Towards a humanistic constructivist model of science learning: changing perspectives and research implications

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Towards a humanistic constructivist model of sciencelearning: changing perspectives and researchimplicationsK. C. Cheung & R. TaylorPublished online: 29 Sep 2006.

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J. CURRICULUM STUDIES, 1991, VOL. 23, NO. 1, 21-40

Towards a humanistic constructivist model ofscience learning: changing perspectives andresearch implications

K. C. CHEUNG and R. TAYLOR

Curriculum development and provision in the UK has been characterized inthe past by its decentralized nature. Until recently, the only statutoryrequirement for schools has been the provision of religious education topupils of compulsory school age (5-16). This situation has been significantlyaltered by the recent introduction into England and Wales of a nationalcurriculum, whereby all pupils of compulsory school age are required tostudy a prescribed range of subjects. The subject matter, in terms both ofcontent and skills, is specified in detail for each subject area.

A second characteristic of curriculum development in the UK has been thelimited nature of any systematic theoretical underpinning (Lawton 1989).This paper focuses on the need for such an underpinning of the nationalcurriculum in science (Department of Education and Science (DES) 1989 b),although many of the issues raised are equally applicable to science curriculain other contexts. Indeed, many of the over-arching concerns raised aboutthe need to integrate theory and practice more closely apply equally tosubject areas other than science.

It is the intention of this paper to review recent theoretical developmentsin science education and to integrate these into a coherent humanisticconstructivist model of science learning. This model is then applied to therecently developed national curriculum in science. Formulation of the modeldraws upon many fields of research and highlights the need for a coherent,coordinated and reflexive research programme so that all the relevant issuesmight be addressed adequately.

A justification for the apparently grandiose sweep in the discussions thatfollow can be suggested by borrowing from the preamble to a recentperspective on cognitive psychology (Claxton 1988: ix-x):

British cognitive psychologists have been, by temperament perhaps as well asby training, more beaver than bird, and higher-order, reflective discussions[about synthesis and coherence] have sometimes been treated as signs of

Robert Taylor is a professional officer in the Evaluation and Monitoring Unit of the SchoolExaminations and Assessment Council, Newcombe House, 45 Notting Hill Gate, LondonW11 3JB, UK. He was formerly a senior research fellow in the Centre for Educational Studies,King's College, London and deputy director of the Assessment of Performance Unit(Science). His research interests centre on assessment in science and the evaluation ofassessment systems. K. C. Cheung is a lecturer in the Institute of Education, Republic ofSingapore. This paper was prepared while he was a Commonwealth Academic Staff Scholar atKing's College, London. His interests centre on comparative science education and themodelling of educational data.

0022-0272/91 $300 © 1991 Taylor & Francis Ltd.

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22 K. C. CHEUNG AND R. TAYLOR

grandiosity, or of an unhealthy and unproductive interest in one's own navel. Iwould argue, on the contrary, that this kind of reflection is a vital precursor tomore detailed theorizing and experimentation, and that without some sense,albeit hazy, of the Big Picture, research runs the risk of being neither well-motivated nor cumulative.

We would argue that recourse to a big picture, however hazy, of learning inschool science is a necessary precursor to the development and evaluation ofthe components of that picture.

The way ahead

In his keynote address to the National Forum on School Science held by theAmerican Association for the Advancement of Science, Black (1987)elaborated the concepts of scientific technology capability, which heregarded as essential ingredients of the scientific and technological literaciesof a community. He concluded:

Overall, we do need a [national] system of science education that has within it acertain breadth, a certain balance between the technological and scientific,which is designed to carry through the notion of progression that research andother studies are now giving us a hold on. We need a way in which you can offerchildren [of mixed ability] a menu of [scientific and technological] tasks whichbuilds up year by year to develop their ability and stretch them further at each[key] stage [of development] (Black 1987: 29).

This paper seeks to develop the ideas raised by Black.and to provide atheoretical framework, primarily based on a constructivist epistemology andthe concept of the socio-psychological environment. This framework is thenused to construct a heuristic tool for the design of learning tasks appropriateto the requirements of the English national curriculum in science.

In order that the recent changes in science education in the UK might beseen in perspective we review the pedagogic principles underlying cur-riculum developments during past decades. A variety of theories of learningare considered; particularly the Piagetian model of learning, althoughseminal works such as Kelly's (1985) Psychology of Personal Constructs,Bruner's (1966) concept of the Spiral Curriculum, Ausubel's (1968) theoryof meaningful learning, Osborne and Wittrock's (1983) model of generativelearning, and others, contribute. The purpose of this discussion is to proposethat constructivism needs to make explicit the links between the learningprocesses in an individual and the environment in which the individualdevelops. The paper includes some suggestions on the design of learningtasks, classroom management, and formative monitoring of pupil progress.Finally, the need for a coherent, co-operative research programme ishighlighted.

Science curriculum and pedagogy

From the time of the late nineteenth-century British science educator, H. E.Armstrong to the work of the Nufneld Foundation in the 1960s, and from

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HUMANISTIC CONSTRUCTIVIST MODEL OF SCIENCE LEARNING 23

Nuffield to the present time, there has been a shift from heurism toconstructivism in the design of science courses. Armstrong's heurismstressed the importance of training pupils in scientific methods. It has beenrecognized, however, that such heurism might in practice lead to neglect ofscientific principles and of the presentation of science as a humanizinginfluence (Jenkins 1979). Before the British education system moved tobecome a comprehensive system, two styles of science teaching werediscernible: (1) the 'beautiful' science of the grammar school, and (2) the'useful' science of the secondary modern school. In both types of school theidea of the pupil as a practising scientist was far too distant an objective to beachieved realistically.

The Nuffield science courses of the 1960s represented the first seriousattempt in the UK at large-scale science curriculum reform. Curriculumexperiments were developed, tested, and then made available to scienceteachers in recipe format. For some curriculum materials, Piaget's stage-theory was consulted for the arrangement of content. Unfortunately therecipe format is a distortion of the model of a 'scientist in action' into theguided-discovery or stage-managed heurism that is far removed frompersonal discovery (Woolnough and Allsop 1985). The Nuffield sciencematerials were also of variable quality, and the prior knowledge of learnerswas rarely taken into account (Shayer and Adey 1981).

The work of the Assessment of Performance Unit (APU) in the early 1980semphasized the view that pupils should be problem-solving scientists,deploying process skills and science concepts in different investigativelearning contexts (DES 1989 a). This view has gradually developed over thelast decade through focusing on science process component skills, integrativeinvestigative skills, and more recently in the use of general problem-solvingstrategies. In a way that is compatible with contemporary psychologicalprinciples, pupils are regarded as essentially active in their learningprocesses: they should be continuously inquiring, speculating, testing andbuilding up their personal construct of knowledge. Recent APU research hasillustrated the close interplay between conceptual and procedural know-ledge. This symbiotic relationship is reflected in the design of the emergingEnglish and Welsh national science curriculum.

Mind-environment linkage

A theory is needed to explain what happens when pupils engage in sciencelearning. Our view is that such a theory should entail a constructivistphilosophy and make explicit the linkage between the epistemic individualand the environment. We will describe one such theory from Piaget in thissection and expand it into a conceptual model of science learning later. Theexpansion entails an integration of the four prevailing research perspectiveselaborated by Eylon and Linn (1988), viz., concept-learning, developmental,differential and problem-solving. The ensuing discussions highlight theimportance of metacognition in the development of both conceptual andprocedural understanding.

The Constructivist Epistemology of the Genevan School is one suchperspective that can be consulted, although its relevance to the science

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2 4 K. C. CHEUNG AND R. TAYLOR

classroom has to be spelled out clearly (see Novak 1988, for example) and thesimplistic association of this perspective with stage-theory should be avoided(see Wood 1988). Cognition, as viewed from this perspective, is an active andprogressive process occurring in the mind of the learner (for a discussion, see,for example, Gunstone 1988). It involves the replacement of exogenouslearning experiences by endogenous reflexive cognitive reconstructions (aphenomenon called 'cognitive phenocopying').

Piaget used the Spiral of Knowing, which can be conceptualized as thehybrid resultant of maturation and socio-experiential learning, to delineatethe processes of cognition (see Gallagher and Reid 1981). The Spiral is aninverted, open-ended, and ever-widening cone, representing the continuousendogenous cognitive process of reflexive abstraction, which results in thedifferent stages of maturative and experiential development and levels ofcognitive structures. This Spiral is surrounded by a peripheral envelope,which is analogous to the mind-environment interface, representing theempirical abstraction of the learning experiences from the environment.

Since the Piagetian maxim is that during early adolescence learning issubordinated to maturative and experiential development, the replacementprocess mentioned above is actually a reconstruction process. It is self-regulatory and its mechanisms are assimilation and accommodation, suchthat the external experiences to be incorporated into the internal structuresare handled in such a way that the existing structures are conserved andenriched, although this process may sometimes involve extensivereconstruction.

This Spiral of Knowing, particularly the envelope, directs our attentionwhen undertaking mental modelling not only to the cognitive structure of theepistemic individual but also to the environmental experiences of thisindividual. The provision of exploratory and investigative tasks in a varietyof negotiated learning contexts is one way to provide such an educationalenvironment.

A conceptual model of school science

The Education Reform Act 1988 (England and Wales) provides for theestablishment of a national curriculum, comprising core and other found-ation subjects to be taught to all pupils of compulsory school age inmaintained schools. For all subjects there are to be appropriate (1) attainmenttargets, (2) programmes of study and (3) assessment arrangements. Theattainment targets for science have been grouped into two profile componentsfor the purpose of reporting: (1) Exploration of Science and (2) Knowledge andUnderstanding of Science (DES 1 9 8 9 C).

The profile components and attainment targets, plus examples ofprogrammes of study and statements of attainment, for the nationalcurriculum in Science are shown in table 1.

The intention of this section is to clarify these terms and to provide aconceptual model of school science in this national curriculum. The Spiral ofKnowing is borrowed as the conceptual analogue of the programme ofstudy's attainment targets, in which a succession of negotiated learning tasks

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constitute the mind-environment linkage. The shape and orientation of theSpiral serve as a guiding tool in the understanding of progression anddifferentiation.

Procedural and conceptual knowledge

As already noted, the evolution of the English national curriculum in sciencehas its intellectual origins in the curriculum developments of the Nuffield eraand subsequent decades. These developments have legitimized the role ofinvestigative and exploratory science in schools, without ever coherentlyarticulating the relationship between procedural and conceptual learning.Indeed, it has been argued that recent expositions about the role and status ofthe process and content aspects of science, implying that they are alternativeways of presenting science to children, have not served science educationwell (Millar and Driver 1987, Swatton 1990, Wellington 1989). In onesense this debate is continued in the context of the national curriculum. Thetwo aspects of science are represented by the profile components 'Explorationof Science' and 'Knowledge and Understanding of Science' (DES 1989 C).

It is worth noting that 'Exploration of Science' as representing pro-cedural understanding, is being viewed, possibly for the first time, as anenterprise which has its own unique, internal structure and rationale. But weargue that the intimate interplay between the two profile components lies at thevery heart of any rationale put forward for the inclusion of 'explorations' and'investigations' in the national science curriculum. If this relationship is to beunderstood and implemented, it is necessary to define a structural frameworkfor Exploration of Science. That definition, while it is developed in thenational curriculum materials culminating in the programmes of study(curriculum content or syllabus) and statements of attainment (assessmentobjectives) of the Statutory Order for Science (DES 1988 a, 1989 c, NationalCurriculum Council 1988), requires expansion if it is to serve as a pedagogicheuristic.

Procedural learning environment

Two dimensions of the 'procedural learning' environment are implicitlyrepresented in the programmes of study for 'Exploration of Science':features of the learning tasks (task complexity) and features of the problem-solving approaches (task approach). In reality neither of these is unidimen-sional, or linear, but they will be represented as such in the development of apedagogic model. The artificial separation of the task environment into thesetwo conceptual dimensions facilitates consideration of the design of invest-igative or exploratory activities.

A basis for discussing the issues of task complexity and task approach is tomake reference to the 'problem-solving cycle' model of the APU (see figure 1).This model was developed as a heuristic tool to both structure and analyseexploratory activities, while at the same time reflecting the way pupils mightbe expected to work when carrying out explorations and investigations if they

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Table 1. Structure of the National Curriculum in Science in England and Wales, with exemplar materials.

Profile Components Attainments target (AT) Sample programme of study Sample statements of attainment

Exploration of Science 1. Exploration of Science ATI. Key Stage 2:

Children should be encouraged todevelop their investigativeskills and their understandingof Science in activities which:promote the raising andanswering of questions;encourage a workingunderstanding of safety and care;are set within the everydayexperience of childrenand provide opportunities toexplore with increasingprecision, where appropriate;build on existing practicalskills within a given framework;require the deployment of anincreasingly systematic approachinvolving the identification andmanipulation of obvious keyvariables...

ATI. Key Stage 2: Level 2

Pupils should:ask questions and suggest ideas of the'how', 'why', and 'what will happenif variety;identify simple differences, forexample, hot/cold, rough/smooth;use standard and non-standardmeasures, for example, hand-spans andrulers;list and collate observations;interpret findings by associating onefactor with another;record findings in charts, drawingsand other appropriate forms.

Knowledge and Understandingof Science

2. The Variety of Life3. Processes of Life4. Genetics and Evolution5. Human Influences on the Earth6. Types and Uses of Materials7. Making New Materials8. Explaining How Materials Behave9. Earth and Atmosphere

10. Forces11. Electricity and Magnetism12. Information Technology13. Energy14. Sound and Music15. Light and Electro-magnetic

Radiation16. The Earth in Space17. The Nature of Science

AT14. Key Stage 2:Children should be made aware ofthe way sound is heard and thatsounds, including musical notes,are made in a variety of ways,and can be pleasant or obtrusivein the environment. They shouldexplore the changes in pitch,loudness and timbre of sound...

ATI 4. Key Stage 2: Level 2Pupils should:

know that sounds are heard when soundreaches the ear;be able to explain how musical soundsare produced in simple musicalinstruments.

o>za525

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PROBLEM - generation- perception

1bREFORMULATION- into torn open toinvestigation

- deciding what toaeasure

11PUNNING ANEXPERIMENT- setting upconditions

IVRECORDING DATA- tables- graphs

111CARRYING OUT THE EXPERIMENT- using apparatus' Making neasurements• making observations

Figure 1. The Assessment of Performance Unit model for problem-solvingactivity.

were complying with an 'expert' model of problem-solving (Gott andMurphy 1984, 1987). These two dimensions, together with procedural andconceptual knowledge with understanding, provide the basis for a discussionof the concepts of progression and differentiation.

The model is a synthesis of the component process skills. Many learningtasks will involve pupils in the deployment of these component skills in thedevelopment of investigative procedures and problem-solving strategies.Some learning tasks will, however, focus on the component process skillsthemselves. If the philosophy of a constructivist mind-environment linkageis held to be important, then focusing on these skills will always be in thecontext of a meaningful and relevant problem whose teaching purposeshould be explicitly articulated.

Concept of progression

Task complexity is determined both by the context in which a problem is setand structural features of the task itself. Progression in terms of task complexityis defined by reference to changes in the novelty and abstraction of theintended learning context. The task context, however, is not a straightfor-ward issue. In one sense it seems unproblematic to ascribe tasks to particularcontexts, such as school science or everyday contexts. These could bedescribed as the intended context of the problem-setter. The context which isexperienced or perceived by the problem-solver, however, results from

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complex interactions and reconstructions between the problem-solver, theproblem task and their shared environment. This could be described as theexperienced or the perceived'context.

Structural features of the tasks are defined in terms of the increasingcomplexity of experimental variables. This increasing complexity can be interms of the number and types of the experimental variables. The variabletypes might be simple or derived, categoric or continuous, non-interacting orinteracting.

Progression in terms of task approach is defined by reference to changes inthe structuring, precision, abstraction and reflective nature of the problem-solving approaches. This progression could involve changing from the use ofstructured experiential approaches, including an increasing use of quantita-tive, rather than qualitative procedures. It could also involve increasinglyreflective and evaluative approaches, resulting in subsequent refinementsbeing made to particular procedures and strategies. Pupils might thus beexpected to use powers of abstract reasoning to an increasing extent as theyprogress in problem-solving activity.

There is further the conventional type of progression in terms ofincreasingly differentiated procedural and conceptual understanding, which islinked to the various 'key stages' of development and hence to the cognitiveand procedural demands of a curriculum (see Case 1980 for a discussion ofthe Piagetian perspective). This type of progression is generally viewed as thecognitive and procedural outcome of schooling. Further delineation of theconcept of differentiation of procedural and conceptual knowledge will begiven later after clarifying the notions of statements of attainment and keystages of development.

The different types of progression described are conjoint in naturebecause they relate to the design of learning tasks and the monitoring ofstudent performance. They spell out the need to match the approach andcomplexity of learning tasks to the differentiated procedural and conceptualdevelopment of the pupils.

The Double-Spiral of Knowing

Decisions about the construction of learning and assessment tasks will beinformed by the curriculum guidelines in the programmes of study. Theprogrammes of study are divided into four age-related key stages ofdevelopment: (1) ages 5-7, (2) ages 7-11, (3) ages 11-14 and (4) ages 14-16, forthe purpose of monitoring pupil performance. The statements of attainmentare graded into ten ordered levels, reflecting the model of progression definedby the Task Group on Assessment and Testing and used to structure thenational curriculum framework (DES 1988 d). The assessment objectivesallow for fine-tuning of the task features, deploying procedural andconceptual knowledge with due regard to both task complexity andapproach.

The dimensions of (1) task complexity, (2) task approaches, whichstructure the task environment and (3) programmes of study are representedby the three axes in figure 2. The two components of science learning

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(procedural and conceptual), expressed formally by the profile components'Exploration of Science' and 'Knowledge and Understanding of Science', arerepresented by the 'Double Spiral of Knowing' in the conceptual model ofschool science. It is central to the philosophy underlying the development ofthe model that the two elements of the spiral are intimately linked and yetdescribed separately for analytical reasons. Undoubtedly some scientificconcepts such as chromatography and electric potential cannot be adequatelyunderstood without having some tacit and procedural experience ofexperimentation.

The links between the two profile components are forged through asuccession of negotiated learning tasks, that are carefully designed to spanthe programmes of study, through the four key stages of development. Thelearning tasks are represented in figure 2 by the 'spiders' linking the twocomponents of the 'Spiral of Knowing'. The legs of the spiders represent theprocedural and conceptual demands of the learning tasks. It should be notedthat the model only has meaning in terms of negotiated learning tasks, whichdefine the mind-environment linkage. These tasks, rather than the actualtrajectory of the Spiral, shape and develop the Spiral of Knowing for thelearning individual. Hence the Spiral is a conceptual representation of theprocess of cognition rather than a concrete representation of the events in thelearning process.

Within the framework of the national curriculum there is increasingemphasis on the conceptual component as pupils progress to higher stages ofdevelopment. In the model this is illustrated by the increasing number of legsanchored to the conceptual component. This is not to imply that it will be

Task Approach

1. KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDINGOF SCIENCE •

m "understanding" ofscientific concepts

2. EXPLORATION OF SCIENCE

- "understanding* of theprocedures and strategiesof scientific Investigation

conceptual understanding required

" Task Complexify

understanding of procedures andstrategies required

Everyday/personal context -Single variableSimple variablesCategoric variablesNon-inleracting variables -

increasingly abstract contextmultiple variablesderived variablescontinuous variablesinteracting variables

Figure 2. A conceptual model of school science in the national curriculum(England and Wales) (Qualter et al. 1990).

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3 0 K. C. CHEUNG AND R. TAYLOR

appropriate for all learning activities at higher stages of development to havethis increased conceptual demand. Neither is it intended to imply that allactivities will have spiders defined only in terms of conceptual andprocedural knowledge (see Roberts 1988 for a discussion of Schwab's four'curriculum commonplaces' inherent in seven curriculum emphases forscience education). Some may focus on other aspects of learning such ascommunication skills, technological and societal concerns.

Concept of differentiation

Investigative or exploratory tasks, of the types described in the context of thenational curriculum, will require pupils to apply various aspects of theirprocedural and conceptual understanding. The extent to which applicationof particular procedures and concepts by pupils is required will bedetermined by the task environment. For example, pupils at very early stagesof development would not be required to apply high-level scientific conceptsin the explanation of their phenomenological experiences during exploratoryand investigative activities. Tasks would not be assigned that could only besolved through the application of procedures outside the experiences of thepupils. For pupils at later stages of development these constraints wouldgradually be relaxed. It should, however, be recognized that even at thehighest level of development the assignment of tasks of low-level taskcomplexity and task approach might well be appropriate in some investiga-tive contexts. These tasks would still, however, call upon high-levelconceptual knowledge or conceptually embedded procedural knowledge.This is demonstrated by the open, ever-widening cone of the Double-Spiralseen in figure 2.

Differentiation is secured through the revisiting of both 'conceptual' and'procedural' knowledge, as represented by the four rings of the Double-Spiral. Differentiation of conceptual knowledge application can be illus-trated using the concept of energy. For example, the national curriculum inscience states that at key stage one pupils might be expected to be able todescribe how a toy which moves and stores energy works; at key stage two tounderstand that energy can be stored, and transferred to and from movingthings; at key stage three to be able to recognize different types of energysources and follow some processes of energy transfer in terms of the principalof conservation of energy; and at key stage four to understand that theultimate result of energy transfers is to change the temperature of thesurroundings and that useful energy is dissipated. This kind of differenti-ation of conceptual knowledge is represented by the symbols c, c', c", and c'"in figure 2.

Differentiation of procedural knowledge application can be illustratedusing the example of variable identification and manipulation. The nationalcurriculum for science states that at key stage one pupils might be expected tobe able to identify simple variables; at key stage two to be able to indicate thatthe relevant variables in an investigation have been identified and otherscontrolled; at key stage three to be able to identify, describe and vary morethan one key variable, where the variable to be measured can be treated

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continuously; and at key stage four to be able to handle derived and/orinteracting variables. This kind of differentiation of procedural knowledge isrepresented by the symbols p,p',p", and p'" in figure 2. Thus construction oflearning tasks should allow for differentiation in the application of bothprocedures and concepts.

Example of a succession of learning tasks

Pupils might be engaged in a topic concerned with toys. The topic itself couldconsist of a series of negotiated learning tasks appropriate for children atdifferent stages of development. Many of the tasks would also be constructedin such a way that they allow access at a range of proficiency levels anddifferentiation would be by outcome. The tasks would allow pupils to engageand deploy various aspects of their procedural and conceptual knowledge.Examples of some such tasks are illustrated in table 2.

Table 2. Examples of learning tasks, allowing for differentiation in the applicationof procedures and concepts.

Task* Procedural understanding Conceptual understanding

Compare the ways in whichvarious mechanicaltoys move.

Find out which of severaltoy cars is the 'best'.

Find out the relationshipbetween the wing widthand flight distance ofpaper aeroplanes.

Construct a traffic-lightcircuit.

Design a mechanical toy foruse by a physicallyhandicapped child.

Simple qualitative No scientific concepts needobservations, but with the be applied,potential for developingsimple measurementstrategies and the notion ofa 'fair test'. Recording andreporting information.

Decisions about what tojudge (i.e. what is 'best')what to vary and how tojudge the effect. Design ofappropriate measurementstrategy etc.

As above, plus increasinglysophisticated notions ofcontrols and experimentalerror.

Manipulative skillsassociated with circuitry.

Possible application ofconcepts associated withvelocity etc.

Application of conceptsassociated withaerodynamics.

Aplication of range ofconcepts associated withelectrical circuits.

Full scale design project, Application of wide range ofpossibly involving survey scientific/technologicaltechniques and concepts,technological applications,with scientific testingduring evaluation phase.

* The tasks are not intended to be isolated activities but rather to be set in a purposefulcontext associated with a coherent learning programme.

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Five constructivist aspects of 'science in action'

Before proceeding to discuss the implications of these conceptualizations forthe design of learning tasks, classroom management and formative assess-ment procedures, it is important to clarify five aspects of the two modelsdiscussed above. They are: (1) the fallacy of process-led heurism in schoolscience; (2) the significance of problem context in problem-solving; (3) thesignificance of 'habits of the mind' in problem-solving; (4) the keycharacteristics of the philosophy of constructivism in the construction ofscientific knowledge; and (5) the key characteristics of the constructivistapproach to science learning.

The fallacy of process-led heurism

Process approaches to science teaching are very prominent in both the UK andus, although constructivist approaches have been gaining momentum inrecent years. The fallacy of a process-led heurism is that when designingscience courses, conceptual understanding and its applications is oftenoverlooked in the notion of concept-free process. Undoubtedly some processskills such as measuring and observing can be rehearsed to near automaticityvia extensive and varied exercises. However, in genuine investigative tasks inwhich problem-solving is a fundamental part, variations in task perceptionwill always exist. Task perception will result in the construction of aparticular mental model, guiding conceptualization of the task to beinvestigated. Hence, observation is not random and measurement isselective. It is well known that our observations are coloured by ourexpectations and our inferences and interpretations of phenomenologicalexperiences are sometimes biased by our convictions and intuitions (forexample, see Hodson 1988).

Process-led heurism in school science has fallen victim to an inductivistphilosophy in which scientific knowledge is viewed as accumulating steadilythrough the assimilation of more and more facts under broader and broadergeneralizations resulting from a number of observations. Since pupils willinevitably use their own 'theories' in the acquisition of knowledge, a morefruitful philosophy for 'science in action', we contend, should be to deploythe use of pupils' alternative mental models in the context of a constructivistpedagogy. This could involve bridging the misconceptions via a successionof learning tasks to the anchoring concepts (for a review on patterns ofmisunderstandings in science, see Perkins and Simmons 1988). Theproblem-solving model in figure 1 provides a heuristic tool to help achievethis end.

The question of the importance of problem context

One question of considerable importance is whether problem-solving andscientific process skills are context-dependent or not. In the past decade,studies of the heuristic structures of expert as contrasted to novice problem-solvers on typical and novel problems revealed that experts and novicesrespond differently to both types of problems (for concrete examples, see

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Eylon and Linn 1988). Both general strategic and context-bound heuristicsoperate in a highly contextualized way, deploying the rich personalknowledge base of domain-specific schemata of both experts and novices(Perkins and Salomon 1989). This may account for the lower difficulty levelof problems if they are framed in a more familiar everyday-experience ratherthan a scientific context.

The problem of context effects is complex. Research by the APU into theeffect of question context on performance is inconclusive, showing that anovertly everyday context encourages some pupils to engage with a problem,yet for others with a different view of the role of science knowledge, it can be abarrier or can cue selective access to their knowledge (DES 1989 d).

Consequently, we endorse a view similar to that of Perkins and Salomon(1989) that if pupils are to be successfully educated in problem-solving, theyneed to generate abstractions mindfully and decontextualize scientificprinciples in order to acquire transferable strategic skills. Pupils are likely toachieve this metacognition by applying problem reformulations using asuccession of negotiated learning tasks, which are designed for this purpose,and framed in a variety of relevant learning contexts.

The neglected component of school science

One neglected component of school science concerns the 'habits of the mind*of students when they engage in investigative tasks. From the constructivistperspective, learning is viewed as a purposeful and relevant process ofmeaning-construction, linked to the values, beliefs and attitudes pupils hold,and the meanings they construe in the problem context (see Gunstone 1988for some examples of student ideas and beliefs). This component, which wecontend is overarching, accounts for much of the variation in problem-solving approaches, with diverse attentional and motivational patterns inresponse to the various surface features and deep structures of the learningtasks (for examples see Eylon and Linn 1988). Consequently, different levelsand qualities of outcomes of problems are attained by subgroups of pupils,each of distinct cognitive processing styles (see Entwistle 1987). Novak(1987: 357) has also highlighted the significance of this component:

The objective, value-free character of science or other fields of knowledgecreation was only a positivist's myth sustained by ignoring the myriads ofsubjective and value-based decisions that everyone involved in knowledgeproduction must make. It is this constructive integration of thinking, feelingand acting that gives a distinctively human character to knowledge production.

Gowin (1981) has advanced a vee heuristic to help pupils understand theconstructed nature of knowledge and to take charge of their own meaningconstruction in science activities.

Demarcation of constructivism in school science

Constructivists subscribe to the idea of the individuality of personalcognitive constructs and deny a correspondence of these constructs to the

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notions of certainty and absolute truths. Since scientific knowledge is also aproduct of human corporate endeavour, pupils need to be initiated into acommon socially-constructed world. Hence social justification and specificobjectivity are the hallmarks of constructivism in science knowledge andacquisition. These should be interpreted simultaneously in the context ofscience in schools.

(1) Social justification: Science knowledge is socially constructed, andmediated in a research tradition commonly shared by scientists. Thissocial character of science results in certain legitimate world viewsabout the nature of scientific methodology, patterns of scientificchange, status of scientific knowledge and its demarcation from non-science (Kouladidis 1987). Consequently, students need to beinitiated into this tradition and experience this social justificationduring their personal construction of knowledge. It is in this researchtradition that the objectivity of scientific knowledge can be defined.Hence theories should be viewed as provisional and fallible.

(2) Specific objectivity: Science knowledge is constructed in an objectiveway, deploying scientific process and problem-solving skills andscience concepts in a relevant context. This construction process isguided by the specific habits of the mind and prior conceptions ofstudents, allowing them to make claims about what they value,believe, or feel, and also about how they perceive the way the worldworks. These specificities result in a proliferation of alternativeframeworks of understanding of scientific knowledge.

Crossing the Rubicon to a constructivist pedagogy

Given that science knowledge has to be both personally and sociallyconstructed, the key characteristic of a constructivist pedagogy in science isto cross the Rubicon from the diversified constructs of personal knowledge tothe domain of socially justified and publicly mediated knowledge. Driver(1987: 89, 90), who endorsed the same view, has described the key features ofthe constructivist approach used in the Children's Learning in ScienceProject (CLISP):

In this [socialization] process, the [science] curriculum, rather than beingconsidered as 'that which is to be learned', is seen as a set of experiences fromwhich the learners construct a view closer to the scientists' view.

As a mediator between the scientists' knowledge and childrens' understand-ings the teacher is required to act as a diagnostician of children's thinking and atthe same time, to carry a map in his/her head of the conceptual domain whichenables appropriate activities to be suggested and meanings negotiated. [Ouremphases.]

The process of negotiation of meanings between teachers and pupils is thenthe key characteristic of the constructivist pedagogy. Undeniably, thereshould be a consensus amongst science teachers and curriculum developersabout the most appropriate map for use in school science. Teachers' priorconceptions of teaching and learning are also vital in the negotiation process.

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The key questions to ask, according to Gunstone (1988) are 'How canteachers make this interpretation/model/generalization etc. appear believ-able to students?' and 'How can teachers show this interpretation etc. to bemore useful, in particular contexts or generally, than the one pupils currentlyuse?'

Since habits of the mind plays a key role in the personal construction ofknowledge, it would be appropriate to give particular attention to thiscomponent when exploring the formation of the various alternative frame-works with pupils. Such manoeuvres are likely to have a higher probability ofcorrecting misunderstandings of scientific concepts and principles, than theuse of one-way expositions treating the surface symptoms of individualmisconceptions.

Given all these, the Spiral of Knowing, which is a resultant hybrid of bothmaturation and social experiential learning, highlights the significance of therich base of prior conceptions in the negotiated learning process. Whatremains uncertain is how this humanistic constructivist pedagogy might beput into practice in the classroom (for some concrete experiences see Driver1988). The next section suggests some principles to be considered if theuncertainty is to be resolved. However, the experiences at Monash Univer-sity in Australia show that theories about the enhancement of pupils'metacognition, when put into practice, are likely to be interpreted byteachers in diverse ways, and these resulting experiences will in returnreshape the guiding theory (White 1988).

The key to success

From Rousseau in the eighteenth-century, through Dewey and Armstrongonwards, the idea of heurism prevails, differing only in the ways it has beenpackaged for use in the classroom. Unfortunately, in the past, the concept ofheurism was based on an outdated philosophical account of abstractionismand empiricism put forward by John Locke, and the inductivism pro-pounded by Francis Bacon (see Wellington 1981). The five aspects that weredelineated above and the various conceptual models discussed earlierconstitute our humanistic constructivist model of school science based onconstructivist epistemology, the socio-psychological environment, cognitivepsychology, and contemporary views of the sociology of knowledge andphilosophy of science. The key to success, we contend, lies in (1) design oflearning tasks, (2) classroom management and (3) formative monitoring ofprogression and differentiation.

Design of learning tasks

Learning tasks should be set in the context of a coherent view of learning inschool science, such as the one described above. Apart from decisions aboutthe task environment, viz., decisions about how procedural and conceptualknowledge are deployed, having due regard to both task complexity and taskapproach, teachers need to consider how the learning tasks should match the

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learners' needs, readiness and cognitive processing styles. There is a need fora common language to describe tasks. These tasks, which span theprogrammes of study, should aim to achieve curricular balance and pro-gression. The precise design of these tasks should be informed by conceptualmodels of the type illustrated in figure 2 (see also Murphy 1988 for someinsight into pupils' responses to practical investigations from the APU).

Classroom management

There is little doubt that classroom management strategies and resources willneed further development and refinement, so that they adequately takeaccount of the constructivist philosophy. The move towards a constructivistpedagogy generates a new agenda for a continuing debate on the notion of acommon curriculum for the common school. The important point to note isthat the implemented curriculum, instead of the common intended one, hasto take into account the diversity of alternative frameworks and habits of themind. These should be the starting points of any negotiating process in theconstruction of meanings. Classroom management strategies should providegenuine opportunities for children to be regarded as individuals rather thancorporate bodies. This is particularly important in the development ofmetacognition since pupils need to understand and be responsible for theirlearning. The negotiation of perceptions, meanings and understandings hasto begin at the level of the individual. The design of appropriate learningtasks has to take into account the starting points of the individuals concerned.Although the end points may be more clearly focused in terms of theirsocially justified status, there may well be a variety of routes towards theseend points.

Crossing the Rubicon from the diversified constructs of personalknowledge to the domain of socially justified and publicly mediatedknowledge requires the development of methods of group dialogue that allowthe achievement of group consensus, during which the teacher plays the roleof both diagnostician and mediator between public and personal knowledge.The simplistic notion that knowledge is imparted or acquired has limitedcredibility.

Formative monitoring of progression and differentiation

Recognizing and interpreting the needs of children as individuals require theestablishment of reliable assessment methodologies and materials. Theseshould provide both diagnostic and formative information about pupils'progress. This information, if it is to be of maximal use to teachers, should becapable of relatively easy collection and interpretation and be an integral partof the learning environment.

The use of checklists, self-reports and oral dialogue are potentially usefulin this monitoring process. Using the analogy of a zoom-lens on a camera,teachers, during their monitoring of student progress, should focus onparticular aspects of performance while students are engaged in their

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learning tasks. This analogy highlights the need for tasks to have clearobjectives and structures, which in turn influence the layout and structure ofthe monitoring instruments. To this end, the various structural parts of theproblem-solving cycle model in figure 1 provide a heuristic tool.

Epilogue

Curriculum development requires a sound theoretical underpinning andevaluation if it is to achieve its aim of improving the quality of educationalprovision. This is not to suggest that curriculum planning should not beinformed by existing practice. Indeed, to echo the words of Lawton (1989: 3):

. . . in practical activities such as . . . education... practice tends to precedetheory; but this does not mean that theory is unnecessary —at a later stagetheory refines practice and it eventually becomes difficult to improve practicewithout theoretical analysis.

The national curriculum in science, introduced into England and Wales, hasbeen developed from the perspective of current practice and educationaltheory. It is the argument of this paper, however, that a broader-basedtheoretical perspective is needed.

Rowell and Dawson (1989) have suggested that there is the need for anintegrated theory and practice for science teaching. We suggest that byintegrating relevant developments from Piagetian and neo-Piagetian theory,modern cognitive psychology (particularly in the field of problem-solving)and constructivist epistemology it is possible to construct a broad-basedmodel of science learning. This model recognizes the importance of thelearning context, the habits of the mind and the role of metacognition. On thebasis of this model it is possible to develop pedagogic heuristics whichintegrate the procedural and conceptual elements of science learning. Thesecan be applied to curricula, including the national curriculum in sciencerecently introduced into England and Wales. The practice of scienceeducation is refined by the model, which itself is tested and expanded by theresulting practice.

If however, the principles formulated at a very general level in this articleare to be tested and translated into practice there is a need to identify moreclearly those issues that require further research. Of particular concern inthis respect is the need for further research into the effective developmentand use of diagnostic and formative assessment in the classroom. Muchrelevant research has already been carried out by the research and develop-ment initiatives of projects such as: the Assessment of Performance Unit (APU)(see DES 1988 b, c, 1989 a, d); the Graded Assessment in Science Project (GASP)(see GASP 1988); the Cognitive Acceleration through Science Education Project(CASE) (see Adey and Shayer 1990); the Children's Learning in Science Project(CLISP) (see Driver 1987, Driver and Bell 1986); Open-ended Work in ScienceProject (see OPENS 1988); Science Processes and Concept Exploration Project(SPACE) (see Harlen 1988); Science Teachers Action Research Project (STAR)(see Harlen and Russell 1990); Secondary Science Curriculum Review (SSCR)(see SSCR 1987); and the London Mental Models Group based at the Centre for

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Educational Studies, King's College, University of London, among manyothers too numerous to catalogue. What is lacking is a common frame intowhich all the pieces might be set. It is hoped that this paper will contributetowards the coherence of future research in the area of learning andassessment in science education.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to Philip Adey, Paul Black, Guy Claxton, Juliet Froufe,Arthur Lucas and Anne Quaker for their critical comments on this paper.The views expressed have benefited greatly through discussions with ourcolleagues in the Assessment of Performance Unit (Science) and others in theCentre for Educational Studies, King's College, University of London. Theopinions expressed however, are solely those of the authors.

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Towards a humanistic constructivist model of science learning: changing perspectives and research implications