Crim Cases 102

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Baguio City

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 184179 April 12, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

JULIAN PAJES y OPONDA and MIGUEL PAGHUNASAN y URBANO, Accused-Appellants.

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ, J :

This is before this Court by way of an ordinary Appeal1 from the Decision2 dated 14 April 2008 of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00555. In the said decision, the appellate court

affirmed the conviction of appellants Miguel Paghunasan (Paghunasan) and Julian Pajes (Pajes),

for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom u nder Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code ,3 and meted

upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision

reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in

that accused-appellants Julian Pajes ("Mario"/Pajes) and Miguel Paghunasan

("Yoyoy"/"Yoy"/"Iyoy"/Paghunasan) are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua. They are also jointly and solidarily ORDERED to payP130,000.00 to Amelita Yang Cesar

as indemnity for the amount taken from her office, and moral damages in the amount of

Php50,000.00.4

In view of the gravity of the penalty imposed and in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the

possibility of error, this Court saw it fit to revisit the records of this case and re-examine the facts

as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Our review brings us to the following facts:

Private complainant Amelita Yang Cesar (Mrs. Cesar) is the manager of the NC Farms in Pulung

Cacutud, Angeles City.5 Around 4:30 in the afternoon of 31 January 2002, Mrs. Cesar was at her

office preparing the payroll of her employees when a man posing as a buyer of chicken, rang the

doorbell of the farm.6 Unsuspecting of any danger, Mrs. Cesar instructed one of her workers to sell

a chicken to the buyer standing outside of the farm’s main gate.7

As soon as the chicken was handed, the buyer pushed the gate and, immediately, five (5) armed

men forced their way inside the farm’s premises.8 The poseur-buyer, who goes by

the alias "Yoyoy,"9 turned out to be part of a group of malefactors set to rob NC Farms and to

kidnap Mrs. Cesar.

Mrs. Cesar was able to witness the violent entry of the malefactors from the two-way mirror of her

office and quickly rushed to lock its door .10 But before Mrs. Cesar could do so, Yoyoy was able to

kick the door and the group of armed men barged into the office of Mrs. Cesar .11 Once inside, the

leader of the group, a man named Serio Panday, pointed a gun at the right temple of Mrs. Cesar

and forced her to surrender the farm’s payroll money.12 All in all, Serio Panday was able to extort

roughly One Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P130,000.00) in cash from Mrs. Cesar.13

Meanwhile, the other malefactors stormed the kitchen, where Erlinda Santos (Erlinda), a cook of

Mrs. Cesar, was staying.14 The sight of armed men left Erlinda stunned with fear .15 One of the

intruders told Erlinda, "Hold-up ito, tumahimik ka para walang mangyari sa iyo. "16 The intruders

then scoured the place and proceeded upstairs in search of other occupants.17

After ransacking the office and before making their escape, Serio Panday directed his cohorts to

bring Mrs. Cesar along with them.18 Against her will, Mrs. Cesar was made to board her own

delivery van which the group decided to use as their getaway vehicle.19 She was placed at the

back of the van where three armed men, including Yoyoy, guarded her .20 Two other members of

the group occupied the front passenger seats, while another one drove the van.21

After driving for a while, the group stopped along the base of a mountain in Capas, Tarlac, to pick

up a certain Ponggay Ventura who would guide the group to a nipa hut – a safehouse at the top of

the mountain.22 The group also picked up a certain "Mario" to drive the van to their destination,

replacing the group’s former driver.23

Prior to reaching the nipa hut, however, the cellular phone of Mrs. Cesar rang.24 The phone of Mrs.

Cesar was then in the possession of one of the kidnappers by the name of "Brad," who

answered25 and demanded from the caller, who happened to be Mrs. Cesar’s brother -in-law, Fifty

Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) in exchange for the r elease of Mrs. Cesar.26

Upon reaching the top of the mountain at about 6:00 in the evening, Mrs. Cesar was led by her

abductors inside the nipa hut.27 From the inside looking out, Mrs. Cesar saw, and met, for the first

time Mario who introduced himself as the driver of the group .28 Shortly afterwards, Mario was

ordered by Serio Panday to dispose of the delivery van by driving it all the way down from the

mountain to the town proper of Capas, Tarlac.29 Mario would later on return to the mountain

around 9:00 that evening, after leaving the van somewhere in Bar angay Dolores, Capas, Tarlac.30

Aside from Mario, Mrs. Cesar also saw two new faces outside the nipa hut — one of which was of a

man, while another was of a woman with long hair.31 Mrs. Cesar also noticed a red pick-up truck

parked about five hundred (500) meters away from the nipa hut.32

Later that night, Yoyoy told Mrs. Cesar to call her husband, Christopher Cesar (Mr. Cesar) .33 Upon

making contact, Yoyoy reiterated Brad ’s earlier demand of Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00)

for the release of Mrs. C esar.34 When Mr. Cesar refused to pay because the amount asked was too

much for his means, Yoyoy became irritated and hung up.35 Mrs. Cesar spent the rest of the night

inside the nipa hut guarded by appellant Yoyoy.36

The next morning, Yoyoy resumed negotiations with Mr. Cesar.37 Following a consultation with his

fellow kidnappers, Yoyoy finally conceded to a ransom of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos

(P800,000.00) proposed by Mr. Cesar.38 Yoyoy then informed Mr. Cesar that the pay-off would be

at the Capas cemetery at 7:00 that evening.39

Mario accompanied Mrs. Cesar to the Capas cemetery for the agreed pay-off .40 The other

kidnappers, including Yoyoy, arrived earlier and were already scattered throughout the

cemetery.41 Later, Mr. Cesar arrived with his driver, and they were approached by Yoyoy who had

alighted from a motorcycle.42 Upon securing from Mr. Cesar the ransom money, Yoyoy signaled

Mario to release Mrs. Cesar.43 Yoyoy then rode off o n a motorcycle, while Mario left the cemetery

alone.44

What followed was a hot pursuit operation supervised by the National Anti-Kidnapping Task Force

(NAKTAF).45Unknown to the kidnappers, Mr. Cesar coordinated with the NAKTAF prior to the pay-

off.46 In fact, the driver who was with Mr. Cesar at the Capas cemetery is actually PO3 Ceferino

Gatchalian, an undercover agent of the NAKTAF.47

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The hot pursuit operations led to the apprehensions of herein appellants Paje s48 and

Paghunasan.49 Also arrested were one Rustico Pamintuan and one Luz Gonzales, who were the

owners of the red pick-up truck p arked outside of the nipa hut where Mrs. Cesar was detained.50

On 17 May 2002, both of the appellants, along with Rustico Pamintuan, Luz Gonzales as well as

the other persons51 alleged to be involved in the abduction of Mrs. Cesar, were charged of

Kidnapping for Ransom penalized under Article 26752 of the Revised Penal Code.53 The

accusatory portion of the Information54 reads:

That on or about 4:30 o’ clock in the afternoon of January 31, 2002 in the Municipality of Capas,

Province of Tarlac and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused

conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,

unlawfully kidnapped and detain Amelita Yang Cesar in a Nipa Hut at Barangay Aranguren, C apas,

Tarlac who was released on February 01, 2002 in exchange of ransom in the amount

of P800,000.00.

Considering that the other accused remain at large, only the appellants, Rustico Pamintuan and

Luz Gonzales were arraigned and were able to enter a plea of not guilty. For them, trial thereafter

ensued.

During the trial, Mrs. Cesar positively identified appellant Paghunasan as the very same "Yoyoy"

who acted as a poseur- buyer at NC Farms; who kicked the door of her office to enable his armed

companions to enter; who negotiated with Mr. Cesar for her release in exchange for a ransom of

Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P800,000.00); and who was among those responsible for her

abduction and subsequent detention in the nipa hut at the top of the mountain.

Erlinda, Mr. Cesar and PO3 Ceferino Gatchalian corroborated the identification made by Mrs.

Cesar. Erlinda pointed to appellant Paghunasan as one of the armed men who entered the office

kitchen of NC Farms. Mr. Cesar and PO3 Gatchalian, on the other hand, testified that it was

appellant Paghunasan who approached them in the Capas cemetery, and who received the

ransom money for the release of Mrs. Cesar.

Likewise positively identified in the course of the trial was appellant Pajes. Mrs. Cesar testified

that appellant Pajes is the same "Mario" who acted as the driver for her kidnappers, who was

among those who guarded her in the nipa hut, and who accompanied her to the Capas cemetery

for the pay-off.

After the prosecution rested its case, accused Rustico Pamintuan and Luz Gonzales filed a motion

to dismiss by way of a demurrer to the evidence. In an Order55 dated 28 October 2003, the

Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, granted t he demurrer to the evidence, effectively

resulting into the acquittal of Rustico Pamintuan and Luz Gonzales.

The appellants, on the other hand, would have a different fate. In the Decisio n56 dated 16

September 2004 of the trial court, the appellants were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

Kidnapping for Ransom and were meted the ultimate penalty of death. The decretal port ion of the

ruling reads:

WHEREFORE, finding Miguel Paghunasan y Urbano @ Yoyoy and Julian Pajes y Oponda, guilty

beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby imposes the penalty of DEATH upon them. The

accused are hereby jointly and solidarily ordered to pay the amount of P800,000.00 to the victim

as indemnity of the ransom paid. The accused are jointly and solidarily ordered topay P130,000.00 to Amelita Yang Cesar as indemnity of the amount taken from her office. The

accused are ordered to pay moral damages of P50,000.00.

On automatic intermediate review,57 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the

appellants. The appellate court, however, reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua in light of

Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.

Hence the instant appeal.

Appellant Miguel Paghunasan

Appellant Paghunasan proffers the defense of alibi. The plain version of Paghunasan was that he

was not at the locus criminis at the time the alleged crime was committed. Rather, Paghunasan

maintains that he was merely at his home in Caloocan City the whole day of 31 J anuary 2002.58

To strengthen his alibi, Paghunasan points to what he perceives as flaws in his open-court

identification by the private complainant Mrs. Cesar, her husband Mr. Cesar, PO3 Ceferino

Gathchalian and Erlinda. Paghunasan explains:

1.) Mrs. Cesar’s identification is not worthy of belief for it is contrary to common

experience that a kidnap victim like herself, was not blindfolded by her kidnappers so as

to allow her to see where she was being taken.59

Moreover, Mrs. Cesar categorically stated in her Sinumpaang Salaysay60 that she did not

know the names of her captors. She was only able to identify Paghunasan after the

latter was already arrested and presented to her via a police line-up conducted by the

NAKTAF.61

2.) The identification by Mr. Cesar and PO3 Gatchalian is likewise highly doubtful

considering that their respective testimonies contradict each other. Mr. Cesar testified

that Paghunasan was alone at the time he received the ransom money, but PO3

Gatchalian testified that two other persons accompanied Paghunasan.62

3.) Erlinda’s identification is also suspect. During the time that she executed her own

Sinumpaang Salaysay,63 Erlinda was shown a picture of appellant Paghunasan by

NAKTAF agents, but was then unable to identify Paghunasan as one of the kidnappers.64

The Court is not impressed.

It is a well-settled principle in law that the defense of alibi is one of the weakest defenses

available to an accused in a criminal case .65 As it may easily be concocted, alibis are invariably

viewed with suspicion, and, as a general rule, crumbles in light of positive identification of the

offender by truthful witnesses.66

Conversely however, this Court has, in more than one occasion, held that the defense of alibi may

acquire commensurate strength where the witnesses have made no positive and proper

identification of the offender.67This is because the inherent weakness of alibi as a defense does

not operate to relieve the prosecution of its responsibility to establish the identity of the offender

by the same quantum of evidence required for proving the crime itself .68 By assailing the

credibility of his open-court identification, appellant Paghunasan seems to believe that the latter

doctrine may be applied in this case.

The Court does not agree. A simple scrutiny of the contentions raised by appellant Paghunasan

will reveal that they are specious at best, and not sufficient to destroy the credibility of his positive

identification. We substantiate:

First, there is nothing contrary to common human experience about the fact that Mrs. Cesar was

not blindfolded by her kidnappers. Certainly, it would be at the height of absurdity, short of anoutright injustice, to discredit the testimony of a kidnap victim just be cause her kidnappers forgot,

or decided not to blindfold her.



















































































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On the other hand, we are reminded of the following facts: (a) the kidnappers placed Mrs. Cesar at

the back of a delivery van — which is virtually an enclosed structure except for two small windows

at the front,69 and (b) while thereat, three armed men guarded Mrs. Cesar.70 Given the foregoing

circumstances, we find it not hard to believe that the kidnappers deemed it no longer necessary

to blindfold Mrs. Cesar.

Second, there is nothing irregular about the fact that Mrs. Cesar was not able to give the name of

her kidnappers at the time she executed her Sinumpaang Salaysay. On the contrary, it is quite

normal for a kidnap victim to be ignorant of the names of her abductors. Frequent use by

kidnappers of aliases, like the ones in the case at bar, makes it extremely difficult for a kidnap

victim to know their real names.

Be that as it may, knowledge of a person’s name is not necessary for proper identification.71 Mrs.

Cesar may not know the names of her abductors, but she was nevertheless familiar with their

physical features and was, thus, able to describe them quite extensively in her Sinumpaang

Salaysay. Hence, it is perfectly logical that Mrs. Cesar was only able to identify appellant

Paghunasan upon seeing him in person during the police line-up.

Third, there is actually no conflict between the testimonies of Mr. Cesar and PO3 Ceferino

Gatchalian. In contending that there is such conflict, appellant Paghunasan cited the following

portion of the testimonies of Mr. Cesar and PO3 Ceferino Gatchalian, viz:72

Direct Examination of Christopher Cesar:

Fiscal Llobrera:

Q: Upon arriving at the cemetery at 8:00, what else happened?

A: I[t] was dark at the cemetery and so we turned on the headlights of the vehicle, sir.

Q: And then what happened?

A: After that, a motorcycle arrived wherein a man was on board and he alighted, sir.

Q: And after the person alighted from the motorcycle, what else happened?

A: He approached us and asked us if we brought the money, sir.73 (Underscoring

supplied)

Direct Examination of PO3 Ceferino Gatchalian:

Fiscal Llobrera:

Q: And then after giving instruction or order to the other team by your Superintendent

Magno (sic), what else happened?

A: I and Mr. Cezar proceeded to the Dona Agripina Memorial Park and we parked at the

side of the cemetery, sir.

x x x x

Q: And what happened after that, after parking your vehicle?

A: We saw a motorcycle 125 boarded with three (3) persons and one of the persons

using a cellphone approached us.

Q: Was he able to approach you?

A: Yes, sir; they (sic) approached Mr. Cesar.

Q: How many of them approached Mr. Cesar?

A: Only one, sir.74 (Underscoring supplied)

As can be gleaned from the above, Mr. Cesar never testified that Paghunasan was alone at theCapas cemetery during the pay-off. All that Mr. Cesar stated was that a man, whom he later

identified as appellant Paghunasan, alighted from a motorcycle and approached him and PO3

Ceferino Gatchalian. Mr. Cesar was silent as to the number of persons boarding the motorcycle

from which Paghunasan alighted. Verily, the statements of Mr. Cesar cannot be said to contradict

the testimony of PO3 Ceferino Gatchalian who merely clarified that Paghunasan alighted from a

motorcycle boarded by two other persons.

Significantly, Mr. Cesar and PO3 Ceferino Gatchalian uniformly attested to the more material fact

that it was only appellant Paghunasan who alighted from the motorcycle and who approached

them to receive the ransom money. To the mind of this Court, this is enough to make their

identification of appellant Paghunasan worthy of belief. Indeed, perfect symmetry between the

testimonies of the witnesses, while desirable, is not absolutely required for them to be deemed

credible. To be deserving of belief, it is enough that the testimonies of the witnesses concur on

material points.75

Fourth, the failure of Erlinda to identify appellant Paghunasan from the pictures shown to her

during the time she executed her Sinumpaang Salaysay is not fatal to the integrity of her

subsequent open court identification. In response to this issue, we hereby quote with approval a

portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals, to wit:

Not even Erlinda [Santos’] failure to identify the accused -appellants when confronted by their

pictures would render the prosecution’s case weak. She was able to explain the apparent

difference between the picture shown her and the physical features of Paghunasan in person. But

she was categorical in identifying Paghunasan as one of the persons who entered the kitchen on

31 January 2002. We do not doubt her ability to remember with precision considering that she

herself testified that a gun was poked at her, that her knees were trembling out of fear, and that

she just stayed in the kitchen, put her face down on the table as her employer shouted for

help.76(Emphasis supplied).1avvphi1

His positive identification intact, appellant Paghunasan is left with only his alibi to fend off the

serious accusations against him. Without any other evidence proving that it was physically

impossible for him to be at the locus criminis on 31 January 2002, appellant Paghunasan’s alibi

must necessarily fail.

Appellant Julian Pajes

Appellant Pajes raises a different defense. Appellant Pajes admits that he drove the delivery van

boarded by the kidnappers to their nipa hut upon request of Serio Panday, but claims that he did

not know, at least at the inception, that the van was the group’s getaway vehicle, let alone, that it

was carrying a kidnap victim.77 According to Pajes, he only came to have an idea that something

was wrong when after arriving at the mountaintop, a lady was made to alight the delivery van and

was led into the nipa hut by the cohorts of Serio Panday.78

Succinctly put, appellant Pajes denies involvement in any criminal conspiracy to kidnap Mrs.

Cesar.79 Pajes maintains that he was merely "at the wrong place at the wrong time," for which he

deserves a milder penalty, if not total absolution from any penal liability.

The Court finds no merit in this contention.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission

of a felony and decide to commit it.80 When a crime is committed under a conspiracy, the liability

of all conspirators becomes collective regardless of the extent of their actual participation in the

crime.81 In other words, the act of one becomes the act of all.82

In determining the existence of conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement to commit acrime is not necessary.83 After all, conspiracy may be inferred from the mode and manner by

which the offense is perpetrated or from the very acts of the accused themselves .84 To support a

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of the accused before, during and after the commission of a felony were all aimed at the same

object, one performing one part and the other performing another for the attainment of the same

objective; and that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and

cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of

sentiments.85

In the case at bar, the facility and efficiency by which the abduction of Mrs. Cesar was effected

was an undeniable proof of the existence of a pre-conceived plan under which the kidnappers

were acting. From their entry to the NC Farms by the ingenious use of pretension, to the groups’

systematic scouring of Mrs. Cesar’s office, and up to their cinematic escape— the acts of the

kidnappers were knitted seamlessly together in a web of a single criminal design.

This Court finds it impossible to accept the contention of appellant Pajes that he merely drove the

delivery van at the suggestion of Serio Panday, without any knowledge of what was inside the said

vehicle.86 As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, it is hard to believe why appellant Pajes

would readily agree to drive a delivery van in going up a mountain, if, in the first place, he has no

idea of what he was supposed to be transporting.87

Moreover, the subsequent acts of appellant Pajes contradict his claim of innocence. It may not be

amiss to point out that the participation of appellant Pajes was not merely limited to transporting

the kidnappers to their nipa hut.

Other than being the driver of the kidnappers, appellant Pajes also admitted of being the one

tasked of disposing the delivery van by driving it all the way down the mountain to the town proper

of Capas, Tarlac.88 Pajes added that after parking the van somewhere in Barangay Dolores,

Tarlac, he returned to the nipa hut, where he was again tasked at looking after Mrs.

Cesar.89 Finally, he was the one who accompanied Mrs. Cesar to the Capas cemetery during the

night of the agreed pay-off.90

The aggregate participation of appellant Pajes shows that he was part of the criminal conspiracy

to kidnap Mrs. Cesar. Indeed, if appellant Pajes was as innocent as he claims to be, he could have

easily avoided going back to the nipa hut upon his descent from the mountains to the town proper

of Capas, Tarlac. But instead, he did just the opposite. Pajes returned to the nipa hut and fulfilled

the criminal purpose of the kidnappers. While he was not among those who actually raided NC

Farms, his subsequent contribution to the victim’s continuing detention more than speaks of his

concurrence and involvement to the kidnappers’ criminal design.

Finding no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals in affirming the appellants’

conviction, this Court is constrained to let the hammer fall where it must. We only need to be

explicit that the appellants are denied of the benefit of any parole, in view of Section 3 of Republic

Act No. 9346. 91

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 14 April 2008 in CA-G. R. CR-HC No.

00555 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the appellants are denied the benefit of

parole.

SO ORDERED.


SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 188601 June 29, 2010


vs.

JOHNNY BAUTISTA y BAUTISTA and JERRY MORALES y URSAL, Accused.

JOHNNY BAUTISTA y BAUTISTA, Accused-Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J :

The Case

This is an appeal from the March 18, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-

H.C. No. 01694 entitled People of the Philippines v. Johnny Bautista y Bautista and Jerry Morales y

Ursal (accused-appellants), Roberto Yap-Obeles, Luis Miranda, John Doe @ "Roy" and John Doe @

"Centes" (accused), which affirmed the July 1, 2002 Decision in Criminal Case No. 00-2082 of the

Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116 in P asay City.2

Accused-appellant Johnny Bautista y Bautista (Bautista) stands convicted of the crime of

Kidnapping for Ransom, as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code

(RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 7659, for which he was sentenced to suffer the

penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Facts

The charge against the accused-appellant stemmed from the following Information:

That on or about November 12, 2000, in the City of Pasay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction

of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then private individuals, conspiring and

confederating with each other, and mutually helping one another, together with others whose real

names and/or whereabouts are still unknown, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously, for the purpose of extorting ransom from one Fritzie So and her parents/family, or of

killing said Fritzie so if the desired amount of money could not be given, kidnap, and carry away,

detain and deprive the said Fritzie So of her liberty without authority of law, against her will and

consent.

Contrary to law.3

On December 21, 2000, accused-appellant Bautista, Roberto Yap-Obeles (Yap-Obeles), Celso

Palapar (Palapar), and Jerry Morales (Morales), with the assistance of their counsel de parte, were

arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the charge against them .4 Pre-trial was then considered

closed and termination.Prior to trial on the merits, however, all of the accused separately petitioned the trial court for bail

for their provisional liberty.5 During the course of the initial hearing of the separate petitions for

bail, it was mutually agreed by the parties that whatever evidence the prosecution adduces in






















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support of its opposition will be considered to form part of its evidence in chief in the case,

without prejudice to the presentation of other evidence as additional proof during the trial of the

case on its merits. After presentation of evidence, the trial court resolved to deny the petitions for

bail filed by the accused for lack of merit, except t hat of accused Yap-Obeles who was granted bail

for his temporary liberty in t he amount of PhP 300,000.6

Likewise before trial on the merits, the prosecution sought the discharge of accused Palapar as a

state witness which, after due hearing and despite the opposition of his co-accused, was granted

by the trial court through a Resolution dated July 3, 2001.7

Trial on the merits finally commenced on March 27, 2001.

During the trial, the prosecution offered the testimonies of Fritzie So (Fritzie), Dexter So (Dexter),

P/Sr. Insp. Fernando Ortega (P/Sr. Insp. Ortega), Atty. Florimond Rous (Atty. Rous) and Palapar.

On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses Yap-Obeles, Morales, and Bautista, the

accused-appellant.

Version of the Prosecution

A summary of the facts according to the prosecution is as follows:

On November 12, 2000, at around 12 noon to 1 o’clock in the afternoon, Fritzie was inside their

store located at 2485 Taft Avenue, Pasay City. She was with her brothers Dexter and Kingsley So,

and her mother, Lolita So, when they noticed a grey Toyota Corolla car and a black Mitsubishi

Adventure going around their place. The cars were driven by men later identified as Palapar and

Yap-Obeles, respectively.8

Yap-Obeles, a doctor by profession and a businessman, had been known to t he So family for 10

years. He had also been a tenant for six months at the So family’s apartment located at the back

of the family’s hardware store.9

After a while, Fritzie noticed that the Toyota Corolla stopped in front of the store while the

Mitsubishi Adventure parked some two meters away. Three (3) armed men then alighted from the

Toyota Corolla and entered the store. Two (2) of the armed men, later identified as Morales andaccused Luis Miranda, poked their guns at Fritzie’s brothers and mother and warned them not to

report the incident to the police. The remaining armed man, later identified as alias "Centes,"

forcibly took and carried Fritzie from the store and forced her to board the Toyota Corolla. The car

then sped towards the direction of Baclaran, followed by the Mitsubishi Adventure.10

On board the vehicle, Fritzie noticed that aside from her, there were five (5) other persons inside

the car: Palapar, the driver, Morales, and three (3) other unidentified men. Fritzie was seated

between Morales and an unidentified man. During the ride, Fritzie was blindfolded and the

blindfold was not removed until they reached the safe house.11

Meanwhile, after Fritzie was abducted from the store, Dexter called up the Criminal Investigation

Division (CID) of the Pasay City Police Station to report the incident but was advised to go directly

to the police headquarters. At around 1:45 in the afternoon, or 15 minutes after Fritzie’s

abduction was reported to the police, Mrs. Lolita So received a telephone call from the armed

men who informed her that they had Fritzie. Dexter also received similar calls from the

kidnappers.12

At 2:00 in the afternoon of November 12, 2000, Dexter went to the CID of the Pasay City Police

where he was referred to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and he wasable to talk to Colonel Michael Ray Aquino (Col. Aquino) through the telephone. Col. Aquino told

Dexter that his men would arrive at their house later t hat evening to coordinate with him.13

When Dexter returned home from the office of the CID, he received a call from the kidnappers

who demanded PhP 8 million for the release of Fritzie. Dexter told the caller that he and his

family could not raise such amount although they would try their best to look for such amount.

The caller replied that Dexter better do something as he would call back and if they fail to raise

the amount, Dexter would find the corpse or dead body of his sister in Pampanga. This threat

made Dexter and his mother so afraid that they could not sleep or eat thereafter.14

When the abductors arrived at their destination in San Nicolas, Bacoor, Cavite, Fritzie was told to

alight and later brought inside a room. When the blindfold was removed, she noticed that the

persons who abducted her were the same ones attending to the safe house. She identified them

as Palapar, Yap-Obeles, a certain alias "Roy" and alias "Centes," Luis Miranda, Morales, and

accused-appellant Bautista.

Fritzie was kept inside one of the rooms in the safe house. She was allowed to go and use the

comfort room for her personal need. But while at the safe house, she noticed that all of her

abductors tried to hide their faces from her but, nonetheless, she recognized and remembered

one of them as accused-appellant Bautista.15

Later that night, one of the abductors, identified by Fritzie as the accused alias "Roy," entered her

room and angrily told her that her family reported her abduction to the barangay authorities and

did not make any arrangements for the payment of the ransom money. Roy then told Fritzie that

they would just kill her. Because of such threat, she became so afraid that she cried for a long

time for fear that she would really be killed.16

After several negotiations, Dexter was able to bargain for the payment of PhP 1 million ransom

for the release of his sister. He agreed to meet with the kidnappers at the Magallanes

Supermarket along the South Expressway at 4:00 in the afternoon on November 14, 2000. The

kidnappers instructed him to lower down the windshields of his car, not to report the meeting to

the police, and to bring the exact amount of ransom money in a travelling bag; otherwise,

something will happen to his sister. Subsequently, the kidnappers changed the location andinstead instructed him to bring the money to the Magallanes Bridge, not the Magallanes

Supermarket, particularly at the broken post situated beside a billboard of Guess on top of the

same bridge.17

When Dexter arrived at the place designated by the kidnappers, he threw the money bag along

the street near the bridge, after which the kidnapper called him in his cellphone and Dexter was

told to pick up the bag and throw it on the road underneath the bridge. As instructed, Dexter

dropped the bag and he suddenly saw someone catch the bag. He later identified accused-

appellant Bautista as the person who caught the bag .18

After delivering the ransom money, Dexter went home. Thereupon, he received a call from the

kidnapper telling him that the money was complete and that his sister, Fritizie, would be released

after an hour. The kidnappers gave Fritzie PhP 1,000 for taxi fare and at around 8:30 in the

evening of November 14, 2000, she finally arrived home.19

That night, alias "Roy" received a phone call from Yap-Obeles instructing him to go to his (Yap-

Obeles) warehouse in Paco, Manila. Roy answered that he would instead send Palapar. Upon

Roy’s instructions, Palapar went to the warehouse and found Yap -Obeles, accused-appellant, and

accused-appellant’s sister, Doris, who is also Yap -Obeles’ wife, waiting for him. Yap -Obeles andDoris gave Palapar PhP 300,000 wrapped in a yellow plastic bag, with instructions to deliver it to

Roy as his share in the ransom money. Palapar did as told and was in turn given PhP 7,000 by

Roy as payment for his services as the driver of the group.20





























































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On November 15, 2000, two teams were designated by Col. Cesar Mancao of the PAOCTF to

investigate the kidnapping of Fritzie. One team was headed by P/Sr. Insp. Ortega and the other by

P/Col. Tucay. The following day, at about 4:00 in the morning, Col. Mancao conducted a briefing

of the teams informing them that the PAOCTF was able to trace a call made by Palapar to a

certain Marilyn Pena, a reported neighbor of Palapar.21The teams were then sent to scout the

area and found a person fitting the description of Palapar. Palapar informed P/Col. Tucay that he

would cooperate with the task force in the apprehension of the persons involved in the

kidnapping.

Palapar disclosed that the plan to kidnap Fritzie was hatched in a meeting among the group

which, among others, included Yap-Obeles and Bautista.22 Further, he narrated that on November

10, 2000, he, Luis Miranda, and Roy even went to the hardware store of the victim to familiarize

themselves with the appearance of Fritzie and with the vicinity of the hardware store .23 He

pointed to Yap-Obeles as the mastermind and financier of the kidnapping and also mentioned the

names and whereabouts of the other per sons involved in the kidnapping.

Relying on this information, the teams proceeded to Pier 4, North Harbor to search for a certain

person, who was subsequently identified as Morales. They proceeded to a house pointed to by

Palapar as the residence of Morales, but the person who opened the door of the house was not

Morales. Instead, this person pointed to the whereabouts of Morales, and he (Morales) was

subsequently invited by the team of PAOCTF officers to give his side on his alleged involvement in

the kidnapping incident.24

Next, the teams proceeded to locate a certain Yap-Obeles at 321 Southway Mansion in Manila

and likewise invited him to go to Camp Crame. As a last stop, the team of P/Sr. Insp. Ortega

dropped by the warehouse of Yap-Obeles at Paco, Manila to retrieve the motor vehicle and the red

scooter involved in the kidnapping incident. At the warehouse, they met Yap- Obeles’ wife, Doris

Bautista, and asked her permission to bring both the scooter and the Mitsubishi Adventure to their

office. Doris Bautista agreed and both vehicles were turned over to the Legal InvestigationDivision after said team arrived at the PAOCTF office in Camp Crame.25

The police then went after Roy, who was able to escape.26 Bautista, on the other hand, was

persuaded by his younger brother to surrender.27

The following day, the police called up Dexter saying that certain persons surrendered and others

were arrested. He was requested to go to Camp Crame to identify the suspects. Upon arriving at

Camp Crame, Dexter was shown a police line up and he identified two persons: first, accused-

appellant Bautista as the one who received the money; and second, Yap-Obeles as the driver of

the black Mitsubishi Adventure who followed the Toyota Corolla car that carried away his sister.28

Version of the Defense

Bautista’s defense, on the other hand, was confined to an alibi, to wit:

In the evening of November 11, 2000, accused-appellant and his live-in partner, Janet Arida

(Janet), left Manila on board a gray Honda City to attend the town fiesta in Gumaca which was

scheduled on November 12, 2000. He stayed at Janet’s house in Barangay Progreso, Gumaca,

Quezon the entire day and only left for Manila the following day, November 13, 2000 at around

4:00 in the morning. He then reported for work the next day, November 14, 2000, at the Almighty

Trading Corporation in Paco, Manila, a corporation owned by the family of Yap-Obeles, thehusband of his younger sister, Doris.29

He denied knowledge of any of the accused, except Yap-Obeles, because of his marriage to his

sister. But, he admitted that he fled to Bicol when he learned that Yap-Obeles was arrested

fearing that he might be implicated as he was an employee of Yap-Obeles. Further, he admitted

that he rented a vehicle for Yap-Obeles at a rent-a-car company and the said vehicle was delivered

on November 10 or 11, 2000. Yap-Obeles allegedly provided the rent money.30

But contrary to his initial testimony, the accused-appellant subsequently admitted knowing

Palapar as early as second week of October 2000 when the latter went to the warehouse where

accused-appellant was working. With the help of his younger brother and a certain Police

Inspector Moya, accused-appellant eventually surrendered.31

His alibi was corroborated by the mother of his live-in partner, Ludivina Arida. She testified that

accused-appellant was indeed with her daughter on November 12, 2000 attending the fiesta, and

that he left early in the morning of November 13, 2000.

Ruling of the Trial Court

After trial, the RTC convicted the appellant. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing facts and considerations, this Court hereby renders

judgment finding the accused Roberto Yap-Obeles, Johnny Bautista y Bautista and Jerry Morales y

Ursal all GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals in the crime of Kidnapping for Ranson, as

this felony is defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by

Republic Act No. 7659, and are sentenced each to death. The same accused are further ordered

to restore and to pay jointly and severally the family of the victim Fritzie So the sum of

Php1,000,000.00, by way of restitution, and the sum of Php200,000.00, as moral damages, plus

costs of suit.

x x x x

SO ORDERED.32

Ruling of the Appellate Court

On March 18, 2009, the CA affirmed the judgment of the lower cour t with a modification as to the

penalty. The CA noted that the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as "An Act

Prohibiting the Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines," effectively proscribed theimposition of the death penalty. In lieu of which, the CA imposed reclusion perpetua without

eligibility of parole, notwithstanding the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The CA

reasoned that a single indivisible penalty, like reclusion perpetua, is "applied by the courts

regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the

commission of the deed"33. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is affirmed with the MODIFICATION that appellants are each

sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.34

The Issues

Bautista contends in his Brief that:35

1. The court a quo gravely erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses;

2. Assuming arguendo that the accused-appellant is guilty, the court a quo gravely erred

in finding that the accused-appellant acted in conspiracy with the other co-accused and

in not finding that his participation in the commission of the crime was as a mere

accomplice.36 The Court’s Ruling

We sustain appellant’s conviction.

Factual Findings of the Trial Court should be Respected
































































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In his Brief, accused-appellant argues that the trial cour t failed to consider several inconsistencies

in the testimonies of the victim. Notably, he pounds on the fact that on cross-examination Fritzie

stated that she had no personal knowledge of the participation of the accused-appellant in the

alleged kidnapping for ransom. It is his position that Fritzie’s identi fication was merely derived

from the confession of the state witness, Palapar.

In addition, accused-appellant asserts that the trial court also failed to consider the material

inconsistencies of the testimony of the victim’s brother, Dexter, with regard to his (accused-

appellant’s) identification as the recipient of the ransom money.

We do not agree.

After a careful perusal of the records of this case, this Court finds no cogent reason to questionthe trial court’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses.

It is a well-entrenched doctrine that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their

testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to

observe the witnesses first hand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling

examination.37 The trial court has the singular opportunity to observe the witnesses "through the

different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or

the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the

forthright tone of a ready reply; or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation,

the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sign, the candor

or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien."38

This rule admits of exceptions, however, such as when the trial court’s findings of facts and

conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record, or when certain facts of substance and

value, likely to change the outcome of the case have been overlooked by the lower court, or when

the assailed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.39 None of these exceptions exists in

this case.

Moreover, the alleged inconsistencies in the declarations and testimony of the witnesses weresufficiently explained. The reason why Fritzie’s affidavit did not mention accused -appellant’s

participation was because the affidavit was only limited to those who participated in the actual

kidnapping. Likewise, as to the specific role of accused-appellant, Fritzie could only testify on what

she heard about this from Palapar who was privy to the conspiracy to kidnap her. However, Fritzie

categorically affirmed in open court that accused-appellant was among those who guarded her in

the safe house. This observation indicates the complicity of accused-appellant in the kidnapping.

As to Dexter’s contradicting affidavit and testimony, this was more than adequately explained, as

well, when he testified in open court that his statement in the affidavit did not mean that he had

no opportunity to recognize accused-appellant Bautista as the person who received the ransom

money. It only mean that he will b e able to identify the accused -appellant if he saw him again, viz:

COURT:

Q: So would you still insist that you recognized Bautista as the one who catched (sic) or

received the bag of money?

A: Yes, your honor.

Q: Then if you insist now that it was Bautista who catched (sic) or received the money,

why is it that in your sworn statement you did not mention it and you mentioned that youdid not recognize the one who received the money?

A: When I threw the bag, I did not closely see him but when I see him again I can identify

him, you Honor.40 (Emphasis supplied.)

It is quite common for a witness to recognize a malefactor better when there is a face-to-face

confrontation during the hearing. Jurisprudence is cognizant of this situation.41

Therefor, such testimonies prevail over the affidavits previously executed by the witnesses. It is

settled that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness

in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are

inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes

inaccurate.42

Additionally, accused-appellant cannot plausibly bank on the minor inconsistencies in the

testimonies, even if they do exist because such minor and insignificant inconsistencies tend to

bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of the witness for they show that his testimony was notcontrived or rehearsed.43 Trivial inconsistencies do not rock the pedestal upon which the

credibility of the witness rests, but enhances credibility as they manifest spontaneity and lack of

scheming.44

Furthermore, accused-appellant was unable to prove any ill motive on the part of the prosecution

witnesses. The presumption is that their testimonies were not moved by any ill will and was

untainted by bias, and thus entitled to full faith and credit.45

Conspiracy was present

In addition, accused-appellant submits that his participation in the commission of the crime was

merely that of an accomplice and that the finding of the trial court of conspiracy is in error. He

argues that the prosecution failed miserably to prove the existence of a conspiracy.

We disagree.


of a felony and decide to commit it .46 Where all the accused acted in concert at the time of the

commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or

common design and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established .47 It must

be shown that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as toindicate a common purpose or d esign to commit the felony.48

In People v. Pagalasan, the Court elaborately discussed the concept of conspiracy, to wit:

Judge Learned Hand once called conspiracy "the darling of the modern prosecutor's nursery."

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit

it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proven separately from and with

the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct

evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.

Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,

during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common

purpose and design. Paraphrasing the decision of the English Court in Regina v. Murphy,

conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the

accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,

though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, co nnected and cooperative, indicating

a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. To hold an accused guilty as

a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in

pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in thetransaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

The United States Supreme Court in Braverman v. United States, held that the precise nature and

extent of the conspiracy must be determined by reference to the agreement which embraces and

















































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defines its objects. For one thing, the temporal dimension of the conspiracy is of particular

importance. Settled as a rule of law is that the conspiracy continues until the object is attained,

unless in the meantime the conspirator abandons the conspiracy or is arrested. There is authority

to the effect that the conspiracy ends at the moment of any conspirator's arrest, on the

presumption, albeit rebuttable, that at the moment the conspiracy has been thwarted, no other

overt act contributing to the conspiracy can possibly take place, at least as far as the arrested

conspirator is concerned. The longer a conspiracy is deemed to continue, the greater the chances

that additional persons will be found to have joined it. There is also the possibility that as the

conspiracy continues, there may occur new overt acts. If the conspiracy has not yet ended, then

the hearsay acts and declarations of one conspirator will be admissible against the otherconspirators and one conspirator may be held liable for substantive crimes committed by the

others.

Each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his confederates which follows incidentally

in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequences even

though it was not intended as part of the original design. Responsibility of a conspirator is not

confined to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral

acts and offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. Conspirators are held to

have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely engaging in conspiracy which

necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result that they are in contemplation of law,

charged with intending the result. Conspirators are necessarily liable for the acts of another

conspirator even though such act differs radically and substantively from that which they intended

to commit.49 x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Evidently, to hold an accused guilty as a co -principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to

have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be

intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design

and purpose. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to the accomplishment of a particularpurpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of

the purpose intended.

In this case, the evidence on record inscrutably shows the existence of a conspiracy between

accused-appellant and his co-accused. The testimony of the state witness Palapar was replete

with instances of accused-appellant’s involvement with the kidnapping group considering: (a)

accused-appellant was present at Chowking Malate when the kidnapping was being planned with

the group;50 (b) he was also with the group of Yap-Obeles immediately after the kidnapping

attempt on a certain trader was foiled;51 (c) he was the one who rented the gray Toyota Corolla

that was used in the kidnapping;52and (d) he was likewise present with Yap-Obeles and his wife,

Doris, when the couple asked Palapar to deliver Roy’s share of t he ransom money.53

Taking these facts in conjunction with the testimony of Dexter, who testified that accused-

appellant was the one who received the ransom money and apparently, was also the one giving

him instructions, and that of Fritzie, who testified that accused -appellant was one of her guards at

the safe house, then the commonality of purpose of the acts of accused-appellant together with

the other accused can no longer be denied. Such acts have the common design or purpose to

commit the felony of kidnapping for ransom.Thus, accused-appellants’ argument that he is a mere accomplice must fail. He is liable as a

principal for being a co-conspirator in the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom under Art. 267 of the

RPC, as amended by R.A. 7659, which provides:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. — Any private individual who shall kidnap or

detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of

reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or det ention shall have lasted more than five days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or

detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the

purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of thecircumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of t he offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to

torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.

The prosecution has proved that the motive for the kidnapping was indeed to obtain ransom

money for the victim. Ransom is money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the

redemption of a captured person or persons; a payment that releases from captivity .54 In the

instant case, the testimonies of the witnesses were more than sufficient to satisfy the motive of

the accused-appellant and his co-conspirators to obt ain ransom money from the vict im’s family.

Defense of Alibi cannot Stand

In a last attempt to avoid liability, accused-appellant relays an alibi, which, according to him,

would be sufficient to acquit him when taken in light of his other arguments. The Court is not

persuaded.

Consistently, this Court has declared that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the defense must

establish the physical impossibility for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime at the

time of the commission thereof.55 The facts in this case illustrate that there was no physical

impossibility for the accused-appellant to be at the scene of the crime, considering that Manila is just a short ride away from Gumaca, Quezon.

Physical impossibility takes into consideration not only the geographical distance between the

scene of the crime and the place where the accused-appellant maintains where he was at, but

more importantly, the accessibility between these two points – how this distance translates to

number of hours of travel.56 Geographical distances may be taken judicial notice of, but this alone

will not suffice for purposes of proving an alibi.57

What is more, alibi is considered as one of the weakest defenses not only due to its inherent

weakness and unreliability, but also because it is easy to fabricate.58 Nothing is more settled in

criminal law jurisprudence than the doctrine that alibi cannot prevail over the positive and

categorical testimony and identification of the accused by the complainant.59 Such is the situation

in the instant case. Accused-appellant was positively and categorically identified not only by the

victim but as well as her brother. As has been consistently ruled by this Court, an affirmative

testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a

credible witness and alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and

self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.60

It should be noted that accused-appellant fled to Bicol when he learned that Yap-Obeles wasarrested by the authorities.61 In People v. Deduyo,62 this Court said that flight by the accused

clearly evinces "consciousness of guilt and a silent admission of culpability. Indeed, the wicked

flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as lion."63




























































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In conclusion, in criminal cases such as the one on hand, the prosecution is not required show the

guilt of the accused with absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is demanded, or that degree of

proof which, to an unprejudiced mind, produces conviction.64 We find that the prosecution has

discharged its burden of proving the guilt of the accused-appellant for the crime of Kidnapping for

Ransom with moral certainty.

With respect to the award of damages, the prevailing jurisprudenc e65 dictates the following

amounts to be imposed: PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime warrants the

imposition of death penalty; PhP 75,000 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to

have suffered moral injuries, without need of proof; and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.

Even though the penalty of death was not imposed, the civil indemnity of PhP 75,000 is stillproper because the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but

on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended

the commission of the offense.66

Instead of the usual award of PhP 75,000 as moral damages without need of proof, this Court,

however, sustains the award of the RTC of PhP 200,000 as moral damages for the ignominy and

sufferings of Fritzie and her family have suffered due to the accused-appellant’s act of detaining

the victim in blindfold and mentally torturing her and her family into raising the ransom money.

And to set an example for the public good, accused-appellant should pay the victim PhP 30,000

as exemplary damages following prevailing jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.

01694 finding accused-appellant Johnny Bautista guilty of the crime charged is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION. In addition to the sum of PhP 1,000,000 as restitution for the ransom money and

PhP 200,000 as moral damages, accused-appellant is likewise ordered to pay the victim the

amount of PhP 75,000 as civil indemnity and PhP 30,000 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.


SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 180122 March 13, 2009

FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., Petitioner,

vs.SANDIGANBAYAN First Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

TINGA, J :

This is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the

Resolution2dated 2 March 2007 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.

26583 entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Robert P. Balao, et al.," which denied petitioner

Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr.’s Motion to Quash. The Resolution3 dated 18 October 2007 of said court

denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is likewise challenged in this petition.

The antecedents follow.

In June 1990, the National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded the original contract for the

infrastructure works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod City to A.C.

Cruz Construction. The project, with a contract cost of P7,666,507.55, was funded by the World

Bank under the Project Loan Agreement forged on 10 June 1983 between the PhilippineGovernment and the IBRD-World Bank.4

A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the infrastructure works on 1 August 1990.5 In April 1991, the

complainant Candido M. Fajutag, Jr.(Fajutag, Jr.) was designated Project Engineer of the project.

A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was approved for the excavation of unsuitable materials and

road filling works. As a consequence, Arceo Cruz of A.C. Cruz Construction submitted the fourth

billing and Report of Physical Accomplishments on 6 May 1991. Fajutag, Jr., however, discovered

certain deficiencies. As a result, he issued Work Instruction No. 1 requiring some supporting

documents, such as: (1) copy of approved concrete pouring; (2) survey results of original ground

and finished leaks; (3) volume calculation of earth fill actually rendered on site; (4) test results as

to the quality of materials and compaction; and (5) copy of work instructions attesting to the

demolished concrete structures.61avvphi1.zw+

The contractor failed to comply with t he work instruction. Upon Fajutag, Jr.’s further verification, it

was established that there was no actual excavation and road filling works undertaken by A.C.

Cruz Construction. Fajutag, Jr.’s findings are summarized as follows:

1. No topographic map was appended, even if the same is necessary in land

development works; a discarded drawing sheet: "Spot Elevations and ExistingGradelines" of the project site was found, but this contrasted significantly with the

alleged joint-survey results in support of the Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1;










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2. No laboratory tests were conducted to ascertain unsuitability of materials, even if the

same should have been required as essential basis thereof;

3. There were no records of the excavation and disposal of unsuitable materials and of

road filling works having been made by the previous engineers, Rodolfo de los Santos

and Noel Lobrido at the time said activities were allegedly executed;

4. The excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works were overestimated to

the prejudice of the government:

a. in a 10.00 meter right-of-way (ROW) road, the entire width of 10.00 meters

was used in calculating the volume of cut of unsuitable materials when the

undisturbed natural grounds on both sides of the road was only 6.00 meters;b. the mathematical calculation in determining the volume of cut of unsuitable

materials are contrary to the contract’s technical specifications which provides

for cut measurements, i.e.[,] by end-area method;

c. in a 10.00 ROW road, an effective width of 8.70 meters was used in

calculating the volume of road fill when the undisturbed natural grounds on

both sides of the road was only 6.00 meters apart;

d. the mathematical calculations in determining the volume of roadfill are

contrary to the contract’s technical specifications, specifically Section 3.11

thereof, i.e., by end-area method.

5. No laboratory test was made to ascertain the quality of imported road fill materials.7

In a Memorandum dated 27 June 1991, the Project Office recommended the termination of the

infrastructure contract with A.C. Construction.8

In its Report dated 12 August 1991, the Inventory and Acceptance Committee determined the

total accomplishment of the contractor at 40.89%, representing P3,433,713.10 out of the total

revised contract amount of P8,397,225.09 inclusive of Variation Order No. 1 in the amount

of P710,717.54. Thereafter, said Committee recommended t hat the temporary pr ojectsuspension imposed by the contractor, which incurred delays in the project completion, be

referred to the Legal Department for appropri ate action.9

On 19 August 1991, the Manager of the Legal Department issued a Memorandum addressed to

the General Manager of NHA endorsing approval of the Regional Projects Department’s (RPD’s)

recommendation. The NHA General Manager through a letter dated 29 August 1991 informed the

contractor of the rescission of his contract for the development of the said project upo n his receipt

thereof without prejudice to NHA’s enforcing its right under the contract in view of the contractor’s

unilateral and unauthorized suspension of the contract works amounting to abandonment of the

project. Despite the rescission notice issued by the NHA per letter dated 29 August 1991, the

contractor continued working intermittently with very minimal workforce until such time as the

award of remaining infrastructure works is effected by NHA to another contractor.10

In March 1992, the NHA Board of Directors, per Resolution No. 2453, approved the mutual

termination of the A.C. Cruz Construction contract and awarded the remaining work to Triad

Construction and Development Corporation (Triad). The contract amount for the remaining work

was P9,554,837.32.11 Thereafter, representatives from A.C. Cruz Construction, Triad and NHA-

Bacolod conducted a joint measurement at the site to determine the total accomplishment of A.C.Cruz Construction inclusive of accomplishments after NHA inventory.

The Project Office was subsequently informed by the Central Office that the accomplishments

made by A.C. Cruz Construction after the NHA inventory would be paid directly to said contractor

by Triad. As of 27 March 1992, Triad had issued checks in favor of A.C. Cruz Construction

amounting to One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) which were received by Arceo M. Cruz per

Official Receipt No. 3003.12

In its Memorandum dated 22 June 1992, t he Regional Projects Department recommended to the

General Manager that the fund settlement to A.C. Cruz Construction be effected.13

Thereafter, Triad discovered that certain work items that had been in under the inventory report as

accomplished and acceptable were in fact non-existent. Fajutag, Jr. brought these irregularities to

the attention of the Commission on Audit (COA).

After its special audit investigation, the COA uncovered some anomalies, among which, are ghost

activities, specifically the excavation of unsuitable materials and road filling works andsubstandard, defective workmanship. Laboratory tests confirmed the irregularities.14

Further, according to the COA, while it is true that the fourth billing of A.C. Cruz Construction had

not been paid its accomplishments after the August 1991 inventory found acceptable by NHA

amounting to P896,177.08 were paid directly by Triad. Effectively, A.C. Cruz Construction had

been overpaid by as much as P232,628.35, which amount is more than the net payment due per

the computation of the unpaid fourth billing.15

Consequently, petitioner, as manager of the Regional Projects Department and Chairman of the

Inventory and Acceptance Committee, and other NHA officials were charged in an

Information16 dated 5 March 2001, worded as follows:

INFORMATION

The undersigned Ombudsman Prosecutor II of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses

ROBERT P. BALAO, FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, JOSEPHINE O. ANGSICO,

JOSEPHINE T. ESPINOSA, NOEL H. LOBRIDO AND ARCEO C. CRUZ for VIOLATION OF SECTION 3 (e)

of REPUBLIC ACT No. 3019, AS AMENDED (THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT),

committed as follows:

That in or about the month of March, 1992 at Bacolod City, Province of Negros Occidental,Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, ROBERT P.

BALAO, JOSEPHINE C. ANGSICO, VIRGILIO V. DACALOS, FELICISIMO F. LAZARTE, JR., JOSEPHINE T.

ESPINOSA, and NOEL H. LOBRIDO, Public Officers, being the

General Manager, Team Head, Visayas Mgt. Office, Division Manager (Visayas), Manager, RPD,

Project Mgt. Officer A and Supervising Engineer, Diliman, Quezon City, in such capacity and

committing the offense in relation to office and while in the performance of their official

functions, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with each other and with accused

ARCEO C. CRUZ, a private individual and General Manager of A.C. Cruz Construction with address

at 7486 Bagtikan Street, Makati City with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality and evident

bad faith, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause to be paid to A.C.

Construction public funds in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND SIX

HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS and THIRTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P232,628.35) PHILIPPINE

CURRENCY, supposedly for the excavation and roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and

Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact no such works were undertaken by A.C.

Construction as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by the Commission on Audit, thus

accused public officials in the performance of their official functions had given unwarrantedbenefits, advantage and preference to accused Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Construction and

themselves to the damage and prejudice of the government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.17












































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On 2 October 2006, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Information raising the following

grounds: (1) the facts c harged in the information do not constitute an offense; (2) the information

does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused

to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against them have been violated by the

inadequacy of the information; and (4) the prosecution failed to determine the individual

participation of all the accused in the information in disobedience with the Resolution dated 27

March 2005.18

On 2 March 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution denying petitioner’s

motion to quash. We quote the said resolution in part:

Among the accused-movants, the public officer whose participation in the alleged offense isspecifically mentioned in the May 30, 2006 Memorandum is accused Felicisimo Lazarte, Jr., the

Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance Committee (IAC), which undertook the inventory and

final quantification of the accomplishment of A.C. Cruz Construction. The allegations of Lazarte

that the IAC, due to certain constraints, allegedly had to rely on the reports of the field engineers

and/or the Project Office as to which materials were actually installed; and that he supposedly

affixed his signature to the IAC Physical Inventory Report and Memoranda dated August 12, 1991

despite his not being able to attend the actual inspection because he allegedly saw that all the

members of the Committee had already signed are matters of defense which he can address in

the course of the trial. Hence, the quashal of the information with respect to accused Lazarte is

denied for lack of merit.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby resolves as follows:

(1) Accused Robert Balao, Josephine Angsico and Virgilio Dacalos’ Motion to Admit

Motion to Quash dated October 4, 2006 is GRANTED; the Motion to Quash dated October

4, 2006 attached thereto, is GRANTED. Accordingly, the case is hereby DISMISSED

insofar as the said accused-movants are concerned.

(2) The Motion to Quash dated October 2, 2006 of accusedEngr. Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr. is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Let the arraignment of the

accused proceed as scheduled on March 13, 2007.

SO ORDERED.19

Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan issued the second assailed resolution denying petitioner’s

motion for reconsideration. Pertinently, it held:

The Motion for Reconsideration of accused Lazarte, Jr. merely reiterated the grounds and

arguments which had been duly considered and passed upon in the assailed Resolution.

Nonetheless, after a careful review of the same, the Court still finds no cogent reason to disturb

the finding of probable cause of the Office of the Ombudsman to indict accused Lazarte, Jr.,

Espinosa, Lobrido and Cruz of the offense charged. In its Memorandum dated July 27, 2004 and

May 30, 2006, the prosecution was able to show with sufficient particularity the respective

participation of the aforementioned accused in the commission of the offense charged. The rest

of the factual issues by accused Lazarte, Jr. would require the presentation of evidence in the

course of the trial of this case.

The Court also maintains the validity and sufficiency of the information against accused Lazarte,

Jr., Espinosa, Lobrido and Cruz. The information has particularly alleged the ultimate factsconstituting the essential elements of the offense charged which are as follows:

1. that accused Lazarte, Jr., Espinosa, and Lobrido are public officers being the

Department Manager, Project Management Officer A, and Supervising Engineer of the

NHA during the time material in the criminal information; and

2. that the said accused, in their respective official capacities and in conspiracy with

accused Cruz, a private individual and the General manager of A.C. Cruz Construction,

have acted with manifest partiality or evident bad faith and have given unwarranted

benefits, preference, and advantage to Arceo C. Cruz and A.C. Cruz Construction or have

caused damage and prejudice to the government, by "[causing] to be paid A.C. Cruz

Construction public funds in the amount of Two Hundred Thirty Two Thousand Six

Hundred Twenty Eight Pesos and Thirty Five Centavos (P232,628.35) supposedly for theexcavation and roadfilling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and Services Project in Bacolod

City despite the fact that no such works were undertaken by A.C. Cruz Construction as

revealed by the Special Audit conducted by the Commission on Audit."

The other factual details which accused Lazarte, Jr. cited are matters of evidence best threshed

out in the course of the trial.20

Hence, the instant petition which is a reiteration of petitioner’s submissions. Petitioner ascribes

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the Sandiganbayan in: (1)

upholding the validity and sufficiency of the Information despite its failure to make out an offense

and conform to the prescribed form; (2) denying his motion to quash considering that the

remaining averments in the Information have been rendered unintelligible by the dismissal of the

charges against some of his co-accused; and (3) using as bases the Prosecution’s Memoranda

dated 27 July 2004 and 30 May 2006 to supplement the inadequacies of the Information. In

addition, petitioner avers that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of

the accusation against him had been violated for failure of the Information to specify his

participation in the commission of the offense. Petitioner also argues that the facts charged in t he

Information do not constitute an offense as no damage or injury had been made or caused to anyparty or to the government. Finally, petitioner maintains that the Sandiganbayan lost its

jurisdiction over him upon t he dismissal of the charges against his co-accused as the r emaining

accused are public officers whose salary grade is below 27.

In its Comment21 dated 21 December 2007, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of

the Special Prosecutor, counters that separate allegations of individual acts perpetrated by the

conspirators are not required in an Information and neither should they be covered by evidence

submitted to establish the existence of probable cause. Allegations regarding the nature and

extent of petitioner’s participation and justification for his acts which constitute the offense

charged are evidentiary matters which are more properly addressed during trial. The Ombudsman

reiterates our ruling in Ingco v. Sandiganbayan22 that the fundamental test in reflecting on the

viability of a motion to quash is the sufficiency of the averments in the information that is,

whether the facts asseverated, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements

of the crime defined by law. And relying on the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan ,23 the

Ombudsman states that informations need only state the ultimate facts; the r easons therefor are

to be proved during the trial.24 The Ombudsman moreover maintains that the Sandiganbayan has

jurisdiction over petitioner. The Ombudsman argues that it is of no moment that petitioner’sposition is classified as

salary grade 26 as he is a manager within the legal contemplation of paragraph 1(g), Section 4(a)

of Republic Act No. 8249.25
































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In his Reply26 dated 9 October 2008, petitioner strongly asseverates that, according to the

Constitution, in a conspiracy indictment the participation of each accused in the so-called

conspiracy theory should be detailed in order to apprise the accused of the nature of the

accusation against them in relation to the participation of the other accused. A general statement

that all the accused conspired with each other without stating the participation of each runs afoul

of the Constitution.27 Petitioner adds that the ultimate facts intended by law refer to determinate

facts and circumstances which should become the basis of the cause of action; statement of facts

which would be in complete accord with the constitutional requirement of giving the accused

sufficient information about the nature and the cause of the accusation against him .28 Petitioner

also avers that the Ombudsman’s reliance on and citation of the cases of Ingco v.Sandiganbayan29 and Domingo v. Sandiganbayan30 is misplaced and misleading.

Petitioner’s main argument is that the Information filed before the Sandiganbayan insufficiently

averred the essential elements of the crime charged as it failed to specify the individual

participation of all the accused.

The Court is not persuaded. The Court affirms the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

At the outset, it should be stressed that the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by

certiorari. Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied,

the remedy is not a petition for certiorari but for petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to

reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards

interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. The

evident reason for this rule is t o avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single court.31

This general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to

dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies.32 And in the case at bar, the Court does not find the

Sandiganbayan to have committed grave abuse of discretion.

The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that thefacts charged do not constitute an offense is whether or not the facts asseverated, if

hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in

law.33 Matters aliunde will not be considered.34

Corollarily, Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states that:

SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is sufficient if it

states the name of the accused, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or

omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the

approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was

committed.

When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be included in the

complaint or information.

The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a

person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged and enable the

court to know the proper judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately the

elements of the crime charged. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included

therein must be determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific crimes.35 The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise

the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d’etre of the rule is to

enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.36 Another purpose is to enable accused, if

found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The use of

derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic facts constituting the offense charged is

sufficient.37

Pertinently, Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act, reads:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers

already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public

officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

x x x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private partyany unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative

or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.

This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged

with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.38

The essential elements for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 are as follows:

1. The accused is a public officer or private person charged in conspiracy with him;

2. Said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his official

duties or in relation to his public position;

3. He causes undue injury to any party, whether the gov ernment or private party;

4. Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference

to such parties; and

5. The public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross

inexcusable negligence.39

The Court finds that the Information in this case alleges the essential elements of violation of

Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically alleges that petitioner, Espinosa and

Lobrido are public officers being then the Department Manager, Project Management Officer Aand Supervising Engineer of the NHA respectively; in such capacity and committing the offense in

relation to the office and while in the performance of their official functions, connived,

confederated and mutually helped each other and with accused Arceo C. Cruz, with deliberate

intent through manifest partiality and evident bad faith gave unwarranted benefits to the latter,

A.C. Cruz Construction and to themselves, to the damage and prejudice of the government. The

felonious act consisted of causing to be paid to A.C. Cruz Construction public funds in the amount

of P232,628.35 supposedly for excavation and road filling works on the Pahanocoy Sites and

Services Project in Bacolod City despite the fact that no such works were undertaken by said

construction company as revealed by the Special Audit conducted by COA.

On the contention that the Information did not detail the individual participation of the accused in

the allegation of conspiracy in the Information, the Court underscores the fact that under

Philippine law, conspiracy should be understood on two levels. Conspiracy can be a mode of

committing a crime or it may be constitutive of the crime itself. Generally, conspiracy is not a

crime in our jurisdiction. It is punished as a crime only when the law fixes a penalty for its

commission such as in conspiracy to commit t reason, rebellion and sedition.40

When conspiracy is charged as a crime, the act of conspiring and all the elements of said crimemust be set forth in the complaint or information. But when conspiracy is not charged as a crime

in itself but only as the mode of committing the crime as in the case at bar, there is less necessity

of reciting its particularities in the Information because conspiracy is not the gravamen of the




























































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offense charged. The conspiracy is significant only because it changes the criminal liability of all

the accused in the conspiracy and makes them answerable as co-principals regardless of the

degree of their participation in the crime. The liability of the conspirators is collective and each

participant will be equally responsible for the acts of others, for the act of one is the act of all.41

Notably, in People v. Quitlong,42 as pointed out by respondent, the Court ruled on how conspiracy

as a mode of committing the offense should be alleged in the Information, viz:

x x x Where conspiracy exists and can rightly be appreciated, the individual acts done to

perpetrate the felony becomes of secondary importance, the act of one being imputable to all the

others. Verily, an accused must know from the information whether he faces a criminal

responsibility not only for his acts but also for the acts of his co-accused as well.A conspiracy indictment need not, of course, aver all the components of conspiracy or allege all

the details thereof, like the part that each of the parties therein have performed, the evidence

proving the common design or the facts connecting all the accused with one another in the web of

the conspiracy. Neither is it necessary to describe conspiracy with the same degree of particularity

required in describing a substantive offense. It is enough that the indictment contains a statement

of facts relied upon to be constitutive of the offense in ordinary and concise language, with as

much certainty as the nature of the case will admit, in a manner that can enable a person of

common understanding to know what is intended, and with such precision that the accused may

plead his acquittal or conviction to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts. It is said,

generally, that an indictment may be held sufficient "if it follows the words of the statute and

reasonably informs the accused of the character of the offense he is charged with conspiring to

commit, or, following the language of the statute, contains a sufficient statement of an overt act

to effect the object of the conspiracy, or alleges both the conspiracy and the contemplated crime

in the language of the respective statutes defining them (15A C.J.S. 842-844).

x x x Conspiracy arises when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the

commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy comes to life at the very instant theplotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith to actually pursue it.

Verily, the information must state that the accused have confederated to commit the crime or

that there has been a community of design, a unity of purpose or an agreement to commit the

felony among the accused. Such an allegation, in the absence of the usual usage of the words

"conspired" or "confederated" or the phrase "acting in conspiracy," must aptly appear in the

information in the form of definitive acts constituting conspiracy. In fine, the agreement to

commit the crime, the unity of purpose or the community of design among the accused must be

conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or its derivatives and synonyms or by

allegations of basic facts constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not just

inferred, in the information on which basis an accused can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is

not to be confused with or likened to t he adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. In

establishing conspiracy when properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not necessarily be

shown by direct proof but may be inferred from shown acts and conduct of the accused .43

In addition, the allegation of conspiracy in the Information should not be confused with the

adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved by evidence of

actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common purpose or design, a concertedaction or concurrence of sentiments to commit the felony and actually pursue it. A statement of

the evidence on the conspiracy is not necessary in the Information.44

The other details cited by petitioner, such as the absence of any damage or injury caused to any

party or the government, likewise are matters of evidence best raised during trial.

As to the contention that the residual averments in the Information have been rendered

unintelligible by the dismissal of the charges against some of his co-accused, the Court finds that

the Information sufficiently makes out a case against petitioner and the remaining accused.

With regard to the alleged irregular use by the Sandiganbayan of the Prosecution’s Memoranda

dated 27 July 2004 and 30 May 2006 to supplement the inadequacies of the Information, the

Court finds adequate its explanation in the first assailed resolution, to wit:

It may be recalled that a reinvestigation of the case was ordered by this Court because the

prosecution failed to satisfactorily comply with an earlier directive of the former Chairperson andMembers of the First Division, after noting the inadequacy of the information, to clarify the

participation of each of the accused. In ordering the reinvestigation, the Court noted that the

prosecution’s July 27, 2004 Memorandum did not address the apprehensions of the former

Chairperson and Members of the First Division as to the inadequacy of the allegations in the

information.

This time, despite a reinvestigation, the prosecution’s Memorandum dated May 30, 2006 still

failed to specify the participation of accused-movants Balao, Angsico and Dacalos. The most

recent findings of the prosecution still do not address the deficiency found by the Court in the

information. The prosecution avers that pursuant to Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, in

determining the viability of a motion to quash based on the ground of "facts charged in the

information do not constitute an offense," the test must be whether or not the facts asseverated,

if hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime as defined by law.

The prosecution contends that matter aliunde should not be considered. However, in the instant

case, the Court has found the information itself to be inadequate, as it does not satisfy the

requirements of particularly alleging the acts or omissions of the said accused-movants, which

served as the basis of the allegation of conspiracy between the aforementioned accused-movantsand the other accused, in the commission of the offense charged in the information.45

Finally, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to hear the case. As correctly pointed

out by the Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment that petitioner does not occupy a position with

Salary Grade 27 as he was a department manager of the NHA, a government-owned or controlled

corporation, at the time of the commission of the offense, which position falls within the ambit of

its jurisdiction. Apropos, the Court held in the case of Geduspan v. Peopl e46 which involved a

regional Manager/Director of Region VI of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation

(Philhealth) with salary grade 26, to wit:

It is of no moment that the position of p etitioner is merely classified as salary grade 26. While the

first part of the above–quoted provision covers only officials of the executive branch with the

salary grade 27 and higher, the second part thereof "specifically includes" other executive officials

whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law

placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.

Hence, respondent court is vested with jurisdiction over petitioner together with Farahmand, a

private individual charged together with her.

The position of manager in a government-owned or controlled corporation, as in the case ofPhilhealth, is within the jurisdiction of respondent court. It is the position that petitioner holds, not

her salary grade, that determines the jurisdiction of t he Sandiganbayan.

This Court in Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al. ruled:

























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A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense

committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),

(b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, book II of the Revised

Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986

(sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other

crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or

employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of section 4; and (3) the

offense committed is in relation to the office.

To recapitulate, petitioner is a public officer, being a department manager of Philhealth, agovernment-owned and controlled corporation. The position of manager is one of those

mentioned in paragraph a, Section 4 of RA 8249 and the offense for which she was charged was

committed in relation to her office as department manager of Philhealth. Accordingly, the

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over her person as well as the subject matter of the case.47

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The Resolutions dated 2

March 2007 and 18 October 2007 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.


SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 185011 December 23, 2009


vs.SPO3 SANGKI ARA y MIRASOL, MIKE TALIB y MAMA, and JORDAN MUSA y BAYAN, Accused-

Appellants.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J :

This is an appeal from the December 13, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.

CR-H.C. No. 00025B entitled People of the Philippines v. SPO3 Sangki Ara y Mirasol, Mike Talib y

Mama, Jordan Musa y Bayan, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),

Branch 9 in Davao City, convicting accused-appellants of violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165

or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

Three Informations charged accused-appellants Sangki Ara, Mike Talib, and Jordan Musa, as

follows:

Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002 against AraThat on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction

of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, willfully,

unlawfully and consciously traded, transported and delivered 26.6563 grams of

Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu," which is a dangerous drug, with the aggravating

circumstance of trading, transporting and delivering said 26.6563 grams of "shabu" within 100

meters from [the] school St. Peter's College of Toril, Davao City.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002 against Talib

That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction

of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, willfully,

unlawfully and consciously had in his possession and control one (1) plastic sachet of

Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu," weighing 0.3559 gram, which is a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 against Musa

That on or about December 20, 2002, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction

of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, without being authorized by law, willfully,unlawfully and consciously had in his possession and control five (5) big plastic sachet[s] of

Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or "shabu" weighing 14.2936 grams, which is a dangerous

drug.




http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/dec2009/gr_185011_2009.html#fnt1









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CONTRARY TO LAW.3

During their arraignment, accused-appellants all gave a "not guilty" plea.

Version of the Prosecution

At the trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Forensic Chemist Noemi Austero,

PO2 Ronald Lao, SPO1 Bienvenido Furog, PO1 Enrique Ayao, Jr., SPO4 Rod rigo Mallorca, and PO2

Jacy Jay Francia.

In the morning of December 20, 2002, a confidential informant (CI) came to the Heinous Crime

Investigation Section (HCIS) of the Davao City Police Department and reported that three (3)

suspected drug pushers had contacted him for a deal involving six (6) plastic sachets of shabu. He

was instructed to go that same morning to St. Peter's College at Toril, Davao City and look for anorange Nissan Sentra car.4

Police Chief Inspector Fulgencio Pavo, Sr. immediately formed a buy-bust team composed of

SPO3 Reynaldo Capute, SPO4 Mario Galendez, SPO3 Antonio Balolong, SPO2 Arturo Lascaños,

SPO2 Jim Tan, SPO1 Rizalino Aquino, SPO1 Bienvenido Furog, PO2 Vivencio Jumawan, Jr., PO2

Ronald Lao, and PO1 Enrique Ayao, Jr., who would act as poseur-buyer .5

The team proceeded to the school where PO1 Ayao and the CI waited by the gate. At around 8:45

a.m., an orange Nissan Sentra bearing plate number UGR 510 stopped in front of them. The two

men approached the vehicle and the CI talked briefly with an old man in the front seat. PO1 Ayao

was then told to get in the back seat as accused-appellant Mike Talib opened the door. The old

man, later identified as accused-appellant SPO3 Ara, asked PO1 Ayao if he had the money and

the latter replied in the positive. Ara took out several sachets with crystalline granules from his

pocket and handed them to PO1 Ayao, who thereupon gave the pre-arranged signal of opening

the car door. The driver of the car, later identified as accused-appellant Jordan Musa, tried to drive

away but PO1 Ayao was able to switch o ff the car engine in time. The back-up team appeared and

SPO1 Furog held on to Musa while PO2 Lao restrained Talib. PO1 Ayao then asked Ara to get out

of the vehicle.6 Recovered from the group were plastic sachets of white crystalline substance: six (6) big sachets,

weighing 26.6563 grams, from Ara by PO1 Ayao; five (5) big sachets, weighing 14.2936 grams,

from Musa by SPO1 Furog; and a small sachet, weighing 0.3559 gram, from Talib by PO2 Lao.7

The three suspects were brought to the HCIS and the seized items indorsed to the Philippine

National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic Chemist Austero, who

conducted the examination, found that the confiscated sachets all tested positive for shabu.8

Version of the Defense

The defense offered the sole testimony of Ara, who said that he had been a member of the PNP

for 32 years, with a spotless record. On December 20, 2002, SPO3 Ara was in Cotabato City, at

the house of his daughter Marilyn, wife of his co-accused Musa. He was set to go that day to the

Ombudsman's Davao City office for some paperwork in preparation for his retirement on July 8,

2003. He recounted expecting at least PhP 1.6 million in retirement benefits.9 Early that morning,

past three o'clock, he and Musa headed for Davao City on board the latter's car. As he was feeling

weak, Ara slept in the back seat.

Upon reaching Davao City, he was surprised to see another man, Mike Talib, in the front seat of

the car when he woke up. Musa explained that Talib had hitched a ride on a bridge they hadpassed.10

When they arrived in Toril, Ara noticed the car to be overheating, so they stopped. Ara did not

know that they were near St. Peter's College since he was not familiar with the area. Talib

alighted from the car and Ara transferred to the front seat. While Talib was getting into the back

seat, PO1 Ayao came out of nowhere, pointed his .45 caliber pistol at Ara even if he was not doing

anything, and ordered him to get off the vehicle. He saw that guns were also pointed at his

companions. As the group were being arrested, he told PO1 Ayao that he was also a police officer.

Ara insisted that he was not holding anything and that the shabu t aken from him was planted. He

asserted that the only time he saw shabu was on television.11

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC pronounced accused-appellants guilty of the crimes charged. In its Decision dated March

1, 2003, the trial court held that the prosecution was able to establish the quantum of proof

showing the guilt of accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. It further ruled that the"intercept operation" conducted by the buy-bust team was valid.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing the Court finds the following:

In Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002, the accused herein SANGKI ARA Y MASOL, Filipino, 55 years

old, widower, a resident of Kabuntalan, Cotabato City, is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt, and is CONVICTED of the crime of violation of Sec. 5, 1st paragraph of Republic Act 9165.

He is hereby imposed the DEATH PENALTY and FINE of TEN MILLION PESOS (PhP 10,000,000)

with all the accessory penalties corresponding thereto, including absolute perpetual

disqualification from any public office, in view of the provision of section 28 of RA 9165 quoted

above.

Since the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed in the area

which is only five (5) to six (6) meters away from the school, the provision of section 5 paragraph

3 Article II of RA 9165 was applied in the imposition of the maximum penalty against the herein

accused.

In Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002, the accused herein MIKE TALIB y MAMA, Filipino, of legal age,

single and a resident of Parang, Cotabato, is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, and isCONVICTED of the crime of violation of Sec. 11, 3rd paragraph, Article II of Republic Act 9165. He

is hereby imposed a penalty of Imprisonment of SIXTEEN (16) YEARS and a fine of THREE

HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 300,000) with all the accessory penalties corresponding

thereto.

In Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 the accused herein JORDAN MUSA Y BAYAN, Filipino, 30 years

old, married and a resident of Cotabato City, is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt and

is CONVICTED of the crime for Violation of Sec. 11, 1st paragraph, Article II of Republic Act No.

9165. He is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and FINE of FOUR

HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 400,000) with all the accessory penalties corresponding

thereto.

SO ORDERED.12

As the death penalty was imposed on Ara, the case went on automatic review before this Court.

Conformably with People v. Mateo,13 we, however, ordered the transfer of the case to the CA.

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

Contesting the RTC Decision, accused-appellants filed separate appeals before the CA. Talib

claimed that it was erroneous for the trial court to have used the complaining witnesses' affidavitsas basis for ruling that their arrest was valid. He also cited as erroneous the trial court's refusal to

rule that the prosecution's evidence was inadmissible. Lastly, he questioned the failure of the buy-

bust team to follow the requirements of RA 9165 on proper inventory of seized drugs.













































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Ara and Musa filed a joint brief, alleging the following: (1) the trial court erred in denying the

Motion to Suppress and/or exclude illegally obtained evidence; (2) the trial court erred in denying

the Demurrer to Evidence; (3) the trial court failed to consider that the criminal informations did

not allege conspiracy among the accused; and (4) the trial court erred in ruling that the "intercept

operation" was valid.

The CA affirmed the trial court's decision with some modifications on the penalty imposed. It ruled

that a majority of the errors raised in the appeal referred to technicalities in the conduct of buy-

bust operations that did not invalidate the police officers' actions. On the issue of the evidence

presented, the CA held that the presumption that police officers performed their duties in a

regular manner was not overturned.The appellate court resolved the issue of the validity of the buy-bust operation by stating that the

law requires no specific method of conducting such an operation. It ruled that to require a warrant

of arrest would not accomplish the goal of apprehending drug pushers in flagrante delicto. The

CA's Decision emphasized that all the elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of

drugs were established.

The fallo of the December 13, 2007 CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises foregoing, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the appealed March 1,

2003 Decision is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification insofar as the death penalty

imposed upon accused SPO3 Sangki Ara is concerned. Accordingly, his penalty is hereby reduced

to life imprisonment pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.

SO ORDERED.14

On December 17, 2008, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so

desired. The parties, save for Musa, manifested their willingness to forego the filing of additional

briefs.

The Issues

Reiterating the matters raised before the CA, accused-appellants alleged the following:I

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the arrest of the accused-appellants was valid

based on the affidavits of the complaining witnesses

II

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the apparent defects and inconsistencies in

the affidavits of the complaining witnesses

III

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to consider the suppression or exclusion of

evidence

IV

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not holding that the prosecution miserably failed to prove

the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt

Talib also raises the following grounds for his acquittal:

I

Whether the arrest of Talib was illegal and t he evidence confiscated from him illegally obtained

IIWhether the police officers who conducted the illegal search and arrest also deliberately failed

and/or violated the provisions of RA 9165

III

Whether the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses and their respective affidavits were

gravely inconsistent

Ara and Musa additionally raise the following issues:

I

Whether the trial court erred in denying the Demurrer to Evidence

II

Whether the trial court failed to consider that the criminal informations did not allege conspiracy

among the accused

III

Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the "intercept operation" was validAccused-appellant Musa also avers that the CA erred in convicting him since the prosecution

failed to prove the corpus delicti of the offense charged.

The Ruling of this Court

What are mainly raised in this appeal are (1) whether the buy-bust conducted was valid; (2)

whether the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of drugs were sufficiently established;

and (3) whether the chain of custody over the shabu was unbroken.

Warrantless Arrest and Seizure Valid

In calling for their acquittal, accused-appellants decry their arrest without probable cause and the

violation of their constitutional rights. They claim that the buy-bust team had more than a month

to apply for an arrest warrant yet failed to do so.

Owing to the special circumstances surrounding the drug trade, a buy-bust operation has long

been held as a legitimate method of catching offenders. It is a form of entrapment employed as

an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of commission of an offense.15 We have

ruled that a buy-bust operation can be carried out after a long period of planning. The period of

planning for such operation cannot be dictated to the police authorities who are to undertake

such operation.16 It is unavailing then to argue that the operatives had to first secure a warrant ofarrest given that the objective of the operation was to apprehend the accused-appellants in

flagrante delicto. In fact, one of the situations covered by a lawful warrantless arrest under

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court is when a person has committed, is actually

committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in the presence of a peace officer or private

person.

It is erroneous as well to argue that there was no probable cause to arrest accused-appellants.

Probable cause, in warrantless searches, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion

or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. There is no hard and fast

rule or fixed formula for determining probable cause, for its determination varies according to the

facts of each case.17 Probable cause was provided by information gathered from the CI and from

accused-appellants themselves when they instructed PO1 Ayao to enter their vehicle and begin

the transaction. The illegal sale of shabu inside accused-appellants' vehicle was afterwards clearly

established. Thus, as we have previously held, the arresting officers were justified in making the

arrests as accused-appellants had just committed a crime when Ara sold shabu to PO1

Ayao.18 Talib and Musa were also frisked for contraband as it may be logically inferred that they

were also part of Ara's drug activities inside the vehicle. This inference was further strengthenedby Musa's attempt to drive the vehicle away and elude arrest.

Moreover, the trial court correctly denied the Motion to Suppress or Exclude Evidence. We need

not reiterate that the evidence was not excluded since the buy-bust operation was shown to be a





















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legitimate form of entrapment. The pieces of evidence thus seized therein were admissible. As

the appellate court noted, it was within legal bounds and no anomaly was found in the conduct of

the buy-bust operation. There is, therefore, no basis for the assertion that the trial court's order

denying said motion was biased and committed with grave abuse of discretion.

Prosecution Established Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt

For the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be

established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the

consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. W hat is material is the proof

that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the

corpus delicti as evidence.19 All these requisites were met by the prosecution.In contrast, Ara, the sole defense witness, could only proffer the weak defenses of denial and alibi.

He expressed surprise at having Talib in his car and claimed he was framed and that the shabu

confiscated from him was planted. According to the trial court, however, Ara's lying on the witness

stand "was so intense as he tried very hard in vain to win the Court's sympathy."20

Given the prosecution's evidence, we rule that the presumption of regularity in the performance of

official duties has not been overturned. The presumption remains because the defense failed to

present clear and convincing evidence that the police officers did not properly perform their duty

or that they were inspired by an improper motive .21 Ara could not explain why his fellow police

officers, who did not know him prior to his arrest, would frame him for such a serious offense.

Validity of Buy-Bust Operation

Likewise questioned by the defense in the affidavits of the police officers was the allegation that

there was a legitimate buy-bust operation. No marked money was presented to back up the police

officers' claims. This argument lacks basis, however. There are requirements that must be

complied with in proving the legitimacy of drug buy-bust operations. Nevertheless, this Court has

ruled that presentation of the marked money used is not such a requirement. In the prosecution

for the sale of dangerous drugs, the absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in theevidence for the prosecution, as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proved and the

drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court .22 In the instant case, the police

officers' testimonies adequately established the illegal sale of shabu. The shabu was then

presented before the trial court. The non-presentation of the marked money may, thus, be

overlooked as a peripheral matter.

Talib further contends that it is incredible that a shabu transaction would be carried out in a very

open and public place. Contrary to Talib's claim, however, judicial experience has shown that drug

transactions have been conducted without much care for an inconspicuous location.

Thus, we observed in People v. Roldan:

Drug pushing when done on a small level x x x belongs to that class of crimes that may be

committed at anytime and at any place. After the offer to buy is accepted and the exchange is

made, the illegal transaction is completed in a few minutes. The fact that the parties are in a

public place and in the presence of other people may not always discourage them from pursuing

their illegal trade these factors may even serve to camouflage the same. Hence, the Court has

sustained the conviction of drug pushers caught selling illegal drugs in a billiard hall, in front of a

store, along a street at 1:45 p.m., and in front of a house.23

It is also argued as impossible to believe that even if there was already a deal between the

informant and accused-appellants, it was the apprehending police officer who acted as the buyer

and that he requested to see the shabu first before showing the money. These claims by Talib are

similarly undeserving of consideration. First, there is no uniform method by which drug pushers

and their buyers operate. Second, the choice of effective ways to apprehend drug dealers is within

the ambit of police authority. Police officers have the expertise to determine which specific

approaches are necessary to enforce their entrapment operations.24 Third, as long as they enjoy

credibility as witnesses, the police officers' account of how the buy-bust operation transpired is

entitled to full faith and credit. 25 Lastly, these arguments are merely incidental and do not affect

the elements of the crime which have been, in the instant case, sufficiently established.

Talib also alleges that during his testimony, SPO1 Furog was not certain as to the reason he was

apprehending Musa. Another claim is that SPO1 Furog, when examined by the prosecutor and two

different defense lawyers, allegedly made re levant inconsistencies in his testimony. The pertinentexchange reads:

Direct Examination of SPO1 Furog:

Prosecutor Weis:

Q What was your basis for stopping [Musa] from letting the car go?

A I made him [stop] the car[.] [W]e [had] to check them first because I think Ayao saw [that] Ara

[had] the suspected shabu.

Cross-Examination of SPO1 Furog:

Atty. Estrada

Q When you arrested Musa as you said, it was because he attempted to drive the car away, that

was it?

A The most, when SPO3 Sangki Ara told us that he was a PNP member and when we saw the

substances from the two of them first.

x x x x

Q You are referring to Musa and Ara?

A Yes sir.26

x x x xAtty. Javines

Q Ayao did not arrest [Ara] inside the vehicle?

A Only I rushed to the vehicle. I don't know if he directly arrested him when he saw the substance

and [got] out of the vehicle but I saw him get out from the vehicle.27

The alleged inconsistencies in SPO1 Furog's "reason for apprehending Musa" are, however,

insignificant and do not merit much consideration as well. The questioned parts in the testimony

of SPO1 Furog do not dent the totality of evidence against accused-appellants. To repeat, the

elements of the crime of illegal sale of drugs and illegal possession of drugs were both sufficiently

established. Although SPO1 Furog was not categorical in explaining his basis for apprehending

Musa, the arrest of the latter must be considered as part of a legitimate buy-bust operation which

was consummated. Musa's arrest came after the pre-arranged signal was given to the back-up

team and this served as basis for the police officers to apprehend all those in the vehicle,

including Musa.

Denial of Demurrer to Evidence

Although alleged by accused-appellants Ara and Musa, no reason was given in the appeal as to

why the trial court erred in denying their Demurrer to Evidence. Whatever their basis may be, anaction on a demurrer or on a motion to dismiss rests on the sound exercise of judicial

discretion.28 In Gutib v. CA,29 we explained that:













































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A demurrer to evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the

evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make

out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole

evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a

demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence t o

sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt.

Here, the trial court found competent and sufficient evidence to support a conviction of all three

accused-appellants. We see no reason to overturn the trial court's finding.

Allegation of Conspiracy in Information Not Necessary

We find no merit in accused-appellants' insistence that conspiracy should have been alleged inthe separate Informations indicting them. We agree with the appellate court, which succinctly

stated that conspiracy was not alleged "precisely because they were charged with different

offenses for the distinct acts that each of them committed. One's possession of an illegal drug

does not need to be conspired by another who, on his part, also possessed an illegal drug. "30 The

three separate indictments against Ara, Musa, and Talib do not need to allege conspiracy, for the

act of conspiring and all the elements of the crime must be set forth in the complaint or

information only when conspiracy is charged as a crime.31

Requirements of RA 9165 on Proper Inventory

Musa contends that since the markings on the seized items were only made at the police station,

there is a great possibility that these were replaced. The result, he argues, would be a lack of

guarantee that what were inventoried and photographed at the crime laboratory were the same

specimens confiscated from the accused.

As recently highlighted in People v. Cortez32 and People v. Lazaro, Jr. ,33 RA 9165 and its

subsequent Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do not require strict compliance as to the

chain of custody rule. The arrest of an accused will not be invalidated and the items seized from

him rendered inadmissible on the sole ground of non-compliance with Sec. 21, Article II of RA9165. We have emphasized that what is essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the

evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the

guilt or innocence of the accused."

Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR

relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a

serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy- bust operation.34

The chain of custody in the instant case did not suffer from serious flaws as accused-appellants

argue. The recovery and handling of the seized drugs showed that, as to Ara, first, PO1 Ayao

recovered six plastic sachets of white crystalline substance from Ara and marked them with both

his and Ara's initials. Second, the sachets were likewise signed by property custodian PO3

Pelenio. Third, PO1 Ayao signed a Request for Laboratory Examination then personally delivered

the sachets to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Fourth, SPO4 Mallorca then received

the sachets at the crime laboratory.

As to Musa, first, SPO1 Furog seized the sachets from Musa and marked each with his own

initials. Second, an Inventory of Property Seized was then made by SPO4 Galendez. Lastly, SPO1

Furog later submitted a Request for Laboratory Examination of the five (5) sachets weighing atotal of 14.2936 grams to the PNP Crime Laboratory.

As to Talib, first, PO2 Lao seized a small sachet from Talib during the buy-bust operation. Second,

PO2 Lao delivered a Request for Laboratory Examination of one (1) sachet of suspected shabu

weighing 0.3559 gram. Third, SPO4 Mallorca also received the items at the PNP Crime

Laboratory.

Forensic Chemist Noemi Austero's examination of the sachets confiscated from all accused-

appellants showed that these were positive for shabu. During trial, the seized items were

identified in court. The five (5) sachets taken from Musa were marked Exhibits "A-1" to "A-5,"

while the sachet seized from Talib was marked Exhibit "B." The six (6) sachets taken from Ara

were marked Exhibits "B1-B6."

We are, thus, satisfied that the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary

value of the shabu in all three criminal cases against accused-appellants.

The rest of the arguments interposed are evidently without merit and do not warrant discussion.Penalties Imposed

Criminal Case No. 51,472-2002 against Talib

The crime of illegal possession of drugs is punishable by Sec. 11 of RA 9165, as follows:

Sec. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - x x x

x x x x

3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from

Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if

the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of x x x methamphetamine

hydrochloride x x x.

Talib was sentenced to imprisonment of sixteen (16) ye ars and a fine of PhP 300,000.

Criminal Case No. 51,473-2002 against Musa

The provision Musa was charged of violating prov ides the following penalty:

(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to

Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride

or "shabu" is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;

Musa was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of PhP 400,000.Criminal Case No. 51,471-2002 against Ara

The crime of illegal sale of shabu is penalized by Sec. 5, Art. 11 of RA 9165:

SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of

Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals . - The penalty of life

imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to

Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by

law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in

transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless

of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

The same section contains the following provision:

If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of any

dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires within one hundred

(100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case.

Since the sale of shabu was within five (5) to six (6) meters from St. Peter's College, the maximum

penalty of death should be imposed on Ara. Pursuant to RA 9346 or "An Act Prohibiting the

Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," however, only life imprisonment and a fine shallbe meted on him.

Ara was sentenced to life imprisonment and a fine of PhP 10,000,000. He, however, is no longer

eligible for parole.





















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What distinguishes this case from others is that one of the accused-appellants was a police officer

himself who should have known better than to break the law he was duty-bound to enforce. What

is more, he is charged with the crime of selling illegal drugs, an offense so horrendous for

destroying the lives of its victims and their families that the penalty of death used to be imposed

on its perpetrators. No one could have been more deserving of such a punishment than someone

who should be enforcing the law but caught pushing drugs instead. As it was, the death penalty

was indeed originally imposed on SPO3 Ara, who had been in the service for more than 30

years.1avvphi1

The ill effects of the use of illegal drugs are too repulsive and shocking to enumerate. Thus, once

the charges of sale and possession of said drugs are established in cases such as this, any errorsor technicalities raised by the suspects should not be allowed to invalidate the actions of those

involved in curtailing their illegal activities. The punishments given to drug pushers should serve

as deterrent for others not to commit the same offense. No price seems high enough for drug

dealers to pay; it is just unfortunate that the penalty of death can no longer be imposed because it

has been abolished.

As the penalties meted out to all three accused-appellants are within the range provided by RA

9165, we affirm the CA's sentence.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00025B entitled

People of the Philippines v. SPO3 Sangki Ara y Mirasol, Mike Talib y Mama, Jordan Musa y Bayan

is AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant Sangki Ara is not eligible for parole.

SO ORDERED.


SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 185195 March 17, 2010

VIOLETA BAHILIDAD, Petitioner,

vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

NACHURA, J :

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan in

Criminal Case No. 28326, convicting petitioner Violeta Bahilidad and co-accused Amelia Carmela

C. Zoleta of the complex crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public

Documents.

Acting on a complaint filed by a "Concerned Citizen of Sarangani Province" with the Office of the

Ombudsman-Mindanao against Mary Ann Gadian, Amelia Carmela Zoleta, both assigned to the

Office of the Vice-Governor, and a certain Sheryll Desiree Tangan, from the Office of the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan, for their alleged participation in the scheme of giving fictitious grants

and donations using funds of the provincial government, a special audit was conducted in

Sarangani province. The Special Audit Team, created for the purpose, conducted its investigationfrom June 1 to July 31, 2003, and submitted the following findings:

1. Release of financial assistance intended to NGOs/POs and LGUs were fraudulently

and illegally made thus local development projects do not exist resulting in the loss

of P16,106,613.00 on the part of the government.

2. Financial Assistance were also granted to Cooperatives whose officials and members

were mostly government personnel or relative of the officials of Sarangani Province

resulting to wastage and misuse of government fund amounting to P2,246,481.00.2

Included in the list of alleged fictitious associations that benefited from the financial assistance

given to certain Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), People’s Organizations (POs), and Local

Governmental Units (LGUs) was Women in Progress (WIP), which received a check in the amount

of P20,000.00, issued in the name of herein pet itioner Bahilidad, as the Treasurer thereof.

Based on its findings, the Special Audit Team recommended the filing of charges of malversation

through falsification of public documents against the officials involved. Thus, the following

Information was filed:

That on January 24, 2002, or prior or subsequent thereto in Sarangani Province, Philippines, and

within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Felipe Katu Constantino, a high-rankingpublic officer, being the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sarangani, Maria D. Camanay, Provincial

Accountant, Teodorico F. Diaz, Provincial Board Member, Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta, Executive

Assistant III, all accountable public officials of the Provincial Government of Sarangani, by reason








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of the duties of their office, conspiring and confederating with Violeta Balihidad, private individual,

the public officers, while committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of their

respective positions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, convert and

misappropriate the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency, in

public funds under their custody, and for which they are accountable, by falsifying or causing to be

falsified the corresponding Disbursement Voucher No. 101-2002-01-822 and its supporting

documents, making it appear that financial assistance had been sought by Women in Progress,

Malungon, Sarangani, represented by its President Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta, when in truth and in

fact, the accused fully knew well that no financial assistance had been requested by the said

group and her association, nor did Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta and her association receive theaforementioned amount, thereby facilitating the release of the above-mentioned public funds in

the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) through encashment by the accused at

the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 36481 dated January 24, 2002 issued in the

name of Violeta Bahilidad, which amount they subsequently misappropriated to their personal

use and benefit and despite demand, the said accused failed to return the said amount to the

damage and prejudice of the government and the public interest of the aforesaid sum.

Upon arraignment, accused Constantino, Zoleta and Bahilidad pled not guilty to t he charges, while

Camanay and Diaz did not appear and remain at large to date. Thereafter, during the pendency of

the case, Constantino died. Consequently, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to dismiss the

case against him. As regards Zoleta and Bahilidad, they posted bail and the case against them

proceeded to trial.

The prosecution presented in evidence the testimonies of the following persons:

1. Helen Cailing, a State Auditor IV at the Commission on Audit (COA) and leader of the

Special Audit Team (SAT) of Sarangani Province. Cailing testified that the SAT,

composed of herself and three (3) members, in the course of the audit, discovered that

the voucher issued by the Office of the Vice-Governor to the WIP violated specific COAGuidelines 3.1, 3.2, 3.4, 3.7, 3.10 and 4.4. The guidelines required the monitoring,

inspection and evaluation of the project by the provincial engineer if an infra-project and

by the provincial agriculturist if it is a livelihood project. Cailing further testified that,

based on their audit, WIP appeared to be headed by Zoleta, who was the daughter of

Vice-Governor Constantino, and simultaneously an Executive Assistant III in the latter’s

office.

2. Luttian Tutoh, Region XII Director of the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA),

testified on the certification3 she issued that WIP and Women in Development (WID)

were not registered cooperatives. Tutoh further testified that (1) the certification was

based on the listing prepared b y the Assistant Regional Director; (2) the Cert ification was

issued upon the instruction of the CDA Chairman, who received an inquiry from the

Office of the Ombudsman on whether WIP and/or WID were cooperatives registered with

the CDA; and (3) she had not come across a registered cooperative named WIP.

3. Mary Ann Gadian, Bookbinder II, designated as Computer Operator III at the Office of

the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Sarangani from July 1993 to Augu st 2002, who acted

as state witness, admitted in open court that she took part in the preparation and

processing of a disbursement voucher and its supporting documents involving a cash

advance for WIP sometime in 2002. Gadian, likewise, testified that she saw accused

Constantino, Camanay, Diaz, and Zoleta sign the documents, and she merely followed

Zoleta’s directive and instructions on the preparation of the disbursement voucher.

Gadian further admitted antedating and changing the date of a January 24, 2002 letter-

request from WIP to January 7, 2002 in order to make the letter appear authentic.

4. Sheryll Desiree Jane Tangan, Local Legislative Staff at the Office of the Vice-Governor

in 2002, who also acted as state witness, admitted in open court that, upon orders of

Zoleta, she helped prepare and process the request of WIP. Tangan disclosed that she

was used to signing for other persons, as instructed by Zoleta, whenever their office had

legal transactions; in this instance, she forged the signature of Melanie Remulta, the

purported secretary of WIP. Tangan then recounted that she accompanied petitioner

Bahilidad to claim and encash the check for WIP. After encashment, Bahilidad gave hera white envelope containing the P20,000.00 cash. She noticed Bahalidad’s uneasiness.

She was told by Zoleta that Bahilidad was merely a dummy for that disbursement.

Tangan gave the money to Zoleta who told her that she would take care of Bahalidad.

The defense presented, as witnesses Bahilidad, Zoleta and Remulta. On the whole, the defense

denied the prosecution’s charge of malversation. The witnesses testified that WIP and WID were

registered cooperatives. To support her contention that WIP and WID were legitimate

cooperatives, Bahilidad presented a Certification from Barangay Captain Jose Mosquera

containing a list of the supposed officers of these cooperatives. Bahilidad insisted that the

amount of P20,000.00 that she received from the Office of the Vice-Governor was, in turn,

properly distributed by WIP as loans to its members. Remulta corroborated Bahilidad’s story on

this point. As for Zoleta, she completely denied knowing Bahilidad.

After trial, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner Bahilidad and Zoleta guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public Documents, and disposed, as

follows:

ACCORDINGLY, accused Amelia C. Zoleta ("Zoleta") and Violeta Bahilidad ("Bahilidad"), are found

guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of PublicDocuments under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 171[,] par[.] 2[,] and

Article 48 of the same Code and are sentenced to suffer in prison the penalty of 14 years[,] 8

months and 1 day to 16 years[,] 5 months and 11 days of reclusion temporal. They also have to

suffer perpetual disqualification from holding any public office and to pay back the Province of

Sarangani the amount of Php 20,000.00 plus interest on it computed from January 2002 until the

full amount is paid.

No pronouncement is made for or against Constantino, said accused having died during the

pendency of this case, his personal and pecuniary penalties and liabilities were totally

extinguished upon his death. This Court has already ordered the dismissal of the case against

him.

Since the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the other accused, Teodorico Diaz

and Maria Camanay, the case as it pertains to them is in the meantime archived. It shall be

revived when the Court acquires jurisdiction over their person. Let an alias warrant of arrest be

then issued against them.

Costs against accused Zoleta and Bahilidad.4

Hence, this appeal by Bahilidad, questioning her conviction by the Sandiganbayan.

We find for petitioner.

Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of the trial court are given great respect. But when

there is a misappreciation of facts as to compel a contrary conclusion, the Court will not hesitate









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to reverse the factual findings of the trial court. In such a case, the scales of justice must tilt in

favor of an accused, considering that he stands to lose his liberty by virtue of his conviction. The

Court must be satisfied that the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court, leading to an

accused’s conviction, must satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.

In the instant case, petitioner was found guilty of conspiring with Zoleta and other public officials

in the commission of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public

Documents. The trial court relied on the dictum that the act of one is the act of all. The

Sandiganbayan explained petitioner’s complicity in the crime, to wit:

The facts taken together would prove the existence of conspiracry. Zoleta, as president of an

inexistent association and a co-terminus employee at the office of her father, [accusedConstantino,] initiated the request for obligation of allotments and certified and proved the

disbursement voucher. There is no doubt that accused Constantino facilitated the illegal release

of the funds by signing the questioned voucher. Without the signatures of accused Constantino,

Zoleta and Bahilidad, the amount could not have been disbursed on that particular day. When the

voucher with its supporting documents was presented t o accused Constantino, Diaz and Camanay

for approval and signature, they readily signed them without further ado, despite the lack of

proper documentation and non-compliance of the rules. Zoleta had contact with the payee of the

check, Bahilidad, and received the amount. Their combined acts, coupled with the falsification of

the signature of Remulta, all lead to the conclusion that the accused conspired to defraud the

government.


of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by d irect evidence and may be

inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime,

which are indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. In

conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Conspiracy is present when one concurs with the

criminal design of another, indicated by the performance of an overt act leading to the crimecommitted. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.

The circumstances that Zoleta placed her initials on the voucher knowing that there was really no

WIP, that the other accused likewise signified their approval to the disbursement and allowed

payment, and that payee received and encashed the check out of the fund of the provincial

government instead of depositing it, shows that there was connivance between the accused. The

unavoidable conclusion is that the accused were in cahoots to defraud the provincial government

and to camouflage the defraudation by using a dummy organization as a payee.5

There is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the

commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical

acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable

doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from

the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken

together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to show the community of criminal

design. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an

offense. Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the part of the cohorts. 6

It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect

contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active

participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to

his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral

ascendancy over the other co-conspirators.7 Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the

discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not

enough for purposes of conviction.81avvphi1

In the instant case, we find petitioner’s participation in the crime not adequately proven with

moral certainty. Undeniably, petitioner, as a private individual, had no hand in the preparation,

processing or disbursement of the check issued in her name. A cursory look at the disbursement

voucher (No. 101-2002-01-822) reveals the following signatures: signature of Board Member

Teodorico Diaz certifying that the cash advance is necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct

supervision; signature of Provincial Accountant Camanay certifying to the completeness and

propriety of the support ing documents and to the liquidation of previous cash adv ances; signatureof Moises Magallona, Jr. over the name of Provincial Treasurer Cesar M. Cagang certifying that

cash is available; signature of Constantino, with the initials of Zoleta adjacent to his name,

certifying that the disbursement is approved for payment, and with petitioner’s signature as the

payee.9

The SAT reported that the check was payable to the alleged Treasurer, Bahalidad, instead of to

Women in Progress; that the check was encashed when it should have been for deposit only; and

that there was also failure of the provincial agriculturist to monitor and submit an evaluation

report on the project.10 Based on this SAT report, the Sandiganbayan particularly pointed to

petitioner’s indispensable participation in the crime, being the payee of the check, because

without her signature, the check would not have been encashed, and the funds would not have

been taken from the coffers of the provincial government. Other than her being named as the

payee, however, there were no overt acts attributed to her adequate to hold her equally guilty of

the offense proved. There was no showing that petitioner had a hand in the preparation of the

requirements submitted for the disbursement of the check. There was no evidence presented that

she was instrumental to the issuance of the check in favor of WIP, nor was there any showing that

she interceded for the approval of the check. Why the check was issued in her name and not inthe name of WIP is beyond cavil, but this was not incumbent upon her to question.

On being informed by Melanie Remulta that WIP’s request for financial assistance was granted,

petitioner went to the provincial capitol to claim the check, because the check was issued in her

name as the Treasurer of WIP. She later encashed the check and distributed the proceeds to the

different members of WIP. There were acknowledgment receipts dated February 7, 2002, signed

by the different members of the cooperative, in varying amounts of P3,000.00, P2,000.00

and P500.00, all of which prove that the amount of P20,000.00 was disbursed for the benefit of

the members of the cooperative.11

The Sandiganbayan faulted petitioner for immediately encashing the check, insisting that she

should have deposited the check first. Such insistence is unacceptable. It defies logic. The check

was issued in petitioner’s name and, as payee, she had the authority to encash it. The

Disbursement Voucher (No. 101-2002-01-822) clearly states that she is the WIP treasurer, and

the purpose of the voucher is "to cash advance financial assistance from grants and donations for

Winds Malugon, Sarangani as per supporting papers hereto attached." Petitioner’s action cannot,

in itself, be considered as specious. There was no showing that petitioner had foreknowledge of

any irregularity committed in the processing and disbursement of the check ,12 or that the COA

Rules required that the check had to be deposited in the bank first, or that an evaluation report

from the provincial agriculturist had to be submitted. Evil intent must unite with the unlawful act

for a crime to exist. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the

































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criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to particular facts, honest

and real, will exempt the do er from felonious responsibility.13

All told, there is reasonable doubt as to petitioner’s guilt. Where there is reasonable doubt, an

accused must be acquitted even though his innocence may not have been fully established. When

guilt is not proven with moral certainty, exoneration must be granted as a matter of right.14

Finally, we reiterate what we have long enjoined:

Time and time again, this Court has emphasized the need to stamp out graft and corr uption in the

government. Indeed, the tentacles of greed must be cut and the offenders punished. However, this

objective can be accomplished only if the evidence presented by the prosecution passes the test

of moral certainty. Where doubt lingers, as in this case, the Court is mandated to uphold thepresumption of innocence guaranteed by our Constitution to the accused.15

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is

ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.











