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Vulnerability of Complex Networks Prepared for: ACS Contact: Stuart S. Wagner [email protected] September 20, 2012 “Only the Paranoid Survive” – Andy Grove

1 Vulnerability of Complex Networks Prepared for: ACS Contact: Stuart S. Wagner [email protected] September 20, 2012 “Only the Paranoid Survive” –

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Page 1: 1 Vulnerability of Complex Networks Prepared for: ACS Contact: Stuart S. Wagner swagner@appcomsci.com September 20, 2012 “Only the Paranoid Survive” –

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Vulnerability of Complex Networks

Prepared for: ACS Contact:

Stuart S. [email protected]

September 20, 2012

“Only the Paranoid Survive” – Andy Grove

Page 2: 1 Vulnerability of Complex Networks Prepared for: ACS Contact: Stuart S. Wagner swagner@appcomsci.com September 20, 2012 “Only the Paranoid Survive” –

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Problem Statement

• Inadvertent misconfiguration responsible for huge percentage of IP network downtime and vulnerabilities

− Think what intentional, malicious misconfiguration could do

• Fundamentally more powerful botnets are on the horizon

• Black Hat Conference regularly features the latest hacks of routers, cellular networks, middleboxes, control planes,…

• Network standards organizations and protocol developers don’t usually address the most pernicious attack vectors

• Offense is generally easier and cheaper than defense, and is getting more so as networks become more complex

• You can’t afford infinite resilience against all possible vulnerabilities and threats

Page 3: 1 Vulnerability of Complex Networks Prepared for: ACS Contact: Stuart S. Wagner swagner@appcomsci.com September 20, 2012 “Only the Paranoid Survive” –

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Challenges for Network Resilience

• Getting the most bang for the buck in the face of unanticipated vulnerabilities and unforeseen attacks

− How do you even know when you have made a good investment?

− What metric do you utilize to quantify the gain in trustworthiness and reliability for a given investment?

• Providing different levels of resilience for different users, organizations, and missions

− When does the cost of failure out-weigh the cost of resilience?

− How do assign a probability, or a cost, to an unforeseen failure or attack mode?

• How can we design networks to make them fundamentally less vulnerable to attack? Is this even possible?