A Reevaluation of the Trade Union Unity League

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34 SCIENCES'SOCIETY

(TUUL) in 1929 had the explicit purpose of organizing Communist-

led dual unions in industries where AFL unions already existed. This

appeared to be a dramatic shift in policy from the strategy of boring

from within the AFL that had been in place for the greater part of

the 1920s. Factional opponents that had been recently expelled from

the CPUSA, the left-wing Trotskyists in 1928 and the right-wing Love-

stoneites in 1929, argued that establishment of these revolutionary

industrial unions was decidedly un-Leninist and called for their liq-

uidation and the Party's return to working within the craft unions.

However, the TUUL remained a central component of the CPUSA's

trade union strategy until late 1934 when the Communist Interna-

tional (Comintern) embarked on its Popular Front strategy and or-

dered the Party to dissolve its red unions and reenter the AFL.

Klehr (1984, 118) has argued that the TUUL was never an effec-

tive force in the trade union field during its nearly six-year existence.

Very nearly stillborn by its second anniversary, the TUUL

was

a ghostly

presence in most industries, where its organizers demonstrated an eerie

talent for losing what strikes they did succeed in calling. And former

Trotskyist Bert Cochran (1977,44-5) is no less critical in his assessment

of the CPUSA's foray into establishing industrial unions:

Throughout their lifetime, the red unions (aside from a few special cases)

were propaganda organizations. To the extent that they had members at

all, these came in during strikes and left when strikes were lost (which they

generally were). . . . the Communists never succeeded in breathing life into

their revolutionary industrial unions. The policy, in terms of its declared

purposes, was a failure.

Ottanelli (1991, 27) is more favorably disposed to the activities of the

League's unions, although he acknowledges that a variety of external

forces limited their success. The common pattern of circumstances

legal and vigilante violence against organizers, strikers and their

families; the diminishing number of employed workers; the material

inability to provide relief for protracted strikes; and, in the case of

agricultural workers, the seasonal character of their employment —



THE TRADE UNION UNITY LEAGUE 35

represented a significant advance over the previous Communist policy of

boring from within existing AFL trade unions. Although meager in mem-

bership and results, the TUUL helped to establish a new type and style of

Communist unionism, more suited to the organization of African-Americans,

women, and mass-production workers.

With the recent opening of the CPUSA archives, combined with

the current extant secondary literature, it is possible to reevaluate the

Party's activities in the U. S. trade union movement during Third

Period Communism. This new material, composed of internal reports,

meeting minutes, etc., provides a level of detail and richness concern-

ing the TUUL's activities that is missing from the reporting in the

Daily

Worker

or Labor Unity

the TUUL's monthly publication. While articles

in these two periodicals contain information that is also found in the

CPUSA Archives, the archival data fill in numerous gaps that do not

appear in the publications. This documentation is not limited to the

large, high-profile strikes which were more likely to end in defeat; it

therefore provides more than sufficient ammunition for challenging

Cochran's (1977) and Klehr's (1984) dominant paradigms.

Although it is true that the TUUL unions experienced major

defeats and had difficulties in organizing in the heavy and mass pro-

duction industries, these unions did experience organizing success

in light industries in New York City, where the CPUSA had a signifi-

cant membership presence, particularly after the implementation of

the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in June 1933. Besides

promoting union organization on an industrial basis, the League's

vision of trade unionism was structurally different from that of the

AFL in the sense that the red industrial unions attempted to promote

the democratic, rank-and-file participation of the membership in

union affairs as opposed to leaving such activities solely in the hands

of the union officials.

The TUUL's modest achievements are even more impressive when

placed in their proper context. During the Third Period, CPUSA

membership was relatively small: only 7,545 members in 1930, increas-

ing to a little over 19,000 in 1933 (Ottanelli, 1991, 43). In addition,





TH E TRADE UN ION UNITY LEAGUE 37

die NTWU bad been founded in September 1928, tbe NTWIU was born

on January 1 1929 and tbe

WU —

an independent industrial union

tbat began as a Knigbts of Labor affiliate — came u nd er Com munist

control by tbe late 1920s (Levenstein, 1981, 17; Keeran, 1980, 32).

Soon after tbe TUUL's organizadon, approximately a dozen new

industrial unions appeared in industries sucb

as

maritime, agriculture,

laundry, food and tobacco. Tbe standard bistorical interpretation is

tbat tbe federation's formation came about because of Comintern

directives after Lozovsky, bead of tbe Profintern (Red Internationa l

of Labor U nions), stated, at the Sixth World Congress in tbe summer

of 1928, tbat tbe U. S. Com munists bad to stop dancing a quadrille

around tbe AFL (Cochran, 1977,

43).

Johanningsm eier (2001,161),

however, points ou t tba t significant sup po rt already existed in tbe

CPUS

for tbis change due to tbe fact tbat Party trade un ion organiz-

ers wbo often came out of an indigenous trad ition of radical indus-

trial un ionism acknow ledged tbe failure of tbe CPUSA's boring

from witbin strategy witbin tbe AFL unions th rou gh ou t tbe 1920s.

At its founding conference, the League oudined tbat it would use

tbree organizing strategies: 1) forming national industrial unions

along the lines of tbe NMU, NTWU and tbe NTWIU; 2) in indus-

tries wbere tbe federation lacked sufficient strength to organize fully

developed industrial union s, group ing togetber local unions and sbop

committees into nadonal industrial leagues, industrial unions in

embryo ; and 3) organizing left-wing oppositions in tbe AFL unions

(Levenstein, 1981, 17).

Within six months o ftbe TUU L's founding, tbe NTWU

was

lead-

ing a major strike of unorganized workers in tbe American Woolen

Company mills in Lawrence, M assacbusetts, the site of

two

prior suc-

cessful general strikes. Although tbe walkout began in February 1930

as a fight against speedup, witb only 33 workers in one departm ent,

witbin two weeks 10,000 to 12,000 workers were on strike demand-

ing un ion recognition, overtime pay at dme and a half the rigbt of

workers to elect departm en tal com mittees, elimination of efficiency

men , and reduction in tbe num ber of combs, from nine to tbree,

that eacb worker bad to operate. The employer conceded on all of

tbe strikers' demands except time-and-a-balf pay for overtime work,






refused to recognize tbe severity of tbe situation until late in August

w be n W ill iam Z. Foster s tated that a tem por ary and organ ized re-

trea t was necessary in o rd er to re gr o u p for future batt les (Klehr ,

1984, 45; Cochran, 1977, 51) .

The Par ty a t t r ibuted tbe loss of tbe miners ' walkout to NMU

orga nizers fail ing to dev elop and train necessary new cad res from

below tba t wo uld be able to take over tbe s trike 's lea de rsbi p. Tb e

CPUSA argued tbat the organizers per formed a l l of tbe leadersbip

work without involving the leaders duly elected by tbe workers , and

that tbe walkout could not be consolidated because of the fai lure to

build local an d pit orga nizatio ns tha t ba d daily con tact with tbe

cen t ra l s tr ike l eade r sb ip . A no tbe r r eason for f a i lu re , acc ord in g to

tbe Party, was tb at th e u n io n did n o t sufficiently dev elop a s tr on g

rel ief mo ve m en t f rom the be gi nn in g of tbe s t r ike as well as tbe in-

abi l ity of tbe N M U to bu i ld a u n i t ed f r on t f rom below witb tb e

M usteite-led mi ne rs ' work s topp age in sou the rn W est Virginia (RILU,

[1932] ,

5 - 7 ) .

A ltb ou gb tb e m in er s ' strike was decisively lost, tbe L aw renc e tex-

tile work stoppage ended in a partial victory (elimination of tbe effi-

c iency expe r ts and em ployer recogni t ion o f tb e mill com mit tees) for

tbe NTWU. However , a l a rger wa lkou t occur red in the Lawrence

texti le mil ls in Oc to be r 1 931 ; som e 23,000 wo rkers sbut down the

ci ty ' s en t i re indus t ry wben employers s lasbed wages by 10%. The

NTWU was caugbt off guard and union organizers were quickly dis-

pa tcb ed to Law rence a l tbo ug b tbey found themselves in co m pet ido n

wi tb a r e inv igora ted Mus te i t e - led Uni ted Tex t i l e Worker s Union

(UTW ) for lea de rshi p. Bo tb unio ns es tablished tb eir own s trike com-

m ittees , m eetin gs an d pick et l ines . W ith tbe two un ion s f ighting tbe

owners as well as eacb otber, tbe walkout was easily defeated in six

weeks and tbe workers ended tbeir industr ial act ion witb tbe wage

cut remaining in effect (Klebr , 1984, 43-44) .

Certainly a major reason for tbe Lawrence textile strike's collapse

was due to the NTWU's fai lure to form a united front f rom below

witb tbe UTW members . On the o tber band, tbe fur r iers acbieved a

total victory in tbeir work s toppage which tbe CPUSA attr ibuted to

tbe NT W IU's cor rect app l ica t ion of tbe uni ted- front- from-below



40 SCIENCE

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successful walkout leading to weekly wage increases from $5 to $15

(RILU, [1932], 8-9).

Membersbip figures for April 1931 dem onstra te tbe problem atic

status of many TUU L u nions, witb only the NTWIU and tbe AWIL

experiencing increased mem bersbip since August 1930 (RILU, [1932],

9),

largely tbrougb conducting successful strikes. The CPUSA ac-

knowledged the large gap between tbe influence tbat it exerted

among tbe masses and tbe un ions ' organ izational stability, blam-

ing tbe lack of growtb on the TUUL's inability to penetrate large

factories and its failure to organize walkouts on tbe basis oftbe work-

ers'

sbop floor grievances. It

also

admitted that tbe red industrial unions

had problems in retaining membersbip during and after strikes, was

bindered by the labor organizadons' lack of daily work in address-

ing the special grievances that African-American, women and immi-

grant workers experienced, and tbat tbese unions were created on a

national basis from above witbout sufficient representation from work-

ers engaging in the struggle in the shops (RILU, [1932], 9-10).

The NTWIU, the bealtbiest of the TUUL affiliates, increased in

size tbrougb its united front tactics and the managing of

a

number

of successful strikes in 1931. However, tbe Party acknowledged tba t

tbe union's major weakness was that tbe bulk of

its

m em bersbip was

located in New York City, witb locals in Cbicago, Pbiladelpbia and

Boston consisting of only a few bun dre d mem bers eacb. In addid on ,

tbe NTWIU had been unsuccessful in gaining access to tbe most in-

fluential in depend en t union in the industry, tbe Amalgamated Cloth-

ing Workers (ACW), and in developing a united front from below

witb its members, according to tbe Party (RILU, [1932], 10-11).

Wbile tbe TUUL languished on a national scale, it fared consid-

erably be tter in tbe New York City district, doubling its m em bersbip

from 8 500 to 17,000 from October 1931 to the middle of February

1932. Tbe federation had established 68 shop groups among tbe

district's plants (not including those in tbe needle trades), and bad

organized 30 opposition groupings in factories represented by eitber

independent or AFL unions. Tbis resulted in tbe League baving

direct organized contact witb 115,000 workers in tbe New York met-




of the Tra de Un ion Unity Cou ncil (T UU C), led approx imately 11,000

w orke rs in defensive strikes agains t wage cuts and in offensive strikes

for pay raises. A bo ut 6 5% of these walkou ts en d e d in victory. M ost of

th e defensive walko uts we re wo n; in th e well org an ize d offensive

work s toppages , employer-provided wage increases and e i ther shop

com m it tee rec ogn i t ion o r un ion recog ni t ion was achieved. This suc-

cess was a t t r i bu ted to an exp ans ion an d m ore successful op era t ion

of [ the Par ty ' s ] f ac to ry g ro up s , the co ns t ruc t ing o f op po s i t ion

gro up s wi th in the non-TU UL unio ns , the successfu l im plem en tat ion

of united-front-from-below tactics , an d a ser ious at te m pt to rem ove

bure auc rat ic pract ices an d organiza t ional chaos f rom the inne r

wo rkings of the red trade un ion s (TU UL , 1932a, 1) .

In sp i te of the TUUC's successes , a number of pr imary weak-

nesses was ou t l in ed as reaso ns why the org aniz at ion was no t mak-

ing gre ate r advan ces am on g NewYork City wo rkers . Major cr it icisms

included having the t rade union federa t ion focus ing on organiz ing

smaller shops as opposed to larger ones, a failure to collectively acti-

vate the mem be rsh ip, an d having the off ice serve as the un ion , using

m eth od s and tac tics that app eale d to nei the r youth n or wo m en work-

ers, and implementing an insuff icient approach to at tract ing African-

American workers (except in the needle t rades) . Other cr i t ic isms

focused on def ic ient methods in p lanning s t r ikes and insuff ic ient

collect ion of funds, inabili ty to provid e defen se an d dis tr ibu te relief

hav ing th e T U U L affiliates assu m e lea de rsh ip at th e tail of even ts,

and react ing to mass pressure f rom below ra ther than shaping the

deve lopm ent o f even ts in a p lan ned a nd purposefu l m an ne r (TUUL ,

1932a, 2).

By the be g in n in g o f Ju ly 1932 , the TU UC had approx imate ly

20,000 m em be rs , with 16,500 foun d in eigh t industr ies : ne ed le trades

(10,000), shoe (1,500), food (1,200), laundry (1,000), off ice work

(1,000),

ma r ine (900) , furn i ture (600) , an d me tal (300 ) . Th ese fig-

ures indicate that the NewYork City organization 's s trength was in

the l ight industr ies , while i t exhibited considerable weakness in the

basic indus t r ies . T he NTW IU expe r ien ced a con t inua l upw ard t rend ,

a l though development was uneven among i t s sect ions , leading the

Party to claim that the union lacked organizational s tabil i ty . For ex-







44 SCIENCE &' SOCIETY

independent labor organizations conducted 29 work stoppages, and

101 spontaneous strikes emerged. The AFL-led walkouts were con-

cen trated in three industries — mining, need le trades and textile —

while a majority of TUUL-led strikes occurred in four industries:

mining, needle trades, auto and shoe (TUUL, 1933g, 1). Two m onths

later, the

CPUSA

estimated that one million workers had struck since

the beginning of 1933. Th e AFL had directed 45 of these strikers,

the TUUL had led

20 ,

independ ent unions had headed 17.5 , and

17.5

had been involved in spontaneous walkouts (ibid.).

If we estimate that the AFL had approximately 2.8 million mem-

bers and the TUUL 125,000 mem bers at the end of 933 (Mikhailov,

etal

1977, 205;

Stachel, 1933,1) then in calculating an index of strike

mobilization effectiveness (num ber of strikes led divided by m ember-

ship size), the AFL conducted one strike for every 9 003 mem bers,

while the TU UL directed one strike for every 1,000 mem bers. Using

an alternative measure, the ratio of number of strikers to member-

ship, the AFL led approximately one-sixth of its mem bersh ip on strike,

while the TUUL led 1.6 times the number of its members in work

stoppages during the first ten months of 1933.

The only labor organization that conducted strikes in agriculture

during the last half of 933 was the TUUL-affiliated Cannery and Agri-

cultural Workers Industrial Union (CAWIU), previously named the

Agricultural Workers' Industrial Union (AWIU) and before that, as

previously mentioned, tbe AWIL. Since directing 5 000 Mexican and

Filipino lettuce workers in a walkout in California's Imperial Valley in

January 1930, the AWIL and its successor organizations had retained a

strong presence among California agricultural laborers. Although the

lettuce workers' strike eventually collapsed and the CAWIU lost other

major California farm worker walkouts, the un ion did win 3 of at least

18 strikes among cotton pickers, pea pickers, strawberry pickers, let-

tuce workers, cherry pickers, pear pickers, and beet workers, the larg-

est of which was the 18,000 cotton picker strike in the fall of

933

in

the SanJoaquin Valley (Daniels, 1984 ,111-116,141-221; RILU, 1933).

In New York City, the TUUC unions were prospering, attaining

a membership of 45,000 with the NTWIU having 18,200 and the




In virtually all of tbese actions, workers struck to obtain wage in-

creases, minimum pay scales, reduced bours, an equal division of

work du ring tbe slow period in seasonal trades, and union recogni-

tion (TUUL,

1933f

1).

Tbe TUUC affiliates won most of tbe work stoppages tbat tbey

conducted during tbis period. More tban balf of tbese strikers (35,000)

were in tbe needle trades. Am ong tbis group , successful walkouts oc-

curred am ong fur workers, ba tbrobe workers, custom tailors and knit

good workers. In knit goods and batbrobe, strikers obtained wage

increases rangin g from 20% to

35%;

in kn it goods, tbe 35-bour work

week

was

acbieved. In batbrobe, union recognition

was

also attained,

wbile in fur, substantial pay raises were won along witb a 35-bour work

week (TUUL, 1933f 1; TUUC, [1933], 1-2).

In New York City, tbe SLWIU cond uc ted walkouts tb at culmi-

nated in pay increases of between 20 and 50% for tbe vast majority

of sboe workers; un ion mem bersbip multiplied m ore tban seven-fold,

from 1,200 to 9,000. As in otber successful industrial actions, tbe

CPUSA attributed tbe strike's success to a united-front-from-below

policy witb sboe workers organized in inde pend en t unions (TUUL,

1933f 1; TUUC, [1933], 4- 6) .

However, not all TUUC-led work stoppages at tbis time were

successful. Strikes of 2,000 tobacco workers and 2,000 cleaners and

dyers ended in defeat, wbile a walkout of 1,000 laundry workers ob-

tained only sbop com mittees witb some improvem ents in tbe con-

ditions of tb e workers (TUUC, [1933], 5).

Virtually all TUUC-led strikes in tbe latter balf of

933

were con-

duc ted in ligbt industries; tbe re were no work stoppages in tbe beavy

industries, sucb as transport, railroad, m arine and beavy metal, wbicb

tbe CPUSA admitted the TUUC unions bad problems penetrating

(TUUC, [1933], 2). In addition, many of tbese strikes occurred in

sbops of at most several bundred workers, cbaracteristic of tbe in-

dustries in wbicb tbe TU UC u nions experienced tbe most organiz-

ing success.

The TUUL s

Oppositional ctivities

Within

the

AFL



46 SC IEN CE &=• SO CIE TY

focused on building Communist fractions within the AFL unions to

eventually win the federation's rank-and-file mem bership to the revo-

lutionary industrial unions. Klehr (1984, 119) argues that the Party

placed, at best, minimal emphasis on organizing within the reform-

ist unions; this conclusion is based on the CPUSA 1930 Convention

Resolution, which devoted only one sentence to the work within the

AFL while allotting four pages to the construction of the TUUL unions .

Thro ugh 1932, Klehr claimed (1984, 120), the Party

was

barely vis-

ible within the

A.F.

of L.

The reality, however, was far different from these official pro-

nouncements, even though the CPUSA did not make significant

progress within the craft-oriented federation until 1933. As early as

February 1930, the TUUL actively organized the 5,000-worker New

Orleans longshoremen strike, led by the AFL (Stachel, 1930, 2). In

an April 1931 letter to Profintern leader Lozovsky, the Party rep orte d

that the NTWIU's Executive Board acknowledged that the union has

failed to develop any real minority organiza tion within the AFL

needle trades unions and that the success of the red needle trades

union depended on this (TUUL, 1931, 6).

The purpose of building League groups within the AFL needle

trades unions was to organize a struggle around a program of eco-

nomic dem ands and united front movements between the minori-

ties and the NTW IU in order to eventually achieve mass affiliation

of these workers to the NTWIU. In the com munica tion's conclusion,

the CPUSA pointed ou t that work within the

FL

unions

was

becom-

ing an important issue not only for the NTWIU, but for all TUUL

affiliates (TUUL, 1931, 7).

Through the end of 1932, the League 's work within the

FL

was

deemed woefully inadequate by the radical trade union federation.

The only major achievement that the TUUL could claim in this field

was its campaign for unemploym ent insurance, in which dozens of

branches of

FL

unions, comprising approximately 200,000 mem-

bers,

supported the organization's drive. However, by fall 1932, this

movement had bogged down and the momentum achieved within

the AFL had essentially fizzled (RILU, 1933, 27 -28) .




(RILU, 1933, 2). The most successful work occurred within the six

AFL needle trades unions. The primary focus of the NTW IU s activ-

ity took place in seven New York City locals of the 30,000-member

ILGWU, although similar efforts also occurred in Chicago, Cleveland

and Los Angeles. In Local 1, the NTWIU had obtained substantial

majorities in electing 12 members to the Executive Board; in Local

9, the u nio n s opposition group possessed approximately 800 mem-

bers and controlled the Executive Board, with two of its members

voted in as board chairm an and board secretary. Finally, in Local 22,

the 150-member opposition group elected several NTWIU members

to the union s executive board (RILU, 1933, 6-7).

W ithin the AFL fur workers union, virtually the enti re New York

City bran ch of the IFWU jo in ed the NTWIU after the latter s success-

ful furrier strike, which also resulted in the Philadelphia IFWU local

affiliating with the red un ion . The NTW IU s strongest oppositional

activity within the Cloth, Hat, Cap and Millinery W orkers Interna-

tional Union took place within New York ity Locals 24 and 42, where

the union had organized factions of between 200 and 300 members.

In the Tailors Union , an oppositional group pe rformed effective

work and had secured control of the Chicago local through the end

of 1932 (RILU, 1933, 7-8).

After the NIRA s passage, the TUUL affiliates activity within bo th

the AFL and ind epe nden t un ions experienced a significant up turn.

By July

1933,

the red union federation directed a num ber of indepen-

dent unions that it hoped to eventually affiliate with the League, the

largest being the Tobacco W orkers Union of Florida (5,000 mem bers),

the SubPostal Workers (4,200 members), the Hod Carriers Union

in New York City (800-1,000 m em bers), and the Alteration Painters

Union in New York City (800-1,000 m em bers ). Besides these labor

organizations, the TUUL controlled several smaller independent

unions totaling a few thousand members in industries such as metal,

packinghouse, building, etc. in smaller cities (TUUL, 1933h, 1-2). By

the end of October

1933,

the red federation

was

leading 30,000 workers

in independent unions, including textile (5,000 members), postal

(4,000 members) and packing (3,000 members) (TUUL, 1933b).



48 SCIENCE

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either CPUSA or TUUL members. The largest of these un ions were

in textile (3,000), cement works (1,200), hnoleum (1,000) and at

Victor Radio (1,200). These membership figures in the League-led

ind epen dent un ions compared quite favorably to the 5 000 members

in the Ph iladelphia district TUUL un ions (TUUL, 1933e, 1).

Towards the end of 1933, the red federation believed that it was

necessary to intensify its efforts within the independent unions because

of the gains it felt it could achieve. For example, the League was work-

ing within the Progressive Miners of Am erica (PMA), an Illinois-based

30,000-member un ion formed from a split in the UMWA and led by

the Musteites and the Trotskyists. Because the PM members strongly

opposed reaffiliation with the UMWA and due to a growing revolt

against the UMWA leadership among rank-and-file members, the

TUUL felt that a strong independent un ion could be created that could

rival the UMWA (RILU, 1933, 1; Stachel, 1933, 2).

AfterJune

1933,

the radical trade union federation made significant

progress inside the AFL unions. Prior to the NIRA's implementation,

the League's AFL oppositional activity had been primarily restricted

to the needle and building trades. By the end of

1933,

however, work

within the AFL [was] much more extensive and on a higher plane

than at any time since the T UU L's founding, particularly in the min-

ing, building, metal, needle, textile, marine, baking, printing and rail-

road industries where the craft unions predominated. This activity

within the

FL was

m ost developed in New York City, where the League

had 50 important opposition groups with the FL unions along with

1,200 CPUSA members at this time (TUUL, 1933a, 2).

In mining, the TUUL basically abandoned the NMU and focused

much of its efforts in developing left-wing movements within the

UMWA. Th e P ittsburgh district's en tire activity, which had been the

main base of the NMU, was involved in the UMWA and, although

work was only in the preliminary stages, several hundred had been

organized into opposition groups. In add ition, in many UMW locals,

either CPUSA m embers or NMU supporters had been elected to lead-

ing positions (TUUL, 1933a, 2).

In metal, the League acknowledged that it was carrying on very





50 SCIENCE = SOCIETY

In the various AFL needle trades' work stoppages, the TUUL

helped to defeat the leade rship's sellout settlement in the white

goods walkout. In the cloakmakers strike. League activists led the

successful vote, by a two-to-one margin, against the implem entation

of piecework and forced the AFL officials and the National Recovery

Administration to give the cloakmakers a code tha t is perhaps the

best in the country (TUUL,

1933f

2).

Did TUUL Unionism Offer a ifferent Vision

than AFL U nionism

Besides organizing industrial workers, the TUUL attempted to

promote a more democratic, activist and participatory unionism, or

bottom up unionism, am ong its rank-and-file mem bers, as opposed

to the AFL's burea ucratic, or top down, app roach. Th e League

unions also tried to address the concerns and develop the leadership

of workers traditionally ignored by the AFL: young, women and

African-American workers. Although it was not always successful in

achieving these lofty objectives, the radical trade union federation

worked diligently to turn its vision into a reality.

As early

as

the summer of

1930,

the TUUL n oted with pride that

the NTWIU had been reorganized on a shop delegate basis and that

more than half of its leaders were workers who had come directly ou t

of the shops. Progress had also been made with regard to African-

American and young workers and both groups were represented in

the union's general leadership. In addition, within the NTWU, the

union's national council was com posed of an overwhelming major-

ity of rank-and-file workers, inc lud ing young workers from the

shops (Schmies, 1930, 1-2).

In spite of attempts to reach ou t to wom en and African-American

workers, the TUUL argued, in April 1931, that a problem limiting

the organization's growth was that it was not adequately addressing

the special grievances am ong Negro and women workers (TUUL,

[1932b],

1). Even in New York City, where the red trade union fed-

eration began to experience a modicum of success in late 1931 and




this pro ble m , th e New York City org aniz ation discussed how its orga-

nizing tactics must necessarily be different from those of the AFL, if

it was to be successful in enrolling workers:

A union with a small active and large passive mem bership could exist, the

office functioning as the union. Red trade unions, whose existence and

effectiveness depends n ot only on the mass bu t how alert tha t mass is to its

class interests at the point of production, must have a tremendously large

active organiza tion for collective leadership. Organization inside big plants

can only be done by developing the workers tha t work there in to rank-and-

file organizers. This essential difference between old organizing tactics

em ana ting from class collaboration days and red trade un ion organization

is not und erstood. (TUUL, 1932a, 2.)

In the sum m er of

1932,

the TU U C co nc lud ed tha t i t functions as an

office an d tha t real collective lea de rsh ip ha d no t be en develo ped

an d tha t par t icipat ion d ep en de d solely on a narrow circle of un ion

activists (Zack, 1932,5).

In analyzing the fai lure of cer tain TUUL-led work stoppages

during the 1930-1932 period, the organization believed that insuffi-

cient worker involvemen t w s a major drawback. For example, in the

40,000-strong NMU -led strike in the late sp r in g/ su m m er of 1931, a

key pr ob lem in the walkout, acc ord ing to the Leag ue, was the faihire

to activise (the workers) for the building of local and pit organisa-

t ions.

In addit ion, not ing the important role of young workers in

the mining industry, the radical t rade union federat ion pointed out

that the red m ine rs ' un ion failed to develop special youth com mis-

s ions a t tach ed to the s tr ike lead ersh ip in or de r to recrui t youn g

wo rkers as strike lead ers. Finally, alt ho ug h it was ackn ow ledge d tha t

the African-American m ine rs showed them selves as brave fighters

in th e strike, th e T U U L criticized the NM U for not sufficiently draw-

ing this group of workers into the strike leadership, for ignoring the

specific discrim ination s of the African-Am erican w orkers an d for

n ot co nd uc tin g a systematic cam paig n against all m anifestations of

chauvinism am on g the white workers (RILU, [1932] 7-8 ) .



52 SCIENCE SOCIETY

the SMWIU in Septem ber 1932 at the T rum bell Mill of the Republic

Steel Corporation in Warren, Ohio

was

criticized on the grounds that

the un ion perform ed unsatisfactorily in organizing African-American

workers, failed to include their specific demands in the strike pro-

gram and capitulated to the chauvinist attitudes of the white, native-

born workers (RILU, 1933, 8-9).

Even after the TUUL affiliates led many more successful work

stoppages after the NIRA's passage, the federation no ted that there

are still many serious shortcom ings to be overcome. While applaud-

ing the fact that the strike com mittees were organized on a dem o-

cratic basis, it criticized these bodies for not being placed in full

leadersh ip of the walkouts. In many industrial actions, the League

no ted, the strike com mittees played m ore of an ag itational role tJian

one of actually leading the strikes, with the direction of the work

stoppage rem aining in the hands of the top leadership (TUUC,

[1933], 9).

In relation to these m ore successful walkouts in the latter half of

1933, the TUUL remarked on the continuing deficiencies of its or-

ganizing among African-American, women and young workers. Th eir

special demands were no t incorporated into the strike programs, and

workers from these three groups were not sufficiently integra ted into

leadership roles. Finally, the League unions were unsuccessful in

com bating white chauvinism am ong the workers du ring work stop-

pages and for allowing, in som e shops, African-American workers to

receive lower prices than white workers for performing the same

jo b (TUUC, [1933], 10-11).

he End of the Road for the TUUL

In 1934, independent union growth slowed. Three of the four

major class battles of tha t year were won

by FL

affiliates, altho ug h

they were led or su pp orte d by ideological leftists of various stripes

— the M usteite-led To ledo Auto-Lite Strike, the Trotskyist-led Team-

sters strike in Minneapolis and the CPUSA-led strike in San Francisco

of the ILA. Analyzing this wave of industrial confiict in Septem ber




However, at this time, the gro und

w s

shifting in Moscow, with a

movement to return to the reformist unions. This led to the federa-

tion 's folding in two phases. In Novem ber 1934, Stachel rep orte d that

the NMU had b een disbanded in late spring of 1934 and the NTWU

had collapsed du ring the Septem ber 1934 textile

strike.

He instructed

the steel union and the AWU to cease operations and to enter the

AFL. Although Stachel an no un ced that the Party's major policy was

to jo in and to build oppositions within the craft unions, he stated that

those TUUL affiliates that possessed a mass base in industries where

no reformist union existed or the union w s weak would not be abol-

ished unless

the

AFL would accep t these labor organizations with their

leadership and organizations intact. According

to

Stachel, the metal,

marine , fur, food, and furniture un ions would continue to function

as red industrial unions (Cochran, 1977, 75; Klehr, 1984, 132).

However, even the affiliates that the Party felt were viable soon

went und er. In D ecember 1934, the C om intern Executive Commit-

tee called for the elimination of the revolutionary unions, leading

the CPUSA Central Comm ittee to orde r the remaining TUUL affili-

ates to jo in their respective AFL un ions u nd er any cond itions. In

February 1935, the MWIU closed shop and its mem bers en tered the

International Seaman's Union; that same month, the NTWIU's fur

workers section began discussion with the IFWU and merged with

the union in the summer of 1935. The Metal Workers Industrial

Union (minus its steel section, which had jo ined with the Amalgam-

ated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers in the fall of 1934)

went into the International Association of Machinists in the spring

of 1935 (Cochran, 1977, 75; Klehr, 1984, 132-3).

Conclusion A Reevaluation of the TUU L

While the widely-held view is that the TUUL was an abject and

total failure, this article demonstrates that a more nuanced under-

standing of its successes and failures is req uire d and necessary for an

accurate evaluation. Even thoug h the League un ions took over many

spo ntaneous strikes, especially from 1930 to 1932, and lost many of



54 SCIENCE

=

SOCIETY

States, it did develop a base of support in New York City, where it had

some success in organizing and conducting strikes in smaller shops

in light industries, particularly in the needle trades and shoe. In a

num ber of these walkouts, the red trade unions were victorious when

they were able to effectively implement united front tactics from below

with workers who were members of com peting labor organizations.

In addition, the TUUL worked within both the AFL and the inde-

pendent unions in obtaining leadersbip posts, and in many indus-

tries built active and vibrant left-wing oppositions. These activists

continually pushed the AFL officials to fight in a more aggressive and

principled manner during strikes, and m any times League m embers

provided essential leadersbip during walkouts of independent unions.

Although much of the organization's literature aimed for pub-

lic consum ption was filled with political slogans, such as Defend the

Soviet Union , in their daily activities, TUU L organizers did not

emphasize implementation of these slogans. In fact, one complaint

of the federation's leaders was that our organizers and the lead-

ing com rades in the Party were not willing to bring forward the Party

or even to explain the revolutionary character of the League un ions

to rank-and-file mem bers (TUUL, 1933e, 2). Instead, they practiced

a far-sighted industrial unionism that was m ean t to appeal to workers

no t traditionally represen ted by labor organizations, such as agricul-

tural, African-American, women and young workers.

The TUUL also offered an alternative vision of trade unionism

when com pared with the AFL. While it attem pted to reach out to the

more oppressed groups of workers mentioned above, it also promoted

a democratic, participatory and shop-floor-oriented approach to trade

unionism. Although the League was not always successful in devel-

oping fully self-governing and activist unions, it continually pushed

its affiliates in this direction.

If the C om intern had not abolished the TUUL in 1934, could it

have become the foundation of a viable left-wing industrial trade

union federation in the post-Wagner Act period, when organizing

became considerably easier? Based on the organization's strength

being centered in the light industries in and around New York City,




unions were in tb e process of being eclipsed by a somewhat reinvigo-

rated AFL.

Nevertheless, tbis vision of a dem ocra tic and activist trade un ion-

ism, nurtu red in the TU UL in tbe early 1930s until its demise in 1934,

provided a bridge and an excellent training g round for CPUSA trade

un ion activists when they reen tered the AFL in 1934 and 1935. Be-

coming a major force in organizing the CIO unions in the mid- to

late-1930s, the League s initial efforts laid the foundation for large

gains for the U. S. working class. For example, th e NTW IU s fur sec-

tion became the basis ofthe reconstituted Fur and Leather Workers

Union , the largest openly Com munist labor organization in the CIO,

when it reen tered the

FL

union in 1935 (Foner, 1950). In add ition,

establishment of a tightly interwoven rank-and-file structure on the

shop floor, initially advocated by the TUUL, served as the lynchpin

of the CPUSA s amazing success in organ izing and acquiring leader-

ship of the 600,000-strong United Flectrical Workers (Filipelli and

McCollocb, 1995). Moreover, the CPUSA not only helped to build

many of the CIO unions; Party-ledunionso f tbe late 1930s and 1940s

were also m ore likely to bave had a more activist shop-floor orienta-

tion than non-CPU SA-led un ions (Cilpin, 1988; Stepan-Norris and

Zeitlin, 1991, 2002; McColloch, 1992; Devinatz, 1996).

The TUUL unio ns imp ortant struggle was the beginning ofth e

CPUSA s com m itment to building a viable industrial unionism in the

United States. W hen these un ions are viewed from this perspective,

one must consider them to have been far from a total failure.

Department of Management and Quantitative Methods

Iltinois State University

Normal IL 61790-5580

[email protected]

ARCHIVAL SOURCES

The references listed in this section a re from materials sent to the Com munist In-

ternational (Comintern) by the Communist Party USA. complete microfilm

set of the Comin tern archives was provided to the Library of Congress by the




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ton, D. C.

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ton, D. C.

TUU C. Trade Union Unity Council. Records of the CPUSA, 1914-1944. Library of

Congress, Washington, D. C.

TUU L. Trade Union Unity League. Records of the CPUSA, 1914-1944. Library of

Congress, Washington , D. C.

Zack. Records of th e CPUSA, 1914-1944. Library of Congress, Washing ton, D. C.

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Documents

A Reevaluation of the Trade Union Unity League