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ReflectionsontheproblemsfacingsustainablecertificationsystemsintheColombiancoffeeindustry:Thelonganddifficultpathtowards

decentworkingconditionsDanielHawkins

Paper#97

Apirila–Abril–April24,25,262017

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ylaAgriculturaenelSigloXXI.

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ReflectionsontheproblemsfacingsustainablecertificationsystemsintheColombiancoffee

industry:Thelonganddifficultpathtowardsdecentworkingconditions

DanielHawkins

Abstract

Inthepasttwodecades,ethicaltradeandsustainablecertificationinitiativeshavebeenkeyagentsinreconfiguringthedynamicsofbothproductionandmarketingtrends in commodity chains in the global agricultural industry. Claiming torestructure the hefty power imbalances that have traditionally favoured large-scaleproducersandglobalcommoditytraders,theseinitiativesadvocateamovebeyond just the competitive dynamic of global trade and commerce, fomentingpartnershipbetweenproducers,tradersandconsumers.Whiletheirmarketsharehasgrownexponentially,ashasthemembershipofsmallproducerorganizationsfromtheGlobalSouth1,critiqueremainsastotheextenttowhichsuchsystemsand brands impact on the decent working conditions of farm labourers, bothseasonal and permanent (see: Barrientos, Dolan & Tallotire 2003; Davenport &Low, 2012; Daviron & Ponte, 2005). Adopting the global value chain analyticalframework,thisarticleexamineshowtransformationsintheglobalcoffeemarket,especially since its deregulation in 1989, have affected the functioning of theColombiancoffeeindustry.Ofspecificinterest,thearticleexaminesthedegreetowhich the recent and very noteworthy expansion of sustainable coffeecertification systems in Colombia has impacted on labour relations andspecifically, whether or not these systems, with their corresponding labourstandards, have managed to improve working conditions in the coffee sectorwhichhashistoricallybeenbasedonalmostuniversallyinformallabourrelations.

1. Coffee:changesintheglobalcommoditychainofcoffeeandtheirrepercussionsforworkers.Ananalyticaloverview

Coffee is one of only a few products that have had such a long and intrinsicrelationshiptotheemergence,rise,consolidationandgradualreconfigurationsofthe global capitalist economy. And coffee, unlike most of the other keyagriculturalcommoditieslinkedtotheexpansionofEuropeancolonizationoftheAmericas(silver,sugar,tobacco,rubberhenequen,cacao,indigo),remains,tothisday, a key export product for several Central American and South Americancountries. But while its importance to global trade and the developmentstrategies of Southern nations and multinational companies is unquestionable,changesinthecoffeemarkethaveoccurredacrosstimeandspace,affectingmanyoftheactorsstrategically linkedtothis industry. Indeed,asarguedbyTopikand 1Forexample,Fairtradecountson1.65millionfarmers/producersaroundtheworld.See:Fairtrade.February2016.“MonitoringtheScopeandBenefitsofFairtrade–Seventhedition–2015.GeneralOverview.https://www.fairtrade.net/impact-research/monitoring-impact-reports.html.

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Samper(2006:121),controloftheglobalcoffeemarketshiftedfromproducerstoexportersinthe18thcentury,toimportersinthe19thcentury,inthe20thcenturytoroastersandgovernmentalentities,andfinally,inthepresentmillennium,toaselect group of “vertically integrated multinational firms”. Such changes in thepower relations within this chain reflect its inherently dynamic nature, astechnical innovations,combinedwithnewstrategiesinthesocialorganizationofproduction,distributionandregulation(Ibid:119),togetherwithevolvingculturalhabits,forgenewtrendsbothinsupplyanddemand.

The Global Commodity Chain (GCC) approach is useful as an analytical tool toexamine how changing strategies within the coffee market are linked to theshifting power relations of the actors involved in one or many of the chain’sdiverse activities. Although the GCC approach surfaced from within the WorldSystem’s Theory (WST) of Hopkins andWallerstein (1986), which outlined hownation-state spanning networks of labour and production processes have beenpart of global capitalism for over two hundred years; the GCC approach,popularizedbyGereffiandKorzeniewic’s1994publication,CommodityChainsandGlobalCapitalism,movesbeyondtheState-centristfocusofWSTandzoomsinonthe ways in which leading firms coordinate transnational economic activities(Patel-Campillo,2010:78).

TheGCCapproachhasadvancedintermsofitsanalyticalframeworkinlinewiththerapidlychangingstrategieslinkedtoeconomicglobalization,forexample,thefissuring of employment relations (Weil, 2008) and their manifestations in thenewinternationaldivisionoflabour.Whereasinpasttheoreticalschools,suchasWST andDependency Theory, tradewas considered a zero-sumgame and verymuchstructuredinasymmetricrelationshipsbetweencore,peripheral(andinthefirstperspective,semi-peripheral)nationstates,theGCCapproachismoreflexibleand empirically focused, allowing one to analyse the heterogeneity of powerrelationshipswithinandacrosscommoditychains.Indeed,morethanfocusingonthe product, the GCC approach examines the different segments of a specificcommoditychainandthekeyactorscontrollingtheactivitieswithin(Evans,1997).

One of the most important contributions of the GCC approach involves theattention given to governance structures, defined by Gereffi (1994: 97) as“authority and power relationships that determine how financial, material, andhuman resources are allocated and flowwithin a chain”. While his early workdifferentiated between producer- and buyer-driven commodity chains, in morerecent studies, Gereffi identified five forms of governance: hierarchy, captive,relational, modular, and market; each of these is deemed to have levels ofcoordination and power asymmetry that range from high to low (Gereffi,Humphrey,andSturgeon,2005).Furthermore,Gereffi laterabandonedthetermGlobal Commodity Chain and replaced it with Global Value Chains (GVCs) andmodifiedtheconceptualframeworksothatitencapsulatedtransactioncostsandorganization(Bair,2009).

TheremouldingoftheGCCapproachintotheGVCparadigmbroughtwithitaverywarm reception from diverse multilateral agencies, leading to a certainmainstreaming of this conceptual framework (for example, see: Blyde, 2014;OECD, WTO & UNCTAD, 2013) and an increasing emphasis on methodologicalattempts to measure the degree of developing country participation in GVCs.Meanwhile, some authors have sort to combine the GVC approach with other

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theoretical perspectives, such as the French Regulation school, as a means ofexamining how institutions, norms and networks linkup to facilitate marketinteractions(Patel-Campillo,2010).Indeed,theneedtoemboldentheberthgiventoinstitutionalregulatoryframeworksandindeedculturalpreferenceswithinthegovernance paradigm of global commodity chains is paramount, especially inmarketssuchasthatofcoffee,whichhaveahighcomplexityoftransactionsthatrequire regulation by a combination of three industry standards: internationalregulation(mandatory),third-partycertification(voluntary),orleadfirms(private)(Petkova,2006:320-321).

Herein,attentionmustbegiventohowinstitutions,socialandpoliticalprocessesand cultural discourses and preferences are linked to changing patterns ofaccumulation, and the reconfiguration of previously existing asymmetries. Theglobal commodity chain for coffee, especially when examined from a historicalperspective, illustrates these linkages and their manifestations in the evolvingpatterns of income distribution. But themain purpose of this article, alongsideexaminingthepatternsofgovernanceandtheirimpactsonthefunctioningofthemarket, is to offer a reflection on the degree towhich one of themost recentgovernancemodes,namelysustainablecoffeecertificationsystems,hasimpactedonworking conditions, andparticularly, theworkers’ rightsof the lowest tieredactor in this chain: coffee pickers. To do so, we shall focus on the Colombiancoffeeindustry,oneofthekeyactorsintheglobalcoffeemarketandoneofthecountriesthathasmostheartilyembracedthisnewgovernanceparadigm.

2. OverviewoftheColombiancoffeeindustry:history,structure,keyactors,productionregimesandworkingconditions

IfcoffeeissynonymouswithBraziltheworldover,duetothesuccessthiscountryhashad inmaintaining itsstatusas themajorcoffeeproducingcountry forover150 years, in Colombia, the coffee industry is widely recognized as being theengineofgrowthfor thecountry foroveronehundredyears.Thebeginningsofcoffee farming in Colombia came midway through the 19th century, with aplantationof20,000coffeetrees inTolimaandfurther large-scaleplantations inAntioquia(1885-1905)andCundinamarca(1870-1900)(Ramírez,2004:63).IntheregionpopularlyknownasColombia’scoffeebelt,ViejoCaldas(todaydividedintothree provincial departments: Caldas, Quindio and Risaralda), the expansion ofcoffee farms came about, in the closing years of the 19th century, after thenationalgovernmentauthorizedopeninghugetracksofuncultivatedlandforthecolonizationofsignificantnumbersofAntioquiansfromdiversesocialclassesandsectors(LeGrand,1984).

The geographical spread of the coffee plant across the central and westernAndeanmountainrangesofthecountry,activelypromotedbytheState,eagerlyfollowed in the footsteps of the Brazilian experiment, Colombia’s neighbouringcountrywhich,by1850wasproducinghalftheworld’scoffeeandwhich,duringthat century, increased its coffee production 75-fold at a time when worldconsumptionrosefifteen-fold(Topik&Samper,2006:22).Despitethehugefirst-mover advantage of Brazil, the Colombian coffee industry, from these humblebeginnings, took off in leaps and bounds, becoming the country’s preeminentexportbythefirstdecadeofthe20thcentury(Cataño,2011:263). Itseconomicpredominance was undisputed, at least until the 1970s and 80s when thegovernment, following advice from various multilateral agencies, began

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promotingnon-traditionalexports(petroleum,palmoil,cut-flowers).Indeed,forthegreatpartofthe20thcentury,coffeewasKinginColombiaandinthewordsofoneofthecountry’sleadinghistoriansofthemid-century,LuisEduardoNieto,“therewasnoMinistryoftheEconomymore importantthanthepriceofcoffeeandthecongressofcoffeegrowershadmoreinfluencethantheCongressoftheRepublic”(citedbyCataño,2011:266).

Thedevelopmentofthecountry’scoffeeindustrycompletelyreshapedthesocio-economic and political terrain of Colombia, and especially, across the majorcoffee-producing regions, previously mentioned. The coffee growth paradigmpushed forth the emergence of new social classes and fomented the economicmodernizationof the country, aswell as implanting a socialmodel grounded inCatholic conservatism and large families whose lives revolved around theproduction of coffee (Molano, 2017). The Colombian coffee economy wasgroundedprimarily insmall-scalecoffeefarms,withoutnegatingthe importanceofhaciendasandmedium-sizedplantations.Thispredominanceofpeasant-basedproductionwasdue,ononehand,topoliticalandfinancialproblemsaswellastosocio-economicquestionsoforganization,andontheother,andtoanevenmoresignificant degree, due to the major fluctuations in the international price ofcoffee, year after year (Palacios, 2009). Small-scale coffee farming enabledproducers to shield themselves from the negative impacts of price declines byreinvertingproductioninothersubsistenceproducts(platain,guama,maize,yuca,avocado, etc); something that large-scale coffee farms could not do (Palacios,2009;Molano,2017).

This socialproduction structure forColombiancoffeewasdecidedlydifferent totheBrazilian case, as there, the enormous scale of the coffee fazendas and theearlytechnological innovationsthatallowedfor“industrialstylemanualgrowingandpickingregimes,basedonthesuperexploitationoflabourandland,ensuredthatBraziliancoffeecouldoutcompeteanyofitscompetitors”(Topik&Samper,2006: 125). Furthermore, the focus on Brazilian quantity as-against Colombianquality also ensured that the industrial model of growing and picking found inBrazilwasnotfeasibleinColombia.Brazil,duetobothitsproductionregimeandits geographical and topographical specificities, has traditionally focused on theproduction of the lower quality robusta coffee variety, while Colombia, takingadvantage of its mountainous geography and its pluvial precipitation, hasprioritised the production of arabica coffee, coming to attain internationalrecognitionforits“mild”coffees,knownasColombianmilds(suaves).

Aswell as concentratingondifferent coffeevarieties, theproductionprocessofColombiancoffeeisdistincttothatofBrazil.InColombia,thecoffeecherry,oncepicked,passes throughthe“beneficio”process (washing to removetheskinandthendrying); inBrazil,asignificantpartof itscoffeeproduction isdriedwithoutprior washing, which, together with mechanized picking, leads to considerablecost reduction when compared to Colombia and Central American mild coffeevarieties (Aguilar,2003:244),evenwhenonetakes intoconsiderationthe lowerpricetraderspayforBraziliancoffee.

3. ChangingpatternsofcoffeeexportsandproductioninColombia

Thesurge in thecoffeeeconomy inColombiawasverymuchallplainsailing,atleastupuntil thebeginningofthe1930s,when,followingtheGreatDepression,

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the bottom fell out of the coffeemarket, drastically reducing the internationalpriceofcoffeeandleavingmanymediumandlarge-scalecoffeefarmersseverelyin arrears. Their efforts toease their burdenby lowering labour costs (reducingtheratespaidtodayworkers)andpressuringotherworkers,whohadundertakenthefamous“parcería”contracts,whichwerebasedonlandlesspeasantsofferingtheirlabourinexchangeforaplotoflandwhichtheycouldcultivateintheirfreetime, pushed forth growing social tension and conflict, especially with theascension of the Liberal Party to the presidency, in 1930, via Alfonso LópezPumarejo,afternearly30yearsofConservativePartyrule.

At this very time, the National Coffee Growers Federation (FNC) was created(1927),rapidlybecomingthebiggestruralgremialorganizationinthecountryandgraduallycomingtofunctionasaStatewithinaState(Palacios,2009)andtakingresponsibility for implementing the political economy of the coffee industry inColombia. In 1940, the Federation created the National Coffee Fund (FondoNacional del Café) which is financed via the collective savings of the nation’scoffeefarmers,(termed“thecoffeecontribution”)andviaincomeobtainedfromthecommercializationofthecoffeesoldbytheFNC,aswellasbyroyaltiespaidtotheFNCby thirdpartiesusing itsbrandsand labels (FNC,2013:117).Aswellasfunctioning to provide public goods of benefit to coffee growing regions of thecountry,theCoffeeFundestablishesapolicyof“guaranteedpurchase”ofallthecoffee produced in the country that complies with certain basic standards ofquality (UGQ: Usual Good Quality) as well as undertaking research aimed atimproving the quality, disease-resistance and competitiveness of Colombiancoffee,viaCenicafe(FNC,2015).

Perhaps the FNC’s principal line of action during the developmental era ofColombia was its role in stabilizing the international price of coffee. TakingadvantageofthebipolargeopoliticalenvironmentofthepostSecondWorldWar,andespeciallythethreatthatcommunistexpansionintheAmericasposedtotheregional focusofthePaxAmericana regime,aftertheCubanRevolutionof1958and theemergenceofnumerous ruralguerrillagroupsacrossCentralandSouthAmerica, followingBrazil’s lead, thedirectorsof theFNCcoordinateda“pseudocartelagreement”,viathemanipulationofthesupplyofcoffeebeansasameansofsecuringhigherandmorestablecoffeeprices(Hough&Blair.2012:37).Atthesame time, the US government signed onto a number of International CoffeeAgreements(ICAs),whichregulatedboththeinternationalpriceofcoffeeaswellasitssupply.TheseAgreements—signedin1962,1968,1976and1983—helpedavoid excess fluctuations in price as well as guaranteeing a more favourableincomedistributionalongthecoffeechaintoproducercountriesandtheircoffeefarmers(Pérez&Echánove,2006:70).

However, as geopolitical interests andpriorities began changing, especiallywiththe imminentdemiseof theUSSR towards theendof the1980sand the riseofneoliberal ideology as a political force, especially in the US and the UK, thepolitical stability of the Agreements fell apart. In 1989, this informal system ofmanagingtheinternationalcoffeemarket,infavourofaselectgroupofproducingnations,cametoanendinthefaceofsignificantconflictsofinterestsbetweenthetwolargestproducers,BrazilandColombia,theUSgovernmentandthemajorUSandEuropeancoffeetoasters.Thesystemofvolumesandpricewasreplacedbythemarketmechanismandthe internationalcoffeeprice felldrastically (Oxfam,2002). Indeed, as the figure below shows, during the period of coffee market

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regulation, the international price of coffee was relatively high, while the freemarketperiodsawheftyandlong-termpricereductions,particularlyin1989-1993and1999-2004,the latterbecomingthe longestperiodofcontinually lowcoffeepricesever(InternationalCoffeeCouncil,2014:4).

Aswellasensuringmoreproducercontrolofthecoffeemarket,theexportquotasystemhelpedrestrictexcesssupplybutsincetheearly1990s,thecoffeemarkethas been inundated without a sufficiently comparable increase in consumerdemand.Vietnam,especially,duringthepost1989period,hasbecomeoneofthemain coffee producers in the world. Indeed, between 1990 and 2013 Vietnamproducedanaverageof11.6millionbagsperyearcomparedtoonly451,000bagsbetween1980and1989(InternationalCoffeeCouncil,2014:8).

Figure1.WorldCoffeePrices(Monthlyaverage1965-2013).

Source:InternationalCoffeeCouncil.2014:4.

TheeffectontheFNCofthisdramaticchangeinthegovernancestructureofthecoffeemarketwasnotlongincoming.Duringtheregulatedperiod,theFNChadbeennotonlythekeyexporterofcoffee inColombiabutalsobyfarthebiggestexporter of any product in the country. Indeed, its formidable size in theColombianeconomyensuredthatitwasthecountry’sbiggestsingleexporteruntil2002when itwas replacedby themixedenterpriseoil company,Ecopetrol.Theprice crisis of the 1990s dramatically reduced the financial power of theFederation and its capacity to regulate and intervene in the Colombian coffeemarket.AsthecoffeepricedovetailedtheFNCtriedtocushionitsimpactonlocalfarmers,firstlybyreducingthe“coffeecontributiontax”leviedonallthecoffeeitboughtfromproducers,andsecondly,byofferingsubsidiestothesefarmers.Butbythemid-1990stheFNCfacedafinancialcrisisandwasforcedtosolicita loanfromtheColombiangovernmentevenasitsolditscontrollingactionsintheBancoCafetero.Butsuchactionsonlytemperedtheoncomingstorm.

Withdebtabove430millionUSdollars,in2002theFNCwasforcedtoabandonitsfloor price for Colombian coffee, leaving local growers completely exposed tomarket volatility, with power along the coffee chain now in the hands of acombination of financial futures’ speculators and the interests of the other bigglobalplayers,especiallythetoastersandtraders.Indeed,asvariousexpertshave

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noted, today global coffee brands2 are at the forefront of influencing both theprice of coffee and the quality standards required by the industry (Pelupessy,2007;Pérez&Echánove,2006;Petkova,2006).

Inthegraphbelow,theextremevolatilityofthemarketpricepaidtoColombiancoffee growers ismore than evident; a factor that generates significant anxietyeachyearforthethousandsofgrowerswhodependonarelativelyhighpricetocovertheirproductioncostsandmakeaprofit.Theinternalpricepaidtogrowersdepends on three factors: the exchange rate (Colombian pesos to dollars), theinternationalcoffeepricesetontheNewYorkStockExchange,andthedifferentialpaid forColombiancoffeeUGQ,recognised in internationalmarkets (FNC,2015:12).

Source:USDepartmentofAgriculture

With its capacity for intervention significantly diluted, from the early 2000s theFNC changed focus, attempting to reinvent itself and prioritise the commercialcompetitivenessofColombiancoffee. In2002,theFNC launchedthebrandJuanValdez Café as a way of engaging final consumers with the Colombian coffeeexperience.Thisstrategyhasreapedenormousrewards.Bytheendof2014,JuanValdez Café3 had earned approximately 163 million US dollars in royalties andtherewere309stores in15countries4.Nonetheless,thisbrandremainsadwarfwhencomparedtoitsglobalcompetitorsandassuch,JuanValdezCaféisjustoneofthewaysinwhichtheFNChasattemptedtotransformitselfinthewakeofthehuge shake-up of the global coffee market since 1990. In terms of increasingproductivity, the FNC has focused on renovating Colombia’s coffee plants, 2For2015,the5mostimportantcoffeeretailersare:Starbucks,withmorethan20,000storesin61countries;DunkinDonuts,withmorethan10,000stores;TimHorton’s,withmorethan4,300stores in Canada and the USA; Costa Coffee, with more than 1700 stores in 35 countries; andMcCafé,withmorethan1,300stores.Thethreeleadingtoastersare:Kraft,Procter&Gamble,andNestlé.3It’simportanttonotethattheFNCistheownerof83.74%oftheactionsofProcafecol,thefirmthatadministerstheJuanValdezBrand.4 Information taken from Juan Valdez’s Financial report for 2014:http://www.juanvaldezcafe.com/sites/default/files/Negocios/Accionistas/INFORMACIONFINANCIERA/Informesdegestion/InformedeGestion2014.pdf

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expandingthereachofColombia’sspecialcoffees,increasingbothcoffeeharvestsandplantationsandpromotingthecertificationofColombiancoffee(FNC,2013:27).Indeed,evenpriortothelaunchingofJuanValdez,inthefaceofthecountry’sdecreasing share ofworld coffee exports5, the FNC had envisioned the need tofind a new niche for Colombian coffee and in 1996, it created the Program forSpecial Coffees, which focused on selecting coffees with special characteristics,based on three factors: firstly, coffees that are produced in a manner whichconserves the environment; secondly, coffee that is producedwith attention toeconomic equity throughout the production process; and thirdly, coffee that isproducedaccordingtosociallyresponsiblepractices6.

The decision to foment a coffee industry that is more concerned with quality,diversity, care in both production and processing, and for transparency in eachphase was deemed as necessary to ensure the continuing viability of theColombian coffee economy. Concretely, specialty coffees are divided into fourcategories: 1, Coffees of origin, 2. Prepared coffees, 3. Sustainable coffees, 4.Organiccoffees.AccordingtotheFNC,specialtycoffeesrepresentapproximately12%ofworldconsumption,afigureroughly in linewithColombia’sparticipationintheworldcoffeemarket.

The principal advantage of promoting the expansion of speciality coffees,according to the FNC, is thebonusprice (sobreprecio)whichproducers receivewhenselling their coffee to theFNCorother coffee traders.Thisbonusprice ispaidintwophases:thefirstpartisgiventotheproducerwhenhe/shebringsthecoffee to the purchasing depots at the regionally distributed coffee growercooperatives,whichadministerthepurchaseofspecialitycoffeesinColombia.Thesecondinstalmentispaidtotheproducerinasumthatisequivalenttotheloadofcoffee sold, once the client has paid the cooperative. According to the FNC, in2015,USD$9.3millionwaspaidoutinbonusprices(atanaverageofCOP$26.193perloadofcoffee)tocoffeefarmerswhotradedtheirspecialtyproductunderthecommercialization scheme run by the Federation (FNC, 2015: 25). The FNCmanages 98 programs of specialty coffee across the country7. The followingsection will briefly examine the spread of the third type of specialty coffees:sustainableandcertifiedColombiancoffees,payingspecialattentiontothelabourstandardsfoundinthesesystems.

4. SustainabilitycertificationprogramsintheColombiancoffeeindustry

The FNC’s attempt to transform the Colombian coffee industry in line withchanging trends both in supply and demand faces significant counter-pulls andobstacles. First and foremost has been the post 1990s trend towards theinternational sourcing of generally homogenous, lower grade coffee

5Itisimportanttonotethatasof2015Colombiancoffeeexportsmakeup6.8%ofworldexports,while in the1970sColombiancoffeemadeup20%ofworldcoffeeexports.See:RedOrmet.Nodate.PerspectivalaboralenlaRegióndelEjeCafetero.CasoCadenaProductivadeCafé.Estudiosde Prospectiva. PNUD/Ministerio de Trabajo de Colombia: Bogotá.http://issuu.com/pnudcol/docs/eje_cafetero_prospectiva_fin(p.26).6See:http://www.federaciondecafeteros.org/particulares/es/nuestro_cafe/cafes_especiales/7 See:http://www.federaciondecafeteros.org/particulares/es/nuestro_cafe/cafes_especiales/beneficios_para_el_caficultor/

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(predominantlyBrazilian),whichhasbeenpushedforthasarent-seekingstrategybytradersastheyfocusoneconomiesofscale(Petkova,2006:323).Herein,thepreference for robustas (generally from Vietnam and Brazil) and low-qualityarabicas (mostly Brazilian) over Colombian and Central American mild varietieshasbecomemarked(Petkova,2006:323-324;Topik&Samper,2006),significantlydecreasing Colombia’s share in the world coffee market. Nonetheless, acountervailingtendencyhasalsoappearedwhichdoesseemtolendcredibilitytothe FNC’s strategy: the increasing demand for sustainable and ethical coffee,particularly in the European and Japanesemarkets8. And such a trend,while indebilitatingcompetitionwith themove towardscheapandbulkcoffee,which isenhanced by technological improvements in roasting rather than improvedcultivation techniques, offers, at least in theory, the possibility of making thecoffee industrymore sustainable, both environmentally and in terms of decentwork practices, while also potentially opening up more possibilities for marketintegration.

In Colombia, sustainability certification programs have taken off in leaps andbounds. According to thewebsite of theColombianCoffeeHubof theNationalCoffeeGrowers’Federation(FNC),9asofDecember2013theextentofsustainablecoffeecertification in theColombiancoffeesectorwasas follows,differentiatedaccordingtothespecificcertifyingbrands:10

• 4CAssociation:88,000producerscovering250,000hectares

• Fairtrade:37,000producerscovering90,000hectares.

• UTZ:3,000producerscovering19,000hectares

• RainforestAlliance/SAN:2,000producerscovering12,000hectares;

• Organic:3,000producerscovering11,000hectares;

While these figures should be scrutinized in more detail, to avoid the issue ofrecountingfarmsthathavemultiplecertificationsystems11,theydoillustratethesignificantgrowthofthis industry.Accordingtodatainareviewofsustainabilityinitiatives published in 2014, standard-compliant production as a percentage oftotal national coffee production is higher than 60 per cent for the case ofColombia,whichishigherthananyothercoffeeproducingcountry12.Intermsof

8See:TheCentreforthePromotionofImportsfromdevelopingCountries(CBI):https://www.cbi.eu/market-information/coffee/trends/(visitedon5April2017).9See:http://colombiancoffeehub.com/origin/coffee-certifications_1467111/(visitedon6April2016).10Unfortunately,thereisnoavailableinformationforcoveragebyregion.11ThispointwasmadebyoneofRainforestAlliance’ssenioragriculturemanagerforcoffeeinameetinginAmsterdaminMay2016.12InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment(IISD)andtheInternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopment(IIED),2014,TheStateofSustainabilityInitiativesReview2014,p.157;http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2014/ssi_2014.pdf.Thisfigureisdownwardadjustedformultiplecertifications.ItisnotedthatColombiahousessignificantvolumesofdouble-andmultiple-certifiedproduction(e.g.,72percentoverlapinUTZ/RainforestAlliance,63percentUTZ/Fairtrade,and9percentOrganic/Fairtrade).

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volumes of coffee produced in Colombia under the various sustainablecertificationlabels(for2011/2012),thefollowinginformationwasfound13:

• 4CAssociation:260,444MT(metrictonnes14)

• Fairtrade:107,200MT

• UTZ:78,171MT

• NespressoAAA:55,277MT

• Rainforest/SAN:29,417MT

• Organic:4,800MT

According tomore recent data, the FNC supports the implementation of sevencodesof sustainability via73 farmauditingprocesses, 48 certificationprocessesand25processesof verification.By theendof2015 therewere209,081 coffeefarms that were registered in at least one certification or verification program.Thesefarmsareownedby165,385coffeefarmersandmakeup391,619hectaresonwhichcoffeeisgrown.Ofallthesefarms,53,605(26%)arecertified;112,449(54%)havebeenaudited;andthe43,027remaining(21%)arebothcertifiedandaudited(FNC,2015:32-33),seeFigure3below.

13Takenfrom:Figure8.2Leadingproducersofstandard-compliantcoffeebyinitiative,2011/12,in:InternationalInstituteforSustainableDevelopment(IISD)andtheInternationalInstituteforEnvironmentandDevelopment(IIED),2014,p.158.141metrictonne=1,000kg

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Figure3.Participatingfarmsinsustainablecoffeeprograms

Source:FNC(2015:32).

ThisarticlebrieflyexaminestwoofthemaincertificationstandardsinColombia:RainforestAllianceandUTZKapeh, focusingonthe labourstandardstheyutilizeso seehow rigorous theyare, on theground, in theColombian coffee industry.Thesetwolabelsaresaidtobethefastestgrowingsustainablecertificationlabelsinrecentyears,withUTZcertifieddisplayingaperannumgrowthof26%between2008and2012andRainforestAlliancea30%growthrateforthesameperiod15.

4.1. RainforestAlliance

RainforestAlliance, established in1987, is a certification schemeworkingunderthe auspices of the Sustainable Agriculture Network (SAN), which promotesproductive and efficient agricultural systems, biodiversity conservation andsustainable human development through the application of its SustainableAgriculture Standards. These include social, environmental and productiveaspects.16 There are some 2,500 Rainforest Alliance certified coffee producersaround the world, many of which have multiple operations (sometimes up toseveral thousands).17 These are often coffee cooperatives that consist of manysmallercoffeefarms.

TheSANSustainableAgricultureStandardincludestenprinciples:18

1.Socialandenvironmentalmanagementsystem

2.Ecosystemconservation

3.Wildlifeprotection

4.Waterconservation

5.Fairtreatmentandgoodworkingconditionsforworkers

15TheCentreforthePromotionofImportsfromdevelopingCountries(CBI):https://www.cbi.eu/market-information/coffee/trends/(visitedon5April2017).16SustainableAgricultureNetworkwebsite,http://san.ag/web/about-us/who-are-we-2/17SAN,‘listofcertifiedfarmsandoperation’,30June2015<http://san.ag/web/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/List-of-certified-farms-and-operations-June-2015.pdf>18Source:http://www.san.ag/biblioteca/docs/SAN-S-1-4_Sustainable_Agriculture_Standard.pdf

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6.Occupationalhealthandsafety

7.Communityrelations

8.Integratedcropmanagement

9.Soilmanagementconservation

10.Integratedwastemanagement

Eachofthetenprinciplesisbrokendownintovariouscriteria.TheSANstandardcontains23criticalcriteria.Afarmmustcompletelycomplywithacriticalcriteriontoacquireandmaintaincertification.Regardingfairtreatmentandgoodworkingconditions forworkers, the SAN standard includes the following critical criteria:non-discrimination; wages; prohibition of child labour; prohibition of forcedlabour and freedom of association and collective bargaining. To obtain andmaintain certification, farms must comply with at least 50 per cent of theapplicablecriteriaofeachprincipleandatleast80percentofthetotalapplicableSANcriteria.

Rainforest Alliance/SAN discloses a list of certified farms and operations.However,noinformationisdisclosedregardingtheperformanceofthesecertifiedfarmsandoperationsandauditresultsarenotdisclosed.19

4.2. UTZ20

UTZ is a program and a certification label that promotes sustainable coffeeproduction ensuring product traceability. To become certified, all UTZ suppliersmust follow the UTZ Core Code of Conduct, which offers expert guidance onbetter farmingmethods, working conditions and care for nature. The standardoperatesthroughtwosetsofguidelines–theCoreCodeofConduct(whichcoversthe growing and harvesting process), and the Chain of Custody (which coversproductsfromthemomenttheyleavethefarmtothemomenttheyarriveontheshelves). The standard is based on International Labour Organization (ILO)conventions, among others, which means they represent an internationally 19SANauditsalwaysincludecrossverificationofevidenceviaworkers’interviews,farmdocumentationreviews,andtheobservationoffarmpracticesandconditionsinthefield;InformationprovidedbyemailbyM.Willems,RainforestAliance,22May2016(afterthisreferredtoasWillems,2016).20Source:https://www.utz.org/

• Rainforest Alliance

• Type of monitoring

• Third-party inspections are required

• Frequency of inspections:

• Annual inspections

• Validity of the certification:

• 3 years

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recognized set of guidelines, reflecting the latest agreements, research andexpertise in sustainable farming. Coffee producers are not only audited againstthe Core Code of Conduct but also against the Coffee Module. The Modulecontains requirements applicable to coffeeproduction andprocessing activities,upuntilproductionofgreencoffee.21

TheCoreCodeofConductisdividedintofourblocks,representingthefourpillarsofsustainableagriculture:

-BlockA:Management

-BlockB:Farmingpractices

-BlockC:Workingconditions

-BlockD:Environment

UnderBlockC,workingconditions,thefollowingprinciplesapplytoproducers:

- Producersobserveworkers’rightsonfreedomofassociation,workinghours,wagesandrespectfultreatment

- Producersdonotuseforcedlabourorchildlabour

- Producerspromoteliteracyandguaranteethatthechildrenofworkersgotoschool

- Producersguaranteehealthyandsafelivingandworkingconditionsforworkers

- WorkersearnaLivingWagetomeetbasicneeds.

More specific criteria are provided for in the Core Code of Conduct.22 The UTZcertified label features on more than 20,000 different products across 135countries.23

21Source:https://www.utz.org/?attachment_id=362322Source:https://www.utz.org/?attachment_id=362123Source:http://colombiancoffeehub.com/

• UTZ

• Type of monitoring

• Third-party inspections are required

• Frequency of inspections:

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4.3. Auditsampling

Regarding the sampling of auditing, according to employees at the AndesCooperative,theCoffeeCooperativeundertakesan internalpre-auditingprocessamongtheirmemberfarms.Then,thecooperativecontractstheformalauditingprocesswiththeaccreditedcertificationbodyforspecificcertificationsystem.Thecooperativeprovides theauditorswith specific informationabout the individualcoffeeproducerstobeaudited. It is likelythatauditorsdonotundertakeauditsduringthebusymonthsofharvest(September-DecemberandApril-June),whichmeansthattheyprobablynevergettoseeorspeakwiththecoffeepickers24.

According to Rainforest Alliance, the certification body is the only responsibleentity for determining the composition of the sample. Apart from the externalaudits,groupadministratorsofthecooperativesmust inspecteachfarmat leastonceperyear25.

In the caseofUTZ, the first certificationauditmustbe conducted in theperiodspanningfromfourmonthsbeforetofourmonthsafterthebeginningofthefirstharvest to be certified. Harvest can refer to the principal or secondary harvestperiod. If the audit is conducted outside of this period, the harvest cannot becertified26. Any follow-up audits could take placewithin a certain timewindow.Rotating the time of the audit would allow for the assessment of differentpractices. The choice of the timing of the audit depends on a risk assessmentundertakenbytheauditors.Additionally,UTZrequiresspecificrecordkeepingtotakeplacethatwouldallowthemtocapturethemost important informationontemporaryandpermanentworkersandisabaseforauditors’checks27.

4.4. MajorcustomersofColombiancoffee

Based on information from an export database, the followingmajor customerswerefoundtobeimportingcoffeefromColombia28:

- JacobsDouweEgberts

- NestléNespresso

- Ahold

- Tschibo 24InterviewwithMariaCamilaValencia,employeeoftheCooperativadeCaficultoresdelosAndes,Andes,Antioquia,17thApril201525Willems,2016.26UTZCertificationprotocol;https://www.utz.org/?attachment_id=362527UTZCodeofConduct;criteriaI.A.7;InformationprovidedbyemailbyP.Konijn,UTZ,22May2016(afterthisreferredtoasKonijn,2016)28Source:InfodriveIndiaPvt.Ltd,ColombiaExportIntelligence,Exportdataforcoffee,January2015

• Annual inspections

• Validity of the certification:

• 1 year

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- UCCEurope

Basedoninformationfromthewebsitesofthesecompanies,thesecompaniesallsourcecoffeefromColombia.Arequestwassenttothesecompaniestoconfirmthis.Fourofthesecompanies,JacobsDouweEgberts,UCCEurope,NespressoandAhold, responded that theyare indeed sourcing coffee fromColombia.29 Tchibodidnotrespondtoourrequest.AllfivecompaniesaresourcingcoffeecertifiedbyUTZandRainforestAlliance.Therefore,thefindingsofthisstudyarerelevantforthesecompaniesastheyhavecommittedthemselvestosustainabilitycriteria,andthechallengesrelatedtolabourrightsinColombiashouldbeofconcerntothemaswell.Thefollowingsectionwillofferanoverviewoftheproductivestructureofthe coffee industry in Colombia and then focus on working conditions, beforesummarizingthefindingsoftheresearchproject,uponwhichthisarticleisbased.

5. TheorganizationandregulationoftheColombiancoffeeindustry:theworkfactor

The productive structure of the Colombian coffee industry has not changedsignificantlyinrecentdecades,despitetheheftyreconfigurationsalongtheglobalcoffee commodity chain. Indeed, according to the National Federation ofColombianCoffeeGrowers(FNC),for2012,“96%ofcoffeeproducers,farmonlessthanfivehectares,participatingwith71.4%ofthetotalcultivatedareaand69%ofallproduction”(Rocha,2014:5).Suchabroaddistributionofcoffeeproductionisinmarkedcontrast to theconcentrationofagriculturalproduction for the threeexport products that follow coffee in importance, measured by volume andrevenue(palmoil,flowersandbananas)30.Furthermore,unliketheseotheragro-exportcommodities,coffeeisspreadacrossvastswathesofthecountrywith10ofthecountry’s3132provincialdepartmentscontributingwithnearly85%ofthetotalcoffeeplantvolumefor201332.

29UCCspecifiedthatthecompanybuysconventionalcoffee,Fairtrade,RainforestAlliance,UTZ,FairtradeOrganicandRainforestOrganiccertifiedcoffee;NespressospecifiedthatitdoesbuycoffeefromColombia,however,itdoesnotpurchasecoffeefromfarmersinthemunicipalitiescoveredintheresearchofthereport.30 Forexample, in2010,palmoilproduction inColombiawasdecidedlyagro-industrial in scale,with78.3%ofall production coming fromhaciendasgreater than200hectares in size, andonly2.8%ofallAfricanPalmfoundonfarmslesstan20hectaresinsize,see:Martínez,GabrielPeláez.Seminario:“Laagroindustriadelapalmadeaceite:unnegociosostenibleeinclusivo”.Fedepalma,APEylaUniversidaddelaSabana.Bogotá,5deoctubrede2013.P.22.Thecut-flowerindustryofColombiaishighlycapitalandlabourintensive,somethingwhichcontributestoitsconcentration.Indeed, it is estimated that over 90% of exports are undertaken by 350 firms which, betweenthem,occupy10,000hectaresdedicatedtoproduction,see:Salom,LuisFelipeSernayMaríadelPilarSepúlvedaCalderón.2012.“CanalesdedistribuciónyestrategiasdecomercializaciónparalaflorcolombianaenlosEstadosUnidos:unmarcoconceptual”.EstudiosGerenciales.Vol.28N°124,julio-septiembre, pp.191-228. The banana export industry, for its part, is centered on roughly48000hectaresnationallyandtheregionalleader,Urabá,whichcontributeswith33000hectares,isdividedamongst160producersacross340plantations,see:MinisteriodeAgricultura.AnuarioEstadísticodelSectorAgropecuario2013.Octubre2014,p.67.31Huila,Antioquia,Tolima,Cauca,Caldas,Valle,Risaralda,Santander,Cundinamarca,yCesar.32 See: Federación Nacional de Caficultores de Colombia (FNC). “Área cultivada con café enColombia,aniveldepartamental”.https://www.federaciondecafeteros.org/(accessedJuly2015).

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ThenotablegeographicaldispersionofcoffeeproductioninColombiaexplainsitsdynamic role in terms of job creation in the country’s rural zones. Indeed,according to estimates, the coffee industry accounts for 40% of all ruralemployment (Merchán, cited in Rocha, 2014: 5). The FNC speaks of 560,000families that live off the coffee industry and according to calculationsmade byAgronet,duringtheperiodbetween2002-2012,theColombiancoffeecommoditychain— which includes the provision of inputs, agro-industrial transformation,commercialization, internal consumption and export — required between 726-798,000 workers (Rocha, 2014: 3), or roughly 3.5% of the country’s occupiedpopulationforthatyear.Intermsofsupplyanddemandforeachcoffee-growingdepartment, recent years have seen significant labour shortages (see Table 1below). Indeed, country-wide, for 2012, therewas a shortage of almost 12,000labourers,althoughtheregionalvariationisenormous,withlesstraditionalcoffeeregions(especiallyHuila,CaucaandValledelCauca)havingahighexcesssupplywhilethemaintraditionalcoffeecentresofthecountry(Antioquiaandthecoffeebeltregion)showhugelabourshortages.Thissignificantregionaldisparityhasledto a large migratory coffee workforce, especially during the two main harvestseasons each year, a factor which is highly important when examiningworkingconditionsintheindustry.

Table1.Thedemand-supplyforcoffeeworkin2012byprovincialdepartments.

Source:DANE,tabulationbyRocha,(2014:9).

Themigratorycoffeeworkforce iscentredonthepickingprocess,which,duetothe geographic and biological diversity of the country, spans various monthsthroughout the year.While themain harvest period is at the year’s end,mostcoffee-growing zones have a mid-season (mitaca) harvest, although the exacttimesofharvestfluctuatefromregiontoregion33.Assuch,pickers,intheirdiverseforms34,wander fromregion to region, following the trajectoryof the flowering

33Forexample,accordingtoonecoffeegrowerandexmemberoftheNationalCommitteeoftheFNC,inHuila,themostrecentdepartmentinthecountry’sSouthtomakeamajorincursionintothecoffeeindustry,madethepointthatintheSouthandCentralregionsofHuilatheprincipalharvestperiodwasattheendoftheyearwhileinneighbouringdepartments(Cauca,NariñoandpartofTolima),themainharvestcamemid-year.InterviewN°1,30April,2015inPitalito,Huila.34 Following the ethnographic study of one author,we categorise the Colombian coffee pickersintofivegroups:1.Permanentandlong-termpickers;2.Novicepickers;3.Circumstantialpickers;

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and ripening coffee berries. Without doubt, the segments, that make up thecoffeecommoditychain,thataremostlabourintensivearethoseassociatedwithplanting,maintenance,picking,andwashing-drying,whichaccount for thegreatmajority of employment (DNP, 2003: 97; Rocha, 2014: 3-4). Indeed, when oneexaminestheparticipationofworkerswithintheFNC,byfarthebiggestgremialorganization in Colombia, the enormous concentration of employment in theproductive process, versus activities associated with administration, marketingandcommercialization,ishighlyvivid.AccordingtotheFNC,for2013,ithadonitsbooksatotalof2,679workers35(FNC,2015:114),anextremelysmallproportionof the overall industry workforce. Seasonal work, specifically, picking andprocessing,issaidtomakeupapproximately20%ofallworkassociatedwiththecoffeechaininColombia(Rocha,2014:11),or,innumericalterms,approximately140,000workers36.

Thecoffee industry, just likeColombia’sagricultural sectoroverall, faces severalproblemsrelatedtolabourrights,especiallyduetotheinformalityofthesector.Precarious working conditions prevail, including a lack of basic protection, lowincomes(oftenbelowtheminimumwage), job insecurity, lackofaccesstobasicsocial security schemesandpension systemsand, inmost cases, the inabilityofworkers to exercise their fundamental labour rights, particularly the right toassociationandtherighttocollectivebargaining(Hawkins,2014).

Innoactivityisthisinformalitymorevisiblethanforthatofcoffeepicking.Theseworkers are not protected by formal labour relations and they must sell theirlabourtothehighestbidderthroughverbalandinformalcontracts.Inmostcases,thesecontractsarenotevenestablishedwith theownersof the farmsbutwithother workers who serve as forepersons, supervisors or assistants. Pickers areusuallycontactedatthemainsquaresofthecoffee-producingmunicipalitiesandagreeonperformingdailyworkshifts,whicharepaidaccording to timeworkedor,more frequently, theweight of the coffee harvested (referred to askileo orarrobeo).Whilepieceratesperkilovary,dependingontheregion,theygenerallyrange anywhere from between 350 and 500 Colombian pesos (approx. US0.14-0.19 cents).37 Although this is a temporary/seasonal type of work, exclusivelycarriedoutduringtheharvest timeandover thecourseof fivetosixweeksperharvest,asalreadymentioned,formanyitisalmostlikeapermanentoccupation.

Animportantdevelopmentistheincreasedmigrationofcoffeeworkerstoothereconomicsectors.Forinstance,alargegovernmentalinfrastructuralproject38hasincreased the demand for workers in the construction industry, giving coffeeworkers the chance to change their occupation, improve their income andbecome affiliated to the social security system (which is something that manycoffeepickershavenevermanagedtodo).Somethingsimilarhashappenedwith Pickersforstrategy;and,5.Disguisedpickers.Formoreinformationoneachspecificcategory,see:Castaño,Gloria2010.“Lapobrezaenlasrepresentacionessocialesdelosrecolectoresdecaféentornoasímismosyasuactividad”En:Antropol.sociol.No.12,January-December.pp.89–125.35957oftheseworkerswereemployedunderpermanentcontracts,1,428hadfixed-periodemployeecontractsandtheremaining294werehiredasprovisionalcontractworkers.36Calculationmadeinlinewiththesupplyfigureofapproximately700,000workersfor2012,inlinewithTable1.37TheexchangerateusedtocalculatetheUS$amountisbasedontherateof1July2015at:https://www.oanda.com/currency/converter/(1US$=2,584Colombianpesos).384GRoads,alsoknownasFourthGenerationRoads,isaroadinfrastructureprogramthatplanstobuildandoperate,underconcession;morethan8,000kmofroadsinColombia.

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theminingsectorinotherpartsofthecountry,39orwiththeproductionofotheragricultural crops (including cocoa, banana, passion fruit and sweet granadilla),andespecially,withthecocoaleaf,whichguaranteeequalorbettersalariesthanthose obtained in the coffee sector, while demanding less work effort. Factorssuchasthesehavemeantthattheavailabilityofpeopleduringthecoffeeharvesttime has decreased in recent years, a matter which has caused considerableconcernintheindustry40.

Theproblemoflabourshortage,especiallyatharvesttime,isespeciallyacutefortheColombiancoffeeindustry,preciselybecauseitissolabourintensive.ThefactthatColombiancoffee,asalreadymentioned, isgrownpredominantlyalong themountainside(lasladeras, inSpanish),mechanizedpicking,suchthattakesplaceinBrazilandothercountries,is,sofar,untenableandassuch,labourcostsarebyfarthehighestcomponentinoverallcoststoproducers.Indeed,accordingtotheFNC(2016:15),labourcostsmakeuproughly65%ofallproductioncosts.Herein,we arrive at perhaps themost acute problem facing the numerous sustainablecoffee certification systems: in an industry that is structured on such informallabour relations, is it possible to expect that certified growers will graduallyembracetheneedtoformalizetheirworkforce,muchofwhichistemporal,whento do so necessitates a significant increase in labour costs? To answer thisquestion,wemustassessmorecloselytheeconomicviabilityofthe“bonusprice”forspecialtycoffeesinrelationtoproductionandespeciallylabourcosts.

6. ArecertificationstandardssustainableforcoffeegrowersinColombia?

One argument that was repeatedly expressed by several coffee producers andexpertsofthecoffeeindustryinColombiaduringthefieldworkconductedforthisproject,dealtwiththemanyrequirementsof thecertificationsystemsandhow,most of the time, the benefits they provide do not compensate for theinvestments and effort required on the part of the certified producers. Forinstance,aformerrepresentativeoftheNationalCoffeeGrowersCommitteeandamedium-scalecoffeefarmerinPitalito,Huila,arguesthatdespitethewillingnessshownbymanyproducerstobecertified,theinvestmentsrequiredcanbequiteexorbitant when it is taken into consideration that the average extension ofColombiancoffeefarmsismerely1.6hectares.41

Achievingacertificationonenvironmentalconservationrequires,fromthecoffeeproducer, "(...) investments in wastewater management, cutting-edge water-saving beneficiaderos (coffee bean processing stations), (...); these investmentsmaynotseemexcessivelypriceybutyouhavetothinkthattheyaretobepaidby 39 One of the ten items that the Dignidad Cafetera (Coffee Dignity) movement attempted tonegotiatewith the government earlier this year in order to end a national strike caused by thecontinuouscrisisofthesector,wasaboutthisparticulartopic,theywereagainstillegalmininginthecoffeezonesduetothecompetitionitrepresentsinfindinglabour.See:‘DignidadCafeterahaseight conditions to end the national strike’. In: El Colombiano, 10 April 2015:http://www.elcolombiano.com/dignidad-cafetera-pone-ocho-condiciones-para-frenar-el-paro-nacional-GH168796740See,forexample:Semana.“JuanValdeznoconsiguerecolectoresdecafé”.17September2016:http://www.semana.com/economia/articulo/juan-valdes-escases-de-recolectores-de-cafe/49402741InterviewwithDr.FernandoCastro,Pitalito,Huila,April30,2015.

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small-scale farmers who live on the coffee they grow and barely have enoughmoneytofeedtheirfamiliesandsendtheirchildrentoschool."42

In the same vein, the head of the specialty coffee division of the AndesCooperativeofCoffeeGrowers,mentionsthatthecertificationsystems,regardingenvironmental conservation, tell youwhat the requirements are to comply butneverexplaintheprocessofactuallyadheringtothem:inordertoavoidpollutingthesourcesofwater"(...) theyadvise farmersto installatreatmentsystemthatcanuseeitherinfiltration,tankorirrigationmethods,butthestandardnevertellsyouhowtoadaptthissystemtotheparticularconditionsofeachfarm." 43Whilethistypeofflexibilityisdeemedasbeingpositive,accordingtoher,thesmall-scalefarmersfaceanimbalancebetweenthecostsoftheinvestmentsandthebenefitsobtainedviathepremiumprice:"Alongtimewillhavetopassbeforethepremiumprice receivedbya small-scale farmer from the sellingof their coffee covers thecostsoftheirinvestments."

The weak-spot of certified sustainable coffee lies in its cost-benefit whencomparedtoanon-certifiedbrandofcoffee.Thereareacoupleofcontroversialfactsthatovershadowthepremiumpricesforspecialtycoffees;oneofthemhasto do with the fact that they are unilaterally determined by the certificationsystem; and the other questions its high levels of fluctuation. Maria CamilaValencia also mentions how the volatility of the premium prices for specialtycoffeeshasastrongimpactontheopinionthatthecoffeeproducershaveoftheviabilityofbeingcertified,especiallywhentherangeofthepremiumpricecanbesowide that it cango fromabout$50.000Colombianpesosper loadof coffee,only todropdownto$7.000-10.000pesos,dependingonthepriceofcoffeeonthe New York Stock Exchange and the decisions taken by the brands and thecertificationsystems.44

Thereisonecertificationsystemthatbreakswiththeinstabilitygeneratedbythevolatility of the prices: Fair Trade. This system determines a "guaranteedminimum price” to be paid to the certified small-scale coffee-growingorganizations.Anditalsoeliminatesintermediaries,obligingbulkbuyersofgreencoffeebeans todirectly pay the small-scaleproducers aminimumprice (CalistoFriant, 2016: 223).However, this certification systemonly exists to guarantee aminimum price and, in consequence, the certification regimes for specialty andsustainable coffee have not been able to generate confidence among thethousands of coffee growerswho do notwant to put themselves at risk of notbeingfairlycompensatedfortheircoffee,afterhavinginvestedsignificantsumsofmoney.Sofarwehaveonlyreferredtotherisksofthecost-benefitwithrespectto theenvironmental issues.However,once the issues thatdealwith the socio-labor management are analyzed in light of the systems that put it as arequirement for the certification, a sea of ambiguities and doubts begins toappear.

42Ibid.,43InterviewwithMaríaCamilaValencia,opcit.,44InterviewwithMaríaCamilaValencia,opcit.,

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7. Demandingtheenforcementoflabourstandardsandworkers'rightsinaninformally-drivenworld:Sellingsustainabilityinanon-conduciveenvironment

We have alreadymentioned the labor informality that abounds not only in theColombiancoffee industrybutacrossthecountry’sagriculturalsector.However,themostcontroversial issuewithrespect tothe informalityandthisnewperiodcharacterizedbyspecialtycoffeesandcertificationsystemsisthebroadgapthatexists between the formal requirements and the concrete reality of theworkplace.

Inaddition to theaforementioned requirements regardingenvironmental issuesandadministrativetransparency,mostofthecertificationsystemsappliedbytheColombiancoffeesector(UTZCertified,RainforestAlliance,Nespresso,FairTradeand Starbucks) demand compliance with their standards regarding the workingconditions on certified coffee farms and they give particular importance toguaranteeingthefreedomofassociationandcollectivebargaining.

Thestandardsof thesesystemsaremore than reasonableandarea finemixofminimum standards and basic rights. Indeed, the inclusion of the guarantee offreedomofassociationandcollectivebargaining isparticularly importantduetothefactthattheseareenablingrights,meaningthatiftheyareguaranteed,theyhave thepower toopenup thepossibility forotherstandards improvingdue tothe pressure exerted by trade unions (Anner, 2012). However, considering thatthe Colombian coffee industry is structured by informal conditions, locatedoutside governmental regulation and the Labor Code, there is, in reality, littlechanceofensuring the implementationofminimumstandardsand fundamentallaborrights.

ThroughoutitswholehistorytheColombiancoffeeindustryhasneverhadatradeunion organization and/or association, with the sole exception of the laborstruggles for the protection of the land and thework that occurred during the1920s.TheFNChasalwaysworkedforthepromotionofthecoffeegrowersofthecountry,buthasnevertriedtoimplementapolicythatprotectsthethousandsofcoffeeworkerswhodonotownpropertyordirectlygrowcoffee.Therefore,notasinglecoffeepickerhashadthepossibilityofexercisinghis/herfundamentalrightsof freedomof association and collective bargaining, and fewhave been able toearnasalaryequaltoorhigherthana legalminimum.Thediscordbetweentheinternational requirements of the certification systems and the reality lived bythousands ofworkers in this sector requires significant effort, intervention, andcommitment,onthepartofthecertificationsystems,theFNC,andespeciallytheColombian State, which has historically received the most benefit from thecontributionthatthecoffeeworkershaveprovidedtothecountry,.

Given the structure of the small farms, which has served as the basis for theconstruction of the coffee industry in the country, and knowing the manydifficulties faced by the small-scale farmers in order to earn at least minimalprofits after all the love and work that they have deposited in their coffeeplantations, it wouldn’t be unrealistic to expect that they willingly agreed tolabourformalizationifthismeantthattheyaloneassumedtheassociatedincrease

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in costs.As FernandoCastroargues, theneed to improveworking conditions inthecoffeeindustry,whileverymuchpartoftheprocessofmodernizingtheruralzonesofColombia,isalsoataskthatshouldbeledbytheState,viathedesignandimplementationof public policies geared towards labour formalization45. So, forthe final section of this reflection, we will examine recent efforts to improveworkingconditionsbytheColombiangovernment.

8. LabourformalizationintheColombiancoffeesector:notesforadebate

In2013,aftertheimpactscausedbytheimplementationofnumerousFreeTradeAgreements (FTAs)withcountrieswithhighly technologicalandState-subsidizedagricultural sectors, signed with the United States, Canada and the EuropeanUnion, a massive national strike and protests which had huge reverberationsacross the country’s biggest urban hubs were promoted by several agriculturalproducer organizations, such as Dignidad Cafetera (Coffee -Growers Dignity)which represents thousandsof large,mediumand small-scale coffeegrowersofthecountry.Thesedemonstrationsweresounexpected,successfulandpowerfulthat the Colombian government was forced to react, first, with State violenceagainst theprotesters,and later,viapresidentialpromises tonegotiatewiththeleaders of the participating organizations. During the subsequent negotiations,convened to end these strikes, the thenMinister ofWork, Rafael Pardo, statedthat if the coffee farmers wanted to receive aid and subsidies from thegovernment, theywould have to advance in formalizing thework of the coffeepickers. This announcement showed the minister’s lack of knowledge of thestructure of the coffee industry in Colombia, where, as we have alreadymentioned, labor costs are said to represent 65% of all costs. Additionally, thevolatilityoftheinternationalcoffeepriceseverelylimitseffortstoraisestructurallaborcosts(evenifasignificantproportionofthesecostsareassociatedwiththeseasonalworkofcoffeepicking)associatedwiththeefforttoformalizetheworkofthecoffeepickers.InColombia,aformalworkcontractrequirestheemployerto affiliate his/herworkers to a social security system (pension, healthcare andoccupational hazards insurance), in addition to contributing to the payment ofsocial benefits (severance pay, service bonus) and vacations. In total, the laborformalizationprocess impliesthatthelaborcostsofanemployeewhoearnstheminimumwageareincreasedbyapproximately30%,46meaningthatthepaymentofaminimumsalary($737.717thousandpesospermonth,for2017),willincreaseby approximately $217.500 Colombian pesos. That is quite a large amountconsidering the precarious income of the average small-scale coffee farmer inColombia.With the structure of the Colombian coffee industry and the almosttotalregulatoryabsenceoftheMinistryofLabor(viaitslaborinspectionsystem),it is too far-fetched to imagine that Pardo’s demands couldbecome reality in ashortperiodoftime.Itwouldbemoreusefultoanalyzehowitwouldbepossibletoencouragebetterworkingconditionsandpracticesthroughthecombinationofpublic policies, the certification systems and the big coffee brands that receivehugeeconomicdividendsfromthecommercializationofspecialtyandsustainable 45InterviewwithDr.FernandoCastro,Pitalito,Huila,April30,201546Thisestimate takes intoconsideration that thecontributionof theemployer to theemployeehealthcareis8.5%ofsalary(the2015monthlylegalminimumwageis$644.350),12%forpension,thecontributiontooccupationalhazardsdependsonthetypework(itrangesbetween0.522%to6%)andpapayrolltaxes9%.

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coffee that are said to respect and promote best practices and decentworkingconditionsinthecoffeefarms,andateverystageintheglobalcoffeechain.

At least discursively, the Colombian Government has been committed topromoting labor formalization in the coffee industry since 2010, following theimplementationoftheAgreementforCoffeeProsperity2010-2015,signedbythePresident and the FNC to formalize 300.000 coffeeworkers, all ofwhomwouldbecome,gradually,workersaffiliatedtothesocialsecuritysystem.

Legally speaking, up until 2013, there was an obstacle to such a grand idea.Workerswhodidnotearnatleastthelegalminimumwagecouldnotcontributeto either the public or private pension schemes in Colombia. According to thelatest DANE data available on coffee workers’ characterization (2012), theiraveragemonthlyincomeonlyexceededonemillionpesosinthecaseofthefarmsupervisors,therestofthepositionsreceivedincomesbelowthelegalminimumwage,whichbackthenwas$566,700.Indeed,accordingtotheDANE,theaveragemonthly income for all coffee workers came to a miserly $363,485 pesos,significantly below the legalminimum. In the case of the independentworkers,their average monthly income was $340.000; $327.000 for laborers andemployees and $ 286.000 and $ 218.000 for family workers and domesticemployeesrespectively.47

Decree 2616 of November 2013 introduced the possibility of workers paying apensioncontributionweeklywhichwouldhelptoovercome,atleastpartially,theproblem of fluctuating wages based on piece-meal rates. Furthermore, thismechanism permitted the separation of pension contribution and affiliation (inwhichtheemployeepays4%ofhis/herwageandtheemployerpays12%)fromaffiliation to the healthcare system by way of a new financial and operationalmodelwhichallowsnon-independentworkerswho laboured forperiodsof less-than-a-month to be affiliated to a pension and occupational hazards insurancesystem, aswell as having the right to receive family allowances (Caja Familiar).Although these changes sort to promote labor formalization, they have beenmarkedly unsuccessful in termsof their reach and specifically, their adoption inthecoffeeindustry.Oneofthemajorproblemswiththeimplementationofsuchmeasures is that the workers must be formally hired, with a labour contract.Another tool that aims assist in offering social security coverage for informalworkers is the Periodical Economic Benefit (BEP) scheme, a type of subsidizedretirement fund, which offers protection to workers who are live in precariousconditions,bymeansofamechanismthatgivesthepossibilitytothosewhohavenevercontributedtoanyprivateorpublicpensionsystemandmake less thanalegal minimum wage, to save voluntarily and secure some type of pensioncoverageduringtheirsenioryears.Thisadditionalsocialserviceoffersworkersthechance of saving proportionally to their needs and receive an additional 20%incentive (forworkers 62-years-old ormore) from the state, proportional to thevalueof theirowncontributions.Thismechanismwasdesigned in2012but thepilottestsandaffiliationswereonlyimplementedin2015.

AninterestingexperienceassociatedwiththePeriodicalEconomicBenefitsofthecoffee sector is apilotprogram launched inAguadas,Caldas,by theMinistryofLaborandNespresso inearly2014,whichaimstoreach1200coffeeworkersby

47Rocha,García.Opcit.Pág.13.

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meansofaspecialColpensiones(thePublicPensionFund)account.48Thistypeofeffort could help gradually reduce the high level of insecurity faced by theColombiancoffeeworkers.However,theprogramisstillinitsinitialstagesandassuchitisalmostimpossibletoevaluateitsimpact.Whatiscertainisthatthereisaneed for more programs of support that count on the participation of thegovernment,thecoffeeorganizations,thecertifyingbodiesandtheprivatesector,along the production chain to ensure healthcare, senior retirement andoccupationalhazardsprotection,astheyrepresentapendingdebtthatmustnotbeexclusivelyassumedby thesmall-scaleproducerswhoaccount for95%ofallgrowers.

9. Finalreflections:proposalsforimprovingdecentworkintheColombiancoffeeindustry

Inaglobalvaluechainmarkedbytheincreasingmonopolizationofpowerbytheleading economic agents from the segments of trading, brandedmerchandizingand retail (Petkova, 2006: 319), the emergence of new governance regimes,grounded in sustainable and ethical standards for trade in agriculturalcommodities, is without doubt, in and of itself, a positive development. For acountry such as Colombia, for so long almost totally dependent on the coffeemarket for export revenues and a path to development, the growth of suchsustainable initiatives is perhaps the one positive trend in an otherwise hostilepattern of structural changes in this industry ever since the beginnings ofderegulationfrom1989onwards.Nonetheless,whiletheexpansionofsustainablecertification programs in Colombia’s coffee industry, and across the world, hasseennoticeableimprovementsinenvironmentalmanagement(See:Crece,2014;Ponte,2004),significantcontroversyremainsregardingthedegreetowhichsuchprogramshavehelpedtoempowerworkersandimproveworkingconditions(see:Davenport&Low,2012;Wright&Madrid,2007).DespitethenotoriousgrowthofthesesystemsacrossColombia’scoffeegrowingregionsoverthepastdecade,asyet there have been no studies showing that this expansion has brought aboutconsistentimprovementsinworkingconditionsandespecially,inthefulfilmentofcoffee workers’ fundamental labour rights. Outside of the National CoffeeGrowersFederation(FNC)notradeunionsexistinthecoffeeindustryandrecentstudieshaveshownthatlabourinformality(takingintoaccountwagesandsocialsecurity) is nearly universal (Rocha, 2014), and as such the rigorous labourstandards utilized by the main sustainable coffee brands (Rainforest, UTZCertified,Nespresso,StarbucksandFairtrade)remainextremelyalientothevastmajorityoftheroughly700,000coffeeworkers.Obviously,oneshouldnotexpectthese brands to change a reality that has been structured in over one hundredyearsofinformalityandruralfolklore,buttheyareimportantactorsinthevaluechain and together with the FNC, the Colombian government, and other keyagentssuchastraders,merchandizersandroastersandretailers,amid-to long-termpath shouldbedrawn togradually formalize labour relationsandenhancetheenvironmentfortheexercisingofthefundamentallabourrights,protectedbytheILO’scovenantsandtheirratificationbytheColombiangovernment.

48See:AccesstoSocialSecurity,TheChallengeOfTheCoffeeGrowers.LaPatria,March31,2014:http://www.lapatria.com/negocios/acceso-seguridad-social-el-reto-con-caficultores-67161

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NazioartekoHizketaldiaELIKADURARENETORKIZUNAETANEKAZARITZARENERRONKAKXXI.MENDERAKO:

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EL FUTURO DE LA ALIMENTACIÓN Y RETOS DE LA …elikadura21.eus/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/97-Hawkins.pdf · 2017. 5. 9. · 2. Overview of the Colombian coffee industry: history,