1. G.R. No. 156055 March 5, 2007R.R. PAREDES, W.S. TIFFANY, T.R. KOTZE, H. MUSSAIN, FRANCISCO A. CRUZ, EDGARDO C. CATAGUIS, E.M. LAPUZ, ATTY. JOSELIA POBLADOR, JOSE DE LUSONG, EDUARDO A. RICARDO, ATTY. ARIEL F. ABONAL, and ADOLFO GARCIA, Petitioners, vs.TARCISIO S. CALILUNG, Respondent.

Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.24 While probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.25 Webb v. Hon. De Leon, 317 Phil. 758, 789 (1995).

2. G.R. No. 181021 December 10, 2012BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs.JOSEFA "JING" C. REYES and SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondents

This Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.15 The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt.16 A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence.17 Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims.18A review of the records would show that the investigating prosecutor was correct in finding the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa. Reyes did not dispute that she received in trust the amount of P23,423,327.50 from petitioner as proven by the checks and vouchers to be used in purchasing the parcels of land. Petitioner wrote a demand letter for Reyes to return the same amount but was not heeded. Hence, the failure of Reyes to deliver the titles or to return the entrusted money, despite demand and the duty to do so, constituted prima facie evidence of misappropriation. The words convert and misappropriate connote the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.19 To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without right.20 In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.21 Thus, the mere presumption of misappropriation or conversion is enough to conclude that a probable cause exists for the indictment of Reyes for Estafa. As to whether the presumption can be rebutted by Reyes is already a matter of defense that can be best presented or offered during a full-blown trial.

To reiterate, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.22 Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.23 The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty.24 It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.25 Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.26 It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.27

4. SUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 164538 August 9, 2010METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner, vs.ROGELIO REYNADO and JOSE C. ADRANDEA,** Respondents.We find the petition highly meritorious.

Novation not a mode of extinguishing criminal liability for estafa; Criminal liability for estafa not affected by compromise or novation of contract.

Initially, it is best to emphasize that "novation is not one of the grounds prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the extinguishment of criminal liability."34In a catena of cases, it was ruled that criminal liability for estafa is not affected by a compromise or novation of contract. In Firaza v. People35 and Recuerdo v. People,36 this Court ruled that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement or belated payment to the offended party of the money swindled by the accused does not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. We also held in People v. Moreno37 and in People v. Ladera38 that "criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion even though complete reparation should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended party." Similarly in the case of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v. Tonda39 cited by petitioner, we held that in a crime of estafa, reimbursement of or compromise as to the amount misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, affects only the civil liability of the offender, and not his criminal liability.

Thus, the doctrine that evolved from the aforecited cases is that a compromise or settlement entered into after the commission of the crime does not extinguish accuseds liability for estafa. Neither will the same bar the prosecution of said crime. Accordingly, in such a situation, as in this case, the complaint for estafa against respondents should not be dismissed just because petitioner entered into a Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal. Even the OSG arrived at the same conclusion:

Contrary to the conclusion of public respondent, the Debt Settlement Agreement entered into between petitioner and Universal Converter Philippines extinguishes merely the civil aspect of the latters liability as a corporate entity but not the criminal liability of the persons who actually committed the crime of estafa against petitioner Metrobank. x x x40xxxxx

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In requiring "hard facts and solid evidence" as the basis for a finding of probable cause to hold petitioners Bernyl and Katherene liable to stand trial for the crime complained of, the DOJ disregards the definition of probable cause that it is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well-founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief; that is, the belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. While probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify conviction."