Masaryk University Faculty of Arts

Department of English and American Studies

English Language and Literature

Martin Hulman

Partition of India and its Leading Figures (1935-1947)

Bachelor’s Diploma Thesis

Supervisor: Stephen Paul Hardy, Ph.D.

2013

I declare that I have worked on this thesis independently,

using only the primary and secondary sources listed in the bibliography.

…............................................ Author's signature

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank you my family for unconditional support and ever-present

encouragement during my studies.

Table of contents Introduction 5-7

1. On the Road to Partition (1935-1939) 8

1.1 1935 Act and Provincial Elections 8-10

1.2 Aftermath of the Elections 11-13

1.3 The Rise of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League 13-16

2. In the Shadow of the War (1939-1945) 16

2.1 The Congress resignation 17-18

2.2 Jinnah-Linlithgow co-operation and 'Lahore Resolution' 18-22

2.3 The British proposals – 'August Offer' and 'Cripps Mission' 22-27

2.4 The Quit India Movement 27-31

2.5 Towards the Peace 31

2.5.1 Gandhi-Jinnah talks 31-33

2.5.2 The Simla Conference 33-35

3. Endgame of the British Raj and Partition (1945-1947) 35

3.1 Elections and the 'Cabinet Mission' 34-44

3.2 The Direct Action 45-48

3.3 The Breakup 48-52

3.4 Mountbatten Plan and Partition of India 52-59

Conclusion 59-60

Bibliography 61-65

Introduction

The history of the struggle for independence and partition of India from

British stronghold have been subjects of countless studies and academic

publications. The fact that it caught the attention of so many scholars and historians

certainly speaks volumes about the importance of these events. This thesis

concentrates primarily on the latter, even though both events were necessarily

interconnected. The emphasis is going to be laid on the timeframe from 1935 to

1947 when the actual partition happened. From the 1935 Government of India Act,

which had started the course of events leading to the partition, all the way to the 3

June Plan of 1947 which eventually decided the fate of millions of people. During the

process, important figures raised and made crucial decisions behind the negotiating

table. Their influence was of huge importance for the history of India and ethnically

diverse communities. Therefore, it is going to be studied in detail for the purposes of

better understanding of the whole issue of partition which brought about one of the

worst human tragedy in modern history. The main aim is to present how the state of

Pakistan came into being by a configuration of forces and events. Secondly, to find

out whether the partition and enormous suffering of people could have been avoided

and thirdly, who is to blame for such drastic operation.

Partition of India was one of the most significant events in the history of this

vast and multicultural subcontinent. Long-lasting struggle for freedom and

independence from the shackles of the British Empire had finally come to an end

and two new states emerged on the world map, India and Pakistan. However, the

price of freedom and self-rule was enormously high. Resulting in a dislocation of

millions of people, countless deaths, rapes and other atrocities which spread across

the new-established borders as well as inland. It was, indeed, its hastened nature,

imposed implementation by the British authorities, along with seemingly unsolvable

differences in attitudes and priorities between the two principal communities of the

sub-continent, Hindus and Muslims, which led to colossal communal violence and

misery. The discrepancies among these two ethnic groups had existed long before

the British arrival but grew out of proportion under the aegis of imperialism.

The Indian subcontinent was divided on the forceful demand of the Muslims

represented by Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League. They admittedly

feared united India, especially after the debacle in 1937 elections, in which Muslims

would be a minority. It was neither the goal of the British nor the dream of the

Hindu Congress to see India divided. The fact that Pakistan was, nonetheless,

created speaks volumes of a leader's perseverance and a nation's will to sacrifice for

the cause of independence (Ali 115-16).

India was partitioned in August 1947 and power was transferred from the

British hands to India and Pakistan on the basis of dominion status in accordance

with the 3 June Plan, which was accepted by and acquiesced in by the principal

Indian leaders. It was a task of tremendous responsibility and entailed all the

complications of partition of territory and division of resources, at a time of

heightening tension and turmoil (Mansergh and Moon xi). For this purpose, British

government appointed new viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, who played probably the

most crucial role in the whole process. As Mushirul Hasan put it: “the destiny of

millions light on him” (4). The British decided to divide India mainly along the

religious lines and failed to foresee or imagine the consequences of such division.

India had never been a homogeneous entity and therefore, not one that could be

easily handed over and governed. Actually, majority of common people was for 'One

India', but it was this communal divide between the Hindus and the Muslims, which

brought matters into cry for partition. After all political negotiations in the early

1940's had reached an impasse, the British started to believe that the partition

remained the only option to avoid outright civil war and anarchy, and the only way to

conduct a graceful retreat. However, this 'graceful retreat' turned into a tragedy and

some scholars, e.g. Gyanendra Pandey or Urvashi Butalia, even use the term

'holocaust' with casualties of around 1 million, some 15 million refugees and

thousands of women raped. The critical element in the planning of the partition was

time and unsettled disputes between political leaders. Mountbatten established his

credibility by designating the precise date - 30 June 1948, by which the British

intended to retreat and make a peaceful transfer of power. It gave the British a mere

15 months to wrap up an empire which political, administrative and constitutional

decisions were far too tricky to be resolved in such a short period of time. In reality,

they even dared to shorten it by almost a year in order to prevent violence and

sustain an image of 'peaceful liberators' in the eyes of the world. On the top of that

nobody knew where the new borders would be drawn.

1. On the road to Partition (1935-39)

First chapter maps the events which set the country on the road to partition,

particularly provincial elections and an immediate aftermath which considerably

deteriorated Hindu-Muslim relations and undeliberately gave rise to the Muslim

League and Muhammad Ali Jinnah who became one of the most influential figures of

the partition history. It was the fear of Hindu domination, after its landslide victory in

1937 elections, and Jinnah's insistence that Hindus and Muslims constituted two

different nations, that gave the ground for the Pakistan demand.

1.1. 1935 Act and Provincial Elections

The early decades of the twentieth century saw a growing demand, from the

educated middle class Indians, for power sharing and responsibility to run their own

institutions, to which the British response was reluctant and evasive (Panigrahi 1-2).

“Protests against British rule and the rise of nationalist consciousness had risen in

tandem, bringing with it unintended divisive elements between Hindus and Muslims,

which had surfaced with call for unity between these 'two nations' in India”

(McMenamin 71).

Realizing the need for gradual introduction of parliamentary democracy, the

British promulgated a series of bills, reforms and acts guaranteeing increased

representation and greater participation of Indians in legislative matters to assuage

the common sentiment of the population. Probably the most critical one that

sharpened relations between two major forces of political spectrum, the Muslim

League and the Indian National Congress, and set the country on the road to

Partition, was the 1935 Government of India Act and subsequent provincial elections

two years later. The Act provided for the establishment of full responsible

Government subject to ‘safeguards’ in the eleven provinces of British India; It

provided also for a federation of India, comprising both provinces and states, with a

federal central Government and legislature for the management of all subjects

except foreign affairs and defence (Philips 188). It became operative on 1 April 1937

except its second part, the Federal Structure, which could not function until a

specific number of princely states had joined the Federation (Coupland 2).

Jawaharlal Nehru, the future leader of the Congress, initially rejected the Act

entirely, declaring that the New Constitution offered India only responsibility without

power (Shakoor 7) because the principle of autocracy was retained (Menon 14). The

Congress, with its avowed nationalist and democratic-socialist view demanded

absolute authority in the provinces and at the centre (Shakoor 8). It also stated that

the future constitution of India could only be framed by a Constituent Assembly

based on adult franchise (Singh 2). Nevertheless, they decided to participate in 1937

elections with the Manifesto dwelt upon the economic crisis in India, poverty,

unemployment and resistance to British imperialism with ultimate goal of free united

India (Sitaramayya 12-24).

With regard to the Muslim League, “it was in a state of hopeless confusion,

with interests clashing at all levels, provincial, local and personal” (Shakoor 9). It had

existed only 'on the paper' and without a leader until Muhammad Ali Jinnah returned

from England in 1936. Despite his tireless effort to unite Muslims in all parts of the

country, he could not bring together all the factions of fragmented Muslim politics.

Therefore, the principal aim of his programme was to maintain solidarity of the

Muslims in order to protect their 'interests' in any future constitutional fabric,

asserted that such a demand did not 'savour of communalism'. For it was not “only

natural, but essential for securing stable national government by ensuring whole-

hearted and willing cooperation of the minorities who must be made to feel that they

can rely upon the majority with a complete sense of confidence and security” (11).

Even though he supported unity of India at that time, he believed that this unity

could not be attained without Muslims having a strong organization of their own

(Sisson and Wolpert 309). His desire of separate electorate was in direct clash with

Congress ideology of one organization representing all Indians and he did not seem

to realise it could diminish the chances of future Hindu-Muslim cooperation (Shakoor

11).

The programs of both parties were actually quite similar, in terms of

addressing people's needs (Hasan 9) and securing the freedom from the British rule.

However, they differed in important question of communal leadership and the results

of the provincial elections – the Congress' overwhelming victory and miserable

performance of the Muslim League – considerably altered the outlook of the different

political groups in India. The most significant factors, that seriously disrupted

Congress-League relations and pointed to great divergence between them, were

“the Congress tendency towards a one-party polity in India that assumed the

submersion of other Indian parties and the emergent unity of Muslim India”

(Shakoor 16).

1.2 Aftermath of the Elections

The conclusion of the 1937 elections had fully exposed the inability of the

Muslim League to attract Muslim voters which resulted from Muslim political disunity.

The Muslim League failed to win majority in any of the Muslim provinces, where

regional non-communal parties like the Unionists in the Punjab won majorities and

formed ministries. Jinnah and his colleagues faced the future of permanent

inferiority and exclusion from office in Hindu-majority provinces and the proposed all

India federation. They could stand a chance in Muslim-majority provinces (Punjab

and Bengal), provided they would create as effective organization as that of

Congress. (Shakoor 19). With characteristic daring, the Muslim leaders clutched at

this off-chance, but very soon they started to realize that their ambition could not be

fulfilled without detaching the Muslim majority provinces from the main body

(Mehrotra 192). The demand for separate Muslim homeland accelerated rapidly after

the provincial elections. Specifically after the Congress ill-advised political decisions

targeted to strengthen Hindu domination over the Muslims.

The Congress emerged as the dominant parliamentary party in India, winning

716 out of the 1161 seats it contested, but it fared poorly in Muslim constituencies.

In order to break the communal impasse, new approach was conducted. Since the

negotiations between the Congress and Muslim politicians, regarding cooperative

relationship based on genuine sharing of power and Indian nationalism, had failed in

the past, Nehru launched the programme of Muslim mass contact in rural and urban

areas with emphasis on the urgency of tackling economic issues such as poverty and

unemployment (Sisson and Wolpert 311) along with struggle for freedom. He

believed to resolve Hindu-Muslim disputes by highlighting that ultimate goals of both

communities were identical and they should act like a one body. This tactics was

primarily aimed to lure the masses away from their communal organizations (as well

as the Muslim League) and rally them under the banner of the sole national

organization (Shakoor 18). Shortly after the elections, Nehru stated: “We have too

long thought in terms of pacts and compromises between communal leaders and

neglected the people behind them . . . It is for us now to go ahead and welcome the

Muslim masses and intelligentsia in our great organization and rid this country of

communalism in every shape” (Rao 88). Although the movement ultimately met with

little success, the Muslim league, other parties and communal leaders considered it a

serious threat to the very existence of their organizations. (Sisson and Wolpert 341).

Jinnah “took serious umbrage at what he described as an adroit effort on the part of

the Congress to take advantage of the weakness of the League and the presence of

splinter parties among the Muslims, and so to divide the community” (Menon 56).

The Congress was hoping to gain governmental authority by recruiting Muslims to its

fold which added to Hindu-Muslim bitterness. It also received a fair share of criticism

and more or less resulted in the defeat of the Congress candidates in subsequent by-

elections.

Moreover, at the beginning of Congress' reign there was a proposal it should

form coalition ministries with the Muslim League in UP. However, no such agreement

had ever been reached between Congress and the Muslim League. In fact,

Jawaharlal Nehru said that “it was unthinkable for him to have a member of the

Muslim League in the Congress ministry unless there was congruence of purpose

between the two elements and a workable agreement regarding policies and

programmes.” He also mentioned that they “had differed so radically from each other

that there was hardly any possibility of an agreement” (Panigrahi 70).

Understandably, the Congress decided to have homogeneous ministries of its own

and chose Muslim ministers from amongst those who were members of the

Congress Party, i.e. those who agreed to the programmes and policies of the

Congress government (Menon 56). The leaders of the Muslim League found this

prospect completely unacceptable because they wanted to maintain their separate

identity and at the same time secure a substantial share in power. The attitude of

the Congress towards other parties opened the eyes of all sections of politically

conscious people and the status of the Muslim League began to rise all over India

(27). Penderel Moon, distinguished member of the Indian civil service in Punjab

during Partition years, thought that this ministry episode was “the prime cause of

the creation of Pakistan” (Moon 15).

1.3 The Rise of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League

Those events further hastened the transformation of a barrister Mohammad

Ali Jinnah into the 'Quaid-i-Azam' (The Great Leader) and sole spokesman of the

Muslims in the 1940's. Until 1937 and Nehru's declination to take two Muslim

Leaguers in the U.P. ministry, he continued to co-operate with the Congress in the

pursuit of unity. Nevertheless, from this point onwards, he started to agitate for

separate Muslim state within India.

He was hugely influenced by the poet-philosopher of Muslim nationalism,

Muhammad Iqbal, who suggested that “the only proper solution of the Indian

problem lay in the Muslim-majority areas (North-west and East) of India emerging as

an independent state or states”. In one of his letters, Iqbal also brought Jinnah's

attention to importance of addressing problems of Muslim masses, especially poverty

and stressed “the enforcement and development of the Shariat of Islam1” which is

likewise “impossible without a free Muslim state or states” (Sisson and Wolpert 321).

Iqbal can be perceived as a father of two-nation theory, the ideology that the

primary identity of Muslims in the Indian subcontinent is their religion rather than

their language or ethnicity, and therefore Indian Hindus and Muslims are two distinct

nationalities, regardless of ethnic or other commonalities. Jinnah translated this

theory into the political reality in his famous speech at Lahore conference in 1940.

However, he had to gain substantial support from fragmented Muslim community

first.

Jinnah made the best of the adverse situation during Congress rule and in a

few years he transformed the Muslim League into a mass organization commanding

the allegiance of the Muslim community (Shakoor 64). In his presidential address to

the annual session of the Muslim League meeting at Lucknow, on 15 October 1937,

he gave a resounding reply to the Congress policies and exposed the anti-Muslim

acts of the Congress ministries:

“The present leadership of the Congress, especially during the last 10 years,

has been responsible for alienating the Muslims of India more and more, by

pursuing a policy which is exclusively Hindu; they are in a majority, they have

by their words, deeds and program shown, more and more, the Muslims

cannot expect any justice or fair play at their hands” (Bonney 89).

1 The body of doctrines that regulate the lives of those who profess Islam

He also addressed Muslims and called for an active resistance against Hindu

oppression:

“To the Muslims of India in every province, in every district, in every tehsil, in

every town, I say: your foremost duty is to formulate a constructive and

ameliorative program of work for the people's welfare, and to devise ways and

means for the social, economic and political uplift of the Muslims […] There

are forces that may bully you, tyrannize over you and intimidate you, and you

may even have to suffer. But it is going through this crucible of the fire of

persecution which may be levelled against you, the tyranny that may be

exercised, the threats and intimidations that may unnerve you - it is by

resisting, by overcoming, by facing these disadvantages, hardships and

suffering, and maintaining your true glory and history” (90).

The speech had an electrifying effect and contributed to the growth of League's

popularity. Jinnah resolved to strike all communal chords to win the Muslims for the

League. He made tours across India and roused the Muslims with stirring speeches

about the dangers of Hindu Raj2. He was making “a forceful emotive appeal for

Muslim solidarity with the sole object of wrestling power from the 'Hindu' Congress”

(Panigrahi 73). Panigrahi argues that Jinnah's “relentless, loose and malicious

propaganda campaign” against the Congress governments which had been accusing

them of “tyranny and oppression over the minority community” is very questionable

because no details were given or discussion with the Congress ever taken regarding

such allegations (74). In fact, various reports had been conducted by different

community bodies and none of them found serious cases of faulty play. However,

2 Hindu for “reign”

Jinnah never really cared to justify his claims, he only needed to appeal to the

masses and gain power. According to Harry Haig, “one of the few fair-minded and

well-wishers of India”, the essential grievance of Muslims was not religious but rather

political one, stemmed from the fact that the community was in opposition, thus

lacked power (78). Jinnah used the Islam religion as a weapon against Muslim

consciousness and the masses “converged and supported him once the slogan 'Islam

in danger' was raised and gained ground” (72). Consequently, many members of

provincial assemblies joined his all-India Muslim organization and the Muslim unity

which Jinnah yearned for seemed to be within reach. Within short period of time

“Jinnah suceeded in creating a sense of deep communal cleavage and separateness

in the collective consciousness of the Muslim community. His hate campaign created

feelings of antagonism” (81) and could be perceived as one of the causes of the

Partition of India. Beverly Nichols argues that it was the “hate” and “inferiority

complex” of the Muslims which founded Pakistan (Nichols 178-87). However, Jinnah

only gained decisive support for his demand when the Second World War broke out

and he sidelined with the British government.

2. In the shadow of the War

Before the Second World War started in 1939, Jinnah's position as the voice of

the Muslims had substantially strengthened. However, it will be argued that without

the help of the British, he could have probably never succeeded in the creation of

Pakistani sovereign state. The British wartime politics showed its interest in pitching

the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League against each other. This

chapter covers their ostensible attempts to break the political deadlock by series of

proposals known as the 'August Offer' and the 'Cripps Mission'. None of these

proposals had envisaged the Indian independence or separate state of Pakistan. As a

response, the Congress launched 'Quit India' campaign to win the independence,

while Jinnah was spreading webs of his influence across the country with the

encouragement of the British and defined the two-nation theory in Lahore. The

situation had radically changed with a cessation of the war and an emergence of

Attlee's Labour Government in 1945 which were set to grant India the long-awaited

independence. However, the partition had not been in the cards yet.

2.1 The Congress resignation

The outbreak of the Second World War on 3 September, 1939, “signalled a

new crisis in Indian Politics” (Parveen 133). Viceroy Lord Linlithgow declared the war

against Axis powers without consent of Indian leaders and India was forcefully

dragged into the conflict. Only after this unilateral declaration did he invite Jinnah

and Gandhi, who returned to high politics, to ask for their support in war effort.

Gandhi and the Congress considered it “a national affront” and demanded from the

government an immediate explanation of the war aims in order to consider its

support. On the other hand, Jinnah and the Muslim League did not outrightly

denounce or question the British war agenda in return for certain concessions. The

question of the declaration and war aims became a major issue of wartime politics

between the Congress and the central British government. (Panigrahi 86). Now, the

Congress found itself in conflict with the League and with the British as well.

Although the Congress sympathized with the British in their effort to defeat

the Nazis, it was not willing to abandon its desire for freedom and swaraj3. Nehru, in

his book “Discovery of India”, wrote: “Without that freedom the war would be like

any old war, a contest between rival imperialisms and an attempt to defend and

perpetuate the British Empire as such. It seemed absurd and impossible for us to

line up in defence of that very imperialism against which we have been struggling for

so long. Only freedom could release mass energy and convert bitterness into

enthusiasm for a cause. There was no other way” (370). On 14 September, the

Congress demanded immediate independence with a constituent assembly to decide

a constitution; when this was refused, its eight provincial governments resigned on

10 November, and governors in those provinces thereafter ruled by decree for the

remainder of the war (Jalal 47). The British only had promised to negotiate about

the modifications to the Act of 1935 with Indian leaders when the war was over.

They also refused to define British war aims apart from stating that the country was

“resisting agression” (Chandra 454). Had the British acted in more liberal way, the

course of events might have been different. In the meantime, it was a 'clever' move

from their point of view.

2.2 Jinnah-Linlithgow co-operation and the 'Lahore Resolution'

When Jinnah was invited by Linlithgow to talk about the League support in

war effort, his position was elevated and he was satisfied that the League and its

leadership was recognized as political entity. Jinnah offered “full effective

cooperation of the Musalmans'” by taking into “confidence the Muslim League which

3 Hindu for “self-rule”

is the only organization that can speak on behalf of Muslim India” but also

demanded a safeguard of the Muslim interests particularly in the Congress governed

provinces, and an assurance that no constitutional headway in the country would be

made without their involvement and acceptance (Panigrahi 124-5). The British could

not afford to lose another 'big player', so the Viceroy appeased the League that “full

weight would be given to their views and interests”, and that it was unthinkable to

proceed with planning India's future constitution without taking them. Jinnah

dreaded the idea of “federation because of the risk involved in it of Hindu

domination at the centre” (Panigrahi 130). It was clear that the hallmark of British

rule in India was to keep the two parties divided and pitched against each other in

order to maintain its 'most precious asset' under control and Jinnah was proving to

be the most convenient instrument and best guarantee for the British against a

united political demand (Jalal 46). Perhaps the most revealing is Linlinthgow's

statement from November 1939 that he had a “vested interest” in Jinnah's position

(French 122). He was confident that “Britain's hold on India was safe so long as the

discords between communities and classes remained” (Shakoor, 132). It is not hard

to imagine that “with such mindset, it was impossible to reach any settlement of the

political problem in India” (Panigrahi 132). For the time being the alliance with the

British also suited Jinnah's interests, as he needed time and support of the

government to rebuild the League and secure the support of Muslim community

after the debacle in 1937 elections (Jalal 49-50).

His position as a leader of Muslim India considerably strengthened during the

war and partition became synonymous with independence in the Muslim definition of

the struggle after the 'Lahore Resolution' of 23 March 1940 had been presented by

him at the annual meeting of the All Muslim League. There, he observed:

Musalmans are not a minority as it is commonly known and understood . . .

Musalmans are a nation according to any definition of a nation and they must

have their homelands, their territory and their state . . . (Jinnah)

Then went on to define his two-nation theory based on what he called the real

nature of Islam and Hinduism:

They are not religions in the strict sense of the word, but are, in fact,

different and distinct social orders and it is a dream that the Hindus and

Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality . . . The Hindu and Muslim

belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs and literature.

They neither intermarry nor interdine together and indeed they belong to two

different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and

conceptions . . . To yoke together such nations under a single state, one as a

numerical minority and the other as a majority must lead to growing

discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the

government of such a state . . . (Jinnah)

Jinnah alleged that “there were two parallel cultural streams with divergent

religions, traditions and social orders which hardly ever interacted; and if they did,

they ended in conflict” (Panigrahi 152). Such observation contradicts with the nature

of Indian history where different religious groups lived together in peace and amity

for centuries, respecting different customs and traditions of Hindu and Muslim

culture. There might be occasional conflicts between those communities in the past

but they were, in vast majority of cases, spearheaded by secular forces such as

politics and power ambitions of the rulers rather than religious belief. The religious

lines under which Indian people were distinguished had been drawn unambiguously

at the very beginning of the British rule in 19th century. Nearly two hundred years of

its reign were 'dedicated', apart from undeniable infrastructural and cultural

development, to exploitation of country's resources and widening of the gulf and

social cleavages between those religious groups, castes, classes and communities of

India (Panigrahi 159). It is highly questionable whether if it would have been

possible for Jinnah to fulfil his demand for separate state had it not been for the

'encouragement' of the British. He believed that religion constitutes the foundation

stone of nation-state. Such assumption seemed to be quite inaccurate and

undemocratic, given that “none of the European countries were products of religious

beliefs or sentiments” (Panigrahi 161). Nevertheless, Jinnah succeeded in rooting

this idea into the minds of Muslims.

The 'Pakistan Resolution', as it became known, can be summarized into

following points:

1. The Scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935,

is totally unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country

and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim India;

2. Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is

reconsidered de novo and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the

Muslims, unless it is framed with their approval and consent;

3. No constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to

the Muslims unless it is designated on the following basic principle, viz. that

geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be

so constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that

the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-

Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute

"Independent States" in which the Constituent Units shall be autonomous and

sovereign;

4. Adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically

provided in the constitution for minorities in these units and in the regions

where Muslims are minority for the protection of their religious, cultural,

economic, political, administrative and other rights, and interests in

consultation with them (Ambedkar)

The resolution altered the character of Indian politics and made all meaningful

negotiations about future of India more intractable (Panigrahi 143). From this point,

it was quite clear that anything short of partition would not be acceptable for Jinnah

and his followers.

2.3 The British proposals – 'August Offer' and 'Cripps Mission'

Meanwhile, the events of the Second World War created great difficulties for

the British, who were losing their hold in North Africa and Southeast Asia. Moreover,

the Nazi Germany was about to unleash its vicious air raids onto the British Isles.

Situation was gradually getting critical, therefore in order to “associate Indian public

opinion with the conduct of the war” as well as ostensibly tackle Indian

constitutional issue, the viceroy Lord Linlithgow had proposed the so-called 'August

offer' on 8th August 1940. Apart from expansion of his executive council with

representative Indians and the establishment of a War Advisory Council consisting of

party leaders and representatives of Indian States it promised to set up an Indian

representative body with the right to enact new constitution after the conclusion of

war (Kuracina) and to grant Dominion Status in the unspecified future. Furthermore,

Linlithgow stressed once again that special consideration would be given to the

minorities, especially Muslims, and the British government would not transfer power

to any party “whose authority is directly denied by a large and powerful element in

India's national life” (Chatterji 126). Ironically enough, he stated that no

constitutional advancement could be settled before the Congress and the Muslim

League had not resolved their disputes. Not surprisingly, the Congress rejected the

offer because it completely ignored their demand for the acknowledgement of

independence and the establishment of a provisional National Government at the

centre (Sharma 17). Even the Muslim League repulsed the offer, although on

different grounds, declaring that “the partition of India was the only solution” to

break the political deadlock. The August offer further deteriorated already-massive

communal problem (Chatterji 127).

In the context of widespread dissatisfaction that prevailed over the rejection

of the Congress' demands, Vinoba Bhave, selected by Gandhi, launched the

Individual Civil Disobedience movement based on satyagraha or non-violence. Anti-

war speeches spread to all corners of the country, with satyagrahis earnestly

appealing to the people not to support the Government in its war endeavours. The

Congress effectively gave up its bargaining power after it had already lost control by

resigning from office previous year and the campaign resulted in imprisonment of

more than 20,000 thousands Congress men and women, including members of the

working committee, erstwhile Congress ministers, speakers, leaders of the Congress

in all provinces and other local members during 1940-41 (Rizvi 166-7). Gandhi and

Nehru were put in prison as well and stayed there until winter of 1941, when the

viceroy ordered the acquittal of all the satyagrahis. They were released to negotiate

after India found itself in great peril.

The situation in the Asia underwent radical change with Japan's sudden attack

on Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941. Within a few months they had been

occupying much of the south-east Asia and the Far East. They advanced as far as

Burma, threatening India's west coast. Imminent danger caused the change in the

Congress policy; civil disobedience movement was withdrawn and negotiations with

the British concerning war support were reopened. The British government, with

Prime Minister Winston Churchill, realized that securing co-operation of India's

political leaders is of urgent need. Actually, it was the combination of “the exigencies

of war and the pressure of world opinion”, especially that of American president

Roosevelt regarding initiation of constitutional reforms in India to solve the political

impasse, which “set the stage for the Cripps Mission” (Chatterji 128). The mission

was designated to convince the world of British liberal and democratic intentions in

India rather than engaging in sincere quest to settle communal rift. Sir Stafford

Cripps was sent to India on 22nd March, 1942, as emissary of the War Cabinet, to

talk terms with the representatives of a very broad spectrum of Indian opinion. The

declaration was drafted in a short space of time essentially by Clement Attlee, the

leader of the Labour Party. Discussions were related to these long-term mission

proposals:

1. Creation of a new Indian Union which would have full status of a Dominion

with the power to secede, if it chose, from the British Commonwealth;

2. The establishment of a constitution-making body representing both British

India and the States immediately on the cessation of hostilities;

3. For this purpose, all members of the lower Houses of the provincial

legislatures would meet as a single electoral college and choose

representatives equal to one-tenth of its own number, seats being fixed for

communities on the basis of their proportion to the total population. As for

the states, they were to appoint their representatives in proportion to their

population.

4. The British Government undertook to accept and forthwith implement the

constitution framed by this body subject to two conditions viz., (a) the right of

any province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new

constitution to retain its present constitutional provision. The issue of

accession would be finally decided by means of a plebiscite in the province if

its Legislative Assembly did not decide in favour of it by a 60 per cent

majority. With non-acceding provinces, His Majesty's Government would be

prepared to agree upon a new constitution; (b) the signing of a Treaty

negotiated between His Majesty's Government and the constitution-making

body.

Moreover, for the time being, “the British Government was to retain control of the

defence of India but the leaders of major Indian parties would be invited to an

immediate and effective participation in the counsels” (Chatterji 127-8).

The Cripps' proposal once again failed to take into account Indian strong

desire for self-government and independence. It also indirectly conceded the

demand for Pakistan and “indefinite number of partitions”, as it accepted the

principle of non-accession on an unwilling province (130). It was readily rejected by

all the parties involved in negotiations. The Shiks, who unconditionally opposed the

creation of Pakistan, declared that they would “resist by all possible means the

separation of the Punjab from the All-India Union” (129). At first, the Congress

leaders – Gandhi, Nehru, Azad, Asaf Ali and others – also refused to accept any

proposal which would cut India into parts yet they could not “think in terms of

compelling the people of any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against

their declared and established will” (130). Partition proposals were actually kept at

abeyance by common agreement after the series of discussions. But two

insurmountable difficulties relating to the immediate present arose. At the beginning

of the negotiations, Cripps had assured Maulana Azad, the Congress President, that

the provisional National Government would be a responsible government on the

pattern of the cabinet system with the Viceroy acting as a constitutional head like

the King of England, i.e. possessing only limited power. But later, Cripps resiled from

this position and insisted that such a far reaching constitutional change was

impossible and that the Viceroy's autocratic powers were to remain unaltered. This

fraud shattered any prospect of reaching settlement between the Congress and the

British Government. Nehru stated at press conference on 11 April: “Before the last

interview with Sir Stafford Cripps on the night of April 10 there was a seventy-five

per cent chance of settlement” because “his language had led us to conclude that

the new government would function as a cabinet and that the Viceroy would not

intervene” (Morrow 268-273). Another important point of discussions was the

question of Defence. Despite Congress' agitation, the Government gave no real

control over Defence to responsible ministers except for the appointment of an

Indian Defence Member with the ridiculously trivial duty of looking after canteens or

printing of stationery. These difficulties uncovered the Government's unwillingness to

trust Indian people and to transfer real power to them. Stubborn and imperialistic

attitude of the British proved to be one of decisive factors in ultimate failure of the

Cripps Mission and subsequent unleashing of the 'Quit India' movement.

Shortly after the Congress, the Muslim League also turned down the Cripps

offer on account of its rigidity and the fact that it did not explicitly recognize the

demand for Pakistan. The League expressed “their gratification that the possibility of

Pakistan is recognised by providing for the establishment of two or more

independent Unions in India.” However, “the rigidity of the attitude of His Majesty's

Government with regard to the fundamentals not being open to any modification”

left them “no alternative but to say that the proposals in the present form are

unacceptable” due to lack of “clear and precise pronouncement on the subject”

(Wolpert 203).

2.4 The 'Quit India' Movement

As mentioned earlier, the Indian National Congress was willing to co-operate

with the British in war effort on condition of immediate independence and transfer of

power into Indian hands. But proposals drafted by the British government between

1940 and 1942 showed no intention of fulfilling these demands and the Congress as

well as other parties rejected them. The relations between the Government and the

Congress deteriorated enormously during this period, even to the point of hostility. It

seemed to be the clash of ultimately adversarial ideologies: imperialism versus

nationalism; slavery versus freedom; inequality versus equality, etc. After the talks

with Cripps had abruptly ended in April 1942, particularly when the agreement had

practically been within the reach, the Congressmen and Indian people in general felt

“deep sense of betrayal and resentment” (Panigrahi 229). With constitutional

advance towards self-rule and India's freedom shattered by unacceptable offers of

the British, the leaders of the Congress met in Bombay on 7-8 August to decide on a

course of action for the liberation of India. On 8th August 1940 the All India Congress

Committee passed the 'Quit India' Resolution which called for “the withdrawal of

British power from India” and the establishment of “the institution of a provisional

national government with full powers to Indian representatives forming the

government. It promised cooperation in the war effort, only after independence was

granted and not otherwise: A free India will assure this success by throwing all her

great resources in the struggle for freedom against the aggression of Nazism,

Fascism and Imperialism” (231). Gandhi made a passionate speech at the gathering

and urged people to mass action in order to achieve these aims. He declared that

nothing short of freedom will satisfy Indians and they should fight for it till the very

end: “We shall either free India or die in the attempt; we shall not live to see the

perpetuation of our slavery . . . Take a pledge with God and your own conscience as

witness, that you will no longer rest till freedom is achieved and will be prepared to

lay down your lives in the attempt to achieve it“ (Gandhi 83: 197).

Upon this event, the very next day, Linlithgow ordered to arrest all Congress

leaders, including Gandhi and Nehru, and entire working committee. Therefore, the

Congress had no time to clarify the movement strategy and detailed plan of action.

Gandhi's last words to the country were written shortly before he was taken into

custody: “Everyone is free to go the fullest length under ahimsa. Complete deadlock

by strikes and other non-violent means. Satyagrahis must go out to die not to live.

They must seek and face death. It is only when individuals go out to die that the

nation will survive. Karenge ya marenge4” (208).

The masses were left without any guidance, except for Gandhi's non-violence

tactics, and swift imprisonment of the Congress leaders created a massive upheaval

in the country. The movement “swept across the country as a mighty tidal wave”

(Panigrahi 228). It had started with the launching of individual satyagraha in form of

peaceful processions, workers' strikes and demonstrations but, without proper

leadership, it inevitably ended up with widespread riots, violence and heavy losses to

both life and property. Nehru wrote: “The sudden and unorganized demonstrations

and outbreaks on the part of the people, culminating in violent conflicts and

destruction, and continued against overwhelming and powerful armed forces, were a

measure of the intensity of their feelings . . . There were no directions, no

programme. There was no well-known person to lead them or tell them what to do,

and yet they were too excited and angry to remain quiescent” (430-2). The British

adopted a policy of harsh repression and ferocity to suppress the movement.

Thousands of people were killed or imprisoned without trial by the end of 1942.

They crushed the rebellion and the imprisonment of the Congress leaders practically

guaranteed sustaining of the British power in India, at least for the duration of the

War when leaders of the Congress were finally released. Even though the rebellion

was not successful, its significance in struggle for freedom should not be derogated.

According to an Indian historian, Bipan Chandra, the Quit India movement “placed

4 Hindu for “We will do or die.”

the demand for independence on the immediate agenda of the national movement .

. . Any future negotiations with the British Government could only be on the manner

of the transfer of power. Independence was no longer a matter of bargain. And this

became amply clear after the War” (475). In the retrospect, it also served the British

cause of using the pretext to intern its leadership, and unwittingly supported the

League's rise.

Jinnah and the Muslim League deplored “the decision of the AICC to launch an

open rebellion for the purpose of establishing Congress Hindu domination in India.”

They believed that the movement was “an attempt to force the Musalmans to submit

and surrender to Congress terms and dictation” (Wolpert 209). Furthermore, Jinnah

advised the Muslims to stay away from the Congress initiated movement and once

again stressed that Pakistan was the only solution of India's constitutional problem

(Panigrahi 244). The events of 1942 and the removal of Congressmen from the

limelight gave him another opportunity to rally the Muslim strength around his

demand (Khan 23). Moreover, Lord Linlithgow helped him with securing the strong

position of the League in the Muslim-Majority provinces before resigning from the

Viceroy office in late 1943 (Panigrahi 256). It was clear that anything short of

separate Muslim state would have not satisfy resilient Jinnah. Until 1945 the British

had worked on the assumption that the empire had all the potential to survive; they

had used Pakistan only as a counterpoise to Congress demand for independence5

(Singh 244). Only after the War and failure of Congress-League countless

negotiations did the Partition of India and the creation of Pakistan seem to be

5 Most British officials did not take the Pakistan demand seriously and were content at using it only as a

convenient ploy to keep the Congress pressure at bay, which for them was a far more crucial issue than

heeding to the unpractical and absurd slogan of the Muslim League for a separate state.

inevitable.

2.5 Towards the Peace

Lord Wavell, a professional soldier, replaced Lord Linlithgow as Viceroy of

India in October 1943. His appointment was clearly aimed to sustain a political

status-quo and order in India for the duration of the War but he made personal

efforts to resolve the constitutional and political deadlock. He also agitated for an

early and smooth transfer of power into Indian hands with ultimate goal of India's

unity (“Wavell's Relations” 69). He realized the magnitude of issues on the Indian

political scene (“Wavell's Breakdown Plan” 220) and wanted to reopen talks with

Indian leaders as soon as possible but was strictly obliged by the British Cabinet,

especially Winston Churchill, to forget about any political changes or negotiations for

the time being (“Wavell's Relations” 70). However, he managed to release seriously-

ill Gandhi from prison in May 1944 despite strong reluctance of the Government

(71). An opportunity to initiate much needed dialogue presented itself.

2.5.1 Gandhi-Jinnah talks

On Gandhi's proposal he and Jinnah engaged in series of discussions

concerning the Pakistan demand and related issues in September. Jinnah explained

the basis of the demand of Pakistan. “We maintain”, he wrote to Gandhi, “that

Muslims and Hindus are two major nations by any definition or test of a nation. We

are a nation of a 100 million . . . We have our distinctive outlook on life and of life.

By all the cannons of international law, we are a nation” (Gandhi 84: 467). He added

that he was “convinced that the true welfare not only of the Muslims but of the rest

of India lies in the division of India as proposed in the Lahore Resolution” (84: 469).

Gandhi on the other hand observed that India was one nation but he tried to reach

an agreement with Jinnah to satisfy his demand. He suggested that if Pakistan had

to be conceded, the areas in which the Muslims were in absolute majority, i.e.

Baluchistan, Sind, North-Western Frontier Province and part of Punjab, Bengal and

Assam where they were in absolute majority “should be demarcated by a

commission, approved by the Congress and the League. The wishes of the

inhabitants of these areas demarcated should be ascertained through the votes of

the adult population . . . If the vote is in favour of separation . . . these areas shall

form a separate State as soon as possible after India is free from foreign domination

. . . There shall be a treaty of separation, which should also provide for the efficient

and satisfactory administration of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Communication,

Customs, Commerce and the like, which must necessarily continue to be the matters

of common interest between the contracting countries” (84: 407-8). This proposition

was rejected by Jinnah because he wanted “Pakistan now, not after independence”

(84: 370). Furthermore, he would not approve of self-determination of non-Muslim

minorities, i.e. right to vote on separation, in those Muslim-majority provinces

(Panigrahi, 171) and opposed the idea of shared responsibility of foreign affairs,

defence and other mentioned matters since he envisaged full partition (172). The

right of self-determination was particularly tricky question, especially regarding

Punjab and Bengal provinces where substantial number of non-Muslims (Sikhs,

Hindus, Christians, etc.) lived. Jinnah claimed the right of self-determination of

Muslims as a nation but would deny the same right to the other 'nations'. Following

his logic that what constitutes the nation is religion, it seemed to be quite shallow

way of reasoning (169-170). The talks eventually failed and proved conclusively the

stubbornness and rigidity of Jinnah mind and inability to work on any compromise.

Wavell was disappointed about the result of Gandhi-Jinnah talks because he

hoped that it would “bridge Hindu-Muslim divide” (“Wavell's Viceroyalty” 40). He was

alos frustrated with regard to the general lack of the Government's interest and

enthusiasm towards complex affairs in India. Right at the outset, Wavell had been

urging London on numerous occasions to take necessary steps to deal with political

dilemma in order to prevent social breakdown and looming Partition of India.

However, Churchill explicitly instructed him to deal with the crucial issues after the

War and not earlier (“Wavell's Relations” 69). His die-hard imperialistic mind-set,

vehemently ruling out the possibility of self-government in India, had not changed

until the very end of his reign in summer 1945.

2.5.2 The Simla Conference

The situation underwent dramatic change with Allied victory and the end of

the War in sight. Wavell undertook an official trip to England in spring 1945 to

vindicate his, previously refused, proposal on Indian problem known as the 'Wavell

plan'. After prolonged and exhausting discussions with the Cabinet and the Indian

Committee, the plan had been finally approved to be presented before Indian

political spectrum6 at the Simla Conference in June 1945 (75). The main goal of the

conference, based on Wavell's scheme, was to make proposals for the composition

6 22 representative Indian leaders were invited to the conference including members of the Congress – Nehru,

Azad, the party President, and others – who had been released from prison prior to discussions.

of an interim government in India. It was intended to form a new Executive Council,

which would represent the dominant political opinion in the country and important

communities represented by “an equal number of caste Hindus and Muslims.” Except

for the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief all members of the Council were to be

“Indian political leaders.” Even “the portofolio of External Affairs would be placed

under the Charge of an Indian member of the Council.” And “the proposals would

not prejudice or prejudge the essential form of the future permanent constitution or

constitutions of India which must be framed by Indian themselves” (Chatterji 134).

The proposal did not mention independence of India as both Gandhi and

Jinnah rightly pointed out. Nevertheless, the talks eventually broke down on

communal and not political grounds. Jinnah was persistent and uncompromising in

the League's claim to be the sole representative of Indian Muslims with the right to

nominate Muslims to the Executive Council. Both Lord Wavell and the Congress

resisted this claim because former felt it is his “prerogative to select men for the

council” and latter because it would be a denial of its national character (Panigrahi

263). On the rock of Jinnah's intransigence and the fact that Wavell gave him a right

of veto, the Simla conference foundered on 14 July (265). “That the British let

Jinnah wreck the conference, rather than proceed without him, was testimony to the

leverage the League had secured by its wartime collaboration with the imperial

government” (Metcalf and Thomas Metcalf 212). Moreover, utter failure of the

conference strengthened Jinnah's presidential position “as the demand for Pakistan

gained credence among Muslims across the land” (Wolpert, 245). It also cast grim

shadow over future prospects of a British sponsored settlement to the Indian

political impasse and brought the unwanted and impractical proposition of partition

out in the open to be considered much more seriously than ever before.

3. Endgame of the British Raj and Partition (1945-47)

This last chapter aims to delineate the crucial two-year period after the war

when the British engaged in a last-ditch effort to settle political disputes of the

Congress and the Muslim League by sending the Cabinet Mission's delegates to

India. Their proposal caused a lot of confussion, and seemingly endless political

negotiations finally led to the partition of India. Nevertheless, in the end, it was Lord

Mountbatten, the last Viceroy, whose hasty decisions failed to considerate the

magnitute of the communal problem, and Jinnah's direct action which set the

country ablaze. It was thought that partition would solve the long-lasting constituent

impasse and save the country from complete social breakdown. It will be revealed

that, in reality, brutal ethnic cleansing swallowed the country and, like many times in

the history, common people were unfortunate victims of mind games and decisions

of the political elite.

3.1 Elections and the 'Cabinet Mission'

The landslide victory in favour of Clement Attlee's Labour party in July 1945

marked a significant transformation of the Indian political scenario and the last stage

of the British rule in India. As opposed to Churchill's hard core imperialism, Attlee

was set on decolonization (Victoria Schofield, Wavell 340). After discussions in

London, it was announced on 19 September 1945 that “it was the intention of the

Attlee government to transfer power for full self-government in India.” Based on the

results of general elections, which were to be held in the coming winter, a central

body would start designing the future constitution of India under 1942 scheme, with

possible modifications if needed, and Executive Council of the Governor-General was

to be Indianized (Panigrahi 268). The partition of India was not generally envisaged

yet, as it suited the strategic needs of Britain to leave behind a united India.

However, Wavell knew only too well that ignorance of its possibility would not make

it fade away. (Wolpert 249). As a matter of fact, as soon as the elections were

announced in August, tempestuous political campaigns spread like a wildfire and

effectively divided the country and its people. While the Congress claimed to speak

for all Indians, irrespective of religion, the League claimed to be the mouthpiece of

all Muslims. The elections ultimately “evolved into a plebiscite in favour of, or

against, the idea of Pakistan” (Khan 32). Jinnah unleashed his 'poisonous

propaganda' on the sole platform of Pakistan demand stating that it was a matter of

life and death for Muslims (Wolpert 250-1) and every vote cast against the League

“would help create Hindu Raj”. Once again, Jinnah was playing on consciousness of

Muslims using religion and fear of Hindu domination. But he was not the only one

who was manipulating religious feelings in order to gain votes. Similar practices were

adopted by the Congress, the Socialists, the Unionists and others. Bigotry,

chauvinism and exaggerated statements were to be the precursors of violent

encounters that followed. The Congress manifesto underlined economic development

and reforms but not even Nehru did refrain from utopian remarks; he observed that

“Pakistan was a useless idea which meant slavery forever” (Khan 33-4). In addition

to spreading anti-Pakistani sentiment, Congress was also mobilizing people against

the British Government and towards immediate independence. Series of mutinies,

workers' strikes and nationwide anti-British protests (Khan 25), encouraged by

speeches of the Congress leaders, especially Nehru and Patel (Panigrahi 270),

conclusively showed the British Government and Lord Wavell that transfer of power

in India was inevitable7. Last attempt to resolve political impasse without having to

confront partition and ensure smooth withdrawal was made in a form of the 'Cabinet

Mission' after general elections.

The 1945-46 elections were held first for the Central Legislature and soon

after for the provincial legislative. The results clearly showed keen interest of

Muslims in Pakistan idea and once and for all proved that the League was the sole

representative of Indian Muslims, as it secured approximately 87 per cent of the vote

in Muslim-majority areas and won all 30 seats reserved for Muslims in Central

Legislature. Likewise, the Congress swept the polls in general constituencies with 91

per cent tally and captured 57 out of a total of 102 seats in central assembly, thus

emerged as the strongest national party and formed ministries. Although the Muslim

League had won almost all Muslim seats in the provinces, it could not form the

government in any Muslim-majority province, except for Bengal and Sind. In the

Punjab, the Congress came up with an offer of coalition on a condition that the

League would abandon the claim for Pakistan (Panigrahi 271). It seemed as if it had

been deliberately placed only to be refused since the Punjab province was “the key”

to Pakistan in prevailing opinion (Mujahid 6). The Congress teamed up with the

Unionists instead, who were predominantly of Sikhs. These developments struck

massive blow to Jinnah ambitions of sovereign state and members of the League

7 Riots in Calcutta on account of trials of the Indian National Army officers, who tried to liberate India by

force in 1943, and the mutiny of naval ratings of the Royal Indian Navy in February 1946 underscored the

fact that the loyalty of the subordinate services could no longer be relied upon.

were threatening with violence if their dream was denied them. Hindu-Muslim bloody

confrontations had already occurred during the election campaign, though on

relatively small scale. Nobody could predict what would happen this time around.

Social disorder bordering on civil war was surely not an exaggerating scenario,

bearing in mind bitter antagonism between the communities, and later events

unfortunately confirmed that. Reports made by the British delegation, which visited

India in early 1946, suggested that “some form of Pakistan would have to be

conceded” considering the heated attitude of Muslims, especially in Punjab (Wolpert

255). Everything depended on the outcome of the Cabinet Mission whose members,

Stafford Cripps, Pethick Lawrence and V. Alexander, had been in India since March

1946.

The purpose of the mission was to bring the Indian National Congress and

the Muslim League to an agreement regarding the framing of a new constitution for

a self-governing, independent India through a constitution-making body and to set

up a new Executive Council or interim government that would hold off ice

while the constitution was being hammered out (Qureshi 209). There was a great

deal of discussions whether India should be partitioned or whether union of India

comprising British India and the states should be formed. Furthermore, central and

provincial responsibilities were discussed; residuary powers were to be assigned to

the provinces and the questions relating to communal issues were to be voted upon

by the two major communities representatives in the legislature. Jinnah was

persistent on his stand for partition and fully independent sovereign state

encompassing whole Muslim-majority areas in the North West (Baluchistan, Punjab,

Sind and North-West Frontier Province) and in the East (Bengal and Assam) (Menon

246). He once again referred to the two-nation theory and Pakistan to be the only

possible solution. But Petick Lawrence, the Secretary of State, ensured him that such

'combo' had very “little chance of acceptance” considering that large parts of Bengal

and Punjab were inhabited by substantial number of non-Muslims, especially Sikhs

and Hindus in Punjab (Wolpert 259). In addition, a set-up “on the lines claimed by

the Muslim League would not solve communal problem” (Panigrahi 275). Partition of

these areas would not be acceptable for Jinnah either, so the whole idea of

sovereign state was put on hold. The Congress leadership represented by Azad (the

President), Nehru, Patel and Khan also strictly opposed any kind of partition and

wanted to establish strong Federal Government with the power gathered at the

centre. Jinnah was forced to consider the Union, sustaining critics from his followers,

which would have consisted of the Pakistan and the Hindustan groups, so-called

'three-tier Federation'. But insisted on separate constitution-making bodies for these

groups. He mentioned that it would be the price for entering into the Union. He also

demanded a parity of representation between the groups in the Union Legislature

that might be established. The Congress on the other hand wanted “one

constitution-making body for the whole of India and later for the groups, if so

desired, by the provinces concerned” (Menon 263). It opposed two separate bodies

for it would in principle allow the League to pursue Pakistan and disrupt the unity of

India. It also rejected the possibility of the parity between 90 million Muslims and

200 million Hindus; Gandhi termed the idea “worse than partition” (Wolpert 266).

The gap between the Congress and the League was so huge that after nearly three

months of exhausting negotiations the leaders still could not reach a consensus.

Their political views were apparently irreconcilable. The British, frustrated at

Congress-League 'tussle', resented to present its own settlement on 16 May 1946

based on prolonged discussions. It was a last hope for a single Indian unity and a

peaceful transfer of power.

The Cabinet Mission Plan envisaged a Union of India, embracing both British

India and the States, which would deal with defence, foreign affairs and

communications and have the power to raise finances for these areas of government

activity. All other areas would be delegated to the provinces. The Union would have

an executive and legislature representing both British India and the states. Any

communal issue or question would be decided by a majority of votes of two major

communities in the legislature. Provinces had an option to form groups and to elect

their own executives and legislatures and were given right to call for a

reconsideration of the terms of the constitution of the union and the group after

every ten years by a majority vote of its Legislative Assembly. The Mission proposed

the setting up of an Interim Government having the support of major political

parties, in which all the portfolios would be held by Indian leaders, while

constitution-making body would frame the constitution. Regarding constitution-

making body, it would consist of representatives of all provinces proportional to its

population (in the ration of one to a million) and divided between the main

communities (General, Muslims and Sikhs) in each province in proportion to their

population. Representatives allocated to each community in a province would be

elected by members of that community in its Legislative Assembly. Those would be

separated into three sections:

Section A – Madras, Bombay, United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces and Orissa

Section B – Punjab, NWFP and Sind

Section C – Bengal and Assam

These sections would decide the provincial constitutions within their group and

whether any group constitution should be set up. Provinces would have the power to

opt out of the groups when the new Union constitution had come into force. After

the group constitution had been settled the sections would reassemble, together

with representatives of the Indian States, for the purpose of settling the Union

constitution (Menon 264-6).

The plan gave the opportunity to the Muslim-majority provinces to form

groups with full legislative and executive powers with a weak central union only

dealing with defence, foreign affairs and communications. Moreover, these groups

were allowed to frame their provincial and group constitutions “unfettered by the

Union in any way” and would have the power to secede from the union after ten

years. Disappointed as they were, this 'version of Pakistan' had to be good enough

for the League and Jinnah, at least for now, and they accepted the plan on 6 June

1946. However, “separate sovereign Pakistan was still the unalterable objective”

(Menon 273) of the All-India Muslim League. The plan had encouraged them to do

so in principle. Jinnah agreed to the Mission for another reason. Communal tensions

were rising up and extremists of his own party “were ready to launch jihad without

further delay” (Wolpert 269-270) if instructed.

The proposal was complex and grouping of the provinces was probably the

most controversial issue. Even though the Cabinet Mission rejected the concept of

two separate and fully independent sovereign states of Pakistan and India and

opposed the principle of partition, “Congress felt that the plan envisaged not one but

several partitions after a few years.” There was a question of protection of minorities

in these groups with no reliable answer (Panigrahi 278). Ambiguity of the 16 May

statement caused it was interpreted differently. The Congress thought it was not

compulsory for the provinces to enter particular group (Chatterji 138). Gandhi mainly

objected the idea of grouping of the provinces on a religious or communal basis and

their option of secession from the union. Another contentious problem was the

composition and formation of the interim government. On 16 June the Cabinet

Mission announced short term plan about its composition (Ghose 147). It was to be

a coalition represented equally by the Congress and the Muslim League and other

elements8. Gandhi expressed in his letter to Pethick Lawrence that the National

Government, as he labelled it, ought to be “strong, capable and homogenous . . .

Without it, deep and universal corruption cannot end . . . There can therefore be no

question of parity whether the Government is allowed to be formed by the Congress

or the Muslim League. He also pointed out that “National Government [should be]

resposible in fact, if not in law, to the elected members of the Central Legislative

Assembly, should precede the summons of the election of members of the

Constituent Assembly.” (Gandhi 91:5-6). This last statement suggested, according to

Lord Alexander, that Gandhi was trying “to secure power without a constitution

coming into being and so to abandon the just claims of the Muslim League” (Wolpert

270). Finally, Gandhi criticised presence of the British troops in India and requested

an unconditional withdrawal if the British intentions of granting independence to

India was genuine (Gandhi 91:5). These ideas were not knew at all, only underlined

existed parallels between the Congress and the League.

8 14-member Executive Council was proposed to have the proportion of the parties and communities as

5+5+4: five from the Congress, five from the Muslim League and one each from the Sikhs, the Scheduled

Castes, the Indian Christians and the Parsis.

The crux of the problem was the parity in the interim executive. The Congress

was not willing to accept it after grabbing most of the 'general seats' in recent

elections and Jinnah could not afford to waive it, as he had been fighting for it for

too long. The Congress finally 'accepted' the 16 May proposal, on 25 June 1946,

with reservations about “the limitations of the Central authority” and “the system of

grouping of provinces” (Menon 277) but did not agree to 16 June Statement and

refused to enter the interim government on two grounds. Jinnah, as the President of

the Muslim League, insisted that he alone should nominate Muslim members to the

Executive Council. The Congress, being a national organization, declared that it

would nominate members from any community including Muslim and others. It also

claimed the right to nominate a member of the Depressed Classes community by

virtue of the communal award agreed to earlier. Thus it would have six members to

which Jinnah objected (Panigrahi 292). While the Congress had “turned down the

scheme for the interim government”, it signified “its willingness to participate in the

deliberations of the constitution-making body” (Tongo 13). Since the Congress had

not accepted the plan in its entirety, Jinnah now thought that the Viceroy, Lord

Wavell, would invite him to form the interim government as he stipulated earlier in

discussions (Wolpert 272). Instead he decided to appoint a “caretaker government”

for “a short interval” and remarked that they could “go ahead with the Constituent

Assembly and constitution-making” during that interlude since cabinet mission was

returning to England. (Menon 277). Jinnah was absolutely shocked at dishonesty of

the Viceroy and the Cabinet Ministers who committed “a breach of faith” (Menon

283). He pointed to the paragraph 8 of 16 June statement which clearly stated that

“in the event of the two major parties or either of them proving unwilling to join in

the setting up of a coalition Government on the above lines, it is the intention of the

Viceroy to proceed with the formation of an interim Government which will be as

representative as possible of those willing to accept the Statement of May 16th.” The

Viceroy answered that Jinnah had just misinterpreted the statement and he was not

obliged to do anything of that sort (278). Jinnah's bitterness was multiplied by the

statements of Jawaharlal Nehru who became President of the Congress on 6 July. At

the press conference on 10 July he stated that “the Constituent Assembly . . . would

be a sovereign body regardless of the policy statements from London [the Cabinet

Mission] . . . Any further delay in the transfer of power would compel the Congress

to directly clash with England. [He went on and said that], The Grouping scheme

was unworkable . . . It would never come to fruition because in section A the Hindu

majority provinces would be opposed, the North West Frontier Province would

oppose its section B as would Assam in Section C, and provincial jealousies would

thwart it . . . He also stressed the likelihood of a much stronger central government .

. . because it cannot exist otherwise.” Maulana Azad, Muslim leader of the Congress,

labelled it as “one of those unfortunate events which changed the course of history”

(Dube 131). Jinnah characterized the statement as “complete repudiation of the

basic form upon which the long-term scheme rests and all its fundamentals and

terms and obligations and rights of parties accepting the scheme” (Menom 281).

Reassurances from Pethick-Lawrence and Sir Stafford Cripps that the clauses of the

Mission still stood had had little effect. There was no point of return. The period of

“power vacuum” was to be substituted by “systematic breakdown” (Tsugitaka 112)

of the society as Jinnah had called for direct action to achieve Pakistan.

3.2 The Direct Action

At the meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League in Bombay on 27

July 1946, Jinnah “accused the Cabinet Mission of bad faith and of having played

into the hands of the Congress . . . He said that the League had gone to the limit of

concession, but the Congress had shown no appreciation of the sacrifices it had

made; the League therefore had no alternative but to adhere once more to the

national goal of Pakistan” (Menom 283). Two days later, Jinnah and his Working

Committee presented two resolutions hammered out after hearing the council's

opinions. The first withdrew League acceptance of the Cabinet Mission's May

proposals; the second charted the League's course of future direct action:

Whereas Muslim India has exhausted, without success, all efforts to find a

peaceful solution of the Indian problem by compromise and constitutional means;

and whereas the Congress is bent upon setting up Caste-Hindu Raj in India with

the connivance of the British; and whereas recent events have shown that the

power politics and not justice and fair play are the deciding factors in Indian affairs;

and whereas it has become abundantly clear that the Muslims of India would not

rest contended with anything less than the immediate establishment of an

Independent and fully sovereign State of Pakistan . . . the time has come for the

Muslim nation to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan to assert their just

rights, to vindicate their honour and to get rid of the present British slavery and the

contemplated future Caste-Hindu domination (Wolpert 282).

After both resolutions were enthusiastically adopted, Jinnah concluded:

We have taken a most historic decision. Never before in the whole life-

history of the Muslim League did we do anything except by

constitutional methods and constitutional talks. We are today forced

into this position by a move in which both the Congress and Britain

have participated. We have been attacked on two fronts . . . Today we

have said good-bye to constitutions and constitutional methods.

Throughout the painful negotiations, the two parties with whom we

bargained held a pistol at us; one with power and machine-guns

behind it, and the other with non-co-operation and the threat to

launch mass civil disobedience. This situation must be met. We also

have a pistol (282).

'Direct Action Day' or 'universal Muslim hartal'9 was set for Friday, August 16, 1946.

Wavell did not seem to take this threat too seriously and failed to foresee the

magnitude of the events which were about to come. It was not quite clear what

Jinnah meant by direct action and against whom was it directed but it was presumed

that riots between Hindus and Muslims are likely to occur, especially in the cities

(Panigrahi 298-9). Jinnah instructed his followers “to conduct themselves peacefully

and in a disciplined manner although his own usually precise and legalistic prose was

vague enough to allow for violent interpretation (Khan 63). And indeed his call for

direct action triggered carnage between the Muslims and the Hindus on

unprecedented scale. A few days before the riots, Muslims of Calcutta had been

preparing plans for direct action day. There was to be a massive gathering of

Muslims and propaganda of Pakistani cause. By late afternoon on 16 August, the

people went berserk and Calcutta turned into a battlefield. Mass killings, looting,

9 'Strike action'

arson and rapes swallowed the city. The streets were soon congested by piles of

dead bodies. Police and the military were deliberately deployed too late and there

were signs that “state resources had been exploited by the murderers with the

League's blessing.” There were heavy casualties on both sides as the violence was

anticipated by the Hindus as well (Khan 64). “The fire of violence spread to East

Bengal . . . Abductions, forced marriages, compulsory conversion to Islam,

destitution of whole families created distress . . . which was not to be compared to

the mass deaths three years earlier by starvation in the province” (Chatterji 141).

The implementation of politics “granted the violence legitimacy in the eyes of

rioters.” They were told to fight for freedom, space and history even though very

few could have imagined what these notions would mean (Khan 65).

Merciless skirmishes between the communities in Calcutta lasted almost a

week. In first three days at least 4,000 people died and another 10,000 were injured

(Khan 63). “Unofficial sources claimed that as many as 16,000 Bengalis were

murdered between 16 and 20 August 1946” (Wolpert 286). This 'pogrom' initiated by

the Muslim League will be forever remembered as 'the Great Calcutta Killings'. It was

“a sound warning of what was likely to happen if Jinnah's Pakistan was not granted”

(Panigrahi 302). The riots and terror continued well after the Day Action Day in

many parts of India. The country was on the verge of civil war and the British did

not seem to be able to handle it. On account of communal holocaust, Jinnah

remarked:

If Congress regimes are going to suppress and persecute the

Musalmans, it will be very difficult to control disturbances . . . there is

no alternative except the outright establishment of Pakistan . . . We

guarantee to look after non Muslim and Hindu-caste-minorities in

Pakistan . . . and protect and safeguard their interests in any way . . .

That is the quickest way to India's real freedom and to the welfare and

happiness of all the peoples inhabiting this sub-continent

(Wolpert 287)

It is noteworthy that in Bengal, where the bloodshed took place, a League ministry,

headed by Suhrawardy, was in power. Thus, they could have mitigate the tragedy.

Instead, “the police remained inactive and the army was not called” (Ghose 148).

The end justified the means; the situation changed dramatically after the Calcutta

killings and Wavell realized that “a much greater measure of toleration is essential if

India is to survive the transition to freedom” (287).

3.3 The Breakup

As the League revoked the 16 May plan on 29 July 1946, Wavell turned to the

Congress, on 6 August, regarding the formation of the Interim Government. Nehru

accepted the responsibility and voluntarily tried to negotiate the cooperation in

coalition with Jinnah. They met twice, prior to the Direct Action Day, but both

discussions ended up to be futile (Wolpert 283-4). Given the state of affairs it was

not so surprising. It was understood that the Government was to be formed in early

September without Muslim League. Then, the Calcutta killings altered drastically the

general view on Pakistan and left the country in turmoil. Deeply disturbed by the

havoc that the slaughters in Calcutta had caused, Wavell appealed to Gandhi and

Nehru on 27 August 1946 to accept a new formula of “grouping”, threatening not to

convene the constituent assembly until they did so (Menon 302). He felt, obviously

intimidated by recent events, that the Interim Government could not be formed

without the League. Nehru did not fail to realize that Wavell was trying to appease

the League and reported Wavell's attitude to his friends in England. Subsequently,

Clement Atlee “overruled Wavell” and instructed him “to form the government with

the Congress even if the League did not join” (Ghose 141). The Congress took over

the interim government on 2 September and Nehru became, virtually, the prime

minister of India and head of foreign affairs portfolio, with Patel in charge of home

affairs and Baldev Singh in charge of defence (Wolpert 289). It was “a day of

mourning” for the Muslim League as Jinnah put it (Ghose 149). But it was a historic

day for the Congress in a sense. Gandhi recorded: “At last the way to purna swaraj

has been opened. The whole of India has waited for this day for years and years . . .

[but insisted] So far we have not secured full independence.” On 26 September, he

had an interview with Wavell. Viceroy was eager to bring the Muslim League into

government, so was Gandhi, but the issue of appointing Nationalist Muslim by the

Congress to Executive Council remained. (Gandhi: 92-465). As before, Nehru and

Gandhi opposed the Jinnah's claim to nominate all the Muslims. Wavell was

convinced that the Congress would not change its stand (Wolpert 291) and

approached Jinnah in secret allowing him to nominate five Muslims and a Scheduled

Caste member from the ranks of the Muslim League (according to 6-5-3 scheme)

and join the government (Tharooor 148). Jinnah's position was desperate; he had

realized that he had to be more flexible in order to secure position in the

government, recognizing that “it would fatal to leave the entire field of

administration . . . in the hands of the Congress” (Jalal 225). In early October, he

was negotiating with Nehru and Gandhi about the set-up of the interim government.

In a letter from 6 October, Nehru expressed his willingness to co-operate with Jinnah

only “as a united team” and recognized the Muslim League “as the authoritative

representative organization of an overwhelming majority of the Muslims of India [but

not all of them]. . .” (Gandhi 92:459). Jinnah refused to work as a team, which

speaks volumes about his true intentions behind joining the interim government.

According to Tharoor, Jinnah had done so tactically, “only to wreck it from within”

(148). And subsequent events clearly justify her point.

The coalition was announced on 15 October, but the tussle was far from over,

with communal rioting spreading to Bihar and the North Western Frontier. Jinnah

forfeited all of his demands in order to be able to join the government on October

26, 1946. Apart from the parity, “monopoly of Muslim representation” and the “right

to veto on issues concerning Muslims”, Nehru was not willing to relinquish any of the

three major portfolios either (Jalal 225). He used all its power to prevent the League

from entering the government, since on the provincial level the League's influence

was weak. Nehru was quite aware of Jinnah's real intentions because the League

leaders, especially Liaquat Ali Khan, made their ultimate goal – Pakistan – no secret.

In the end, the League was able to nominate a Scheduled Class member and take

over the finance portfolio. Tension between the Congress and the League was

glaring and there was no reconciliation or solution to “fundamental mistrust,

suspicion, fear and hatred” (Wolpert 293-4). Appointed League's members of the

government “worked as a separate and distinct wing” and Wavell was unable, due to

his lack of political skills, “to ensure more effective co-ordination.” Smooth

functioning of the government was thereby virtually impossible (Moraes 343).

Immediately after the formation of the government, Nehru insisted on

League's acceptance of the May 16 Plan, since it was the condition for its entry into

office. Jinnah argued that the Congress had never accepted the Mission's proposals

unequivocally (Menon 321) and wanted the grouping cut, before he would bring the

League into the Constituent Assembly, which was scheduled on December 9 (321).

The Congress suggested that the grouping clause might be referred to the Federal

Court for its interpretation. This was the major flaw of the Cabinet Mission all along,

since the British had failed to guarantee the procedure of the Constituent Assembly

and were unable to forestall the Congress from misinterpreting its spirit. On 21

November, Jinnah announced that no representative of the Muslim League would

participate in the Constituent Assembly, thus he effectively “cramped constitutional

process” (Moraes 343). Jinnah, Nehru and other Leaguers and Congressmen had

been invited to London, in December, “in a last-ditch effort to salvage the situation”,

but the talks failed because neither of them showed willingness to accommodate

(Zakaria 126). However, the British government released the statement on 6

December declaring that “Should a Constitution come to be framed by a Constituent

Assembly in which a large section of the Indian population had not been

represented, His Majesty's Government could not of course contemplate–as the

Congress have stated they would not contemplate-forcing such a Constitution upon

any unwilling parts of the country” (Wolpert 301) and confirmed grouping of the

provinces (Jalal 231). Nevertheless, the League would not participate in framing of

the constitution till the very end. Not even after the Constituent Assembly meeting

was held on 9 December 1946 (Chatterji 139) and Nehru accepted the 6 December

statement. Attempts to compile “an agreed constitution for a united India [were] an

idle dream” (Wolpert 309). Apparently, Jinnah had made his mind some time ago;

the League “continued to instigate violence across the country” and Jinnah declared

that bloodshed “would not stop unless Pakistan was created” (Tharoor 148). By the

end of 1946 onwards, the law and order situation had worsened considerably and

even the capital felt insecure and incapable of dealing with communal outbursts

(Jalal 178). Gandhi observed: “We are not yet in the midst of a civil war. But we are

nearing it” (Khan 79). Untenable situation forced the British to a radical decision. On

20 February 1947, Clement Attlee announced “to take necessary steps to effect the

peaceful transfer of power into responsible Indian hands by a date not later than

June 1948.” It was desired that by fixing the exact date of withdrawal Indian

politicans would come to an agreement about constitution. But given the

circumstances, it was unlikely to happen and the question of how and to whom it

should transfer powers was yet to be decided. Moreover, Lord Wavell was being

replaced by Lord Mountbatten on the position of the Viceroy (Menon 338). He was to

be the last Viceroy of India with enormously difficult task of wrapping up the British

Raj. Penderel Moon recollected, in his book Divide and Quit: “This announcement [of

transfer of power] meant Partition, and Partition within the next seventeen months”

(63).

3.4 Mountbatten Plan and Partition of India

Prior to his arrival on 22 March 1946, Mountbatten was instructed by the

Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, to avoid Partition and obtain a unitary Government

for India. The hallmark was to secure British interests of keeping the army undivided

and retaining India in the Commonwealth. It took, however, just a few weeks and a

couple of meetings with Indian leaders to come to the conclusion that partition was

inevitable, and the “only possible alternative” (T.O.P. Vol 10,294). Although

undesirable, by both the British and the Indian National Congress, it became

abundantly clear that some sort of Pakistan had to be conceded, given Jinnah's

stubborn attitude and communal violence that had spread to, virtually, all parts of

the country, Punjab being affected the most. It was, however, the division of Punjab

and Bengal that caused misery and suffering of millions of Hindus, Muslims and

Sikhs. This could have been avoided only if the Congress had not insisted on this

division and the British had not taken side with its leaders. Both failed to realize or

rather neglected, despite warnings from Jinnah and others, the possibility of horrible

consequences of such fragmentation of ethnically diverse provinces. They hoped to

avoid further conflict but, in reality, it made the matters worse. Another reason was

the hastened nature with which the final decision was made.

By the time Mountbatten arrived in India, the communal violence and riots in

Punjab, once peaceful 'jewel' of the British India, had reached considerable heights.

Lahore, Amritsar and other cities were ablaze and mobs of young League's followers

and armed gangs were attacking government buildings, as well as private houses,

hoisting Muslim League flags. The situation was rapidly going out of control, and

Congressmen “started to use the vocabulary of Partition” as a possible solution for

the disaster unfolding in the region (Khan 81-5). The Congress Working Committee's

resolution from March 8 demanded for immediate Dominion Status and the handing

over of power to the interim government which would “function as a Cabinet with

full authority and responsibility.” It also called upon all parties and groups to discard

violent and coercive methods, and co-operate peacefully. Nehru urged “the Muslim

League to join Congress in the Assembly and work together amicably toward

reaching a final settlement.” If this would not have been possible, a division of the

Punjab and Bengal, with bearing in mind the will of large groups of non-Muslims in

these provinces, had become inevitable. Jinnah insisted that ideology and goal of the

Congress and the League are fundamentally different and in conflict and therefore

“there is no common ground for co-operation” (Wolpert 311-2).

Nehru and the Congress had been “attached to the idea of a United India” but

eventually reluctantly conceded to partition, in the expressed hope of avoiding

conflict and destruction of the country (T.O.P. Vol.10, 519). The only other solution

was presented by Gandhi who suggested that “India could be kept united if Jinnah

were offered the leadership of the whole country.” This idea, however, was

unthinkable for Nehru and Patel and Mountbatten “did not seem to take it seriously”

either (Tharoor 154).

Crucial discussions between Mountbatten and Jinnah were held in April 1947.

They ultimately determined the resolution of the Indian dilemma. Mountbatten was

very skilful negotiator but not even him could persuade Jinnah “to shake [his]

resolve to have partition.” Jinnah was a true leader of the Muslim League and the

Muslims for that matter. His position was strong enough to adamantly stick to his

demand, especially after the killings in Calcutta in 1946 (Zakaria 131-2). In his talks

with Mountbatten, Jinnah thought that “he had only to keep arguing to ensure that

Pakistan came into being” (Morris 3). They did agree on the urgency of speedy

decision, given the state of uncontrollable communal conflicts in the country. In the

BBC documentary ‘The Day India Burned: Partition of India’, Bir Bahadur Singh

recollects how their Sikh village in the Punjab was being attacked by the Muslims

and his father and other men decided rather to kill their own daughters and women

than to see them being taken away by Muslims. Such horrible scenes of communal

frenzy repeated again and again behind the curtain of political negotiations.

Mountbatten warned Jinnah that partition might produce even more violence and

bloodshed and it is in the best interests of the Muslims and the Hindus to avoid

partition. But Jinnah reassured him that such 'surgical operation' would resolve all

the troubles in the subcontinent. He also agitated against the division of Punjab and

Bengal, despite the fact that they contained enormous Hindu and Sikh population.

Mountbatten did not agree; he run Jinnah to the wall and told him that “as a part of

the bargain” to earn any Pakistan at all, those provinces must be divided (Zakaria

132-4). Mountbatten, being a friend of Nehru, would not listen to any proposal or

suggestion that would not hold ground with the Congress. Jinnah's insistence on the

unity of the Punjab and Bengal was very logical and based on a realistic and

peaceful solution to the impasse. Such a settlement would avoid the probable

dislocation, violence and above all confusion rampant in the country. But

Mountbatten in his final plan utterly disregarded the possibility of massive population

transfer that was naturally attached with the partition of these two large provinces

(Ghose 160). Likewise, the Sikhs of the Punjab were overlooked altogether. In the

words of Mountbatten, “a psychopathic case”, Jinnah, was given a choice, either “a

moth-eaten Pakistan” or the united India with safeguards that would allow him to

have his Pakistan later (Wolpert 318-9). This ultimatum forced deeply saddened

Jinnah to accept the 3 June plan prepared by Mountbatten and approved after

considerable discussion by London. Gandhi was strongly against the partition but

could not prevent it in the end and “felt helpless to carry on any more with his life-

long mission.” Mountbatten had to convince Nehru and Patel first and he secured

their consent with the help of Krishna Menon and V.P. Menon (Zakaria 136-40).

Nehru hated the vivisection of India, but as he said on 3 June 1947 “they could not

let India bleed continuously” (Moraes 357) Later, in 1960, he admitted that “partition

offered a way out . . .” (Ghose 161). Mountbatten wanted to proceed as quickly as

he could, in order not to be blamed for law and order of the country (The Day India

Burned), and deliberately “swept the Indian leaders along” (Tharoor 154). Panigrahi

hold the view that the Indian leaders, mostly tired old men, sacrificed the national

cause by seizing the first opportunity to grasp power and thus hastily accepted

partition of India (12). However, it was the fundamental divergence of aims of the

Congress and the Muslim League which constituted the crux of the whole issue:

unity vs. partition (Ali 117).

The partition plan was broadcasted on June 3, 1947, and it specified the

division of India into two dominions of India and Pakistan with immediate

independence; “Pakistan was to be of the truncated contiguous area variety

involving the partition of both the Punjab and Bengal.” The partition would have to

be approved by the Legislative Assemblies of these provinces by majority of votes,

first as a whole and then as two parts, one representing the Muslim-majority

districts and the other the rest of the province. If either part voted for partition, then

the province would be divided (Moon 66). The bisection was highly anticipated,

therefore necessary steps were to be initiated, with hastened nature, for dividing the

army, debt, and all the assets. In case of partition of the Punjab and Bengal, a

Boundary Commission was to be appointed “to demarcate the boundaries on the

basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims, and

also to take into account other factors” (67). Furthermore, the very next day,

Mountbatten declared that the transfer of power to the two states “was [to be]

advanced from June, 1948 to August 15, 1947” (Moraes 356).

The Quaid-i-Azzam had finally earned Pakistan for the Muslims although

“there was no firm line between winners and losers”. The plan inevitably caused an

utter confusion and disorientation in the minds of all communities. The country was

to be divided but it was not clear whether they would be expected to relocate and

where the actual boundaries would lie (Khan 89). The cardinal mistake of the

Boundary Commission, under the chairmanship of Sir Cyril Radcliffe who had never

been in India before, was that it had kept the already-drawn boundaries a secret

until the independence was granted to Pakistan and India on 14 and 15 August 1947

respectively (Wolpert 334). The uncertainty of the borders and fixed date of the

partition (Pollack,The Day India Burned: Partition of India), more or less, led to the

worst ethnic cleansing between Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in the history of British

India, particularly in the Punjab (Morris). The law and order considerably weakened

after the British had decided to bring most of their armed troops home in June 1947.

The remaining ones, “feeble and polarised police forces and undermanned Punjab

Boundary Force” could hardly make much of difference, considering a vastness of

the Indian Territory, to stop colossal human tragedy from happening. The British

completely failed to guarantee any safeguards to the Indian people because

Mountbatten had instructed the remaining troops to stay away from the frenzy with

only one exception: they could intervene “in [case of] an emergency to save British

lives” (Khan 128-9). This cold-blooded attitude cast a gloomy shadow on

Mountbatten's viceroyalty and Attlee's government as well.

At the end of June 1947, the Bengali and Punjabi legislative assemblies voted

for partition of their provinces as a “solution to the communal problem that had

burned much of Lahore and Amritsar to the ground” (Wolpert 332). The provinces

had been cut in half with taking into account religious population of each individual

district, which was based on outdated figures, and other factors such as connections

of railways, canals, irrigation channels, etc. (Pollack,The Day India Burned: Partition

of India). The fate of millions of people had been decided and resulted in a massive

movement of civilians prior to the announcement of boundaries but mainly in an

immediate aftermath. The boundaries had been drawn in extremely rushed manner,

in thirty six days, and the people who found themselves on the 'wrong' side of the

boundary “were forced to embark upon unplanned migrations under extremely

unguarded and dangerous circumstances” (Ali 126). Communities were literally

running for their lives on foot or by trains which were often attacked by armed

gangs who slaughtered the passengers. The roads were crammed with refugees and

their tracks were soon covered with blood; many villages of Punjab were levelled to

the ground and inhabitants executed. On top of that, countless women of all

religious communities were brutally raped and often disfigured (Khan 129). The

price of freedom and the emergence of Pakistan was enormously high; roughly 1

million people died and some 15 million had to relocate in the process (Hartnack

244). The evidence presented in this thesis put the question of inevitability of the

partition beyond any doubt but the number of casualties could certainly have been

alleviated if the British had taken full responsibility for the law and order in the

country. Unfortunately, Mountbatten turned a deaf ear to the warnings of both Nehru

and Jinnah (Khan 107). Celebrations of freedom, which were boycotted by its

“architect” Mahatma Gandhi (Zakaria 154), were overshadowed by the holocaust

across the boundaries and bitter legacies of the partition continue to haunt people of

India and Pakistan even today.

Conclusion

There were several reasons for the birth of a separate Muslim homeland and

the evidence suggests that all three parties – the British, the Congress and the

Muslim League were responsible. First of all, the British followed a divide-and-rule

policy in India and from the very beginning of their rule were categorizing people

according to religion and viewed and treated them as separate from each other.

Secondly, there was an ideological divide between the Muslims and the Hindus of

India. While there were strong feelings of nationalism in India, there were also

communal conflicts that were based on religious communities rather than class or

regional ones. Jinnah played probably the most crucial role in rooting this religious

divide into the minds of Muslims. Other communities inevitably answered with the

same violence and India was on the verge of civil war in 1946-47. Indian Congress

made several mistakes in their policies which convinced the League that it was

impossible to live in an undivided India after freedom from colonial rule because

their interests would be completely suppressed. The British did not hide its interest

in pitching two sides against each other and in the end did not take responsibility of

the law and order in the country. If they had, there would probably not have been so

much suffering. There had been some hope of an undivided India, with a

government consisting of three tiers along basically the same lines as the borders of

India and Pakistan at the time of Partition. However, Congress' rejection of the

Cabinet Mission plan of 1946 convinced the leaders of the Muslim League that

compromise was impossible and partition was the only course to take.

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Résumé

Partition of Indian subcontinent in August 1947 was truly a remarkable event

accompanied with independence and an emergence of a sovereign Pakistan state.

The reasons and circumstances which led to the partition can be determined,

primarily, from the events of 1935 onwards. Two main political organizations, the

Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, had contested in provincial

elections two years later and their outcome changed the political situation in India

substantially. The Congress had won persuasively and its leader Jawaharlal Nehru

claimed to represent all Indians, irrespective of religion. But the Muslim League's

leader, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, feared Hindu domination over the Muslim minority in

united India and started to agitate for a separate state which the Muslims could call

their own. All his future negotiations with the British Government and the Congress

were based on the assumption that the Hindus and Muslims constituted two different

nations. He appealed to the Muslims when he declared that their Islam religion was

in danger. The Viceroys of India, especially the last one, Lord Mountbatten, played a

crucial role in the process of creation of Pakistan, even though their main goal was

undivided India. They were ostensibly trying to resolve political impasse by series of

proposals from the August offer of 1942 to the Cabinet Mission offer of 1946. Their

real intention, though, was to preserve the Empire as long as possible. In the end,

all negotiations had inevitably failed and riots in the Punjab and Bengal provinces

escalated in a shocking ethnic cleansing finally forced the British Government to

concede Pakistan. Moreover, the boundaries were drawn and the power was

transferred in extremely short space of time. It was considered to be the only

solution to prevent the country from complete social breakdown. However, the

partition of India and division of the Punjab and Bengal along religious lines caused

a staggering human tragedy on an unprecedented scale with some 15 million

refugees and casualties of around 1 million.

Resumé

Rozdělení Indického subkontinentu v srpnu 1947 bylo v skutku nevšední

událostí, která byla spojená s nezávislostí a vznikem samostatného státu Pakistan.

Důvody a okolnosti, které vedly k tomuto rozdělení se dají určit zejména z událostí,

které následovali po roku 1935. Dvě hlavní politické organizace, Indický národní

kongres a Liga muslimů, se utkali ve volbách do provincií a výsledek těchto voleb

výrazně pozměnil politickou situaci v Indii. Kongres přesvědčivě vyhrál a jeho lídr

Džaváharlál Néhrú prohlásil, že reprezentuje všechny Indy bez ohledu na

náboženství. Jenomže lídr Ligy muslimů, Muhammad Alí Džinnáh, měl strach z

dominance hinduistů v jednotné Indii a začal agitovat za samostatný stát, který by

muslimové mohli nazývat svým vlastním. Všechny jeho budoucí vyjednávání s

britskou vládou a kongresem byly založené na předpokladu, že hindové a muslimové

tvoří dva odlišné národy. Samotné muslimy přilákal, když vyhlásil, že jejich islámské

náboženství je v ohrožení. Místokrálové Indie, zejména ten poslední, Lord

Mountbatten, hrály důležitou roli při vytvoření Pákistánu, i když jejich hlavním cílem

byla jednotná Indie. Zdánlivě se pokoušeli vyřešit politický rozkol předložením návrhů

v srpnu 1942 až do Mise kabinetu v roku 1946. Jejich skutečným cílem však bylo

udržet britské impérium tak dlouho jak jen bude možné. Všechny vyjednávání

nakonec nevyhnutelně selhaly a nepokoje v provinciích Paňdžáb a Bengál byly

vyhrocené až do šokujících etnických čistek. Tyhle události nakonec přinutili britskou

vládu uznat Pákistán. Co víc, ve velmi krátkém čase byli stanoveny hranice spolu s

předáním moci. Tohle rozhodnutí bylo považované za jediné možné řešení, které

mělo zamezit absolutnímu zhroucení společnosti. Rozdělení Indie a provincií Paňdžáb

a Bengál však způsobilo ohromnou lidskou tragédii, která neměla obdobu – 15

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