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Constructivist goggles: implications for process in teaching and learning physics

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1988 Eur. J. Phys. 9 101

(http://iopscience.iop.org/0143-0807/9/2/004)

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Physics and Physics Education - Today and Tomorrow

Constructivist goggles: implications for process in teaching and learning physics

Maureen Popet and Mike Watts*

+ Department of Educational Studies. University of Surrey, Guildford UK t Roehampton Institute of Higher Education. London UK

Received 28 January 1987. in final form 13 July 1987

Abstract Constructivist perspectives are having an increasing influence within science education. This article outlines some of the main premises of George Kelly's Personal Construct Theory which may he relevant for science educators. Kelly's theory places a strong cmphasis o n the need to recognise that one's system o f construing events is potentially open to change. These 'ways of seeing' are likened to goggles which. i f one realise\ one is wearing them. can be removed. rose tinted. focal length altered. etc. Aspects of the theory such a s the root metaphor 'man-the-scientist'. indiLiduality. organisation and sociality corouaries are examined a n d implications for Issues such as conceptual de\elopment and teaching strategies within physics education are explored.

I . Introduction

George Kelly's theory (1955) arrived at a time when the zeitgeist was not conducive to a ready accep- tance of his ideas. He offered his theory as an alternative to both the dominant naive behaviourism and the various psychoanalytic theories popular at that time. Kelly did not expect his theory to be rhe blueprint for human nature, to be a? set of infallible laws. Nor did he expect his practices as a therapist and teacher to be accepted wholesale. Instead his was an invitation to test his Personal Construct

Zusammenfassung Konstruktivistische Perspektiven bekommen immer mehr Einfluss im naturwissenschaftlichen Unterricht. Dieser Artikel skizziert einige der Hauptvoraussetzungen der George Kellys Personalen Konstruktionstheorie. die fur Lehrer der Naturwissenschaft von Bedeutung sein k8nnten. Kellys Theorie legt vie1 Gewicht auf den Bednrl zu erkennen. dass man sein System der Ereigniskonstruktion andern k a n n . Diew 'Anschauungsweisen' werden verglichen mit Brillen. die entfernt. rosa gefirbt werden oder eine andere Brennweite hekommen kiinnen u s w . wenn man sich dartiher klar ist. dass man sie trigt. Aspekte der Theorie wie die wurzelhafte Metapher 'Der naturwissenschaftliche Mensch'. 1ndividualit;lts-. Organisations- und Sozialit~tskorollare werden untersucht und Implikationen fur Anleigen wic Begriffsentwicklung und Unterrichtsmethoden Im Physikunterricht uerden durchforscht.

Theory (KT) within different spheres of concern. I n this article we explore PC'T in relation to the teaching and learning of school physics.

Today there is an increasing interest in Kelly's ideas due, in part. to an increased emphasis on constrlrctiuism in philosophy, sociology. psychology and education (Magoon 1977). Much of this deve- lopment has been within clinical psychology as an extension of Kelly's original work. However. his views are gaining increasing recognition amongst

102 M Pope ~ t 7 d M Wrrltts

educationalists. Pope and Keen (1981) highlighted a number of aspects of Kelly‘s views which are rele- vant in education. Thomas (lY78). Salmon ( I Y X O ) and Thomas and Harri-Augstein (1985) have been influential in bringing Kelly’s theorq to the attention of those whose interests lie in the educational con- text.

This cannot be an exhaustive account of the impli- cations o f I Y T for educationalists. It does attempt to draw) on some o f Kelly’s ideas and to consider their significance for educational practice - particularly the teaching o f physics. Readers are urged to study Kelly’s original writings to assess other ideas which we have neglected to explore.

2. Constructive alternativism: a core construct . N o one needs to paint himself into a corner: no

one needs to be completely hemmed in by circum- stances: no one needs to be a victim of his biogra- phy‘ (Kelly 1955. p IS).

Kelly arrived at psychology via education and educational sociology after initial studies in physics and mathematics. His notion of ‘constructive alter- nativism’ is fundamental to an appreciation of his theor). Its message is that our ‘ways of seeing‘ reality can be likened to temporary goggles we wear t o create U window on the world. Like goggles. they are subject t o change - we can alter the clarity with which we inspect the world and choose. for, exam- ple. t o look at i t through rose-tinted spectacles. However. in order t o change o u r goggles we must tirst recognise that we are wearing them!

‘Constructive alternativism‘ suggests that people understand themselves and their surroundings and anticipate future eventualities by constructing tenta- tive models. They then evaluate these against personal criteria, s o a s to succesfully predict and control events based upon the models. I t is a philo- sophy that rejects an absolutist view of truth. Kelly contrasted his position with that of ‘accumulative fragmentalism‘ - the notion that knowledge is a growing collection o f subtantiated facts or ‘nuggets of truth’. For Kelly. a l l theories are hypotheses created by people. which may fit a l l the known facts at any particlar time but may eventually be found wanting in some unforeseeable respect and be rep- laced by ;I ’better theory’.

He also stressed the notion that people may con- strue their environment in an infinite number of different ways depending on their imagination and the courageousness of their experimentation. In order for one person to understand another i t is important to know what (and how) he or she thinks about the present situation, to understand his or her current hypotheses and constructs. Changes in a person’s theories or contructs can occur if the indivi- dual is encouraged to see ideas (1s hypotheses. or representational models. which are open t o refu- tation and amendment.

In putting forward constructive alternativism Kelly was aware that i t is a relativistic philosophy. At the time he was writing, philosophers o f science such as Popper. Kuhn and Lakatos had not had the impact on thinking in science they hi1F.e today. Relativity of knowledge received scant attention. A.; Kelly pointed out. people. like the scientists o f his day. find i t hard to accept that their personal models are not the world as i t is. but are constructed realities and are not soundly based in rlbsol~rte truths. When faced with the challenge o f construc- tive alternativism. people may be unwilling to accept the responsibility which goes along with the acknow- ledgement that is is they that construct their o u n world views. For many. it is more acceptable t o believe that their views are imposed upon them by ‘the ways things really are’.

Kelly recognised the challenge of constructile alternativism as follows.

’a person who spends ;I great deal of his time hoarding facts is not likely to be happy at the prospect of seeing them converted into rubbish. He is more likely to want them bound and preserved. ;I memorial to his personal achievement. A scientist. for example. who thinks this way. and especially 21 psychologist who does so. depends on his facts t o furnish the ultimate proof of his propositions. W i t h these shinitzg t71rgget.r of truth it7 his grusp it s w m w ~ t w e s s o r y f o r hinz to trike re.spot~.sibility f b r tlw cot~cl~r.siot~.s he c la i tm the? thrust 1 r p o t 1 Izit?~. To suggest to him at this point that further human reconstruction can completely alter the appearance of the precious fragments he has accumulated. ;IS well ;IS the direction of their arguments, is to threaten his scientific conclusions. his philosophical position. and even his moral security. N o wonder. then. that , in the eyes o f such 21 conservatively minded person. o u r assumption that a l l facts are subject - are wholly subject - to alternative con- structions looms up as culpably subjective and dan- gerously subversive t o the scientific establishment‘. (Kelly 1Y70a. p?. o u r emphasis)

Postman and Weingartner (1971) have discussed the relative nature of knowledge and recognised the subversive implications o f such a view o f education. They argue that the issue is a direct challenge. and possible threat. to teachers who see their role a h

passing on bodies o f substantiated facts or ’absolute truths’ without the necessity of presenting these a s problematic or conjectural. The idea that all facts are subject to interpretation and change leaves the door open for students to question the knowledge presented by the teacher. In their book Tmchitlg r1.s

U Subrwrsicw Actioity Postman and Weingartner pose a clear challenge to the static. analytic concep- tion of knowledge and suggest that teachers should see their role as helping to release and encourage the enquiry powers of their students in order to help them create their personal knowledge and operate

C'orz.strlrc,til,i.st <yogglcr

in situations where the ground rules are unknown and there are no established 'facts'.

Philosophers of science have argued in a similar vein. Feyerabend for instance. has argued for a n 'anarchistic theory of knowledge'. and views an appropriate approach in education to be one which nould foster ;I conjectural stance amongst students:

.. . . . i t is o f paramount importance to strengthen the minds of the young and 'strengthening the minds o f the young' means strengthening them ~gnir7st any easy acceptance of comprehensive views. What we need here is a n education that makes people corlrrory. c,o~rrzrer-slcggestirre. wirhour making them incapable o f devoting themselves t o the elaboration o f any single view. How can this aim be achieved'?

It can be achieved by protecting the tremendous imagination U hich children possess and by develop- ing to the full the spirit of contradiction that exists in them'. (Feyerabend 1975. p7. original emphasis)

l03

rival hypotheses. s o each o f us can be seen a s designing ou r daily explorations of life around rival hypotheses which form part of o u r system o f con- structs or 'world view'. People can be seen a s scien- tists. constantly experimenting with their definitions of existence.

Kelly saw the scientist as engaged in the m r k i p - riot1 of events with the view to the prediction and control o f events. I t is the invalidation o f our antici- pation that encourages reorganisation o f our psy- chological processes. People who anticipate events successfully build a 'coherent' construct system and. if they keep an open frame o n the world. then conceptual and personal grouth is viable. He lik- ened persotznl c m . s / r ~ ~ ~ r s t o hypotheses which are erected t o account for present experience and t o forecast events (theory building) and also t o assess the accuracy o f prelious forecasts after the events hake occurred. thereby testing and validating o r invalidating their predictive efficiency (theory test- ing).

A key assumption within Kelly's theory is his 'individualit! corollary':

'Persons differ from each other in their construc- tion of e\ents ' .

H e lay great stress on the uniqueness o f each person's construct system. For Kelly. i t is presump- tuous to assume that any person will have the same idea as others who have ostensibly experienced the same set o f events.

He also sets great store by individuals trying to make clear their ideas. This articulation is important on tho counts :

( i ) i t allows the teacher t o have some understand- ing of the personal models the learner is currently using to impose meaning on the world;

( i i ) the process o f articulation may help the teacher t o clarify thoughts. t o recognise the signiti- cance o f the power o f these thoughts and t o form the basis for reflection a s t o potential avenues for change.

That is. unless we have some understanding of another person's set of personal constructs about the domain within which we wish t o converse. and that person has some understanding o f o u r constructs. then the process of communication between us will be inadequate. What is important is not that we share the same constructs. but that we have some empathy as t o each other's point of view. Kelly recognised that learning is a personal exploration and that the teacher must come to some understand- ing of the experiments. lines of enquiry and personal strategies used by the learner. He saw the teacher's role as helping

'to design and implement each child's own under- takings. as well as to assist in interpreting the out- comes and in devising more cogent behavioural

3. Conceptual functioning: Kelly's root metaphor Kelly has taken a s his root metaphor 'man-the- scientist'. He invites us to entertain the possibility that looking at people cr., if' they were scientists. t o view their 'scientist-like aspect'. will illuminate human behaviour. In this paper we use it to explore young people's learning in physics.

I . , , , when we speak of ~~z~/~z- f~ze- , sc je~?r i . s f we are speaking o f a l l mankind and not merely ;I particular class o f men who have publicly attained the stature o f 'scientist ' . We are speaking o f a l l mankind in its scientist-like aspects. rather than all mankind in its biological aspects or a l l mankind in its appetitive aspects. , , , , might not the individual man. each in his own personal way. assume more o f the stature of ;I scientist. ever seeking t o predict andcontrol the course o f events \vith which he is in\olved'? Would he not have his theories. test his hypotheses. and weigh his experimental evidence'? And. if so. might not the differences between the personal viewpoints o f different men correspond to the differences between theoretical points o f view o f different scien- tists?' (Kelly 1955. ~ $ 5 )

The person-the-scientist and scientist-the-person are both engaged in a process o f observation. inter- pretation. prediction and control. Each person erects for his or herself a representational model of the world which enables himiher to chart a course of behaviour in relation to i t . This model is subject to change over time since constructions of reality are constantly tested and modified to allow better pre- dictions in the future. The questioning and explor- ing, revising and replacing in the light of predictive failure which is symptomatic of scientific theorising is precisely what each person does in hisiher attempts to anticipate events. Just as the experimen- tal scientist may design hisiher experiments round

104 12.1 Pop? rrt1tl , M w(rtr.\ inquiries. But usually she has t o begin. as any differ radically from the physicist's, In this example apprentice begins. by implementing what others he draws on his past experiences in order to support have designed: in this case. what her children have his constructs and confirm his hvoothesis: initiated. To be fully accredited participant in the experimental enterprise she must gain some sense of David: .It must have a force driving it forward. I f lvhat is seen through the chi ld .s eyes., (Ke l ly 1970b, i t didn't i t . would stop . . . . like ;I car will i f y o u take p X 2 )

1 1

vour foot off the accelerator'.

1. Constructivism and physics education One area where Kelly's ideas have been explored both for learning and teaching is science education. The existence of 'alternative frameworks' amongst young science students has been documented by. amongst others. Dri\,er (1983). Driver o f rrl (1985). Osborne and Fensham (lY8-5) and Gilbert and Watts (1983) and currently by the Children's Learning in Science Project (Bell and Driver 1984).

The bulk o f the research. and therefore o f the frameworks described. has been i n physics educa- tion. for reasons which are not a l l together clear. It m a y be that not a 1 1 is well in physics education and learners' problems are quickly apparent. I t may be the very nature o f physics. I n Feyerabend's terms. Inany hypotheses about the world invoke 'natural interpretations' - ideas W closely connected with obser\ations that it normally needs ;I special effort t o realise their existence. The standard answers that physics prcnides are often \;er? counter-intuitive. and quickly throw into relief the contradictions between personal interpretation and orthodox science. Posner (1981) for example. has pointed out that many students' preconceptions can be resistant to change because they ha\e been acquired through interaction Lvith the physical world but without formal instruction. and are 'therefore very func- tional i n and adaptable t o most circumstances'.

Some examples might help.

E.v(rtryle I Da\id. 14 years old. discusses the forces on a golf ball in flight through the air. Is there. he is asked. ;I force on the golf ball in the direction of motion? 'Of course'. comes the reply. 'I 've been hit by 21 golf ball :lnd i t hurts! I f you stuck your head in the way and it hit you. y ~ ' d feel ;I force there a l l right'.

From the physicist's point o f vie\+. David is not correct. There is no force in the direction o f motion. there is only the force o f gravity acting vertically downwards and frictional forces from the air acting i n ;I direction opposite to the motion.

DaLid's response is similar t o many youngsters o f his own age. and older (Watts 1983). He sees forces ;IS quite tangible and obvious by their effects. He goe4 on t o say that if there were t w t a force i n the direction o f motion then the ball would habe no reason t o go on. no 'motive power' and would therefore stop. His understanding of force. and o f the answers necessary to satisfy the question. might

For many students. the construct that 'motion implies a force' is highly resistant t o change. So much so that. ;IS :I number o f reports document. many students cannot solve basic problems of this kind where the direction o f motion does n o t coin- cide with the direction o f net force. Some of us who are exploring these issues have described students' conceptions of force and motion a s Aristotelian. others have described the conception a s similar t o the mediaeval Impetus Theory.

In one sense it could be argued that these labels are irrelevant. ;IS no youngster has conceptions o f these issues with the breadth and internal consist- ency o f . say. Aristotle or the 14th century French scholar Buridan. However these labels do serve t o remind us that Aristotelian and 'impetus' vieus of force and motion were seen a s logical and reason- able by fine minds f o r long periods o f t ime. One Inajor reason for this is. o f course. that it is quite possible to make daily observations - and natural interpretations - o f phenomena which wppor t either \ie\v.

In general i t is very reasonable t o suggest that large numbers o f students have used such da i ly observations to build up models to allow them to make sense o f their world. These models. albeit i n some cases poorly articulated and inappropriate i n terms o f the current \iews o f physics. are brought into the cl;~ssroom. There in the cl;tssroom. of course. they are brought into conflict with the usu;~l school science o f teachers and textbooks.

E.rtrt)lple 2 Lou. 13 years old. was asked to predict and comp;lre the times taken f o r one-inch cubes of plastic and aluminium to f a l l about two metres. He answered that the heavier aluminium one ~vould hit thc ground tirst (Gunstone and Watts 1985). He sup- ported his prediction by claiming t o have dropped different weights off a bridge and t o have seen the heavier one reach the ground first. When the t \%o cubes were then dropped i n the laboratory. he claimed that the aluminium cube actually struck before the plastic one.

Excrt)1pk 3 Cathy is 11 years old and talking about heat. She develops ;I model o f the earth's atmosphere where the temperature gradient is such that temperature increases with distance from the earth's surface. She begins by making the commonplace comment that

Corntrlrcririst goggles

'heat rises'. What does she think happens as distance from the ground increases'? ' I t gets hotter and hot- ter ' she responds. The next question sets out to explore this further. and asks what happens at alti- tude. at the upper reaches of the atmosphere.

Cathy: .It gets very very hot. That's why things burn up when they come into the atmosphere. That's why that space shuttle needs those heat- resistant tiles o n i t ' .

During ;I similar session Colin. at IS. develops a different model in which atmospheric pressure gradient increases with distance. This increasing air pressure does have a tinite end - at the edge of the atmosphere. where Colin postulates a kind of barrier before space is reached. There is a 'layer' which represents an invisible shield around the earth. he suggests. This atmospheric pressure model explains why a t o y balloon of hydrogen. released into the atmosphere. will eventually burst as it rises - i t implodes due to the increasing pressure.

Both these youngsters were able to retain their models in the face of further questioning (Watts lY83). For example. Cathy was asked how she would explain. in terms of her heat model. why there is snow on very high mountains. After a puzzled moment she said.

' N o . I ' m not sure. But I do know its hot up there . . . . my friend went skiing at Christmas and she got sunburnt ' .

Colin's model helped to explain why mountain- eers required oxygen cylinders while climbing: to 'help resist the immense pressures up there'. Clearly. the obsenations students make are influenced by the construction. hypotheses and theories they hold - 'believing is seeing' is some- times more apposite than the more usual 'seeing is believing'. An interesting addendum to the example o f Lou. in example 1 above. concerns five co- students who predicted that the two cubes would take the same time to fall the two metres. All five independently justitied their predictions by arguing that the force o f gravity was the same on each cube, There is further eLidence that even when students give correct responses to standard physics questions. they may still hold o n t o quite contrary world views Mhich they use to interpret such real phenomena.

These examples all come from the science educa- tion of adolescents. There has also been much research into the alternative conceptions o f under- graduates (for example. the early wJork o f Viennot (IY79) o r McKloskey et rrl (1Y80)) while, as a paper by Peters (1982) suggests. 'Even honours graduates have conceptual difficulties with physics'.

105

change as we do to the structure of knowledge taught' . That is. we need to pay attention t o the processes of conceptual chrrnge. In what ways is the physics teacher in a position to enable youngsters. like those above. to change their models'? Kelly's work implies the need to come to some understand- ing of the learner's current conceptualisation.

The relationship between constructs within a per- on's conceptual system is complex. Kelly saw i t a s one where incompatibilities and inconsistencies between constructs are tn i t~ imised whilst retaining the maximum potential for the system to grow. That is. each of the clusters of constructs (and there are many) represent coherent domains of meaning which a person uses to explain and explore certain issues or experience. The ways in which a person's systems can change are not random o r nd hoc but are themselves part of a regulated system of change. Each system of constructs (or domain of meaning) is part of a person's overall system which not only binds the subsystems together but also regulates the processes of change. Whether or not a person will change constructs depends on the 'permeability' of the constructs (their openness to change). and o f predictions the person makes. The extent of change will depend on the nature of the inter-relationships between constructs and their position within the person's repertoire.

Ofpernzerthiliry. the degree of openness to change and to countenance new features. he says:

'what is meant by permeability is not a construct's plasticity. or its amenability to change within itself. but its capacity to be used as a referent f o r novel events and accept new subordinate constructions within its range o f convenience' (Kelly 1970a. ~ 1 9 ) .

I f some parts o f a person's system are impert?~c>- crhle then those parts will be resistant t o change since those constructs will reject elements on the basis o f their newness'. Resistance to change can a l s o be the result of what Kelly referred t o a s .hostility'. As Fransella suggests. when o u r personal experiments fail. one uay of coping is to deny the invalidation.

' . . . . we can resist change and refuse t o accept the invalidation for what i t is. We thereby show hosti- l i ty . As personal or psychological scientists. as psy- chotherapist or teacher. as worker or boss. as parent or child, we often "make" the events support our predictions. One reason for this refusal to accept the invalidatory evidence could be that to acknowlege this reality staring us in the face would require personal change o f such enormitv that we could not

5. Conceptual change: altering the goggles Driver (1982) suggests 'we may need to pay as much attention to the learner's current ideas and how they

Kelly's notion of 'range of convenience' also bears comment. Both a person's construct and hisiher system o f constructs are seen as having a limited sphere of applicability. Certain items can be ruled out of consideration on a particular construct on the

106 M Pope and M Watt.s

basis that, for that person. the construct is an inap- propriate or inadequate way of viewing the item. The i tem is deemed to lie outside the range of convenience of the construct.

Kelly's 'fragmentation corollary' suggests that a person might use successive subsystems that are inconsistent. It says: 'A person may successively employ a variety of construction subsystems which are inferentially incompatible with each other'.

Clearly some individuals can tolerate 21 greater number of inconsistencies in their construct systems than can others. Youngsters can sometimes describe and explain similar phenomena with very different models without worry. or a n y sense of inappropri- ateness or incompatibility. That is. whilst cognitive functioning requires integration through the deploy- ment of superordinate constructs. differentiation. inconsistency or fmgrmwtar ior z has its merits. Kelly (1955) suggested that one implication o f his frag- mentation corollary is that the constructive alterna- tivist can test out new hypotheses without having to discard old ones. Constructs are hypotheses and we can hold o n to constructs u.hich are incompatible while we test them. Kelly saw this as a feature of human thought which a a s especially noted in chil- dren.

'The nice thing about hypotheses is that you don't have to believe them. This. I think. is a key t o the genius o f scientific method. I t permits you to be inconsistent with what you know long enough t o see what will happen. Children do that . What is wonder- ful about the language of hypothesis is its refreshing ability to free the scientist from the entangling consistencies of adulthood. For a few precious moments he can think again like a child. and. like a child, learn from his experience . . . .' (Kelly 1970b. p258).

Kelly clearly valued children's. at times inconsis- tent, theorising as scientific whilst the adults' tightly ordered constructs could limit their theorising and thus stunt the development of new knowledge. However. he saw limits to incompatibility of con- structs when he noted:

'One can tolerate some incompatibility but not too much. The amount that can be tolerated depends on the permeability of superordinating con- structs' (Kelly 1955).

His fragmentation and modulation corollaries give a picture of a person using a variety of differing subsystems to make sense of what is happening. These are distinctive. semi-independent and are subsumed at some point by a unifying thread. some superordinate construct. That is. although one might have task-specific or domain-specific construc- tions which are separate and fragmented from one another. there is some level at which a person can bring together and join the systems.

As Ryle (1975) contends. the fragmentation cor- ollary is necessary to account for the penerall) observable fact that people can hold beliefs or make judgements which seem incompatible aith each other and yet remain consistent and coherent t o themselves.

Strike and Posner (1982) have proposed six rea- sons why one conception might be replaced b! another: 0 if it is no longer capable o f interpreting the person's experiences: 0 i f it is n o longer necessary in such interpretations: 0 i f i t is incapable o f solving some problems that i t presumably should be able to sohe: 0 i f i t violates a person's epistemological or nleta- physical standard: 0 i f its implications are unacceptable: 0 i f i t becomes (too) inconsistent with knowledge in other areas.

6. Ways forward for physics teaching Kelly's theory describes people's normal everyday construing of the world around them. Students interpretations of phenomena are natural a n d understandable. not somehow deviant o r wilfull> misguided. As far a s the physics teacher is con- cerned they may be inappropriate. and even unde- sirable. but that does not negate the normality a n d personal importance of the construct5 to the stu- dent. Moreover. unless ways are found to develop or make bridges between these preconceptions a n d the formal concepts of science. Posner (1981) \ug- gests that students may simply compartmentalise their knowledge 'claiming that the problem is ;I

physics problem and therefore does not have any- thing to do with the "real world" ' . A constructivi\t curriculum must include methods which militilte against cwes.vior compartmentalisatic,n and frag- mentation.

Adopting a Kellyan perspective would require the teacher to recognise pupils' o r students' scientitic constructs as having both important epistemological value and high educational status. This is not a n assumption shared by those who uphold the 'traditions' of science education who stress that students' beliefs must be directly and efticientlq overcome by the strength and knowledge of 'true' science. For them. when noticed. students' con- structs are not to be built and developed. but 'cor- rected'. This view of education is increasingl! under attack (see. for example. Donaldson 1978).

Marshall and Rowland (1983) echo man! o f the sentiments expressed i n Postman and Weingartner (197 1 ) and Feyerabend's suggestions for a critical approach to knowledge. and support the need for students to be helped to know 1 1 o ~ t o learn so that they can contimre to learn after their formal educa- tion has ended. This they believe is significant learn- ing:

Cotl.ctr~lc,rir~i.ct goggles

."Students' minds are like containers to be tilled". "Education is to sharpen that tool which is the mind". .'Knowledge is to be built up, block by block".

These are a few of the metaphors commonly used to describe formal education. But such metaphors describe learning as essentially confined and defined. rather than as a process of growing and changing . . . At the heart of all of our significant learning. formal and informal. are the questions we ask because o f who we are and what we need to know . . . . ' (Marshall and Rowland 1983).

This concern for learning which goes beyord the confines of the currently known is emphasised in Novak and Gowin (1984 p. vi). They suggest that. whereas rrrrining programmes can lead to desired behaviour such as answering mathematics problems o r spelling correctly. edwutiorzul programs should provide learners with the basis for understanding 'why and how new knowledge is related to what they already know'. and to give them the effective assur- mce that they have the capability to use this new knowledge in new contexts.

These writers recognise that for education to be effective. teachers need to adopt approaches which are seen by many as revolutionary. They will need to reflect o n their current models of teaching and learning. If they hold to the kinds of metaphors of knowledge and teaching quoted by Marshall and Rowland. their actions a i l 1 not be conducive to enabling their students to learn.

Learners. too may need to change the goggles they wear. if they are to move from a dependent to a n independent and self-organised learner.

For instance. formal instruction which simply tells the student the correct (phyics) version is often less than effective. In the eyes of students. teachers do not always command the necessary didactic auth- ority to simply replace well used and tested world models with seemingly arcane physics examinations. I n B recent study (Bentley and Watts 1986) 15-year- old students were shown an authoritative television programme in physics. In discussions shortly after- wards. several alternative frameworks were quickly apparent. all of which conflicted with the science presentation in the programme. science which was also reinforced by the teacher in the lesson, The combination o f authoritative science, factual tele- vision programme and teacher seemed unassailable. The youngsters were asked 'does it matter if your ideas about something in science are different from those shown in a physics television programme'?'

The responses fall into six broad categories. The initial response to the question may have been either 'yes' - i t does matter that there is a conflict between prior knowledge and new information. or 'no. i t doesn't'. The reasons in both cases, however. are very different. The categories can be summarised as 'Science TI is always right' (30%). 'Two 1' Jlews are

107

confusing' (lo"/,), 'Sometimes you are right. some- times wrong' (9%). 'Being a pluralist' (29'%1)% 'I'm always right' (l0"/0). 'Towards a personal synthesis' ( 1 W " ) .

Simply put. only about one-third of the sample opted for the orthodox version on the basis that I.\

physics is always right. or that competing L ' w w s a r e confusing and therefore accepting the television version is a safe option. Slightly over a third were happy to retain and use two o r more models. sug- gesting that this pluralism b a s not only useful but also desirable. The remaining third preferred their own conceptions - either their old ones regardless. or some personal synthesis. o r fusion of the two views. As one said:

'No. i t doesn't matter. I like to be right all the time. So if they put something on the programme and I don't agree with them. I won't watch i t . Or if it's like a series of different programmes - and when i t starts it's different to my ideas of what was - I ' l l stick to my ideas and not watch it . . . . I f I thought I knew, or if I knew I was right and the programme was wrong. I'd stay with my own ideas. I don't like to be wrong.'

What is clear from a l l o f this work is that whilst the recognition of alternative frameworks i s import- ant. teaching strategies to help develop personal meanings and foster bridges between them and .:K- cepted science' need to be elaborated. Constructive alternativism is a view about knowledge and action which suggests that. if practices are to change. then teachers need to examine some of [heir fundamental beliefs. Just as the learner may be reticent to recon- struct their ideas, so teachers too may find re- examination of their current constructs threatening. especially if they need to change. Threatening and revolutionary this may be but we see this a s :I route to empowering the teachers to make education a positive experience for learner and teacher:

'when the goal of teaching becomes achievement of shared meaning. a great deal of both teachers' and students' energy is released' ( N o b n k and Gowin 19x4. p XII) .

A Kellyan approach to the teaching of physics would suggest that. as a matter of classroom policy. differ- ences between the learner's personal meanings. those of the teacher and the formal concepts of 'scientist's science' should be dealt with bithin ;m open forum where the differences are valued f o r what they are. i.e. constructive alternative ways o f seeing.

As teachers we may see ourselves as in the busi- ness of encouraging conceptual change. There has been a growth in what is being called 'conceptual change teaching' based upon the premise that the instructional act starts with the learner's 'naive' conceptions being articulated and then 'experi- ments' devised so that these can be challenged and

l08 M Pope and M Watrs

( i t is hoped) the 'accepted' view of science will prevail given the 'failure' of their personal models to hold to the challenge of experimentation.

U p to a poirzr this may seem to be an explanation of some of Kelly's notions hut Kelly is much more aware of the location of a particular domain of sense making within the overall construct system. Unfortunately the conceptual change model (as sug- gested by Posner and Strike (1985) for example) could have serious side-effects (Clark 1985). Clark notes:

'The theory of conceptual change (as articulated by Posner. Strike et a l ) holds that the state of rettdiness for conceptual change ought best to arise from the learner's own attempts to make sense of experience . . . . yet a troublesome aspect of the way in which their work has been transformed into an instructional method is that the topics addressed arise from the wisdom of the curricularists. not the curiosity of the learner. The teacher is asked to r ~ s l z .sr~rrlerzrs 10 reaclitwss by posing a question . . . that probably never occurred to the students, and then induce dissatisfaction with their own explanations by confrontation . . . . The result is U kind of "cognitive assault" in which students areforcecl to confront and abandon 21 part of self that has been. and is. serving them reasonably well'.

Kelly's organisation, modulation. fragmentation and choice corollaries taken together support much of Clark's concern. The particular domain under experimentation may be more or less linked with other domains. may be more or less permeable and its position with respect to core constructs may be of vital importance to the person. The perceived conse- quence of change may engender anxiety. fear or threat. What is difficult for a teacher to gauge is the perceioetl cot1seqmm-e and degree of stress that 'conceptual change instruction', of the type referred to above. will induce. This is not to suggest that we do not engage in the e~zco~rr~~ger~ze tz t of conceptual change. HoweLer. as we have illustrated. the gog- gles may not be easily altered.

7. Fixed role therapy and conceptual change Kelly's 'fixed role therapy' was a model of the process of encouraging conceptual change. The therapeutic process begins with the client 'painting a portrait' of himselfiherself - either through a written or spoken 'self characterisation sketch' or the com- pletion of a repertory grid. (It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a detailed description of these techniques but the reader may care to consult Kelly (1955). Bannister and Fransella (1980). Pope and Keen (1981) o r Beail (1985) for some accounts).

Once the person's view of himselfiherself or some domain of the world under scrutiny is exposed. a negotiation takes place between client and clinician. The person is encouraged to see hisiher point of

view (range of constructs) as current hypotheses and. as such. potentially open to change.

The person is encouraged to construct a n alterna- tive hypothesis to the construct selected and then go away and behaoe us $this construct were one he o r she believed in. I n this way the person puts himself/ herself into a position where an alternative r ~ z q be validated. However. there could be prolonged resis- tance t o change. The role o f the therapist is t o support the client during the unsettling period o f experimentation with ne" ideas r r r d at times to suggest alternative hypotheses f o r exploration.

As Kelly (1969) pointed out. this strategy had much in common with how he tutored his research students. We would suggest the process is one which sensitive teachers could use with young scientists a t school. We must recognise that b) encouraging students to articulate their personal meanings in science we make them portray something o f their selue.s. The classroom climate has to be such that this disclosure is valued (Watts and Bentley 19x7). The students can come to view their personal meanings as hypotheses t o be put t o the test and in putting fonvard the 'accepted' view o f science concepts and theories we need to stress the conjectural nature o f this scientific viev,,

This is not to imply that the students' \.iew and the 'accepted' science view are o f the same order or same level of conjecture. A student's view may be such that i t is far removed from the 'public' k n o w - ledge o f the current community o f scientists. The student needs to recognise this discrepancy. / f ' the student wishes to understand the literature emanat- ing from such efforts then the teacher's role could be seen as one of helping the student to gain access to the constructs of others via a consideration of the student's current personal viewpoint. However there is still lively debate about the relative status o f 'students' science' and 'scientists' science' -which, if either. should be central to classroom activity. This debate raises a range of ethical and epistemological questions which lie outside the brief o f this article. Here we focus primarily on the students' concep- tions.

The outcome of strategies such a s fixed role ther- apy or brainstorming (Nussbaum and Novick 1981) could be diverse. One student might hold on t o his current hypotheses and temporarily adopt another perspective (fragmentation). Another may choose to see her model as being invalidated and replace i t with one proffered by a peer or the 'accepted' view supplied by the teacher or television programme. Yet another course of action may be that the student holds resolutely to her original model and rejects others given (however. she may have a better ~tt l t lcr- srarzrlirzp of the other perspectives). The process o f interchange of personal models could also result in ;I person discarding hisiher previous model. rejecting all of the other models put forward by members of the group and erecting an alternative model which

Corz.s[ructioi,s[ goggles

goes beyond any of the models. The latter type of change is essential in scientific progress.

I t follows that. unless the learner's views are articulated. the teacher cannot devise a strategy whereby the learner's model can be put to the test. Kelly noted that change in construing will only take place if the person experiments with hisiher way of seeing things. construes the implications of these experiments and sees that it would be fruitful. That is. they might result in an elaboration of hisiher constructs systems. in order to adopt an alternative way of seeing things.

For 21 Kellyan. the teaching of science should be scientific. I t should be based upon a rigorous con- sideration o f alternative theories - those of the sruder1t.r. the tcrrcher and 'scientists' scierzce'. The ethos or social context within which such a consider- ation should take place would be one where the alternatives are treated in a n equitable manner. There should be sufficient support for students as they t r y to articulate their concepts of science so that they are encouraged to talk about their ideas. As Sutton (1981) pointed out. talking about one's ideas is 'one o f the most powerful provocations t o sorting out what you understand'. Talking about one's ideas and listening to the conflicting opinions of others and. testing o f these ideas represents an approach to teaching which is consistent with Kelly's model of 'm~ln-the-scientist'.

Recognition by the learner. teacher or researcher that our ways o f categorising and explaining the world can be an impediment. is just as necessary for creation in science a s it is for the personal growth of ;I client in therapy. Morrison and Cometa (1982) comment that:

' I f ;I psychotherapist has done his work properly. the client has been guided towards changing his constructs o f self and others so that he takes some responsibility for the past and lays plans to shape the future ' (Morrison and Cometa 1982. p163). One could argue that this criterion could also be one applied to 'successful teaching'.

References Bannister D a n d Fransella F I Y X O Inquir ing , M m 2nd edn

(Harmond\worth: Penguin) Bcail N ( d . ) IY8.i Rcpc,r/or! Grid Toch~r /c /~tc untl

Pc~notlnl C ' o t / \ t r / t c , r \ (London: Croom Helm) Bell B and Driver R l983 Edrcc. Scr. 6 I t 8 Bentle? D and Watts D M 19x6 Looking fbr L e u r n i q :

S < . / c , , r c e Erl/rctr/ion 7e/e1>i.\iot1 (London: Independent Telekision Authorit!)

Clarh C IYX5 Thought\ o n the epistemological side- eflects o f conceptual change teaching. C o t w t w ~ / l , ~ t l e rdopc t i lor / / I C 1985 t n w t i n g of the /tlo/.\ih/e College o f Rc\cwrc~her,\ on Teuc,/Iin,q, Chictr,go. 20 ,March 198.5 (Per\onal eommunicatlon)

Donaldson M 1978 C ' h / / d r e i s M i n d \ (London: Fontana) Dr! \er R I982 E t l ~ Atlu/. 4 6Y-79 ~ I ' M T/!c Prrpii U\ .Scio/ri\rP (Milton Kcyne\ :

Open University Press)

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