Bitten.robert

Instrument First, Spacecraft Second:A New Mission Development Paradigm

Bob Bitten, Eric Mahr The Aerospace Corporation

Claude FreanerNASA Headquarters, Science Mission Directorate

2011 NASA Program Management ChallengeLong Beach, California9-10 February 2011

Used with permission

2

Executive Summary

• Instrument development difficulties have been shown to be a significant contributor to overall mission cost and schedule growth

• An approach that starts instrument development prior to mission development, entitled “Instrument First, Spacecraft Second” (IFSS), could potentially lead to a reduction in cost growth

• An assessment of the IFSS approach was conducted looking at historical instrument development times to assess schedule variability at the mission level and its effect on a portfolio of missions

• Applying IFSS approach to the Tier 2 and Tier 3 Earth Science Decadal Survey (ESDS) missions has the potential to save NASA several billion dollars while providing additional benefits including:

– Launching full set of ESDS missions sooner– Increasing number of missions launched by a given date– Decreasing number of Threshold Breach instances

3

Agenda

• Background

• Approach Overview

• Individual Mission Simulation Results

• Mission Portfolio Simulation Results

• Considerations

• Summary

4

Background

• Observations– >60% of missions experience developmental issues with the instrument– These issues lead to increased cost for other mission elements due to

“Marching Army” cost– Recent missions such as ICESat, OCO & Cloudsat all had instrument

development issues• Results show instrument cost growth influences total mission cost

growth at 2:1 factor– Missions in which the instruments were almost fully developed, such as

QuikTOMS and QuikSCAT, were developed at minimal cost and on short development schedules while experiencing limited cost growth

• Hypothesis– Developing instruments first and bringing them to an acceptable level of

maturity prior to procuring the spacecraft and initiating ground system development could provide an overall cost reduction or minimize cost growth

5

Instrument Development Problems Account for Largest Contributor to Cost & Schedule Growth*

• Cost & Schedule growth data from 40 recently developed missions was investigated

• 63% of missions experienced instrument problems leading to project Cost and Schedule growth

• Missions with Instrument technical problems experience a much larger percentage of Cost & Schedule growth than missions with Spacecraft issues only

S/C Only22.2%

Other14.8%

Inst. Only33.3%

Both Inst & S/C29.6%

Distribution of Internal Cost & Schedule Growth

* As taken from “Using Historical NASA Cost and Schedule Growth to Set Future Program and Project Reserve Guidelines”, Bitten R., Emmons D., Freaner C., IEEE Aerospace Conference, Big Sky, Montana, 3-10 March 2007

24.1%

17.4%

9.3% 8.0%

18.7%

4.7%

34.6%

51.3%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

Cost Schedule

Pe

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Inst only

S/C only

Both

Other

Cost & Schedule Growth Due to Technical Issues

Historical NASA Data Indicates Payload Mass and Cost Growth Significantly Greater than Spacecraft Mass & Cost Growth

60%

101%

33%

44%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

Mass Cost

Ave

rage

Per

cent

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Pha

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Sta

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Payload

Spacecraft

6

1 1

Note: 1) As measured from Current Best Estimate, not including reserves

Data Indicated Payload Resource has Greater Uncertainty than Spacecraft

* As taken from “Inherent Optimism In Early Conceptual Designs and Its Effect On Cost and Schedule Growth: An Update”, Freaner C., Bitten R., Emmons D., 2010 NASA PM Challenge, Houston, Texas, 9-10 February 2010

Historical Instrument Schedule Growth*

< 0%

0 to 15%

15% to 30%

30% to 60%

> 60%

7

12%

30%

14%

30%

14%

Distribution ofInstrument Schedule Growth

Average Instrument Development Schedule Growth = 33% (10 months)

* Based on historical data of 64 instruments with non-restricted launch window

0

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Planned Delivery Duration

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Planned vs. ActualInstrument Development Duration

Cost* & Schedule Growth Examples

1.61.7

2.2

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2.5

OCO CloudSat ICESat

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OCO CloudSat ICESat

Total Mission to InstrumentCost Growth Ratio

Instrument Schedule GrowthPlanned to Actual Ratio

* Note: Although it is understood that other factors contributed to the cost growth of these missions, it is believed that the instrument delivery delays were the primary contributor

Ratio of Mission Cost Growth to Instrument Cost Growth is on the order of 2:1

9

Case History: QuikSCAT

• On November 19, 1997, NASA awarded the first rapid spacecraft delivery order to Ball Aerospace & Technologies Corp., Boulder, CO for the delivery of QuikSCAT spacecraft

– The satellite was the first obtained under NASA's Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity program for Rapid Spacecraft Delivery Office (RSDO) for rapid delivery of satellite core systems

• QuikSCAT, NASA’s ocean-observing satellite mission, was rapidly developed to fill in the data gap between NSCAT on ADEOS-I and SeaWinds on ADEOS-II

– A scatterometer nearly identical to SeaWinds was quickly assembled from NSCAT spare parts

• QuikSCAT was launched on June 19, 1999 on a Delta II

Demonstrates that a 2-year procurement and S/C development, when instruments are complete, is feasible

10

Case History: QuikTOMS

• In July 1999, NASA selected Orbital Sciences Corporation (Orbital) to build, launch and operate the Quick Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer (QuikTOMS)

– The fifth TOMS instrument flight model 5 (TOMS FM-5) was complete– FM-5 was originally scheduled to fly as a cooperative mission with Russia in late 2000 but was

delayed due to Russian funding issues, so it was decided to launch in August 2000 as a US free-flyer

– Named QuikTOMS since the effort entailed the construction and launch of a spacecraft in less than two years as compared to traditional missions which take from three to five years

• QuikTOMS was procured by NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center’s (GSFC) Rapid Spacecraft Development Office (RSDO) and was managed by the GSFC QuikTOMS Project Office

– QuikTOMS, with the already built TOMS FM-5, was co-manifested as a secondary payload with Orbview 4

– Orbview 4, the primary payload, experienced integration and test difficulties, which caused a launch delay

• QuikTOMS was launched on September 21, 2001 on a Taurus

From FY03 Budget Document, pg. SAT 3-86, dated Feb-02

Demonstrates that a 2-year procurement and S/C development, when instruments are complete, is feasible

11

Agenda

• Background




• Considerations

• Summary

12

IFSS Development Approach Overview

Historical Development Approach

Instrument First, Spacecraft Second (IFSS) Approach

Spacecraft Development

Instrument Development

System I&T

Delay

System I&T

Marching Army

Plan Actual



System I&T

Delay

IFSS Offset

Comparison of Element Delivery Times – HyspIRI-like Mission

45

40

44

10

13

4

12

16

8

20 30 40 50 60 70

TIR

VSWIR

Spacecraft

Months to Delivery

Minimum

Mean

Maximum

IFSS Assessment Approach

13

Earth Science Decadal Survey

Quad ChartsESDS-”like”

Concept Sizing Baseline-”like” ICE Schedule Comparison

Schedule SimulationIFSS ResultsSand Chart ToolMeasures of

Effectiveness

• Cost to implement Tier 2 & 3 missions• Time to launch all Tier 2 & 3 missions• Number of missions launched by 2024• Percent of Threshold Breach Reports

$0.0

$0.5

$1.0

$1.5

$2.0

$2.5

$3.0

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

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0M

)

3D-WindsGACMSCLPGRACE-IIPATHLISTACEGEO-CAPESWOTASCENDSHyspIRICLARREODESDynI-LDESDynI-RIceSat-2SMAPGPM LDCMNPPAquariusOCO-2GlorySystematic MissionsESSPES Multi-MissionES Technology Applied SciencesES ResearchFY11 PBR

HyspIRI-like Design Summary

Mass (kg) Power (W)

Payload 188.9 141.6

Propulsion 23.9 4.0

ADCS 86.9 173.2

TT&C 76.2 153.2

C&DH 168.8 466.9

Thermal 29.0 69.3

Power 198.5 N/A

Structure 193.0 0.0

Dry Mass 965.1

Wet Mass 1056.6

EOL Power 1732.4

BOL Power 1903.7

Mass and power values include contingencySubsystem power values represent orbit average power

As modeled mass of HyspIRI is within the launch capability

of the Atlas V 401

LV capability = 7155 kg

HyspIRI-like Independent Cost Estimate Results FY10$M

Cost in FY10$M IndependentCategory EstimateMission PM/SE/MA 40.5$ Payload PM/SE/MA 7.3$ VSWIR 91.0$ TIR 54.7$ Spacecraft 94.4$ MOS/GDS Development 29.8$ Development Reserves 103.0$

Total Development Cost 420.7$ Phase E 24.2$ Phase E Reserve 4.0$ E/PO 1.9$ Launch System 130.0$

Total Mission Cost 580.7$

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

100.0%

300 400 500 600 700 800 900

Cum

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Estimated Cost (FY10$M)

Distribution

Sum of Modes

70th Percentile

HyspIRI-like Development Cost Risk Analysis Results –Case 1A, 1B & 2B (IFSS with 18 Month Offset) FY10$M

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

$200 $300 $400 $500 $600 $700 $800 $900

Estimated Development Cost (FY10$M)

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Probability of Instrument Delaying Project• 96.7% for Case 1B no IFSS offset (9.8 month average delay)• 5.9% for Case 2B with 18 month offset

14

IFSS Assessment Overview

• Start with instrument resources– If no detailed instrument data can be found, then surrogates are used

• Size spacecraft for orbit conditions and instrument resource requirements

• Estimate the cost of the system

• Lay out baseline plan

• Phase cost over funding profile

• Identify analogous instrument development times to use in simulation

• Run the individual mission simulation

• Fold the mission simulation results into the mission portfolio simulation

Example Mission Data - HyspIRI Mission Overview

15

* Note: As taken from page 3 of HyspIRI presentation at Earth Science Decadal Survey Symposium, Feb 2009 , http://decadal.gsfc.nasa.gov/Symposium-2-11-09.html

Data Completeness Assessment

• Given the desire to have representative (i.e., “-like”) missions, surrogate instruments used when actual data was not available

16

Altitude Inclination Design Life

Mass Power Data Rate Duty Cycle Type

Tier 2HySPIRI X X X X X X X XASCENDS X X X P P P P XSWOT X X X P P XGEO-CAPE X X X P XACE X X X XTier 3LIST X X X X X P X XPATH X X X X X X X XGRACE-II X X X X

SCLP X X X X

GACM X X X X3D-Winds X X X X X X X X

Instrument ParametersMission ParametersMission

X = YesP = PartialBlank = No

Mission Concept Sizing

• Using mission and instrument parameters, representative Tier 2 and Tier 3 designs were developed

• Designs were developed using a Concurrent Engineering Methodology (CEM) model

• CEM model is a spreadsheet spacecraft conceptual design and analysis tool

– Sizing relationships generated using historical trend data

• Include physics, rules-of-thumb, parametric relationships, and educated guesswork

– Will not give an exact result, but provides representative designs “in the ballpark”

17

Comparison of Tier 2 & 3 Mission Public Costs vs. Estimate

18

MissionPublic Cost*

(FY10$M)

Aerospace Estimate(FY10$M)

Difference

Tier 2

HySPIRI-like 433$ 451$ 4.2%

ASCENDS-like 455$ 510$ 12.1%

SWOT-like 652$ 808$ 24.0%

GEO-CAPE-like 1,238$ 677$ -45.3%

ACE-like 1,632$ 1,285$ -21.2%

Tier 2 Total 4,409$ 3,731$ -15.4%

Tier 3

LIST-like 523$ 683$ 30.7%

PATH-like 459$ 387$ -15.7%

GRACE-II-like 454$ 280$ -38.3%

SCLP-like 449$ 552$ 22.9%

GACM-like 988$ 830$ -16.0%

3D-Winds-like 760$ 856$ 12.6%

Tier 3 Total 3,632$ 3,587$ -1.2%

Total 8,042$ 7,319$ -9.0%

Note: Costs do not include launch vehicle cost* Taken from NASA Day 2 - Earth Science and the Decadal Survey Program, Slide 20 February 2009 and inflated to FY10$,http://decadal.gsfc.nasa.gov/Symposium-2-11-09.html

Tier 2 Missions

Tier 3 Missions

Total

Results indicate that estimates are representative

19

Agenda

• Background




• Considerations

• Summary

Simple Schedule Analysis Simulation Framework

20

Instrument Development Delays Can Lead to Overall Schedule Delay


Spacecraft Integration & Test

System Integration

Env. Test

Pad Ops.

Launch


Instrument Integration & Test

SIR TRR

Typical DeliveryWith

Instrument Delay

Simulation of IFSS Approach

• If Instrument Dev + I&T to S/C > S/C Dev + System Integration Time– Add project marching army cost until instrument is complete

• If S/C Dev + System Integration Time > Instrument Dev + I&T to S/C– Add instrument marching army cost after instrument is developed

21

System ATP to TRR

Instrument ATP to Integration

}Cost due to Instrument Delay

System ATP to TRR

Instrument ATP to Integration

}IFSS Offset

}

Cost of Early Instrument Delivery

Instrument Delays Much More Costly than Early Instrument Delivery due to Marching Army

Example of Spacecraft & Instrument Timelines

• Basis of Triangular Schedule Distribution:– Low: Baseline Plan– Mode: Baseline Plan (S/C) and Average of Historical Analogies – High: Maximum of Historical Analogies

Spacecraft InstrumentDistribution ATP-TRR ATP-DelLow 45.0 44.6 Most likely 45.0 53.4 High 57.0 66.3 Mean 49.0 54.8

49 54.75340 45 50 55 60 65 70

Schedule Distributions (months)

Spacecraf t ATP-TRR

Instrument ATP-Delivery

}

Differences in means will lead toS/C waiting for instrument delivery

}22

Comparison of Element Delivery Times – HyspIRI-like Mission

45

40

44

10

13

4

12

16

8

20 30 40 50 60 70

TIR

VSWIR

Spacecraft

Months to Delivery

Minimum

Mean

Maximum

23

TIR instrument delivery time exceeds Spacecraft delivery time

Current Plan

Mission Simulation Overview

• To test the potential impact of implementing an IFSS approach, an analysis was conducted using historical instrument development durations to simulate the development of a mission

• A simulation was developed in which a Monte Carlo draw is made for both the spacecraft development duration and instrument development duration(s) to determine if the spacecraft will be ready for system testing prior to the instruments’ availability for integration to the spacecraft

– Simulation provides a statistical distribution of potential outcomes allowing for an assessment of the benefit or penalty of different IFSS offsets

• Two primary cases were studied – – Case 1: Baseline without any IFSS “offset”– Case 2: IFSS with an IFSS “offset”

24

Summary of Cases

• Case 1A – Plan without IFSS– Normal NASA mission development which has concurrent instrument,

spacecraft, and ground system development, with no unanticipated problems

• Case 1B – “Actual” without IFSS using Historical Data– Baseline with historically representative technical difficulties

• Case 2A – Plan with IFSS– “Instrument first" - development of instruments through successful CDR

and environmental test of an engineering or protoflight model prior to initiation of spacecraft and ground system development, with no unanticipated problems

• Case 2B – “Actual” with IFSS using Historical Data– “Instrument first" with historically representative technical difficulties

25

HyspIRI-like Development Cost Risk Analysis Results – Case 1A & 1B FY10$M

26

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

$200 $300 $400 $500 $600 $700 $800 $900


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Case 1BEstimate with

Instrumentdifficulties

$547M

Case 1AEstimate without instrument issues

$459M

HyspIRI-Like Development Cost Risk Analysis Results – Case 1A, 1B & 2B (IFSS with 18 Month Offset) FY10$M

27

0%

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100%

$200 $300 $400 $500 $600 $700 $800 $900


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$547M

Case 1AEstimate without instrument issues

$459M



$466M

Probability of Instrument Delaying Project• 96.7% for Case 1B no IFSS offset (9.8 month average delay)• 5.9% for Case 2B with 18 month offset

Summary of Simulation Results*

28

w/o IFSS w/IFSS

HySPIRI-like 541$ 654$ 1,429$ 22.6% 8.4%ASCENDS-like 599$ 882$ 636$ 47.3% 6.2%SWOT-like 866$ 933$ 875$ 7.8% 1.1%GEO-CAPE-like 759$ 1,129$ 816$ 48.7% 7.6%ACE-like 1,318$ 1,616$ 1,429$ 22.6% 8.4%LIST-like 759$ 1,093$ 800$ 44.0% 5.4%PATH-like 480$ 628$ 505$ 30.8% 5.1%GRACE-II-like 313$ 374$ 325$ 19.4% 3.7%

SCLP-like 635$ 900$ 681$ 41.7% 7.1%

GACM-like 886$ 1,333$ 959$ 50.5% 8.2%3D-Winds-like 900$ 1,320$ 952$ 46.6% 5.8%

Total 8,056$ 10,862$ 8,557$ 34.8% 6.2%

Percent IncreaseMission

PlannedCase 1A

"Actual" w/o IFSS

Case 1B

"Actual" w/o IFSS

Case 2B

* Note: Cost values represent simulation mean mission total cost

IFSS Approach saves on the order of 30% compared to typical approach

Mean of Simulation Data is Consistent with Actual Earth Science Mission Cost & Schedule Growth Histories

29

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

140%

160%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Development Schedule Growth

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Actual Mission GrowthSimulation Data

30

Agenda

• Background




• Considerations

• Summary

31

Mission Portfolio Assessment Approach

• Mission Portfolio Assessment– The Tier 2 and Tier 3 mission simulation results were entered into a

mission portfolio simulation entitled the Sand Chart Tool– The Sand Chart Tool assesses the affect of mission cost and schedule

growth on the other missions within the portfolio– The interaction creates a domino effect for all subsequent missions

• Simulation Assesses Portfolio with and without IFSS– Baseline Without IFSS Case

• Case 1B (i.e. baseline with historical instrument problems) is used to adjust mean and standard deviation and results are propagated through model

– With IFSS Case

• Case 2B (i.e. IFSS approach with historical instrument problems) mean and standard deviation is used as input and simulation is run again

Strategic Analysis Tool Needed to Support Long Term Decision Making Process – Sand Chart Tool (SCT)

32

Input:baseline plan, cost likelihood curves

Perform Monte Carlo probabilistic analysis

Output:schedule likelihood curves, # of missions complete, etc.

• Quantitative results to support strategic decisions– Changes in mission launch dates to fit new program – Assess Figures of Merit

• The Sand Chart Tool is a probabilistic simulation of budgets and costs

– Simulates a program’s strategic response to internal or external events

• Algorithms are derived from historical data and experiences

– Long-term program/portfolio analysis – 10-20 years

$0.0

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2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

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$200 $300 $400 $500 $600 $700 $800 $900


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$9.1

$11.1

$0.0

$2.0

$4.0

$6.0

$8.0

$10.0

$12.0

w/IFSS w/o IFSS

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B

2024.1

2025

2023

2024

2025

2026

w/IFSS w/o IFSS

10.1

8.9

8

8.5

9

9.5

10

10.5

11

w/IFSS w/o IFSS

11.8%

64.2%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

w/IFSS w/o IFSS

Cost to Implement ESDS Missions Time to Launch ESDS Missions

Number of Missions Launched by 2024 Percent Threshold Breach Reports

Sand Chart Tool will Assess Domino Effect for Other Projects in Program Portfolio

$0

$50

$100

$150

$200

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Mission #4

Mission #3

Mission #2

Mission #1

33

$0

$50

$100

$150

$200

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Mission #4

Mission #3

Mission #2

Mission #1

Planned Funding = $690M Actual Funding History = $715M

Although the total program funding remained consistent over this time period, implementation of successive missions were substantially affected

Portfolio effect adds cost due to inefficiencies of starting & delaying projects

34

IFSS SCT Measures of Effectiveness

• Equal Content, Variable Cost – Cost to implement all Tier 2 and Tier 3 ESDS Missions

• Equal Content, Variable Time– Time to launch all Tier 2 and Tier 3 ESDS Missions

• Equal Time, Variable Content– Number of Tier 2 & Tier 3 ESDS Missions launched by 2024

• Program Volatility– Percentage of time that missions exceed the 15% cost growth or 6-month

schedule growth threshold breach requirement*

* Note: Of the 11 SMD missions under breach reporting requirements in FY08, 10 missions had experienced a breach

Mission Portfolio Example with IFSS

35

$0.0

$0.5

$1.0

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$2.0

$2.5

$3.0

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

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Tier 1Missions

Tier 2 & 3Missions

ExistingMissions

ContinuingElements

Continuing Activities

Tier I MissionsExistingMissions

Funding Availablefor Future Missions

Mission Portfolio Example Without IFSS

36

$0.0

$0.5

$1.0

$1.5

$2.0

$2.5

$3.0

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025

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Tier 1Missions

Tier 2 & 3Missions

ExistingMissions

ContinuingElements

Continuing Activities

Tier I MissionsExistingMissions

Less Funding Available for

Future Missions

Domino Effect is much greater leading to more inefficiencies & less funding available for future missions

Comparison of Mission Portfolio Results

$9.1

$11.1

$0.0

$2.0

$4.0

$6.0

$8.0

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$12.0

w/IFSS w/o IFSS

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B

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2024.1

2025

2023

2024

2025

2026

w/IFSS w/o IFSS

10.18.9

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

w/IFSS w/o IFSS

11.8%

64.2%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

w/IFSS w/o IFSS

Cost to Implement ESDS Missions Time to Launch ESDS Missions

Number of Missions Launched by 2024 Percent Threshold Breach Reports

IFSS Provides Better Results for Each Metric Assessed

38

Agenda

• Background




• Considerations

• Summary

IFSS Considerations

• Typical IFSS “Offset” for instrument development is two years– Provides instruments with a two year head start prior to a three to four year mission

development phase

• For most instrument development efforts, this is after CDR but prior to full instrument integration

– At this point, most instrument problems should be identified– Time remains to recover prior to delivery to spacecraft for system environmental

test

• Assumes that mission systems engineers and spacecraft vendors are involved at low level of effort to ensure mission requirements and spacecraft accommodations are considered

• IFSS approach may not be suitable for all mission types– May not apply when spacecraft is integral to instrument

39

Rapid III Procurement* Can Provide Reliable Spacecraft with Known Performance within 20 to 36 Months

40

VendorsCore

Spacecraft

Spacecraft Delivery (Mos.)

Spacecraft Lifetime

(Yrs)

Spacecraft Dry Mass

(kg)

Payload Mass (kg)

Payload Power (W)

Pointing Accuracy(Arcsec)

CommSys

Band

System Redundancy

Ball Aerospace BCP 2000 36 5 450 500 400 10.5 S, X Fully

General Dynamics

GD 300S 26 2 265 65 125 360 S, X Selective

GD 300HP 30 5 1107 3115 775 360 S, Ku Selective

Lockheed Martin LMx 26 3 426 460 427 130 S Fully

Northrop Grumman

EAGLE-0 22 1 471 86 100 360 S Selective

Orbital Sciences Corp

LEOStar-2 32 5 938 500 850 48 S Fully

Surrey Space Technologies –

U.S.

SSTL 150 22 7 103 50 50 36 S Selective

SSTL 300 28 7 218 150 140 360 S Selective

SSTL 600 28 4 429 200 386 605 S, X Selective

Thales AleniaSpace France

Proteus 20 5 261 300 300 72 S Selective

Thales AleniaSpace Italy

Prima 29 7 1032 1138 1100 36 S Selective

Overall Summary 20 - 36 1 - 7 103-1107 50 - 3115 50 - 1100 10.5 - 605 S, X, Ku Selective, Fully

VendorsCore

Spacecraft

Spacecraft Delivery (Mos.)

Spacecraft Lifetime

(Yrs)

Spacecraft Dry Mass

(kg)

Payload Mass (kg)

Payload Power (W)

Pointing Accuracy(Arcsec)

CommSys

Band

System Redundancy

Ball Aerospace BCP 2000 36 5 450 500 400 10.5 S, X Fully

General Dynamics

GD 300S 26 2 265 65 125 360 S, X Selective

GD 300HP 30 5 1107 3115 775 360 S, Ku Selective

Lockheed Martin LMx 26 3 426 460 427 130 S Fully

Northrop Grumman

EAGLE-0 22 1 471 86 100 360 S Selective

Orbital Sciences Corp

LEOStar-2 32 5 938 500 850 48 S Fully

Surrey Space Technologies –

U.S.

SSTL 150 22 7 103 50 50 36 S Selective

SSTL 300 28 7 218 150 140 360 S Selective

SSTL 600 28 4 429 200 386 605 S, X Selective

Thales AleniaSpace France

Proteus 20 5 261 300 300 72 S Selective

Thales AleniaSpace Italy

Prima 29 7 1032 1138 1100 36 S Selective

Overall Summary 20 - 36 1 - 7 103-1107 50 - 3115 50 - 1100 10.5 - 605 S, X, Ku Selective, Fully

Typical 2-3 year procurement for spacecraft plus additional year for testing plus 2 year IFSS offset equates to 5 to 6 year total mission development time

* Note: As taken from Rapid III Spacecraft Summary, posted April 1, 2010, http://rsdo.gsfc.nasa.gov/Rapid-III.html

41

Agenda

• Background




• Considerations

• Summary

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Summary

• Historically, Instrument development difficulties have been shown to be a significant contributor to overall mission cost and schedule growth

• An approach that starts instrument development prior to mission development, entitled “Instrument First, Spacecraft Second” (IFSS), could potentially lead to a reduction in cost growth

• Applying IFSS approach to the Tier 2 and Tier 3 Earth Science Decadal Survey (ESDS) missions has the potential to save NASA on the order of $2B while providing additional benefits including:

– Launching full set of ESDS missions a year sooner– Providing for an extra mission launched by 2024– Decreasing the number of Threshold Breach instances from 64% to 12%

• IFSS approach is enabled/enhanced given Rapid III Rapid Spacecraft Development Office (RSDO) bus procurement approach

– Availability of wide range of busses provides quick acquisition of required capability

Questions?

• Bob Bitten, NASA Advanced Projects, The Aerospace Corporation– [email protected]

• Eric Mahr, Space Architecture Department, The Aerospace Corporation– [email protected]

• Claude Freaner, Science Mission Directorate, NASA Headquarters– [email protected]

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mailto:[email protected]

