99975554 HAZID Worksheet FORM Rev 25 May 2012 Timas Premier Oil Indonesia

HAZID WORKSHEET

: ANOA PHASE 4 - AGX COMPRESSION RECONFIGURATION PROJECT

: DLB Activities in the vicinity and moored alongside AGX Platform

: 25 May 2012

S L R S L R

1 Anchor Handling

(Running

Messanger Line

Under the

Bridge) using

Work Boat

Work Boat collision with

the platform / AHT

Boat damage / lost boat

Personnel injury

5 2 HR 1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure

2. Reliable / maintained work boat

3. Weather limit

4. Adequate illumination of work area

5. Trained work boat operation

6. Maintain good communication

7. JSA for work boat operation

8. FRC/MOB Boat ready at all time

9. Suitable PPE: include work vest

1 1 LR

Lost control of wire due

to failure of

comunication or control

system

Damage to redundant

umbilical / subsea structure

3 2 MR 1. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure

2. DP Vessel as AHT

3. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with

MWS approval)

4. Competence Vessel Captain

5. Maintain good communication between

Anchor Tower and AHT

3 1 LR

AHT collision with the

platform / complex

Damage to vessel or

complex (damage to riser)

Personnel injury

Schedule delay


2. JSA for Anchor Handling

3. Weather limit for Anchor Handling

4. Parachute Buoy

5. DP Vessel as AHT

6. Reliable and well maintained vessel (with

MWS approval)

7. Competence Vessel Captain

8. Maintain good communication between

Anchor Tower and AHT

9. Weather limit

10. Briefing about the facility for all Vessel

Captain including the location of risers

11. Secondary AHT standby in the field at all

time

3 1 LR

Project

Node Description

Date of HAZID Study

Initial RiskNo Type of Event Potential Hazards Consequences

Safeguards

(Existing and Recommended Control

Measures)

REC # Recommendation Action PartyResidual Risk

2 Running Anchor

/ Anchor Wire

HAZID Study for Premier ANOA Phase 4 - AGX Compression Reconfiguration Project N1 Page 1 of 15

HAZID WORKSHEET

S L R S L R


Safeguards


Measures)


Drop/Drag Anchor on

Subsea Facility

Damage Subsea Facility

Environmental HC

Discharge

Potential fire/explosion

Company reputation

5 3 HR 1. Subsea / Seabed Survey DONE

2. Approved Anchor Handling Procedure and

Approved Anchor Pattern

3. Anchor on Deck of AHT

4. Mooring Analysis

5. BMS/Survey Equipment Calibration

6. Pull test the anchors

7. Continue anchor wire tension monitoring by

Anchor Tower

8. Shut Down & Depressurize West Lobe line

9. Compliance with POI Marine Procedure

3 1 LR

3 DLB Approach /

Final Departure

of AGX

DLB colission with

platform and riser

Damage to both DLB and

Platform

Personnel injury / Lost of life

Schedule delay

Environmental impact


(Step by Step DLB Approach to AGX)

2. Weather limit

3. Maintain good communication with all

parties

4. Final approach only after all anchors are

installed / laid and DAY Light only.

5. Shut Down the platform and Depressurize

West Lobe line during Final Approach

6. AGX Riser is inside the Jacket

7. Responsible person on DLB monitoring the

gangway tip during final approach

8. Minimize personnel on AGX during DLB

final approach

9. Complete GO and No GO Checklist for the

DLB Final Approach to AGX

10. Anchor removal for final departure is

the reverse of anchor installation. (Meeting

will be performed with relevant parties

including MWS for removal anchors).

3 1 LR

2 Running Anchor

/ Anchor Wire


HAZID WORKSHEET

S L R S L R


Safeguards


Measures)


Dropped loads / objects

on Topside of AGX /

Subsea Facilities

Damage asset causing HC

leak

Personnel injury

Schedule delay

Environmental delay

5 4 HR 1. Approved Lifting Procedure

2. Certified and good condition Crane (include

MWS inspection/approval)

3. Certified and good condition Rigging

4. Certified and experienced Crane Operator

and Rigging Personnel

5. Maintain good communication among

parties involved

6. All lift within the SWL of the crane / rigging

7. Weather limit

8. Stay clear from load

9. Suitable PPE

4 1 MR

Crane Boom collision

with the AGX Topside

and/or with Other Crane


leak

Personnel injury

Schedule delay

4 3 HR 1. All Cranes will be under the control of the

Project (CTR).

2. Designated Person In Charge for Every Lift

3. Good illumincation

4. Procedure control for Cranes Operations

(SIMOPS)

5. Detail planning meeting for Crane

Operations

6. Trained and experienced Crane Operator


7. Maintain good communication among all

involved parties

3 1 LR

1 1. Risk Assessment to be

performed for using the

Crawler Crane for Personnel

Transfer related to the

visibility (ability of the Crane

Operator to see the FROG)

Timas/POI

2 2. Review Crawler Crane

Operation Procedure

Timas

3 2 MR 1. Weather limit

2. Barge rails in place

3. Certified and good condition crane

4. Certified and good condition rigging

equipment

5. Certified and experienced Crane Operator


6. Operate cranes within the design limit

3

4 DLB Crane

Operation

Crawler Crane fall over

the side due to bad

weather related during

lifting (overloaded /

dynamic load)


leak / Environmental impact

Personnel injury

Schedule delay

1 LR


HAZID WORKSHEET

S L R S L R


Safeguards


Measures)


DLB Exhaust Increase risk of

Fire/Explosion in the event

of HC release

1 1 LR 1. DLB Exhausts are located on the STBD

Forward.

2. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger

is +16 elevation)

3. F&G and ESD System on AGX

4. ERP Procedures

5. Platform will inform the DLB in case of F&G

detection system on platform is activated

6. PM on platform e.g. leaks prevention

7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of

DLB

NOTE: based on 10mm hole during the study,

the dispersion of HC release / gas cloud

would NOT reach the DLB.

1 1 LR

Electrical Equipment on

DLB (Lights, Etc)

Increase risk of


of HC release

1 1 LR 1. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger

is +16 elevation)


3. ERP Procedures




6. Switch off the light on Crane Boom during

the Day Light

7. Weather proof lighting/electrical system on

the barge deck and crane boom

8. DLB can be pulled / winched away (winch

speed approx 60m per minute)

9. Construction activities around process area

controlled by PTW asper integrated project

plan


DLB




1 1 LR 3 Explore the possibility to

switch off the lights and other

ignition source on crane

Timas

5 Ignition Source

on DLB

- Gas Release

(10mm hole on

Gas-Gas

Exchanger) with

20knots wind

speed toward

the DLB


HAZID WORKSHEET

S L R S L R


Safeguards


Measures)


Crawler Crane Exhaust Increase risk of


of HC release

1 1 LR 1. Crawler Crane is located more than 60

meters away

2. Crawler Crane Exchaust is fitted with Spark

Arrestor


is +16 elevation)


5. ERP Procedures







1 1 LR

Welding Machines on

DLB

Increase risk of


of HC release

1 1 LR 1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are

located on DLB are 60m away from the

platform.

2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding

leads to Platform and shut down (turn off) the

welding machines on DLB.


is +16 elevation)


5. ERP Procedures





DLB




1 1 LR

5 Ignition Source

on DLB

- Gas Release

(10mm hole on

Gas-Gas

Exchanger) with

20knots wind

speed toward

the DLB


HAZID WORKSHEET

S L R S L R


Safeguards


Measures)


Hot Works on DLB Increase risk of


of HC release

1 1 LR 1. All Hot Works on DLB Deck will be covered

by PTW

2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding

lead to Platform and shut down (turn off) the

welding machines on DLB.


is +16 elevation)


. ERP Procedures





DLB




1 1 LR

5 Ignition Source

on DLB

- Gas Release

(10mm hole on

Gas-Gas

Exchanger) with

20knots wind

speed toward

the DLB

COMMENT: The probability (frequency) of having leaks will be further elaborated (POI)


HAZID WORKSHEET

S L R S L R


Safeguards


Measures)


DLB Exhaust Increase risk of


of HC release

1 1 LR The release of HC with 100mm hole is demonstrated to unlikely because:

1. As per QRA

2. Process Integrity Management e.g. FLIR

Camera, rectification of significant TSS Matrix

Integrity Related Defect. All Integrity related check

and improvement are included on the GO and NO

GO Process.

3. No break of containment the process system

during SIMOPS

4. No Heavy Lifting over the process during

SIMOPS (Most construction activities involved

small weights - structure lifted in around the

platform edges west and south

5. Drop Object Protection is in place for Gas Gas

Exchanger

The risk of release of gas has been reduced to

ALARP, if it would occur the severity would be less.

Additional Safeguards:

1. DLB Exhausts are located on the STBD

Forward.

2. Gas is lighter than air (Gas-Gas Exchanger is

+16 elevation)


4. ERP Procedures




7. Portable Multi-Gas Detector on Stern of DLB

NOTE: based on 100mm hole during the study, the

dispersion of HC release / gas cloud would NOT

reach the DLB Exhaust.

1 1 LR6 Ignition Source

on DLB

- Gas Release

(100mm hole on

Gas-Gas

Exchanger) with

20knots wind

speed toward

the DLB


HAZID WORKSHEET

S L R S L R


Safeguards


Measures)


Electrical Equipment on

STERN of DLB (Lights,

Etc)

Increase risk of


of HC release

5 1 HR The release of HC with 100mm hole is demonstrated to unlikely because:

1. As per QRA





GO Process.


during SIMOPS






Exchanger


ALARP, if it would aoccur the severity would be

less.

Additional Safguards are:


2. ERP Procedures



4. Close water tight doors on the crane tub

5. Portable Multi Gas Detector on the Stern of

DLB.

6. Any lifting over the process during the SIMOPS

shall be covered by PTW, Risk Assessment.

4 1 MR 4 Requirement of Multi Gas

Detector on the STERN of

DLB to be captured in Project

Procedure

Timas

6 Ignition Source

on DLB

- Gas Release

(100mm hole on

Gas-Gas

Exchanger) with

20knots wind

speed toward

the DLB


HAZID WORKSHEET

S L R S L R


Safeguards


Measures)


Crawler Crane Exhaust Increase risk of


of HC release


1. As per QRA





GO Process.


during SIMOPS






Exchanger



less.


1. Crawler Crane is located more than 60 meters

away


3. ERP Procedures




6. Crane Crawler will be shut down upon the

detection of Gas Release after operation is

secured.

4 1 MR

6 Ignition Source

on DLB

- Gas Release

(100mm hole on

Gas-Gas

Exchanger) with

20knots wind

speed toward

the DLB


HAZID WORKSHEET

S L R S L R


Safeguards


Measures)


Welding Machines on

DLB

Increase risk of


of HC release resulting:

- Personnel injury

- Asset damage


1. As per QRA





GO Process.


during SIMOPS






Exchanger



less.


1. During SIMOPS, Welding Machines are located

on DLB are 60m away from the platform.

2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead

to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding

machines on DLB.


4. ERP Procedures




7. Refer to Technical Note for Control of Welding

Machines Isolation

8. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of the

DLB.

4 1 MR

6 Ignition Source

on DLB

- Gas Release

(100mm hole on

Gas-Gas

Exchanger) with

20knots wind

speed toward

the DLB


HAZID WORKSHEET

S L R S L R


Safeguards


Measures)


Hot Works on DLB Increase risk of


of HC release resulting:

- Personnel Injury

- Asset Damage


1. As per QRA





GO Process.


during SIMOPS






Exchanger



less.


1. All Hot Works on DLB Deck will be covered by

PTW

2. Standby Persons to disconnect the welding lead

to Platform and shut down (turn off) the welding

machines on DLB.


4 ERP Procedures




7. Portable Gas Detector on STERN of DLB

4 1 MR

Fire as Ignition Source

and its Impact to the

Safety of the Platform

Complex

Increase Risk of Fire on

Platform (AGX) if there is

concurrent HC Release

2 2 LR 1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the

Platform (winch speed is approx 60m per

minute).

2. F&G System and Fire Fighting System on

the DLB

3. ERP

4. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of

the DLB.




1 1 LR

6 Ignition Source

on DLB

- Gas Release

(100mm hole on

Gas-Gas

Exchanger) with

20knots wind

speed toward

the DLB

7 Emergency (Fire)

on DLB


HAZID WORKSHEET

S L R S L R


Safeguards


Measures)


Helicopter Emergency

on DLB

Increase Risk of Fire on

Platform (AGX) if there is

concurrent HC Release

2 2 LR 1. DLB can be pulled / winched away from the

Platform (winch speed is approx 60m per

minute).

2. F&G System and Fire Fighting System on

the DLB

3. ERP

4. Portable Gas Detector on the STERN of

the DLB.




1 1 LR

Failure of Main

Generator / Black Out

on DLB

DLB cannot pull away in

case required

3 2 LR 1. Redundancy of Generators

2. Emergency Power Generator

3. Fail Safe Brake on the anchor winches

4. AHT / Tow Tug standby in the field at all

time

5. PM System on DLB

1 1

Increasing Flaring Rate

due to Blow Down Event

Increase Radiant Heat in the

vicinity of AGX Crane

NOTE: No Effect anticipated

to the DLB based on Flare

Radiation Study

2 2 LR 1. Radiant Heat Study for AGX shows that it

is safe for the Crane Operator to be inside the

Crane Cabin during Full Process Blow Down.

2. Proximity of DLB Crane Operator is farther

from the Flare Tip therefore impact of Radiant

Heat is minimal.

1 1 LR

ESD Event Causing

AGX Process Instability

Creates changes in Process

System Pressure,

Temperature, and Liquid

Inventory which could lead

to an increase potential for

HC release

2 2 LR 1. Process System is designed to fail safe

2. Process is continuosly monitored from

CCR

3. Process System will be maintained and

functional with no significant case to operate

in place during SIMOPS

4. Contingency Plan in place such that AGX

Project Team will be asked to leave AGX until

ESD event has been rectified

5. COntingency Plan in place such that HOFO

will communicate potential for escalation to

DLB such that preparation may made for DLB

withdrawl from AGX vicinity.

1 1 LR

7 Emergency (Fire)

on DLB

8 Process Upset

on AGX


HAZID WORKSHEET

S L R S L R


Safeguards


Measures)


Gas Release Anoa

Riser

Fire / Explosion

Personnel Injury

5 2 HR 1. Mitigation as per CTO Procedure

2. F&G System on AGX

3. ERP Procedures



5. DLB can be pulled / winched away to clear

from platform (winch speed approx 60m per

minute)

5 1 HR

9 Helicopter

Operation on

DLB

Interference with Crane

Operation

Helicopter collision with

Cranes / Crash


4 3 HR 1. Crane Operations on DLB will be shut

down and/or crane boom would be clear for

Helicopter Operations

2. Trained and experienced HLO

3. Inform Crane Operators of Incoming

Helicopters

4. ERP

3 1 LR

10 Vessel

Movement /

alongside on

DLB

Collision with the DLB /

Platform / Material

Barge / Anchor Buoy /

Anchor Wire

Asset damage


Schedule delay

4 3 HR 1. Suitable Vessels (Include MWS

inspection/approval)

2. Competent Vessel Captain

3. Slack Anchor Wires if required

4. Good communication between paties

involved

5. Weather limit

6. Adequate fendering on DLB and vessels

7. Briefing to all Vessel Captain prior to

entering 500m zone

8. High Vis painted Anchor Buoys

9. Comply with POI Marine Operation

Procedure

10. Establish communication with HOFO prior

to entering 500m Zone and/or Marine

Supertindent prior to approaching DLB

2 2 LR

11 SIMOPS

Operation

Between DLB

Crane and AGX

Crane

DLB Crane Boom

collision with the AGX

Crane

Damage asset

Personnel injury

Schedule delay

4 3 HR 1. All Cranes will be under the control of the

Project (CTR).

2. Designated Person In Charge for Every Lift

3. Good illumincation

4. Procedure control for Cranes Operations

(SIMOPS)

5. Detail planning meeting for Crane

Operations

3 1 LR

8 Process Upset

on AGX


HAZID WORKSHEET

S L R S L R


Safeguards


Measures)


12 Personnel

Transfer

Personnel being

Transferred Fall from

Height

Personnel injury / Lost of life 5 3 HR 1. Certified and good condition Crane

2. Certified and good condition FROG

3. Certified and good condition rigging

4. Provision of safety sling

5. No personnel transfer untill the Vessel will

be securely moored

6. Distance of free board between DLB and

vessel is small

7. Provision of tag lines

8. Familiarization for transfer using FROG

9. Maintain good communicaton among

parties involved (CO, Bunksman, and

Riggers).

10. Weather limit defined for personnel

transferring using FROG and Crawler Crane

2 1 LR

Pool Fire on ANOA

coming from ANOA 8"

Riser Pipeline


Impair both ANOA and AGX

Muster Area

5 1 HR 1. All personnel shall muster to DLB including

POI Personnel

2. Corrosion Monitoring and Pigging Pipeline

covered by FIMS

3. PSLL on the pipeline

4. Daily surface inspection

5. DLB will be pull / winched away

5 1 HR

Condensate on the sea

due SKIM pile overfilled

Personnel Injury / Lost of

Life

3 1 MR 1. Level Management

2. Daily surface inspection

3. DLB will be pull / winched away

1 1 LR

5 Verify the certification of the

storage tank and inspection

prior to mobilization offshore

Timas / PNS

6 Review the N2 handling and

storage procedure

Timas / PNS

N2 Spill Personnel Injury

Cryogenic

Embrittlement

3 3 MR 1. Engineered and certified ISO Storage

Tanks

2. Scaffold and bunded area

3. Use of planks and tarpaulin

3 2 MR

3

13 MAE on

AGX/ANOA

MR 1. Engineered and certified ISO Storage

Tanks

2. Scaffold and bunded area

3. Use of planks and tarpaulin

3 2 MR14 N2 Operation Extreme Temperature

(minus 160 - minus 200

C)

Personnel injury

Cryogenic

Embrittlement

3


HAZID WORKSHEET

S L R S L R


Safeguards


Measures)


15 3rd Party Vessel

/ Security

Collision with the

Anchor Buoy / Anchor

Wire

Personnel Injury

Asset Damage

Schedule Delay

3 2 MR 1. High Vis Anchor Buoy

2. Standy By Vessels

3. Radar Watch

4. Intensity of Marine Activities would deter

the 3rd Party Vessel to stay away

5. Liaison Officer onboard of DLB

3 1 LR

16 Sabotage Construction Crew

tempering with Platform

and DLB system

Increase risk of incident 3 2 MR 1. Socialization of work to the offshore

construction team in advance

2. PTW, JSA, and workpacks

3. Involve operation team during work pack

review and execution of the works

4. Maintain positive working environment,

provide motivation

5. Restriction to sensitve areas (security

measures) e.g. safety / warning signs,

socialize restricted areas during

meeting/awareness, Access Control

6. Maintain adequate supervision / QC

7. Reward program

3 1 LR 7 Operation to review the

existing "security measures"

and improve as required

POI

17 Communication

between DLB

and its Support

Vessels and

between DLB

and AGX/ANOA

Clear Communication

Method NOT

established

Increase risk of

miscommunication /

interference leading to

incident resulting to:

- Personnel injury

- Asset damage

3 2 MR 1. ANOA HSE Induction / Awareness

2. Various coordination meeting e.g. daily

planning meeting

3. Provision of radio communication

4. English speaking key personnel

5. Permission to be obtained from HOFO prior

to entering 500m zone

6. Permission to be obtained from Marine

Superintendent for approaching DLB or

entering the Anchor Pattern

7. Competent Vessel Captain

8. Briefing of all support vessels include

socialization of procedures

9. Complete GO and No GO Checklist.

3 1 LR 8 Establish radio

communication channel for

all parties to minimize

interference

Timas/POI


Documents

99975554 HAZID Worksheet FORM Rev 25 May 2012 Timas Premier Oil Indonesia