution was not able to prove that at the time of the police surveillance, he was indeed looking for buyers of shabu, and that were it not for the inducement of the informant that the latter would buy shabu, he would not have produced the same on November 29, 2002.

We are not persuaded.

In entrapment, the entrapper resorts to ways and means to trap and capture a lawbreaker while executing his criminal plan. In instigation, the instigator practically induces the would-be-defendant into committing the offense, and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, the means originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime come from him. In instigation, the law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. The legal effects of entrapment do not exempt the criminal from liability. Instigation does.8

Here, the mere fact that the agreement between appellant and the police informant for the purchase and sale of illegal drugs was made on November 27, 2002, while the buy-bust operation was conducted on November 29, 2002, is of no moment. Without more, it does not prove that said informant instigated appellant into committing the offense. If at all, the earlier agreement and the subsequent actual sale suggest that appellant was habitually dealing in illegal drugs.

It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct.9

As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized by the police merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.

It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. 10 In this case, apart from appellant’s self-serving declaration that he was instigated into committing the offense, he did not present any other evidence to prove the same.

A perusal of the records readily reveals that the police operatives who took part in the buy-bust operation, namely, PO1 Alexander Ancheta, PO1 Rhoel Ventura and PO3 Enrique Rullan, clearly and convincingly testified on the circumstances that led to appellant’s arrest. In a credible manner, they narrated in open court the details of the buy-bust operation they conducted on November 29, 2002 in Sitio Gulod, Barangay Pantubig, San Rafael, Bulacan. We thus quote with approval the trial court’s findings on this matter:

PO1 Ancheta, PO1 Ventura and PO2 Rullan testified on the aforementioned circumstances concerning the drug buy-bust operation that led to the arrest of accused Sta. Maria, following the purchase from him of P200 worth of shabu by PO1 Ventura posing as poseur-buyer. The testimonies of these officers, as summarized above, are essentially clear credible and convincing. Notwithstanding minor inconsistencies, their declarations in Court dovetail and corroborated one another on material points, and are generally consistent with the narrations contained in their "Joint Affidavit of Arrest" (Exh. "D") executed on December 2, 2002. More significantly, there is no credible showing that the aforementioned police officers were impelled by any improper motive or intention in effecting the arrest of accused Sta. Maria and in testifying against him in Court.

The Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that accused Sta. Maria had other criminal cases before other branches of this Court for involvement in drug activities. He was charged with and convicted by Branch 21 of this Court of Violation of Section 16, Article III of the Republic Act of 6425, as amended, also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," following a voluntary plea of guilty in Criminal Case No. 341-M-2001. He was likewise charged with Violation of Sections 15 and 16 of the same law before Branch 81 under Criminal Cases Nos. 59-M-2000 and 60-M-2000, which were dismissed on mere technicality because of non-appearance of the arresting officers.

The Court is not persuaded by the defense of denial interposed by accused Sta. Maria. According to him, the police officers just barged into his house on November 29, 2002 while he was watching television together with co-accused Dela Cruz. He said, he was frisked and his place searched, and he was arrested for no reason at all by the police officers.

The Court rules that the version bandied about by accused Sta. Maria is purely self-serving. It cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the police officers regarding the drug buy-bust operation and purchase from him of shabu. To reiterate, there is no showing that said police officers were actuated by any ill or improper motive or intention in effecting the arrest of the accused Sta. Maria and in testifying against him in Court. (See People v. Dela Cruz, 229 SCRA 754; People v. Persiano, 233 SCRA 393). 11

Appellant would next argue that the evidence against him was obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 because the buy-bust operation was made without any involvement of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Prescinding therefrom, he concludes that the prosecution’s evidence, both testimonial and documentary, was inadmissible having been procured in violation of his constitutional right against illegal arrest.

The argument is specious.

Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 reads:

SEC. 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. – The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the Narcotics Division of the NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit are hereby abolished; however they shall continue with the performance of their task as detail service with the PDEA, subject to screening, until such time that the organizational structure of the Agency is fully operational and the number of graduates of the PDEA Academy is sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided, That such personnel who are affected shall have the option of either being integrated into the PDEA or remain with their original mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be immediately reassigned to other units therein by the head of such agencies. Such personnel who are transferred, absorbed and integrated in the PDEA shall be extended appointments to positions similar in rank, salary, and other emoluments and privileges granted to their respective positions in their original mother agencies.

The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices and units provided for in this Section shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That personnel absorbed and on detail service shall be given until five (5) years to finally decide to join the PDEA.

Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and the PNP on all other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided, however, That when the investigation being conducted by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters.

Cursory read, the foregoing provision is silent as to the consequences of failure on the part of the law enforcers to transfer drug-related cases to the PDEA, in the same way that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 is also silent on the matter. But by no stretch of imagination could this silence be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal nor evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.

It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words.12

As we see it, Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the "lead agency" in the investigations and prosecutions of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter. Additionally, the same provision states that PDEA, serving as the implementing arm of the Dangerous Drugs Board, "shall be responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of all the provisions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical as provided in the Act." We find much logic in the Solicitor General’s interpretation that it is only appropriate that drugs cases being handled by other law enforcement authorities be transferred or referred to the PDEA as the "lead agency" in the campaign against the menace of dangerous drugs. Section 86 is more of an administrative provision. By having a centralized law enforcement body, i.e., the PDEA, the Dangerous Drugs Board can enhance the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs. To be sure, Section 86 (a) of the IRR emphasizes this point by providing:

(a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies – The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support of the PDEA xxx. Provided, finally, that nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement personnel and the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and seizures in consonance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

Appellant next argues that the prosecution failed to show compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 regarding the custody and disposition of the evidence against him.

Appellant demands absolute compliance with Section 21 and insists that anything short of the adherence to its letter, renders the evidence against him inadmissible. Pertinently, Section 21 of the law provides:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Regrettably, the pertinent implementing rules, Section 21 of the IRR, states:

Section 21. a. xxx Provided further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

It is beyond quibbling then that the failure of the law enforcers to comply strictly with Section 21 was not fatal. It did not render appellant’s arrest illegal nor the evidence adduced against him inadmissible.

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers’ alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.13

To recapitulate, the challenged buy-bust operation, albeit made without the participation of PDEA, did not violate appellant’s constitutional right to be protected from illegal arrest. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 which even remotely indicate the intention of the legislature to make an arrest made without the participation of the PDEA illegal and evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Moreover, the law did not deprive the PNP of the power to make arrests.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the appealed decision of the CA, affirmatorary of that of the trial court, is AFFIRMED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CANCIO C. GARCIAAssociate Justice

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 175222 July 27, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.RAMON QUIAOIT, JR., Accused-Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 12 July 2006 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00803 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Ramon Quiaoit, Jr. y De Castro," affirming the Decision 2 dated 1 December 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 13229, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as "The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."

The information against appellant reads as follows:

That at around 3:45 o’clock in the morning of April 13, 2004, at Tarlac City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell, dispense and deliver 0.851 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, to poseur buyer PO1 Mark Anthony Baquiran for P500.00, without being authorized by law.3

Appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 5 May 2004.4

During the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: P/Sr. Insp. Ma. Luisa G. David, a Forensic Chemical Officer of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory assigned at the Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory; PO2 Ronnie Dueña, a member of the buy-bust operation team and the one who arrested appellant; and PO1 Mark Anthony Baquiran, a member of the PNP and the designated poseur-buyer.

The prosecution’s version of the case is as follows:

At around 11:00 o’clock in the evening of 12 April 2004, the Tarlac PNP received a report from a confidential informant that someone was selling shabu at the Golden Miles,5 a videoke bar located in Barangay San Roque, Tarlac City. Acting on said information, a team was immediately organized by PNP Provincial Director Rudy Gamido Lacadin to conduct a surveillance in order to verify the information and perform a buy-bust operation.

Shortly thereafter, the team went to Golden Miles where they initially observed the movements of appellant who was with the confidential informant at that time. Later, the informant introduced PO1 Baquiran to appellant and the two negotiated the sale of shabu. According to PO1 Baquiran’s testimony, appellant handed to him a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance in front of The Golden Miles’ comfort room which was located at the back of said establishment.6 In return, he gave appellant a marked P500.00 bill. As soon as the exchange between appellant and PO1 Baquiran took place, the latter gave his companions the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head. PO2 Dueñas and PO1 Cabradilla moved in to arrest appellant. The plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was later marked RID 1 by PO2 Dueñas.

On their way back to Camp Makabulos, the informant allegedly told the buy-bust team, through a text message, that appellant still had in his possession illegal drugs other than that which he had sold to PO1 Baquiran. Thus, upon reaching the camp, they frisked appellant and this yielded six more plastic sachets, the contents of which were similar to those earlier bought by PO1 Baquiran.

All seven pieces of the plastic sachets were then forwarded to the Provincial Crime Laboratory for examination. The test was conducted by P/Sr. Insp. David, and her report7 contained the following pertinent information:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

Seven (7) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with markings "RID-1" through "RID-7" and marked as specimen "A" through "G," respectively, each containing white crystalline substance having a total weight of 0.851 gram. x x x.

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of dangerous drugs xxx

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE results to the tests for the presence of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. x x x.

CONCLUSION:

Specimen "A" through "G" contain Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. x x x.8

Expectedly, appellant presented a disparate narration of the incident:

Appellant claimed that at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning of 13 April 2004, he went to the Golden Miles in order to meet a friend of his. While he was having drinks, PO1 Baquiran saw him and asked if he had company and he replied that he was by himself. He alleged that he knew PO1 Baquiran as he used to be a police asset. PO1 Baquiran then inquired if he was familiar with a certain August Medrano who was a drug pusher in their place. When he answered in the affirmative, PO1 Baquiran supposedly instructed him to buy P500.00 worth of shabu from Medrano. He was also allegedly ordered by PO1 Baquiran to bring Medrano with him to Golden Miles. He initially declined to follow PO1 Baquiran’s instructions since he no longer worked with the police. PO1 Baquiran, however, represented that he was the one who would buy shabu from Medrano and not appellant. Despite this, appellant alleged that he was "forced"9 to buy shabu himself after PO1 Baquiran told him that "(they) need August Medrano."10

And so, from Golden Miles, appellant proceeded to Medrano’s house. He informed Medrano that someone was interested in buying shabu but the prospective buyer wanted to talk to him in person. Medrano refused appellant’s invitation claiming that he had to go somewhere else; instead, he gave the plastic sachet containing shabu to appellant and the latter gave him the P500.00 earlier given by PO1 Baquiran. After this, appellant went back to Golden Miles to inform PO1 Baquiran of what had just transpired between him and Medrano including the latter’s refusal to go with him. He also handed over to said police officer the plastic sachet containing shabu which he bought from Medrano. All of a sudden, PO1 Baquiran placed his hand over appellant’s shoulder and the latter was then taken to Camp Makabulos.

At the camp, PO2 Dueñas called for a certain PO4 Donato for whom appellant used to act as a police asset. PO4 Donato allegedly asked appellant if it was possible for him to buy some more shabu from Medrano. Appellant purportedly replied in the negative claiming that the personnel at Golden Miles already knew about his arrest. To this, PO4 Donato reportedly retorted, "How could we release you when this August Medrano is not yet arrested."11 Appellant claimed that he was surprised by PO4 Donato’s statement since he was only doing the police force a favor.

Appellant also denied having possessed the other six plastic sachets of shabu, insisting that he bought only one heat-sealed plastic sachet from Medrano which he turned over to PO1 Baquiran.

After trial, the court a quo found appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:

Wherefore, the prosecution having established the guilt of the [appellant] beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165, the accused RAMON QUIAOIT JR. y DE CASTRO is sentenced to undergo a prison term of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of Php500,000.00 and to pay the cost.12

On 8 February 2005, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.13 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 12 July 2006, affirmed the findings and conclusion of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DENIED. The December 1, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 13229, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.14

Aggrieved, appellant is now before us assailing the above-mentioned Decision of the Court of Appeals. In our Resolution of 21 January 2007, we required the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs if they so desired. Appellant manifested that he was adopting the Appellant’s Brief dated 7 September 2005 which he previously filed before the Court of Appeals in order to avoid the repetition of substantially the same arguments.15Similarly, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested that it was no longer filing a supplemental brief.16

In his brief, appellant impugns the trial court’s decision on the following grounds:

I

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE ABSOLUTORY CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSTIGATION.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S DEFENSE OF FRAME-UP.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE CORPUS DELICTI.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE II, OF REPUBLIC ACT 9165, WHEN THE LATTER’S GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.17

In essence, appellant contends that the trial court erred in not finding that the buy-bust team instigated him into buying shabu from Medrano and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt by its failure to properly identify the sachet of shabu allegedly bought from him by PO1 Baquiran.

In support of the first error, appellant argues that the facts obtaining in this case reveal that he was a victim of instigation perpetrated by PO1 Baquiran. He emphasizes that despite his initial resistance to participate in the police operation that night, PO1 Baquiran, nevertheless, insisted that he purchase shabu from Medrano with the specific instruction to bring the latter to Golden Miles. Appellant, likewise, points out that the money he used in acquiring shabu was supplied by PO1 Baquiran himself, thus, proving that it was said police officer who initiated the events which led to his eventual arrest.

Appellant further assails the existence of a valid buy-bust operation on the ground that the buy-bust team was composed of untrained and incompetent police officers. He claims that it was "inconceivable"18 for such a team to be made up of police officers who had insufficient knowledge of how to properly conduct a buy-bust operation as shown by their failure to frisk appellant at the scene of the crime.

The demarcation line distinguishing "instigation" from "entrapment" is clearly drawn. In the case of People v. Quintana,19 we explained the distinction between the two, to wit –

There is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation, for while in the latter case the instigator practically induces the will be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal, in entrapment ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker in the execution of his criminal plan.

Instigation and inducement must be distinguished from entrapment. The general rule is that instigation and inducement to commit a crime, for the purpose of filing criminal charges, is to be condemned as immoral, while entrapment, which is the employment of means and ways for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker, is sanctioned and permissible. And the reason is obvious. Under the first instance, no crime has been committed, and to induce one to commit it makes of the instigator a co-criminal. Under the last instance, the crime has already been committed and all that is done is to entrap and capture the law breaker.20

In the case at bar, we find appellant’s claim of instigation to be baseless. To recall appellant’s version of the story, PO1 Baquiran approached him that night inquiring about Medrano, the alleged object of the buy-bust operation. PO1 Baquiran then gave him a P500.00 bill to be used for purchasing shabu from Medrano; but PO1 Baquiran had an additional instruction for appellant which was to bring along Medrano to Golden Miles. While appellant was able to talk with Medrano, he was unable to convince the latter to accompany him back to Golden Miles. Such being the case, we fail to see anymore reason for him to still buy shabu considering that he knew fully well that he would be unable to fully abide by PO1 Baquiran’s instructions. Furthermore, we scrutinized the records of this case and failed to discern any "force" that was exerted upon him by PO1 Baquiran. In fact, nowhere in appellant’s testimony did he aver that PO1 Baquiran insisted that he buy shabu from Medrano. We note that after appellant had initially refused to take part in the buy-bust operation that night, PO1 Baquiran merely told him that "(they) needed August Medrano" and nothing more.

THE COURT:

Q: What will you buy?

A: Shabu worth 5 hundred pesos, sir.

Q: Did he give you the money?

A: Yes, sir.

ATTY. ABELLERA:

Q: What again PO1 Baquiran says to buy and what else?

A: "Take him along with you".

Q: Where?

A: At GMA Golden Miles, sir.

Q: And how much money did he hand to you?

A: Five hundred, sir.

Q: And how many items will you buy?

A: One sachet, sir.

Q: And how much is one sachet?

A: Five Hundred, sir.

Q: Now, you said that he asked you to buy from this Medrano, did you comply?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: By the way, what did you tell PO1 Baquiran concerning the task that he is asking you to do?

A: I told him I was already passed on that matter, I am now working. Then he told me that he will be the one to buy but I was forced to buy, sir.

Q: How did he force you, Mr. Witness?

A: He told me, "We need that August Medrano."

Q: And how did you find this August Medrano?

A: I went to his house in Suizo, sir.

Q: Who told you that he lives in Suizo at that time?

A: My friend, sir.

Q: What is the name of your friend?

A: Noel Mallari, sir.

Q: What did you use in going there?

A: Single motorcycle, sir.

Q: And were you able [to] purchase a sachet of shabu from Medrano?

A: Yes, sir.21

To our mind, such innocuous statement on the part of PO1 Baquiran is inadequate to lead to the conclusion that appellant was "forced" by the police to procure shabu. Moreover, appellant himself admitted that he was all alone when he went to see Medrano at the latter’s house, far from the prying eyes and the perceived influence of PO1 Baquiran. Clearly, at that point, he could have easily desisted from buying shabu from Medrano and chosen instead to go back to Golden Miles empty handed for he already knew before he bought the illegal drug that Medrano could not accompany him back to the said videoke bar. The fact that he persisted in buying shabu despite the absence of PO1 Baquiran betrays his contention that said police officer "forced" him to purchase shabu.

In challenging the existence of a legitimate buy-bust operation, appellant casts questionable, if not improper, motive on the part of the police officers. Unfortunately for appellant, jurisprudence instructs us that in cases involving the sale of illegal drugs, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary.22 Where there is nothing to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution were moved by improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved and their testimony, therefore, is entitled to full faith and credit. 23 In this case, the records are bereft of any indication which even remotely suggests ill motive on the part of the police officers. The following observation of the Court of Appeals is indeed appropriate, thus:

In this case, the policemen categorically identified Quiaoit as the one subject of the "buy-bust" operation who agreed to sell to PO1 Baquiran a sachet of "shabu" in front of the restroom of Golden Miles Beerhouse after he was being introduced by the informant. As police officers, PO1 Baquiran and PO2 Dueñas had in their favor the presumption of regularity of performance of duty. Furthermore, the defense failed to present any evidence to show that the police officers were improperly motivated to bear false witness against Quiaoit. While Quiaoit claimed that he was a former asset of the police and he knew the police officers who arrested him, yet, he did not impute any ill-motive as to why the police officers would implicate him to drug pushing. This fact bolsters the police officers’ claim that Quiaoit was, indeed, arrested in a buy-bust operation.

Quiaoit’s claim that he was just being framed-up by the arresting officers does not inspire belief. Appellant failed to show any motive why the policemen would implicate him in a crime for illegal possession of prohibited drugs. It is the settled rule that where there is nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by improper motives, his/her positive and categorical declarations on the witness stand made under solemn oath, should be given full faith and credence. (People vs. Dela Torre, 373 SCRA 104).

Moreover, there is nothing in the record that the police officers were trying to extort money from Quiaoit during his apprehension up to the time he was brought to the police station. If Quiaoit was really a victim of frame-up, then he should have filed an administrative or criminal case against these policemen. But he did not. Hence, his defense of frame-up must fail.

Finally, Quiaoit’s defense of denial is a weak defense. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof, it is self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law (see People v. Hampton, 395 SCRA 156). It cannot prevail over the positive identification by PO1 Baquiran that it was Quiaoit who sold to him a sachet of "shabu" in the early morning of April 13, 2004 at Golden Miles Beerhouse.24

Neither can we give credence to appellant’s contention that the existence of a valid buy-bust operation was betrayed by the inadequate training of the members of the team for, it must be stated here, there is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers.25

Anent the second issue, appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt by its failure to properly identify the sachet of shabu which he sold to PO1 Baquiran. Again, we disagree with appellant’s proposition.

In order to successfully prove the existence of the illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the prosecution must be able to establish the following elements of the crime: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.26

In the case of People v. Mala,27 we held that what is material is the proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the presentation before the court of the corpus delicti. It bears emphasizing that neither the law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any of the money used in a buy-bust operation, for the only elements necessary to consummate the crime is proof that the illicit transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in

court of the illicit drug as evidence.28 In the present case, appellant insists that the prosecution failed to properly identify the sachet of shabu sold by appellant to PO1 Baquiran because of the buy-bust team’s failure to segregate the said sachet from those confiscated from him at Camp Makabulos.

The pertinent portions of the testimony of PO1 Baquiran belies appellant’s claim:

ATTY. ABELLERA:

Q Mr. Witness did Dueñas mark these RID before Quiaoit was frisked?

FISCAL

No basis.

ATTY. ABELLERA

Q Mr. Witness, you said that this RID 1, these RID 2 and series where they mark these (sic)?

A RID 2 and series were marked in Camp Makabulos.

Q Did he marked (sic) them simultaneously or one at a time?

A One at a time sir.

Q He was already marking after you handed this to him?

A The RID 1 was marked before Quiaoit was frisked.29

It is clear from PO1 Baquiran’s declaration that, contrary to appellant’s assertion, the packet of shabu sold to PO1 Baquiran by appellant during the buy-bust operation was properly identified and marked as RID 1 by PO2 Dueñas even before the police frisked appellant for more illegal drugs. With PO1 Baquiran’s testimony, there can no longer be any basis for vacillation with respect to the identity of the object which he, acting as poseur buyer, obtained from appellant. And, as the laboratory examination would later confirm, the contents of the sachet bearing the mark RID 1 was positive for shabu.

All told, as the illegal sale of drugs had been established beyond reasonable doubt, this Court is constrained to uphold appellant’s conviction.

We shall now determine the proper imposable penalty.

The sale of shabu is penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. It reads:

SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

Under the law, the sale of any dangerous drug, regardless of its quantity and purity, is punishable by life imprisonment to death and a fine of P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00. The statute, in prescribing the range of penalties imposable, does not concern itself with the amount of dangerous drug sold by an accused. With the effectivity, however, of Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been proscribed. Consequently, the penalty to be meted to appellant shall only be life imprisonment and fine. In this regard, this Court likewise sustains the penalty imposed by the court a quo and which was subsequently affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00803 dated 12 July 2006 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 65, in Criminal Case No. 13229, finding appellant Ramon Quiaoit, Jr. y de Castro guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice

PEOPLE vs QUIAOIT Case DigestPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMON QUIAOIT, JR. G.R. No. 175222 July 27, 2007

FACTS: At around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of 12 April 2004, the Tarlac PNP received a report from a confidential informant that someone was selling shabu at the Golden Miles, a videoke bar located in Barangay San Roque, Tarlac City. Acting on said information, a team was immediately organized by PNP Provincial Director Rudy Gamido Lacadin to conduct a surveillance in order to verify the information and perform a buy-bust operation.

Shortly thereafter, the team went to Golden Miles where they initially observed the movements of appellant who was with the confidential informant at that time. Later, the informant introduced PO1 Baquiran to appellant and the two negotiated the sale of shabu. According to PO1 Baquiran's testimony, appellant handed to him a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance in front of The Golden Miles' comfort room which was located at the back of said establishment. In return, he gave appellant a marked P500.00 bill. As soon as the exchange between appellant and PO1 Baquiran took place, the latter gave his companions the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head. PO2 Dueñas and PO1 Cabradilla moved in to arrest appellant. The plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance was later marked RID 1 by PO2 Dueñas.

On their way back to Camp Makabulos, the informant allegedly told the buy-bust team, through a text message, that appellant still had in his possession illegal drugs other than that which he had sold to PO1 Baquiran. Thus, upon reaching the camp, they frisked appellant and this yielded six more plastic sachets, the contents of which were similar to those earlier bought by PO1 Baquiran. The seized crystalline substance was subjected to test and the result shows that it was “shabu”.

The appellant contends that the arrest was illegal since he was framed up by the police and the court should consider the arrest as a result of instigation and not entrapment contrary to the arresting officers claim.

ISSUE: Was the arrest of the accused a result of instigation or inducement?

HELD: No. The demarcation line distinguishing "instigation" from "entrapment" is clearly drawn. In the case of People v. Quintana, the Court explained the distinction between the two: In instigation, the instigator practically induces the accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal; in entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker in the execution of his criminal plan.

Instigation and inducement must be distinguished from entrapment. The general rule is that instigation and inducement to commit a crime, for the purpose of filing criminal charges, is to be condemned as immoral, while entrapment, which is the employment of means and ways for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker, is sanctioned and permissible. And the reason is obvious. Under the first instance, no crime has been committed, and to induce one to commit it makes the instigator a co-criminal. Under the last instance, the crime has already been committed and all that is done is to entrap and capture the law breaker. In the case at bar, the Court finds appellant's claim of instigation to be baseless.FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

- versus -

PHILIP DILAO y CASTRO,

Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 170359

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CORONA,

AZCUNA, and

GARCIA, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 27, 2007

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

GARCIA, J.:

Under automatic review is the May 26, 2005 Decision[1] and September 16, 2005 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 00920, affirming in toto the February 27, 2003 Joint Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 127, in Criminal Case Nos. C-65963 and C-

65964, finding appellant Philip Dilao y Castro guilty of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Case

On July 31, 2002, in the RTC of Caloocan City, two (2) separate Informations were filed against accused-appellant charging him, in the first, with violation of Section 5, Article II, of R.A. No. 9165. Docketed in the same court as Criminal Case No. C-65963, the first Information[4] alleges, as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of July 2002, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the authority of law, did then and therewilfully(sic), unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to PO1 ROLANDO DE OCAMPO who posed as buyer, METHYLAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) weighing 0.06 grams, a dangerous drug, without the corresponding license or prescription therefor, knowing the same to be such.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The other Information,[5] docketed as Criminal Case No. C-65964, charges accused-appellant with violation of Section 11, Article II, also of R.A. No. 9165, allegedly committed in the following manner:

That on or about the 19th day of July 2002, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the authority of law, did then and there willfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control METHAMPHETAMINE (sic) HYDROCHLORIDE (SHABU) weighing 0.07 grams, knowing the same to be a dangerous drug under the provisions of the above-cited law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Criminal Case No. C-65964 was originally raffled to Branch 120 of the court, while Criminal Case No. C-65963 to Branch 127 thereof. On arraignment, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded “Not Guilty” to both charges. Thereafter, and on motion of appellant’s counsel, the two (2) cases were consolidated and assigned to Branch 127, after which a joint trial ensued.

Presented by the prosecution as its evidence were the testimonies of four (4) police officers belonging to the Drug Enforcement Unit of Caloocan City Police Station and that of the forensic chemist, plus the marked money and the plastic sachets of “shabu.”

The Evidence

The People’s version of the incident is well laid out in the People’s Brief[6] filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, to wit:

On July 19, 2002, around nine o’clock in the evening, a police informer called up the [DEU] Unit, Caloocan City Police Station, and …[spoke] to PO2 Rolando de Ocampo [who was told] … that an alias Philip was rampantly selling shabu along Pangako St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The informer also identified the drug pusher as Philip Dilao y Castro, herein appellant.

PO2 de Ocampo relayed the said information to their Chief, Captain Jose Valencia, who told him to verify the information. PO2 de Ocampo again spoke to the informer on the phone and asked how they could entrap appellant. xxx.

PO3 Rodrigo Antonio informed Capt. Valencia about the conversation between the informer and PO2 de Ocampo. Acting thereon, Capt. Valencia instructed PO3 Antonio to form and head a team to conduct a surveillance and “buy-bust” operation. Aside from PO3 Antonio, the team was composed of PO2 Ferdinand Modina and PO1 Joel Rosales as back-up, and PO2 de Ocampo as poseur-buyer. Capt. Valencia provided the P100 bill to be used as “buy-bust” money with serial number ZX 985203. PO2 de Ocampo marked the money with his initials, RDO, and the date, 07/19/02. The team had their operation blottered. Then, they proceeded to the target area …and arrived thereat around 10:15-10:20 p.m.

PO3 Antonio’s team was met by the informer at a burger machine near the target area. PO2 de Ocampo was then accompanied by said informer to appellant. Meanwhile, the rest of the members of the team positioned themselves in strategic places nearby.

The informer pointed to appellant who was standing outside a billiard court along Pangako St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. Then, they approached appellant and PO2 de Ocampo was introduced to him as a buyer of shabu. PO2 de Ocampo then addressed appellant, “Pare, pa-iskor ng piso,” and handed him the marked money. Appellant seized him up … and then got a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance ….

After the exchange, PO2 de Ocampo examined first the contents of the plastic sachet and then gave the pre-arranged signal … to show that the “buy-bust” operation was

completed. Thereafter, he introduced himself to appellant as a police officer and told him: “Pare, pong ka na,” meaning he was already caught, while the rest of the team closed in on them.

PO2 de Ocampo recovered the marked money and P200 more in different denominations from appellant while PO2 Modina recovered another plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. PO2 de Ocampo asked appellant where he got the P200 but he was not given a reply. He then informed appellant of his constitutional rights ….

Appellant was turned over to … PO3 Fernando Moran, together with the seized articles. In the presence of PO2 de Ocampo and PO2 Modina, PO3 Moran placed the initials “PCD” on the specimens.

On even date, Capt. Valencia requested for laboratory examination of the seized articles. Subsequently, PO2 de Ocampo and PO2 Modina executed a “Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay” about the incident.

P/Insp. Erickson Lualhati Calbocal, forensic chemist of the Philippine National Police, Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, conducted a laboratory examination on said specimens and found the same positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. His findings are contained in Chemistry Report No. D-323-02. (Words in brackets added.)

For its part, the defense presented the following: appellant himself and Jose Bandico.

Denial and alleged frame-up were appellant’s main exculpating line. In his Brief, [7] appellant summarized the version of the defense as follows:

xxx. At about 8:00 to 9:00 o’clock p.m. of July 19, 2002, he [appellant] was playing billiard opposite alias “Joker” at the billiard hall xxx located along Pangako St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. He and his companions were surprised when … police officers led by PO3 Antonio suddenly appeared … [and] instructed all persons there numbering [8] including his friend companion Socrates Manalad alias “Sote”. They told them, “WALANG TATAKBO MAY TAWAG SA AMIN MAY NAGBEBENTA NG SHABU DITO”, and … individually frisked them. Nothing illegal were recovered from all of them. Thereafter, six (6) of them were allowed to leave, leaving behind himself and Manalad who were handcuffed and made to board one of the two (2) owner-type vehicles, parked near the North Diversion Road. While the jeep was running, he and Manalad asked the operatives: “WALA KAMING KASALANAN, ANO BANG KASALANAN NAMIN?” to which PO3 Antonio retorted: “KUNG GUSTO NINYONG MAKAWALA KAYO MAGPALIT ULO KAYO”. He initially protested but upon being told by PO3 Antonio: “OKAY KAHIT WALA KAYONG

KASALANAN MATUTULUYAN KAYO, NGAYON KUNG AYAW NINYONG MATULUYAN PALIT ULO NA LANG KAYO”. He was made to understand, that was an order for them to point to the police other persons in exchange for their release ….. He pretended to have agreed to this proposal xxx. The police officers stopped the owner-type vehicle at the corner of Evangelista St. and EDSA, Caloocan City, near the Toyota Motors and let him alight. His handcuff was removed. PO3 Antonio and PO2 Modina then asked him the name of the drug pusher he was supposed to point. In response, he mentioned a fictitious name, one alias “JETT” …. Then, the police officers remarked: “O SIGE PAGKATAPOS… PAG NATAPOS ANG TRABAHO NA TO PUWEDE NA KAYONG UMUWI”. They made him board again the vehicle and they proceeded to Katarungan Street.

Upon arrival thereat, his handcuff was removed. As he planned, he immediately fled but the police officers pursued and cornered him …. His captors got provoked and took turns in slapping and mauling him. He was brought first to the Ospital ng Kalookan where he was supposedly physically examined [then] taken to the DEU, Caloocan City Police Station. xxx. At the DEU, the police informed him that he could have been freed if not for the fact that he fooled them (DAHIL PINAGOD MO KAMI”) hence, he was charged for Violation of Sections 5 and 11 of the Dangerous Drugs Law. At around 11:00 o’clock in the evening of the same date, while he was inside the DEU detention cell, he was investigated by the police investigator. The next day, July 20, 2002, Manalad, was released. At about 3:00 o’clock [p.m.] of that day, he was brought before the Inquest Prosecutor who conferred only with PO2 Modina and PO2 De Ocampo without even bothering to examine him about the incident.

He denied the charges leveled against him …. He explained that he first saw PO2 Modina when he was allowed to alight the jeep at Toyota Motors, EDSA and that he saw PO2 De Ocampo only during the inquest. He admitted that he had no previous quarrel or misunderstanding with the arresting police officers … who he came to know only when he was arrested.

He was unable to file any complaint against the concerned police officers for the physical injuries inflicted on him and for filing fabricated charges against him as he has been detained since January [July] 19, 2002. (Word in bracket supplied).

JOSE BANDICO alias “Joker” substantially corroborated the testimony of appellant on the ownership of the billiard hall, the fact of the latter’s arrest on July 19, 2002 and that nothing illegal was taken from appellant when frisked by the police in the hall. Alias “Joker” also testified about the accused playing rotation billiard with him since 2:00 p.m. and how the police officers, after the arrest, even got the P260.00 bet.

The Trial Court’s and the CA’s Ruling

In its joint decision[8] dated February 27, 2003, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond moral certainty of doubt of the offenses charged against him and accordingly sentenced him, thus:

THEREFORE, premises considered and the prosecution having established to a moral certainty the guilt of Accused PHILIP DILAO y CASTRO of the crimes charged, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:

1. In Crim. Case No. 65963 for Violations of Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165 this Court, in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, hereby sentences the aforenamed Accused to LIFE IMPRISONMENT; and to pay the fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;

2. In Crim. Case No. 65964 for Violation of Sec. 11, Art. II of the same Act, this Court, in the absence of any modifying circumstance, sentences the common Accused to a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and to pay the fine of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00), without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

xxx xxx xxx

SO ORDERED.

Therefrom, appellant came directly to this Court considering the penalty imposed.

Per Resolution dated March 9, 2005,[9] however, the Court, in line with its ruling in People v. Mateo,[10] referred the cases to the CA for intermediate review, whereat it was docketedC.A.–G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00920.

On May 26, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision[11] affirming in toto that of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated February 27, 2003 of the trial court is affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, appellant sought reconsideration, which the CA denied in its Resolution of September 16, 2005.[12]

The case is again with this Court pursuant to the Notice of Appeal filed by appellant with the appellate court which has forwarded the entire records of the case to this Court.

In its Resolution of February 20, 2006, the Court accepted the appeal and required the parties to file their supplemental briefs, if they so desire.

In his manifestation[13] of March 21, 2006, appellant in effect waived the filing of any supplemental brief and declared that he is adopting his brief dated May 20, 2004, heretofore submitted before the Court, wherein he raised the following matters:

1. The Court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the incredible and inconsistent testimony of the prosecution witnesses, and

2. The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the fact that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses on the alleged buy-bust operation, particularly that of PO2 Rolando De Ocampo, contending that there were discrepancies in the testimony of PO2 De Ocampo, the poseur-buyer, and the affidavits submitted to the trial court. He maintains being a victim of a frame-up operation of police operatives who, in fact, recovered nothing illegal from him. He urges the Court to take judicial notice of the reality that some law enforcers in drug-related cases, in their quest to secure information from suspected drug dealers, resort to numerous anomalous practices, such as planting evidence, physical torture and extortion.

Moving on, appellant insists that the presumption on regularity in the performance of an official duty, by itself, could not sustain a conviction, let alone prevail over the presumption of innocence in his favor. On these broad premises, appellant thus maintains that the prosecution failed to adduce adequate evidence to prove his guilt.

The Court’s Ruling

We AFFIRM.

Right off, the Court shall address appellant’s lament about the credibility of witness PO2 De Ocampo. According to appellant, PO2 De Ocampo’s testimony should have altogether been discredited since he, as poseur-

buyer, cannot even remember (“Hindi ko gaanong matandaan”)[14] the marking he allegedly placed on the P100.00-bill marked money, albeit he did recall its serial number.

While indeed PO2 De Ocampo failed to remember early in his direct testimony the markings placed on the marked money, he readily identified the said markings during the latter part of the direct examination. We quote from the transcripts of stenographic notes:

Q. I am showing to you a photo copy of a one hundred peso bill with serial number ZX-985203, will you please go over it and tell the Court its relation to the one which you used as buy bust money against the accused?

A. this is it sir.

Q. Why did you say so?

A. This is what we entered in the blotter book sir.

Q. Will you please go over this photo copy and tell us if this is your initial appearing immediately after the serial number ZX-985203 in the lower part corner of this money?

A. Yes sir. There is.

Q. Can you explain to us what does that initial RDO mean?

A. Refers to my initial Rolando de Ocampo sir.

Q. How did that initial indicated there?

A. Because every time we conducted buy bust operation we always put initial sir.

Q. If you recall where did you place that initial RDO in the original copy of that buy bust money?

A. In our office sir.

Q. When?

A. At 9:45 p.m. July 19, 2002 sir.

Q. Also there’s (sic) appear on the right side of this buy bust money a figures 07/19/02 what does that mean?

A. We put that when we conducted the buy bust operation sir.

Q. Who was the one who placed that?

A. Me sir.

Q. When?

A. On that very day sir.

Q. Before or after the operation?

A. Before the operation sir.[15]

Moreover, the failure of PO2 De Ocampo to recall immediately the markings on the buy-bust money only shows that he is an uncoached witness. Such momentary lapse in memory does not detract from the credibility of his testimony as to the essential details of the incident. As the trial court aptly found, PO2 De Ocampo was candid, forthright and categorical in his testimony:

xxx . In the first place, this Court has had the untrammeled opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of poseur-buyer PO2 DE OCAMPO while testifying on the witness stand and definitely he was noted to testify in a candid, forthright and categorical manner which are the earmarks of a truthful and credible witness.

The Court accords the highest degree of respect to the findings of the lower court as to appellant’s guilt of the offenses charged against him, particularly where such findings are adequately supported by documentary as well as testimonial evidence. The same respect holds too, as regards the lower courts’ evaluation on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It is a settled policy of this Court, founded on reason and experience, to sustain the findings of fact of the trial court in criminal cases, on the rational assumption that it is in a better position to assess the evidence before it, having had the opportunity to make an honest determination of the witnesses’ deportment during the trial.[16]

Furthermore, the well-entrenched rule is that the findings of facts of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court, absent any evidence that both courts ignored, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would warrant a modification or

reversal of the outcome of the case.[17] And in the instant case, after a careful evaluation of the records, we find no oversight committed by the trial and appellate courts for us to disregard their factual findings as to the fact of possession andselling by the appellant of “shabu.”

As between appellant’s testimony and that of the arresting/entrapping police officers as to what occurred in the evening of July 19, 2002, this Court finds, as did the trial court, the accounts of the latter more credible. For, aside from the presumption that they – the police operatives – regularly performed their duties, we note that these operatives, as prosecution witnesses, gave consistent and straightforward narrations of what transpired on July 19, 2002. As things stand, the police officers uniformly testified of having apprehended the appellant in a buy-bust operation and upon being frisked, was also found to be in possession of another sachet containing a white crystalline substance later on found to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as “shabu.”

It cannot be over-emphasized that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law at that, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. It is often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities. [18] Credence of the buy-bust operators cannot be undermined by the mere fact that law enforcers are perceived to resort to the practice of planting evidence to gain favor from their superiors. In the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute a serious crime against an accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellant’s often self-serving and uncorroborated claim of having been a victim of a frame-up.

It must be remembered that appellant’s defense of frame-up and denial requires strong and convincing evidence to support them for the incantation of such defense is nothing new to the Court. [19] As it were, appellant only offered an unsubstantiated tale that the police officers asked, in police jargon, a “palit-ulo”[20] and that he was a victim of a frame-up. His allegations that the police officers likewise beat him up in their attempt to extract information from him is belied by the absence of any proof to that effect. And without so much of an explanation, appellant did not even present as witness his companion Socrates Manalad, alias “Sote,” who was allegedly with him when the apprehension was effected. If the police officers indeed tried to extort information from appellant by beating him up, appellant could have filed the proper charges against the erring police officers. The fact that no administrative or criminal charges were filed lends cogency to the conclusion that the alleged frame-up was merely concocted as a defense ploy.

Clearly, as against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that they red-handedly caught appellant in a buy-bust operation selling “shabu,” supported by other evidence, such as the two (2) sachets of the prohibited substance seized from him and the marked money, appellant’s negative testimony must necessarily fail. An affirmative testimony coming from credible witnesses without motive to perjure is far stronger than a negative testimony.[21] Records show that appellant and the police officers are strangers to each other. Thus, there is no reason to suggest that the police officers were ill-motivated in apprehending appellant. Moreover, there is nothing in the records which shows even an iota of evidence that the prosecution witnesses merely fabricated their testimonies to wrongly impute such a serious crime against the accused-appellant.

All told, in Criminal Case No. C-65963, the Court is convinced that the prosecution’s evidence more than proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements necessary in every prosecution for the illegal sale of “shabu,” to

wit: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust operation between the entrapping police officers and the appellant. What is material in a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.

Likewise proven by the same quantum of evidence is the charge for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 (illegal possession of shabu) in Criminal Case No. C-65964, appellant having knowingly carried with him the plastic sachet of “shabu” without legal authority at the time he was caught during the buy-bust operation.

Anent the penalty thus imposed, the RTC, as did the CA, correctly applied the provisions of Sections 5 and 11 (3) of R.A. No. 9165, which respectively provide:

Section 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The Penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell any dangerous drugs, xxx.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs –

(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of x x x, methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu” x x x. (Emphasis supplied).

Since the appellant was found guilty of selling “shabu” weighing 0.06 gram, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the trial court correctly sentenced him to life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 in Criminal Case No. C-65963. Since he was also found guilty of possession of “shabu” weighing 0.07 gram, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance and in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he was correctly meted a prison term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and a fine of three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) in Criminal Case No. C-65964.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 26, 2005 of the CA in CA-G.R. C.R.-H.C. No. 00920, as reiterated in its resolution of September 16, 2005, affirming in toto that of the trial court isAFFIRMED in all respects.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED