1.

• ChaosVPN

• openfly

2.

The Mission

Establish a free and open communications network for any hackerspace or lab to collaborate over. 3. Ensure the network is reliable. 4. The network must be fully open source, and well documented. 5. All nodes on the network must be excellent to each other. 6. Endeavor to do no harm.

Governments and citizens must have confidence that the networks at the core of their national security and economic prosperity are safe and resilient. Now this is about more than petty hackers who deface websites. - Hillary Secretary of State Clinton 7.

Tech

ChaosVPN VPN mesh agent deployed to nodes to manage connections and certificates TINC Many to Many VPN software.Free and open source.Developers working with us to meet our needs

Fonera OpenWRT based wifi units.Embedded device ChaosVPN support .

8.

ChaosVPN Application

I once killed a man with a belt sander. Hannah Montana

ChaosVPN originally CCC VPN 9. ChaosVPN 1.0 ( HHH only US H space) 10. ChaosVPN 2.0 planned at HAR 2009 11. ChaosVPN 2.0 released last year 12. Packages for Debian / OpenWRT 13. Images for Fonera 2.0n 14. 60 or so registered nodes 15. NYC Resistor is fully integrated 16. Services are being added daily 17. DNS service was added last year 18. Multiple Servers now in use

19.

Key Distribution

Key Distribution / Authoritative Node Registry List

20.

The VPN to rule them all

TINC Network Topology

21.

Node Locations

Public Access Permanent Locations ( Tied to authoritative data sets and people ) 22. Single Access Permanent Locations ( Tied to one person with some authoritative datasets ) 23. Mobile Access Points ( Tied to a person or group of persons ) 24. MANETS?( Conference / Camp deployments )

25.

Node Targets

Server / Routing Infrastructure Deployments 26. Embedded Routing Device Deployments 27. Soft Client Deployments 28. Embedded Soft Client Deployments

29.

The Warzone

Separate logical network from ChaosVPN 30. Isolated network, no direct internet link 31. Opt in network that requires a minimum level of complexity when accessing 32. Hazardous projects expected, but general being excellent to each other rules apply 33. CTF competition field, and infosec training ground

Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired signifies in the final sense,a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.This world in arms is not spending money alone.It is spending the sweat of its laborers,the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children.This is not a way of life at all inany true sense.Under the clouds of war, it is humanity hanging on a cross of iron. - Rainbow Bright 34.

Threat Model

35.

Trust Models The tactical war hare is a key component in the defense of the British Isles.- RAF Field Manual

36.

Function versus Form

PKIwith the web of trust

Diffie-Hellman P2P Trust Architecture

Affiliation-Hiding Key ExchangeAH-AKE / LAH-AKE

37.

Social Factors

CCC is older, far larger an organization, and originated in a very different environment. 38. Hacker spaces are community organized and managed with little to no commonality. 39. Organizational Models are very different. 40. All organizations, and users have different goals and concerns.

41.

Logistical Factors

Spaces tend not to have large bandwidth throughput available to them on premises. 42. Compute resources are usually hand me down systems, or embedded systems. 43. On site human resources are ever changing and of diverse skill sets. 44. Environmental factors are diverse. 45. Nodes are dispersed globally.

46.

PKI Topology

47.

PKI Web of Trust

Benefits

Web of Trust relies on existing sociological factors that form the basis for cooperative development 48. Cheap in terms of CPU costs, faster throughputs on embedded devices. 49. Simple architecture, simple diagnostics and support for a small operations team 50. All communications are point A to B.

Costs

Single Point / Few Points of Failure 51. Keys are more vulnerable to interception 52. Privacy is non existent

53.

Diffie-Hellman P2P Topology

54.

Affiliated-Hiding Key Exchange Topology

55.

Affiliation-Hiding Key Exchange

Benefits

Protection of keys at an affiliated organization level 56. Reduced reliance on higher risk keys in core routing infrastructure 57. Privacy can be guaranteed within groups

Costs

Costly in CPU, and in transmission 58. Requires multiple group controllers 59. Resiliency is now dependent on reliability of authorities

60.

Special Notes

Robust methodology of the LAH-AKE model by Stanis law Jarecki, Jihye Kim, and Gene Tsudikhttp://www.ics.uci.edu/~gts/paps/jkt08.pdf 61. Upcoming Geekend in Hamburg

https://wiki.hamburg.ccc.de/index.php/ChaosVPN::geekend1