Srebrenica: a safe area

Part III - The fall of Srebrenica

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Contents

Chapter 1 The military and political situation in spring 1995 .......................................................................... 5 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................... 5 2. Force Commander general Bernard Janvier............................................................................................... 6 3. Commander UNPROFOR general Rupert Smith in Sarajevo .............................................................. 10 4. The differences between Smith and Janvier............................................................................................. 13 5. The Split meeting: split visions? .................................................................................................................... 15 6. The strategic field of forces spring 1995, seen from UNPROFOR ..................................................... 18 7. After the end of the cease-fire ................................................................................................................... 26 8. Boutros-Ghalis move in the Security Council ........................................................................................ 29 9. Janvier in the Security Council and in consultation with the troop contributing nations ................. 36 10. The air strikes on Pale ............................................................................................................................... 41 11. Direct consequences of the air strikes for UNPROFOR .................................................................... 42 12. The report from the UN Secretary-General .......................................................................................... 48 13. Response to the air strikes on Pale: formation of the Rapid Reaction Force ................................... 54 14. The situation on the ground for UNPROFOR in June 1995 ............................................................. 67 15. At the political front in Bosnia after the air strikes: the situation in June 1995 ............................... 74 16. The strategy of the Bosnian Muslims in the fighting ............................................................................ 79 17. The strategy of the Bosnian Serbs in the fighting ................................................................................. 85 18. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 97

Chapter 2 Air power: Close Air Support and air strikes ................................................................................. 99 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 99 2. Backgrounds of the differences of opinion between NATO and UN .............................................. 100 3. Air strikes in practice: the second half of 1994 ..................................................................................... 109 4. Discussions on air strikes in spring 1995 ............................................................................................... 117 5. After the OGrady incident: air power in July 1995 .............................................................................. 121 6. Discussions on air power between UN and NATO at the highest level ........................................... 125 7. Conclusions ................................................................................................................................................. 128

Chapter 3 No air actions on release of the hostages: a deal between Janvier and Mladic? ...................... 131 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 131 2. Rumours in the media about a deal ....................................................................................................... 131 3. Further investigation into a deal in New York and Paris ..................................................................... 134 4. The rumours on the Bosnian side ........................................................................................................... 137 5. The report on the meeting with Janvier and Mladic ............................................................................. 139 6. External interference with the hostage crisis ......................................................................................... 141 7. Visions from later days .............................................................................................................................. 144 8. Continuing the use of air power, also during the hostage crisis? ........................................................ 146 9. Conclusion: deal or no deal? .................................................................................................................... 148

Chapter 4 The mood in the enclave: May - July 1995 ................................................................................... 152 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 152 2. Dutchbats mood ....................................................................................................................................... 153 3. The home straight was the heaviest for Dutchbat ................................................................................ 163 4. Bosnia in the Netherlands domestic political arena - June 1995......................................................... 168 5. The relief of Dutchbat III......................................................................................................................... 171 6. The morale of ABiH and the population ............................................................................................... 187 7. VRS propaganda in the enclave ............................................................................................................... 192 8. The absence of Naser Oric ....................................................................................................................... 195

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9. The humanitarian situation in Srebrenica ............................................................................................... 200 10. Conclusions .............................................................................................................................................. 208

Chapter 5 The period from 25 May 1995 to 6 July 1995 .............................................................................. 210 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 210 2. The position of the Dutchbat observation posts (OPs)....................................................................... 210 3. The days of late May and early June 1995: the VRS threaten around OP Echo .............................. 217 4. Developments in June: an imminent VRS attack? ................................................................................ 232 5. The NATO withdrawal plan .................................................................................................................... 238 6. The ABiH offensive at Sarajevo .............................................................................................................. 240 7. The situation around Srebrenica in mid June ........................................................................................ 242 8. Individual skirmishes between ABiH and VRS ..................................................................................... 245 9. The final two weeks before the attack .................................................................................................... 259 10. The motivation for starting the attack .................................................................................................. 263 11. VRS plans for the attack on Srebrenica ................................................................................................ 271 12. Signs of an impending attack? ................................................................................................................ 276

Chapter 6 The Fall of Srebrenica: 6 to 11 July 1995 ...................................................................................... 281 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 281 2. Investigative problems related to the period of the fall and thereafter .............................................. 281 3. A closer look at the headquarters and chain of command .................................................................. 288 4. Procedures for the request of Close Air Support .................................................................................. 295 5. Combat action and Close Air Support from day to day: 6 July .......................................................... 298 6. Combat action and Close Air Support from day to day: 7 July .......................................................... 307 7. Combat Action and Close Air Support from Day to Day: 8 July ....................................................... 309 8. Combat Action and Close Air Support from Day to Day: 9 July ....................................................... 321 9. A Line in the Sand: The Blocking Positions .......................................................................................... 337 10. The Early Morning Hours of 10 July: Dutchbat Activities at the Blocking Positions .................. 353 11. Close Air Support: A Third Request from Dutchbat ......................................................................... 359 12. Further Activities of the Blocking Position on 10 July ...................................................................... 362 13. The Night of 10 July: The Fourth Request for Close Air Support .................................................. 366 14. The Start of the Refugee Stream ........................................................................................................... 372 15. The Evening of 10 July: Emergency Meetings in Various Locations .............................................. 374 16. The Night of 10 to 11 July: Last Meeting between Karremans and the Opstina ........................... 379 17. 11 July: No Air Strikes ............................................................................................................................ 386 18. The Situation in the Early Morning Hours of 11 July ........................................................................ 393 19. The Morning of 11 July: Is Close Air Support Coming? ................................................................... 395 20. Close Air Support Approved ................................................................................................................. 401 21. The VRS occupy the city the population moves to Potocari ......................................................... 412 22. From Srebrenica to Potocari .................................................................................................................. 414 23. The fate of the remaining OPs .............................................................................................................. 416 24. The ABiH reaction to the VRS attack .................................................................................................. 425

Chapter 7 6 - 11 July 1995 retrospective accounts ..................................................................................... 437 1. DCBC: Defence Crisis Management Centre and the Royal Netherlands Army Crisis Staff (RNLA Crisis Staff) ...................................................................................................................................................... 437 2. Discussions at the Defence Crisis Management Centre up to 11 July 1995 ..................................... 440 3. Discussions at Defence Crisis Management Centre: 11 July 1995 ..................................................... 445 4. Meeting of the Ministerial Council at the Defence Crisis Management Centre on 11 July ............ 450 5. Calling a halt to further air support on 11 July ...................................................................................... 453 6. The discussions in Zagreb on 11 July ..................................................................................................... 460

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7. Prior knowledge of the attack in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ............................................... 462 8. Retrospective accounts relating to air support: Zagreb, The Hague, Mons, Naples, Washington etc. ........................................................................................................................................................................... 463 9. The non-arrival of air strikes .................................................................................................................... 470 10. Close Air Support at the large debriefing in Assen, and later in The Hague ................................ 487 11. A retrospective at the blocking positions and the Rules of Engagement ........................................ 494 12. First impressions of Dutchbat action ................................................................................................... 509 13. Later criticism of Dutchbat .................................................................................................................... 517 14. The Dutchbat command ........................................................................................................................ 523 15. Military honours for Karremans and the Forward Air Controllers? ................................................ 532 16. Conclusions .............................................................................................................................................. 535

Chapter 8 Plans to re-take Srebrenica .............................................................................................................. 544 1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................ 544 2. The French proposals................................................................................................................................ 544 3. UN Resolution 1004: formulation and consequences .......................................................................... 549 4. Military plans for retaking Srebrenica after the UN resolution ........................................................... 555 5. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 558

Chapter 9 The departure of Dutchbat from Srebrenica ............................................................................... 560 1. Plans for the departure of Dutchbat ....................................................................................................... 560 2. No withdrawal, stay put ............................................................................................................................ 564 3. The hard truth: Mladic dictates whether and how Dutchbat withdraws ........................................... 569 4. The Hague, Zagreb and New York deliberate on the departure of Dutchbat ................................. 571 5. Is a withdrawal in sight after all? The birth of the Smith-Mladic Agreement ................................... 572 6. The arrangements for the withdrawal and the route ............................................................................ 574 7. Consultations between Mladic and Nicolai on the Dutchbat equipment .......................................... 577 8. The Dutchbat withdrawal as a public issue ............................................................................................ 578 9. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................................. 581

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Chapter 1 The military and political situation in spring 1995

1. Introduction

A proper understanding of the series of events that resulted in the fall of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995 is not possible without a further discussion of the political and military-strategic developments since the spring of that year. Even within the United Nations some heated discussions took place. After all, there are arguments to support the conclusion that the Safe Area policy had become a failure. The Safe Areas had not been demilitarized as intended but, on the contrary, the warring factions were misusing them for military purposes.

That also made the UNPROFOR mandate and organization subject of discussion once again. In May 1995, the UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, and Force Commander General Janvier, presented their ideas to the UN Security Council. However, their ideas stranded in the interplay of political forces in New York and in the capitals of the troops-supplying countries. Nevertheless the ideas of Janvier as well as those of Boutros-Ghali will be discussed further because they provide an insight into the situation of the mission at the time and into the ambiguities in the UNPROFOR mandate as laid down in the various Security Council resolutions. Those ambiguities influenced the effectiveness of the UNPROFOR mission and the warring factions perception and the public opinion regarding the UN presence.

The matter will be approached from the Bosnian angle. That means hardly any attention will be given to developments in Croatia and Republika Srpska Krajina, the serb Republic proclaimed by the Croatian Serbs in the Krajina.

This chapter focuses on the military operational and strategic aspects. That is because after the rejection of the Contact Group plan by the Bosnian Serbs, political activities to end the conflict in Bosnia were on the backburner. The cease-fire agreed on 31 December 1994, known as the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, that should have lasted until 1 May 1995, had not put a stop to the fighting. On the contrary, the hostilities continued with renewed intensity, also before the end of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. The political vacuum in which UNPROFOR found itself will also be discussed in detail. The political activities that did continue, such as the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force, will also be addressed.

In spring 1995 the military-strategic balance between the warring factions in Bosnia was shifting. That had two causes: firstly the creation of a military alliance within the Muslim-Croat Federation but, more importantly, the shift in balance between the military forces of the Bosnian Muslims (the ABiH) and those of the Bosnian Serbs (the VRS). This balance shifted in favour of the Bosnian Muslims: the ABiH had considerably more manpower than the VRS and over the course of time they became better armed, equipped and trained, while the VRS became more and more exhausted.

Also from an economic point of view the Serb Republic in Bosnia, Republika Srpska, proclaimed by the Bosnian Serbs, was taking a beating. The effect of the sanctions became apparent and fuel shortages had an impact on the mobility of the VRS.

In addition to visions of the military-strategic situation that prevailed in Zagreb, Sarajevo and other capitals, this introduction will also discuss the strategy of the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian-Serb intentions. Particularly the latter was an unknown element for UNPROFOR, just like for the ABiH. A major cause of that was that UNPROFOR did not have a properly functioning intelligence organization. Interviews by UNPROFOR representatives with politicians and soldiers of the warring factions, and interpretations of those, had to lead to the best possible assessment of the intentions of

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the warring factions. In several cases that caused differences of opinion between the UN headquarters in Zagreb and Sarajevo.

Moreover, since 1995 these UN headquarters were under new command. Newcomers in 1995 were the French general Bernard Janvier, as Force Commander of UNPROFOR based in Zagreb, and the British general Rupert Smith in Sarajevo as Commander Bosnia-Hercegovina Command. They had to find their role at the Yugoslav scene amidst the players who were already there, including: the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (abbreviated: the SRSG), Yashusi Akashi from Japan; general Ratko Mladic at the Bosnian-Serb side; and general Rasim Delic on the side of the Bosnian Muslims. For UNPROFOR an important official within NATO was the American admiral Leighton Smith (not to be confused with general Rupert Smith). As Commander in Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe he was one of the people holding the key to Close Air Support.

Their visions, the differences between those, and the resulting disputes regarding the assessment of the military-strategic situation will receive special attention in this chapter. That is because these visions had an impact on the policy and its implementation. For that reason we will start with a characterization of the main players on the military-strategic stage. The two newcomers in Zagreb and Sarajevo have a prominent position among them: generals Janvier en Smith.

2. Force Commander general Bernard Janvier

Opinions differ widely on the French general Bernard Janvier who took office in February 1995. His way of acting can be described as careful and cautious, for which he was both praised and abused.

Among journalists, Janvier would soon be regarded as the man who later refused Srebrenica Close Air Support, thus causing the onset of the fall of the enclave. That left a mark on the appreciation for Janvier in later days.

However, on such qualifications it was often too easily forgotten that Janvier had a military responsibility that not only covered Bosnia, but also included Croatia and Macedonia. That means his assessments were also based on conditions outside Srebrenica.

There was more admiration for Janvier in Dutch military circles. That was caused by the fact that the safety of the peacekeepers, who of course had not been sent to Bosnia to fight, had his continuous attention. On various occasions Janvier pointed out that the safety of the UN personnel was more important than the implementation of the mandate; that also determined his attitude regarding Close Air Support. Janvier always tried to protect the soldiers on the ground. That was one of the reasons why for instance his substitute (Deputy Force Commander), the Canadian General-Major Barry Ashton, highly respected him.1

Other people in Janviers staff did show a more critical attitude towards the Force Commander. Nobody had any doubts that Janviers concern for the UNPROFOR troops was genuine, but at the same time some people of his Zagreb staff saw it as an excuse to do nothing.

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Also within NATO for instance, criticisms of Janviers attitude could be heard, though those could partly be explained by the differences in roles between NATO and UN. NATO Secretary-General Claes resented the fact that Janvier - and with him Akashi and Boutros-Ghali - were continuously holding back when it came to military action, though according to Claes it had not been much different with Janviers predecessors Cot and De Lapresle. De Lapresle took the position that the peacekeeping character of the mission had to be maintained and, moreover, he did not want to put his troops at risk. For that reason he too resisted NATOs call for air strikes.

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1 Interview Barry Ashton, 30/05/00.

Claes thought that firmer action had to be taken towards the Bosnian Serbs, but he got irritated by the lingering and the willingness to compromise on the part of Janvier and Akashi, the more so because Janvier had once

2 Interview Tony Banbury, 05/06/00. 3 UNNY, UNPROFOR, Box 87302, File 3200-5, Vol. I, Air Strikes, 6 Aug 93-19 Dec 94. Interoffice Memorandum, De Lapresle to Akashi (Only), 25/11/94, UN Confi.

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told him: I dont owe you an explanation: I am the UN. Janvier could sometimes really pull rank, according to Claes.4

Janvier spent about half his time in Zagreb and the other half travelling. The latter for talks in the UN framework in Geneva or New York, with his subcommanders in Sarajevo, or in Croatia or Macedonia.

In addition to strictly military aspects, Janvier was also expected to be engaged in the link with the political-strategic decision-making process. Janvier considered his staff in Zagreb to be suitable for military affairs only. The military staff in Zagreb was hardly or not consulted regarding negotiations or direct contacts with Mladic or others. Janvier handled that with Akashis political advisor.5

The language barrier

Generally speaking, the performance of French officers in peacekeeping operations and international staffs could sometimes be a problem, because mainly the higher officers in many cases did not speak any foreign languages. That hampered their performance in the communication with other members of international staffs. Working with interpreters was not always a solution.6 For instance, general Gobilliard, substitute of general Smith in Sarajevo and acting commanding officer of Bosnia-Hercegovina Command at the time of the fall of Srebrenica, did not speak any English at all.7 Janvier did not speak English fluently either, which had consequences for his work: meetings were in English, but Janvier apparently did not understand English as medium of communication sufficiently to take control of discussions and to recognize subtle differences. For that reason he surrounded himself outside official meetings with a number of confidants who did speak French.8

That mechanism also made itself felt more widely: also in New York Janvier had close relations with UN Undersecretary-General Annan and Director of Communications and Special Projects, Tharoor, mainly because the latter spoke French fluently. Conversely, people at the UNPROFOR head office in Zagreb who spoke English, preferred to discuss matters outside meetings with other English-speaking people and within the staff there was a strong tendency to quickly discuss minor matters with the Deputy Force Commander or the Chief of Staff without calling in an interpreter. Maybe that also resulted in Janvier not being aware of all ins and outs. But whatever could be said about Janvier: according to the military advisor to the UN Secretary-General, general-major F.H. van Kappen, he did not manipulate.

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One of Akashis assistants, Tony Banbury, even went as far as stating that the language problem also influenced Janvier with regard to his perception of the Bosnian-Serb way of thinking. Partly due to the language problem, Janvier would hardly be able to handle the day-to-day affairs, according to Banbury. On occasions he would not have understood the situation because he often refused to use an interpreter at meetings and briefings so he could not properly follow the discussion and made few contributions

10. EU negotiator Carl Bildt also mentioned Janviers English as a problem. Sometimes he could not follow a line of thought and, according to Bildt, that caused him to become isolated. Janviers predecessor De Lapresle didnt have Janviers language problem.11

However, not everybody considered Janviers inadequate knowledge of the English language a problem for his performance. The Canadian major David Last, Military Assistant to the Deputy Force Commander, for instance, who often accompanied Janvier, thought positively about Janvier. According

4 Interview W. Claes, 12/03/00. 5 Interview Michel Guesdon, 07/06/00 6 Interview Michel Guesdon, 07/06/00 7 Interview F.H. van Kappen, 21/06/00. 8 Interview H. de Jonge, 27/09/99. 9 Interview F.H. van Kappen, 21/06/00. 10 Interview Tony Banbury, 11/05/00. 11 Interview Carl Bildt, 12/12/00.

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to him the general was mentally fine. He saw a connection with the circumstances: everybody in Zagreb was exhausted in those days in July, said Last. They made days from six in the morning to late at night, while in many cases they were on the telephone with their international capitals till all hours. Last had never seen Janvier not alert or concentrated as a consequence, yet when Janvier was tired, his English gradually deteriorated and he had more trouble following the discussions.12 Yet Janvier did realize that he had his shortcomings in this field. He insisted on appointment of an English-speaking Deputy Force Commander, after his predecessor De Lapresle pointed out to him that the position would no longer be held by a Canadian officer, but that it would be offered to the Netherlands. For that reason Janvier wrote to Annan: I have a personal requirement for a native English DFC, due to my present lack of fluency in English. As a result, the Netherlands contributed the Chief of Staff (Kolsteren, as from June 1995), and Canada kept the position of Deputy Force Commander (Ashton got that post).13

In Kolsterens perception, Janvier didnt miss much despite the language barrier and if he did miss anything, he asked his Military Assistant or his translator. Once when Janvier was accompanied by a different interpreter who still had to learn the jargon, he said: No, that is not how I said it. That would lead the conclusion that he did have a reasonable command of English, but did not feel comfortable enough to speak it. Important briefings, such as those Janvier arranged for Akashi as his military adviser, were held by Janvier personally and alone, usually with an interpreter, Kolsteren said. Janvier did speak English with Kolsteren himself, but as soon as an Englishman or American was present, he didnt, apparently for fear of being at a relative disadvantage due to the language problem. Then Janvier would speak French and his interpreter translated for him.

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Janvier as Force Commander

There have been speculations about the extent to which Janviers policy was spoon-fed by the French government. The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Akashi, declared to the NIOD that Janvier was under some pressure from his government.15 Consequently, Janvier would have shown little initiative and would have followed the national line too closely. Other French Force Commanders, who adopted an attitude that was more independent from the French government, would have operated more effectively: general Cot would have achieved more, and someone like De Lapresle would even have had Akashi and Boutros-Ghali in his pocket. In addition, he would have been able to direct the minds of these two to a great extent because they had no military experience, according to UN Assistant Undersecretary-General Manfred Eisele.16 Bildt too called de Lapresle extremely knowledgeable and intellectual.17

However, when judging Janvier it should not be forgotten that he had great doubts about the effectiveness of Close Air Support, as he had to deal with it in more difficult circumstances than Cot and De Lapresle. The use of Close Air Support did not yield much tactical advantage in the opinion of Janvier, but did entail substantial risks for the UNPROFOR units.

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12 Interview David Last, 05/06/00.

A similar story was heard from the Dutch military adviser to the UN Secretary-General, Van Kappen. In his opinion Janvier set great store by the proportionality and subsidiariness principle, and his judgement on requests for Close Air Support were based on that principle. Janvier adhered to the concepts thought out in New York, said Van Kappen. Only when UNPROFOR was under fire from heavy weapons and there were no other methods to solve the problem, Janvier was prepared to call in air power. In his opinion Janvier was

13 UNNY, DPKO, UNPF. Code Cable Janvier to Annan, 06/03/95, No. Z-376. 14 Interview A.M.W.W. M. Kolsteren, 07/10/99. 15 Interview Yasushi Akashi, 25/11/99. 16 Interview Manfred Eisele, 14/10/99. 17 Interview Carl Bildt, 12/12/00. 18 Confidential interview (4).

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strongly focused on doing things right rather than on doing the right thing. He wanted to remain impartial as long as possible and not be carried away by the emotions of the moment. Janviers staff, as well as Smith in Sarajevo, were prepared to go much further than Janvier.19 However, Janvier himself was not a Machiavellian and he felt a strong responsibility for the soldiers.20

The ideas about this attitude of Janvier seem to be obscured, at least in his environment. There the image prevails that Janvier had great problems taking part in the discussions and had little to contribute. That way Janvier created the impression that he didnt have much to say. Yet that was not correct. Janvier did prove to be a good analyst, but he could not show it very often due to the language barrier.

Of course Janviers personality also had an impact. He had problems gaining peoples confidence21 and he was not easy to approach.22 Neither should he have been a man with beaucoup de finesse who was always in control of the situation.23

This meant that Janvier was of a whole different breed than general Smith in Sarajevo who came under him. Differences of opinion between Zagreb and Sarajevo were not purely of a strategic nature. Philip Corwin, Head of Civil Affairs in Sarajevo, pointed out the differences in background and character of the leading military figures. According to Corwin, Smith had known nothing but successes as a soldier. He had been shaped by his experience in the Gulf War and the Falklands War. In both operations the use of military force against a military inferior opponent had paid off. As an advocate of more forceful action, Smith felt supported by popular sentiments and the international press.

Janvier on the other hand, felt the pressure of the international community in Zagreb stronger than Smith felt it in Sarajevo. In addition, Janvier was wary of what he called Smiths American-type cowboy diplomacy and he was strongly influenced by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The French were shaped by a less glorious military past and the experience of Dien Bien Phu. According to Corwin, Dien Bien Phu had not been a coincidence and Janvier was aware of that, just like general Andr Soubirou, the Commander of the Rapid Reaction Force, on which more in section 13. Soubirou had emphasized the considerable similarity between the geographical circumstances in Sarajevo and Dien Bien Phu. That was because both Sarajevo and the three eastern enclaves were situated in valleys surrounded by mountains and, consequently, they were indefensible.24

Janvier adopted a more cautious attitude regarding forceful action against the Bosnian Serbs than the other leading figure at the UNPROFOR stage, general Rupert Smith. There were major differences between the ways of thinking of the two leading figures. Bildt judged that general Smith was far more intellectual than Janvier. He was an intellectual who could also command troops.

25 Occasionally, the two generals had differences of opinion. Still Janvier said not to have harboured any animosity towards Smith but, on the contrary, spoke highly of him. Smith was in favour of hard action but never succeeded in convincing Akashi and Janvier. Smith wanted to fight and to take the side of the Bosnian Muslims, among other things by using force to open a corridor to Sarajevo. However, Janvier did not want to do that because UNPROFOR was not adequately equipped for such actions. The two had carried on a fundamental debate on the subject and, according to Janvier, Smith had known that Janvier would refuse.26

19 Interview F.H. van Kappen, 21/06/00.

20 Interview H. de Jonge, 30/05/00. 21 Interview Emma Shitaka, 11/05/00. 22 Interview F.H. van Kappen, 21/06/00. 23 Interview Michel Guesdon, 07/06/00. 24 Corwin, Dubious Mandate, p. 160. 25 Interview Carl Bildt, 12/12/00. 26 Mission d Information commune sur les vnements de Srebrenica, Audition de M. Bernard Janvier, 25/01/01.

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3. Commander UNPROFOR general Rupert Smith in Sarajevo

The British lieutenant-general Rupert Smith, Commander in Bosnia after his predecessor, the also British general Sir Michael Rose, was the latters counterpart in a number of respects. Rose mainly relied on his British personal staff and tended to ignore the rest of staff. Smith on the other hand did use his staff, which made the work pleasant for a Chief of Staff. That at least kept the staff informed and people could keep a grip on things. Apart from the fact that Smith was an extremely pleasant superior, he also was at a very nice human being, according to his Chief of Staff, the Dutch Brigadier-general C.H. Nicolai.27

Also as regards vision and policy, Rose and Smith were somewhat on opposite sides. One of Akashis policy officers called Rose a general who was not very receptive to advice: once he had taken in decision, he refused to deviate from it.

28 One of Akashis other policy officers confirmed that Smith had been the better general of the two. Rose had continuously been busy embellishing the UNPROFOR image.29 He would rather talk to the media than enter into a meaningful discussion. For Smith this was exactly the other way round.30 Rose used Close Air Support with care31 while Smith advocated the use of more extensive force. In Smiths analysis UNPROFOR was the hostage of the VRS. That continuously put UNPROFOR in an inferior position while Smith on the other hand was trying to reach a superior position. According to Smith a psychological battle against the VRS was required rather than just military force. He wanted to take a number of subsequent measures to get the message across to the VRS that he was not be trifled with.32

Shortly after he took office on 23 February 1995, Smith explained his way of thinking to his subcommanders during a Force Commanders Conference. He wanted them to think ahead and to elaborate on ideas on what could be done. Only few people had to be involved because of the sensitivity of the matter. His message was be creative, think and work options out. Smith wanted to promote the following lines of though about the VRS: if they do this, they might already have done what they could do if we would do something which they wouldnt like. So we should do this, because they played their cards already while we have ours in hand. Realization of the actions was not so much his department: for actual implementation of an action he at least had to involve Janvier and Akashi.

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One of Akashis assistants considered Smith a wonderful analyst, a great soldier and intellectually dangerous. In that respect he was no match for Akashi or Janvier, she admitted. Akashi was afraid that Smith was provoking a war. Smith would have made an excellent team with Janviers predecessor, De Lapresle. He was brilliant as well, he grasped the current situation of UNPROFOR and the negotiating process and in fact he was more than a troops general.

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Smith versus Mladic: a war of nerves

General Smith and general Mladic were well-matched. A true war of nerves was going on between these two diehards. An example of the way Smith operated at the time of operation Deliberate Force (the operation against the Serbs that after the fall of Srebrenica brought the change that eventually would result in the Dayton Peace Accord) was, that he used six artillery guns (howitzers) for selected

27 Interview C.H. Nicolai, 11/06/99. 28 Interview Tony Banbury, 11/05/00. 29 Interview Tone Bringa, 13/07/99. 30 Interview Manfred Eisele, 14/10/99. 31 Interview George Joulwan, 08/06/00. 32 Interview Tony Banbury, 11/05/00. 33 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 117, Civil Affairs SNE. Memorandum, Notes from Force Commanders Conference, 23-02-95. Compiled by colonel NLA J.H.M. Engelen. 34 Interview Emma Shitaka, 11/05/00.

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targets, and every time had a separate howitzer fire two grenades on Mladics native town. This would not have remained without effect.35

Meetings between the two generals could be rather heavy. After the air strikes at Pale late May, Smith said that it was not proper for a professional soldier to expose unarmed observers and to threaten them with televised death. He demanded release and decent treatment, but did not want to negotiate about it. Smith urged Mladic to impose restrictions upon himself and his soldiers, and he also urged Mladic to think about the dangers of his course of action. Mladic urged Smith to do the same.

When two days later Smith took the opportunity to explain on the telephone that he did not command the NATO forces, but that he could only recommenced an action, and once more pointed out to Mladic what the difference was between air strikes and Close Air Support, Mladic hung up the phone. He said he didnt want to listen to these monstrous thoughts. Yet two days later Mladic still accepted Smiths offer to let the situation cool off, casually advising Smith to take a tranquilizer to enable him to take reasonable decisions.

Another illustrative moment in their relation happened when the French retook the Vrbanja bridge at Sarajevo. A number of Bosnian-Serb soldiers were killed there, after which Mladic said that Smith did not have the right to kill VRS soldiers. It werent Africans like Smith had killed earlier in his career, Mladic said. If Smith were a civilized human being, he would have to write letters of condolence to the families of the dead VRS soldiers, after which Smith asked Mladic if he had done the same to the families of the French soldiers who were killed. After all, it had been the VRS that started the action.36

The two were not only matched, but in a sense they were also condemned to each other. There was little development in the relations between the two generals. Late June for instance, in an interview in Srpska Vojska Mladic lashed out to UNPROFOR and general Smith. Because the West did not want to send troops to Bosnia, the Croatian and Muslim forces were executing the Western policy in the Balkans, Mladic alleged. UNPROFOR had made it clear that it considered the VRS as the enemy, encouraged the Bosnian Muslims to continue fighting and provided them with food, fuel and ammunition. Mladic described Smith as a person who did not understand the situation. He came to Bosnia as an arrogant man, showered with glory from the Gulf War. According to Mladic he needed time to switch from fighter to peacemaker. Mladic also contended that Smith had recommended the Muslim-Croat Federation to jointly wage war, and that the Bosnian Serbs were the enemy.

37 The latter was exactly what UNPROFOR was frenetically trying to avoid. On the contrary, it had to become clear to the Bosnian Serbs that UNPROFOR was not at war with them and had no wish to be so. The Bosnian Serbs seemed to live in a world of their own and to have confidence in their ability to resist NATO and the UN.38

After some time Mladic understood that Smith was something entirely different than Janvier. He may have thought he would be able to overcome Janvier, unlike Smith. For that reason Mladic decided not to talk to Smith anymore, but to Janvier.

39 Smith on this part also refused to do business with Mladic for some time, for a number of reasons: out of principle; because of the hostages that were being held; because Smith himself was holding four VRS soldiers; and because he believed that the VRS would not be interested in talking to him.40 After the last hostages were released in June, Janvier subsequently asked Mladic to resume normal relations with Smith and his staff.41

35 Interview Emma Shitaka, 11/05/00.

36 UNNY, DPKO, UNPF. Telephone Conversation Gen Smith / Gen Mladic: 28/05/95 UN Confi, attached to Code Cable Akashi to Annan, 29/05/95, No. Z-883. 37 NIOD, Coll. Smith. Telegram Belgrade to FCO, 2616161Z June 95. 38 UNNY, DPKO, UNPF. Fax Deyan Mihov, Acting D-SRSG/CAC BH Command Sarajevo to Yasushi Akashi and Michel Moussali, HCA Civil Affairs, HQ Zagreb, Situation Assessment May 29 1995 mailed with Code Cable Akashi to Annan, 29/05/95, No. Z-889. 39 Interview Tony Banbury, 11/05/00. 40 NIOD, Coll. Banbury. SRSGs Meeting in Split, 09/06/95, Confi. 41 DPKO, UNPF Code Cables 14 June 1995-30 June 1995. Code Cable Akashi to Annan, 20/06/95, No. Z-1025.

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In fact the opposite was going on of what Mladic observed in the interview. UNPROFOR generally did not behave as an enemy of the Bosnian Serbs, but generally showed willingness to come to arrangements. For that reason a Western ambassador in Sarajevo concluded: UNPROFOR tended to side with the Serbs. UNPROFORs tendency to do business with the VRS rather than with the ABiH can partly be explained from the fact that the Bosnian Serbs had an organized army (uniforms and regular units), according to the standards of the soldiers who were in command of UNPROFOR. The VRS were soldiers like us, unlike the moderately equipped and less organized ABiH army. Another reason for that implicit choice was the continuous complaining by the Bosnian Muslims.

In fact, Smith was the first of the UNPROFOR Commanders who adopted a different attitude and chose the side of the victim: de Bosnian Muslims. Smith qualified this intervention with the words: I have broken the machine and nobody can repair it. However, saying this he overestimated his own role a little; Smiths problem was that the Force Commander in Zagreb, Janvier, took the decisions and in many cases ignored the advice from the Bosnia-Hercegovina Commander, Smith.42

Smith and politicians

Smith had some reservations regarding politicians, who according to him did not always really have an idea of what was actually happening in Bosnia, and regularly failed to consult the military when taking decisions that did have military consequences. Before he was appointed in Bosnia, Smith in his position of British Operations Officer in London had become involved in the possible deployment of NATO forces in the former Yugoslavia. He had opposed it: in his opinion it was impossible for UN and NATO to operate at the same time in the same area. According to him, at the time no politician had consulted the UN desks or the military on declaring the No-Fly-Zone above the former Yugoslavia. That was an invention by politicians and, said Smith, the soldiers were then left to implement it.

Those politicians did make themselves heard in the meantime; Smith indeed had the problem that time and again he had to convince the government in London that his vision was correct, and that was not always easy.43 Yet Smith was very open about those contacts with London. He quite regularly showed his Chief of Staff Nicolai messages he had exchanged with London.44

An example of Smiths vision regarding political plans was that already at an early stage for military-operational considerations he was not enthusiastic about the plans NATO was designing to get UNPROFOR out of Bosnia in case of an emergency. The question he repeatedly asked was: how fast can we get away? His experience in the Gulf War had taught him that it could take four to six months to remove all vehicles and heavy equipment from the operating area. Another worry with regard to this was whether sufficient staging areas for the troops and the equipment could be found, i.e. places to take the troops and equipment on board, and whether sufficient vessels were available.

45

Another example of the different approaches of politicians and the military which Smith was dismayed at, was that the UN did not allow him to move artillery to Sarajevo. The British had artillery available, but that had to remain embarked on vessels in the Adriatic Sea and the UN did not allow it to be put ashore. In his opinion artillery would have been more useful than airplanes. Smith adopted a pragmatic approach in military affairs.

46

42 Confidential interview (3).

43 Interview Tony Banbury, 11/05/00. 44 Interview C.H. Nicolai, 09/07/99. 45 UNGE, UNPROFOR, Box 117, Civil Affairs SNE. Memorandum, Notes from Force Commanders Conference, 23/02/95. Compiled by Colonel NLA J.H.M. Engelen. 46 Interview R.A. Smith, 12/01/00.

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4. The differences between Smith and Janvier

That also had an impact on his relation with Janvier. A clear example happened as regards the political decision to set up what was called the Rapid Reaction Force for Bosnia in June 1995. This Rapid Reaction Force will be discussed in more detail in section 13; what it roughly comes down to is that this Rapid Reaction Force was a forceful military unit read: with artillery and attack helicopters - with the objective of strengthening UNPROFOR in order to reduce the missions vulnerability. Janviers estimate was that the Rapid Reaction Force could be used for defensive purposes, but that it would be of little use for offensive action.47

However, it was also clear that a considerable risk existed that this Rapid Reaction Force would not be able to keep away from the battle that was going on. For instance sending supplies to the eastern enclaves was of course in conflict with the attrition strategy pursued by the Bosnian Serbs for these enclaves. It was also clear that general Smith anticipated extensive discussions on the exact implementation of the Rapid Reaction Force. For that reason Smith took the following clear position on this force: if I cant use it to fight, I dont want it.

Janvier at least showed to be prepared to help thinking about the deployment of this unit.

48

The - very broad - idea was that Smith mainly took the position of a soldier who thought that politicians did not sufficiently allow for the military reality in taking their decisions. Janvier on the other hand in his position of Force Commander had to take into account the political reality to a greater extent. Smith did not feel supported by Janvier and Akashi either, but as an exception he did by Annan in New York, although he said not to have sought support from the UN in New York. Smith admitted that there were differences between him and Janvier, although these were not in the first place personal according to him.

49

Differences of opinion between Smith and Janvier remained, but according to Smith they only really disagreed on two occasions. The first time a conflict between them developed about being forceful regarding the use of helicopters for supplying the enclaves; see the extensive Appendix supplying by air to this report. The second time the problem was the solution of the crisis regarding UN personnel taken hostage in May/June 1995. Smith thought that Janvier should not make a deal with the Bosnian Serbs who had taken UN people hostage. More about this alleged deal in Chapter 3.

50

However, the fact remained that Smith and Janvier fundamentally differed in their ideas about a more forceful course of action against the Bosnian Serbs. For instance when the VRS stopped UN convoys, Smith wanted to use force to get them to their destination, but Akashi and Janvier prevented that.

51

47 NIOD Coll. Banbury. SRSGs Meeting in Split, 09/06/95, Confi.

More in general Smith opted for a tougher course of action against the Bosnian Serbs, and he expected results from that. He thought that UNPROFOR had lost much of its credibility, and he certainly had a point there. For instance, the Bosnian Serbs (as well as the Bosnian Muslims) had set up many checkpoints for UN personnel. It had started with one checkpoint, but at a certain moment all of Bosnia was riddled with checkpoints. As a consequence, UNPROFOR had lost its Freedom of Movement, one of the starting points of the mission. More and more UN vehicles were seized. UNMOs were taken from their vehicle, undressed and robbed, and then they came walking back barefoot. All the time there were shooting incidents and these also deteriorated into shooting incidents towards UNPROFOR. And on top of all that it not only became impossible to supply the population, but it even became impossible to send supplies to the own UN personnel. For that reason Smith wanted to take a stand in order to change things radically. In his opinion there was only one language the Bosnian Serbs would understand: the hard hand. However, Janvier en Akashi were afraid of

48 Interview R.A. Smith, 12/01/00. 49 Interview R.A. Smith, 12/01/00. 50 Interview R.A. Smith, 12/01/00. 51 Interview Tone Bringa, 13/07/99.

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hostage-takings. The political leaders in Zagreb preferred the solution of bringing in a new negotiator to keep the staff in Sarajevo quiet for some time. People had to accept that, certainly while there still were hostages.52 According to Philip Corwin, Head of Civil Affairs in Sarajevo, Smith would rather face the battle with the Bosnian Serbs and he felt that he had the moral weight of the international community behind him.53

There is no agreement on the question how far the opinions of Janvier and Smith differed. Akashi for instance thought that messages about major differences of opinion between Janvier and Smith were exaggerated.

However, it would appear that having a case was not the same as winning it.

54 He saw no reason to let his judgement on the relation between the generals be influenced by newspaper messages about major differences between Janvier and Smith.55 Yet other people said that Janvier and Smith did not hit it off. Also according to a UN spokesman Smith and Janvier had a normal relationship, although he remarked on Janvier that rank and intellectual capacity did not match and that this had also been heard from French circles.56 Swedish UN officers on the other hand were positive about Janvier: brilliant, honest, the safety of the troops always came first and he was a good Commander.57

EU negotiator Carl Bildt analyzed that Janvier was mainly a troops Commander. Smith was less of a troops man than Janvier. He tried to be more analytical, to take everything in and to make proposals. Sometimes that clashed, but the lines between Sarajevo and Zagreb were open and operative. There was no other possibility, because the UN headquarters in Sarajevo could do nothing without that in Zagreb, for instance when calling in Close Air Support, for which the key was in Zagreb.

58 According to the American admiral Leighton Smith the relation between Smith and Janvier could be described as reasonable, although the two generals did have heated debates from time to time.59

In practice the difference in attitude between Janvier and Smith appeared to solve itself because most decisions were taken in Zagreb. For that problem Smith, like Rose before him, tried to find a modus vivendi , for instance because he did not fully report on his thinking to Akashi and Janvier

60. Zagreb took the decisions and several times Smith had to face the fact that he was overruled by Janvier or that his advice was ignored. Janvier, and other Force Commanders before him, should have been insufficiently open to the special situation in Sarajevo and the rest of Bosnia. For instance only after the fall of Srebrenica a UN office was established in Sarajevo with an own Mission Chief, which restored the balance somewhat and a more or less customized policy for Bosnia could be pursued. On taking decisions, Zagreb strongly depended on the reports supplied by Smith from Sarajevo and the events in Sector North East were far away.61

Smith confirmed to the NIOD that this had put Zagreb out of the loop as regards the events in Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves. Consequently, information about the situation in Sarajevo and the eastern enclaves reached Zagreb less and less adequately. There was not much contact between Smith and Janvier or Akashi, and Smith himself did not go to Zagreb very often. Moreover, contacts were hampered by the fact that the UN satellite connections were not secure;

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52 Interview C.H. Nicolai, 11/06/99.

once the UN had lent a UN-secured fax machine to the VRS to enable them to maintain secure connections with the Bosnian-Serb regime in Pale. Later the Bosnian Serbs had refused to return this fax machine

53 Corwin, Dubious Mandate, p. 160. 54 Interview Yasushi Akashi, 25/11/99. 55 Interview Yasushi Akashi, 25/11/99. 56 Confidential interview (56). 57 Interview Jan Inge Svensson, 04/11/99. 58 Interview A.M.W.W. Kolsteren, 07/10/99. 59 Interview Leighton Smith, 06/06/00. 60 Interview Tony Banbury, 11/05/00 61 Interview K. Bache, 29/10/99. 62 Interview R.A. Smith, 12/01/00.

15

In conclusion it can be said about the relation between Smith and Janvier that in general Smith was advocate of a hard line towards the Bosnian Serbs, because he thought they were not sensitive to softer means; Janvier was much more cautious with a view to the safety of the UN troops. On the basis of his responsibility, Janvier also had to take into account the political world in which the decisions on UNPROFOR were taken. Smith from his responsibility also didnt have to worry so much about the political Umwelt of UNPROFOR than Janvier had to. In addition, Janvier seemed to have a less analytical attitude than Smith, but his analyses and the resulting solutions were in many cases checked by Janviers cautiousness and political reservations. Eventually Smith increasingly appeared to have seen it correctly, but that was not until after the fall of Srebrenica. During the preceding period Janvier repeatedly overruled Smiths military initiatives. To sum up: differences of opinion remained, but it was not impossible for them to work with each other. There was not much consultation, also due to a lack of properly secure means of communication.

5. The Split meeting: split visions? By way of illustration of the various ideas within the UNPROFOR top, first an explanation follows about the meeting in Split on 9 June 1995. That was a highly important meeting because that was where Smith, Janvier and Akashi were going to synchronize their watches. The meeting took place in an atmosphere that was crisis-like for UNPROFOR. That was mainly caused by the fact that since the end of May UN personnel had been held hostage by the Bosnian Serbs. That had happened after NATO had carried out air strikes on ammunition depots in Pale, the capital of the republic in Bosnia that had been proclaimed by the Bosnian Serbs. The meeting was intended to ensure that the analysis of the situation in Bosnia and its approach by these three leading figures (and then mainly between Smith on one side and Janvier and Akashi on the other) would be the same, but in fact it only illustrated the differences between their way of thinking.

The discussion was mainly carried on between Smith and Janvier, with Smith playing first fiddle. The few times Akashi contributed to the discussion, it would be typical of his attitude: he did not commit himself. Akashis only real contribution to the discussion was that it would be a problem to get the hostages released, unless the Bosnian Serbs would get the assurance that no more air strikes would follow, and that was impossible. Small numbers of hostages had been released earlier, but now the situation was different, said Akashi. In his opinion the Bosnian Serbs were more isolated than they used to and the scale of air strikes had been more massive than ever before. Not much had changed to the framework in which UNPROFOR operated. Modifications to the Safe Areas regime had appeared a controversial issue in the Security Council, Akashi reported (later in this Chapter the cautiousness of the Security Council will be discussed in detail). Any proposed new actions had to be acceptable to the Security Council and the troop contributing nations. New proposals also had to fit in within the context of peacekeeping. Akashi once more listed the relevant requirements: consent of the warring factions, impartiality, use of force only in self-defence and freedom of movement.

If elements of peace enforcing were to creep into the mission, it would reach the edge of the Mogadishu line, according to Akashi. He said that with reference to the failed UN operation in Somalia; since then crossing the Mogadishu line meant crossing the border between peacekeeping and peace enforcing. Crossing this border results in chaos and unpredictable consequences for the peacekeepers, or forced withdrawal.

As peacekeeper UNPROFOR had to talk to all parties, and small steps were better than a combative approach, said Akashi. If UNPROFOR would not cross the Mogadishu line, it would be accused of being too mild and pro-Serb. On the other hand, if the line was crossed, they would be accused of recklessness and endangering the peace process. That way Akashi merely described the problem for UNPROFOR, without giving much indication for a solution to it.

At this meeting Smith recognized the major problems UNPROFOR was facing as a consequence of the current hostage crisis. He also reported major problems in the enclaves, in the sense that it was not possible to send supplies to the population there. Moreover, in Zepa and

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Srebrenica there were UNPROFOR observation posts (OPs) that could easily be run over. Many UNPROFOR compounds, including those in the eastern enclaves, were within artillery arrange of the VRS. Every form of endorsement by the Bosnian Serbs for the UNPROFOR actions was a lost case. The Bosnian Muslims cooperated less and less too. In fact the UN had been neutralized and the Safe Areas were under increasing threat. The VRS still held UNPROFOR by the throat and Smith didnt believe that the VRS wanted a cease-fire. He believed that the VRS would no longer tolerate UNPROFOR in its vicinity and would also continue neutralizing NATO. The Bosnian Serbs would want to show the international community that they were not to be kept under control. That could strengthen the hold of the VRS on Sarajevo or lead to an attack on the eastern enclaves.

The Bosnian Muslims too were increasingly fed up with the UN, said Smith. When Pale was bombed, they hoped that the world came to their rescue, but now they saw that such was not the case. Their army, the ABiH, would want to continue what they started in May: entering into battle with the VRS, and in the meantime at the political front sticking to the Contact Group plan. All in all UNPROFOR had gradually been marginalized and developments for further marginalization went faster than UNPROFOR could keep up with. Things were looking bad for air strikes as well. More in general the Air Power instrument had been neutralized because the air strikes at Pale had not had the desired effect; on the contrary, it had caused the hostage crisis.

Despite the described problems, Smith still showed a certain amount of optimism. It would also be possible to take advantage of the situation that had developed. The air strike on Pale had surprised the VRS for various reasons. For once the UN had done what they said they were going to do. Also the scope and precision of the bombings had surprised the VRS. Advantage could be taken from that.

Nevertheless Smith thought that this action had failed because the VRS had not returned the heavy weapons around Sarajevo to the Weapon Collection Points. But that was a failure that could be converted into a gain. It was no longer necessary to deal with the VRS, after they had suspended their endorsement of the UNPROFOR operation in response to the bombings. Smith saw a wide range of opportunities: the fact that the UN was also holding four VRS soldiers gave UNPROFOR something to barter with and at least they showed the Serbs that they could not get away with everything. Smith did not seem to worry so much about the UN people who were being held hostage.

Janvier had a gloomier view of the situation than Smith. UNPROFOR was being frustrated more than ever, said Janvier. The Bosnian Serbs were master of the situation. Janvier was not amused that he had to ask permission from Mladic to let convoys pass. For him the main issue was to get the hostages released and to send supplies to the enclaves. Mladic now considered UNPROFOR as the enemy, although he had said that he would not fire at the UNPROFOR positions. Mladic knew that this was not in his interest.

However, Smith thought that Mladic did not see UNPROFOR as the enemy as long as everything happened on his terms, but that entailed the problem that if actions were carried out on Mladics terms, he would succeed in neutralizing UNPROFOR. If UNPROFOR would just show its teeth, Mladic would make concessions, in Smiths opinion.

Janvier on the other hand considered UNPROFOR a peacekeeping force whether they wanted it or not. That also caused the scheduling problems for the Rapid Reaction Force, that had a more forceful character which would be at odds with the peacekeeping character of UNPROFOR. It was highly important that the political process would start, said Janvier. As long as it did not, a confrontation was out of the question. If UNPROFOR should leave the enclaves, that would mean giving the Bosnian Serbs what they wanted, said Janvier.

Smiths analysis of the intentions of the Bosnian Serbs was different than Janviers. Janvier thought that the Bosnian Serbs had a military-strategic advantage, and were not going to overplay their hand. Smith remained convinced that the VRS wanted to end the war that same year and would do everything in their power. As long as the sanctions along the Drina against the Bosnian Serbs were maintained, the VRS gradually weakened compared to their opponent, but the Bosnian Serbs would only accept a cease-fire when their political identity was guaranteed. Smiths analysis also was that the Pale regime would realize that the main issue now involved the hostages, not the solution of the

17

Bosnian problem. For that reason Smith supposed that the Bosnian Serbs could now gain more by a military offensive attitude, also to emphasize their political identity, than by sitting down at the negotiating table and letting a political process start. Though Bildt had been appointed as negotiator, it was not clear what his mission was and for that reason Smith did not really expect that Bildt would be able to achieve anything through negotiations. Moreover, it was difficult to make military peacekeeping plans as long as it was not clear what the peace UNPROFOR should support was going to look like.

Janvier shared Smiths analysis that Bosnian Serbs felt the need for international recognition and the lifting of the sanctions along the Drina. In view of the gravity of the situation, Janvier hoped that this would soon be realized. However, Janvier did not believe that the Bosnian Serbs were trying to create a crisis. He believed that they were prepared to adjust their behaviour and to become good discussion partners. For that reason the discussion with them had to be continued to show how important it was to behave normal. Yet Smith didnt believe either that the Bosnian Serbs wanted to force a crisis. What they did want was to neutralize the UN and NATO to be able to fight the ABiH to create a military advantage.

For Smith the problem remained that he didnt know what the political course was going to be. Therefore, he was at a loss what to do with the announced Rapid Reaction Force. Could it be used to fight or couldnt it? He reiterated that if the unit was not allowed to fight, it wasnt very welcome as far as he was concerned, because it would create expectations it could not live up to.

How to go on?

Smith feared that after the bombings on Pale the status quo would return, but then with UNPROFOR as demanding party. There had not been freedom of movement before the air strikes either, and now that should have to be realized, Smith urged. At least it should be possible to supply food to the enclaves.

Smith wanted two things to stabilize the situation. Smith thought that the risk of provocations by the ABiH was controllable. Therefore, now first of all the Bosnian Serbs should be tackled, but that was only sensibly possible if the risk that the UN people were taken hostage was reduced and their safety would be guaranteed. That would require UNPROFOR to withdraw from the eastern enclaves to safe positions that could be defended until help was available. In the field only some UNMOs (military observers) should remain with what was known as Forward Air Controllers, necessary to guide NATO aircraft to their target. Smiths intention also was to hold out the prospect of massive air strikes in the event the VRS would subsequently still attack a UN base. That would greatly reduce the threat of the new hostage-takings.

However, this plan had considerable consequences for the UNPROFOR mandate and Smith did not have the authority to decide on the subject. In the Security Council, Janvier and Boutros-Ghali had already advocated a plan to withdraw UNPROFOR, but that had not been accepted (see sections 7 and 8). Smiths military ideas were politically water under the bridge.

Smith also wanted to have the Security Council determine routes along which the UN could move freely, comparable to the routes to Berlin during the Cold War. Janvier rejected that idea too: he saw no possibility to impose a corridor upon the Bosnian Serbs. That could only be achieved through political negotiations.

Smith considered negotiations on the subject a loss of time. New York had to impose the rules. If UNPROFOR was not prepared to fight, the VRS would get the best of the situation, he estimated. The fact that in that event the Mogadishu line would be passed, was not a problem for Smith. In his opinion this line had already been passed because the Bosnian Serbs no longer saw UNPROFOR as peacekeepers. Turning back across that line was only possible either by doing nothing, getting UNPROFOR increasingly in the power of the Bosnian Serbs, or by showing the will to fight, which would mainly come down to bluff because it would not be possible to implement this will.

Janvier didnt want to hear about the fighting option: I insist that we will never have the possibility of combat, of imposing our will on the Serbs.

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Smith repeated that he considered the situation around Exclusion Zones, Weapon Collection Points and the Safe Areas a major problem, because military-strategically the Serbs had a very advantageous position in an absolute sense. This could cause crises, even before the Rapid Reaction Force would be available. Smith predicted actions, mainly by Bosnian Serbs, who would make a fool of his political superiors. He anticipated situations in which UNPROFOR would be forced to ask for Close Air Support.

Janviers approach was different. Janvier wanted to reinstate contact with the Bosnian Serbs to explain that there were things they just couldnt do. Smiths assessment remained that they wouldnt want to listen. Janvier argued that the Bosnian Serbs were in a politically favourable situation which they wouldnt want to compromise. They would realize that cooperation had its advantages. Unless provoked by the ABiH, the Bosnian Serbs wouldnt act, Janvier thought.

The end of the discussion was that Janvier saw no other option than going back to the negotiating table, to realize a cease-fire and to resume the UNPROFOR operations.

Smith predicted that in that event UNPROFOR would be forced to take decisions within a month. Smith assessed the situation as in the interest of the Bosnian Serbs. All this would also confirm the belief of the Bosnian government that they would rather see the arms embargo lifted (that was being discussed mainly from the American side) than to rely on UNPROFOR. Smith considered all this short-term decisions, which would have implications for the long-term, but of which no one knew what they would lead to. As long as the enclaves remained in existence, UNPROFOR remain neutralized to a certain extent.

Janvier then took the position that the ABiH rather than UNPROFOR would have to defend the enclaves in the event of an attack by the VRS. They were strong enough to be able to do that. He had also said that in New York, but that idea was not appreciated.63

It was remarkable that Akashis contributions to the discussion remained minor. He didnt draw conclusions and didnt indicate a direction. This is surprising because exactly Akashi emphasized the importance of a uniform analysis of the situation and approach of the problem. On the other hand there was not so much difference of opinion between Akashi and Janvier regarding their approach: adhere strictly to the practice of peacekeeping, and believe in negotiations with the Bosnian Serbs.

Even if history would prove Smith to be more or less right, he was their inferior and had to comply with the judgement of Zagreb and New York.

6. The strategic field of forces spring 1995, seen from UNPROFOR

The rather hopeless situation in which UNPROFOR found itself at the time of the meeting in Split, had not appeared out of the blue. In spring 1995 there were numerous developments that indicated a worsening situation for UNPROFOR.

Incidentally, the name of UNPROFOR was changed on 31 March 1995 because on that date the Security Council adopted a number of resolutions on the subject. The overall command (for all of Yugoslavia) of general Janvier in Zagreb, called UNPROFOR until that moment, was given the name UNPF (United Nations Peace Forces). The UN operations in Croatia and Macedonia were given different names and no longer came under UNPROFOR but under UNPF. The term UNPROFOR was reserved for the UN operation in Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, old names were still being used for a long time. To prevent confusion, the name Bosnia-Hercegovina Command (BH-Command) or sarajevo will still be used hereinafter, although it officially had been transferred to UNPROFOR on 31 March 1995. The sector division in Bosnia-Hercegovina remained unchanged.

Consequently, in the rest of this report UNPROFOR in a general sense refers to the UN operation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, where the (former) Bosnia-Hercegovina Command (sarajevo) of

63 NIOD, Coll. Banbury. SRSGs Meeting in Split, 09/06/95. Confi.

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general Smith was in charge. When reference is made in the text to Zagreb, that refers to general Janviers UNPF command.

The state of affairs in the struggle between ABiH and VRS

Late 1994 at headquarters of Sector North East of BH Command in Tuzla they were taking stock of the situation. In a general sense they concluded that a stalemate situation had developed in East Bosnia. The warring factions along the confrontation line made little progress. Neither party had the military power to impose its will on the other or to force a breakthrough. Little indicated that the stalemate could be broken.

However, it was important that the VRS were at a relative strategic disadvantage: time was in favour of the Bosnian Muslims. The VRS had lost the initiative in North and East Bosnia. Whether that was the consequence of the fuel shortages that the VRS were confronted with, remained unclear to the UN. In any case it seemed that VRS had had to change their tactics and could not longer deploy the full potential of its mechanized forces.

This strategic advantage also had a political impact for the Bosnian Serbs. That is because the Bosnian Serbs became increasingly politically isolated after the rejection of the Contact Group plan. As a result of the embargo measures the Bosnian Serbs also got more and more economically isolated from Yugoslavia. The economic situation in the Republika Srpska, bad as it already was, made it impossible to mobilize more men and to tip the military scales, a situation that could cause friction between political and military leaders.

In absolute terms the VRS did maintain its superiority regarding heavy weapons and ammunition supplies. However, the VRS had the problem that they had won more terrain than they could control. With 60.000 men they had to hold a front that stretched over 1600 km and, consequently, the VRS troops were overstretched. Sector North East identified the following areas as strategically the most important to the VRS in East Bosnia (see map East Bosnia): the Ozren mountains; controlling the northern approach to Sarajevo from Tuzla; the Posavina corridor at Brcko; a corridor of only a few kilometres wide that formed a vital

connection between the western and eastern part of the Republika Srpska; the communication tower of Stolice, north of the Majevica hills; this tower was an indispensable

chain in the communication network of the Republika Srpska; the corridor north of Zvornik; here the ABiH front line was not even 10 kilometres from the

Drina, which made it possible to drive a wedge into the territory of the Republika Srpska and to sever the connections between the northern and southern parts of Eastern Bosnia.

The prospects for the leaders of the Bosnian Muslims improved over the course of time. The ABiH gradually got more and better equipment available. Fuel was not a limiting factor for the ABiH, unlike for the VRS. The ABiH increasingly took the offensive, but lacked the heavy weapons the VRS did have to gain real strategic advantage. In addition, at the operational level they lacked capacity to adequately support military operations.64

All in all the military-strategic balance between ABiH and VRS and the resulting political relations between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs were anything but static late 1994. In absolute terms the VRS still had a major military-strategic advantage, but they were increasingly experiencing problems to control the area they had taken. The ABiH used the time to build its military strength and could take advantage from the political vacuum in which the other party found itself.

64 NIOD, Coll. Brantz. HQ SNE, Chief G2/G3 (Lt Col. C.A. Le Hardy). Revision of HQ Sector North East Operation Instruction, 05/12/94.

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The cease-fire as dead letter

In the meantime the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Akashi, was worried about the position of UNPROFOR in relation to the warring factions. He reported on the subject to the UN in New York on 1 March.

In a general sense Akashi concluded that the Bosnian government was increasingly resisting the peace process and UNPROFOR. He stated that the attitude of the Bosnian government regarding UNPROFOR was changing. Because there was no prospect of a political solution it was not likely that the Bosnian Muslims would be prepared to renew the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. Through radio and television the Bosnian government in Sarajevo made it clear that certain cities in Bosnia had to be retaken.

This change in attitude of the Bosnian Muslims had already started in January 1995. Akashi thought he detected an orchestrated campaign of obstruction. An indication of that Akashi saw in the fact that though the ABiH had accepted the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, they still obstructed attempts by UNPROFOR to separate the troops of ABiH and VRS and to observe the confrontation lines. In addition, the ABiH imposed limitations upon UNPROFORs freedom of movement, said Akashi. He also concluded that not only did the Bosnian Serbs impose restrictions on sending fuel supplies to UNPROFOR, but the Bosnian Muslims were doing the same: supplying the troops in the Sapna Thumb (were a Dutchbat company was stationed) and Srebrenica was hindered by the restrictions imposed by the ABiH.

The ABiH were getting ready for an offensive, Akashi concluded. He saw numerous indications: the pace of restructuring, training and supplying had been increased; fuel and logistic convoys that had not been seen before were moving towards the north of Sector North East; mobilization took place in Zenica and Tuzla; hospitals had been warned to expect wounded people; and lives of VRS officers had been threatened.

Of course an ABiH offensive would mean a violation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. However, Akashi got the impression that violating this agreement had a wider impact, also towards UNPROFOR: the ABiH refused to implement the arrangements of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. Indication for that was the circumstance that everywhere where the ABiH were preparing for battle, UNPROFOR were under pressure and their Freedom of Movement was limited: the ABiH refused the UN access to the front line. On the other hand UNPROFOR did not have access to the areas controlled by the VRS either. In addition, the VRS liaison officers stationed in Tuzla

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and Gorni Vakuf were told by the ABiH that they had to clear out. These liaison officers should have played an important role in determining the demarcation lines and the separation of the troops.

In Akashis opinion everything was aimed at an ABiH offensive as soon as the weather conditions would improve. The Bosnian government had not explained the reasons for this obstruction against the arranged Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, but Akashi did have the impression that the Bosnian government wanted to make it clear to the international community that the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement had no effect, with the purpose of discrediting the Bosnian Serbs. However, in reality it was the Bosnian government that failed to fully comply with it. That had put UNPROFOR in a deadlock. In addition, the Bosnian government used the relatively quiet period to financially squeeze UNPROFOR for rent of facilities (buildings for accommodation and logistic installations).65

There were many more signs like this that a continuation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement for the period after 1 May 1995 was not very likely. In the middle of March 1995 it began to become clear that Akashis attempts to achieve a continuation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement after 30 April were going to fail. Both the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs were preparing for a continuation of the war. General Smith expected that already by the end of March the ABiH would take the offensive. The VRS should first want to find out which way the wind would be blowing, to determine a central area where they could best send their troops, and also to avoid being considered the party violating the cease-fire.

In Sarajevo general Smith already saw it coming that the hostilities would be resumed. Smith took precautions: he tried to prepare his troops for the end of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement: commanders had to be prepared that as soon as the fighting started, the ABiH would be carrying out operations from the Safe Areas. In addition, pending UN guidelines, Smith issued a Directive for the Bosnia-Hercegovina Command. In it, he voiced his opinion that, in so far as practically possible in wartime, the population ought to be protected. Finally Smith tried to define a number of criteria, under the heading: avoiding. Avoiding a worsening of the situation for the population through UN actions; avoiding that the conflict would spread further or that the violence level would increase; avoiding that the UN would get involved in the fighting; and avoiding that UN personnel would be put at risk. Smith reiterated that UNPROFOR did not have a mandate to fight a war on the side of one of the warring factions. The safety of the UN personnel was of the highest importance, according to Smith. So in this regard Smith agreed with Janvier. Taking action to enforce a Safe Area was only permitted if the population was under threat, and if the criteria for avoiding were observed.66

Recommencement of the hostilities by the ABiH

The ABiH strategy appeared to be aimed at gaining ground over a wide front, before the end of the Cessation of Hostilities. That could be intended to increase the distance of the VRS guns to the area of the Bosnian Muslims in the Tuzla area; it could also have the limited objective of keeping the VRS occupied over the widest possible front, without the ABiH exhausting itself. The ABiH possessed the manpower for this strategy. This tactic stemmed from weakness, but if it were to succeed, it would keep the VRS with its weaker manpower busy along its much too long front lines. The strategy also involved compensation for the lack of artillery and mobility, the ABiH took advantage of the adverse weather conditions and favourable mountainous terrain, which slowed down the VRS response.

In March the ABiH indeed resumed the battle, and that at one of the four places that were strategically important to the VRS: the communication tower of Stolice, north of the Majevica hills. However, this attack revealed the limitations of the ABiH and the superiority of the VRS in fire power. Although they did achieve surprise, the operations were badly planned, commanded and executed. That caused major losses for the ABiH that affected morale.

65 UNNY, DPKO, UNPF. Code Cable Janvier to Annan, 01/03/95, No. Z-341. 66 NIOD, Coll. Smith. Commander BHC Directive 1/95, 15/03/95, Confi.

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These ABiH operations elicited a worried reaction from general Smith. It was not only a violation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, an attack had been set up from the Safe Area Tuzla. That had to trigger a countermove by the VRS. Smith feared that the ABiH action would cause more civilian victims and that it would endanger the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement elsewhere in Bosnia.67 Indeed the VRS reacted in the usual manner by firing at villages in the area.68 The Bosnian Prime Minister Siladjzic called the ABiH attacks a counteroffensive and stated that all ABiH actions were self-defence.69

In addition, the Bosnian government justified the ABiH attacks in the Tuzla region by referring to the Bosnian-Serb interference with Bihac. That worried Akashi, but what annoyed him the most was that the Security Council hardly reacted to these violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement. The effect was that both warring factions were starting to consider UNPROFOR an irrelevant factor, Akashi warned.

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Does the VRS also take the initiative?

Indeed that was exactly what happened.

In the meantime, the question remained whether the VRS would also take the offensive, in particular against the three eastern enclaves, including Srebrenica. Assessments on the subject differed. The Senior UNMO in Bosnia, colonel G.M. Mohatarem, didnt consider it very likely in March 1995 that the VRS would start an offensive to reduce the size of the enclaves Gorazde and Srebrenica. In view of the difficult terrain and a considerable ABiH presence, an offensive would cost them dearly, he estimated. It was more likely that the VRS would try to gradually break the will of the ABiH by a blockade with second-rate troops.71

General Smith on the other hand was not so sure that the eastern enclaves would remain in existence. On 7 March Mladic had said to him on their first meeting in Vlasenica that the eastern enclaves bothered him. On this occasion it became clear to Smith that Mladic wanted to get rid of those. For that he had two military-strategic considerations.

The first consideration was that the VRS were keeping these three enclaves surrounded and Mladic thought that it held too many of his troops tied up. Zepa, Srebrenica and Gorazde caused a constant drain of an estimated 10% of all VRS troops to the eastern enclaves that Mladic could not afford. After all, the battle of the Bosnian Serbs had to be fought at the same time in central Bosnia and the Krajina.72 With all attention going to Bosnia, Croatia was silently preparing to retake areas in the Krajina from the Croatian Serbs. Both Croatia and the Republika Srpska Krajina ignored Resolution 981.73

Smith also saw this strategic problem of lack of manpower with his own eyes. He had noticed that the Republika Srp