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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO, CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL.

LUISITO SANCHEZ, LTC. ROMELINO GOJO, LTC. ARSENIO TECSON, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ, LTC. TIBURCIO

FUSILLERO, LTC. ERICSON AURELIO, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS,MAJ. CESAR DE LA PERA, MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO, CAPT. DANILO

LIM, CAPT . ELMER AMON, CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,

vs.

GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S.

MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and

GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA,

COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO

T. MALLILLIN, respondents.

No. 95020 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA, COL. HERMIMO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY

FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT . FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, petitioners,

vs.

HON. MIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Q.C., LTC. JACINTO LIGOT

PA., respondents.

No. 96948 August 2, 1991

B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN. MARCELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO PN, CAPT. MANUEL ISON PN,

LTC. ROMELINO GOJO PN (M), LTC. ARSENIO TECSON PA, LTC. RAFAEL GALVEZ PA, LTC. TIBURCIO FUSILLERO PA,

LTC. ERICSON AURELIO PA, LTC. JACINTO LIGOT PA, LTC. FRANKLIN BRAWNER PA, MAJ. ALFREDO OLIVEROS PA,

MAJ. CESAR DE LA PENA PN (M): MAJ. LEUVINO VALENCIA PA, CAPT. FLORENCIO FLORES PA, CAPT. JAIME JUNIO

PA, CAPT. DANILO LIM PA, CAPT. ELMER AMON PAF CAPT. VERGEL NACINO, and LT. JOEY SARROZA, petitioners,

vs.

B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A. MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI COL. WILLY

FLORENDO, COL. DIONY A. VENTURA, and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN PRESIDENT AND MEMBERS OF

GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL NO. 14, respondents.

No. 97454 August 2, 1991

AFP CHIEF OF STAFF LT. GEN. RODOLFO BIAZON, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJOR GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,

PNP DIRECTOR GENERAL MAJOR GEN. CESAR NAZARENO and LT. COL. ALBERTO OLARIO, Commanding Officer of

the PNP/INP Detention Center/Jail, pet

vs.

HON. ANTONIO P. SOLANO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, CAPTAIN REYN

RAFAEL, 1 LT SERVANDO A. BAOANAN PN(M), 1 LT. WILFREDO JIMENEZ PAF 1 LT. ATANACIO T. MACA

PMM 2LT ELISEO T. RASCO PC, 2LT JONAS CALLEJA PC, 2LT JAIRUS JS GELVEZON III PMM 2LT JOSELITO CA

PMM 2LT MEMEL ROJAS PN(M) and 2LT HERMINIO L. CANTACO PC, respondents.

Armando M. Marcelo and Rainier L. Madrid for petitioners Luisito Sanchez, Tiburcio Fusillero, Ericson

Levino Valencia, Danilo Arnon Vergel Nacino, Florencio Flores, Benigno Junio and Joey Sarroza.

Manuel Q. Malvar for Rafael Galvez and Danny Lim.

Manuel E. Valenzuela for Arsenio Tecson

Mariano R. Santiago for Alfredo Oliveros.

Ricardo J.M. Rivera for Manuel Ison.

Castillo, Laman, Tan and Pantaleon for Danilo Pizarro.

Alfredo Lazaro for Romelino Gojo.

Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. for Jose Comendador.

Jonathan B.S. Rebong and Efren C. Carag for Marcelo Blando.

Pablito V. Sanidad for Franklin Brawner and Ericson Aurelio.

Efren C. Moncupa for All Tecson.

M.M. Lazaro & Associates for respondents Ligot and Ison .

Baldomero S.P. Gatbonton, Jr. for Jacinto Ligot.

Salvador B. Britanico for Cesar de la Pena.

Gilbert R.T. Reyes for Danilo Pizarro.

Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas for petitioners in G.R. No. 93177.

The Solicitor General for respondents.


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CRUZ, J.:p

These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties and related issues

arising from the same incident.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 are

officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for their alleged participation in the failed coup

d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.

The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an

Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code

(Murder).

In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are questioning the conduct

of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the charges against them and the creation of

the General Court Martial GCM convened to try them.

In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14, seek certiorari against its

ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.

In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are assailed

oncertiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and no authority either to set aside its

ruling denying bail to the private respondents.

In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in a

petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents. Jurisdictional objections are likewise

raised as in G.R. No. 95020.

I

Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had been constituted

pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and

96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the

petitioners, to wit:

You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial Investigating

Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon City, then and there tosubmit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial

investigation of the charge/charges against you for violence of AWs _______________. DO

NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.

Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified

deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.

On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn statem

witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.

At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds, promptin

Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing This was done through a Mo

Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.

In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the petitioners 5 danotice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses.

On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial and the P

gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was done on March 14,1990.

The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Articl

71, which provides:

Art. 71. Charges Action upon. Charges and specifications must be signed by a

subject to military law, and under the oath either that he has personal knowledge o

investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are true in fact, to the

his knowledge and belief.

No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thoroimpartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include i

as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and what dis

of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At such investiga

opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him if t

available and to present anything he may desire in his own behalf, either in def

mitigation, and the investigating officer shall examine available witnesses requeste

accused. If the charges are forwarded after such investigation, they shall be accompa

a statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplie

They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that no pro

witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for summary dismissal was den

motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date and they have not been able to submit their c

affidavits.

At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were exercis

right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of GCM No.14. They invoked A

of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory challenges ha

discontinued under P.D. No. 39.


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In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM

No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition

for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary injunction. After

considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and members of GCM No.14, Judge

Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional liberty to Ligot.

On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and to declare in

contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said order. He later also complained that

Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him "pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to

this Court.

After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of intervenors Ltc

Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later of additional intervenors Ltc

Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.

On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:

(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to all

persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing court-

martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court- Martial No. 14

denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail does not

apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that there is no

precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent General Court-

Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the applications of bail of the

petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include other persons facing charges before

General Court-Martial No. 14.

Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No. 14,

this Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner Jacinto Ligot

as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.

On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a petition for habeas

corpuson the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred

to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding

after hearing that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their

arrest, the trial court ordered their release.

II

The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.

It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities to present their

side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the

denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-

affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again a

submit in writing. This they did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel

to recommend that the charges be referred to the General Court Martial for trial.

The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the investigat

resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-affidavits. They had been e

warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on t

above specified shall be deemed a waiver of (their) right to submit controverting evidence." They chos

heed the warning. As their motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the

to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense.

Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed

deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.

There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel. Mor eover, it is now

that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court- martial of juris

We so held in Arula v. Espino,1thus:

xxx xxx xxx

But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a genera

martial of jurisdiction.

The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not man

and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U

93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:

We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by A

(The Philippine counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth

can properly be construed as an indispensable pre-requisite

exercise of the Army General court martial jurisdiction.. The Arti

serve important functions in the administration of court

procedures and does provide safeguards to an accused. Its lan

clearly such that a defendant could object to trial in the absenc

required investigation. In that event the court-martial cou

postpone trial pending the investigation. And the military re

authorities could consider the same contention, reversing a court

conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has subs

injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress inte

make otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void becatrial investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by Ar

That Congress has not required analogous pre-trial procedure f

court-martial is an indication that the investigatory plan was not i

to be exalted to the jurisdictional level.


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xxx xxx xxx

Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General

of the Army did hold that where there had been no pre-trial

investigation, court-martial proceedings were void ab initio. But this

holding has been expressly repudiated in later holdings of the Judge

Advocate General. This later interpretation has been that the pre-trial

requirements of Article 70 are directory, not mandatory, and in no way

effect the jurisdiction of a court-martial. The War Department's

interpretation was pointedly called to the attention of Congress in 1947

after which Congress amended Article 70 but left unchanged the

language here under consideration. compensable pre-requisite to theexercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction

A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under

article of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might

nevertheless have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in

criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary investigation

does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.

As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was resolved more than

two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa,2where we declared:

The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial

compliance with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D. No. 77,

as amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer, were signed by Maj. Antonio

Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had investigated the matter through an

evaluation of the pertinent records, including the reports of respondent AFP Board of

Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the testimonies on record. The charge sheets

were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser," in accordance with and in the manner provided

under Art. 71 of the Articles of War. Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No.

911, is only of suppletory application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the

manner provided under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has

personally examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and

understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial

investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to P.D. No.

77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required to file their

counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled pleading seeking the

dismissal of the charges against them. That petitioners were not able to confront the

witnesses against them was their own doing, for they never even asked Maj. Baldonado tosubpoena said witnesses so that they may be made to answer clarificatory questions in

accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911.

The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article 8 of the

of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the body, was not signed by Gen. Re

Villa as Chief of Staff.

Article of War No. 8 reads:

Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Sta

Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered

President, the commanding officer of a major command or task force, the comm

officer of a division, the commanding officer of a military area, the superintenden

Military Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade or body of troo

appoint general courts-martial; but when any such commander is the accuser

prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be appointed by s

competent authority. ...

While it is true that General Order No. M -6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt that he au

it because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De Villa" and it has not been show

spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De

Chief of Staff, AFP, actually constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is sig

that General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as he

certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as the principal respo

G.R. No. 93177, he sustained General Order No. M 6 in the Comment filed for him and the other respon

the Solicitor General.

Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for under A

of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on June 12, 1948, to wit:

Art. 18. Challenges. Members of general or special courts-martial may be challe

the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court. The cou

determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a challenge to mo

one member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate shall ordinarily be pr

and decided before those by the accused are offered. Each side shall be entitled

peremptory challenge, but the law member of the court shall not be challenged ex

cause.

The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro,3thus:

In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in

Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), exce

handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military anacademies who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete de

officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps of the de

army was numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly military aspect

national defense program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that pere


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challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in

any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act

No. 408), as worded on September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no

mention or reference to any peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a

court- martial or by the accused. After December 17,1958, when the Manual for Courts-

Martial of the Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of the

Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and education in

military law, encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines. This program was

pursued until the outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the

formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer corps of the Armed Forces of the

Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a great many of the officers had been

indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental circumstances that Article of War18 was amended on June 12,1948 to entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with

the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be challenged except for cause.

On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief of Staff of the

Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as

may be referred to them.

On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition, Jurisdiction,

Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree disallowed the peremptory challenge,

thus:

No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges fo r cause may be entertained to insure

impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and determined by a

majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote does not disqualify the

challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall be immediately replaced.

On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security Code, which was a

compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies intended "to meet the continuing

threats to the existence, security and stability of the State." The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39

was embodied in this decree.

On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the state of martial

law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 and declared the dissolution of

the military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final determination of the cases pending therein.

P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders mentioned therein. With

the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for

the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself

ceases.Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the maxim ratio legis est

anima: the reason of law is its soul.

Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D. No. 39 b

ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the issuance of Proclamation No. 20

result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now agai

the right to peremptory challenge.

We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory challenge

withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was itself withdrawn when martial

lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer op

having been cast out under the new dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one

"iniquitous vestiges of the previous regime.

The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious that the

government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action against the acc used offic

The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited by a respo

a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved Punishment. It is hoped that the

officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated. At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the

present circumstances, is a matter addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court. The judiciary

interpret and apply the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a prob

the political departments can resolve.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for certiorari and ma

and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents with the Regional Trial Courts of Que

It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violation

Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere

court-martial proceedings.

The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is vested with "e

appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Tria

and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petition

cite the case of Yang v. Court of Appeals4where this Court held that "appeals from the Professional Re

Commission are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.

It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals and no

remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts.

In Martelino, we observed as follows:

It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power o

proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true tha

exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an a

discretion what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discre


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as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point at issue in this action

suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .

The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over

petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts and other bodies and on petitions

forhabeas corpus and quo warranto.5In the absence of a law providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a

court-martial or the Office of the Chief of Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the

Supreme Court, we hold that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.

We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has traditionally not been

recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights.

This much was suggested in Ar ula, where we observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis inthe military where the right to bail does not exist.

The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from

the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.

Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the

framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the

government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of

revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities

outside of and against the existing political system.

xxx xxx xxx

National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that release

on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario of say 1,000

putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25,1990 Order

were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is already discomforting. But,

the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which

could very well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this

Honorable Court, and replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of

government and justice.

The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection clause is not

acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things similarly situated and does not

apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially different from others. The accused officers can

complain if they are denied bail and other members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have beendiscriminated against because they are not allowed the same ri ght that is extended to civilians.

On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been charged after m

one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial compliance with the requirement

process and the right to a speedy trial.

The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and was referred

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was heard on February 26, 1991

respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the charge memorandum and specifications aga

private respondents dated January 30, 1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91

panel was created and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20

the private respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications and were r

to submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was indeed a delay of more than on

the investigation and preparation of the charges against the private respondents. However, this was eby the Solicitor General thus:

... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge inves

only after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted me

involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses, had to be intervie

investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The pre-charge investigat

rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved were dispersed and sc

throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command units, such as the Scout Range

already been disbanded. After the charges were completed, the same still had to pas

and approval by the AFP Chief of Staff.

While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following admonition:

This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point thaparticipation of petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on o

Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed

him or the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military comm

wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon (now Gen

release petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if a military o

arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite confinemen

sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps must be taken to

person accused or to dissmiss the charge and release him. Any officer who is respon

unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the case to a final conclusion may e

punished as a court martial may direct.6

It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February 26, 19

government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for reconsideration, the latter was ult

denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48- hour period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of t

of Court did not run until after notice of such denial was received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Cto the private respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become final and executory w

special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this Court on March 12, 1991.

III


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7

Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations of the Court in

Arula:

The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and discretion

(AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on jurisdictional

grounds because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by

him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment

which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an abuse of discretion is not

sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ ofcertiorari.

As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave abuse of discretion or

without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court and the reversal of the actscomplained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated, however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the

right to peremptory challenge should not have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the

private respondents should not have been ordered released.

ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the petition is

GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory

challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED,

and the orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET

ASIDE. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,

Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Facts: The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 who are officers of the AFP were directed to appear in

person before the Pre-Trial Investigating Officers for the alleged participation the failed coup on December 1 to

9, 1989. Petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated by Article of

War 71. A motion for dismissal was denied. Now, their motion for reconsideration. Alleging denial of due

process.

In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was denied by GCM

No.14. He filed with the RTC a petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writof preliminary injunction. Judge of GCM then granted the provisional liberty. However he was not released

immediately. The RTC now declared that even military men fac ing court martial proceedings can avail the right to

bail.

The private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with SC a petition for habeas corpus on the ground th

were being detained in Camp Crame without charges. The petition was referred to RTC. Finding after

that no formal charges had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, t

court ordered their

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not there was a denial of due

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the accused right to

Held: NO denial of due process. P etitioners were given several opportunities to present their side at the

investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12, 1990, and then again after the denial of their

of February 21, 1990, when they were given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On th

they filed instead a verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writi

had been expressly warned in the subpoena that "failure to submit counter-affidavits on the date specif

be deemed a waiver of their right to submit controverting evidence." Petitioners have a right to pre-e

challenge. (Right to challenge validity of members of

It is argued that since the private respondents are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violation

Articles of War, the respondent courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere

court-martial proceedings. This is without merit. * The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction w

Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against

courts and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpus and quo w

The right to bail invoked by the private respondents has traditionally not been recognized and is not ava

the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. The right to a speedy tria

more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not

On the contention that they had not been charged after more than one year from their arrest, th

substantial compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial. The AFP

Investigating Committee was able to complete the pre-charge investigation only after one year

hundreds of officers and thousands of enlisted men were involved in the failed

Accordingly, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. In G.R. No. 96948, the pe

granted, and the respondents are directed to allow the petitioners to exercise the right of peremptory c

under article 18 of the articles of war. In G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also granted,


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8

orders of the respondent courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby reversed and set aside. No

costs.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995

MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233

on November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion forreconsideration thereof, are challenged by petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this appeal

by certiorari through a petition which raises issues centering mainly on said petitioner's right to be

admitted to bail.

On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-conspirator

in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of

Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of

which petitioner was the mayor at the time. The original information, filed on October 6, 1986 with the

Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City,1

had initially indicted for multiple murder eight accused suspect,

namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, J ulito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And

Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet

Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended,

tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have remained at large

up to the present.2

In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an amended

information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As herein petitioner was

his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the former's services as counsel in said

case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary investigation therein, said accused, in a signed

dated March 30, 1989 but which he later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner

supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag family.3

Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case

resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor, desig

replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary inves

and prosecution of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new prosecuto

September 6, 1989, petitioner was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a

amended information dated October 6, 1992. Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein as a co-

all the way to this Court in G.R. No. 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Fra

Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan en banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained the f iling of the

amended information against him.4

Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest wa

petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner through counsel,

October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court which set the same for hea

November 5, 1992. Petitioner duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor He

Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin G

On November 5, 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the application for bail. Four of pet

counsel appeared in court but only Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Region

Prosecution's Office appeared for the prosecution.5

As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to

costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person

client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purp

said hearing of his bail application, he considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor A

the other hand, informed the trial court that in accordance with the directive of the chief

office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither suppor

opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the same to the sound discretio

trail judge.6

Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiv

further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated November 5, 1992,

court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following day, November

petitioner, apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then, managed to personally

before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was the

arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and attended all the sch

court hearings of the case.7

The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later on November 2

by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition for admission to bail on the day

hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993,

than six (6) months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals th


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9

special civil action for certiorari. Thus were the resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to

petitioner annulled on November 24, 1993, in the decision now under review, on the ground that they were

tainted with grave abuse of discretion.8

Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner's application for bail, he was

not yet "in the custody of the law," apparently because he filed his motion for admission to bail before

he was actually arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. It further noted that apart from the

circumstance that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence

of guilt was strong as borne out by the fact that no bail was recommended by the prosecution, for

which reasons it held that the grant of bail was doubly improvident. Lastly, the prosecution, according

to respondent court, was not afforded an opportunity to oppose petitioner's application for bail

contrary to the requirements of due process. Hence, this appeal.

Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez etc., et

al.,9

his filing of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial court effectively conferred on the latter

jurisdiction over his person. In short, for all intents and purposes, he was in the custody of the law. In

petitioner's words, the "invocation by the accused of the court's jurisdiction by filing a pleading in court

is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction over the person of the accused and bring him within the

custody of the law."

Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record negates the existence of such strong

evidence as would bar his provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the prosecution, by reason of the

waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further presentation of evidence to oppose the application for bail

and whose representation in court in behalf of the prosecution bound the latter, cannot legally assert

any claim to a denial of procedural due process. Finally, petitioner points out that the special civil

action for certiorari was filed in respondent court after an unjustifiable length of time.

On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable and the equities involved in this case, the Court

finds for petitioner.

1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release of a person in

custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any court

as required under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused

from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial.10

As bail

is intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody

over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary

surrender.11

As this Court has put it in a case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is

free."12

The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious

practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing

the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements

therefor.13

Thus, inFeliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al.,14

where the petitioner who had been charged

with kidnapping with murder went into hiding without surrendering himself, and shortly thereafter

filed a motion asking the court to fix the amount of the bail bond for his release pending t

Supreme Court categorically pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for admission to b

As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been arrested, detained, o

wise deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle extende

right to bail. The person seeking his provisional release under the auspices of bail need not ev

for a formal complaint or information to be filed against him as it is available to "all persons"

the offense is bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the condition or limitation that the a

is in the custody of the law.16

On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arreste

by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arresSection 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedur

when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering

proper authorities.17

in this light, the ruling, vis-a-vis the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez,

al.,18

should be explained.

In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the An

and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an "Urgent Ex-parte M

Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital recuperat

serious physical injuries which she sustained in a major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she ex

sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction

Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings." On the basis of

partemotion and the peculiar circumstances obtaining in that incident, the Sandiganbayan au

petitioner to post a cash bail bond for her provisional liberty without need of her personal app

in view of her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration.

When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order against her, she question the jur

of that court over her person in a recourse before this Court, on the ground that "she neith

arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly pos

since she never personally appeared before said court" In rejecting her arguments, the Court h

she was clearly estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for by h

representations in the urgentex parte motion for bail she had earlier recognized such juris

Furthermore, by actually posting a cash bail was accepted by the court, she had effectively su

to its jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the matter of bail, the Court took pains to r

that the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the

authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.

In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for ad

to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that poin

the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally under custodin the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with t

court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submi

person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which th

granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arre


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10

merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.19

The latter mode may be

exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined to

quarters" or restricted to the military camp area.

It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it known to the

prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally appear as he

was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis,

and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court,

notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger

to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. C ertainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort

to place petitioner in the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and

under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement orplacing him under guard.

The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law. Apparently,

both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never attempted to have him

physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his

person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true

information of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the

jurisdiction of the said c ourt. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest

had been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the

law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the

submission application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.

At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement at the hospital on account of an

acute ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they were easily verifiable. And, as a

manifestation of his good faith and of his actual recognition of the authority of trial court, petitioner's

counsel readily informed the court that they were surrendering custody of petitioner to the president

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Misamis Oriental Chapter.20

In other words, the motion for

admission to bail was filed not for the purpose or in the manner of the former practice which the law

proscribes for the being derogatory of the authority and jurisdiction of the courts, as what had

happened in Feliciano. There was here no intent or strategy employed to obtain bail in absentia and

thereby be able to avoid arrest should the application therefore be denied.

2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all indictees shall be

allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of

guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in c ustody

shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its

personal nature21

and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from

the presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at theoutset since after trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable

doubt.22

Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an ac

entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances w

accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua

imprisonment23

and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper applica

admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same

hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now

2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the par

court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be sum

otherwise in the discretion of the court,24

is required with the participation of both the defense an

notified representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is

for the provisional liberty of the applicant.25

Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to sh

the evidence meets the required quantum.26

Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be give an opportu

present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce before the court may

the application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due process.27

If the prosecution is den

opportunity, there would be a denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of which the court's

respect of the motion or petition is void.28

At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully cross -exam

witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal.29

When, eventu

court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the evidenc

prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.30

The court,

cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely objected to, f or these represent only

evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law requires.31

In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation of procedural due process w

court below allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecutor's Office to ap

behalf of the prosecution, instead of State Prosecutor Henrick P. Gingoyon who is claimed to be tgovernment prosecutor expressly authorized to handle the case and who received his copy of the motion

the day after the hearing had been conducted. Accordingly, the prosecution now insists that Prosecuto

had no authority at all to waive the presentation of any further evidence in opposition to the application

and to submit the matter to the sound discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue that the pros

was not afforded "reasonable time" to oppose that application for bail.

We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor acted as the collab

counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No. 86-39 on the basis of an author

then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was sent through radio message on July 10, 1992 a

received by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor on the same date. This authorization, which wa

continuing until and unless it was expressly withdrawn, was later c onfirmed and then withdrawn only on

1993 by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan questio

authority of Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to ent

appearance as collaborating government prosecutors in said criminal case.32

It was in fact by virtue

arrangement that the same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana entered their app

as collaborating prosecutor in the previous hearing in said case.33

Hence, on the strength of said authorit

its receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, through Prosecuto

could validly represent the prosecution in the hearing held on November 5, 1992.


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11

Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not familiar with the case, he

nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position of the Regional State Prosecutor's Office on

the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office received its copy of the motion on the very day when

it was sent, that is, October 28, 1992, duly instructed Prosecutor Abejo to manifest to the court that

the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were

submitting the matter to its sound discretion. Obviously, what this meant was that the prosecution, at

that particular posture of the case, was waiving the presentation of any c ountervailing evidence. When

the court a quo sought to ascertain whether or not that was the real import of the submission by

Prosecutor Abejo, the latter readily answered in the affirmative.

The following exchanges bear this out:

PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:

I was informed to appear in this case just now Your Honor.

COURT:

Where is your Chief of Office? Your office received a copy of the motion

as early as October 28. There is an element of urgency here.

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was only informed just now. The

one assigned here is State Prosecutor Perseverando Arena, Jr. who

unfortunately is in the hospital attending to his sick son. I do not know

about this but before I came I received an instruction from our Chief to

relay to this court the stand of the office regarding the motion to admit

bail. That office is neither supporting nor opposing it and we are

submitting to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court.

COURT:

Place that manifestation on record. For the record, Fiscal Abejo, would

you like to formally enter your appearance i n this matter?

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the Regional State Prosecutor's

Office represented by State Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo.

COURT:

By that manifestation do you want the Court to understand that i

at least, the prosecution is dispensing with the presentation of e

to show that the guilt of the accused is strong, the denial . . .

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.

COURT:

Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to submit the incident cov

this particular motion for resolution by this c ourt?

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

Yes, Your Honor.

COURT:

Without presenting any further evidence?

PROSECUTOR ABEJO:

Yes, Your Honor.34

It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of Region

prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the motion for bail and this shoul

notwithstanding the statement that they were "neither supporting nor opposing" the motion.

of significance is the manifestation that the prosecution was "submitting (the motion) to th

discretion of the Honorable Court." By that, it could not be any clearer. The prosecution was dis

with the introduction of evidence en contra and this it did at the proper forum and stag

proceedings, that is, during the mandatory hearing for bail and after the trial court had fully

itself that such was the position of the prosecution.

3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons,35

it was stressed that where the trial court has

to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application for bail is not just

when he is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the int

Justice, must inquire from the prosecutor concerned as the nature of his evidence to de

whether or not it is strong. And, in the very recent administrative matter Re: First IndorsemeJuly 21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando de Leon, Chief State Prosecutor, Department of Justice; Alicia A

City Prosecutor of Dagupan City vs.Judge Deodoro Sison,36

the Court, citing Tucay vs. D

etc.,37

held that where the prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion of the accused,


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12

court should nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there diligently ascertain from the

prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the bail application.

No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed to the trial

court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the transcript of the stenographic

notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order of March 29, 1993

abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As summarized in its aforementioned

order, the lower court exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence

on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the

evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting through them did the court

conclude that petitioner could be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing

that, since then and up to the present, petitioner has ever committed any violation of the conditions ofhis bail.

As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given the opportunity to present its evidence within a

reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The records indicate that the Regional State

Prosecutor's Office duly received its copy of the application for bail on the very same day that the it

was filed with the trial court on October 28, 1992. Counted from said date up to the day of the hearing

on November 5, 1992, the prosecution had more than one (1) week to muster such evidence as it

would have wanted to adduce in that hearing in opposition to the motion. Certainly, under the

circumstances, that period was more than reasonable. The fact that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his

copy of the application only on November 6, 1992 is beside the point for, as already established, the

Office of the Regional State Prosecutor was authorized to appear for the People.

4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecutor is the indubitably unreasonable period of

time that elapsed before it questioned before the respondent court the resolution and the omnibus

order of the trial court through a special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that

the delay of more than six (6) months, or one hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was

reasonable due to the attendant difficulties which characterized the prosecution of the criminal case

against petitioner. But then, the certiorari proceeding was initiated before the respondent court long

after trial on the merits of the case had ensued in the court below with the active participation of

prosecution lawyers, including Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive rule now in that the

special civil action for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of the three months,38

the

same to be reckoned by taking into account the duration of time that had expired from the

commission of the acts complained to annul the same.39

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233, promulgated on

November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order dated March 29,

1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as well as said respondent court's resolution of April 26,

1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The

aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of the Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P.Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1321. March 10, 2004]

VICTORY LINER, INC., represented by JOHNNY T. HERNANDEZ, President, complainant, vs. JUDGE RE

B. BELLOSILLO, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

For our resolution is the verified complaint of Victory Liner, Inc. (VLI) against respondent Judge Rey

Bellosillo, then Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Orani, Bataan, and Acting P

Judge of the MCTC of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan, for gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of au

oppression, and inaction on a pending motion.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On 2 March 2000, while a Victory Liner bus bearing Plate No. CWF-935 was cruising along the N

Highway of Dinalupihan, Bataan, it accidentally hit and fatally injured Marciana Bautista Morales. Marcia

the following day. VL I shouldered all the funeral and burial expenses of Marciana. Subsequently, on

2000, VLI and the heirs of the victim entered into an Agreement/Undertaking.[1]

On 14 March 200

payment by VLI of the claims, Faustina M. Antonio, the authorized and designated representative of thethe victim, executed aRelease of Claim[2]

and an Affidavit of Desistance[3]

in favor of VLI and the driver R

la Cruz.

However, earlier or on 3 March 2000, two of Marcianas sons Rolando B. Soriano and Jimmy B. M

who were also signatories to the Agreement/Undertaking, executed aPinagsamang Salaysay[4]

against Re

Cruz. On the strength of that document, a criminal complaint was filed with the MCTC of Dina

Hermosa, Bataan, for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide,[5]

which was docketed as Criminal C

10512.

After preliminary examination, or on 13 March 2000, respondent Judge Bellosillo ordered the im

issuance of a warrant of arrest against De la Cruz and fixed his bail at P50,000 to be posted in cash. He

directed the Chief of Police of Dinalupihan, Bataan, to immediately impound the bus involved in the a

which could be released only upon the posting of a cash bond in the amount of P50,000.[6]

On 30 March 2000, VLI filed a Manifestation and Motion[7]

manifesting that it was depositing to t

under protest a cash bond of P50,000 for the release of its bus. After making the deposit, VLIs presented the receipt issued by the Clerk of Court of MCTC, Dinalupihan, to the Chief of P

Dinalupihan, Bataan, who then released the bus.
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13/36


14/36

14

impounded vehicles in accident cases, in addition to the bail bond required for the provisional liberty of accused-

drivers. According to VLI, our ruling on this matter would guide trial court judges nationwide in accident cases

so that bus operators and their personnel would not be at the mercy of judges like the respondent in this case,

who during his incumbency had been requiring vehicle owners involved in accidents to post cash bonds for the

release of impounded vehicles.

InLacadin v. Mangino,[14]

the respondent Judge therein was sought to be administratively liable for

extending the lifetime of a search warrant issued by him. We held that even if he may have committed an error

of judgment or an abuse of discretion for such act, he cannot be punished administratively therefor in the

absence of proof that he was motivated by ignominy or ill-will. Moreover, we ruled that the administrative case

is not the right forum to determine whether the life of a search warrant may be extended by the court upon

proper motion filed before the expiration of the 10-day period.

Worth noting also is the case ofCaas v. Castigador.[15]

In that case, an Isuzu trailer truck involved in a

vehicular mishap was ordered impounded in an Order of 11 September 1996 of the trial court where the criminal

case against its driver was pending. T hat order was addressed to the Chief of Police of General Trias, Cavite, or

any officer of the law. In an earlier order of 14 August 1996, the vehicle owner was required to surrender the

truck to the court. Subsequently, on motion of the prosecutor, the trial court declared the vehicle owner guilty

of indirect contempt for continued defiance of the 11 September 1996 Order. However, upon the vehicle

owners petition, we found respondents order holding the petitioner therein guilty of indirect contempt to be

highly improper for several reasons. But we did not pass upon the issue of the legality of the impounding of the

vehicle involved in the vehicular accident. We did not declare the order for the impounding of the vehicle to be

illegal or unauthorized. If it were so, it could have been one of the several reasons for admonishing the

respondent Judge therein.

In the same vein, this administrative case is not the right forum to determine the issue of the legality of

respondents order requiring VLI to post a cash bond for the release of its impounded vehicle. VLI should have

raised that issue in the proper courts and not directly to us, and much less by way of an administrative

case. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. As we have said inSantiago v. Vasquez,[16]the propensity of litigants

and lawyers to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking a ruling directly from us must

be put to a halt.[17]

It must be recalled that on 4 April 2000, VLI filed with respondent judges court a Petition to Declare Order

Directing Victory Liner, Inc., to Post Bond for the Release of the Bus Null and Void .[18]

In that petition, VLI

submitted that there is no legal basis for the order directing the impounding of the bus and the posting by the

bus owner of a cash bond for its release, and hence that order is void ab initio .[19]

However, despite notice, VLIs

counsel Atty. Reynaldo R. Romero did not appear on 10 April 2000, the schedul e[20]

for the hearing of that

petition as set by him.[21]

The respondent thereupon issued an order[22]

dismissing the petition outright on

grounds of improper venue and lack of jurisdiction, and ordering that a copy of the said order be furnished VLIs

counsel at his given address. However, VLIs counsel reportedly refused to accept or receive from court

personnel notices of hearing and court orders. And, according to respondent Judge, he (VLIs counsel) never

appeared and continued not to appear before the respondent for reasons known only to him .[23]

VLI cannot,

therefore, resurrect that issue directly before us, and much less through a mere verified administrative

complaint or motion to resolve.

To allow VLI to raise that issue before us and obtain a ruling thereon directly from us through an

administrative case would be to countenance a disregard of the established rules of procedure and of the

hierarchy of courts. VLI would thus be able to evade compliance with the requirements inherent in the filing of a

proper petition, including the payment of docket fees. Hence, we shall shun from passing upon that issu

case.

In any event, the absence of a ruling in Caas v. Castigador on the legality of the impounding of

involved in an accident, as well as the foregoing statements of VLI in its Motion to Resolve, implies that

yet no clear-cut policy or rule on the matter. They would, therefore, negate a finding of gross ignoranc

law or grave abuse of authority on the part of respondent Judge. Moreover, even assuming that the ac

respondent in ordering the impounding and subsequent re-impounding of the subject vehicle and in r

the posting of a cash bond for its release were erroneous, as found by OCA C onsultant Atienza, such are

judgment that cannot be the subject of a disciplinary action absent proof of fraud, dishonesty, corruption

faith.[24]

A judge may not be held administratively liable for every erroneous order or decision he ren

hold otherwise would be to render a judicial office unbearable, for no one called upon to try the

interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in rendering a judgment. For a be held administratively liable for ignorance of the law, it is necessary that the law be sufficiently basic

that the judge must do is to simply apply it;[25]

or that the error must be gross or patent, deliber

malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith.[26]

We, however, find respondent administratively liable for imposing excessive cash bail bonds on

Reino de la Cruz in Criminal Case No. 10512 and Edwin Serrano in Criminal Case No. 9373.

The Constitution guarantees to every person under legal custody the right to bail except those

with offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong .[27]

Section 9, Rule 11

1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,[28]

provides that in fixing the amount of bail, the jud

primarily consider the following factors:

a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;

b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;

c) Penalty for the offense charged;

d) Character and reputation of the accused;

e) Age and health of the accused;

f) The weight of the evidence against the accused;

g) Probability of the accused appearing in trial;

h) Forfeiture of the bonds;

i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and

j) The pendency of other cases in which the accused is under bond.

The amount of bail should, therefore, be reasonable at all times. It should be high enough to as

presence of the accused when required, but no higher than is reasonably calculated to sepurpose. Excessive bail shall not be required.[29]

In implementing this mandate, the accuseds financial c

should particularly be considered. What is reasonable to a wealthy person may not be so to a man char

a like offense. Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum

excessive.[30]
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