Geneva II: Dealing with the Devil

SMEP No. 6/3 29 October 2014

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Singapore!Middle!East!Papers!!!

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!!!!!!!!!Geneva!II:!Dealing!with!the!Devil!!!by!Manon4Nour!Tannous!!

The demonisation of the other, which then becomes the staunch enemy, undermines the basis for

a solution to the Syrian crisis, when viewed through the lens of negotiations. From the outset, no

sooner had the terms, and consequently the date for the Geneva II Conference been set, than each

side tried to strengthen its position, either to consolidate a precarious statute before negotiating,

or to ensure the means of bringing about its failure.

These tactical considerations question the adequacy of the Geneva II negotiations. The

nomenclature of Geneva II takes us back to the chain of negotiations, where the first stage

(Geneva I) determined the accord that was agreed upon by the Action Group for Syria,1 on 30

June 2012. Summoned by Kofi Annan, special envoy from the United Nations and the Arab

League, to deal with the crisis in Syria, the Action Group for Syria agreed upon the fundamental 1!The!Action!Group!for!Syria,!chaired!by!Kofi!Annan,!consists!of!the!U.N.,!League!of!Arab!States,!European!Union,!United!States,!China,!France,!Russia,!United!Kingdom,!Turkey,!Iraq!(Chair!of!the!Summit!of!the!League!of!Arab!States),!Kuwait,!and!Qatar.!


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principles for a political transition in the absence of the regime and the opposition. This was

defined as the ‘launch of a Syrian-led political process leading to a transition that meets the

legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and enables them independently and democratically to

determine their own future.’2 The objective was to set up a six-point peace plan,3 and to carry out

the 2042 and 2043 resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, which authorized the

deployment of observers within the country and who are entrusted to oversee the cease fire and

adherence to the peace plan. By its very title, the Geneva II conference can logically be assumed

to uphold these previously-defined fundamental principles. Yet, the consequent difficulties of the

negotiations in reaching an agreement in accordance with the 30 June accord emphasised the

different ways in which it was interpreted. For one, Russian diplomacy welcomed the fact that

the Geneva I accord included both sides in the transition process. For the Americans and the

Syrian opposition, however, the Geneva I text did allow for the possibility of a post-Assad

government, an interpretation discreetly validated by Kofi Annan after his resignation, when he

affirmed that the transition implied the departure of the Syrian president at an undefined point of

time.

In addition to this, between June 2012 and January 2014, the Syrian crisis had become

increasingly complex. Observers' tasks were interrupted due to the escalation of violence on the

ground, therefore making the completion of the mission impossible. Kofi Annan quit as mediator

in August 2012, denouncing divisions amongst the Security Council as well as the militarisation

of the conflict. The chemical attack of the summer of 2013 led to the adoption of the 2118

resolution, which therefore allowed the regime to avoid a military retaliation by some Western

countries. That resolution nevertheless emphasized that the Security Council ‘Endorses fully the

Geneva Communiqué of 30 June 2012, which sets out a number of key steps beginning with the

establishment of a transitional governing body exercising full executive powers, which could

include members of the present Government and the opposition and other groups and shall be

formed on the basis of mutual consent.’ The mechanisms envisaged by Geneva I were thus

reaffirmed but had lost all relevance with the situation on the ground where ‘yesterday's

2!Action!Group!for!Syria,!Final!Communiqué,!June!30,!2012!:!http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf!3!Annan's!sixTpoint!plan!calls!for:!cessation!of!armed!violence,!political!dialogue,!humanitarian!assistance,!release!of!arbitrarily!detained!persons,!freedom!of!movement!throughout!the!country!for!journalists,!respect!freedom!of!association!and!the!right!to!demonstrate!peacefully.!!


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ambitions seemed to be outgunned by new urgencies.’4

The time that had passed between Geneva I and Geneva II was not without significance.

Documentation on negotiations states that the consideration of dialogue and compromise must

only intervene when victory seems to be unattainable for either party, in other words, when the

conflict is ripe. That is defined as ‘a stable impasse’5 or ‘a mutually hurting stalemate.’6 In

comparison, the Bosnia-Herzegovina case preceding the Dayton agreement of 1995 pointed to the

necessity of seizing that brief moment when each side perceived dialogue to be the only option.7

Richard Holbrooke, one of the American Dayton accord negotiators, states in his memoirs that on

the 18th day of negotiations, an agreement was inevitable because it was the only option left:

‘there was a sense then, that peace was probably inevitable because of the dangers of failure.’8

In January 2014, while the Syrian opposition tried to compensate for an unrealized military

victory, the Assad regime–sufficiently weakened as to be compelled to attend Geneva–was still

strong enough not to yield to anything at all. Moreover, the process of demonising the other had

accelerated during this interval; each side had set out to paint the other as an incompatible partner

for negotiations. Where diplomacy exists to allow discussions with the enemy, it is not inclined

to pursue negotiations with sworn enemies. In this context, Geneva II was not ‘the antonym of

war but its full materialization.’9

Difficulties in bringing about Geneva: defeating the idea of negotiations

Each party saw in the other its own demons. Representations of the other marshaled by the

Syrian regime and by the opposition set up a rampart that prepared the ground for a refusal to

negotiate. In order to include this new protagonist in a framework excluding any opposition, the

regime demonized it. The opponent, therefore, could be portrayed as having the attributes of a

monster, an evil incarnate presenting a fair appearance while hiding a revolting character. That

4!Alexis! Varende,! ‘Genève! II,! envers! et! contre! tout,’! Orient! XXI,! January! 21,! 2014,! accessed! May! 16,! 2014,!http://orientxxi.info/magazine/geneveTiiTenversTetTcontreTtout,0495.!5 !Charles! Tenenbaum,! ‘Négociations! et! médiations! dans! la! résolution! des! conflits’,! in! Négociations!internationals,!ed!Franck!Petiteville!and!Delphine!PlacidiTFrot,!(Paris:!Presses!de!Sciences!Po,!2013),!272.!6!Guy!Olivier!Faure!and!William!Zartman!‘Négocier!avec!les!terroristes?’,!Négociations,!No.!16,!135T156,!142.!7!This!peace!conference!was!led!by!the!United!States:!Warren!Christopher,!U.S.!Secretary!of!State,!and!Richard!Holbrooke,!American!negotiator.!!8!Richard!Holbrooke,!To!End!a!War,!(New!York:!Random!House,!1998),!288.!9!Franck!Petiteville!and!Delphine!PlacidiTFrot,!Négociations!Internationales,!(Paris:!Presses!de!Sciences!Po,!2013),!13.!


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argument was magnified by the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Walid Al-Mouallem, at the

opening of the Geneva II negotiations on 22 January 2014, who stated that ‘in the name of a so-

called 'glorious Syrian revolution', civilians, comprising the elderly, women and children are

being massacred’ before denouncing them as ‘monsters disguised as human beings who claim

they are fighting for freedom...’ Thus he refuses to consider them as human beings, a fortiori as

opponents.

Indeed, portraying the enemy as sub-human was part and parcel of the demonization

strategy. This made its appearance in the initial speeches given by Bashar Al-Assad, who

depicted his opponents as being germs against which the country had to be immunised (June

2011) or as puppets of the West (January 2013). His Foreign Affairs minister reinforced the beast

metaphor on 22 January 2014: ‘in Syria, […] women are raped before and after being killed,

according to a hideous and obscene ritual which the exponents of such an ideology alone can

inspire. In Syria the Syrian heart is being devoured.’ These representations were taken up by

regime partisans on social media via comments on pictures of enemy corpses, demanding that the

latter not be buried on Syrian soil so as not to pollute it. This is reminiscent of a lexicon

established in the 1980’s, which treated political prisoners as insects behind closed doors

(hasharât).10 The general effect of such qualifying terminology could then easily allow for the

mentioning of 'cleansing', a vocabulary which left little space for negotiations or the

reinstatement of opponents. The enemy had become absolute, and its defeat imperative.

As for the opposition, similar attempts to demonize the regime were not adopted, instead

they choose to focus their energies on its anachronism and absence of legitimacy. Hafez Al-

Assad’s unrelenting grip on power since 1970, followed by that of his son, was enough to

conclude that they could not be depended on for Syria’s future. This devil was embodied in a

number of ways–through outmoded political concepts, archaic methodology, antiquated state

mechanisms and obsolete alliances. To quote Pierre Grosser, ‘the devil resides in the remnants of

the 20th century,’ the century of world wars, genocide and the advent of repressive regimes.11 In

fact, once in power due to post-independence instability, the regime owed its longevity largely to

coercion, especially since the beginning of the 1980’s.12 In 2000, the handing down of power by

10!See!Aram!Karabet!(who!spent!13!years!in!jail),!Treize!ans!dans!les!prisons!syriennes.!Voyage!vers!l’inconnu,!(Paris:!Actes!Sud,!2013),!208.!His!prison!guards!said:!‘you!can!swat!it!like!a!coackroach.’!11!Pierre!Grosser,!Traiter!avec!le!diable?:!Les!vrais!enjeux!de!la!démocratie!au!XXIe!siècle,!(Paris:!Odile!Jacob,!2013),!213.!!12!Elisabeth!Picard,!‘Armée!et!sécurité!au!cœur!de!l’autoritarisme’!in!Autoritarismes!démocratiques!et!


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Hafez Al-Assad to his son without popular consent perpetuated his repressive dictate, continuing

to proscribe all freedom of speech or association (excepting the timid parenthesis on forum

discussions in 2000) and even allowing the growth of corruption for the benefit of its inner circles

to take place. ‘Absolute repressive power and a personality cult of the President remained the

distinctive characteristics of a regime’13 which tolerated no political criticism.

These characteristics were reinforced in March 2011 during the first peaceful

demonstrations, which the regime crushed with state-sponsored violence. Then the opposition

was convinced that it was inconceivable to negotiate with those who ‘had blood on their hands.’14

From the outset, this notion was taken up by the West. Hillary Clinton's immediate reaction at

Geneva I confirmed this: ‘What we have done here is to strip away the fiction that he and those

with blood on their hands can stay in power.’ The issue of the regime's legitimacy was further

attacked by evoking speeches on various rights the regime had violated: international rights,15

humanitarian rights16 and human rights,17 for which those responsible had to be judged. Thus, the

regime was not to be entitled to enter nor benefit from negotiations. So, when the Syrian

opposition accepted to participate in the Geneva II conference, Ahmad Jarba announced that his

sole objective was ‘to remove absolute power from the butcher.’18

It was with great aversion that both parties envisaged entering into negotiations. However,

while the refusal to negotiate prevailed in each camp, they stemmed from different reasons.

To the regime, negotiating would appear from the outset to be a sign of weakness. The

regime's rhetoric, which depicted itself as the 'saviour (munqidh) of Lebanon'–since its military

intervention of 1976,–or the one that held out against Israel, would admit neither failure nor

démocraties!autoritaires:!Convergences!NordNSud,!ed.!Olivier!Dabène,!et!al!(Paris:!La!Découverte,!2008),!303T329,!318.!!13!Henry!Laurens,!L’Orient!à!l’heure!américaine,!(Paris:!Armand!Colin,!2005),!66.!14!This!demonisation!is!also!aimed!at!the!regime’s!supporters:!Hezbollah!and!Iran.!15!See!Media!Note! of! the! Syrian!Coalition,!December!26,! 2013,! on! the!Assad! regime’s! policy! of! starving! the!Syrian!people!into!submission!in!areas!under!siege,!particularly!in!Moadamiya:!‘The!use!of!food!as!a!tool!of!war!is!not!only!abhorrent,!but!is!also!a!violation!of!international!law’.!16!Press! Statement! of! Khalid! Saleh! (Syrian! Coalition! Media! Office! President),! February! 28,! 2014:! ‘Assad’s!policy! of! ‘starvation! until! submission’! continues! to! enfeeble! civilians! in! Syria,! in! stark! contravention! of!international! humanitarian! law! and! United! Nations! Security! Council! Resolution!2139,! which! demands! the!immediate!lifting!of!sieges!of!populated!areas!and!the!access!of!humanitarian!assistance’.!17!Press!Release,!Syrian!Coalition,!February!14,!2014:!‘The!Syrian!Coalition!condemns!the!Assad!regime’s!largeTscale,!systematic!abuses!and!violations!of!human!rights!laws,!including!the!use!of!internationally!prohibited!weaponry,!the!intense!shelling!of!innocent!civilians,!and!the!use!of!starvation!as!a!weapon!of!war.!Such!practices!amount!to!war!crimes!and!are!in!breach!of!the!Geneva!Convention!and!its!Additional!Protocol!II’.!18!Ahmad!Jarba,!Istanbul,!January!18,!2014.!


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concessions.19 Any compromise, if it did not appear to be a deliberate choice, would risk being

seen as compromising. Additionally, negotiating would appear to be an acknowledgement of a

legitimate contestation. The broadcasting on the Syrian media showing photos and videos of

enemy corpses, demonstrated that for Syrian propaganda the goal was to only show the weakness

of the regimes enemy, hence a dead enemy. This categorical refusal to negotiate brings to mind

the now-famous words uttered by the American vice-president Dick Cheney, after the September

11th attacks in 2001: ‘we do not negotiate with evil, we defeat it.’20 Furthermore, negotiating

would be seen as rewarding the other's tenacity and acknowledging that it was still there, three

years after the first demonstrations.

As for the opposition's coalition, it was convinced that the regime's word was worthless.

Each declaration made by the regime was viewed with suspicion. It is what Pierre Grosser terms

as ‘reactive devaluation’:21 a proposition made by a regime which lies to its people and to the

international community could not, from the outset, be a proposition made in good faith, the

latest proof being its denial of the possession of chemical weapons before consequently

acquiescing to the principle of their dismantling. In comparison, since the Munich accord in

September 1938, between Hitler's Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy, dialogue with

tyrants was deemed to be a major mistake. Negotiating with an ‘irremediably hostile’ party

would be both immoral and useless. 22 This was the reason why the National Syrian Coalition

statute proscribed, in principle, all contact with members of the Syrian regime.

Paradoxically, by the end of 2013, the option of negotiating was seriously considered. The

shear number of initiatives proofs that the different parties emphasized the importance of the

negotiations. One of the reasons is that each side depended on its foreign supporters, who pushed

for these negotiations. The dynamics during the month of January could be interpreted as a

willingness to stack up points prior to negotiations. For example, the regime pursued twin

objectives in January 2014: firstly to represent itself as the winner on the ground, and secondly to

dissuade the opposition from occupying its reserved seat in Geneva, thus enabling it to claim that

a legitimate political option had been refused. The escalation of violence on the ground, the

stranglehold on besieged cities and the intensification of bombardment in Aleppo and in

19!Lisa!Wedeen,!Ambiguities!of!domination:!politics,!rhetoric,!and!symbols!in!contemporary!Syria,!(Chicago,!University!of!Chicago!Press,!1999),!35.!20!Grosser,!Traiter!avec!le!diable!?,!212.!!21!Ibid.,!215.!22!Ibid.,!212.!


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suburban Damascus, amongst others, was specially geared towards fulfilling this aim. The

promulgation on January 2014 of a presidential decree, authorising the return to the armed forces

for retired, exempted and resigned military personnel, was aimed at reinforcing the army on the

ground. Political histrionics also played a part closer to negotiations, in an attempt to shift the

balance of power by conjuring up images of surrendering, repentant fighters wishing to right their

situation. Finally, on the political front, the interview given by Bashar Al-Assad to the AFP on

January 19, 2014 included a symbolic prophecy: the Syrian president announced that there were

‘strong chances’ that he would offer his candidature for the presidential elections of June 2014, a

declaration matched by the puzzling precondition, stating ‘If there is public desire and a public

opinion in favour of [it].’23

Several internal and international events equally allowed the opposition to consolidate its

position. On January 20, 2014, a report drawn up by three former international prosecutors

accused the Syrian regime of systematically resorting to torture and murder in its prisons, based

on 55,000 photographs of at least 11,000 Syrian victims. The publication of the information and

photos was–to use Raymond Aron's words–a means for the opposition ‘to forbid totalitarian

regimes from conversing with its own people.’24 On the ground, the fighting between jihadists of

the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the rebels of the Free Syrian Army (FSA)

acquired a new momentum in the beginning of January. The war between the two parties allowed

the opposition to clarify its position and to attend the Geneva Conference with a better vantage

point for negotiations on the great cost of many human lives. In taking credit for the fight against

jihadism, the FSA could reduce the regime’s bargaining power at the negotiating table.

Facing the devil

Despite all this unwillingness, the Geneva II conference did in fact occur, as a Syro-Syrian face-

to-face between the regime and the opposition. However, three imbalances undermined its

unfolding:

The first imbalance pitted a regime well versed in negotiating–even in scheming–with a

feebly institutionalised coalition, one that was still a novice in this domain. The latter experienced

difficulties in bringing about a unified concept, whereas the Syrian regime appeared as a block 23!Bashar!AlTAssad,!interview!with!news!agency!AFP,!January!20,!2014.!24!Raymond!Aron,!Paix!et!guerre!entre!les!Nations,!(Paris:!CalmannTLévy,!1984),!171.!!


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within whose core all dissonance was forbidden. The delegates that were chosen as

representatives were supposed to show willingness of the parties to implement decisions agreed

upon in the course of negotiations but failed to do so.

For one, the delegation of the Syrian regime was led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs

Walid Al-Mouallem. 25 We can conclude from this example that the opposition delegates

interpreted this to mean that the regime’s reaction to the crisis engendered by the 2011

demonstrations would be similar to its reaction to Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights. The

approach for officialdom thus remains one of conflict against terrorists propped up by foreign

powers. In such a light, discussions are to be interstate. The choice of the other members of the

delegation confirms this. Bashar Al-Jaafari, a career diplomat who was number two at the Syrian

embassy in Paris towards the end of the 1990's before being supplanted following a conflict with

the ambassador, Elias Najmeh, was described as being a 'Ba'ath apparatchik.'26 Moreover, he was

known for the role he played in the Surveillance Group for the truce in South Lebanon, as

director of the Department of International Organisations from 2002 to 2004, as well as being

promoted in 2006 to represent Syria at the United Nations. The Syrian regime delegation also

included other members in charge of communication and public relations: Omran Al-Zoubi, the

Information Minister, who declared on December 4, 2013 that ‘whoever thinks we'll attend

Geneva II in order to deliver the keys to Damascus had better not attend’ as well as Bouthayna

Chaaban, the political and media advisor to Bashar Al-Assad. Finally, members known to

cooperate with the Syrian information service such as Hisham Al-Qadi were also present. This

bias indicated the lack of genuine participation in the regime's negotiations and in its

implementations of the decisions which might be taken.27

The opposition's delegation, heterogeneous by definition, suffered the effects of the enemy's

attempts to demonise its members. With Geneva II discussions in sight, it ended up as a series of

internal deals which brought about a narrowing in its representation. In fact, in order not to 25!A!Sunni!and!seasoned!diplomat!who!was!born!into!the!Damascene!bourgeoisie!and!was!promoted!to!this!post!in!2006!by!Bashar!AlTAssad.!Former!ambassador!to!Washington,!he!is!known!in!diplomatic!circles!for!his!participation!in!informal!decisions!regarding!a!SyroTAmerican!rapprochement!in!2002!and!2003,!and!more!importantly,!for!his!role!as!chief!negotiator!during!talks!with!Israel!in!the!nineties,!where!he!emphasized!the!speech!that!Syria!had!made!since!1994!in!favour!of!the!strategic!choice!of!peace.!Walid!AlTMoallem,!‘Quatre!années!de!négociation!entre!la!Syrie!et!Israël,’!Revue!d’Etudes!Palestiniennes,!10:62,!(1997),!16T26.!26!Elias!Najmeh!is!described!as!a!loyal!bureaucrat,!belonging!to!the!Ba’ath!party!which!is!the!ruling!party!in!Syria!(French!diplomatic!cable).!27!Ignace!Leverrier,!‘Syrie.!La!composition!de!la!délégation!du!régime!à!Genève!2!plus!riche!d’enseignements!que!d’espoirs,’!Le!Monde,!January!15,!2014,!accessed!May!16,!2014,!http://syrie.blog.lemonde.fr.!


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appear to have surrendered by entering negotiations, some of the factions within the opposition

such as the National Syrian Council, the representatives of local committees and the Free Army,

sought the guaranteed departure of Bashar Al-Assad from the international community as a

prerequisite for their participation. This guarantee was, however, not given. The position of the

National Coalition for Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces28 was different. From July 2013

onward, the coalition had been led by Ahmad Jarba, who was born in Qamichli and who was a

representative of the tribal confederation of Chammar.29 The re-elected president believed that

Geneva II could constitute a platform for the opposition, which had until then benefitted little

from effective support from its allies; he was also the leader of the Geneva II delegation.

The second imbalance concerns foreign fighters: whereas Shiite militias seemed to boost the

regime, jihadist groups appeared to be a burden for the opposition. This asymmetry is the result

of two analytical errors. First of all, it leads us to underestimate the role played by foreign

combatants (Iraqi militias, such as the Badr organisation, or groups such as Hezbollah or the

Iranian Al-Qods) in the regime's counteroffensives which have allowed the reclaiming of Aleppo

airport and the capture of Qousseir. Furthermore, access to Syrian territory was facilitated by the

regime's complicity, and these fighters could rejoin their respective native countries before

intervening once more in Syria.

The second error was to consider Sunni jihadist groups as being part of the opposition to the

Syrian regime. Such an analysis is contradicted by the fighting described between some of these

groups and the Syrian rebels in 2014. Also, such an analysis does not address the links between

these groups and the Syrian regime, as the latter had promoted their appearance. The

disappearance of these groups could constitute the loss of a handy enemy and that of a federative

influence for the leaders of Damascus.

The misunderstanding in analyzing the intervention of these groups has been the result of the

regime's information service which succeeded in diverting the Syrian crisis in general–as well as

the contents of the Geneva negotiations in particular–towards the theme of terrorism. Walid

Mouallem declared in Geneva: ‘we are here to prevent the collapse of the Middle East, to protect

the Christians of the Middle East, to put an end to terrorism.’ This strategy, using what Marwa

28!This!had!been!acknowledged!in!December!2012!by!the!Friends!of!Syria!as!the!legitimate!representative!of!the!Syrian!people!and!which!has!held!the!Syrian!seat!at!the!Arab!League!since!March!2013.!29!He!had!been!imprisoned!from!1996!to!1998!for!his!opposition!to!Hafez!AlTAssad,!and!again!during!the!start!of!the!March!2011!events,!after!which!he!left!Syria.!


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Daoudy stipulated, qualifies as a direct or indirect ‘linkage’30 in negotiation power games. The

effect of linkage is brought about by ‘establishing a link between questionable ideas or by adding

irrelevancies to the agenda.’31 For instance, the PKK support by the Syrian regime between 1984

and 1998 fulfilled this objective. It gave Damascus an additional strategic card to further

negotiations with Turkey. Within the framework of Geneva II, for the Assad regime, it was all

about downplaying the factual existence of an opposition and of the people's demands towards

more global concerns where its stance could win support. By introducing the subject of terrorism

into the discussions the regime managed to short-circuit the real objective of the negotiations.

The third inequality concerns the wavering determination of ‘sponsors’ which encouraged as

well as controlled either one of the two parties. The erratic policies of the United States offered

shaky support to the Syrian opposition, which left them hoping for greater determination from its

ally. By his numerous hesitations, from the ineffectual red line speech to the promises of military

support, Barak Obama adopted a policy of procrastination towards the Syrian crisis.

Washington's priorities did not reside in what it perceived to be a Syrian civil war.32

The lack of American determination was driven by its wish to seek common ground with the

Russians, as famously demonstrated by its eagerness to accept the chemical weapons agreement.

In the face of this indecision, Russia managed, through obstructionist politics, to hinder and

marginalise non-western powers in resolving the conflict. Russian foreign policy strategy in

Geneva pointed to its capacity to ‘seize opportunities and its incapacity to generate new

situations.’33 By bilateralising the Syrian conflict and by his helping to spearhead the resolution

of the conflict alongside the United States, Vladimir Putin is considered a negotiating partner on

equal footing with Barack Obama. Apart from the fear of a post-Assad situation marked by

Islamist policies, this ‘congenital impossibility to accept the role of a junior partner with

30!Marwa!Daoudy,!‘Une!négociation!en!eaux!troubles!ou!comment!obtenir!un!accord!en!situation!d’asymétrie,’!Négociations,!6,!65T81.!31!Ibid.,!69.!32!This!stance!had!been!heralded!by!one!of!the!Dayton!negotiators:!‘There!will!be!other!Bosnias!in!our!lives,!different!in!every!detail!but!similar!in!one!overriding!manner:!they!will!originate!in!distant!and!illTunderstood!places,!explode!with!little!warning,!and!present!the!rest!of!the!world!with!difficult!choices–choices!between!risky!involvement!and!potentially!costly!neglect.!But!if!during!the!Cold!War!Washington!sometimes!seemed!too!ready!to!intervene,!today!America!and!its!allies!often!seem!too!willing!to!ignore!problems!outside!their!heartland.![…].!The!world!will!look!to!Washington!for!more!than!rhetoric!the!next!time!we!face!a!challenge!to!peace.’!Holbrooke,!To!End!a!War,!369.!33!Thomas!Gomart,!‘Politique!étrangère!russe:!l’étrange!inconstance,’!Politique!étrangère,!2006/1!Spring,!25T36,!25.!!


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whomsoever’ 34 explains Russia’s determination even though the Syrian regime did not

completely fulfill its promises.

As a result of these three factors, an unpropitious climate was engendered, thwarting the

obtainment of any meaningful result at the close of the Geneva II negotiations. The only grounds

upon which progress could have been made were the humanitarian question and the lifting of

besieged cities, but even on these grounds demonisation had played its part. For instance, while

negotiating the partial lifting of the siege in Homs, the regime's television channels stated that it

had offered to allow ‘non-terrorist’ Syrians to leave, and had asked the opposition representatives

present in Geneva for their names. When the latter rejected this proposition, fearing that these

names could result in arrests, the regime presented this stance as a total refusal by the opposition

to collaborate towards a political solution.

When the nuisance factor overrides diplomacy

As is common with many negotiations, Geneva II has met the logic of redistribution: what one

party gains, the other loses. Having little to lose, the opposition displayed constrained but sincere

commitment and relative tactical flexibility. As for the regime, it only contributed to negotiations

a utilitarian and delaying function which removed all political dimension and prevented to find a

political solution to the conflict.

This utilitarian function consisted of not only exploiting negotiations for propaganda

purposes, but to weigh down the opposition with pressures that were likely to increase internal

differences. This practice is not new following the Hama repression in 1982, there had been

negotiations between Hafez Al-Assad and the Muslim Brotherhood. The regime had quickly

understood that they would benefit from discord within the movement (notably between the

Hama and the Aleppo factions) and offered to negotiate in order to arouse this internal conflict

among the Muslim Brotherhood. Discussions were held from 1984 to 1987 by the military

information chief, Ali Douba, first in Bonn and then in Frankfurt.35 As one of the Brotherhood

leaders who had accepted the offer, Hassan Al-Houeidi became aware of the manœuvre when the

Syrian regime delegates returned to Damascus without prior notification. This attitude revealed 34!Ibid.,!28.!35!Raphaël!Lefèvre,!‘Hama!and!Beyond:!Regime!–!Muslim!Brotherhood!Relations!since!1982,’!in!State!and!Islam!in!Baathist!Syria,!Confrontation!or!CoNoptation?,!ed!Lina!Khateb!et!al,!(United!Kingdom:!Centre!for!Syrian!Studies,!2012),!3T28.!


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that the regime had no real intention of reaching an agreement and saw this merely as an

opportunity to score points by merely entering into negotiations: ‘By proposing negotiations to

the Ikhwan, the regime had achieved two goals: it has managed to re-open the painful internal

debate over how the Ikhwan should best approach the Syrian Ba’ath and it had had a glimpse into

how fractured and bitter the Muslim Brothers were in exile.’36 In Geneva II, if entering

negotiations did indeed highlight the fractures within the opposition, the regime failed to cause its

destruction.

The delaying tactic is also a familiar one. Having been aware of this negotiation strategy for

some time, Hafez Al-Assad had been critical of Anwar El-Sadat's hurried attempts in signing a

peace treaty between Egypt and Israel: ‘It is not as serious to let our land be occupied as it is to

retrieve it at the expense of our national dignity and at the sacrifice of Arab nations' interest.’37

The Syro-Israeli negotiations adopted this approach, which was contrary to the Egyptian strategy.

Walid Al-Mouallem, chief negotiator of the Syrian delegation in peace talks during the 1990's,

described Shimon Peres's eagerness to conclude an agreement with Syria by saying: ‘He wanted,

according to his customary expression, to 'fly high and fast'. I used to reply to my Israeli

counterpart that it was important to fly but even more so to know when and where to land–one

cannot fly high and fast continuously.’38 On the occasion of their intervention, following the

Grapes of Wrath operation in April 1996, French diplomats noted as well how Syrian politics:

‘consists of monitoring its rhythm, slow, methodical, and at times dilatory, in its peace

negotiations.’39 Dominique Moïsi summarises the fact that entering into negotiations does not

necessarily mean there is a will to an agreement: ‘for a totalitarian regime negotiating is a mere

tactic which allows it to strengthen acquired advantages all the while legitimising these by the

other's recognition (Helsinki), to gain time (the 1939 Germano-Soviet accord), to create a

diversion (the 1952 March proposals on the reunification of Germany) to find a propaganda

platform (such as disarmament plans in Central Europe).’40

Finally, the main consequence of Geneva II was neither the acknowledgement of the

36!Ibid.,!14.!37!Hafez!AlTAssad!to!Karim!Pakradouni,!in!Henry!Laurens,!La!Question!de!Palestine,!tome!4:!Le!rameau!d’olivier!et!le!fusil!du!combattant!(1967N1982),!(Paris:!Fayard,!2011),!912,!590.!!38!Walid!AlTMoallem,!‘Quatre!années!de!négociation!entre!la!Syrie!et!Israël,’!20.!!39!French!diplomatic!cable,!April!12,!1996.!40!Dominique!Moïsi,!‘De!la!négociation!international,’!Pouvoirs,!No.!15,!(November!1980),!31T42,!36.!


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internationalization of the Syrian crisis nor its dilution, but rather the ‘nuisance factor’41

dominating politics, thereby hindering the negotiation process. The nuisance factor is usually

used as a tool of obstruction, so that countries that utilize it can be taken seriously while avoiding

falling into alignment or insignificance. So it is by opening up certain options and discarding

others that the nuisance factor led the Geneva II political process. This realisation highlighted one

of the paradoxes of negotiations as Grosser puts it: ‘The smaller the devil, the harder it seems to

force him into yielding.’42 In its January 2014 configuration, the weakened Syrian regime had to

be propped up continuously by its allies, who, taken hostage, could not demand compromises as

this would then have undermined its power structure. It validated the nuisance option as its only

policy. More worryingly, the statute of negotiations was simultaneously altered; instead of being

a political tool, it was reduced to being a ploy used by the regime as a means of its survival. This

evolution assigned the Syrian crisis to a long-term fate of unresolved conflicts.

Conclusion

From these analyses, it is possible to draw a few conclusions which could serve as

recommendations to ensure that the negotiating option, when dealing with the Syrian crisis, could

hopefully be more effective:

- Just as ‘there is no favourable wind for those who do not know which direction to take’

(Seneca) there will be no efficient negotiations without defining precise objectives.43 For reasons

already mentioned – the difficulties in agreeing on one interpretation of the Geneva I conclusions

led to the failing of Geneva II. As such, it would serve initial negotiations well to define the

outlines of Syria’s future: the kind of regime, the constitutional guarantees for minorities,

religion's role in politics and so on; principles which would allow the opposition to present its

blueprint and to compare it to the present regime.

- Political pressure, even boots on the ground, must accompany negotiations. Proof of past

examples of the regime's cooperation or lack of it, warrant the use of such pressure: the 2005

retreat from Lebanon following the adoption of the Security Council's 1559 resolution and the

undertaking of the dismantling of chemical weapons under threat of military intervention. 41!Syria!is!known!for!its!nuisance!value,!because!of!its!capacity!to!cause!inconvenience!or!difficulties!to!the!West,!using!its!links!with!the!regional!actors!or!groups.!42!Grosser,!Traiter!avec!le!diable!?,!228.!43!Faure!and!Zartman,!’Négocier!avec!les!terroristes?’.!


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Without such measures, the regime's participation in negotiations are in reality reduced to being

mere lip service.

- Finally, the sequencing of Geneva I and Geneva II has already been described as being all

at once neither encouraging nor efficient. The very idea that different episodes of negotiations

must be linked without substantial results being achieved during the intervening period

undermines the very content of discussions and propagates the desire to stack up points in the

allocated negotiating time. On the contrary, a continuous dialogue should be considered and

managed by a top negotiator44 whose impartiality would not mean neutrality. This ought to be

part of a remodelling of the dialogue framework itself, to which regional parties–whose roles

were limited in Geneva II–should take part, and on which the issue of the Syrian crisis hangs.

These principles alone will limit the demonisation of the other. Without these, Geneva II will

remain the enforced staging post, affirming that either a legitimate political option was spent in

vain, or that it will only mirror an Oslo-esque process, the limitations of which are well-known.

Manon4Nour!Tannous!is!a!PhD!candidate!at!Université!Panthéon4Assas!(Paris!II)!and!Research!Associate!to!the!Contemporary!Arab!History!Chair!at!Collège!de!France.!She!published!‘Le!monde!face!aux!révolutions!arabes.!Analyses!et!réactions!des!puissances!régionales!et!mondiales.’!

44!See!also!JeanTDavid!Levitte,!the!former!diplomatic!advisor!and!sherpa!to!former!Presidents!Jacques!Chirac!and!Nicolas!Sarkozy:!‘Syrie:!pour!une!autre!négociation,’!Le!Monde,!February!1,!2014,!accessed!May!16,!2014.!!

Documents

Geneva II: Dealing with the Devil