Jurisprudence Specpro

7/28/2019 Jurisprudence Specpro

1/26

Eric-John Soriano Calagui Page 1 of 26

Jurisprudential Developments in Special Proceedings

Settlement of estateARBOLARIO vs. CA

G.R. No. 129163, (April 22, 2003)

Facts:

Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals overstepped its bounds when it ruled that sincerespondents did not raise the issue of partition on appeal, the RTC had no jurisdiction to divide the disputed lot.

The CA held, however, that the partition of the property had not been contemplated by the parties, becauserespondents merely sought recovery of possession of the parcel held by the Salhays, while petitioners sought theannulment of the Deed of Partition respondents had entered into.

Issue: Whether or not the questions as to the determination of the heirs of a decedent, the proof of filiation, andthe determination of the estate of a decedent and claims thereto may be brought up before an ordinary court?

Ruling:

Petitioners in this case were unable to establish any right to partition, because they had failed to

establish that they were legitimate half-brothers and half-sisters of the deceased Purificacion. Questions as to thedetermination of the heirs of a decedent, the proof of filiation, and the determination of the estate of a decedentand claims thereto should be brought up before the proper probate court or in special proceedings instituted for

the purpose. Such issues cannot be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action for the recovery of ownership and

possession.

Note: The same ruling was made in Natcher v. CA, G.R. No. 133000, Oct. 2, 2001 where a regular court wasresolving the question of the alleged advancement of property made by the decedent to one of his heirs. The SCruled that the regular court had no jurisdiction over the issue. It belongs to the probate court.

SECOND DIVISION

RIOFERIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004]

Facts:

Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. Private

respondents discovered that petitioner Teodora Rioferio (the paramour) and her children executed anExtrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, real estate mortgages and transfers

involving the properties of the estate of the decedent. To recover their rights, Alfonso Clyde P. Orfinada IIIfiled a Petition for Letters of Administration praying that letters of administration encompassing the estate ofAlfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.

Issue: Whether the heirs (respondents) may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointmentof an administrator is the issue in this case?

Ruling:

Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring

suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Codethat (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. The provision inturn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the


2/26


inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law.Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an

administrator has not yet been appointed. The heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of anadministrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect

the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties ofthe decedent are violated or dissipated.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 141634. February 5, 2001]

Heirs of Spouses SANDEJAS vs. LINA, respondent.

Facts:

Petitioners fault the CA Decision by arguing, inter alia, (a) jurisdiction over ordinary civil action

seeking not merely to enforce a sale but to compel performance of a contract falls upon a civil court, not upon anintestate court; and (b) that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows the executor or administrator, and no one else, to file anapplication for approval of a sale of the property under administration.

Issue: Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction over the contract of sale of realty belonging to the estateof the decedent?

Ruling:

A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to probate courts approval. The

transaction remains binding on the seller-heir, but not on the other heirs who have not given their consent toit. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate

of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators andexecutors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate courtsrecognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed,

the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flowfrom such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 154322 August 22, 2006

FIGURACION-GERILLA v s. VDA. DE FIGURACION et al.

Facts:

Respondents claim that: (1) the properties constituting Leandros estate cannot be partitioned before hisestate is settled and (2) there should be an accounting before anything else, considering that they (respondents)had to spend for the maintenance of the deceased Leandro Figuracion and his wife in their final years, which

support was supposed to come from the income of the properties. Among other things, respondents apparentlywanted petitioner to share in the expenses incurred for the care of their parents during the ten years she stayed in

the United States, before she could get her part of the estate while petitioner apparently wanted her gross share,without first contributing to the expenses.

Issue: Whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate (that is, an accounting of

the income of the prperties, the payment of expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus compliance with other legalrequirements, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or distributed?

Ruling:

While Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real propertys income (rentals andprofits) in the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which


3/26


property belonging to the decedents estate may be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes andsimilar expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. In a situation where there remains

an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate. While petitioner points out that theestate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro Figuracions only legal heirs, she does

not dispute the finding of the CA that certain expenses including those related to her fathers final illness andburial have not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and respondents) have to submit their fathersestate to settlement because the determination of these expenses cannot be done in an action for partition.

SECOND DIVISION

[G. R. No. 156842. December 10, 2004]

SOTERO A. PUNONGBAYAN vs. DANILO G. PUNONGBAYAN

Facts:

The intestate court denied respondents motion that petitioner (who has been co-administrator for only one (1)day at the time it was filed) should render an accounting of his administration of the estate and to turn over thecertificates of placement of the proceeds from the sales of estate properties. He maintains that petitioner should

be made to account first for the alleged illegal transfers of estate properties made by him before he (respondent)

could render his own accounting.

Issue: Whether or not the denial of the motion is proper?

Ruling:

Yes. Section 8, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court, provides : Every executor or administrator shall

render an account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters

testamentary or of administration, unless the court otherwise directs because of extensions of time forpresenting claims against, or paying the debts of, the estate, or of disposing of the estate; and he shallrender such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is wholly settled.

and Sec. 7, Rule 87, of the same Rules, provides

The court, on complaint of an executor or administrator, may cite a person entrusted by an executor oradministrator with any part of the estate of the deceased to appear before it, and may require such person torender a full account, on oath, of the money, goods, chattels, bonds, accounts, or other papers belonging to such

estate as came to his possession in trust for such executor or administrator, and of his proceedings thereon; andif a person so cited refuses to appear to render such account, the court may punish him for contempt as havingdisobeyed a lawful order of the court.

Applying Sec. 8, Rule 85, the intestate court denied the motion on the ground that it was premature consideringthat petitioner has been co-administrator for only one (1) day at the time it was filed. With the denial,

petitioners accountability as co-administrator was in no way settled as it did not preclude or forestall futureaccountings by him which, under said Sec. 8, he is obliged to render within one (1) year from receiving letters ofadministration, or as required by the court until the estate is settled. Neither an accounting or an examination of

petitioner under Section 7, Rule 87, definitely settle the issue of his alleged illegal transfers and lease since aproceeding under this section, like that under Sec.6 of the same Rule, is merely in the nature of fact-findinginquiries. It is intended to elicit information or evidence relative to estate properties.


4/26


FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006

GUY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, whodied intestate. They prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement ofdecedents estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, the legitimate son of

the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of thepetition alleging that private respondents claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished by

reason of Remedios Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educationalassistance received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from anyand all liabilities; and that private respondents do not have the legal personality to institute the petition for letters

of administration as they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei.

Issue: Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their successionalrights; and whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation?

Ruling:

Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial

approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the courts scrutinyin order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of

Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of thedeceased.

Anent the issue on private respondents filiation, inBernabe v. Alejo that illegitimate children who were

still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority aregiven the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested rightwas not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 167321 July 31, 2006

EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR., vs. JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ

Facts:

Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the deviseestherein. Upon Loretos death a certain Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will.While the petition for the probate of the will was pending, the devisee Oscar Casa died, intestate. Aquino filed a

pleading entitled Appointment of Administrator signed by Candelaria, Jesus, Arlyn, Nestor, Edna, Benhur,Federico, Rafael and Ma. Eden, all surnamed Casa, praying that one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated

as administrator of the estate of the deceased and that he be substituted for the deceased. Petitioner contested thesame.

Issue:Whether or not a person nominated as administrator by purported heirs of a devisee or legatee in a willunder probate may validly substitute for that devisee or legatee in the probate proceedings despite the fact that

such administrator is not the court-appointed administrator of the estate of the devisee or legatee?

Ruling:

The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an administrator of his estate,because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as

devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executor of


5/26


the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted asrepresentatives of the estate. Said heirs may designate one or some of them as their representative before the

trial court.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006

CRUZ et. al. vs. CRISTOBAL

Facts:

Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro Cristobal, and

Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his firstmarriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents (Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose,all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to

Donata Enriquez. Private respondents executed a deed of partition without notifying petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not the deed of partition is valid?

Ruling:

As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by the private respondents

among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners, the applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court,which states:

The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of generalcirculation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be

binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.

Under the said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, theextrajudicial settlement is not binding on said persons. In the case at bar, since the estate of the deceasedBuenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of the subject property, the partition thereof by the privaterespondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of Buenaventura Cristobals estate.


6/26


Guardianship and Custody of Minors

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132223. June 19, 2001]

BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner, vs. HELEN G. BELMES, respondent.

Facts:

Court of Appeals disqualified petitioner Bonifacia P. Vancil (grandmother) to be appointed asjudicial guardian over the persons and estate of subject minors despite the fact that she has all the

qualifications and none of the disqualifications as judicial guardian, merely on the basis of her U.S.

citizenship which is clearly not a statutory requirement to become guardian.

Issue: Whether or not the grandmother of minorshould be the latters guardian?

Ruling:

Being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding natural and legal right to

his custody. Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot qualifyas a substitute guardian. Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardianswho are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards. In Guerrero

vs. Teran, this Court held:

xxx There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators orguardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no statutory requirements upon this question, the

courts, charged with the responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc.,will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who are notpersonally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should

not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to thejurisdiction of our courts here.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 109557. November 29, 2000]

JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA, petitioners, vs. COURT OFAPPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA, respondents.

Facts:

Petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza averred the physical and mental incapacity of her husband, who was then

confined for intensive medical care and treatment at the Iloilo Doctors Hospital. She signified to the court herdesire to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties. She also alleged that her husbandsmedical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up, accumulating to several hundred thousands of

pesos already. For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of real property and its improvements. Thus, she

prayed for authorization from the court to sell said property.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Gilda L. Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, acerebrovascular accident, rendering him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, and could not managetheir conjugal partnership property may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under

Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose of a parcel of land with its improvements, worth more than twelvemillion pesos, with the approval of the court in a summary proceedings, to her co-petitioners, her own daughterand son-in-law, for the amount of eight million pesos?


7/26


Ruling:

The procedural rules on summary proceedings in relation to Article 124 of the Family Code are notapplicable. In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the

proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse isabsent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such rulesdo not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this

case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or semi-comatosecondition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosisof brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 ofthe 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-03-1753. February 5, 2004]

CAPISTRANO OBEDENCIO, JR., complainant, vs. JUDGE JOAQUIN M. MURILLO, PRESIDINGJUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 26, MEDINA, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, respondent.

Facts:

In a letter-complaint, complainant Capistrano Obedencio, Jr., charged respondent Judge Joaquin M.Murillo of unjustly dismissing Criminal Case for rape, entitled People v. Dexter Z. Acenas. Complainantsought to secure from the court a copy of the warrant of arrest issued against the accused. To his great surprise,respondent judge told him that the case had been dismissed three days earlier. According to respondent judge,

Licel Obedencio had come to court, accompanied by her maternal grandparents and Asst. Provincial ProsecutorEmmanuel Hallazgo. There she was presented to affirm her affidavit of desistance.

Issue: Whether or not the affidavit should have been executed with the concurrence of her parents?

Ruling:

Licel was only 14 years old, definitely a minor, when she was presented before respondents sala to

affirm the execution of her affidavit of desistance. This being the case, said affidavit should have been executedwith the concurrence of her parents. Licel could not validly give consent to an affidavit of desistance, for a

minor is incompetent to execute such an instrument. Yet, notwithstanding the absence of her parentsconformity to the affidavit of desistance and lack of notice to them or their lawyer of the scheduled hearing,respondent judge dismissed the criminal case. Truly, he should have exercised more prudence and caution

instead of perfunctorily dismissing the case, considering the nature and gravity of the offense charged.At thevery least, herein respondent should have appointed a guardian ad litem for Licel, to protect her welfare and

interest, instead of hastily dismissing the rape case.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1447. September 27, 2000]

Spouses LEONARDO DARACAN and MA. TERESA DARACAN vs. JUDGE ELI G.C. NATIVIDAD

Facts:

The complainants alleged that upon motion of the court-appointed guardian, Lina Francisco-Velez, the

respondent Judge issued the subject writ of preliminary attachment against their properties even as they are notparties to the guardianship proceedings. Explaining his side in the instant administrative case, the respondentjudge pleaded that he thought all along that under Section 6, Rule 96 of the Revised Rules of Court, he could

issue the questioned writ to protect and preserve the rights of the wards in the light of the sworn assertion of theguardian, Lina Francisco-Velez, that the complainants were indebted to her wards; that even as the complainants

had priorly been cited by the guardian in a motion to require them to appear for examination as debtors of herwards and against whom she (guardian) had initiated the filing of six (6) informations for violation of B.P. Blg.


8/26


22, they (complainants) did not appear to oppose the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment; that thedepartment store of the complainants that the sheriff opened, because the former had abandoned the same.

Issue: Whether or not the writ should have been issued?

Ruling:

Section 6, Rule 96 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court under which the respondent judge issued thequestioned writ of preliminary injunction provides:

Sec. 6.Proceeding when persons suspected of embezzling or concealing property of ward. - Upon complaint of

the guardian or ward, or of any person having actual or prospective interest in the estate of the ward as creditor,heir or otherwise, that anyone is suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed away any money, goodsor interest or a written instrument, belonging to the ward or his estate, the court may cite the suspected person to

appear for examination, touching such money, goods, interest or instrument and make such orders as will securethe estate against such embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.

In the leading case ofCui vs. Piccio,the foregoing rule was construed as follows:

x x x its purpose is merely to elicit information or secure evidence from the person suspected of havingembezzled, concealed or conveyed away any personal property of the ward. In such proceeding the court has noauthority to determine the right of property or to order delivery thereof. If after the examination the court finds

sufficient evidence showing ownership on the part of the ward, it is the duty of the guardian to bring the properaction.

x x x the jurisdiction of the court in guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of havingembezzled, concealed or conveyed property belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining information

which may be used in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward; and thatonly in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has already been

judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian.

It is, therefore, beyond cavil that, as found by the Court of Appeals, the respondent judge clearly exceeded [his]jurisdiction in issuing the writ. Inarguably, a guardianship court exercises but a limited jurisdiction that cannotextend to the determination of questions of ownership. Apart from that, the B.P. Blg. 22 cases filed by the wardsagainst the herein complainants can not be utilized by the respondent judge as basis for the issuance of the writsimply because the cases are not before the guardianship court over which he was then presiding. Similarly, the

fact that herein complainants were deliberately and by stealth removing all their wares and goods from theirstore to the prejudice of the wards to whom they (complainants) were indebted to the tune of P5 million is

entirely foreign to the guardianship proceedings; and the guardians remedy was to institute a collection suitagainst the complainants in the proper court and therein apply for a writ of attachment.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 122906. February 7, 2002]

DINAH B. TONOG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL

Facts:

A year after the birth of her illegitimate daughter Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of

America where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her father (privaterespondent herein) and paternal grandparents. Private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin

Faith, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053. Petitioner contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor,Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority uponher as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin Faith cannot be separated from her since she hadnot, as of then, attained the age of seven.

Issue: Whether or not the father can exercise temporarycustody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears thatthe proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has

been made as to who should have final custody of the minor?


9/26


Ruling:

Yes. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that theappellate court did not err in allowing her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental

custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust intoa strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. Itshall be only understood that, for the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor

should remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court in Sp.Proc. No. Q-92-11053.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 156254. June 28, 2005]

CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO V, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; Hon. HELEN B.RICAFORT, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court Paraaque City, Branch 260; and JOYCELYN D.

PABLO-GUALBERTO, respondents.

Facts:

Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed a petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to JoycelynD. Pablo Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their almost 4-year-old son, minorRafaello (the child, for brevity), whom Joycelyn allegedly took away with her from the conjugal home and hisschool when she decided to abandon Crisanto. One Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistictestified that he was commissioned by Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn and came up with the

conclusion that she is having lesbian relations. The findings of Renato Santos were corroborated by a househelper of the spouses who stated that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the

house and on one occasion, she saw Joycelyn slapping the child.

Issue: Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals, when it awarded the custody of the child to the father,violated Art. 213 of the Family Code, which mandates that no child under seven years of age shall be separatedfrom the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

Ruling:

It should be noted that the Family Code has reverted to the Civil Code provision mandating that a childbelow seven years should not be separated from the mother. It has indeed been held that under certaincircumstances, the mothers immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody. But

sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact thata mother is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her

minor child. To deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have hadan adverse effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper

parental care.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 156343 October 18, 2004

JOEY D. BRIONES vs. MARICEL P. MIGUEL, FRANCISCA P. MIGUEL and LORETA P. MIGUEL

Facts:

Petitioner Joey D. Briones filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against respondents Maricel PinedaMiguel and Francisca Pineda Miguel, to obtain custody of his minor child Michael Kevin Pineda. The petitioner

alleges that the minor Michael Kevin Pineda is his illegitimate son with respondent Loreta P. Miguel. Therespondent Loreta P. Miguel is now married to a Japanese national and is presently residing in Japan.

Issue: Who Should Have Custody of the Child?


10/26


Ruling:

Having been born outside a valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner andRespondent Loreta. Article 176 of the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that "illegitimate

children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled tosupport in conformity with this Code." This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity.

David v. Court of Appeals held that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground forordering the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole

parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only if she defaults can the father assume custodyand authority over the minor. Of course, the putative father may adopt his own illegitimate child; in such a case,the child shall be considered a legitimate child of the adoptive parent.


11/26


AdoptionFIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 167405 February 16, 2006

Reyes vs. Sotero

Facts:

Private respondents Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the Court of Appeals a petition forannulment of the adoption decree. It was alleged that petitioners natural mother supposedly connived with thecourt personnel to make it appear that petitioner was adopted by the Delos Santos spouses and that the CFIsorder for initial hearing was published in a weekly newspaper which was not authorized to publish court orders

in special proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that petitioner had to prove her adoption due toimputations of irregularities in view of Section 47 of Rule 39?

Ruling:

It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered

into the public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affectingthe status of individuals, is the local civil registrars office as well as the court which rendered the judgment.Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are

prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar andthe clerk of court regarding details of petitioners adoption which are entered in the records kept under their

official custody, areprima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof ofthe fact of petitioners adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficientevidence. Mere imputations of irregularities will not cast a cloud of doubt on the adoption decree since the

certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 141501 July 21, 2006

Rivera vs. Villanueva et. al.

Facts:

This petition touches upon questions of filiation, presumptions of co-equal acquisition. A closerexamination of the birth certificate reveals that respondent Angelina was listed as adopted both by thedecedents, Villanueva and Gonzales.

Issue: Is the adoption of Angelina valid?

Ruling:

The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a

valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child,and even amounts to simulation of the childs birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a

public document. Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of thefacts contained therein. It is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by theinterested parties. Following the logic of Benitez, respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857 should

have adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records, however, arebereft of any such evidence.


12/26


13/26


decree, are subject to regulation by the State. Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be takenaway at anytime before it has been exercised.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

Facts:

Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie

Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994, that hermother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and

that he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle nameAstorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed to

Catindig, his surname.

Issue:May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as

her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.

Ruling:

Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for thefollowing reasons:

First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies filiation with her natural mother because underArticle 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion

and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother shouldbe maintained.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as hermiddle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of themother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family LawCommittees agreed that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the

father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.


14/26


Absentee (in relation to presumption of death)THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 163604. May 6, 2005]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (TwentiethDivision), HON. PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and

APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.

Facts:

The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the

Family Code is not a special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a record on appeal shallbe filed and served in like manner. Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the

cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed and a record on appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected. Thepetition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse not being included in the enumeration,petitioner contends that a mere notice of appeal suffices.

Issue: The principal issue in this case is whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a personis in the nature of a special proceeding.

Ruling:

The instant petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petitionmerely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee spouse ClementeJomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]

ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.

Facts:

Petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of Teodorico, filed with the Regional TrialCourt a petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio y Cacabelos,Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio, themarriage between the latter and respondent Marietta Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby

null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of

the estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estatewould have been settled. Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage withJames Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being unknown, for more thaneleven years before she contracted her second marriage with Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouseof Teodorico, she sought priority in the administration of the estate of the decedent.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor-appellant and thedeceased Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failure of the former to secure a decree of the presumptive death

of her first spouse?

Ruling:

Under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally beconsidered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must

have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under thecircumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has awell-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial

declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summaryproceeding in court to ask for that declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the

requirement of judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article40, of the Family Code. In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband,


15/26


James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven years before she entered into asecond marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted

during the regime of the Civil Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicialdeclaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005

EDUARDO P. MANUEL vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

In a criminal action for bigamy, petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the secondelement of the felony, i.e., that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent,the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married

Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been absent for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, shewas presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the CivilCode, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still alive, shall be presumed dead forall purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the rule on legal presumption of deathwith respect to succession.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error of law when it ruled that petitionersfirst wife cannot be legally presumed dead as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death?

Ruling:

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in

1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her formore than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaringthe presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to

Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted ingood faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a

consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to dischargehis burden.

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM vs. TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON

Facts:

Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in Barcelona, Sorsogon.More than 15 years, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance a petition to declare Alice presumptivelydead which was granted. Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead Bailon

contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent). Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security Systemand a retiree pensioner thereof, died. Respondent filed a claim for funeral benefits. Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia),who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa) contested before the SSS the release torespondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime,the first with Alice, the second with her mother Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive;

she, together with her siblings, paid for Bailons medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submittedby respondent to the SSS in support of her claims are spurious. SSS stopped the release of pension torespondent.

Issue: Whether or not the subsequent marriage of Bailon to respondent is bigamous?


16/26


Ruling:

It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct

proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and

not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage

had been perfectly valid. Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made

good abinitio. In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailons andrespondents marriage prior to the formers death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent

spouse-beneficiary of Bailon. In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio butonly voidable under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been

contracted with the first wife having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had

been generally believed dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of thethree persons involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the

action for annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And

furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable

marriage must be carried out in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse, asexpressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]

RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.

Facts:

The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte,Rodolfo G. Navarro. In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation from his act ofhaving solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F.

Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar,confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven years. Withrespect to the second charge, he maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario,he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage may be solemnized

by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof

applies to the case in question.

Issue: Whether or not there was valid subsequent marriage?

Ruling:

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage, the spouse present must institute a summary

proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudiceto the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded belief that theabsent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessary in

order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated intothe Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that the previous marriage has been

dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.


17/26


Habeas CorpusThornton v. Thornton (GR No. 154598 August 16, 2004)

Facts:

Sequiera Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton was born to petitioner and respondent. Without notifying

her husband, the respondent left the family home with her daughter. In view of this incident, the petitioner fileda petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati but was dismissed on the ground that thechild was in Basilan. Petitioner filed another petition for habeas corpus with CA but it was also denied. Hence,this petition for review.

Issue: Whether CA has jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors in light of theprovision in R.A. 8369 giving Family Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitioners?

Ruling:

Yes, the CA should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 (RTC DESIGNATEDAS FAMILY COURTS) that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving custody of

minors. The provision of RA 8369 reveals no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the CA and SC toissue said writs. It cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7902 (EXPANDING THEJURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS) and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does

not prohibit the CA and SC from issuing said writs. Family Courts have concurrent jurisdiction with CA and Scin petition for habeas corpus involving custody of minors.

MONCUPA vs. ENRILE (G.R. No. L-63345 [1986] PHSC 23 (30 January 1986))

Facts:

Petitioner was arrested on the allegation that he was a National Democratic Front (NDF) staff member,a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was issued against him and eight (8) other persons. He wastemporarily released on the condition that he cannot travel outside Metro Manila, change his residence, be

interviewed by media, and have to report to the military.

Isuue: Whether or not habeas corpus can be availed of?

Ruling:

Habeas corpus is available not only for those who are in actual detention but even for those whose

liberty is merely restrained.

Villavicencio v. Lukban (G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919)

Facts:

Mayor Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district forwomen of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of Manila, closed. The city

authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao,Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and

Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers.

Issue: Should the person be actually confined for writ of Habeas Corpus to issue?

Ruling:

No, there is no need for actual confinement. Any restraint which precludes freedom of action issufficient. The forcible taking of women of ill-repute from Manila to be brought to Davao, deprived them of

their freedom of locomotion just as effectively as if they were imprisoned.
http://www.asianlii.org/ph/cases/PHSC/1986/23.htmlhttp://www.asianlii.org/ph/cases/PHSC/1986/23.html


18/26


Sombong v. CA, et. al. (GR NO. 111876, January 31, 1996)

Facts:

Petitioner filed a petition in the RTC of Quezon City for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus againstDr. Carmen TY and her husband, owners of the Sir John Clinic located at Caloocan City for allegedly detaining

and imprisoning her daughter Arabella whom she left at the clinic for her failure to pay her hospital bill. Whenthereafter, she paid the spouses but despite her pleas to have her child back, the spouses refused to return herchild back, the spouses refused to return her daughter. Petition was dismissed on the ground of lack of

jurisdiction, the alleged detention having been perpetrated in Caloocan. A criminal complaint ensued and lateron, information for kidnapping and detention of a minor was filed. Facing arrest, Dr. Ty disclosed the possibility

that the child may be found in San Francisco del Monte in Quezon City. The agents of the NBI went in the saidplace and there found a female child who answered to the name of Cristina Grace Neri. Quite significantly the

evidence disclosed that the child Cristina, had been living with respondent Marietta Neri Alviar since 1988.When she was just a baby, Cristina was abandoned by her parents at the Sir John Clinic.

Issue: Should the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus be granted to petitioner?

Ruling:

No, petitioner does not have the right of custody over the minor child Cristina because by evidence

disclosed before the trial court, Cristina has not been shown to the petitioners daughter, Arabella. The evidenceadduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the same person as Cristina. It

will be remembered that in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subjectto the usual presumptions including those to the identity of the person. Since petitioner was not able to establish

by evidence to be entitled to the custody of the minor Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it cannot be said

that private respondents are unlawfully withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over Cristina.

GLENN CABALLES Y CHUA VS CA

G.R. NO. 163108. FEBRUARY 23, 2005

Facts:

On November 19, 2001, Petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged with rape of minor in the RTC ofMalabon City. Because the petitioner was charged with a non-bailable offense, he was detained. On May 5,

2003, the petitioner filed a motion seeking an earlier trial date, invoking his right to speedy trial Act of 1998. OnJuly 4, 2003, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying his petition for bail. However,the petitioner prompted the resolution of his motion for reconsideration and filed a motion to dismiss on theground that his right to speedy and trial has been violated. The trial court reasoned that there was no violation ofthe petitioners right to speedy trail, considering that the apparent delays could not be attributed to the petitioneralso sought post moments of the trials. The petitioner then filed with Court of Appeals a petition for Habeas

Corpus and/or certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:Whether or not the proper remedy from the appellate courts denial of a petitioner for a writ of habeascorpus is a petition for cetionari under rule 65 of the rules of court.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the petition citing Administrative matter no. 01-03SC amending section 3,rule 41 of the ruled of court. The SC held that the petitioner should have appealed to this court from the CAdecision denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The well-settled rule is that certiorari, is not available

where the aggrieved partys remedy of appeal is plain, speedy and adequate in the ordinary course, the reasonbeing that certiorari cannot co-exist with an appeal or any other adequate remedy. A petition for a writ of habeas

corpus is a remedy different from the special civil action of certiorari under rule 65 of the rules of court, asamended. The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on the processes, orders, as judgment of the trial court,while certiorari is a direct attack of said processes, orders or judgment on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.


19/26


Change of nameFIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 153883. January 13, 2004]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CHULE Y. LIM, respondent.

Facts:

In her petition for correction of entries under Rule 108, respondent claimed that :

First, she claims that her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo. She has been using Yu in all her school

records and in her marriage certificate. She presented a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation(NBI) to further show the consistency in her use of the surname Yu.

Second, she claims that her fathers name in her birth record was written as Yo Diu To (Co Tian) when itshould have been Yu Dio To (Co Tian).

Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father andmother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims thather being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.

Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she

should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the correction of the citizenship of respondent and

allowing respondent to continue using her fathers legitimate surname despite her illegitimacy?

Ruling:

Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate

child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reachingthe age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision inSection 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippinecitizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned beforeany officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shallaccompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the

Philippines.

Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only tolegitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child,considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required to

comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being anillegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stateddifferently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of

majority.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals decision in allowingrespondent to use her fathers surname despite its finding that she is illegitimate.

The Republics submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use herfathers surname. What it did allow was the correction of her fathers misspelled surname which she has been

using ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her touse her fathers surname.

RP vs. LabradorGR No. 132980 March 1999

Facts:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court

of Cebu City in Special Proceedings No. 686 1-CEB granting the petition filed by respondent to have the nameappearing on the birth certificate of Sarah Zita Caon Erasmo changed from Sarah Zita Erasmo to Sarah ZitaCanon and that the name of Sarah Zitas mother, which appeared as Rosemarie B. Canon in the childs birthrecord, be changed to Maria Rosario Canon. Petitioner contended that the summary proceedings under Rule


20/26


108 of the Rules of Court and Article 412 of the Civil Code may be used only to correct or change clerical orinnocuous errors. It argued that Rule 108 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such as

those involving the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, which respondent desired to do. The change soughtwill result not only in substantial correction in the childs record of birth but also in the childs rights which

cannot be effected in a summary action.

Issue: Whether or not summary proceedings for the change of name can be availed of?

Ruling:

Summary proceedings provided under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and Article 412 of the Civil Codemaybe used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the Civil Registry.Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested

parties are impleaded and due process is observed. Where the effect of a correction of an entry in a civil registrywill change the status of a person from legitimate to illegitimate, as in Sarah Zitas case, the same cannot be

granted in summary proceedings. The changes sought by respondent were substantial, thus, an adversarialproceeding is essential in order to fully thresh out the allegations in respondents petition. Sarah Zita and her

purported parents should have been parties to the proceeding. After all, it would affect her legitimacy as well asher successional and other rights. The Supreme Court found the proceeding conducted in the present case does

not suffice. Consequently, it annulled and set aside the decision of the trial court.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 130277. May 9, 2002]

MA. LOURDES BARRIENTOS ELEOSIDA, for and in behalf of her minor child, CHARLES

CHRISTIAN ELEOSIDA vs. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, and CARLOSVILLENA BORBON

Facts:

Ma. Lourdes Eleosida filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking to correctthe following entries in the birth certificate of her son, Charles Christian: first, the surname "Borbon" should bechanged to "Eleosida;" second, the date of the parents' wedding should be left blank; and third, the informant'sname should be "Ma. Lourdes B. Eleosida," instead of "Ma. Lourdes E. Borbon." In support of her petition,

petitioner alleged that she gave birth to her son out of wedlock on May 24, 1992; that she and the boy's father,

Carlos Borbon, were never married; and that the child is therefore illegitimate and should follow the mother'ssurname. The petition impleaded the Local Registrar of Quezon City and Carlos Villena Borbon as respondents.

Issue: Whether or not corrections of entries in the certificate of live birth pursuant to Article 412 of the CivilCode, in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court may be allowed even if the errors to be corrected are

substantial and not merely clerical errors of a harmless and innocuous nature?

Ruling:

Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entriesin the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the

correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If therectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the

procedure to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia where we held that evensubstantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts established under Rule 108 provided the

parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate

adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts havebeen fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the

opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.


21/26


SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005]

IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION

OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also known as

JULIAN LIN WANG, to be amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN WANG,duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA WANG vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR, dulyrepresented by the Registrar OSCAR B. MOLO

Facts:

Petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang,

filed a petition dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in

the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and havehis registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. Petitioner theorizes

that it would be for his best interest to drop his middle name as this would help him to adjust more

easily to and integrate himself into Singaporean society.

Issue: Does the law allow one to drop the middle name from his registered name on the cause

mentioned?

Ruling:

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for

which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some properor compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.

Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous,dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as

in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been knownsince childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipinoname to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when thesurname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent

purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 157043 February 2, 2007

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE

Facts:

Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote,Giovannis guardian ad litem filed a petition for change of name of

her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores. Republic contends that the CA erred in affirmingthe trial courts decision which granted the petition for change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable

parties.

Issue: Whether or not the change petition for change of name should be granted?

Ruling:

The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a

petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the proceduralrequirements. After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presentedduring the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code,Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has alwaysrecognized him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his

father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in theUnited States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son.


22/26


Correction of entriesTHIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 146963. March 15, 2004]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR, GUIMBA, NUEVA

ECIJA, vs. PETRONIO L. BENEMERITO

Facts:

Respondent Petronio L. Benemerito, filed a verified petition before the Regional Trial Court of NuevaEcija asking for the correction of certain entries in the record of birth of his son, Joven Lee Benemerito, on filewith the Local Civil Registrar of Guimba, Nueva Ecija. The entries sought to be corrected included -

(a) a change of the father's name from Peter Laurente Benemerito to Petronio L.Benemerito; and

(b) the date of marriage of Joven Lees parents, Edna V. Sicat and Petronio L. Benemeritoappearing therein from 01 September 1989 to 25 January 1998.

Issue: Whether or not the correction of the spelling of petitioner's name from Peter Laurente Benemerito toPetronio Laurente Benemerito and the change of the date of marriage from September 1, 1989 to reflect the

actual date of marriage as January 25, 1998, are innocuous?

Ruling:

No. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to Article 412 of the Civil Code, states the procedure bywhich an entry in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding there contemplated maygenerally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry.A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a

transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearlymisspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. On the other hand, substantial or contentiousalterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due

process is properly observed.

The corrections sought to be made by respondent in the birth certificate of Joven Lee could hardly

qualify as just clerical errors, therefore not innocous. In order to effect the desired changes, it would be essentialto establish that Peter Laurente Benemerito, the person named as being the father of Joven Lee, and Petronio L.Benemerito, herein respondent, refer to the same person. The intended correction of the date of marriage of the

parents of Joven Lee from 01 September 1989, appearing in his certificate of birth, to 25 January 1998, would,in effect, change the status of the child, Joven Lee, born on 01 June 1990 at a time when he and his wife were

not as yet legally married, from being the legitimate son of Peter Laurente Benemerito to being instead thelegitimated child of Petronio L. Benemerito and a certain Peter Laurente Benemerito.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120587. January 20, 2004]

MILAGROS M. BARCO, as the Natural Guardian and Guardian Ad Litem of MARY JOY ANN

GUSTILO vs. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL SIXTEENTH DIVISION), REGIONAL TRIALCOURT (BR. 133-MAKATI), NCJR; THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MAKATI; and

NADINA G. MARAVILLA

Facts:

The Court of Appeals held that jurisdiction over the parties was properly acquired through the notice bypublication effected in conformity with Section 4 of Rule 108. Barco assails this holding and claims that thefailure to implead her as a party to the petition for correction deprived the RTC of jurisdiction.

Issue: Whether or not in the petition for the correction of entry, jurisdiction over the parties was properlyacquired?

Ruling:

Yes. Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the

petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her


23/26


wards share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joys existence atthe time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under

Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. The factthat Nadina amended her petition to implead Francisco and Gustilo indicates earnest effort on her part to comply

with Section 3 as quoted above.Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appealscorrectly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by

publication, thus:

Section 4. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by order, fix the time and place for thehearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the

petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutiveweeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the

petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3,Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 132980. March 25, 1999]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLADYS C. LABRADOR

Facts:

Petitioner contended that the summary proceedings under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and Article

412 of the Civil Code may be used only to correct or change clerical or innocuous errors. It argued that Rule108 cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such as those involving the legitimacy orillegitimacy of the child, which respondent desired to do. The change sought will result not only in substantial

correction in the childs record of birth but also in the childs rights which cannot be effected in a summaryaction.

Issue: Whether or not Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is the proper action to impugn the legitimacy of achild?

Ruling:

No. Summary proceedings provided under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and Article 412 of the CivilCode maybe used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the Civil

Registry. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which allinterested parties are impleaded and due process is observed. Where the effect of a correction of an entry in acivil registry will change the status of a person from legitimate to illegitimate, as in Sarah Zitas case, thesame cannot be granted in summary proceedings. The changes sought by respondent were substantial, thus, anadversarial proceeding is essential in order to fully thresh out the allegations in respondents petition. Sarah Zita

and her purported parents should have been parties to the proceeding. After all, it would affect her legitimacy aswell as her successional and other rights. The Supreme Court found the proceeding conducted in the presentcase does not suffice. Consequently, it annulled and set aside the decision of the trial court.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 164041. July 29, 2005]

ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother and natural guardian, Armi A. Alba, and

ARMI A. ALBA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSENDO C. HERRERA

Facts:

Private respondent Rosendo C. Herrera filed a petition for cancellation of the following entries in the

birth certificate of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr., to wit: (1) the surname Herrera as appended to the name ofsaid child; (2) the reference to private respondent as the father of Rosendo Alba Herrera, Jr.; and (3) the allegedmarriage of private respondent to the childs mother, Armi A. Alba (Armi) on August 4, 1982 in Mandaluyong


24/26


City. He claimed that the challenged entries are false and that it was only sometime in September 1996 that helearned of the existence of said birth certificate.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner and her minor child?

Ruling:

Substantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry records affecting the status orlegitimacy of a person may be effected through the institution of a petition under Rule 108 of the Revised Rulesof Court, with the proper Regional Trial Court. Being a proceeding in rem, acquisition of jurisdiction over the

person of petitioner is therefore not required in the present case. It is enough that the trial court is vested withjurisdiction over the subject matter.The service of the order at No. 418 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and thepublication thereof in a newspaper of general circulation in Manila, sufficiently complied with the requirement

of due process. Moreover, the publication of the order is a notice to all indispensable parties, including Armiand petitioner minor, which binds the whole world to the judgment that may be rendered in the petition. An in

rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. The absence of personal service of the order toArmi was therefore cured by the trial courts compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which re quires notice by

publication.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 138496. February 23, 2004]

HUBERT TAN CO and ARLENE TAN CO vs. THE CIVIL REGISTER OF MANILA and any personhaving or claiming an interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought

Facts:

Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court forcorrection of entries in their certificates of birth. They alleged that they were born in the Philippines and thelegitimate children of CO BOON PENG who is formerly a citizen of China, was conferred Philippine

citizenship by naturalization under Presidential Decree No. 1055 and had taken his oath of allegiance to theRepublic of the Philippines and at the time of birth of [the] petitioners, their father CO BOON PENG was still aChinese citizen that is why entry in their respective birth certificates as to their fathers citizenship was Chinese.Further they claimed that since they were born in the Philippines and still minors at that time, they became

Filipino citizens through the derivative mode of naturalization under ourNaturalization Law, specifically Section15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 535.

Issue: Whether or not the petition is appropriate?

Ruling:

The petitioners recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is appropriate. Under Article

412 of the New Civil Code, no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

The law does not provide for a specific procedure of law to be followed. But the Court approved Rule 108 ofthe Rules of Court to provide for a procedure to implement the law. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of theNew Civil Code are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the New Civil Code which reads:

Art. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be

recorded in the civil register.

Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) Marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship;(13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;and (16) changes of name.

Specific matters covered by the said provision include not only status but also nationality. The acts, eventsor factual errors envisaged in Article 407 of the New Civil Code include even those that occur after the birth of

the petitioner. However, in such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth will not be corrected or changed.The decision of the court granting the petition shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part ofthe civil register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar.

The proceedings in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are summary if the entries in the civil register sought tobe corrected are clerical or innocuous in nature. However, where such entries sought to be corrected or changed

are substantial: i.e., the status and nationality of the petitioners or the citizenship of their parents, the


25/26


proceedings are adversarial in nature as defined by this Court inRepublicv. Valencia, thus:

One having opposing parties; contested, as distinguished from an ex parte application, one of

which the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party, and afforded the latter anopportunity to contest it. Excludes an adoption proceeding.

In such a proceeding, the parties to be impleaded as respective defendants are (a) the local civil registrar;and, (b) all persons who have claims any interest which would be affected thereby.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 153883. January 13, 2004]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHULE Y. LIM

Facts:

In her petition for correction of entries under Rule 108, respondent claimed that :

First, she claims that her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo. She has beenusing Yu in all her schoolrecords and in her marriage certificate. She presented a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation(NBI) to further show the consistency in her use of the surname Yu.

Second, she claims that her fathers name in her birth record was written as Yo Diu To (Co Tian) when itshould have been Yu Dio To (Co Tian).

Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father

and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claimsthat her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.

Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child when she shouldhave been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ordering the correction of the citizenship of respondent and allowingrespondent to continue using her fathers legitimate surname despite her illegitimacy?

Ruling:

Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimatechild born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reachingthe age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippinecitizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before

any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shallaccompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of thePhilippines.

Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing Filipino citizenship apply only tolegitimate children. These do not apply in the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child,

considering that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was not required tocomply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to become a Filipino citizen. By being anillegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated

differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she reached the age ofmajority.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals decision in allowingrespondent to use her fathers surname despite its finding that she is illegitimate.

The Republics submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use herfathers surname. What it did allow was the correction of her fathers misspelled surname which she has beenusing ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to

use her fathers surname.


26/26

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112597. April 2, 1996]

VIRGINIA A. LEONORvs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ROLINDO D. BELDIA, JR and

MAURICIO D. LEONOR, JR

Facts:

The petition assailed the respondent Courts Decision and Order mentioned in the second paragraph of thisDecision for alleged -

1. Procedural Errors x x x in not finding x x x (a) that the lower court gravely abused itsdiscretion in recognizing the action as one for declaration of nullity of marriage instead of a

special proceeding for cancellation of (an) entry in the civil registry and (b) in not finding that thelower court had no jurisdiction (over) the issue of nullity; and

2. Substantive errors x x x in not finding x x x (a) that the lower court gravely erred in declaring

the marriage null and void x x x and (b) x x x in disregarding the presumptions in favor of the rights ofchildren and to the administration of the conjugal property x x x and the validity of marriage x x x.

Issue: Is a judgment voiding a marriage and rendered by the regional trial court under Rule 108 of the Rules ofCourt valid and proper? May its validity be challenged by the wife in a petition for certiorari against the husband

who abandoned her and who is now living abroad with a foreign woman?

Ruling:

The only errors that can be cancelled or corrected under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are

typographical or clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity or nullity of a marriage. Aclerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; error made by a clerk or atranscriber; a mistake in copying or writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless and

innocuous change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a mis-statement of the occupationof the parent. Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her

children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial proceeding.