13562753-Hazid-Record (1)

Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas StorageFacility

Appendix B : HAZID Record

Issue: 3.0

Risktec Solutions Limited Page B1 of B21

APPENDIX B

HAZID RECORD

Document No: NPL-01-R-01Preliminary Design Major Accident Safety Report for King Street Gas Storage Facility

Appendix B: HAZID RecordIssue: 3.0


HAZID RECORD

RISK POTENTIALREFNo.

GUIDEWORD HAZARDDESCRIPTION

CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.

SAFEGUARDS/ MITIGATINGFEATURES

ACTIONS/COMMENTS

Node1: Initial Cavity Filling

Hazards additional to Nodes 2 and 5 included here for Initial Cavity Filling. All other hazard entries as Nodes 2 and 5.

Engineering safeguards and mitigations all as per “Preliminary Engineering Report”, 1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02 September 2007 unless otherwisespecified






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

1.1 Mechanical failure

- cavity

Loss of containment

- gas

Release of flammablegas, ignited orunignited

Low forsmallreleases,high forlargereleases

High forsmallreleases,low forlargereleases

- Solution mining/initial gas filling ofcavities to be carried out byspecialist contractors

- Thickness of pillar material betweenthe cavities controlled during cavitycreation to prevent cavity collapsedue to inadequate support.

- Cavity size/spacing based ongeological surveys and detailedcomputer modelling

- Will be undertaken as first livecommissioning of the well –undertaken under PrincipalContractor’s HSE andCommissioning regulations andprocedures.

- Pressure integrity checks of bothcavity and equipment/piping prior toinitial cavity filling.

- Cavities that fail the integrity checkare not used.

- Installation of Xmas trees(snubbing) by specialist contractors

- Free flow gas import used ifpossible, hence avoiding potentialleaks from gas processing plant

-

1.2 Corrosion

- internal

- external

No additional hazardsto Nodes 2/5identified.

- - - - -






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

1.3 Incorrect operation

- valve/ compressor/ pumpoperation

- maintenance

Snubbing operation As 1.1 High Low - Snubbing is carried out by aspecialist contractor, using astandard, well understood technique

Snubbing operation –fitting of surface Xmas treeand subsurface safety valveto a well, at the end of theinitial filling operation.

1.4 High/lowtemperature/pressure/flow

- mechanical integrity

Low pressure As 1.1 As 1.1 As 1.1 - Mechanical integrity checks includepressure testing of both cavity andequipment/piping prior to initialcavity filling.

- Cavities that fail pressure test arenot used

- Round the clock monitoring ofprocess parameters during initialcavity filling with gas withcontinuous adjustments as necessarybased on comparison with computermodelling.

-

High/low temperature/pressure/flow

As 1.1 As 1.1 As 1.1 - Round the clock monitoring ofprocess parameters during initialcavity filling with gas withcontinuous adjustments as necessarybased on comparison with computermodelling.

-

1.5 Knock on effects

- Effects of an event at one itemon the process area on anotheritem

- non-process fire or explosion(e.g. sub station fire,transformer explosion)


- - - - -






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

1.6 Misrouted gas Gas breakthrough Loss of containment As 1.1 As 1.1 - High integrity pressure switches tobe included in the design

- Vent provision for washing plant

- Controls for gas entrainment to beincluded in the FEED and DetailedDesign stages.

- As 2.1

-

1.7 Vehicle impact

- lorry/ tanker

- fork lift trucks

- private vehicles

- trains

- farm vehicles

- aircraft


- - - - -

1.8 Missiles

- compressed gases

- fast moving machinery

- explosive materials/processes


- - - - -

1.9 Cranes

- operational use

- maintenance use

- construction


- - - - -






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

1.10 Knock-on effects

- event at nearby facility

- event on nearby roads

- offsite pipeline release

- field fire in area


- - - - -

1.11 Dropped items

- SSV or Xmas tree droppedduring snubbing operation

Loss of containmentdue to dropped loadonto live plant

- gas

As Node 1.1 As Node1.1

As Node1.1

- Lifting procedures/ controls to bedeveloped by operator/owner

- As Node 1.1

-

Loss of containmentdue to dropped loadonto wellhead

1.12 Natural hazards

- flooding

- wind

- earthquakes

- lightning

- cold weather

As Node 2 As Node 2 As Node2

As Node2

As Node 2 As Node 2

1.13 Loss of services

- power

- other


As Node2

As Node 2 As Node 2

1.14 Security

- vandalism


As Node2

As Node 2 As Node 2






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

1.15 Salt solution

- return piping to washing plant

- salt solution tanks

- washing plant

Loss of containment –salt solution returnedduring solution miningand initial gas fillingoperations

Environmental effects

- plant damage

- contamination ofaquifers

Medium/high forlargeenviron-mentalreleases.

Low forsmallreleases

As 1.1 - Short term storage only of re turnedsalt solution

- Bunding around brine storage tanksfor 110% capacity of the largestbrine storage tank. Bunds will be ofwaterproof construction compliantwith BS 5328.

- Isolation of salt solution supply totanks on high level detection intanks

- Majori ty of piping is buried

- EIA taken into account in the design

- Facilities will meet PPC regulations

- Facilities to be designed,constructed and commissioned inaccordance with best practice andnational/international standards (see1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02)

- The design will be reviewed andadditional studies undertaken as partof the FEED and Detailed Designstages including Fire and ExplosionAssessment

- Design will be subject toOperational review

- Maintenance, asset integrity andmonitoring controls to be developedby site operator/owner

Action 1

Confirm what are thevolumes of the salt waterstorage tanks.

Action on : Bob Pearson

COMPLETE

Action 2

Confirm the bundingarrangements for the saltwater storage tanks.


COMPLETE

Action 3

Confirm the liquidtightness of the bund floorof the salt solution tanks.


COMPLETE






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

Node2: Free Flow Import

Engineering safeguards and mitigations all as per “Preliminary Engineering Report”, 1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02 September 2007 unless otherwise specified


- catastrophic vessel orpipework failure

- leakage from (e.g.) valves,flanges, vessels, connections,pipewelds

Loss of containment

- gas

Unignited release offlammable gas



- Facilities to be designed,constructed and commissioned inaccordance with best practice andnational/international standards (see1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 0)

- The design will be reviewed andadditional studies undertaken as partof the FEED and Detailed Designstages including Fire and ExplosionAssessment

- Design will be subject toOperational review


- Free flow gas import used ifpossible, hence avoiding potentialleaks from gas processing plant

- F&G detection system

- ESDV on gas import/export line

- Blowdown system

Action 4

Confirm whether or not,during emergency venting,the process inventory onlyor whether well inventoriesas well are vented.

Action on : AMEC

Response:

The vent stack/sterile areadesign will be developedduring the FEED/DetailedDesign phases of theproject but will based onthe following:

- The automated ESD willvent the above ground GasProcessing facility only.Consideration will begiven to manual initiationof venting of the wellunderground pipework inextreme circumstances (tobe fully documented in theMajor Accident Plan).

Complete






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

2.1(cont’d)

Ignited release Low forsmallreleases,high forlargereleases


- As unignited release above

- PFP

- Active fire protection

- Hazardous area classification;equipment selected in accordancewith “Equipment and ProtectiveSystems Intended for Use inPotentially Explosive AtmospheresRegulations 1996”

- Adequate separation betweenflammable hydrocarbons andignition sources, emergencyservices, main safety equipment andescape routes.

- Layout principles to minimisedistance between Control Room,Sub-stations, main safety equipmentand escape routes.

- Wellheads at least 300m from anyoff -site inhabited buildings.

- Buildings to be adequatelydesigned/constructed so as to fulfiltheir function under normal andemergency conditions

- Gas ingress protection of buildingsto be reviewed during FEED andDetailed Design stages.

- Primary gas processing plant locateda minimum of 250m from the siteboundary fence

-






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

2.1(cont’d)



- Adequate communicationsprovision for use in both normaland emergency conditions

- Adequate fire fighting access to allareas, via alternative routes.

- Sufficient means of escape to allowsafe evacuation from all areas todesignated muster point underemergency conditions

- Orientation of gas plant takes intoaccount prevailing wind direction inrelation to safe areas, ignitionsources, inhabited property andpublic roads/railway outside theboundary fence

- Fire and explosion breaks includedin the design; both within sub-divisions of the process area and thesite boundary; size depending on thelevel of risk.

- Design incorporates results ofliaison with emergency services andemergency planning authorities.

- Emergency Responseprocedures/controls to be developedby operator/owner

-






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

2.2 Corrosion

- internal

- external

As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - As 2.1

- The design wi ll be reviewed andadditional studies undertaken as partof the FEED and Detailed Designstages consideration of cathodicprotection for buried pipework

- All equipment/pipework designedfor 25 year plant life

- Mild steel pipework

- Corrosion allowances included inthe design

- Imported gas is clean and dry


-


- flow control – high importflow rate

As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Operational controls to be reviewedduring the FEED and Detaileddesign phases

- Considered to have little potentialfor leading to loss of containment

-

2.4 High/low temperature/pressure

- process fluids

Cavityoverpressurisation

As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 -Pressure indication on import line

-Methanol injection to preventhydrate formation

- Operational controls to be reviewedduring the FEED and DetailedDesign phases

-As 2.1

-






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

Hydrate formationleading toblockage/partialblockage

- Incoming gas is dry

-Methanol injection to preventhydrate format

-


- process fire or explosion

- non-process fire or explosion(e.g. sub station fire ,transformer explosion)

Loss of containment As 2.1 High Low - Pipelines mainly underground

- As 2.1

- Operational controls to be developedby site operator/owner

-

2.6 Misrouted gas Not considered to be asignificant hazard.Only possiblemisrouting identifiedwas through the gasprocessing plant –operational issue.

- - - - -






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

2.7 Vehicle impact

- lorry/ tanker

- fork lift trucks

- private vehicles

- farm vehicles

- aircraft

- construction vehicles

As 2.1 As 2.1 Low forsmallreleases,high forlargereleases

* - Pipework mainly underground

- Fencing round site, along roads,wellheads, gas processing plant andother critical areas

- At specific points e.g. bends, next tokey equipment, provision of Armcobarriers

- Individual access cul -de-sacs forwells; each road has at least 1 90deg bend

- Reviews of safeguards/ mitigationsfor vehicle impacts to be included inFEED/Detailed Design stages.

- Access controls to site, wellheadsand other critical areas to bedeveloped by owner/operator

- Construction controls for vehicles inforce during construction

- Gas plant construction will becomplete prior to import of gas.

* Varies with vehicle, asfollows:

- lorry/ tanker - low

- fork lift trucks - medium

- private vehicles - low

- farm vehicles - high

- aircraft - low/very low

- construction vehicles –low

Farm vehicles will haveaccess to fields around thewellheads during siteoperation.

2.8 Missiles

- compressed gases



No hazards identified - - - - -






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

2.9 Cranes

- operational use

- maintenance use

- construction

Loss of containmentdue to dropped load onlive plant

Loss of containmentdue to dropped load onwellhead

As 2.1 Low forsmallreleases,high forlargereleases

High - Dropped Object Assessment to becarried out during FEED stage ofdesign

- Operational controls formaintenance, crane and all liftingoperations to be developed by siteoperator/ owner

- No operational requirement for useof cranes

- Construction controls in forceduring construction

- As 2.1

-



- event on nearby roads, tankeraccident leading to spillage/fire


- field fire in area - vandalism

As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Review of notification proceduresfor events at other local facilities,pipelines and roads to be included inFEED and Detailed Design phases

- Provision of firebreaks with respectto farming activities to be reviewedin FEED stage of design

- Pipelines in the area are buried

- Holford Brinefield not considered tobe a hazard because of distance fromsite

- Morrisons depot is not a processingfacility

- Vent design includes provision ofsterile area; vent stack and sterilearea will comply with API-521,pressure Relieving and DepressuringSystems

- As 2.1 and 2.14

Local facilities identified:

- Ineos Gas Storage site

- Holford Brinefield

- Morrisons depot






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

2.11 Dropped items

- onto plant

- onto wellhead

- other

As 2.9 As 2.9 As 2.9 As 2.9 As 2.9 -


- flooding

- wind

- earthquakes

- lightning

- cold weather

As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Distances between the wells and theKing Street geological fault takeninto account in the layout of thewells and plant

- Earthquake potential to be reviewedas part of the FEED and Detaileddesign

- Results of the climatic data report tobe considered in the FEED andDetailed design e.g provision ofweather cladding for buildings

- Provision of lightning conductorsand earthing to be included in theFEED design

- Site location is above local canaland river levels

- Electrical surface heating forpipelines and related equipmentrequiring frost and maintainedtemperature protection

- As 2.1

Flooding of wellhead pitsdue to high groundwaterlevels/ heavy rainconsidered to be anoperational issue.


- power

- other

As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - UPS provision for critical systemsand will allow safe and orderly shutdown in the event of an emergency

- plant is designed to fail safe

-






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

2.14 Security

- vandalism

As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Site security provision to be furtherconsidered in the FEED stage of thedesign

- 24 hour site manning

- CCTV provision

- Fencing around site, wellheads, gasprocessing plant and other criticalareas

- Security and access controlprocedures to be developed byoperator/owner

-

- Shooting As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Consultation by site operator/ ownerwith local farmers/other gun ownersabout shooting activities

-






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

Node3: Assisted Import


No additional hazards identified to Nodes 2 and 5.



CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

Node

4: Free Flow Export


No additional hazards identified to Nodes 2 and 5.






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

Node5: Assisted Export

Engineering safeguards and mitigations all as per “Preliminary Engineering Report”, 1670-010-000-RPT-001 Rev 02 September 2007 unless otherwisespecified.

Additional hazards to Node 2 recorded here. Other entries as Node 2.


- catastrophic vessel orpipework failure

- leakage from (e.g.) valves,flanges, vessels, connections,pipewelds

As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Compressors located in separatebuildings and have separate MCCs

- Cavity design/developmentmethodology prevents marlentrainment

- Dehydration facility in the gasprocessing plant

- As 2.1

-

5.2 Corrosion

- internal

- external

Corrosion/ erosion as aresult of:

- Drop out products

- Wet gas

- Hydrate particles

As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Drop out products and wet gasupstream of gas processing facilityonly

- Methanol injection to preventhydrate formation

- As 2.1

-


- flow control – high importflow rate

No additional hazardsidentified

- - - - -






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

5.4 High/low temperature/pressure

- process fluids

- hydrate particles

Loss of containmentdue to compressordamage from hydrateparticles

As 2.1 Low risk - Design intent is for operationoutside the hydrate band

- Compressor design as per API 617,“Axial and Centrifugal Compressorsand Expander-Compressors forPetroleum, Chemical and GasIndustry Services”

- System designed for maximum NTSrange of temperatures and pressures

- DCS for process control

- Maximum design pressure of thecompressors ~85 bar

- Effects of over -pressured gasexpected to have minimal effects onthe large NTS inventory

- As 2.1

-


- Incident at one compressoraffects the 2nd compressor

As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Compressors housed in separatebuildings including separate MCCs

- Protection of the compressorbuildings to be considered at theFEED and Detailed Design stages

- As 2.1

-

5.6 Misrouted gas

- gas processing facilitiesbypassed

- - - - - Assisted export used when cavitygas pressure < required exportpressure. Hence, gas processingfacility is the only route for gasexport

Bypass of gas processingfacilities not considered tobe a credible hazard






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS

5.7 Vehicle impact

- methanol tanker

- As 2.1

Loss of containment -methanol

As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Bunding around methanol tanks for110% of the larger methanol tankbut takes into consideration the lostvolume in the base of any othertanks or equipment

- Spill containment around hoses

- Design of methanol storage area tobe further considered at the FEEDand Detailed Design stages

- Operational controls for tankerdeliveries to be developed by siteoperator/ owner

- As 2.1

40 te methanol tankers tomake daily deliveries.

Tanker inventory – 25 temethanol

5.8 Missiles

- compressed gases



As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 As 2.1 - Operational controls regarding gascylinders and use of equipment to tobe developed by site operator/owner

- Explosives not expected to be usedon site

- As 2.1

-

5.9 Cranes

- operational use

- maintenance use

- construction

As 2.1 and 2.9 As 2.1 and 2.9 As 2.1and 2.9

As 2.1and 2.9

- Current design intent is for skid-mounted compressors

- Lifts over live plant to be furtherconsidered at the FEED andDetailed Design stages

- As 2.1 and 2.9

-






CONSEQUENCES

CONS. FREQ.


ACTIONS/COMMENTS



- event on nearby roads, tankeraccident leading to spillage/fire


- field fire in area - vandalism


- - - - -

5.11 Dropped items

- onto plant

- onto wellhead

- other


- - - - -


- flooding

- wind

- earthquakes

- lightning

- cold weather


- - - - -


- power

- other


- - - - -

5.14 Security

- vandalism


- - - - -

Documents

13562753-Hazid-Record (1)