Edited by Martin Beck, Dietrich Jung,

and Peter Seeberg

THE LEVANT IN TURMOIL

Syria, Palestine, and the Transformation of Middle Eastern Politics

WORLD

THEMODERNMUSLIM

The Levant in Turmoil

THE MODERN MUSLIM WORLD

Series Editor: Dietrich Jung of the Center for Contemporary Middle

East Studies, University of Southern Denmark

The modern Muslim world is an integral part of global society. In

transcending the confines of area studies, this series encompasses

scholarly work on political, economic, and cultural issues in modern

Muslim history, taking a global perspective. Focusing on the period

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ing of contemporary Muslim life in a comparative perspective and as

an inseparable part of modern globality.

Migration, Security, and Citizenship in the Middle East: New Perspectives

Edited by Peter Seeberg and Zaid Eyadat

Politics of Modern Muslim Subjectivities: Islam, Youth, and Social Activism

in the Middle East

Dietrich Jung, Marie Juul Petersen, and Sara Cathrine Lei Sparre

Transnational Islam in Interwar Europe: Muslim Activists and Thinkers

Edited by G ö tz Nordbruch and Umar Ryad

The International Politics of the Arab Spring: Popular Unrest and Foreign Policy

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Regional Powers in the Middle East: New Constellations after the Arab Revolts

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Tablighi Jamaat and the Quest for the London Mega Mosque: Continuity and Change

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Muslimism in Turkey and Beyond: Religion in the Modern World

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Globalized Muslim Youth in the Asia Pacific: Popular Culture in Singapore and

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Kamaludeen Mohamed Nasir

The Levant in Turmoil: Syria, Palestine, and the Transformation of

Middle Eastern Politics

Edited by Martin Beck, Dietrich Jung, and Peter Seeberg

The Levant in Turmoil

Syria, Palestine, and the Transformation of Middle Eastern Politics

Edited by Martin Beck , Dietrich Jung ,

and Peter Seeberg

THE LEVANT IN TURMOIL

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Names: Beck, Martin, 1962 October 23– editor. | Jung, Dietrich, 1959– editor. | Seeberg, Peter, 1952– editor.Title: The Levant in turmoil : Syria, Palestine, and the transformation of Middle Eastern politics / edited by Martin Beck, Dietrich Jung, Peter Seeberg.Description: New York, NY : Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. | Series: The modern Muslim world | Includes bibliographical references and index.Identifiers: LCCN 2015023441Subjects: LCSH: Syria—History—Civil War, 2011– | Syria—History—Civil War, 2011 —Refugees. | Syria—Politics and government—21st century. | Palestinian Arabs—Politics and government—21st century. | Palestine—Politics and government—21st century. | Arab-Israeli conflict. | Regime change—Middle East. | Middle East—Politics and government— 21st century. | BISAC: POLITICAL SCIENCE / International Relations / General. | POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Freedom & Security / Human Rights. | POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / Political Advocacy.Classification: LCC DS98.6 .L478 2016 | DDC 956.05/4—dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2015023441

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Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2016 978-1-137-53722-5

Contents

List of Tables vii

Acknowledgments ix

Introduction Political Turmoil and Social Transformation

in the Levant 1

Martin Beck, Dietrich Jung, and Peter Seeberg

1 Syria’s Civil War and the Reconfiguration of Regional

Politics 13

Fred H. Lawson

2 Deadly Implications: The Rise of Sectarianism in Syria 39

Peter Sluglett

3 Conflict, Governance, and Decentralized Authority

in Syria 57

Samer N. Abboud

4 The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Its Impact on Jordan:

In Reference to the Regime’s Structural Deficits 79

Simone H ü ser

5 The Crisis in Syria, International and Regional Sanctions,

and the Transformation of the Political Order in

the Levant 101

Peter Seeberg

6 The “Syrian Effects” and the Regional Quest for Human

Dignity in the New Syrian, Egyptian, and Tunesian

Constitutions 123

Mervat F. Hatem

7 Israel and a Palestinian State: Redrawing Lines? 147

Lorenzo Kamel

vi CONTENTS

8 Failed Attempts or Failures to Attempt? Western Policies

toward Palestinian Statehood 167

Martin Beck

9 Turmoil in the Levant: Inconclusive Conclusions 191

Dietrich Jung

List of Contributors 211

Index 215

Tables

3.1 Effectiveness of methods of conflict financing 65

4.1 Distribution of Syrian refugees in Jordan 82

4.2 Unemployment rate in Jordan between 2009 and 2013 84

4.3 Unemployment rate in the Jordanian governorates 85

Acknowledgments

The present volume is partly based on the proceedings of the interna-

tional conference “The Levant in Transformation: The Syrian Crisis

in a Regional Perspective,” which took place on May 23–24, 2014,

at the Center for Contemporary Middle East Studies, University of

Southern Denmark in Odense. We would like to thank the University

of Southern Denmark for hosting the conference and the Danish

Institute in Damascus for the grant that was indispensable for facili-

tating both the conference and the production of this book. In addi-

tion, we would like to express our gratitude to the participants at our

conference and in particular to those who have contributed to this

book.

Dietrich Jung conducted his work as editor and wrote his contri-

bution in his capacity as a partner at CRIC (Centre for Resolution of

International Conflicts). Therefore he would like to thank the Danish

Council for Strategic Research, who granted funding to CRIC in the

period between August 2013 and August 2016.

The way from a manuscript to a book is usually long and we

would like to thank those people who helped us in eventually getting

this volume ready. This applies to the reviewers for their most help-

ful comments, as well as to Catherine Schwerin and Karen Ulbjerg

J ø rgensen, for their assistance in carefully editing this book. Finally,

we are grateful for the support of Farideh Koohi-Kamali, Alisa Pulver,

and Veronica Goldstein from Palgrave, New York, who professionally

handled the production process of this volume.

Odense, Spring 2015

MARTIN BECK,

DIETRICH JUNG,

and

PETER SEEBERG

I N T R O D U C T I O N

Political Turmoil and Social

Transformation in the Levant

Martin Beck , Dietrich Jung , a nd Peter Seeberg

In the year 2014, the ongoing Syrian civil war, the advancement of

the Islamic State (IS) in both Syria and Iraq, another round of failed

bilateral negotiations in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the mili-

tary escalation in Gaza raised the question as to whether the devel-

opments in the Levant might lead not only to processes of regime

change, but possibly also to an even more fundamental alteration of

the Levant’s entire state system. In the period after the Arab Uprisings

of 2010–11, any hopes for a democratic, social, and political change

in the Middle East have increasingly been disappointed. This applies

in particular to the subregion of the Levant, where warfare has char-

acterized the situation in Syria, Iraq, and the Gaza Strip. Hopes for a

democratic rule in Syria and Iraq, as well as for the establishment of a

Palestinian state in coexistence with Israel, have been essentially frus-

trated. Confronted with the enormous human suffering in Syria, the

international community has shown an appalling inability to act in an

efficient way. The Syrian population has become the pawn of a com-

plex setting of brutal regime repression, militia warfare, organized

crime, and the diverging interests of regional states and international

great powers.

At the end of World War I, the international great powers together

with their respective regional clients established a new political order

in the Levant on the remnants of the territories of the demised

Ottoman Empire. Although heavily disputed and challenged by vari-

ous actors, in the end, this new political landscape of modern national

states has largely remained unchanged until today. However, the

2 MARTIN BECK, DIETRICH JUNG, AND PETER SEEBERG

continuing dismantlement of the Syrian state and the territorial asser-

tions of the IS are knitted into regional conflicts such as the Kurdish

issue, the sectarian struggle in Iraq, the future of the Lebanese state,

and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Taking into account this complex

setting of conflicts, the political violence that has unfolded since the

“Arab Spring” might put at stake the political borders of the post–

World War I order.

Taking this turmoil in the Levant as its central point of reference,

this book brings together a multidisciplinary group of scholars. The

following chapters are written by international experts in the fields

of Middle East area studies, history, International Relations, political

science, and sociology. They provide fresh descriptions and analyses

of the political predicament in the Levant that arose in the aftermath

of the Arab Spring. This is done with the aim of presenting studies

on the turmoil in the Levant from different disciplinary angles. We

do not attempt to offer a theoretical frame through which all authors

are expected to process their empirical data. Instead, we want to pre-

sent a multiplicity of perspectives on current developments in the

region. We asked the contributors to address the political turmoil in

the Levant from their disciplinary angles, based on their own schol-

arly experiences. The volume is therefore deliberately characterized by

a diversity of approaches and styles that give credit to the productive

plurality of scholarly traditions as well as to each single author’s theo-

retical and methodological preferences. 1 In this endeavor the authors

present their specific answers to the overarching question of the ways

in which we might discern indicators for a political transformation

of the state system in the Levant including its social, economic, and

ethnic foundations. With the nine chapters of this book, the editors

intend to provide the reader with diverse answers to this general ques-

tion. As the turmoil in the Levant is ongoing, it goes without saying

that these answers are preliminary. They are meant to fuel the debate

on the transformation of Middle East politics rather than to offer

premature conclusions.

In chapter 1 , Fred Lawson opens our discussion with an analysis

based on a chronology of events of the Syrian civil war. Lawson’s

chapter is first of all a primer for the reader, giving a detailed overview

of the developments on the ground. Lawson gives a precise account of

the enormously fragmented political landscape of this war as it devel-

oped throughout 2014. In so doing, he discerns four key features that

characterized the Syrian war in its fourth year. First, he observes, sim-

ilar to Peter Sluglett in chapter 2 , a clear shift toward a fully sectarian-

ized conflict. Second, he points to a remarkable increase in infighting

INTRODUCTION 3

among those militias that initially had the mutually shared goal of

combating the regime in Damascus. Third, Lawson observes the loss

of control over large parts of Syrian territory by Damascus. Fourth,

the regime nevertheless was able to maintain state control over some

key districts with the help of loyal militias.

The second aim of the chapter is to analyze the reconfiguration

of interstate relations in the Middle East, based on the previously

mentioned key features of the war. In assessing the impact of the

Syrian war on the relationship among regional states, Lawson puts

the focus on Turkey’s regional realignments and the reconfiguration

of the relationship between Iraq and Iran. In addition, he emphasizes

the ascendance of a much more powerful role in regional politics of

the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq and of

local Kurdish organizations in general. The chapter concludes with

a description of the shift in the pattern of regional alignments as,

according to Lawson, took place during the winter of 2013–14 and

which are closely related to the “pronounced turn” of the Syrian war

toward ethno-sectarian violence. Lawson’s analysis clearly shows the

transformative power of the events in Syria on a regional level; how-

ever, it also indicates the rather ambiguous nature of these transfor-

mations, making predictions with respect to their outcomes a mere

speculative endeavor.

The turn to ethno-sectarian violence described by Lawson, often

accompanied by Sunni Jihadism, to a certain extent mirrors the vio-

lent expressions of sectarianism that more generally have become a

frequent occurrence in the multi-sectarian parts of the Arab world.

The background for this relatively new phenomenon is described

and analyzed in chapter 2 by Peter Sluglett, with a particular focus

on Syria. The idea of his contribution is to explain how uncoordi-

nated protests and demonstrations developed into an armed conflict

between the regime and the opposition and later became transformed

into a sectarian civil war. The chapter takes a historical starting point,

looking at the modern history of Syria, the creation of the army, and

its history related to several military coups. Furthermore Sluglett

analyses the development of the Baath party and the social and eco-

nomic conditions under Hafiz al-Assad, who based his power on the

Alawi sect in Syria.

Sluglett describes how in 1982 the regime crushed the militant

uprising in Hama with extreme brutality, thereby contributing to lay-

ing the foundation for a “modern form of Salafism.” This Salafism,

building on both Sunni extremism and anti-Shiism, gained impetus

as a result of regional protests against the US-led invasion in Iraq in

4 MARTIN BECK, DIETRICH JUNG, AND PETER SEEBERG

2003. The leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and

others attempted to trigger a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites,

an ambition that was continued by followers in Iraq and Syria. The

chapter emphasizes that the conflict in Syria is not simply a result of

Sunni-Shia contradictions. When the protests began in early 2011,

power was monopolized by a heterodox minority, and the extremely

repressive response to the demonstrations by the regime went out of

control. In this development the religious dimension gradually began

to play an increasing role, not least because of anticipations of revenge

after a possible end of the fighting. It is one of Sluglett’s interest-

ing points to underline that the internal struggle in Syria is to some

degree a result of contradictions beyond Syria’s borders. The chapter

concludes with the idea that even though the complex regional devel-

opment, including the rise of the IS, might not lead to a transforma-

tion of the state system in the Levant, the turmoil in the region will

continue into the foreseeable future.

Basing his analysis on the complexities of the Syrian war economy

with its multiplicity of competing actors, Samer Abboud comes to

a similar conclusion in chapter 3 . In applying the lenses of politi-

cal economy, Abboud is predominantly interested in the very fluid

emergence of new political authorities in the course of the war in

Syria. For the year 2014, he observed the evolution of four distinct

areas that represented centers of military and administrative power.

First, there are those territories that have remained under control of

the Assad regime. Then, there is the squat of land under the control

of the IS, which combines territories within both the Syrian and the

Iraqi states. The third area is the Kurdish enclaves in the northern

parts of Syria, close to the borders to Turkey and Iraq. Finally, there

are various smaller pieces of territory in the south and northwest of

Syria that are under control of different rebel factions.

Abboud describes and analyzes the emergence of forms of micro-

governance and decentralized authority in these four areas. He argues

that, together with different economic interests, this fragmentation of

political authority—so far—has prevented the establishment of more

stable, alternative forms of state institutions that could replace the

institutions of the Syrian Baath regime. In economic terms, it is in

particular the often predatory nature of the economics of these new

forms of political authority that rules out their coalescence into more

lasting state institutions. Instead of benefiting from effective forms of

governance, some of these predatory networks have a major interest

in the continuation of conflict and war. They are the principle bene-

fiters of the political and economic fragmentation of Syria. According

INTRODUCTION 5

to Abboud’s analysis, therefore, the future role of these predatory

actors, the question of their inclusion in or exclusion from attempts to

settle the conflict over Syria and to reconstruct more lasting forms of

authority, will be decisive in conditioning the future political trans-

formations of the region.

In chapter 4 , Simone H ü ser deals with one of the most impor-

tant repercussions of the turmoil in Syria: the massive refugee crisis

it has created in several countries of the region. H ü ser picks Jordan

as a case study of high relevance: 600,000 of the nearly four mil-

lion Syrian refugees ended up in Jordan, which makes the Hashemite

Kingdom, after Lebanon, the second biggest recipient of Syrian refu-

gees in relation to the indigenous population. Thus, as a result of the

influx of Syrian refugees, the Jordanian population has grown nearly

10 percent. H ü ser describes in her painstaking empirical study the

effects that the influx of refugees had on the socioeconomic system of

Jordan. At the same time, she emphasizes that it would be misleading

to perceive the refugee influx to Jordan wholesale as a burden that

has caused a socioeconomic crisis. As H ü ser points out, most of the

crisis symptoms are the result of the homemade structural deficits of

policies pursued in the period prior to the refugee influx. Moreover,

the regime has also managed to exploit the “refugee crisis” to gain

legitimacy, both in terms of material resources (in the form of acquir-

ing political rents) and “soft” strategies (for instance in the form of

scapegoating policies).

H ü ser comes to the conclusion that the “refugee crisis” in Jordan

for the time being has not contributed to a potential transformation of

the state system in the Levant. Rather, the Hashemite regime has man-

aged to use the influx of refugees to stabilize its rule. Demonstrations

related to the Arab Uprisings have indeed significantly decreased with

the influx of Syrian refugees. There are potential destabilizing fac-

tors, for instance Syrian refugees could serve as a pool for Jihadist

groups. Yet, these destabilizing factors have not materialized as such

and at the end of the year 2014 there were no strong indicators that

they would do so in the foreseeable future.

In chapter 5 , taking its point of departure in international and

regional sanctions imposed against Syria, Peter Seeberg discusses to

what degree and in which ways the sanctions have impacted on the

development in Syria and on the regional power balance. Furthermore,

the chapter views the sanctions as part of changes in the political

order in the Levant that seem to imply a gradual transformation of

the state system in the region. Following a presentation of theoretical

aspects related to the use of sanctions in international politics, the

6 MARTIN BECK, DIETRICH JUNG, AND PETER SEEBERG

chapter describes and analyzes the main foreign policy interests of

the international and regional actors that have imposed sanctions on

Syria.

The American sanctions have a relatively long history and, based

on claims by the United States that Syria supports terror groups, go

back to the late 1970s. In contrast to the US sanctions, the European

Union (EU) sanctions are a result of a change in the European

approach to Syria, which followed the Syrian clampdown on the pro-

testers and demonstrators in the early spring of 2011. The interna-

tional sanctions consisted of restrictive measures against individuals

from or close to the regime, but also on broad economic sanctions

and an oil embargo. This was also the case with the Arab League

sanctions, which additionally involved an expulsion of Syria from the

organization, while the Turkish sanctions contributed to the regional

isolation of Syria. Peter Seeberg claims in his chapter that these sanc-

tions as such did not reach their goal, because the sanctioning actors

did not constitute a strong and coherent coalition, and they did not

coordinate their actions. They were not able to obtain support from

a unanimous UN Security Council, due—first of all—to Russian

and Chinese opposition. Thus, important conditions that might

have made the sanctions work were not present in the given politi-

cal context. However, the sanctions implied a restructuring of power

relations in the Arab Middle East and became a part of a changing

political reality in the region, where the traditional significant politi-

cal centers Bagdad, Cairo, and Damascus have lost power in compari-

son to the Gulf States. In sum, the chapter claims that the sanctions

might not have had much direct impact on the Syrian regime, but

they contributed to structural changes in the political order in the

Levant, implying a potential transformation of the state system in the

region.

Political transformations often find their written expression in

constitutional texts. In chapter 6 , Mervat F. Hatem therefore looks at

the traces that the “dignity revolutions” of the Arab Spring have left

in the new constitutions of Syria, Egypt, and Tunisia. Hatem begins

with a brief assessment of the regional political economy behind the

recent Arab Uprisings that started in December 2010 in Tunisia. In

her assessment, she puts her focus on youth and its exclusion from

employment and the concomitant delay in the age of marriage. Hatem

argues that the political economy of the Arab Spring was characterized

by the blindness of regional states to the challenges that their youth-

ful populations have posed. The call for dignity, according to Hatem,

was a call to correct economic exclusion, gender-based discrimination,

INTRODUCTION 7

social inequalities, and the experience of bodily harm, humiliation,

and torture by the authoritarian regimes. Applying a comparative

approach, Hatem analyzes the ways in which these demands for dig-

nity have been addressed by the newly drafted constitutions.

In the three constitutions, Hatem discerns both continuities and

change. Change in the 2012 constitution in Syria, for instance, is vis-

ible in the removal of the article that guaranteed the Baath party a

monopoly of political power in the previous constitution. However,

this did not really challenge the power of the regime that essentially

converges in the presidency. Moreover, the preamble of the constitu-

tion still maintains the dated language of the classical Arab national-

ism of the 1950s and 1960s. In a similar way, both new Egyptian

constitutions from 2012 and 2014 were drafted with strong references

to the 1972 constitution, eventually allowing the military to reclaim

its predominance in a newly built authoritarian state. The preambles

of both the 2012 constitution drafted under Muslim Brotherhood

rule and the 2014 constitution under the newly established military

regime refer to concepts of the “dignity revolution” such as liberty,

public sovereignty, democratic governance, equality, and the rule of

law. Yet, as in the Syrian constitution, the Egyptian constitutions

undermined these bills of rights in simultaneously stipulating the

higher interest of the community and the state vis- à -vis individuals. In

contradistinction to Syria and Egypt, Tunisia saw a different process

of the drafting of its new constitution. Here the document reflects

the societal consensus that was behind the new drafting of the con-

stitution with its minimum level of political consent and compromise.

This difference is particularly emphasized by the stipulation that the

family is the basic social institution without making any reference to

religion. In sharp contrast to this, the Syrian and Egyptian constitu-

tions stipulate religion to be a constitutive element for defining the

family as a constitutional social institution.

In chapter 7 , Lorenzo Kamel presents a historical analysis of the

conflict over Palestine in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He

links the examination of top-down processes with often neglected

bottom-up processes, thereby emphasizing the role of “Biblical

Orientalism.” According to Kamel, Biblical Orientalism shaped both

processes and sidelined the role of the majority of men and women

who lived in the area constructed as “Holy Land.” For a long time

Palestinians contributed to Biblical Orientalism insofar as they made

no major effort to bring the history of Palestinians back in. Only in

the past decade, as a response to a perception of threat to their iden-

tity, have Palestinians discovered archives as a tool to embrace their

8 MARTIN BECK, DIETRICH JUNG, AND PETER SEEBERG

own history. Kamel then shows how the politicization of the various

archival (and pseudo-archival) initiatives connects to what he criti-

cally labels the “empty” debate on the one- or two-state solution of

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

In terms of the overarching question of the present volume,

Lorenzo Kamel comes up with two enriching theses. First, we are

possibly witnessing a “groundbreaking moment,” comparable to the

one when, in the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth

century, “European modernity” caused basic changes in the regional

system. This time, however, change could not only mean a recon-

figuration of the Levantine state system, but also possibly lead to

a “partial deconstruction” of nationalism in the region. This said,

Kamel suggests in his second thesis that the impact of the alleged

structural change in the Levant on Palestine will only be limited due

to the special characteristics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There

are actually particularities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that set

apart Israel and the territories occupied by Israel from other areas

of the Levant. However, specific events after World War II estab-

lished linkages between the areas: wars. The first Arab-Israeli war of

1948–49 created significant Palestinian refugee communities in the

Levant, particularly in Lebanon and Jordan. Although the Palestinian

issue currently does not play a major role in the regional debate on

the Levant in turmoil, it is hard to imagine that the region could

undergo deep structural change without sooner or later raising the

issue. Moreover, it is remarkable—and supports Kamel’s thesis—that

apart from some skirmishes with Syria, Israel refrained from getting

militarily involved in the regional crisis. There are no strong indica-

tors that a policy change is ahead, particularly since Israel avoided

any attempts to regionalize the Gaza War in 2014. However, if Israel

still became engaged in a regional war, a linkage between the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict and the alleged transition of the state system in

the Levant could occur: If in such a hypothetical war, as happened in

previous wars, Palestinians were expelled from areas claimed by Israel

as strategic, their political leadership could use the momentum to

annex further parts of Palestine.

Based on an analytical framework that models the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict as a three-level game, Martin Beck discusses in

chapter 8 three cases of Western responses to Palestinian ambitions

of acquiring Palestinian statehood, thereby focusing on the United

States and the “big three” actors of the EU: France, Germany, and

the United Kingdom. His first case covers the period around 1980,

when the Europeans attempted to return to the Middle East with a

INTRODUCTION 9

new declaratory policy that, when compared to the US approach of

these days, attributed a more significant role to the Palestinians. Beck

then critically discusses the contemporary cases of Western responses

to the “Palestine 194” initiative and the round of bilateral negotia-

tions, the so-called Kerry initiative. His analysis confirms the high

relevance of the international image as a third level beyond the inter-

governmental and the societal dimension of the conflict. In particu-

lar, Beck shows that both concepts of Rationalist consequentialism

and Social Constructivist appropriateness contribute to a better com-

prehension of Western policies toward Palestine.

Martin Beck argues that the conflict over Palestine has the poten-

tial to contribute to a fundamental transformation of the state system

in the Levant. Yet, the trends in Palestinian politics and reactions

to them in the West do not point in this direction. The initiative

“Palestine 194” has been a failure in terms of full recognition of

Palestine as a member state of the United Nations. Although the

Palestinian Authority managed to become upgraded in the United

Nations (the so-called Vatican status), got full membership in both

the UNESCO and the International Criminal Court, and was fully

recognized as a state by EU member Sweden, the impact in terms of

an actual—rather than virtual or symbolic—alteration of the state

system in the Levant is rather limited. The Kerry initiative to hold

another round of bilateral negotiations between the Israelis and

Palestinians appeared from the very beginning not much more than

an attempt to pretend negotiated peace rather than a process with the

potential to establish a “real” Palestinian state, which indeed would

contribute to a more substantial transformation of the Levantine state

system. Moreover, none of the relevant actors—Israel, the Palestinian

Authority in the West Bank, and Hamas in the Gaza Strip—have

made attempts to get involved in the regional turmoil taking place

on the territories of Syria and Iraq. Thus, the findings of Beck con-

firm Kamel’s diagnosis that the Israeli-Palestinian complex follows

its own logic and is only partly connected to other political arenas of

the Levant.

The volume ends with the concluding chapter 9 by Dietrich Jung.

Taking his point of departure in the discussion about the nature of

the IS, Jung puts the focus on three interrelated issues: the politi-

cal economy of the Syrian war, the increasing sectarianization of the

conflict, and the embeddedness of the current situation in regional

and international politics. In the first section of the chapter, Jung

elaborates an analytical framework that is based on some elements

of the school of historical sociology. This theoretical section makes

10 MARTIN BECK, DIETRICH JUNG, AND PETER SEEBERG

particular references to the work of Charles Tilly, Max Weber, and

Sinisa Malesevic. Based on this analytical frame of reference, the

chapter continues with a discussion of the previously mentioned three

issues. In this discussion, Jung engages in a conversation with the

other contributors to this book. He presents his own argumentation

in close relationship with the assumptions, arguments, and findings

of the previous chapters.

In applying Charles Tilly’s analogy of war making and state mak-

ing as organized crime, Jung analyzes the war in Syria from the

vantage point of a number of nascent state-building processes. In

these processes, the sectarianization of the conflict serves the aim of

emerging proto-states in two ways. On the one hand, it is an attempt

to enhance the legitimacy of these new emerging political authorities

with regard to the population under their rule. On the other hand,

it is an ideological means to get support from regional states that

utilize sectarian ideologies in their striving for political hegemony

in the Levant. Putting the Syrian war and the fragmented forms of

political authority this war has generated into the context of regional

and international interstate relations, the chapter argues that we most

probably will not see the emergence of new states. Political change

might occur instead in the way in which existing states deal with the

ongoing social and geopolitical transformation of the region. With

regard to Syria, we eventually might expect institutional changes in

a postwar order toward more decentralized forms of rule comprising

elements of federalism and autonomy schemes.

Note

1 . The contributions to this volume contain names, locations, and

technical terms that have their linguistic origin in Arabic, Kurdish,

Persian, and Turkish languages. Various forms of transliteration have

been applied to them. For the editors it was not always possible to

retrieve the original terms and therefore enormously difficult and

time-consuming to standardize the transliterations. Consequently,

we approached this problem in a pragmatic way. In terms of names

and locations, we use the most common spellings in English, do

not write them in italics, and avoid the transliteration of the Arabic

letters hamza and ain . Technical terms are set in italics and follow

the IJMES word list, however, again avoiding the transliteration of

hamza and ain . These rules apply to the main text of all chapters.

Only the transliterations and names in brackets that were given by

the authors of the respective chapters have been left as they were.

Finally, the authors use different abbreviations and names for the

INTRODUCTION 11

“Islamic State” (IS, ISIS, ISIL) given the fact that this group has

changed its name several times. We decided not to standardize these

abbreviations and have left them as the authors used them. Any fur-

ther errors and mistakes are the fault of the editors.

C H A P T E R 1

Syria’s Civil War and the

Reconf iguration of

Regional Politics

Fred H . Lawson

Introduction

Syria’s civil war exhibited four key features during its fourth chaotic

year. First, the conflict became fully sectarianized. Civil rights activ-

ists who had championed a secularist platform were eclipsed by various

strains of radical Islamists, whose manifestos framed the conflict in

overtly religious terms and whose objectives tended to be couched in

millenarian discourse. Fighters of the Assistance Front for the People

of Syria (Jabhat al-Nusrah li Ahl al-Sham) and the Islamic State in

Iraq and the Levant (al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah fi al-’Iraq wal-Sham,

or ISIL) imposed draconian restrictions and inflicted severe punish-

ments on ethno-sectarian minorities in the districts that fell into their

hands. Such actions prompted Syria’s previously quiescent Kurdish

community to mobilize to defend itself. The shadowy Democratic

Union Party (PYD) took charge of the effort to protect the Kurds

of the northeastern provinces, and the PYD-affiliated militia—the

Popular Protection Units (YPG)—battled the Assistance Front and

the ISIL on two main fronts: the oil-producing areas around al-

Hasakah and Deir ez-Zor and the towns that lie along the border

with Turkey. The Kurdish fighters were joined in the fight against

the Islamist radicals by armed formations of Turkomans, Shiis and

Syriac and Chaldean Christians, as well as by the tribespeople of the

northeastern marches.

14 FRED H. LAWSON

Second, forces opposed to the Baathist regime increasingly

engaged in combat against one another. A major fault line divided

the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant from Syria’s other Islamist

militias. The ISIL units repeatedly skirmished with the Battalions

of the Free of Syria (Kataib Ahrar al-Sham), which had joined the

Dawn of Islam Movement (Harakah Fajr al-Islam), the Army of Islam

(Jaish al-Islam), the Unity Army (Jaish al-Tawhid), and the Truth

Brigade (Liwa al-Haqq) to form the Syrian Islamic Front (al-Jabhat

al-Islamiyyah al-Suriyyah). Other well-armed militias, including the

Unity Brigade (Liwa al-Tawhid), the al-Faruq Battalions (Kataib

al-Faruq), and the Hawks of Syria (Suqur al-Sham), first coalesced

into a rival Islamic Front for the Liberation of Syria (Jabhat Tahrir

Suriya al-Islamiyyah); then, in November 2013, the Battalions of the

Free, the Army of Islam, the Truth Brigade, the Unity Brigade, and

the Hawks of Syria created a new Islamic Front (IF). Shortly there-

after, the al-Faruq Battalions and a dozen smaller formations set up

the Syrian Revolutionaries’ Front (Jabhat al-Thuwwar al-Suriyyah),

which pledged to combat the ISIL but quickly clashed with compo-

nents of the IF. Yet another combination of local Islamist militias, the

Warriors’ Army (Jaish al-Mujahidin), took shape in Aleppo during

the winter of 2013–14; this group’s initial manifesto pledged to carry

out a campaign of armed struggle against the ISIL, but declared that

it would refrain from combat against the Assistance Front.

Third, large chunks of Syrian territory fell out of the purview of the

authorities in Damascus. By early 2014, extensive areas of al- Hasakah

province were being governed by the PYD, and in late January the

al-Qamishli-based PYD leadership announced plans to set up an

autonomous Kurdish zone consisting of three quasi-federal cantons:

Afrin, Ain al-Arab (Kobani), and al-Hasakah. Arrangements to elect

an 82-member popular assembly to enact policy for the autonomous

zone were drawn up over subsequent weeks, despite strong resistance

to the scheme on the part of the Syrian branch of the Iraq-based

Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), the Kurdish National Council,

and several smaller Kurdish organizations.

Fourth, forces loyal to the Baathi regime staged a notable resur-

gence, and reasserted state control over a number of key districts.

Government troops drove the Assistance Front and the Free Syrian

Army’s (FSA) Protectors of Syria Battalion (Kitabah Ansar al-Sham)

out of the coastal town of Kassab in June 2014, and gradually reestab-

lished the central administration’s presence in the hill country inland

from Latakia. By early July, the regular armed forces were advancing

toward Aleppo, methodically dismantling one opposition stronghold

SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR 15

after another. In the face of the advance, the northern metropolis’s

most potent Islamist militia, the Unity Brigade, splintered into mutu-

ally recriminatory factions and the FSA’s Daud Brigade (Liwa Da’ud)

publicly declared its allegiance to the ISIL. The Islamic Front largely

disintegrated in early August. Government forces then turned their

attention to the matter of recapturing the opposition-held suburbs of

Damascus.

These trends had a significant impact on surrounding states. The

sectarianization of the civil war prompted members of the Shii and

the Kurdish communities in adjacent countries to intervene directly

in the Syrian conflict. Most obvious was the involvement of the

Lebanese Shii movement the Party of God (Hizbullah), whose fight-

ers accompanied Syrian troops in the June 2013 offensive to regain

control of the strategic town of al-Qusair and afterward embarked

on military operations throughout the northwest. Equally impor-

tant was the influx of Iraqi Shiis into the ranks of the Abu Fadl al-

Abbas Brigade, which initially took up positions around the shrine

of al-Sayyidah Zainab on the outskirts of the capital, but later played

an active role in other parts of the country. Direct intervention by

external militias prompted the adversaries of Hizbullah and the Iraqi

Shii organization the Bands of the People of Truth (‘Asaib Ahl al-

Haqq) to challenge these movements inside their respective home

states, thereby heightening ethno-sectarian antagonism in Lebanon

and Iraq.

At the same time, fighting among opposition forces clustered in

Syria’s geographical periphery, most notably along the borders with

Turkey, Iraq, and Lebanon. During the initial years of the uprising,

the Syrian armed forces at times chased the FSA units right up to

these three frontiers, but almost always refrained from engaging in

hot pursuit across the border. Violence associated with the uprising

therefore remained tightly encapsulated inside Syrian territory. As

fighting escalated between the ISIL and its various rivals during the

course of 2014, by contrast, the combatants evidenced little respect

for juridical boundaries, leading surrounding governments to step up

their own military deployments and operations in border areas.

Moreover, the emergence of autonomous zones in peripheral dis-

tricts severely weakened the central administration’s capacity to mon-

itor and regulate activity along Syria’s borders. Whatever confidence

adjacent states may have had in the predictability of events in fron-

tier areas largely evaporated, giving the governments of Turkey, Iraq,

and Lebanon—and Israel as well—a strong incentive to adopt asser-

tive, if not actually belligerent, policies in response to ambiguous or

16 FRED H. LAWSON

threatening developments. The pervasive uncertainty that engulfed

the Syrian civil war in its fourth year consequently precipitated a

kaleidoscopic reconfiguration of relations among the Middle Eastern

states.

Syria’s Civil War and Turkey’s Regional Realignments

Fighting between the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant on one

side, and, competing armed Islamist formations and Kurdish,

Turkoman, Christian, and tribal militias on the other, raged along

the Syrian-Turkish border throughout 2014 (Lawson 2014a; Lawson

2014b). In November 2013, the YPG forces based in al-Hasakah

province advanced toward the frontier towns of Tal Abyad, Jarabulus,

and Azaz. The offensive gained momentum during the winter, after

intense fighting erupted between the ISIL and its radical Islamist

rivals on a broad front stretching from Idlib and Aleppo in the west to

Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor in the east; at the end of February 2014, the

ISIL cadres pulled out of Azaz and Tal Brak fell to the YPG. The ISIL

fighters retaliated in mid-March 2014 by raiding the village of Tal

Ma’ruf and destroying a monument to the Kurdish opposition figure

Sheikh Muhammad Mashuq al-Khaznawi. The YPG leaders immedi-

ately charged that the operation had been carried out with Turkish

encouragement and support, and called on the Kurds of southeastern

Anatolia to take steps to protect the Kurdish community’s interests

on both sides of the border. In particular, the Kurdish populace of

Turkey’s Urfa province was enjoined to come to the assistance of the

besieged Kurds residing in Afrin and Ain al-Arab.

The ISIL fighters then attacked Kurdish positions at Tal Abyad,

Ain al-Arab, and al-Qamishli, prompting the PYD leadership to

charge once again that Ankara had facilitated the assault. After seiz-

ing Tal Abyad from the Kurdish Front (Jabhat al-Akrad, a local militia

loosely affiliated with the FSA), the ISIL commanders ordered Kurds

and Christians living in the surrounding towns to abandon their

homes or be forcibly expelled. On March 26, 2014, the ISIL cadres

set off a pair of car bombs that severely damaged the Shii pilgrimage

mosque of Ammar bin Yasirand Uwais al-Qarni in Raqqa. Turkey’s

President Abdullah Gul responded to the bombings by warning the

ISIL not to target the mausoleum of Sulaiman Shah, which stood on

an island in the Euphrates River just north of Raqqa city guarded by

a detachment of Turkish troops. Shortly thereafter, the ISIL person-

nel opened fire on gendarmes in the Turkish province of Nigde after

SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR 17

the guards had flagged down the truck in which they were riding.

Sensing a nascent rift between Ankara and Syria’s radical Islamists,

the YPG commanders in early April yet again urged the Kurds of

Anatolia to mobilize support for their Syrian kinsfolk, most notably

those enveloped at Ain al-Arab.

The YPG forces joined units of the Kurdish Front and the FSA’s

Raqqa Revolutionaries’ Brigade (Liwa Thuwwar al-Raqqah) to expel

the ISIL fighters from several towns in Raqqa province in mid-May

2014. The ISIL leaders responded to the offensive by tightening the

organization’s grip on Raqqa city, while at the same time launch-

ing retaliatory raids against the Kurdish villages along the border

with Turkey and the IF positions north of Hamah and east of Homs

(Zaman 2014). In early June 2014, the ISIL fighters attempted to

blunt the YPG campaign by abducting 200 Kurds from villages

around the town of al-Bab and spiriting them to the neighboring

town of Manbij. The ISIL commanders then tried to outflank the

Kurdish forces based in al-Hasakah province by sweeping to the

southeast of al-Hasakah city, in the direction of Deir ez-Zor and

the Iraqi border.

As the ISIL fighters dashed toward Iraq, the Kurdish fighters

(Peshmerga) loyal to the KDP made an attempt to push the YPG

cadres out of the strategic border crossing at Yaarabiyyah. The sud-

den burst of intra-Kurdish friction accompanied a string of the ISIL

attacks against rival Islamist militias around Deir ez-Zor, followed by

weeks of sustained combat for command of the oilfields of northeast-

ern Syria (Suleiman 2014; Westall 2014b; Westall 2014d). Early July

2014, saw a resumption of the ISIL operations in the vicinity of Ain

al-Arab, which were followed by clashes between the ISIL units and

the government troops garrisoning a pair of air bases outside Raqqa

and al-Hasakah (Tastekin 2014b; Westall 2014c). The ISIL fighters

then attacked a string of villages between Aleppo and Azaz, precip-

itating a round of intense internecine fighting among forces loyal to

the disintegrating IF, the Unity Brigade, and the Kurdish Front (Ali

2014a). These militias set aside their mutual antagonism long enough

to carry out a counterattack against the ISIL positions in mid-August,

but by mid-September 2014, the ISIL fighters were firmly entrenched

around Ain al-Arab and making preparations to overrun the town.

Escalating warfare between the ISIL and its adversaries exacer-

bated simmering discontent among the Kurds of southeastern Turkey.

Kurdish antipathy toward the authorities in Ankara heightened during

the first weeks of 2014, as animosity flared between Prime Minister

Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP)

18 FRED H. LAWSON

and the Gulen Movement, whose adherents had extended its influ-

ence deep into southeastern Anatolia (Akyol 2014). Militants of the

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) took advantage of the AKP-Gulen

conflict to resume their activities, and in late May 2014, the PKK

cadres targeted village guards and security installations in Diyarbakir

and Mardin provinces. Turkish commanders riposted by constructing

additional checkpoints and military outposts, which sparked further

protest against the remilitarization of the southeast (Cakan 2014).

Ankara reacted to the conjunction of a firmly entrenched Kurdish

autonomous zone inside Syria and a resurgent PKK inside Turkey

by accelerating Turkey’s rapprochement with the Kurdistan Regional

Government (KRG) of northern Iraq (Barkey 2010; Bryza 2012;

Jozel 2014; Lindenstrauss and Aksoy 2012). The Turkish govern-

ment concluded an agreement with the KRG leadership at the end

of March, whereby 100,000 barrels of oil per day could be exported

from the stockpile that had been shipped to the Turkish port at

Ceyhan through state-sponsored pipelines without prior authoriza-

tion from Bagdad (Khaddouri 2014). This agreement reinforced the

position of the dominant political actor in the KRG, the Kurdistan

Democratic Party led by Mas’ud Barzani, which strongly opposed

the PYD’s autonomy project in Syria (van Wilgenburg 2014). Shortly

after the oil agreement was signed, KDP fighters started to construct

a network of earthworks to prevent the KDP’s internal rivals, the

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Gorran movement, from

supplying arms and materiel to the PYD/YPG (Coles 2014a). Smaller

parties based inside the KRG that stood opposed to the KDP and

PUK alike, most notably the Muslim Brothers of the Islamic Union

of Kurdistan and the independent Islamic Group of Kurdistan, also

expressed sympathy for Kurdish autonomy in Syria (Coles 2014a).

Ankara’s redoubled rapprochement with the KDP-led Kurdistan

Regional Government infuriated Bagdad, but more important set

Turkey on a collision course with the Islamic Republic of Iran, which

tended to back the PUK in intra-Kurdish disputes. Turkish Foreign

Minister Ahmet Davutoglu had made guarded overtures to Tehran

at the beginning of 2014, and Prime Minister Erdogan subsequently

paid an official visit to the Iranian capital. Persistent disagreements

regarding the future of the Baathi regime in Damascus neverthe-

less prevented the initiative from gaining traction (Arsu and Arango

2013; Barkey 2013; Farhi 2012; Schleifer 2012; Uzun 2013). As the

ISIL stepped up operations across northeastern Syria, however, the

prospect that an energetic, radical (Sunni) Islamist movement might

expand beyond the immediate environs of Raqqa gave the leadership

SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR 19

in Tehran an incentive to explore closer and more sustained security

cooperation with the authorities in Ankara.

Iran’s growing discomfiture in the face of the simultaneous ascen-

dance of the ISIL and the PYD/YPG was compounded by signs of

renewed activism on the part of the Iranian branch of the PKK, the

Party for the Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), as well as by a marked

resurgence of Sunni radicalism in Khuzestan and Baluchistan. Officials

in Tehran worried that the creation of an autonomous Kurdish zone

in northern Syria would inspire ambitions among Iranian Kurds for

a similar arrangement. Sympathy for the PJAK inside the KRG had

rebounded in the months after October 2013, when Iranian officials

ordered the execution of two prominent Kurdish activists (Richards

2013). Two months later, a radical (Sunni) Islamist movement calling

itself the Liberation Brigade (Liwa Ahrar) appeared in Khuzestan,

and two months after that the radical Islamist Army of Justice (Jaish

al-’Adl) raided an Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) base

in Baluchistan (Richards 2013).

Under these circumstances, rapprochement between Turkey and

Iran picked up speed. President Gul welcomed Iranian President

Hasan Rouhani to Ankara in early June 2014, and the two heads

of state pledged to work together to block the further expansion of

“extremism and terrorism” throughout the region (Agence France

Presse 2014). Shortly after Rouhani’s departure, the Turkish govern-

ment at last turned its back on the Assistance Front and officially

designated it a terrorist organization (Daloglu 2014). Meanwhile,

Iranian officials expressed a willingness for outside powers, including

the United States, to intervene in Syria to crush the radical Islamist

current (Hashem 2014d).

Improvements in Turkey’s relations with Iran accompanied an

abrupt cooling of Ankara’s relations with Baku. The chill resulted

partly from the activities of the Gulen movement inside Azerbaijan

(Balci 2014; Muradova 2014; Sultanova 2014), but was also linked

to the growing numbers of Azerbaijani citizens journeying to Syria

to take part in armed struggle against the Baathi regime (Abbasov

2014a; Abbasov 2014b; Souleimanov 2014). Furthermore, Ankara’s

efforts to forge a strategic partnership with Tehran fitted uneasily

with the Islamic Republic’s ongoing rivalry with the government in

Baku (Mamedov 2013). The contradictions inherent in a Turkey-

Iran-Azerbaijan coalition convinced President Rouhani to signal

in May 2014 that a wholesale reconsideration of the long-stand-

ing antagonism between Tehran and Baku had become imperative

(Blank 2014).

20 FRED H. LAWSON

Ankara’s drive to reconcile with the KRG and strengthen ties to

Tehran gathered momentum after the ISIL fighters stepped up the

assault on Kobani in late September, 2014. As fighting around the

town intensified, Turkish warplanes bombed the PKK targets in

southeastern Anatolia; the PKK leaders charged that the air strikes

violated the 2013 ceasefire that had been hammered out between

Turkish officials and the PKK’s imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ö calan.

In an effort to mollify rising Kurdish discontent over its refusal to

intervene in the battle for Ain al-Arab, Ankara granted permission for

a shipment of munitions from the KRG to be delivered to the embat-

tled town. The promised armaments failed to arrive, and Kurds all

across Diyarbekir and Mardin provinces took to the streets in protest

(Oulouh 2014). Not until early November 2014, did Turkish officials

relent and permit Kurdish fighters from the KRG to cross the border

and take up positions inside Ain al-Arab (Berberoglu 2014; Pamuk

and Berberoglu 2014). The Peshmerga quickly brought the battle to

a stalemate, and the ISIL cadres turned their attention toward neigh-

boring Afrin (Berberoglu and Elass 2014; Hogg 2014).

As the ISIL fighters shifted their activities to the northern districts

of Aleppo province, elements of the Assistance Front marched against

a string of Shii-populated villages in the same area (Westall 2014a).

The ISIL commanders tried to undercut the rival organization’s

northward push by soliciting partnerships with independent Islamist

formations in the Assistance Front’s stronghold of Idlib province, but

the ensuing jockeying between the ISIL and the Assistance Front

prevented either one from gaining a significant advantage. 1 The ISIL

subsequently resumed its assault against Ain al-Arab, reportedly car-

rying out military operations on both sides of the Turkish border

(Afanasieva and Dziadoz 2014; al-Akhbar 2014b; McDuffee 2014).

At the same time, the ISIL fighters struck the air base outside Deir

ez-Zor from which government warplanes had started to carry out

sorties against the ISIL positions in Raqqa. State troops launched

a large-scale counterattack that left them in control of key positions

around Deir ez-Zor (al-Akhbar 2014a; Ali 2014b). Government com-

manders then tried to recruit local tribespeople into a new anti-Isla-

mist militia called the Commandos (al-Maghawir); the initiative led

to unprecedented skirmishes between pro-regime forces and the YPG

fighters in eastern al-Hasakah province (Lund 2015).

Toward the end of January 2015, the YPG and the Peshmerga

fighters succeeded in breaking the siege of Ain al-Arab. Kurdish units

then pushed into the western fringes of Raqqa province, encroach-

ing on the ISIL’s home territory (al-Akhbar 2015; Perry 2015). To

SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR 21

parry the threat, the ISIL cadres redeployed from the Afrin front

to positions around Raqqa city (al-Khalidi 2015a). Abandoned by

their ISIL allies, radical Islamists affiliated with the Levant Front

(al-Jabhat al-Shamiyyah) operating outside Afrin concluded a dis-

engagement agreement with Kurdish forces ensconsed in the town. 2

The pact prompted the Assistance Front to pursue a tactical part-

nership with the Battalions of the Free and an assortment of other

local formations. 3 Meanwhile, Syrian troops and Hizbullah fighters

continued to drive into the region between Aleppo and the Turkish

border (Anjarini 2015; al-Khalidi 2015b; Illeik and al-Bacha 2015;

Westall 2015).

Heightened prospects for a major battle between the Assistance

Front and the Syrian armed forces in districts along the frontier

prompted Turkish officials to make overtures to Saudi Arabia. Ankara

and Riyadh had previously found themselves “at loggerheads” on a

wide array of regional issues (al-Buluw 2014b; Idiz 2013). As a result,

Turkey had aligned itself more closely with Qatar than with Saudi

Arabia on matters related to the Syrian conflict (Hashem 2013;

Tastekin 2014). But as the Turkish military started to take an active

part in the fighting north of Aleppo in early February 2014 (Dayoub

and al-Bacha 2015), President Erdogan turned to Riyadh to exert

influence on Ankara’s behalf with the heterogeneous collection

of radical Islamist forces operating in the far north. Collaboration

between Turkey and Saudi Arabia was facilitated by Riyadh’s March

2014 decision to declare the Assistance Front and the ISIL terrorist

organizations and the news two months later that an active ISIL cell

had been discovered and broken up inside Saudi Arabia (al-Buluwi

2014a; Berti and Guzansky 2014: 25). Prospects for closer collabora-

tion between the two countries soared after Salman bin Abdulaziz

Al Saud acceeded to the rulership of Saudi Arabia in January 2015

(Assi 2015).

Syria’s Civil War and the Reconfiguration of Iraq-Iran Relations

At the same time the ISIL was battling the YPG and the rival Islamist

militias across northern and eastern Syria, the Iraqi branch of the

Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant stepped up its ongoing campaign

against the central government in Bagdad. The ISIL fighters launched

sporadic attacks against police stations and state offices in the cities

of al-Ramadi and Fallujah in al-Anbar province, where popular sen-

timent had turned decisively against Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki

22 FRED H. LAWSON

(Abbas 2013; al-Salhy 2013). Similar operations took place in Diyala

and Salah al-Din provinces, as well as around the oil center of Kirkuk

(Lewis 2013). Iraqi officials responded by attempting to resurrect the

armed formations of Sunni tribespeople, known as the Awakenings

(al-Sahawat), that had been mobilized by US military commanders

in 2005–06 to resist the militant Sunni organization al-Qaida in the

Land between the Two Rivers; the effort largely failed, and a number

of tribal leaders in al-Anbar province called for a popular uprising

that might bring an end to the al-Maliki government’s discriminatory

practices against Sunnis and reduce Iran’s influence in Iraqi politics.

As the ISIL cadres became more active in al-Anbar, rival Islamist

formations emerged in neighboring Nineveh, Diyala, and Salah al-

Din provinces. Most influential were the Supporters of Islam Group

(Jama’ah Ansar al-Islam), which was rooted in an earlier movement

based in Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Popular Movement (al-Harakah

al-Sha’biyyah), made up of remnants of the defunct Islamic Army

of Iraq (Jaish al-Islam fi al-’Iraq) (al-Tamimi 2014). Like the ISIL,

these organizations chafed at the exclusionist policies implemented

by Prime Minister al-Maliki and his allies, but they tended to resent

the ISIL’s conceit that it constituted the sole champion of the Sunni

community’s interests. Clashes between the ISIL and other radical

militias swept across Nineveh province during February 2014. 4 The

conflict split northern Iraq’s Turkmen community along sectarian

lines, and set the stage for incursions by Islamist fighters as far away as

the cities of Samarra and Tikrit (Abbas 2014b; Hassan 2014; Tastekin

2014d).

By the spring of 2014, Iraq’s regular armed forces were so degraded

that they could no longer provide security for much of the coun-

try. Government offices came to be protected by an assortment of

pro-regime (and predominantly Shii) militias, including the Bands

of the People of Truth, the Battalions of the Party of God (Kataib

Hizbullah), and the Badr Organization (Munazzamah al-Badr)

(Chulov 2014; Parker, Rasheed, and Salman 2014). Veterans of the

Bands of the People of Truth who returned from fighting radical

(Sunni) Islamists in Syria brought back deep-seated sectarian hatreds

that colored their subsequent activities (al-Jaffal 2014). Meanwhile,

districts that fell into the ISIL hands were subjected to the orga-

nization’s stringent notions of Islamic governance, which discrim-

inated heavily against non-Sunni religious practices. In early April

2014, the ISIL fighters seized control of a dam at Fallujah and cut

off the downstream flow of the Euphrates River, creating a protective

moat around the lands they controlled and depriving surrounding

SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR 23

towns and villages of irrigation and drinking water (Mamouri 2014b;

Reuters 2014c). 5

The ISIL fighters repelled a large-scale offensive by the Iraqi

armed forces outside Fallujah in late May 2014, then once again

raided Samarra. 6 After that, the ISIL attacked government installa-

tions throughout Nineveh and Diyala provinces, and tightened its

grip on districts around Musil, al-Ramadi, and Fallujah. 7 On June 10,

the ISIL cadres—acting in coordination with former Baathi military

personnel, many of them organized as the Army of the Men of the

Naqshbandi Order (Jaish Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshbaniyyah)—cap-

tured the provincial governorate and military headquarters in Musil,

routing the military and police units based in the city (al-Lami 2014).

Combined Islamist and Baathi forces went on to attack Iraq’s largest

oil refinery outside the town of Baiji in Salah al-Din province, along

with the towns of Hawijah and Rashad in Kirkuk province; they then

occupied most of Tikrit, the capital of Salah al-Din province, and Tal

Afar on the highway connecting Musil to Al Bu Kamal (Abbas 2014c;

al-Akhbar 2014c; al-Sanjary and Rasheed 2014). Units of the Bands

of the People of Truth and the Battalions of the Party of God rushed

to the outskirts of Bagdad to block the offensive, while both Prime

Minister al-Maliki and the most influential figure in the country’s

Shii religious hierarchy, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husaini al-Sistani,

called on Shiis to volunteer for service in hastily formed popular mili-

tias to defend the central and southern provinces (Dziadosz 2014;

Parker and Salman 2014). In the northern city of Kirkuk, Peshmerga

seized control of key state offices, prompting the local Turkmen com-

munity to threaten to take up arms if Bagdad’s authority were not

immediately restored (Kaval 2014; Russell 2014; Tastekin 2014a).

The ISIL’s blitzkrieg elicited offers of moral and material support

for the Iraqi armed forces from the Islamic Republic, but only a few

military advisers and technical support personnel (The Telegraph

2014). In fact, Iran provided proportionately greater assistance to the

KRG than it did to the authorities in Bagdad, and subsequently wel-

comed KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani to Tehran (Hashem

2014c; Karami 2014). Only after the ISIL once again attacked

Samarra in early July 2014, did Iran step up its direct involvement in

the fighting, dispatching units of the IRGC to protect that city and

reinforce the defensive perimeter around the capital (Dehghanpisheh

2014a; Qaidaari 2015). The growing presence of Iranian forces on

Iraqi territory prompted Kurdish commanders to make overtures

to the armed Sunni tribespeople and former Baathis in the western

and northern provinces, who had earlier collaborated with the ISIL

24 FRED H. LAWSON

(Mamouri 2014a and 2014b). 8 The KDP leadership at the same time

initiated a hesitant rapprochement with its long-time adversaries in

the PKK, particularly in the contested area around Kirkuk (Chomani

2014; Galdini and Lombardo 2014).

By early August 2014 the tide of battle in Iraq had turned, and

the ISIL no longer posed an imminent threat to Bagdad. Officials

in Tehran took the opportunity to adopt the unprecedented posture

of disinterested “mediator” between the Iraqi authorities and the

KRG. 9 Key figures in the IRGC and foreign ministry even contacted

United States representatives to discuss possible strategies to ease

Prime Minister al-Maliki out of office and improve tactical coordi-

nation between Iraq’s Shii militias, many of which were sponsored

by Iran, and the armed tribal formations that were fighting the ISIL

in al-Anbar province. 10 These moves set the stage for Tehran’s abrupt

abandonment of al-Maliki, whose candidacy for the premiership

Iranian officials had backed as recently as the previous May 2014.

Emissaries from the Islamic Republic’s Supreme Leader met with

al-Sistani in early August 2014, and were persuaded by al-Sistani’s

argument that al-Maliki should not be permitted to flout the con-

stitution by serving a third term as premier (Hashem 2014b). Iran’s

head of national security, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, shuttled between

Bagdad, Irbil, and Najaf to come up with an alternative candidate,

and on August 14, 2014 al-Maliki agreed to step aside in favor of one

of his long-time colleagues in the Party of the Call to Islam (Hizb al-

Da’wah), Haidar al-Abadi. Iran’s foreign minister traveled to Bagdad

a week later to express his government’s willingness to work with the

new prime minister to preserve the unity of Iraq and “exterminate”

the “terrorist organization” ISIL (Dehghanpisheh 2014b).

Yet the fighting continued. Poorly disciplined members of pro-

government, primarily Shii militias engaged in brutal acts of vengence

and retaliation against the Sunni inhabitants of districts that were

retaken from the ISIL (al-Jaffal 2015; Mamouri 2015; Paraszczuk

2015; Rasheed 2015; Reuters 2014a; Salaheddin and Yacoub 2014;

Salman and Dziadosz 2014; Shelton 2014). Iraqi officials announced

plans to create a network of local gendarmes, called the National

Guard, to keep order in the recaptured territories (Abbas 2014a;

Zeed 2014); 11 the policy encouraged minority communities across

the northern provinces to mobilize in defense of their respective

towns and villages, sometimes in ways that contravened the inter-

ests of the central administration (Bouissou 2014; Edwards 2014;

Henderson 2014; Saul 2015). As 2014 drew to a close, rising friction

between tribespeople and pro-government militias fighting the ISIL

SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR 25

and its partners in al-Anbar province posed a distinct threat to fur-

ther tactical collaboration (Rasheed 2014). 12 In an effort to mitigate

such ethno-sectarian conflict, Tehran encouraged Bagdad to import

cadres of Lebanon’s Hizbullah to act as intermediaries between the

two sets of anti-ISIL forces (Hashem 2014a). Meanwhile, along the

southern borders of the KRG, Peshmerga carried out a succession of

joint campaigns with the IRGC personnel and components of the

Badr Organization, although full cooperation between Kurdish and

Shii fighters rarely survived the battle of the moment (Coles 2014b;

Paraszczuk 2014).

Relations between the KRG and the Islamic Republic neverthe-

less blossomed at the turn of the year. Iranian warplanes reportedly

bombed the ISIL positions in support of Peshmerga operating along

the northern border of Diyala province (Reuters 2014b; Stewart

2014). The marked rapprochement that was taking place between Irbil

and Tehran prompted Saudi Arabia to undertake a notable opening

toward Bagdad (Asadi 2015). At the same time, prospects dimmed

for any significant improvement in relations between Riyadh and

Tehran, a trend that accelerated after the demise of King Abdullah

bin Abd al-Aziz (Assi 2015).

Conclusion

By the autumn of 2013, alignments among Syria’s neighbors had

taken on a configuration that was substantially different from—and

considerably more explosive than—the one which had existed prior

to the popular uprisings that broke out across the Arab world in the

winter of 2010–11 (Lawson 2014a). Syria and Turkey had once again

become mutual adversaries; Turkey had taken steps to equilibrate its

relations with Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government; Syria

and Iraq maintained cool but mutually beneficial relations with each

other, which were unofficially but effectively buttressed by the active

intervention of armed formations of Iraqi Shiis in support of the belea-

guered Baathi regime in Damascus; Syria had fallen out almost com-

pletely with the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS),

but continued to enjoy a strong and vigorous partnership with the

Islamic Republic of Iran.

As the Syrian civil war took a pronounced turn toward ethno-

sectarian violence during the winter of 2013–14, this pattern of align-

ments started to shift. Turkey moved more firmly in the direction

of an alliance with the KRG, alienating the government in Bagdad

and sparking renewed conflict with the PKK. At the same time, Iran

26 FRED H. LAWSON

moderated its rivalry with Turkey and made parallel overtures to

the KRG. Brighter prospects for Turkish-Iranian relations accompa-

nied a weakening of the longstanding alliance between Turkey and

Azerbaijan, which was underscored by Ankara’s unexpected apol-

ogy to Yerevan for the mass slaughter of Anatolia’s Armenians in the

course of World War I. Relations between Iraq and Iran cooled as

well, with officials in Tehran pursuing closer ties to the KRG. By con-

trast, the Islamic Republic took steps to conciliate Azerbaijan, with

which it had a lengthy history of antagonism.

Regional politics displayed a further reconfiguration during the

course of 2014. Escalating ethno-sectarianization of the civil war in

Syria led Syria’s Kurdish community to take more active steps to pro-

tect itself from an assortment of Islamist radicals, most notably the

Islamic State in Syria and the Levant. At the head of the Kurdish

movement marched a party that not only enjoyed intimate ties to the

PKK, but also advocated a substantial degree of autonomy for those

districts in which Kurds constituted a majority. Both attributes of the

PYD/YPG were anathema to Turkey, and propelled Ankara more

resolutely in the direction of the KRG and toward Tehran as well.

As the ISIL found its further expansion blocked inside Syria during

the late spring of 2014, the organization struck across the border

into northwestern Iraq. A succession of quick victories left the ISIL

fighters in control of large parts of Musil, al-Ramadi, Fallujah, and

Tikrit. This state of affairs strengthened the position of the KRG,

both inside Iraq and in the Middle East as a whole.

Ankara took firm steps to improve relations with Riyadh as 2015

opened. Tehran, meanwhile, set out to consolidate its nascent partner-

ship with the KRG. This strategic initiative convinced Saudi Arabia

to restore working relations with Iraq, and to keep the prospects for a

warming toward the Islamic Republic minimal at best. Consequently,

developments in the Syrian civil war and the startling expansion of the

ISIL into northern Iraq that occurred as a direct result of that conflict,

precipiated a regional realignment that saw Turkey abandon Qatar and

move closer to Saudi Arabia, even as Iran steadily equilibrated its ties to

the Kurdistan Regional Government and the government in Bagdad.

What Gregory Gause calls the New Middle East Cold War consequently

took on a fundamentally novel configuration (Gause III 2014).

Notes

1 . al Safir (2014) Al-Qaidah and ISIL’s Conflict: A Regional Expansion.

November 28, 2014, available at: http://www.mideastwire.com , last

accessed January 31, 2015.

SYRIA’S CIVIL WAR 27

2 . Ala al-Halabi (2015) Kurds Reap Outcomes of the War in Syria. al-

Safir , February 13, 2015, available at: http://www.mideastwire.com ,

last accessed January 31, 2015.

3 . Abdullah Sulaiman Ali (2015) al-Qa’idah Combines Ranks in Syria.

al-Safir , February 13, 2015, available at: http://www.mideastwire.

com , last accessed February 28, 2015.

4 . al-Mada, Baghdad (2014) ISIL Expands in Southern Mosul and

Army Engages in Hit and Run Battles. April 21, 2014, available at:

http://www.mideastwire.com , last accessed January 31, 2015.

5 . The action seems to have been taken in retaliation for a similar block-

age carried out by government troops in al-Anbar province. See

Mamouri (2014b).

6 . al-Hayah (2014) DA’ISH Demolished a Security Wall to Storm

Samarra. April 10, 2014, available at: http://www.mideastwire.com ,

last accessed January 31, 2015.

7 . al-Hayah (2014) DA’ISH Frees the Student Hostages in al-Fallujah

University. April 10, 2014, available at: http://www.mideastwire.

com , last accessed January 31, 2015.

8 . al-Sharq al-Awsat (2014) Armed Sunni Factions Ally with Kurdistan

Territory to Strike ISIL in Mosul. August 19, 2014, available at:

http://www.mideastwire.com , last accessed January 31, 2015.

9 . Sharq (2014) DA’ISH Snowball; Iran’s Action. August 11, 2014,

available at: http://www.mideastwire.com , last accessed January 31,

2015.

10 . al-Rai al-Amm (2014) al-Rai Carries Details of American-Iranian

Calls that Led to Agreement. August 13, 2014, available at: http://

www.mideastwire.com , last accessed January 31, 2015.

11 . al-Safir (2015) National Guards for Iraq: Small Armies for the

Governorates. February 4, 2015, available at: http://www.mideast-

wire.com , last accessed January 31, 2015.

12 . al-Hayah (2015) Husain ‘Ali Da’ud. Shi’i Militias Participating in

Fight against ISIL Cause Differences. November 9, 2014, available

at: http://www.mideastwire.com , last accessed January 31, 2015.

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C H A P T E R 2

Deadly Implications: The Rise of

Sectarianism in Syria

Peter Sluglett

Introduction

Violent manifestations of intra-Muslim sectarianism, a phenomenon

relatively unknown in the twentieth century until the later years of

the Lebanese Civil War, have become an almost daily occurrence

in the multi-sectarian parts of the Arab world, normally accompa-

nied by increasingly militant forms of Sunni fundamentalism. Given

that many contemporary manifestations of “sectarianism” are also

forms of “anti-Shiism,” the two phenomena tend to go hand in hand,

especially after what is perceived as the “perfidious” Shii collabora-

tion with the American “enemies of Islam” after the invasion of Iraq

in 2003 (Meijer 2009: 11). The rise of what may be called political

Shiism since the Iranian Revolution (Lou ë r 2012; Nasr 2006) but-

tressed by subsequent developments in Iraq and Lebanon, and by

the nature of the conflict in the civil war in Syria, evidently troubles

regimes and individuals not only in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, hith-

erto the principal backers of Sunni extremism, but also in Turkey. At

the moment Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and the

Levant (or Islamic State, as it proclaimed itself in June 2014) seem to

be the main exemplars of this tendency in Syria. This chapter is an

attempt to chronicle and analyze these developments, with a particu-

lar focus on Syria since the beginning of the uprising, but also in the

context of the “religious policies” of the Syrian government since the

1980s (Pierret 2013). In general, once the sectarian genie has been

released, it is extremely difficult to force it back into the bottle, which

40 PETER SLUGLETT

does not bode well for the future peace and stability of Syria (or of

Iraq or Lebanon, for that matter).

Although religious minorities have always existed in Syria, 1 and the

almost accidental domination of politics, the state, and the military

by members of the Alawi sect has been a given since the early 1960s,

both anti-Shiism and militant Sunnism on the scale that exists at the

moment are relative newcomers to the Syrian political stage. Indeed,

anecdotal evidence suggests that Syria long functioned as one of the

more religiously tolerant societies in the region. Perhaps the recent-

ness of events in Syria will militate against a properly detailed under-

standing of the origins and funding of violent Sunni movements,

and there is inevitably a cloak of secrecy surrounding their activities.

Nevertheless it seems worth trying to assess how what began as an

uncoordinated national movement seeking broad forms of social jus-

tice became transformed into a sectarian civil war.

I begin with a brief survey of the modern history of Syria since the

creation of the modern state after World War I, with a particular focus

on the creation of the Syrian Army and the various military coups in

which it participated. I also discuss the early years of the Baath party,

and make some general comments about the Syrian economy in the

last third of the twentieth century, a period of constant and often

paralyzing crises. I then analyze sectarianism, first as a general phe-

nomenon, and then in its manifestations in Syria and its function

in rallying opposition to a regime that has been unpopular both for

what it does (its generally repressive and dictatorial nature) and for

what it is (the fact that it is dominated by members of the historically

despised Alawi community). Continuing with this theme, I describe

and analyze the rise of Sunni extremism and anti-Shiism, the latter

emerging in tandem with the unfolding of the Iranian Revolution

after 1979. A final section discusses the “Arab Revolutions” and their

disastrous consequences for Syria.

Historical Background

Like its immediate neighbors, Syria was formed from a group of

Ottoman provinces that came first under British and Sharifian con-

trol in 1918, French military rule in 1919, and mandatory rule in

1922. Inevitably, mandatory Syria was “artificial” 2 —indeed, under

one of the many iterations of British and French wartime policy,

Mosul had been included in Syria and was thus potentially part of

the French spoils of war, but it was “handed over” to Lloyd George

by Clemenceau in December 1918. From the outset, the French were

DEADLY IMPLICATIONS 41

particularly concerned to control manifestations of nationalist feel-

ing. As well as dividing Lebanon from Syria, they created a series of

small states/ é tats in Syria, most notably small administrative units

among the “compact minorities” in the Druze and Alawi areas. In

addition, the French were always concerned that any military force

that they created might somehow turn, or be turned, against them

(especially after the Revolt of 1925–27), and—unlike their British

contemporaries in Iraq—kept substantial numbers of French, usu-

ally colonial, troops in the country to defend the regime. In the late

1920s the mandatory authorities eventually created a local defense

force, Les Troupes Sp é ciales du Levant (TSL) (Neep 2012; Provence

2005). While Sunni Arabs always formed the bulk of officers and

men in the TSL until the end of the mandate, the Alawis, who were

about 10–11 percent of the population, and were mostly poor peasant

sharecroppers on the lands of Sunni landlords, formed 19.1 percent of

the rank and file of the TSL in Syria in the 1930s and 1940s. 3

By 1948, the Syrian Army (the heir to the TSL) could field about

12,500 men; for a while, the various postindependence Syrian govern-

ments thought the army was a luxury the country could ill afford, and

were not prepared to put money into it. This soon changed, especially

after a series of military coups, beginning in 1949 and continuing

into the 1950s. Conscription, which had been introduced in “inde-

pendent” Iraq in 1934, did not appear in Syria until 1953, and indi-

viduals could generally obtain exemption by paying a relatively small

fine. In sectarian terms, some 65 percent of the Non-Commissioned

Officers (NCOs) were Alawis as early as 1955, and as has already

been noted, there had long been a disproportionate representation

of Alawis among ordinary soldiers, largely because of the poverty

and unemployment in the region from which they came. In addi-

tion, Alawis (along with other Syrians from rural backgrounds) were

joining the Baath party in large numbers in the 1950s and 1960s,

attracted by its radical socioeconomic policies. 4 By the early 1960s,

Alawi officers had taken over the military section of the Baath party,

and they proved crucial in paving the way for the Baathist coup on

March 8, 1963. 5 The Alawi Baathist officers all came from the same

rural and regional background, while the Sunni officers, although

more numerous, came from different parts of Syria, and very few were

from elite or powerful families (Batatu 1981).

There were further military interventions in 1964, 1966, and

finally in 1970, when Hafiz al-Assad, then commander in chief of the

Air Force, took sole power. Over the next few decades, given Syria’s

function as a “front-line state” during the Arab-Israeli conflict, as

42 PETER SLUGLETT

well as being a key player in the 15-year long Lebanese Civil War,

the armed forces were generally regarded as vital to the defense of

the country. Between 1977 and 1988 military spending accounted

for about 30 percent of the GDP, and Syria long remained able to

attract funds from the richer Arab states to boost its capabilities as the

pivot of the struggle against Israel. In time, as in all other countries

in the region, the military’s most important function came to be to

defend the regime from the people. For their part the military were

“kept loyal” by being given the opportunity to engage in a number of

quite unmilitary but evidently profitable activities, including playing

a dominant role in many vital sectors of the economy, from construc-

tion to running hotels to monopolising the production of bottled

water, as well as overseeing high volumes of smuggling from Lebanon

(Mora and Wiktorowicz 2003: 108–22).

Although it would lose its ideological bearings quite soon after

some of its adherents seized political power, Syrian Baathism had

begun as a secular doctrine with elements of egalitarianism and social

justice before it ended up as an Arab version of National Socialism.

Apart from its commitment to Palestine, its much vaunted pan-Arab

aspirations were fairly thin, and its ideology was closer to that of Antun

Saadeh’s Parti Populaire Syrien , with its emphasis on the necessity of

(re)uniting geographical Syria, than to the essentially Sunni reading

of Arab history put forward by its Iraqi counterpart. While secular-

ism gave Baathism considerable appeal among the various religious

minorities, both non-Muslim and heterodox Muslim, the fact that it

appealed precisely to those groups meant that it barely succeeded in

transcending them. The regime’s lack of “orthodoxy” meant that it

always had difficulty in gaining acceptance among the more conser-

vative members of the majority community. 6

The Economy

In the 1960s and the 1970s, various Syrian governments carried out

a series of é tatist reforms generally similar to those enacted by their

contemporaries in Algeria, Egypt, and Iraq, which included land

reform programs and the nationalization of foreign trade, banking,

and some industries. In this way they built up a command economy

on eastern European lines with the rudiments of a welfare state.

This provided a relatively efficient social safety net until the rapid

fall in the price of oil, beginning in the early 1980s, which of course

affected Syria as well as its more affluent patrons. 7 Thus it was only

in 2007 (the last year for which figures are available) that per capita

DEADLY IMPLICATIONS 43

income in Syria overtook the $1,695 it had reached in 1982. In 1989,

for example, it fell to $815. 8 By that time, reflecting the prevailing

neoliberal consensus of the international financial institutions, the

Syrian regime gradually lost its nerve and embarked on a programme

of extensive “privatization,” allowing its supporters in the private sec-

tor to take over state institutions or to fulfil contracts on its behalf,

a combination of processes that tended to pauperize increasing num-

bers of the less well-off.

By the early 2000s both the economy and the various social pacts

into which the regime had entered had begun to falter even more

seriously. In addition, Syria’s forced withdrawal from Lebanon in

2005 had dealt a severe blow to the economy, since Syria had become

dependent on a thriving black market with Lebanon over the previ-

ous decades that included both smuggling and currency manipula-

tion. In general, the “sale” or handover of state assets to cronies of

the regimes in such states as Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Tunisia in the

1980s and 1990s greatly reduced their capacity to provide both gov-

ernment employment and a social safety net. 9 At the same time, the

possibility, at least for skilled workers and professionals, of spending

a few years working in the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, once a tra-

ditional safety valve, was becoming increasingly curtailed. Especially

after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, most of the positions once

filled by Egyptians and Syrians were filled with Asians on fixed term

contracts. 10

Although Syria had fairly low rates of internal migration in the

1990s (Khawaja: 98–101) a long period of drought between 2006

and 2010 led to the migration of some 1.5 million people to the urban

centers. The government ignored urgent issues of water access and

failed to invest in sustainable agriculture, which led to the destruc-

tion of many farming communities and placed immense strain on the

cities. It is difficult to assess exactly how this may have fed into the

ongoing conflict, but due allowance has to be made for the sharp rise

in “forced” rural to urban migration in the past decade.

What Sectarianism Is and What It Is Not

One of the first articles Marion Farouk-Sluglett and I published

together was about the present state of Sunni/Shii relations in Iraq,

in the Bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies , in

1978 (Farouk-Sluglett and Sluglett 1978). Much of the argument of

the article has not stood the test of time: in particular, it turns out

that we were too optimistic about the extent to which, in Iraq at least,

44 PETER SLUGLETT

sectarianism would become a casualty of modernity, that it would

gradually die out. In that sense I am saddened that some 36 years

later, sectarianism is an even more widespread and contagious issue in

the politics of the Middle East than it was in 1978.

In broad terms, sectarian identity is first and foremost a demo-

graphic fact (the fact that one is born Jewish or Protestant, Catholic or

Orthodox, or Sunni or Alawi), and is thus not a fabrication either by

insiders or outsiders. Thus, about 74 percent of the Syrian population

of 23 million 11 are Sunni Muslim, 8 percent Christian, 12 percent

Alawi 12 and the remaining 6 percent other non-Sunni Muslims—

Druzes, Ismaili, and Twelver Shiis. 13 However, sectarianism also falls

into the category of the “invention of tradition,” in the sense that it

can be, and is, used by the lazy or superficial observer as a kind of

portmanteau explanation of everything, from the Balkans to Iraq, to

Lebanon, and to Syria. It also changes very much according to the

historical context in which it occurs. However much the phenomenon

of sectarianism has been disparaged as irrational, primitive, uncivi-

lized, and “un-modern,” it has proved remarkably resilient. In fact,

the phenomenon has intensified rather than diminished over the last

40-odd years, in much the same way as nationalism has thrived over

the same period.

The “from-time immemorial” explanation so cherished by jour-

nalists and other commentators largely unfamiliar with the history

of the region they are covering rarely stands up to serious scrutiny.

According to such views, most modern conflicts (in Bosnia, Iraq,

Ireland, or Lebanon—and now in Syria) are simply the latest man-

ifestation of a long history of violent and by implication irrational

and/or insoluble tensions between the parties. On the contrary, as

Ussama Makdisi has pointed out in the context of nineteenth century

Lebanon (Makdisi 2000), most sectarian conflicts can be traced to

quite specific politico-historical conjunctures, generated both inter-

nally and externally. Circumstances arise in which previously peaceful

“law-abiding citizens,” whose social economic and/or political rights

or opportunities have been redefined to their actual or potential dis-

advantage, find themselves in conflict over often diminishing social

or political spoils. Of particular relevance here, as David Lloyd has

noted for Northern Ireland, is the role of the state “in restructur-

ing and producing ethnic . . . antagonism” (Lloyd 1999: 20). Victor

Gagnon’s study of the history of ethnic conflict during the 1990s

in Croatia and Serbia also highlights the key role of the state in pro-

moting ethnic or sectarian violence, especially in transitional circum-

stances in which much of the former state’s power has dissipated and

DEADLY IMPLICATIONS 45

there is a confusing hiatus: a relatively ordered past gives way to a

suddenly uncertain future:

The violence of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s was part of a broad

strategy in which images of threatening enemies and violence were

used by conservative elites in Serbia and Croatia; not in order to mobi-

lize people but rather as a way to demobilize those who were pushing

for changes in the structures of economic and political power that

would negatively affect the interests of those elites . . .

If we can learn anything from Balkan history, it is that ethnic iden-

tities and the meanings attributed to them are fluid. This is a region

where coexistence was the norm, where homogeneity has historically

not been a prerequisite for peace, and where violence was most often a

tool used by outsiders in order to deal with social and/or political real-

ities that they did not like and could not otherwise control. (Gagnon

2004: xv-xvii)

Fanar Haddad has explained this in some detail for Iraq; he too ques-

tions the notion that sectarianism consists of a fixed set of values or

perceptions that have survived immutably down through the genera-

tions (“from time immemorial”). Instead, he shows the ways in which

a combination of state policy and historical events (the Iran/Iraq war,

the intifada of 1991, the sanctions of the 1990s and early 2000s, and

the overthrow of the Baath regime in 2003) came to turn what he

calls “banal sectarianism” (the general sense that one is a member of

a particular sect, and the fact that other sects exist) into “assertive” or

“aggressive” sectarianism (Haddad 2011). As in Iraq, the outward and

visible signs of sectarian tensions in Syrian society—hitherto generally

celebrated for its tolerance—are also relatively recent, dating roughly

from the mid-1970s. This was the point at which the more conserva-

tive forces in Sunni Islam began to rebel against the structures of the

modern state throughout the Muslim world, a phenomenon that had

wide-ranging and complex social roots (and is thus a far larger topic

than can be dealt with in this short chapter). 14 In the Syrian case, its

enemies in the region, both conservative (Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi

Arabia) and leftist (Iraq, the “other” Baathist regime) were not slow

to allege that members of the country’s ruling clique were not “real”

Muslims.

The Alawis in Syrian Society

Without wanting to get bogged down by too many details, the gen-

eral disdain on the part of Sunnis for Alawis goes back as far as the

46 PETER SLUGLETT

fatwas of Ibn Taymiyya in the fourteenth century, and of course

Ibn Taymiyya, who was admired by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahab,

has long functioned as a source of emulation for many contempo-

rary Sunni extremists. 15 For most of the Ottoman period, neither the

Twelver Shiis nor members of the various more extreme or ghulat

(Halm 2004: 154–60) Shii sects, particularly the Alawis, Druzes,

and Ismaili, were officially recognized as separate communities in the

way that they identified themselves. Ottoman administrators often

treated the Alawis with particular contempt (Winter 2004), while

many “Sunni Muslim scholars and chroniclers . . . placed this minor-

ity beyond the pale of . . . formal Shii doctrine” (Firro 2012: 259). In

the late nineteenth century, as part of a general campaign of outreach

toward non-Sunni Muslims, the Ottoman state founded schools and

mosques in the Alawi mountains and tried to convert the locals to

Sunni Islam.

During the mandate, as has already been mentioned, the French

created a separate administrative entity in northwestern Syria, L’ É tat

des Alaouites , and undertook a limited amount of “development” in

the region as well as bolstering the clan hierarchy that they found in

place. In 1936 the mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, issued

a fatwa declaring that the Alawis were Muslims (Ibn Taymiyya, for

instance, had dismissed them as heretics), and in the course of the

1940s and 1950s various other fatwa s confirmed that the Alawis were

officially recognized as Shiis, who were in turn recognized as part of

the Jaafari madhhab by the authorities of al-Azhar in 1958 (Talhamy

2010: 186–7). Further steps toward enhancing the Alawis’ general

respectability took place in 1972 and 1973. In 1972, the Iranian

Ayatollah Hasan al-Shirazi visited the communities in Lebanon and

Syria and pronounced them Shiis, while in 1973, the Imam Musa al-

Sadr, the founder of the Supreme Islamic Shii Council in Lebanon,

who was close to Hafiz al-Assad, issued a fatwa declaring that “the

Alawis were an authentic part of Shii Islam” (Seale 1988: 173, 352;

Talhamy 2010: 190). 16

It is highly unlikely that such steps achieved anything very con-

crete in the direction of making other Lebanese or Syrians “think

better” of the Alawis. On the other hand, their new status, together

with al-Sadr’s close relationship with Assad, facilitated the strength-

ening of ties between the Syrian regime and the Islamic opposition

to the Shah. This formed the basis of an alliance that has endured

for some 40 years, from the early days of the Iranian Revolution,

through Iran’s war with Iraq, and the rise of mass Shii political par-

ties in Lebanon—first Amal, then Hizbullah, and then the clashes

DEADLY IMPLICATIONS 47

between them—to Iran’s current support for Syria (von Maltzahn

2013: 17–40). Needless to say, the nature and constancy of this alli-

ance has done little to endear the Syrian regime to its Arab brothers.

The Rise of Sunni Extremism

In the late 1970s/early 1980s the Syrian Muslim Brethren (banned in

Syria since 1963) and other religious opponents of the Assad regime,

financed by Jordan and Saudi Arabia, began to organize riots and

demonstrations against the regime in Aleppo, Homs, and Hama. 17

This was part of a general rise in Islamic activism in this period, which

was accompanied by the growth of militant splinter groups from the

(generally nonviolent) Muslim Brethren such as Jama’at al-Muslimin

and Islamic Jihad. 18 Members of the latter group assassinated Anwar

Sadat in October 1981, an incident indicative of the violent atmo-

sphere of this period. In February 1982 the Syrian regime put down

a major rising in Hama, fuelled by the banned Islamist opposition,

with exceptional brutality. Tens of thousands, perhaps 40,000 out

of a population of 220,000 were killed; large parts of the town were

destroyed by bombing, and there was a large-scale exodus of the

Syrian “religious classes” to Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The bombing

of Hama effectively put paid to the activities of the Muslim Brethren

in Syria, and dealt an enormous blow to the “old [Sunni] ortho-

doxy” of moderate rationalism and the four schools of law (Pierret

2013: 103).

It also marked the beginning of the growing influence of what has

been called “modern Salafism” (Meijer 2007; Pall 2013; Pierret 2013:

101–11; Weismann 1997), which has become increasingly anti-Sufi

and anti-Shii in character, though, it must be stressed, it has both

violent and nonviolent adherents. As well as being symptomatic of

the general anomie in the Arab world at the time, the rise of modern

Salafism was also encouraged by fears of the possible repercussions

of the Iranian Revolution. It was partly a response to such events

as the rise of Hizbullah in Lebanon and of the rise in the politi-

cal fortunes of Shiis throughout the region, and it gained additional

impetus as part of the protest against the overthrow of the regime of

Saddam Hussein in 2003. It also reflects the constantly rising ten-

sions between Iran on the one hand and Saudi Arabia and the Gulf

States on the other, dating from 1979 but appearing more forcefully

in the 1990s and 2000s. Having attempted to destroy the radical

Islamists in the early 1980s, the Syrian regime had moved back to

an uneasy accommodation with them by the late 1990s. Both the

48 PETER SLUGLETT

economy and the various social pacts that the regime had made with

different groups began to falter in the 2000s, especially after Syria’s

forced withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005.

The rise of anti-Shiism in the past decade has not produced a

mass confessional movement; it is more the result of the activities

of “relatively small radical Sunni groups,” influenced, of course, by

Wahhabism, which considers Shiis to be kuffar , but also by the notion

that “true Islam is in danger—mostly because of the threat posed by

a foreign power.” 19 On the whole, it is important to remember that

many Sunni and Shii communities have coexisted peaceably enough

in situations where they have lived alongside each other (for instance

in Lebanon before the Iranian Revolution, in Pakistan until the late

1980s). Counterexamples can probably be found, but major Sunni/

Shii conflict has been relatively rare in Islamic history. The wars

between the Ottomans and Safavids (roughly 1510–1639) had politi-

cal and territorial rather than religious roots, and much the same

could be said of the war between Iran and Iraq between 1980 and

1988, in which most of the fighting took place between Iranian Shii

conscripts on one side and Iraqi Shii conscripts on the other.

In contrast, in post-2003 Iraq, the “Sunni insurgency” targeted

Shiis, almost entirely because of their presumed links with Iran. The

intention of the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

(died 2006, regarded as one of the spiritual fathers of the Islamic

State) was precisely to trigger a civil war between the two sects, a tra-

dition that has been carried on by his successors in Iraq and Syria. In

addition, al-Zarqawi (and his successors) claim that Shiis are not real

Muslims, 20 meaning that al-Qaida’s actions against them are based

on religious conviction; they also reiterate Ibn Taymiyya’s accusations

of Shii collusion first with the Mongols against the (Sunni) caliphate

in 1258 and then with the Americans against the (Sunni) Baathists

in 2003. Along with more specific local factors connected with the

Alawi nature of the regime in Damascus, these anti-Shii sentiments

form the foundation of extremist Islamic beliefs, although some

extremist factions in Syria are not above accepting arms whose ori-

gins, however murky, can be traced back to the CIA. 21

“Arab Spring”

The protests that began in Syria in March 2011 were symptomatic of

the general crisis of legitimacy in many countries in the Arab Middle

East that had erupted over the previous weeks and months. There was

certainly a copycat element in Syria in the first few months, although

DEADLY IMPLICATIONS 49

the “early risers” were more active in the second tier provincial centers

than in the main cities of Aleppo and Damascus. 22 The most obvious

causes of discontent, which were common throughout the region,

were the corruption, cronyism, and kleptocracy of the regimes, but

there were broader political and economic grievances including: the

absence of democratic institutions and/or democratic elections, gen-

erally since the 1950s; dictatorial governments, both monarchies and

republics, with strong hereditary tendencies, maintained in power by

the armed forces and the security services, and often tacitly supported

by Western countries; unacceptably high levels of unemployment and

the lack of employment prospects, particularly for educated young

people, and the over-hasty application of some aspects of neoliberal

economic doctrine, which have generally rendered governments inca-

pable of subsidizing basic necessities or providing jobs and social ser-

vices for the poor.

The Ben Ali regime in Tunisia and the Mubarak regime in Egypt

both fell quite quickly, although it seems that no substantial trans-

formation has actually taken place in Egypt, and recent events (early

2015) suggest that military dictatorship has returned there with a

vengeance. In any case these two regimes fell largely because the

armed forces either remained on the sidelines or did not attempt to

defend them. This was not the case in Syria, where the composition

of the army and the security services is so deeply implicated in the

current structures of the state that they had, and have, every interest

in defending and maintaining the status quo. Originally, when it was

clear that the regime would not yield, or reform itself, those elements

of the Syrian armed forces that favoured change broke off to form the

“Free Syrian Army,” the main opposition to the regime in 2011 and

much of 2012. One of the consequences of the widespread discontent

and the hardening of sectarian attitudes that have been characteristic

of the last few years is that Islamic militants from many parts of the

world, but particularly from Iraq, have joined in the struggle against

the Syrian regime (and the Iraqi regime as well).

For many Syrians, this has created a real dilemma of the “bet-

ter the-devil-you-know-than-the-devil-you-don’t” variety—that is,

better the Assad regime, however awful, than these largely acepha-

lous, disunited, and generally murderous extremist Islamic groups.

These groups were initially funded and supplied by Turkey, Qatar,

wealthy individuals in the Arabian Peninsula, and indirectly by flows

of arms created by the United States, 23 although the Islamic State,

with its substantial territorial reach, its extortion rackets, taxation sys-

tems, and oil resources, is now largely self-sufficient in the territories

50 PETER SLUGLETT

it controls. The fact that international media were not permitted

to enter Syria until 2013 enabled the “opposition” to present itself

as winning, which, as is now obvious, was very far from the case.

Typically, in civil wars where the state is fighting a breakaway fac-

tion, the state’s resources are infinitely larger (Kalyvas 2006), and

of course the Syrian state’s monopoly of air power (and the fact that

the “rebels” do not have effective antiaircraft weaponry) has so far

proved decisive. The devastation of whole cities, especially Homs and

Aleppo, bears ample witness to the regime’s superior firepower.

It is misleading to regard the conflict in Syria simply as a Sunni

versus Shii sectarian battle. The existence of the sects, and their ani-

mosity toward each other from time to time is a matter of historical

fact, but as I have tried to show, the conflict is much more than that.

It began as a political struggle, as a protest against a dictatorship

in which, as it so happened, power was monopolized by a hetero-

dox religious minority. This was followed by the dictatorship’s brutal

overreaction and then by things spiraling out of control into civil

war. In such conflicts people tend to retreat into primordial identi-

ties and antagonisms; thus Alawis bonded together in part because

they feared being slaughtered in Sunni revenge killings if Assad loses.

For their part, Sunnis saw Alawi militias forming and thus began to

perceive all Alawis as their enemies, and began to attack them, which

in its turn made other Alawis more likely to form sectarian militias.

And so on.

Salwa Ismail has suggested new and very relevant ways of look-

ing at the different manifestations of the “Arab revolution” in Cairo

and Damascus (Ismail 2013). Based on fieldwork carried out in both

cities between 2010 and May 2011 (and earlier visits in 2004 and

2005), she highlights the role played by diverse actors in the various

uprisings, including those engaged in “popular politics” in Cairo on

the one hand and the Syrian regime’s “functionalization of sect as a

mechanism in the institution of coercion” in Damascus and other cit-

ies on the other. Many of the Alawi residents of Damascus migrated

to the city from the rural northwest of Syria in the 1970s, and settled

in particular quarters of the city (or in new quarters which they con-

structed, or had constructed for them, next to existing ones). They

have generally been patronized or clientelized by the regime, and are

perceived by their non-Alawi neighbors as its supporters or beneficia-

ries. Many poor Alawis were coopted into the gangs ( shabiha ) origi-

nally used by the regime to break up anti-regime demonstrations,

later to chase the populations out of certain city quarters, and then

as death squads.

DEADLY IMPLICATIONS 51

Thus the war in Syria, which has reached an “evolving stalemate,”

is being carried on essentially by one part of the underclass fight-

ing one another, mostly, but not always, across a sectarian fault line

that seems able to attract more or less unlimited resources for both

sides. The fact that the struggle continues at all—as long ago as April

14, 2014, Bashar al-Assad claimed that a “turning point” had been

reached 24 —has been conditional on substantial external support

from, on the “government side,” Iran, Hizbullah (to the extent that

it has agency of its own), and Russia; on the “rebel side” there is a

motley collection with many heads, including Turkey and Qatar as

well as the United States and Saudi Arabia, whose aims are becoming

less and less congruent. Hence, as well as showing the lack of capac-

ity of international institutions, this new “struggle for Syria” is in

many ways a result of the machinations of forces far beyond Syria’s

borders. 25 Again, in a bizarre concatenation of events, the rise of the

Islamic State, which poses an acute and imminent danger to the frag-

ile central government of Iraq, to the Kurdish Regional Government

as well as to Syria, may well also have the effect of making President

Assad, faute de mieux , into an increasingly more attractive partner for

a reluctant West. 26 Whatever Assad’s crimes, he is as much opposed

to the Islamic State as almost all other forces both inside and outside

the region. All these and other factors seem bound to ensure that the

Levant will remain in turmoil well into the foreseeable future.

Notes

1 . Benjamin White (2011) discusses the development of the notion of

“minority” in Syria between the two world wars.

2 . However it is not obvious in what ways any redrawing of the map of

Iraq, Lebanon, or Syria would contribute to an easing of the current

crisis.

3 . In 1947 the TSL had 128 Sunni Arab officers, 17 Kurds, 17 Druze,

16 Alawis, and 52 Christians. See Bou-Nacklie (1993).

4 . Alawis had also been prominent in Akram Hawrani’s Arab Socialist

Party, which merged somewhat uneasily with the Baath in 1953.

5 . Those most closely involved were three leading Alawi officers,

Muhammad Umran, Salah Jadid, and Hafiz al-Asad, in company

with the Baath’s civilian leaders, Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din

Bitar.

6 . “In the 1960s and 1970s, as urban, religious and Sunni elites, the

ulama numbered among the main opponents of the Baathist regime,

which was led by sons of peasants who were often members of the

Alawite community and were driven by secular and socialist ideals.”

(Pierret 2013: 1).

52 PETER SLUGLETT

7 . See WTRG Economics : Crude Oil Prices 1970—October 2011, avail-

able at www.wtrg.com/prices.html , last accessed January 31, 2015.

8 . The World Bank. 2014. GDP per capita (current US$), available at:

http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=1 ,

last accessed January 31, 2015.

9 . For Syria and Egypt see Linda Matar (2013); for Iraq: “The privati-

sation of key sectors of the Iraqi economy left a large section of the

salaried population . . . vulnerable to malnutrition and black marke-

teering.” (Khoury 2013: 148).

10 . While Arabs formed between 70 and 90 percent of the labor force in

the Arabian Peninsula in the 1970s and 1980s, the proportion had

dropped to about 30 percent by 2005. This enabled the Gulf States

to import labor “while avoiding the formation of a working class”

(Fargues 2011). In addition, long-standing employment opportuni-

ties in Europe for north Africans began to decline as a result of the

European sovereign debt crisis beginning in 2008.

11 . This is the 2012 estimate. Some 250,000 have been killed in the con-

flict so far (early 2015).

12 . For a map of the distribution of Alawis in Lebanon, Syria and Turkey,

see Wikipedia 2014, Alawite Distribution in the Levant.png, avail-

able at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Alawite_Distribution_

in_the_Levant.png , last accessed January 31, 2015.

13 . These population statistics are quoted in the US Bureau of Democracy,

Human Rights and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report

for 2012 (Syria) , available at: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/

religiousfreedom/index , last accessed January 31, 2015. Membership

in the Alawi, Druze and Ismaili communities is generally determined

by birth.

14 . Pierret (2013: 1–23). In October 1980 an “Islamic Front in Syria” ( al-

jabha al-Islamiyya fi Suriyya ), which brought ulama and lay Islamists

together, was set up in Saudi Arabia (Pierret 2013: 189).

15 . The origins of the sect itself can be traced back to the ninth or tenth

centuries CE . “Despite the fact that the main fatwa of Ibn Taymiyya

contains many false theological and historical accusations against the

Nusayris, his fatwas were and still are adopted by a large majority of

Muslims . . . ” ( Talhamy 2 010: 181).

16 . Interestingly, some Alawis objected to this “act of amalgamation.”

17 . “ . . . in Ba’thist Syria the conservative clergy were allowed to play a

prominent role in the [institutionalization of specialised religious

teaching] because the state did not want to be involved in it ” (my

italics) (Pierret 2013: 62). The result—another consequence of the

minoritarian nature of the regime—was that at least until the early

1980s, private “religious academies” were able to flourish (often in

the evenings) without state supervision or interference.

18 . In Egypt the Brethren had been subject to intense persecution

between 1954 and Nasser’s death in 1970.

DEADLY IMPLICATIONS 53

19 . Guido Steinberg (2009: 107–8). Meijer’s book, based on a confer-

ence held in September 2007, was published in 2009, well before the

current wave of extreme sectarianism in Syria.

20 . al-Zarqawi’s letter to Bin Laden and Zawahiri, March 2004, quoted

in Steinberg (2009: 110–11).

21 . See note 22 below.

22 . See the detailed account of events in Daraa and other small towns in

the first few months (spring–summer 2011) of the conflict in Syria in

Leenders and Heydemann (2012).

23 . There has been considerable confusion of aims and objectives within

the US administration; see Hersh, S. 2014. The Red Line and the

Rat Line. London Review of Books . 36 (8), 21–24, which lets a lot

of cats out of the bag. The “rat line” refers to the CIA’s despatch of

weapons from Libya to Turkey in 2012, and from there—not exactly

to the US liking—to the jihadist opposition in Syria, an operation

funded by Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The terrain and/or the

political circumstances are such that ”the rebels” can only be sup-

plied through Turkey (i.e., not through Jordan or Lebanon).

24 . BBC (2014).

25 . Early on in the conflict there was a certain amount of discussion of

the proposition that some form of intervention, invoking the highly

controversial notion of the “responsibility to protect,” might have

been desirable in the Syrian case. In fact, all attempts to introduce

resolutions in the UN Security Council have been vetoed by China

and Russia, both of whom claim still to be smarting from “US decep-

tion” during the conflict in Libya in the spring of 2011.

26 . Cf. “ . . . the Americans appear to be softening their rhetoric against

the Assad regime. The fear seems to be that Syria without the

Assads could become even more of a danger to the region.” Bowen,

J. 2015. Bashar al-Assad Interview: Jeremy Bowen Meets Syria’s

Great Survivor. New Statesman , February 13, 2015, available at:

http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2015/02/bashar-al-assad-

interview-jeremy-bowen-meets-syria-s-great-survivor , last accessed

February 28, 2015.

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C H A P T E R 3

Conf lict, Governance, and

Decentralized Authority in Syria

Samer N . Abboud

Introduction

The Arab uprisings have generated a tremendous amount of political

turmoil in the region. The uprisings occurred within the context of

the ongoing American-led occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, a

stalled negotiation between the West and Iran over the latter’s nuclear

program, and continued stalemate on the Palestinian-Israeli peace

front. There was initial optimism that the uprisings would prove as

a catalyst toward resolution of long-standing regional issues, or, at

the very least, lead to transition governments in the Arab World that

would begin to shake-up the political status quo. As events unfolded in

Tunisia and Egypt, and uprisings in Libya, Bahrain, and Syria became

increasingly violent, such optimism quickly turned to cynicism.

At the forefront of the political changes wrought by the uprisings

has been the Syrian conflict, entering its fifth year in spring 2015.

Syria’s conflict has been by far the most deadly, with hundreds of

thousands killed since March 2011 and millions more displaced inside

Syria and to neighboring countries. Meanwhile, the regime has lost

control over large swathes of territory raising serious questions about

the future territorial integrity of the Syrian state. Iran and Saudi

Arabia have turned Syria into a geopolitical battlefield (Hokayem

2014), with both countries providing extensive material and politi-

cal support to their allies in an attempt to tip the military scales. The

end result of Syria’s de facto fragmentation and the ongoing geo-

political battle within its border is military and political stalemate

58 SAMER N. ABBOUD

(on stalemate see Haddad 2012). To date, there is no side within the

country that has the military capacity to render the military solution

a viable one, nor is there a credible political process that could end

the conflict.

Amidst this stalemate, there is a slow consolidation of different

power centers throughout the country. Four distinct areas stand out:

areas controlled by the regime (between Damascus and the coastal

areas); areas controlled by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party

(PYD) in northeastern Syria near the Turkish-Syrian and Syrian-Iraqi

borders; areas controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and as-Sham

(ISIS) in eastern Syria, mainly Raqqa, and southern and northwestern

areas controlled by various rebel factions. In non-regime areas, there

is no monopoly on power and, by extension, governance. Rather, what

we are witnessing in Syria is the emergence of new political authori-

ties whose agency, power, and rootedness within society are as fluid

as the conflict itself. With this in mind, I focus on the emergence of

new political authorities in Syria.

This chapter is thus concerned with how political authorities have

emerged during the Syrian conflict and how they are contributing

to political and administrative fragmentation. I begin with a brief

introduction to the Syrian conflict with an emphasis on how the

current military and political stalemate came about. I then begin

my analysis of the emergence of political authority with a discussion

of Syria’s wartime order, which has been structured by two paral-

lel processes: the contraction of regime authority and the growth

of war economies. I argue here that both processes are central to

understanding the emergence of political authority in the Syrian

conflict. However, political authority has not coalesced and there is

no monopoly on power. As such, I argue that forms of micro-gov-

ernance, or decentralized authority, has emerged in Syria and such

authority is driving the political and administrative fragmentation

of the country. I make two main claims here in the chapter. First, as

the Syrian crisis enters its fifth year, these multiple and overlapping

power structures are characterized as being highly decentralized

and lacking vertical integration (with central or external author-

ities) and horizontal integration (with other power structures on

the ground). Second, the lack of cooperation between the multiple

authorities has led to the parallelization of institutions and forms

of sociopolitical organization. This has fostered conflict between

authorities and prevented the monopolization of power and the

establishment of alternative state institutions. Such fragmentation

has serious long-term consequences on the exercise of authority in

CONFLICT, GOVERNANCE, AND DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITY 59

the country and on the possibilities for integrating wartime orders

into the post-conflict polity.

The Syrian Uprising

As the Arab Uprisings were unfolding in Tunisia, Egypt, and else-

where, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad gave a prophetic interview

with the Wall Street Journal in which he dismissed the possibility

of protests and large-scale violence reaching Syria, stating that “we

[Syria] have more difficult circumstances than most of the Arab coun-

tries [in reference to Western pressure and Syria’s geopolitical align-

ments] but in spite of that Syria is stable” ( The Wall Street Journal

2011). No less than a month after the interview, protests had erupted

in Syria, proving that the country was not immune from the conta-

gion effect of the uprisings.

Protests in Syria began in the southern city of Daraa (Leenders

2012) in February 2011 and came in response to the arrest and deten-

tion of 15 middle-school aged boys who had spray painted the com-

mon Arab slogan of the protests “the people want the downfall of

the regime” on their school wall. The detention of the young boys

sparked immediate protest in Daraa calling for their release, but even-

tually morphed from protests demanding their release along with that

of other political prisoners into anti-regime protests targeting emer-

gency laws, poor socioeconomic conditions (Dahi and Munif 2012),

corruption, police brutality, and arbitrary detention. By mid-March,

protests were recorded throughout Syria in Damascus, Aleppo, al-

Hasakah, Daraa, Deir ez-Zor, and Hama.

Within several weeks, the Syrian protests evolved to a movement

that became more organized and which possessed a national momen-

tum, but did not enjoy central coordination (Khoury 2013). This

was due to the spontaneous nature of the initial protests but was

also predetermined by the absence of an effective political opposition

that could organize and mobilize society in times of protest. Protests

continued throughout the country without any central coordination

and a shared language and a set of demands emerged among the pro-

testors, the principle demand centering on regime change and the

introduction of political reforms (Ismail 2011).

Eventually, protests were becoming more organized by local

groups who emerged to institutionalize the revolutionary energy and

mobilize society against the regime. In the absence of formal institu-

tions to organize the protests, these groups were mostly informal and

structured on social, familial, and neighborhood ties that protestors

60 SAMER N. ABBOUD

had with one another (Leenders and Heydemann 2012). Owing to

widespread grievances in Syria, the social backgrounds of the protes-

tors were rather diverse, with seven distinct social categories repre-

sented among the protestors (Abbas 2011): secular, education, urban

middle classes, tribes (see also al-Ayed 2015), political Islamists,

political activists, the unemployed and marginalized.

These social groupings formed the basis of the Local Coordination

Committees (LCCs) that attempted to organize and represent the

protestors. While the LCCs were initially established as information

clearing houses they quickly assumed greater roles in governance

and resource distribution in their respective locales, particularly as

regime power contracted (Khoury 2013). Meanwhile, an external

opposition made up of political exiles was quickly forming. Despite

the emergence of internal and opposition groups (more on this later)

the regime maintained its commitment to a security solution to the

protests and refused to undertake any serious political reforms. The

sustained violence against protestors and the increase of arbitrary

detentions, torture, and targeted killings, coupled with the perceived

failure of nonviolence as a political strategy, eventually gave way to

the rise of militarized opposition. Army defectors and former soldiers

formed small brigades and declared themselves part of the Free Syrian

Army (FSA). The creation of the FSA—which was in reality more a

loose conglomeration of locally based fighters and nothing resem-

bling an army with a clear chain of command and coordination—

would portend the trajectory of the Syrian conflict from June 2011

onward.

The FSA was, similar to the political opposition inside and outside

of the country, unable to bring about the collapse of the regime.

The FSA suffered from a number of problems, including a lack of

resources, in-fighting among its brigades, and a lack of strategic

coordination that could capitalize on military successes. In the first

year of the uprising, the regime was confronted with an increasingly

organized domestic opposition, an external opposition agitating for

Western intervention and a Syrian-led political transition process, and

militarized groups inside the country that were responding to the

regime’s violence with their own violence. Coordination between

the three main groups was attempted but never fully materialized.

And while many in the political and militarized opposition profess

solidarity and cooperation with other groups, this has been severely

lacking.

The fragmentation of the opposition in part helps explain why the

regime has maintained control over certain parts of the country and

CONFLICT, GOVERNANCE, AND DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITY 61

not collapsed altogether. Opposition fragmentation also helps explain

why we see after 2012 especially the proliferation of more and more

armed groups. The militarized opposition landscape now includes

Kurdish fighters fighting under the PYD banner, Jabhat al-Nusra

(JN), Islamic State of Iraq and as-Sham (ISIS), Islamic Front (a coali-

tion of Islamist brigades), the Syrian Revolutionary Front (SRF), and

more localized groups exercising violence. With the exception of the

Kurdish fighters, all of these groups publically profess their goals to

be the collapse of the regime. However, as we see later, in-fighting,

ideological disputes, and political and territorial conflicts between

these groups have prevented the coalescing of opposition forces and

has contributed to the continuation of the conflict. Political author-

ity in wartime Syria is severely fragmented, not just between rebel

and regime power centers, but within these power centers themselves.

Such fragmentation in political power is manifesting in the different

and conflicting administrative and governance apparatuses emerging

in the country.

Wartime Orders

Two parallel processes in particular are shaping the nature of gover-

nance and political authority in Syria: first, the contraction of regime

authority throughout the country and the emergence of multiple

and overlapping authorities, and, second, the dramatic alteration

of Syria’s social structure and its relationship with political authori-

ties. Such processes have created possibilities for the emergence of

new power structures in Syria and for the proliferation of new actors

whose agency are shaped and determined by their roles vis- à -vis the

conflict. These emergent power structures have appeared differently

throughout the country and outside of it within the growing refugee

and diaspora communities.

The normative view of conflict suggests that such transforma-

tions lead to sovereign gaps, creating lawless and ungovernable spaces

(Th ü rer 1999). Yet, such a view betrays the organizational structure

of violence, conflict, and war economies in general. This is particu-

larly the case in Syria, where the protracted nature of the conflict has

given rise to various agentive actors throughout what are referred to

in popular media and circles as “rebel” or “non-regime held” areas.

The suggestion of a singular “non-regime” authority is highly prob-

lematic given the plural and disaggregated nature of the Syrian oppo-

sition, civil movements, rebels, and other groups that fall under the

umbrella of those fighting against the regime.

62 SAMER N. ABBOUD

To date, there is no monopoly on power, and by extension gover-

nance, in areas that are considered outside of regime control. Rather,

Syria has witnessed multiple and overlapping authorities whose

agency, power, and rootedness within society is as fluid as the con-

flict itself. Conventional approaches to civil conflicts and civil wars

tend to understand them in terms of violence and military gains or

losses. Such approaches ignore the nonviolent aspects of civil wars,

in particular the construction and exercise of political authority and

control, as well as the diversity of interactions between the various

actors involved (Staniland 2012). The nature of political authority

during conflict and the interaction between various actors embed-

ded therein creates the specific wartime political orders that shape

conflict patterns, including violence, governance, and post-conflict

state building. An inquiry into wartime political orders, then, must

go beyond the focus of violence and its measurement toward a con-

cern with control and authority and, in particular, the fluidity of both

as determined by the interactions and cooperation between states and

insurgents or rebel groups.

Staniland (2012) has advanced an appeal for such a nuanced under-

standing of wartime political orders that takes more seriously the

nature of territorial control. His typology of wartime orders and his

claim that they “are fundamentally shaped by the political relation-

ships between the contenders” (Staniland 2012: 248) are extremely

relevant in conceptualizing political interactions. However, Staniland

does not pay sufficient attention to the political interactions between

rebel groups and insurgents, failing to conceptualize how the levels

of cooperation central to his argument not only refer to state-rebel

interactions, but to rebel-rebel interactions as well. His typology of

various levels of cooperation, including collusion, overlapping spheres

of influence, and passive cooperation, are useful in helping us think

about control during wartime, but they do not provide a sufficient

basis for understanding how the “multiple contenders for power,”

he acknowledges exist, cooperate and enter into conflict with one

another.

In a context such as Syria in which there exist multiple contend-

ers for power it is imperative that the interactions, both conflictual

and cooperative, between different contenders be accounted for.

In Syria, power has been constantly shifting over the course of the

conflict. In the early stages, as the regime’s presence and authority

contracted in parts of the country, administrative structures that

were grounded in the popular revolts slowly emerged. Indeed, some

commentators went so far as to argue that the popular uprisings had

CONFLICT, GOVERNANCE, AND DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITY 63

the characteristics of a national movement with an insurrectionary

character (Droz-Vincent 2014) and were engaging in the process of

alternative state building. Such an optimistic view betrays the reali-

ties of the initial stages of the conflict, which were characterized by

loose, informal organization of protestors through such groups as the

LCCs and civil councils. Because of the continued threat of regime

repression and violence, in addition to the organizational challenges

of building capacity, organizing, and establishing authority in the

context of a revolt, these groups were never able to establish monop-

olies on power or to build effective alternative institutions that could

withstand the pressures, first, of sustained regime violence, and, sec-

ond, of the penetration of new actors into the political landscape who

would compete with them for authority.

The introduction of various armed rebel groups into the fray has

created multiple and overlapping authorities within the areas not fully

under the territorial control of the regime. The ISIS, for example, has

begun to establish a number of institutions of governance, including

even a consumer protection bureau in Raqqa. The basis of the pen-

etration of militarized groups into the administrative arena, however,

is their participation in economies of violence, which has allowed

them to control many of the economic benefits of war through their

exercise of violence in certain areas of the country. Indeed, all armed

actors in Syria are deeply connected to, and dependent on, the war

economy, which serves to finance their activities and the growth of

their nonmilitary, political institutions. War economies are thus an

important structuring process of wartime orders.

Many scholars have contested the question of where authority in

conflict derives from. Bakonyi and Stuv ø y (2005) argue that insight

from war economies can help us understand the question of author-

ity during conflict. Rather than equating war economies and the

collapse of formal economic relations with a collapse of social order,

Bakonyi and Stuv ø y claim that war economies construct alternative

social orders centered around violence. These social orders of violence

emerge as armed groups slowly embed themselves in their surround-

ing social and political spheres and begin to participate in the organi-

zation and governance of society.

The war economy is thus a major structuring factor in the current

wartime order and can also help us explain the nature of power shifts

and fragmentation throughout the country. Disputes among the vari-

ous rebel groups are certainly important in helping us understand the

current stalemate and the nature of fragmentation in the country, but

this does not tell us the entire story or the role that war economies

64 SAMER N. ABBOUD

play both in perpetuating conflict and in creating new sources of

political authority. Economic opportunities also change over the

course of a conflict. Scholars have identified three basic stages of this

evolution that link the type of conflict economy (predatory, parasitic,

extractive) with the military strategy (contention, expansion, control)

of armed groups (Naylor 2002; Wennemann 2011: 110). In the first

stage (predatory-contention) rebel groups engage in theft, smug-

gling, kidnappings, security, and so on, to raise funds for further

attacks. These predatory activities are often small-scale, incoherent,

and not indicative of larger economic strategies beyond the immedi-

ate opportunism of the movement or the need to generate funds to

maintain their military activities. The second stage (parasite-expan-

sion) involves the gradual retreat of the previous political authorities

and the assumption of nominal territorial control by rebel groups,

however small. Economic activities increase as the control of territory

provides greater opportunities for taxation, smuggling, controlling

distribution routes, and so on. In the third phase (extractive-control),

rebel groups assume greater responsibility for the provision of services

and the establishment of institutions, as well as other functions nor-

mally associated with the governance of day-to-day life. As such, the

range and depth of their economic activities increases substantially,

and there can emerge greater coherence and organization to their

activities.

War economies have a structuring logic that can evolve into com-

plicated governance systems in periods of conflict (Laudati 2013).

Understood as systems of governance, war economies make possible

the exercise of different forms of power and authority by warlords and

rebel groups. In Syria today, the contiguous territories controlled by

the various armed groups are coming together into contained, partic-

ular economies that do not interact with each other. For example, very

little economic exchange occurs between regime and non-regime areas.

Areas controlled by the ISIS are more dependent on cross-border trade

and smuggling with Turkey, while those controlled by the PYD are

more linked to Iraq and southeastern parts of Turkey. Such contained

economies of violence provide the possibility for the consolidation of

power within these spaces and the monopolization of authority by

armed groups that control the main levers of economic activity.

Severing the link between territory and authority is thus not

merely about reducing criminality and its incentives, but about rup-

turing the sociopolitical relationship that people have with alterna-

tive, nongovernment authorities that have emerged in these spaces.

Today, in Syria, there has been a proliferation of these micro-systems

CONFLICT, GOVERNANCE, AND DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITY 65

of governance, from the creation of different courts to new curricula

being taught to Syrian children. Each area under rebel control has

different systems of governance, administration, and service provi-

sions. These patterns are not altogether disconnected from the war

economies, as they need financial support to be sustainable.

Wennemann (2007: 376) has proposed a model ( table 3.1 ) for

understanding different methods of conflict financing and their

effectiveness in bringing revenues to rebel groups.

Clearly, the most effective method of conflict financing involves

the capture, extraction, and distribution of resources by rebel groups.

Some examples here may include the control of the opium trade by

Afghan warlords or the extractive sectors in Congo. These types of

conflict financing provide considerable wealth to combatants and can

help explain the continuation of conflict. As long as wealth can be

generated, then the material basis of the conflict remains consistent.

Such is not the case with the next two categories of financing meth-

ods, which are more conducive to low-intensity conflicts.

These methods of conflict financing are present in Syria today.

Syria’s war economy was slow to develop after March 2011, owing to

the nature of the conflict. As the Syrian opposition became more mil-

itarized and the rebel groups increasingly fragmented, we witnessed a

rapid rise in criminality and the slow structuring of a war economy. To

date, and despite the informal extraction and distribution of natural

resources in the ISIS-held areas, Syria’s war economy is largely based

on short-term opportunism and mostly predatory behavior, includ-

ing taxation, smuggling, kidnapping, looting, aid theft/diversion; in

Table 3.1 Effectiveness of methods of conflict financing

Method of conflict financing Characteristics Effectiveness

Oil

Diamonds

Drugs

Easy centralized control

High level revenue stream

Possibility of immediate revenue

High

Taxation

Parallel economies

Diaspora financing

Less centralized control

Lower level of revenue stream

Possibility of constant revenue

Medium

Taxation of aid

Individual contributions

Kidnapping

Asset transfers from civilians

Land fees

Centralized control possible

Low level of revenue stream

Possibility of maintaining low

intensity conflict

Low

Source : Author.

66 SAMER N. ABBOUD

other words, methods of conflict financing that have low to medium

effectiveness and which are unstable sources of revenue. The war econ-

omy is characterized by instability, unlike in Afghanistan, where the

war economy was largely driven by the extraction of opium and thus

gave rise to relatively stable economic, monetary, and social structures

(Newman and Keller 2007), the Syrian situation is one in which long-

term, coherent, and stable economic strategies of warlords have not

yet materialized.

While supply and distribution routes have been established at times

during the conflict, these have been largely temporary, unstable, and

subject to the changing military dynamics on the ground. Pugh and

Cooper (2004) have argued that war economies are embedded in

“regional conflict complexes” that are characterized by “the empow-

erment of borderlands as sanctuaries for combatants and . . . also as

centers of shadow economic activities” (Pugh and Cooper 2004).

Arms smuggling routes from Lebanon, for example, thrived in the

early stages of the conflict but have now been forced to alternative

routes because of the changing military situation in the Lebanese

borderlands. The one consistency seems to be in the control of border

crossings in the northern areas of the country, but even here, vari-

ous rebel groups have fought among themselves or negotiated coop-

eration agreements to share the rewards and responsibilities of the

border crossings. The larger point here is that Syria’s fragmented ter-

ritories are increasingly economically connected to the border areas of

neighboring countries and not to the rest of Syria. As discussed previ-

ously, most rebel groups rely on cross-border trade and smuggling

to satisfy their economic needs, and not internal (Syrian) trade with

other regime or non-regime factions. The Syrian conflict has been

unique in its military and political fragmentation of the country and

the malleable and constantly changing frontlines. The proliferation of

small enclaves of control, especially in the northern parts of the coun-

try, which are independent of one another and not yet integrated into

a coherent supply chain or line of command, has further enhanced

the fragmented nature of the war economy. Such fragmentation has

discouraged the formation of long-term economic strategies and left

rebel groups dependent on short-term, predatory activities to finance

their activities. We have also witnessed the slow fusion of rebel groups

and smuggling networks, such as with the creation of the SRF, that

blur the lines between political, military, and criminal elements. Such

fused, yet fragmented, authorities further discourage coherent econ-

omies strategies. Needs and alliances are based on the on-the-ground

realities and changes, as we saw when the Northern Storm Brigades

CONFLICT, GOVERNANCE, AND DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITY 67

entered into an agreement with the Tawhid Brigade on the shared

control of the Bab al-Salama border crossing with Turkey. This bor-

der crossing is one of two in northern Syria that has remained rel-

atively open during the conflict and is the main point of entry for

goods and aid coming into Syria.

It is perhaps more realistic, then, in the Syrian case to speak of the

presence of multiple ( Al Arabiya News 2012) war economies in which

different rebel groups control or share responsibilities and profits.

However, in Syria, the economic activities of these groups have been

largely ad hoc, short-term, and have failed to develop long-term stra-

tegic goals. As such, the ability to develop and sustain an adminis-

trative apparatus capable of functioning as an alternative to existing

state institutions is extremely weak, as the key question of financing

and autonomy from armed groups cannot be resolved. Thus, para-

doxically, the nature of Syria’s war economies as a fractured mosaic

controlled by competing armed groups prohibits the growth of a

more centralized administrative apparatus with vertical integration

between the different agencies and horizontal integration with a cen-

tral body. The level of coordination and interaction between admin-

istrative units in an alternative or “quasi-state” (Bakonyi and Stuv ø y

2005) system must be high in order for there to be coherence and

continuity. The current structure of Syria’s war economies prohibits

such interaction. The main economic activities of warlords—smug-

gling, kidnapping, taxation, and so on—do not serve as the mate-

rial basis for the creation of a strong administrative apparatus. This,

coupled with ideological, political, and military conflicts between the

various rebel groups, has contributed to deepening the fragmentation

of the opposition.

Micro-Governance and Overlapping Authority in Syria

Baczko et al. (2013) have argued that the solution to the Syrian crisis

lies in building a state within non-regime areas that can serve as an

effective alternative to the regime. However, they rightly acknowl-

edge that the efforts to do so have failed, largely because of the polit-

ical fragmentation of the opposition and the administrative division

of Syria into a series of micro-governed spaces (more on this later).

Initially in Syria there were attempts at micro-level reconstruction of

administrative structures. The slow contraction of regime authority

in pockets of the country led to municipal and regional gaps in power,

rather than wider provincial or national spaces. In many parts of the

68 SAMER N. ABBOUD

country outside of regime control, a web of administrative institu-

tions quickly grew at the municipal levels. These included civil coun-

cils ( majlis madani ), district councils ( majlis al-mantaqa ), courts

( mahkama ), and in some cases civil police ( shurta madaniy ).

One of the central goals of the external opposition was to cap-

ture these municipal councils under its political and administrative

authority to build alternative state institutions. The linking of the

micro and macro never materialized and is unlikely to do so any-

time soon, for a number of reasons. The initial funding provided by

the National Coalition in 2012–2013 was meant to organize coun-

cils and to create vertical integration between them, with the aim

of eventually creating horizontal linkages (Baczko et al. 2013) with

the opposition. However, over time, the funding proved insufficient,

especially in larger centers such as Aleppo, and an integrated admin-

istrative system failed to develop. There are other factors as well that

contributed to the failure of the hierarchy. The external opposition in

Syria has not enjoyed political legitimacy among the popular, domes-

tic groups that formed the basis of the administrative councils in the

early stages of the conflict. The division between insider and outsider

opposition groups in Syria (Abboud 2012) was, and remains, acute,

and the lack of institutional and political linkages between internal

and external opposition groups a defining feature of the opposition

landscape. Furthermore, the external opposition, in the form of the

Syrian National Coalition and its other various institutional prede-

cessors and variations, has never been able to provide tangible, mate-

rial support to the local councils. The central problem of financing

administration in the non-regime areas was not solved by the external

opposition, who, over time, were seen as being more interested in

acquiring legitimacy from Western powers and governing the country

remotely than they were in affecting material change in the country.

Support for the provision of electricity, clean water, and other basic

services were beyond the ability of the external opposition.

It is not surprising then that the attempts to establish hierarchy

among the administrative bodies within Syria and the external oppo-

sition has not only failed, but also had severe implications on the

autonomy, viability, and sustainability of these institutions. Rather

quickly, and owing largely to the lack of a hierarchical financial and

administrative center, the administrative councils had to share power

with, and eventually developed dependencies on, militarized groups.

This was in large part due to two reasons. First, councils had mate-

rial shortages that militarized groups could help satisfy. Their control

of trade routes and their role in the war economy made possible the

CONFLICT, GOVERNANCE, AND DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITY 69

acquisition and distribution of goods and resources that local coun-

cils could not access. Second, one of the central goals of the councils

was to organize society and provide security. To do so, they needed

to establish relationships with the militarized opposition who could

enforce court decisions and provide support to local police.

Rather than integrating into a hierarchical, vertical structure, the

councils grew closer to the militarized opposition and more depen-

dent on them. The fragmentation of the militarized opposition and

the presence of parallel projects (e.g., the JN, the ISIS, and the PYD)

have also meant that horizontal integration among groups has failed

to materialize. The long-term effect of this is to stunt, if not prohibit

altogether, the growth of alternative state institutions that could be

mainstreamed or integrated into a post-conflict order. Rather than a

singular opposition of rebel group attempting to establish institutions

of governance that could replace the state, what we are witnessing in

Syria is the emergence of multiple and overlapping authorities that are

neither horizontally nor vertically integrated.

The overlapping of authorities has two distinct features, both of

which are structured by the specific political geography and trajec-

tory of the conflict. The first feature concerns the merging of new

authorities into singular units or spaces of governance. In such sce-

narios, the scarcity of resources, legitimacy deficits, political expedi-

ency, and/or military necessity bring various actors together to form

shared and co-governed institutions that contribute to the mosaic

of overlapping and contradictory administrative structures. The

Kafr Nabel Sharia court is an excellent example of the patchwork of

administrative authorities that cut across political and military lines.

In mid-2014, Kafr Nabel was dually controlled by the Foursan al-Haq

Brigade (affiliated with the FSA) and the Souqour as-Sham Brigade

(affiliated with the Islamic Front), which jointly upheld the rulings of

the court. The court has no codified laws, bylaws, or sets of proce-

dures. All decisions are referred to Islamic jurisprudence and scholarly

opinions and have no grounding in any one of the major Islamic

legal schools. The court deals with criminal, civil, and personal state

issues but does not issue personal status documents, as the docu-

ments issued by regime authorities remain the only accepted ones in

the country.

The court does not have a proper prison and must rely on the two

brigades to transfer prisoners to larger prisons nearby in Khan as-

Sabal or Binnish, where there are also appeals courts. Such a situation

is replicated throughout Idlib province, where courts exist, but with

very little institutional or administrative linkages. There has been no

70 SAMER N. ABBOUD

attempt to codify the relationships between the courts and the shift-

ing security situation and military power ensures that none will likely

happen soon.

Similar patterns of governance have emerged in Manbij (Yazigi

2014), a city of more than 200,000 people just east of Aleppo. The

city is administered by three main agencies: a revolutionary council, a

sharia court, and a police force (Yazigi 2014), and power within these

bodies is shared loosely between members of the community and the

ISIS. As was the case in many parts of Syria, Manbij originally estab-

lished revolutionary councils and courts, as well as a police force, to

uphold security. However, financing issues and the continued dete-

rioration of security in these areas—both as a result of continued

regime besiegement and kidnappings—the revolutionary councils

were unable to maintain the nascent institutions. Eventually, a sharia

court that was better funded was created to replace the revolutionary

courts and a small police force took hold that was more or less con-

trolled by the ISIS.

Alternative Governance

How can these processes in Syria best be understood? What is occur-

ring in Syria now is a constellation of actors into various relationships

that form what Carpenter et al. (2013) refer to as alternative gover-

nance. In this form of governance, constellations of formal and infor-

mal actors exist in an architecture of governance whose functionality

is inconsistent, contradictory, and temporary. This is due in large part

to both the fluidity of the conflict itself and the fluidity of the actors

embedded in governance practices. These “non-state complexes”

(Podder 2014) are by definition unstable, shifting, and composed of

various actors whose agency, power, and authority shifts according to

changes on the ground.

One of the more long-term consequences of this is that the lev-

els of cooperation, institutionalization, and interaction between and

among institutions needed to ensure their sustainability does not

exist. Interaction between various authorities, whether civil or mil-

itary, occurs in more or less localized spaces and is not subject to

any overarching authorities. The changing geography of the conflict

makes vertical linkages between institutions nearly impossible, even

in cases, such as that of Kafr Nabel, where there are relatively pro-

ductive relations between various authorities in the region. Again,

the “non-state complex” emerges as an architecture of various actors

CONFLICT, GOVERNANCE, AND DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITY 71

who are constantly competing for authority, legitimacy, and capacity

(Podder 2014).

The second feature is that many organizations, in particular the

JN, the ISIS, and the PYD, have avoided participating in these shared

governance models and in some cases created altogether new, and thus

parallel, institutions. Rather than providing support to, and coop-

eration with, the emergent state structures, these groups are actively

undermining it by the creation of alternative administrative and mili-

tary structures. Except in very few cases, the JN does not cooperate

with other groups and the PYD has concentrated their state-building

efforts in the northern parts of the country where the FSA and other

groups are largely absent.

The organization of Kurdish areas in Syria is an obvious exam-

ple of the rise of competing and parallel institutions. Having

maneuvered themselves into unique political positions, the two

main Kurdish parties have been relatively successful in insulating

themselves from both the regime and the exiled opposition. As the

conflict developed, Kurdish groups declared The Rojava Project,

an ambitious project of political and administrative policies in

the Kurdish-populated areas that would be driven by the Rojava

Democratic Society Movement (TEV DEM), an umbrella group.

In November 2013, the PYD, now subsumed into the TEV DEM

umbrella as a sub-entity, announced an ambitious administrative

project that would link all the main Kurdish populated areas into

an institutionally linked administrative unit. To date, the project

has led to the creation of institutions around three federated gov-

ernments in Afrin, Kobani, and al-Jazeera. The local councils that

make up the emergent federation have representatives from a wide

spectrum of Kurdish politics.

Similarly, as the PYD attempted to consolidate its administrative

strength in parts of Syria, they also began to institutionalize their

military capacity. Another sub-entity of the TEV DEM, the YPG,

began to organize military strength, first, by opening up military

academies and initiating recruitment, and, second by bringing armed

Kurdish groups under its authority. The PYD has thus far been suc-

cessful in ensuring that no other armed groups operate within Rojava

territory. Similarly, the PYD established courts and police forces

that are receiving similar training and salaries. Although the PYD’s

attempts have been met with some resistance by the KNC, they have

progressed considerably in their attempts to create a regional gover-

nance structure.

72 SAMER N. ABBOUD

Overlapping Authority and Its Consequences

The nature of decentralization in Syria has been fragmented and

uneven, failing to materialize into the institutional alternatives

proffered by Baczko et al. (2013) as alternatives to the regime.

Decentralization has not led to administrative consolidation and

coherence, but rather to competing processes that sometimes lead

to merging authorities and in other cases lead to parallel authorities.

The causes of this are complicated and include the specific social

and political contexts in which regime contraction occurred, the

distributive challenges of a war economy, the political geography

of the conflict, the f luidity of the military situation, and the finan-

cial challenges of establishing administrative authority over large

territories.

The failure to establish vertical and horizontal linkages between

administrative authorities in Syria has a number of consequences on

the trajectory of the conflict and stability in the post-conflict order.

The dominant feature of these authorities is that they remain tempo-

rary and have not established a substantive permanence within spe-

cific regions. As the earlier examples demonstrate, there is fluidity to

the exercise of administrative authority throughout the country that

has created this impermanence. This fluidity is driven largely by the

changing nature of power on the ground, but also by the inability of

the administrative authorities themselves to cultivate financial and

technical relationships with outside (i.e., horizontal) authorities. In

Syria’s courts, for example, there is everything from the regime laws

to different interpretations of Islamic law being utilized to administer

justice, sometimes in neighboring areas. In Idlib province, for exam-

ple, regime courts continue to operate to issue personal status docu-

ments, such as death or marriage certificates. They operate parallel

to revolutionary courts that prosecute criminal matters and handle

disputes.

In the context of an ongoing revolt, it is perhaps unfair to expect

that these administrative authorities would be able to overcome the

many challenges of organizing society. The needs of the moment

most certainly outweigh the more long-term needs of establish-

ing alternative institutions that can be incorporated into the post-

conflict order, if not form the basis of them. The issue in Syria is

not so much about growing pains, however, as the rise of parallel

authorities complicates the issue of building alternative state insti-

tutions. Here, developments within the ISIS and the JN as well as

CONFLICT, GOVERNANCE, AND DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITY 73

the Kurdish populated areas suggests that the challenge of creat-

ing permanent institutions is further hindered by the competition

between various authorities to do so. Such competition serves as

the basis for the lack of coordination, cooperation, and institu-

tion building needed to create vertical linkages between authorities

within the country.

Such a situation creates political inertia, as there are few successes

on which to build administrative capacity. In Manbij, for example,

where revolutionary councils once had full control over the area but

then entered into power-sharing agreements with the ISIS, many resi-

dents have begun revolting against the latter ( The Daily Star 2014).

Such continued infighting in places such as Manbij suggests that the

trust, cooperation, and capacity needed to build functional admin-

istrative authorities is not present throughout Syria. Such a situation

may serve to meet the needs of local populations in the interim, but

they are inherently unsustainable and, as the case of Manbij proves,

destabilizing.

Ultimately, such overlapping authorities are fuelling the fragmen-

tation of Syria. As alternative institutions arise and take root in dif-

ferent areas of the country and are materially supported by thriving

war economies it is unlikely if not entirely impossible that areas out-

side of the regime control will ever coalesce into a coherent adminis-

trative structure. The fracturing of the economy and the emergence

of small fiefdoms connected to regional borderlands has paralleled

the political fracturing of the country into separate administrative

units.

Conclusion

The patterns of wartime orders and wartime governance have sub-

stantive impacts on post-conflict stability. As the Syrian conflict

persists, the social orders of violence will continue to shift and, even-

tually, cement themselves into more fixed architectures. Despite

these challenges, we are certainly witnessing the rise of new author-

ities in Syria, but conceptualizing that kind of authority and what

it means for the future is extremely difficult. In colloquial terms,

the genie is out of the bottle, and how to put it back in is going

to be a key post-conflict question. A useful way to think about the

incorporation of alternative authorities into a post-conflict order

is to inquire into the social contexts of stakeholders and networks.

Social context is extremely important in understanding legitimacy

in society and its members’ interests and capacity in participating in

74 SAMER N. ABBOUD

post-conflict reconstruction. In Syria, the social context of agents is

changing rapidly. The emergence of new power structures in Syria

and for the proliferation of new groups of actors whose agency and

positioning in society is currently being determined by their roles

vis- à -vis the conflict. As discussed previously, these emergent power

structures look different throughout the country and are grounded

in different realities. Criminal structures, for example, are predatory

and have arisen to reap the economic benefits and opportunities of

the conflict. Local governance structures, on the other hand, have

emerged within local social structures in neighborhoods and cities

and have incorporated popular expectations into their activities. The

spectrum of new power structures is thus wide and can range from

the predatory to the popular.

Predatory networks are those that have a stake in the contin-

uation of conf lict and that are direct beneficiaries of it. This is

in contrast to popular networks, which have more rooted social

bases in a society and who have the agency and power to partici-

pate in post-conf lict reconstruction. As such, these popular net-

works become inherently political and acquire a political agency

and legitimacy that is derived from their conf lict-era activities.

This raises a serious dilemma: “ignoring or excluding [from post-

conf lict reconstruction] can threaten political stability” while

“including them undermines reform plans” (Reno 2009: 55).

The position of these actors in post-conf lict spaces depends on a

number of factors, including the degree to which their supporters

desire to participate in post-conf lict spaces, their degree of formal

and informal incorporation into the new body politic, and whether

they have strong enough vertical linkages with other networks of

power to inf luence reconstruction agendas. For post-conf lict plan-

ners, the challenge is in how to incorporate these networks into

the institutions of governance in ways that contribute positively to

reconstruction.

Such questions have regional implications as well. How will neigh-

boring countries deal with groups such as the ISIS, the PYD, the JN,

and others in the broader context of the Syrian conflict? What will be

the implications of the rise of non-state, armed groups that threaten

the territorial integrity of the Syrian state? Stalemate in the Syrian

conflict has made possible the rise of these competing groups and

their consolidation in specific areas of territorial control. They are

emerging as new sources of authority inside Syria and to neighboring

powers as well. For example, in February 2015, Turkey’s intervention

into Syria with a limited military force to move the tomb of Osman I’s

CONFLICT, GOVERNANCE, AND DECENTRALIZED AUTHORITY 75

(the Ottoman Empire’s founder) grandfather required unprecedented

cooperation with the PYD 1 forces in Syria. Conflicts certainly breed

strange alliances.

Note

1 . Turkey accuses the PYD of being aligned with the Kurdish Workers

Party (PKK), who are considered to be a terrorist group in Turkey.

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C H A P T E R 4

The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Its

Impact on Jordan: In Reference to the

Regime’s Structural Def icits

Simone H ü ser

Introduction

Toward the end of 2014, the death toll of the Syrian civil war had

already risen to 191,369 cases (United Nations Human Rights

2014); more than 3.8 million people 1 have been forced to leave

their homes and to f lee to safer places outside of Syria (UNHCR

2015). With an average of 6,000 people escaping every day, aid

agencies are warning that this refugee crisis could be the worst the

twenty-first century has yet seen (Ensor 2014). According to the

United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for Refugees, Ant ó nio

Guterres, a refugee outf low has not been seen “[ . . . ] at such a

frightening rate since the Rwandan genocide almost 20 years ago”

(UNHCR 2013a).

While most Syrians have f led to Lebanon and Turkey, Jordan

has been receiving the third largest number of refugees (UNHCR

2015). 2 In relation to the overall population of the country how-

ever, Jordan is hosting the second largest number of refugees after

Lebanon. More than 600,000 Syrians have crossed the border over

to Jordan to find shelter and protection from the ongoing civil war

in their country (UNHCR 2015)—unofficial numbers are even

higher. With the Hashemite Kingdom itself having a population

of approximately 6.3 million, the influx of refugees has led to a

population increase of almost 10 percent, which puts a significant

80 SIMONE HÜSER

socioeconomic burden on the country. Even though there is no doubt

of the existence of profiteers among the political and economic elite,

the majority of the people are feeling the negative implications of

the tremendous population increase (Ferris 2013). Especially in the

rural northern areas, where two-thirds of the refugees are residing,

the additional burden on already strained resources has been affect-

ing Jordanians and Syrians alike with one of the results being social

tensions. Meanwhile, scapegoating refugees for the worsening of the

economic situation of the country has become common, especially

in the media and among government officials. However, critics are

emphasizing that the effects of the population increase are as much

due to already strained resources and public services resulting out of

the lack of a genuine transition process (REACH 2014b: 9; Simon

and al-Masri 2014a). Therefore, the argument of the economic bur-

den as a consequence of the refugee crisis has often been a way to

attract further funding from the West and to distract the view from

“the monarchy’s track record of economic mismanagement” (Simon

and al-Masri 2014a). This indicates that a transformation of the

state system, politically as well as economically would reform and

stabilize the economy whereas approaching political shortcomings

of the regime has not taken place.

The aim of the present chapter is to analyze whether the socio-

economic burden on host communities can be traced back to the

arrival of refugees or whether the impact is felt as much due to a

lack of political and economic transformation of the state system.

After outlining the arrival of Syrian refugees to Jordan in the first

part of this chapter, the second part—the core of this chapter—

examines the main sectors affected by the continuous inf lux: the

Jordanian economy, with a focus on the labor market; education;

the housing sector; water and waste management; electricity; the

security situation; and social cohesion. In each part, the situation

before and since the beginning of the Syrian conflict is analyzed to

differentiate between general structural challenges of Jordan and

the actual impact of the refugees on the respective sector. It fur-

ther describes how the burden on each sector is accelerating social

tensions among the Jordanian and Syrian populations. Here, the

analysis is primarily based on reports conducted by REACH in

2014 on the key drivers of tensions that have emerged in the host

communities as a consequence of the arrival of refugees. The chap-

ter concludes with a summary and an outlook to possible develop-

ments in the near future.

THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 81

Syrian Refugee Influx to Jordan

According to official figures provided by UNHCR, 622,384 refu-

gees 3 have fled to Jordan since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in

2011. The highest number of refugees arrived between July 2012 and

May 2013 (UNHCR 2015). In the second half of 2013 the number

decreased as a result of temporary closures of Jordanian border points

(al-Samadi 2013) and 250–300 refugees that returned back to Syria

on a daily basis due to different reasons such as an improved security

situation in their home towns or the “unbearable” living conditions

as refugees (IRIN 2013b).

In contrast to Lebanon—where there are no Syrian refugee

camps—Jordan has opened the Zaatari refugee camp in 2012, located

about eight kilometers away from the Syrian border and ten kilome-

ters east of the Jordanian city Mafraq, and opened two more camps in

April 2013 (Emirati Jordanian Camp) and April 2014 (Azraq Camp)

in the governorate Zarqa (Ferris 2013; UNHCR 2015). However,

only 100,378 4 of all refugees are staying in the camps, instead, most

are living outside in cities and villages (UNHCR 2015). Particularly,

the governorates Mafraq and Irbid have grown significantly since the

arrival of Syrians whereas the southern parts of Jordan have received

a relatively small number of refugees (see table 4.1 ).

The Impact of Syrian Refugees on Jordanian Host Communities

With the continuous influx of refugees from Syria, the negative eco-

nomic and social burden of the arrival is finding more and more atten-

tion, especially from the official side (Simon and al-Masri 2014a). An

image is spread by the Jordanian media, and supported by interna-

tional organizations, stating that Jordan has to carry a dispropor-

tionate part of the costs stemming from the refugee crisis (cf. Oxfam

America 2013; Simon and al-Masri 2014a). Already in 2013, 73 per-

cent of the Jordanian population supported the closing of Syrian bor-

der points in order to stop the influx of refugees (Simon and al-Masri

2014b). Indeed, the accelerating influx of refugees has “significantly

increased pressure on public service provision and worsened public

finances further” (World Bank 2013: 14). However, at the same time,

a few critics have been emphasizing that the fears and complaints

against Syrians are misleading with the negative implications being

very limited. Instead, the refugees are exposing the already existing

82 SIMONE HÜSER

structural deficits Jordan has, especially outside the governorate of

Amman (Simon and al-Masri 2014a).

The following part analyzes the impact of the Syrian refugees on

Jordan’s most affected sectors in the Jordanian host communities.

It describes the extent to which the shortcomings of resources and

public services can be traced back to the arrival of the refugees and to

what extent they are a result of structural deficits in Jordan and thus

a consequence of insufficient capacities of fundamental sectors pre-

dating the Syrian crisis and resulting out of a lack of political and

economic transformation. The sectors chosen for the analysis—labor

market, education, housing, water and waste management, elec-

tricity, security, and social cohesion—present essential services and

resources to the community members (REACH 2013: 12–14). The

capacities of these sectors determine the ability of the local gover-

nance system to absorb external shocks such as a significant popula-

tion increase (cf. HCSP 2013: 81). Examining the capacities of these

Table 4.1 Distribution of Syrian refugees in Jordan

Governorate Population

in 2012

Number of

Syrian refugees 5

Ratio to

population (%)

Ajloun 146,900 9,635 6.6

Amman 2,473,400 174,028 7.0

Aqaba 139,200 3,061 2.2

Balqa 428,000 20,268 4.7

Irbid 1,137,100 143,442 12.6

Jerash 191,700 10,973 5.7

Karak 249,100 9,511 3.8

Ma’an 121,400 7,209 5.9

Madaba 159,700 11,100 7.0

Mafraq 300,300 160,781 (of which

76,052 are residing

outside camp)

53.5 (of which 25.3

residing outside

camp)

Tafileh 89,400 2,386 2.7

Zarqa 951,800 67,617 (of which 51,968 are

residing outside camps)

7.1 (5.5 outside

camp)

Dispersed

individuals

2,373

Total 6,388,000 622,384 9.7

Source : Author’s calculation based on Department of Statistics (2014a) and UNHCR (2015).

THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 83

sectors further reveals if a transformation of the state system has

been taking place.

Economic Implications—The Labor Market

According to a recent study, the Syrian refugee crisis has cost Jordan

JOD 5.8 billion ($8.12 billion) at the end of 2013. Benefits aggre-

gated to JOD 4.1 billion ($5.77 billion), which leaves the Jordanian

economy with a burden of JOD 1.7 billion ($2.39 billion) (al-Wazani

2014: 11). The costs are primarily related to an increasing demand

for electricity, water, municipal infrastructure, health care, education,

and subsidized food products (IRIN 2013a). However, the main

source for criticism is the strain refugees are putting on the Jordanian

economy due to the additional labor force; 20.2 percent of all regis-

tered male refugees are in the working age (REACH 2014a: 26). In

the communities with reported tensions, 69 percent of Jordanians

and 71 percent of Syrians are identifying job opportunities as a rea-

son for tensions (REACH 2014c: 9), particularly due to the belief

that Syrians are willing to accept jobs below the market rate and are

hence, preferred by employers (REACH 2014b: 11). While Jordan is

granting legal residency status to Syrian refugees, they are not given

an official work permit (Ajluni and Kawar 2014: 14). However, as jobs

in the informal sector in Jordan account for 44 percent of all employ-

ment and over half of the private sector (Ajluni and Kawar 2014:

11), a separation of legal and illegal Syrian workers for this analysis

is negligible. Instead it should be focused on the actual number of

Syrians working in the country. A 2013 report by the International

Labour Office (ILO) stated that 38,154 Syrians were working in

the northern host communities, which is about 3.5 percent of the

employed population in these governorates (Ajluni and Kawar 2014:

16). As a consequence, criticism against Syrians as being the source

for increased unemployment in Jordan is making refugees the scape-

goat for economic problems (cf. Simon and Al-Masri 2014b).

The budget deficit (even including grants from foreign donors such

as the International Monetary Fund) as well as the total public debt

increased from 2011 to 2014 representing a challenge for the econ-

omy on a macro level (al-Wazani 2014: 25–26). However, the deficit

reached its peak in 2012 but decreased from 2012 to 2013 (al-Wazani

2014: 23)—the time when most refugees arrived—showing that the

deficit cannot be directly traced back to the arrival of the refugees. In

this context, critics are pointing out that Syrian refugees are mainly

taking jobs in the lower skilled sector where only 5 percent of the

84 SIMONE HÜSER

Jordanian labor force can actually be found (Essaid 2013; Simon and

al-Masri 2014b). “Jordanians like to go work for the government, or

in white-collar jobs, but they don’t like to take up menial jobs . . . most

likely—nobody has data on this—the Syrian refugees actually compete

with Egyptian workers” (Simon and al-Masri 2014b). Moreover, ever

since the arrival of refugees, Syrian investments in the service sector

such as restaurants and shops increased, which add jobs to the labor

market (cf. IRIN 2013a). Moreover, working conditions in Jordan

already worsened prior to the refugee crisis especially with regard to

the unemployment rate and inflation 6 and can hence, not be directly

related to the influx of refugees (REACH 2014b: 8). According to sta-

tistics by Jordan’s Department of Statistics (see table 4.2 ), the average

unemployment rate between 2012 and 2013 only slightly increased

from 12.2 percent to 12.6 percent and even decreased in comparison

to 2011 (12.9%) (Department of Statistics 2014b).

Yet, while the overall unemployment only increased by 0.4 per-

cent, the labor situation in the most affected governorates (Mafraq,

Irbid, Ajloun) worsened significantly during 2012 when most refu-

gees arrived. In Mafraq, for instance, which is hosting the highest

number of refugees, the unemployment rate increased from 10.7 per-

cent in 2012 to 14.5 percent in 2013 (see table 4.3 ).

Thus, while the overall unemployment rate of the country only

slightly increased, unemployment raised significantly in those gov-

ernorates hosting the largest numbers of refugees, which shows that

there is a direct impact. However, it should be taken into consid-

eration that those governorates with the lowest number of refugees

are actually having the highest unemployment rate in the country

(Tafileh, Karak, Aqaba). Therefore, it can be concluded that the

structural problem of high unemployment in Jordan should not be

directly traced back to the influx of Syrians but that the situation

worsens due to the refugee crisis. In addition, experts are pointing to

the downward pressure on wages in the informal economy through

the additional work force. In Jordan daily wages in the bottom half

Table 4.2 Unemployment rate in Jordan between 2009 and 2013

Years

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Unemployment in % 12.8 12.5 12.9 12.2 12.6

Source : Author’s compilation based on Department of Statistics 2014b.

THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 85

of the lowest skilled jobs vary between JOD 10 and 15 ($14.06 to

21.1). Syrian refugees in contrast are willing to work for JOD 4 to 10

($5.63 to 14.06) per day, which puts significant pressure on the sec-

tor (Ajluni and Kawar 2014: 21). Analysts are recommending, in this

framework, to involve Syrians in the (formal) Jordanian economy by

letting them work and hence, giving them the chance to bring money

to the Jordanian state through taxes (Essaid 2013).

Education Sector

In Jordan, 210,456 Syrian refugees are school-age children

(5–17 years). 7 Around 52 percent of them are enrolled in schools in

Jordan, which is a higher rate than Lebanon (22%) and Turkey (44%)

(UNHCR 2014: 24). However, international aid organizations are

estimating that only one-third of the enrolled children are actually

attending school (Care Jordan 2013: 17, 32).

At the beginning of the crisis, various schools had mixed classes

with Jordanian and Syrian students. This however, not only led to an

overload in the classes, but also to tensions between the two groups.

In 2014, around 61 percent of Jordanian and 44 percent of Syrian

respondents in communities that identified tensions attributed them

Table 4.3 Unemployment rate in the Jordanian governorates

Governorate /

Year

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 / first

quarter

Ajloun 15.3 13.8 14.6 11.4 13.5

Amman 11.2 11.6 11.7 10.3 10.5

Aqaba 12.4 14.5 14.6 15.7 15.2

Balqa 13.6 12.5 14.4 14.2 14.4 18.9

Irbid 13.9 12.2 12.7 11.9 13.0

Jarash 13.3 13.3 13.5 11.2 12.3

Karak 16.0 15.1 17.3 17.7 15.8

Maan 17.7 15.7 15.2 19.0 15.0

Madaba 15.3 14.5 18.5 17.0 16.2

Mafraq 13.5 13.9 11.8 10.7 14.5

Tafileh 15.6 13.3 17.5 19.6 17.1

Zarqa 12.9 12.5 12.1 12.3 13.1 8.1

Source : Author’s compilation based on Department of Statistics 2011: 33; Department of

Statistics 2013: 35; Department of Statistics 2014c: 23.

86 SIMONE HÜSER

to challenges in education (REACH 2014c: 12). Jordanians were

accusing Syrians of taking the needed places at school and lowering

the quality of teaching (Sweis 2013; Tran 2013). Differences in the

education level caused further tension and aggression among students

(Tran 2013). Problems surrounding education even led to cases of

Syrians not attending school due to altercations with Jordanian stu-

dents (REACH 2014b: 10). Additionally, some Syrian school children

are more likely to be older than their Jordanian counterparts and are

perceived as having a negative impact due to a culture of skipping

school and the like (REACH 2014b: 11).

Yet, already prior to the crisis, Jordanian schools were working

overcapacity, which threatened the education quality. According to a

2011 study, 36 percent of schools in Jordan were rated crowded and

22 percent of schools in the four governorates hosting the highest

number of refugees had already been overcrowded. In 2013, around

41 percent of all basic schools were rated crowded and 40–49 percent

of the schools in Mafraq, Irbid, Zarqa, and Amman were identified as

overcrowded. Thus, while the arrival of refugees is indeed exacerbat-

ing the situation in the schools, the education sector has already been

highly strained before the crisis (UN and HCSP 2013: 59–60).

In 2013, a number of public schools—primarily in the poorer

governorates—introduced double shifts teaching Jordanian students

in the morning and Syrians in the afternoon (Tran 2013). In mid-

2014, about 98 schools offered two shifts of teaching, a number that

is expected to increase in 2015 (UNHCR 2014: 245). However, a

key challenge to primary school education is still the lack of available

facilities (REACH 2014a: 22). Moreover, while a high percentage of

Syrian children are enrolled in classes; many do not attend. In Zaatari

camp, for instance, only 60 percent (12,000) of the 20,502 school-

age children enrolled in school are attending classes (UNHCR 2014:

245). The reasons, inside as well as outside of the camps, are seen to

be related to the distance of the schools, which often leads to a lack

of security especially for girls on their way to school; the disruption

of normal life routines; as well as the financial situation of families

(particularly with regard to secondary education) (REACH 2014a:

24; Sweis 2013). Due to this financially difficult situation child refu-

gees are increasingly involved in generating income for their fami-

lies (Namrouqa 2014; Sweis 2013). In October 2013, according to

estimations, 30,000 child refugees were working in Jordan, most of

them in the agricultural sector (Nebehay 2013). Additionally, experts

are warning of the increase of early marriage due to their financial

situation. While the Jordanian law sets the minimum age of marriage

THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 87

at 18, a sharia judge could authorize a marriage of children in the age

of 15 to 18 under certain conditions. Although these conditions are

restrictive, marriages of minors are still commonly approved. This

indicates that the restrictions in reality, are not being adequately

applied. Furthermore, most marriages of Syrian minors are not regis-

tered under the Jordanian law and hence, lack the minimal protection

that could be given to children by the review through a Jordanian

judge (Save the Children 2014: 2). The percentage of Syrians mar-

ried in Jordan under the age of 18 rose from 12 percent in 2011

(almost the same percentage as before the beginning of the civil war),

to 18 percent in 2012 up to 25 percent in 2013 and thus, more than

doubled (Save the Children 2014: 1). Socially many marriages are

justified as providing security, a concept, also known as sutra , that

is rooted in Islam and attained wide cultural acceptance. Although

the interpretation of the concept may differ, in general, it is supposed

to give security to the child and/or protect it from material hardship

(UNICEF 2014: 9). In such cases the future husband and wife are

signing a marriage certificate in front of two witnesses. Often, the

husband is paying the girl around JOD 2,000 ($2.812) for the mar-

riage. While the marriage does not have any legal basis in front of

a court and does not give the woman any rights, it is seen by many

families, especially traditional and poorer ones, as the best in this sit-

uation. This is because the family can use its income for fewer people

and because the marriage supposedly secures the child personally and

materially (UNICEF 2014: 26). Moreover, since the arrangement is

religiously approved it maintains the dignity of the family and the girl

(Salloum 2014).

Housing Sector

On average 75 percent of all Syrian refugee families are living in rented

accommodation (REACH 2014a: 12). Various assessments by inde-

pendent organizations have consistently identified housing as the pri-

mary need among refugees and the costs for accommodation posing

the main challenge for families (Oxfam America 2013: 18; REACH

2014a: 13). Prior to the beginning of the crisis, the annual housing

need in Jordan was estimated at an average annual need of 32,000

units compared to an average construction of 28,589 units. The refu-

gee influx however, led to a demand of approximately 86,000 units in

addition to the 32,000, which accumulates to a total of 118,000 units

and hence, poses significant pressure on supply and demand and thus,

increases prices (UN and HCSP 2013: 114–15).

88 SIMONE HÜSER

According to a report by Care Jordan (2013), the average rental

prices for a two room apartment across Mafraq, Irbid, Zarqa, and

Madaba varied between JOD 130 to 175 ($182.84 to 246.13) per

month in 2013, while at the same time the monthly income ranged

between no income and an average income of JOD 190 per month

($267.23), leading to the conclusion that in many cases rent is absorb-

ing almost the whole income (Care Jordan 2013: 12–14). Moreover,

rental prices in the northern governorates increased significantly,

sometimes up to 100 percent, since 2012 and 2013 (Oxfam America

2013). The increase of prices and hence, the shortage in affordable

houses was especially noticeable in the governorate of Irbid (REACH

2014b: 10). For example, the price for a three room apartment in

Irbid increased for Syrians as well as Jordanians from JOD 150 in

2012 ($210.97) to JOD 250–300 in 2013 (on average) ($351.62–

421.94) (Oxfam America 2013: 19; REACH 2014a: 2). Accordingly,

83 percent of Jordanian and 77 percent of Syrian respondents in the

communities with social tensions identified affordable housing as one

of the main reasons (REACH 2014c: 22). While many Jordanians

blame refugees for the increase of housing prices, Syrians feel that

Jordanian landlords are taking advantage of their situation (Mercy

Corps 2013: 9). In interviews with Syrian refugees it was stated that

many landlords supposedly think that Syrians are able to pay their

rent merely with the cash assistance they receive (Oxfam America

2013: 19). However, while some landlords are threatening Syrian ten-

ants with eviction if they can not pay the rent in advance others are

reporting of more positive experiences saying that their landlords are

not asking for advance payment (Oxfam America 2013).

Water and Waste Management

Due to severe water scarcity, Jordan is facing a continuous imbalance

between demand and supply of fresh water. While the Yarmouk River

and the Jordan River are not even providing half of the needed water

demand, the majority of water is drawn from groundwater sources

(UN and HCSP 2013: 109).

Overall, 97 percent of the Jordanian population is connected to

the piped water system. An average assessment has shown that 44 per-

cent of Syrian and Jordanian families in rural areas are running out of

water more than twice a month (UN and HCSP 2013: 110). Analysts

are emphasizing that the massive population increase will not stress

the Jordanian economy due to a higher demand in food, of which

87 percent is imported, but instead mainly stress its demand for water

THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 89

(Essaid 2013). Critics, however, are pointing out that the water short-

age can not directly be traced back to the arrival of refugees (Mansur

2014); instead the lack of water has been a structural problem for

more than a decade as “The water network is massively inefficient.

Fifty percent of its water is lost either through leakages or is unac-

counted for (the percentage is higher in Mafraq)” (UN and HCSP

2013: 110). Moreover, people in Mafraq already experienced water

shortage before the beginning of the Syrian conflict (Mercy Corps

2013: 7).

Also, with regard to solid waste management, the nature of the

problem should, according to experts, not be related to Syrian refu-

gees. Indeed, the influx of refugees led to an increase of 340 tons

of waste production every day (REACH 2014a: 32; UN and HCSP

2013: 90–91). While this is adding additional pressure, the munic-

ipalities have already been struggling before the crisis to provide

efficient garbage collection services, which makes it an “old new

problem” (UN and HCSP 2013: 91). In most of the governorates

solid waste management (SWM) capacity was already exceeded. Due

to a shortage of equipment and labor, the problem of SWM is get-

ting worse. Although municipalities are willing to hire more workers,

their possibilities to efficiently reassign funds are limited as the sector

is highly subsidized. Additionally, a higher number of workers with-

out additional equipment do not increase SWM efficiency (UN and

HCSP 2013: 91–93). While financial support by donor and govern-

ment programs is currently deployed it needs “sustainable solutions

to the long-known SWM problem in Jordan in a context of crisis”

(UN and HCSP 2013: 94).

Although 67 percent of all Jordanian and Syrian interviewees see

water shortage as a reason for tensions, the overall perceptions of the

present and future water supply is largely positive (REACH 2014d:

9), and no respondents connected tensions in their communities to

solid waste management (REACH 2014b: 12). This might be related

to the fact that the services are of nondiscriminatory nature and are

hence, not associated with an individual group as well as due to the

fact that problems and shortages already existed prior to the crisis.

Electricity

Ten years ago Jordan signed a contract with Egypt, which provided

the country with natural gas supplies for years and covered almost

90 percent of Jordan’s energy demand. After the fall of Mubarak

in 2011 and subsequent turmoil in the region, the gas pipeline was

90 SIMONE HÜSER

disrupted several times by extremist groups (Schenker and Henderson

2014). As a result Jordan had to shift to an import of crude oil from

the Gulf States, which is significantly higher priced than natural gas

and hence, increased Jordan’s energy import bill with about $2 billion

per year. As a result, energy imports accumulate to almost 20 percent

of the country’s GDP, which has had serious implications for Jordan’s

energy subsidy system and the state budget (UN and HCSP 2013:

119–20).

In addition, general domestic demand for energy has been rising

for years. According to statistics, household consumption rose by

23 percent from 2007 to 2008 and again by 9.5 percent from 2008 to

2009. Ever since, the demand has seen an average annual increase of

approximately 5 to 6 percent (UN and HCSP 2013: 119–20). Indeed,

the influx of refugees has worsened Jordan’s energy insecurity chal-

lenge but should not be traced back to it. Instead, the price increase is

mainly related to a continuously growing demand since 2008 as well

as an elimination of fuel subsidies in 2012, which pushed inflation

(cf. World Bank 2013: 14).

Security Situation

According to reports smuggling, particularly guns, has increased by

300 percent over the year 2013 (al-Daameh 2014); as a result, the

number of unlicensed weapons is supposed to have reached one mil-

lion compared to the pre-Syrian conflict level of 120,000 licensed

weapons (al-Daameh 2014; Hattar 2014). One reason behind the

increasing demand is the lack of safety people feel due to the Syrian

war and a possible spillover of the conflict to Jordan (al-Daameh 2014;

The National 2014). As a reaction to this “weaponisation” (Hattar

2014), the Jordanian government started to ban further licensing of

firearms as well as the renewal of permits and is refusing permissions

for the opening of new shops (Hattar 2014).

Yet, even though the media is spreading numbers according to

which crimes committed by Syrians have doubled (Simon and al-Masri

2014b) in the period from 2012 to 2013, there has been no evidence

until now that the arrival of refugees has had a direct and significantly

growing impact on crime apart from what can be “mathematically

expected” due to an increase in population such as nuisances or cattle

theft (UN and HCSP 2013: 103). A study based on Public Security

Department figures revealed that the crime rate did increase over the

period between 2009 and 2013 from four to five cases per 1,000 peo-

ple. While the population increase in the past years does contribute to

THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 91

the rise, analysts are pointing out that crimes involving refugees are

limited and that the reason should rather be seen in the worsening

of the economic situation of Jordanians (al-Emam 2014). Moreover,

riots in the camps have so far been the response to living conditions

and bans on leaving the camps such as riots in April 2013 or a more

recent clash in April 2014 at Zaatari camp between Jordanian police

forces and refugees (al-Arabiya 2014; Mercy Corps 2013: 15).

Yet, a worsening of the economic situation of Syrian refugees is

nevertheless making them more prone to recruitment by criminal

organizations, which can impact the security of Jordan, but also by

extremist groups that could have a negative influence on the secu-

rity situation of the whole region (Berti 2015). Experts have already

warned of the increasing recruitment of Syrian refugees in Jordan,

particularly adolescents between the age of 14 and 16, by armed

opposition groups including Islamic State (IS) and Jabhat Al-Nusra

(Human Rights Watch 2014; Somerfelt and Taylor 2015).

Social Cohesion

From all six governorates in northern Jordan that have been sig-

nificantly affected by the arrivals of refugees, the highest tensions

were measured in the governorate of Irbid. The primary source of

tension was concerning affordable housing, education, and income-

generating opportunities (REACH 2014b: 10–11). Also, aid given by

international organizations has become a source for tensions (Mercy

Corps 2013: 11). Even though organizations are increasingly trying

to aid Syrian refugees as well as Jordanians in need, Jordanians have

accused Syrians of taking more aid than they need while Jordanians

are being neglected; as a result, the scapegoating of Syrians is ris-

ing (Mercy Corps 2013: 9–11). However, according to encompass-

ing studies, tensions have risen and are emerging in more open and

aggressive ways, but have not yet manifested in violence (Mercy Corps

2013: 1; UN and HCSP 2013: 103).

Furthermore, tensions are varying between as well as within the

governorates. While Ramtha, for instance, located in Irbid governor-

ate, is most affected by the war in Syria due to spillovers, tensions in

this area are less severe than in other areas. Ramtha is located at the

southwestern border with Daraa; one of its key features, in contrast to

Mafraq for instance, is the extensive import and export trading it had

with Syria before the war. Also, because of geographic closeness, mar-

riages between Jordanians and Syrians long predate the conflict. Due

to these economic and tribal ties, Jordanians and Syrians in Ramtha

92 SIMONE HÜSER

consider their nationality rather irrelevant with the result that ten-

sions are significantly smaller than in other cities. Instead, difficul-

ties and existing tensions are rather seen as individual issues between

people or showing a general resentment toward municipalities and

the lack of appropriate responsive action, instead of being related to

the other person’s nationality (Mercy Corps 2013: 5–12).

In contrast, most refugees in Mafraq are from the region of Homs

and do not share tribal ties with residents. A poll conducted in

September 2012 showed that 80 percent of the population in Mafraq

was of the opinion that refugees should stay in refugee camps instead

of communities. The observation that refugees from the Zaatari camp

are selling food as well as nonfood items they receive from interna-

tional aid organizations on the open market has led to the impres-

sion that Syrians are actually doing better than Jordanians. A protest

erupted in Mafraq in March 2013 over housing, the main source for

tensions as described before, which was eventually diffused by the

Jordanian government promising housing projects for Jordanians.

In Mafraq, as well as in Ramtha, Jordanians and Syrians asked the

Jordanian government to interfere in the housing problems, imposing

price caps on Jordanian landlords (Mercy Corps 2013: 6–9). Thus,

while tensions in some areas are lower than in others, the general

resentment toward municipalities and the lack of appropriate respon-

sive action is increasing (Mercy Corps 2013: 12). The government

of Jordan and the UN stated that the increased pressure on public

services is “undeniably the main current threat to social cohesion”

(UN and HCSP 2013: 102). While in other refugee crisis ethnic, reli-

gious, or cultural differences are reasons for tensions, the main chal-

lenge in this conflict are the economic effects and the negative impact

on the livelihood of Jordanians. As a result, the trust of Jordanian

host communities toward public authorities, particularly municipal-

ities, is increasingly deteriorating due to their perception “that their

needs are not taken enough into account by their institutions and/

or that their capacity to solve pressing issues is too limited” (UN

and HCSP 2013: 102). The support by national as well as interna-

tional NGOs for Jordanian and Syrian people in need is often per-

ceived as more reliable. The crisis can hence, be seen as a test for the

newly elected (August 2013) municipalities and their legitimacy (UN

and HCSP 2013: 102). In this framework, experts are warning that

the continuous portrayal of Syrians as being the reasons for a failing

Jordanian economy and suffering Jordanians will create significant

sociopolitical tensions (Essaid 2013; REACH 2014b: 9). Over time,

tensions over a lack of resources might transform into tensions over

THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 93

identity and territory, which would worsen the situation; anxieties

over whether Syrians will remain as permanent refugees in Jordan

is further increasing and heating the political debate in the public

sphere, especially with the reference to prior influxes of Palestinian

and Iraqi refugees (Jaaroun 2012). Indeed, demonstrations of the

Jordanian society demanding political transformation have fallen

short compared to the revolutionary situation in other Arab countries

such as Egypt or Tunisia since the beginning of the Arab Spring in

2011 (Beck and H ü ser 2015). During the relatively few protests, the

people’s demands were primarily economic rather than political (Beck

and H ü ser 2015: 87). The Syrian refugee crisis is exacerbating the

already existing economic shortcomings and placing additional bur-

den on public services, especially in the rural areas where the majority

of the East Bank Jordanians, the monarchy’s powerbase, are residing.

Thus, increasing competition for scarce resources could trigger fur-

ther protests (Satloff and Schenker 2013). Instead of genuine polit-

ical transformation of the state system including a genuine reform

of its economic foundation that could ease tensions, the regime

rather seems to favor the idea of asking for more foreign financial aid

(cf. Simon and al-Masri 2014a). Indeed, public support for the mon-

archy increased recently due to the King’s decision to intensify mil-

itary action against IS targets as a reaction to the immolation of the

Jordanian pilot Moath al-Kasasbeh by IS. However, the enthusiasm

will shallow over time as the initial skepticism of the Jordanian popu-

lation of military operations in Syria remains unchanged and because

tensions over the deteriorating economic situation of the country are

still present (Lekic 2015; Simon and Fromson 2015).

Conclusion

While high amounts of financial aid are reaching the country, large

numbers of Syrians and Jordanians are suffering from the situation

as not enough aid is reaching people on the ground. The situation,

however, is not mainly a result of the refugees, as often assumed,

and widely spread by the media, but rather due to general structural

weaknesses of the Jordanian state, which are exacerbated due to the

population increase but are not directly caused by the refugees. The

fact that people are making Syrian refugees responsible for the dete-

riorating situation in the country seems to serve as an instrument

for the political elite to distract from the fundamental weaknesses of

the state system. Hence, this can be used to further postpone polit-

ical and economic transformation and instead ask for more political

94 SIMONE HÜSER

rents from outside. The carriers of the burden are, however, Syrian

and Jordanian people whose living conditions are further deterio-

rating. In order to ease the tensions and not jeopardize social cohe-

sion, the general structural problems in Jordan have to be faced and

improved. There is an urgent need for “increasing the support for

Syrian refugees, vulnerable Jordanian households and Jordanian

hosting communities” (REACH 2014a: 2). Therefore, over the past

year, national as well as international aid organizations started acting

upon the issue of increasing tension between Jordanians and Syrian

refugees rising from the competition over resources (REACH 2014d:

2) and started to direct their aid to Syrian as well as Jordanians in

need. Some aid organizations are emphasizing to “ensure that a

Do No Harm approach is integrated” (REACH 2014d: 3) which

includes greater accountability and transparency of the allocated

funds to reduce a basis for feelings of unfairness and hence, compe-

tition among the receivers. This approach could improve resilience

for some time (REACH 2014d: 3, 28). However, for the long term

Jordan’s economic challenges have to be dealt with in order to guar-

antee social cohesion.

Analysts are pointing out that the security and stability of Jordan

is related to the political and economic issues the country is facing.

If the economic situation is getting worse, the support of Jordanian

people for the regime is likely to decrease significantly, which could

lead to more public protest in the future (Lekic 2015; Satloff and

Schenker 2013). Thus, it is not the influx of the Syrian refugees

per se that might cause instability but the worsening of the eco-

nomic and political situation due to the exacerbation of already

existing problems. Therefore, an encompassing democratization

process has to take place in Jordan, involving political and economic

development.

Notes

1 . Numbers as of February 17, 2015.

2 . Numbers as of February 17, 2015.

3 . Number as of January 7, 2015.

4 . Number as of January 7, 2015.

5 . Registered with UNHCR as of January 7, 2015.

6 . The rise of the inflation rate is mainly a result of the lift of subsi-

dies on oil and electricity as well as raising customs fees on various

goods including clothes (Al-Wazani 2014: 26).

7 . The real number might be much higher as the numbers only count

the registered refugees (UNHCR 2013b: 6).

THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 95

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C H A P T E R 5

The Crisis in Syria, International

and Regional Sanctions, and the

Transformation of the Political

Order in the Levant

Peter Seeberg

Introduction

In the early months of 2011 the Syrian regime answered demonstra-

tions and protests, escalating from mid-March, with armed retalia-

tion and later on with an extremely violent civil war fought by the

Syrian army, secret services, and regime-loyal militias against uncoor-

dinated groups of anti-regime fighters. This reality led a number of

both international and regional state actors to impose a wide range of

sanctions against Syria, with the intention of weakening the regime

in Damascus or contributing to a regime change. The sanctions thus

became a part of attempts at influencing political transformation pro-

cesses in the Middle East region following the uprisings there. For

the most significant international actors, the United States and the

European Union (EU), the sanctions intended to affect the regime

in a “rogue” Syrian state, which for decades had been on a collision

course with the United States and which the EU had not been able

to involve in its Neighborhood Policy agreements. For the regional

actors, first of all the League of Arab States (Arab League) and

Turkey, the sanctions became an element in the power struggle in

the region.

The complex and highly problematic development in Syria in the

years where the civil war became a reality led to a situation where the

102 PETER SEEBERG

regime of Bashar al-Assad developed into a pariah in the Middle East.

Furthermore the problematic situation in Syria, with millions of refu-

gees fleeing to neighboring countries, first of all Lebanon, Jordan,

Turkey, and Iraq, and the huge numbers of internally displaced per-

sons in Syria, focused international attention on the situation. With

the development of the civil war in Syria in 2012–15, which to an

increasing degree saw radical Islamist groups and not least the IS 1

play a significant role both in the fighting against the Syrian regime

and in internal armed conflicts between oppositional groups, the

character of the war gradually changed as did the perception of it in

the international media and among policy decision makers.

The sanctions against Syria were initiated at a relatively early stage

of the Syrian crisis. On May 10, 2011, the day after the EU had

launched its first step of what later became a comprehensive sanctions

program against Syria, the then EU foreign policy chief, Catherine

Ashton, urged the Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad to “choose the path

of reform and national inclusive dialogue and avoid further blood-

shed whilst the door remains open.” “Failing that,” she continued,

“the EU will consider extending the restrictive measures in light

of the developments, including at the highest level of leadership”

(EU-Union 2011).

The first EU sanctions against Syria were launched on May 9,

2011. Taking the EU sanctions from May 2011 as a point of depar-

ture, it is a notable fact that the current regime in Damascus was

met with one of the EU’s most far-reaching sanctions operations

ever (Blockmans 2012; Portela 2012; Seeberg 2015). Also the

United States has tightened the sanctions it had imposed already

before the crisis began in Syria, and many other state actors in

the West have followed the EU and the United States in wide-

ranging sanctions programs (EU-Council 2012; Sharp 2011). The

most interesting novelty, however, is that rather strong sanctions

have also been imposed on Syria by both bilateral and multilateral

regional players. 2 The Syrian crisis has become an important part of

a regional power struggle, inf luenced by changing realities in the

MENA region following the US-led invasion in Iraq in 2003 and

not least the Arab Uprisings since 2011. These historical events have

in different ways inf luenced the balance of power between the four

traditional dominating centers in the Arab Middle East (Egypt,

Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia within the GCC states). However,

whereas the three former states have experienced a relative weak-

ening over the past years due to internal turmoil, the latter stand

strengthened in the regional power balance. The GCC states, and

SYRIA, INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SANCTIONS 103

especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar, seem—regarding relative for-

eign policy strength—to have been able to gain in many ways from

the problematic developments in the Levant, so far without having

much trouble with internal opposition against their own conserva-

tive regimes.

The intention of this chapter is to analyze the sanctions imposed

against Syria since 2011 and discuss in which ways and to what degree

they have impacted the development in Syria and the political order

in the region. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the interests behind

the sanctions from both an international and regional perspective

and considers if the sanctions are serving their purpose, or if they, as

claimed by some analysts, should be interpreted as being inefficient

or even counterproductive (Filiu 2013). Has the Syrian elite been

affected by the economic restrictions imposed by the EU and the

United States or have the sanctioned individuals been able to adapt to

a situation where a deadlock between the fighting parties seems to be

leading to a long-lasting conflict? To what degree has the important

Syrian military remained loyal to the regime and, if it has, how can

that be explained? Obviously, on the one hand the international com-

munity has been trying to manoeuver the Syrian elite away from the

regime, while on the other hand the regime has attempted to pressure

the elite into staying loyal (Abboud 2013).

The internal Syrian conflict has regional repercussions in vari-

ous ways. The regional state and non-state actors play a role in the

Syrian crisis, some of them directly via intervention, as in the case of

Hizbullah, others more indirectly. The Lebanese state is split between

groups that support the opposition in Syria and groups supporting the

regime, thereby reigniting the sectarian rivalries that for decades have

divided the small Syrian neighbor (Blanche 2014). For reasons related

to this internal split, Lebanon has refrained from supporting the Arab

League sanctions against Syria. So has Iraq, for reasons related to the

trading relations between the two neighboring states (Stack 2011).

Other Arab states have halfheartedly supported the sanctions, and

these developments have placed the Gulf States in an interesting new

more significant role within the Arab League.

The Arab League has not only played an active role in connec-

tion with the situation in Syria, but also played an active role in

requesting the UNSC to impose a no-fly zone over Libya leading

to the fall of Muammar Gaddafi. Afterward the Arab League was

upset by the violence involved in the actual NATO action, but that,

as shown by Caitlin Alyce Buckley, only “demonstrated a shallow

understanding of the action that was required to create such a zone”

104 PETER SEEBERG

(Buckley 2012: 86). And concerning Syria things have been different.

The United States put pressure on the Arab League to condemn the

Syrian regime, thereby attempting to influence the international com-

munity and especially Russia and China to accept more harsh resolu-

tions passed in the UNSC, but a military intervention would hardly

ever be accepted by the Arab League. The member states’ foreign

policy interests related to Syria are highly differentiated and, above

all, a military intervention is considered extremely risky. The regional

sanctions have imposed a variety of restrictive measures ranging from

traditional economic sanctions to institutional sanctions like, in the

case of Syria, exclusion from the organization. The chapter therefore

also discusses the sanctions as part of changes in the traditional polit-

ical order in the Levant, implying a transformation of the state system

in the region.

Sanctions against Syria and the International and Regional Interests

Now is the moment for the cynics to drop

their all-or-nothing criticism of sanctions, and

to see them instead as a limited but useful tool.

(Nye 2011)

Despite the fact that sanctions have played an integral role in the

international political system and probably will continue to do so

in the future, there is hardly doubt that, as emphasized by Andrew

Thomas, generally speaking academics are critical of sanctions as a

foreign policy tool (Thomas 2013). Maybe the most important rea-

sons for that have to do with the social consequences of sanctions.

Iran, Iraq, and Syria all demonstrate that sanctions tend to do more

harm to the population of the targeted state than to the targeted

regime itself and the elite around it. It is difficult, if at all possible, to

find really convincing examples where the international community

or state actors have been able to use sanctions successfully. The sanc-

tions against South Africa, which contributed to the abolishment of

the apartheid regime, and the sanctions against Libya, which forced

Muammar Gaddafi to improve Libya’s foreign relations, are from

time to time mentioned as possible examples of actual successes for

sanctions. A significant discussion within international research has

dealt with theoretical aspects of the role of sanctions in foreign policy

pointing at paradoxes and contradictions in utilizing the sanctions

SYRIA, INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SANCTIONS 105

tool (Baldwin 1999/2000; Drezner 2000; Elliott 1998; Maller 2010;

Niblock 2001; Pape 1998).

By implementing sanctions, a state or a group of states intend to

force another state into making decisions it basically does not want

to undertake. Therefore, a “targeted state will comply if the nega-

tive effects outweigh the benefits of the policies that sanctions have

endeavored to change” (Thomas 2013: 34). In order to be effec-

tive it is important that sanctioning parties are able to establish and

uphold a broad and deep consensus building on a commonality of

interests among the participating states. Furthermore, as emphasized

by Daniel Drezner, it is essential that a multilateral deciding body

(like for instance the UNSC) does not contain significant conflicting

interests that might break the sanctioning alliance or simply prevent

sanctions from being agreed upon (Drezner 2000: 81), as we have

seen it in the cases of Russia and China in connection with the discus-

sions about sanctions or other measures against Syria in the UNSC.

If significant trading partners impose comprehensive economic

sanctions on a given state, they will tend to work by resulting in a dras-

tic drop in trade. It has on this background been argued that the eco-

nomic dimension of sanctions has demonstrated efficiency because they

tend to force the targeted regime to focus its attention on economic

survival (Niblock 2001; Thomas 2013). This, of course, presupposes

that the targeted state will act in a rational way regarding economic

issues and will have difficulties compensating for the inflicted loss. The

economic dimension will often be important, because a lack of finan-

cial means tends to make it more difficult for the incumbent regime

to secure the loyalty from the elite surrounding (and supporting) it.

In authoritarian regimes the loyalty of the inner circles will typically

(via rentier-state mechanisms) be bought through access to privileges

of different kinds, financially or otherwise. This element helps keep

the number of cracks or defections as low as possible. It is within the

framework of this logic, as shown in a study by Simon Chesterman

and B é atrice Pouligny, that a general trend in the design of sanctions

over recent decades has developed whereby the sanctions have become

more targeted, for instance, by sanctioning specific persons, organiza-

tions, institutions, or other entities (Chesterman and Pouligny 2003:

510). This trend has since 2003 been even more widespread, as we

have seen in recent years, for instance, in connection with targeted

sanctions against Syria and Russia.

Chesterman and Pouligny have shown in a historical perspec-

tive how the most-often applied sanctions can be divided into broad

106 PETER SEEBERG

categories that classify them regarding their political context or pur-

pose: (a) sanctions that are intended to compel compliance with inter-

national law; (b) sanctions designed to contain a conflict; (c) sanctions

designed to express outrage. A case like the sanctions that have been

imposed against Syria over recent decades can illustrate the use of a

complex variety of sanctions, covering all three types mentioned by

Chesterman and Pouligny. Each type of sanction applied has a specific

aim, which is not necessarily made explicit. Taking the oil embargo

as an example, it has a broad ambition. By putting economic pressure

on the regime, the sanctioning state ( in casu , for instance, the United

States) wants to alter the specific behavior of the given actor ( in casu

Syria), so that it acts according to international law by, for instance,

not hosting terrorist organizations. A more specific type of sanction

is the arms embargo, imposed by both the United States and the

EU, with the intention of preventing the spreading of a military con-

flict, or to make it more difficult to neutralize an internal opposition.

Finally, as can be seen from the press releases issued in connection

with the launching of the sanctions programs, all sanctions have been

launched in order to point at the atrocities taking place behind the

Syrian borders against the opposition and the populace in general.

In the case of Syria, as shown later in this chapter, the “traditional”

sanctions have been supplemented with targeted sanctions, or so-

called smart sanctions, designed to hit individual members of the

regime and the “politically relevant elite,” to speak in the terms of

Volker Perthes (Perthes 2004). By hurting elite members of the given

targeted regime, the aim of the smart sanctions is to motivate pow-

erful supporters of the regime to pressure the targeted government

into making concessions. In the case of Syria, it remains unclear if this

type of sanctions has been applied because they are considered more

effective or because they are supposed to harm the ordinary populace

less than sanctions with a broader focus. Presumably both effects are

meant to work. According to Daniel W. Drezner, however, “there is

no systematic evidence that smart sanctions will yield better policy

results vis- à -vis the targeted country” (Drezner 2011: 97). Having

reviewed most of the literature on sanctions with a special focus on

targeted sanctions, Drezner concludes that smart sanctions are no

more successful at generating concessions from the target state than

the traditional types of sanctions. The most significant positive differ-

ence might be found on the sender side. As explained by Drezner, this

type of sanctions, since they are considered as minimizing human-

itarian concerns, normally receive relatively limited criticism. Also,

because “they do not impede significant trade flows, smart sanctions

SYRIA, INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SANCTIONS 107

can be imposed indefinitely with minimal cost” (Drezner 2011:

104). Finally they solve the political problem of not doing anything:

Sanctions can sometimes be chosen as a foreign policy tool in order to

silence critical media or other public criticism in the sending state.

US and EU Sanctions against Syria

The sanctions against Syria have, as mentioned, been much differ-

entiated in their character, as well as their background. Whereas the

American sanctions have a long history, which first and foremost has

to do with the US claims of Syrian support for terror groups, the EU

sanctions are mainly a result of the recent Syrian crisis. The US sanc-

tions go back to 1979, when Syria was placed on the State Department’s

list of states sponsoring terrorism. In 2003 sanctions on Syria were

inflicted by the American Congress and President George W. Bush,

the so-called Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act. Both

before and after the uprising in Syria, sanctions against individual per-

sons have been implemented, for instance against rich and influential

business people close to the al-Assad family (Sharp 2011). Later new

sanctions were added. Following the speech in which Barack Obama

called for Assad’s resignation, he signed an “Executive Order, which

froze all assets of the Syrian government, prohibited US persons from

doing business with the regime and banned imports of Syrian petro-

leum products” (Laub and Masters 2013: 6–7). Also, other types of

concrete sanctions were implemented, as mentioned by Rune Friberg

Lyme: “Visa and MasterCard blocked all transactions originating in

Syria as well as transactions on accounts originating in Syria” and

implemented restrictions for Syrian banks, among others Syria’s larg-

est bank, the Syrian International Islamic Bank (Lyme 2012: 27).

However, in June 2013, the United States decided on a partial waiver

of sanctions in order to support the Syrian opposition—by allow-

ing the export of commodities and civilian technologies (including

equipment for agriculture, infrastructure, and oil production). This

was later followed by increased funding of aid to the non-armed

opposition, but parts of this program have been suspended due to the

dominance in some areas of Syria of what is considered problematic

groups fighting the regime, as mentioned in a recent Congressional

Research Service Report (Blanchard, Humud, and Nikitin 2014).

Compared to that, as emphasized by Clara Portela, the EU’s sanc-

tions represent a radical change in EU policies in both scope and

character. From May 2011 onward, the EU launched sets of restric-

tive measures; a comprehensive range of sanctions targeting the

108 PETER SEEBERG

Syrian government, individuals involved in the exercise of repression,

the repressive apparatus of the regime, the energy sector, and Syrian

trade (Portela 2012). Maybe the most important of the EU sanctions

was the oil embargo, which reportedly was living up to its goal of

depriving the Syrian regime of a very important part of its revenue—

due to the fact that the largest proportion of the Syrian export of oil

and oil products used to be sold to the EU countries (Landis 2012).

I have elsewhere analyzed how the EU sanctions were expanded over

a period of a little more than two years from May 2011 to July 2013

(Seeberg 2015). A significant element in the EU sanctions was the

restrictive measures against persons from or close to the regime, who

became subject to having their economic assets frozen and a ban from

entering the EU—to some degree parallel to the US sanctions.

Over the two-year period, the number of persons on the list

increased from 13 on the first list of May 9, 2011 (EU-Commission

2011), to 179 on the total list of sanctioned individuals by July 2013.

Then for a period of a year, only a few more names were added to the

list, while other EU sanctions were only expanded to a rather limited

degree (EEAS 2014). With the purpose of supporting the opposition

in its fight against the regime, the EU eased its restrictive measures in

April 2013 so that the export of oil from opposition-controlled areas

could take place, and it also relaxed its financial restrictions with the

intention of assisting rebel forces. Furthermore, due to an initiative

from France and the United Kingdom, the EU arms embargo was

allowed to expire in June 2013 (Laub and Masters 2013: 6). Finally

in July 2013 the EU took indirect action related to the fighting in

Syria by adding the armed wing of Lebanese Hizbullah to its list

of terrorist organizations (EU-Union 2013). The EU had earlier

refrained from this over concerns that it could contribute to destabi-

lizing Lebanon, but the active involvement in the fighting in Syria on

the side of the regime changed the minds of the EU decision mak-

ers. In 2014 the EU again reinforced the restrictive measures against

the Syrian regime. As mentioned in a press release, the EU Council

decided on July 22, 2014 to target “three additional persons and nine

entities due to their involvement in the violent repression of the civil-

ian population and their support to the regime” (EU-Council 2014),

thereby bringing the total of persons under restrictions to 192 and

the number of entities to 62.

The two global actors the United States and the EU both have

imposed comprehensive packages of sanctions on Syria, as docu-

mented in official reports from the US administration and by the

EEAS, respectively. 3 As described by Sharp and Blanchard, the recent

SYRIA, INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SANCTIONS 109

sanctions follow specific earlier US sanctions levied against Syria,

which fall into three main categories: (1) sanctions from before 2011

prohibiting most US exports to Syria; (2) sanctions imposed on cer-

tain Syrian citizens due to participation in proliferation of weap-

ons of mass destruction, association with al-Qaida, the Taliban, or

Osama bin Laden, or destabilizing activities in Iraq and Lebanon;

and (3) other targeted financial sanctions, among others against the

Commercial Bank of Syria, due to money laundering concerns (Sharp

2011: 23–27). Starting from April 29, 2011, specific sanctions were

imposed on individuals and entities, the first person mentioned being

Maher al-Assad. In rounds of sanctions over the following years, the

sanctions were stepped up, so that most of the elite around the Syrian

regime were affected.

The EU sanctions were in many ways similar to the US sanctions.

They were, as mentioned, initiated on May 9, 2011, and followed by

a next round on May 23, 2011. It seems that a first phase of the sanc-

tions, running from May to September 2011, represented a gradual

scaling up of sanctions aimed at individuals, entities, and bodies in

Syria. In this period, it is first and foremost the international actors

that are active. 4 Maybe already here, as indicated by David W. Lesch

(Lesch 2013: 425), the potential problems for the MENA region as

a result of the growing conflict in Syria were being discussed in the

foreign administrations in Washington and Brussels.

A second phase, running from September 2011 until October

2012, included further sanctions against persons and entities, but,

regarding the international actors, also an oil and petroleum products

embargo. The restrictive measures and the embargo can be under-

stood as representing a tightening of the measures. As an expression

of this, a remark by the EU Foreign Affairs Council can be men-

tioned: “ . . . those whose presence would undermine the political

transition should be excluded and President Assad, in this regard, has

no place in the future of Syria.” In both the case of the US and EU

sanctions, President Assad was included in the second round, signal-

ing, as both the United States and the EU have emphasized, that

the Syrian President should step down. In this phase, US President

Barack Obama added sanctions extending the restrictions regarding

Syria. The regional actors now also imposed sanctions on Syria, so

that the international and the regional level supplemented each other,

without explicitly being coordinated.

A third phase ran from October 2012 until April 2013. The

sanctions from the first and second phases were extended, without

adding significant new elements to the already decided actions.

110 PETER SEEBERG

It was furthermore characteristic that in this phase relatively long

periods went on without significant action being taken by any of

the four players, especially in the first months of 2013. From April

2013 onward, in a fourth phase, it is relevant to speak of chang-

ing practice concerning the sanctions. On April 22, 2013, the EU

published a press release which stated that it had decided to ease

restrictions in order to be able to provide help to the areas in Syria

where oppositional groups dominated (EU-Council 2013). This

was followed by a similar initiative of the US, whereby Secretary

of State John Kerry announced in June 2013 that the export of

commodities and civilian technologies would be allowed to areas

where the opposition dominated (Laub and Masters 2013). The

phase ended, or rather faded out, as a result of the new, com-

plex situation in the fighting and the overall deteriorating circum-

stances in Syria.

During 2014, the gradual emergence of a fifth phase became evi-

dent. This phase is characterized by an increasingly unclear situation

in Syria, where ISIL (from June 2014, IS) and groups related to al-

Qaida become dominant. The chaotic realities leads to caution on

the part of the international and regional actors, who for several years

have attempted to weaken or get rid of the regime in Damascus. In

this phase, the EU has again reinforced its restrictive measures in

order to put pressure on the regime in Damascus by sanctioning addi-

tional persons and entities. In a press release from an EU-Council

meeting of April 14, 2014, it was emphasized that the conflict had

reached a state where it was no longer only a question of the regime

and its opposition, but had become a much more complex and dan-

gerous conflict and that the crisis now reflected (at least) three dif-

ferent aspects:

The EU strongly condemns the war crimes and crimes against human-

ity perpetrated by government forces, pro-government militias, terror-

ist and other non-state armed groups . . . The EU deplores the grave

abuses committed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)

and other terrorist groups with links to al-Qaeda such as the Al-Nusra

Front . . . The EU condemns the regime’s decision to enlist the military

support of foreign groups, including the military wing of Hezbollah,

al-Quds Force and Liwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas (EU-Council 2014).

Added to the three-dimensional conflict pattern there was also the

issue of the Syrian chemical weapons program, which the regime

allowed the international community to deal with.

SYRIA, INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SANCTIONS 111

Summing up, it seems that the very nature of the conflict has lim-

ited the effectiveness of the international sanctions for two reasons:

first, because of the alliances attached to the conflict, primarily that

between Syria and Russia, and the significant conflicting interests in

the UNSC, where Russia and China have made it impossible to reach

an agreement; second, as mentioned in the EU document quoted ear-

lier, because of the deeply problematic internal development in Syria

with the involvement of highly problematic groups on both sides of

the conflict and the increasing interference of IS in the local and

regional power struggle. The cautious “arms-length” policies of both

the United States and the EU are expressions of a pragmatic approach

to the crisis in Syria, which underlines the classical Weberian dogma

about the dominance of interests over morals in international foreign

policy relations.

Sanctions are one of many different foreign policy instruments

available for situations like the one following the uprisings in Syria,

which started out at a relatively low level and only after almost a year

resulted in armed confrontations with the regime. The regime’s harsh

reactions to the demonstrations and later on to the fighting were

what led to the sanctions. One of the things that was expected as a

result of the sanctions was that defections would take place, which

would add to the difficulties for the regime in making the army,

business life, and the like, function. An analysis by Sharon Erickson

Nepstad shows that already in the summer of 2011, defections began

within the army, and by the spring of 2012, an estimated 60,000

soldiers had defected, roughly one fifth of the 300,000 members

of the Syrian army (Nepstad 2013: 344). Added to that, enormous

numbers of refugees having left Syria has weakened the regime, but

it should, of course, be emphasized that this reality is only indirectly

connected to the sanctions issue. Rumors in Jordan point at a devel-

opment whereby large numbers of Syrians—outside the official con-

text of the UNHCR refugee camps—are being integrated into the

lower segments of Amman’s business life. To what degree this con-

tributes to creating problems for Syria is difficult to say, but it seems

plausible that the Syrian economy indirectly is affected by the fact

that a relatively large part of the Syrian work force is economically

active outside Syria. 5

There is hardly any doubt that in the sense that the EU trade with

Syria fell drastically, the sanctions against Syria worked, as shown by

Giumelli and Ivan. The Assad regime has attempted, and to some

degree managed, to divert some of its trade to other markets, but

the oil embargo has definitely created severe financial problems for

112 PETER SEEBERG

the regime in Damascus (Giumelli and Ivan 2013). In the year 2013,

an EPC study attempting to assess the EU sanctions imposed on

Iran, Belarus, Syria, and Myanmar, an analytical model was devel-

oped which distinguishes between four steps in the assessment. The

first element in the analysis deals with placing the sanctions within

the overall strategy. The second aspect analyzes the purposes of the

sanctions more specifically, while the third step deals with the impact

and costs of the sanctions. Finally the fourth aspect of the analysis

looks into the comparative utility of sanctions, or, in other words,

what would have happened, if the sanctions had not been imposed

on Syria.

Applying this four-step analysis produced the firm conclusion that

“unsurprisingly, the restrictive measures against Syria did not stop

the conflict.” Furthermore, it concluded that “sanctions alone are

unlikely to change the fate of a civil war, especially when the targets

have significant external support and the senders of the sanctions

have a reduced leverage.” Finally, regarding the role of the appar-

ently inefficient sanctions, in “this case, the role of sanctions is merely

to contain an active conflict, to keep the attention of the interna-

tional community on events, and to send the signal that there is a

line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior” (Giumelli and

Ivan 2013: 25). The question remains, however, to what degree this

has been the case in connection with the Syrian crisis. The presence

of IS shows that the sanctions have not been successful in containing

an active conflict. The sanctions might have contributed to keeping

the attention of the international community on the crisis, and they

have certainly sent a signal to the regime in Damascus about how to

behave. The regime has not, however, acted accordingly and changed

its behavior.

It has been claimed in parts of the critical literature on sanc-

tions (Filiu 2013; Niblock 2001) that sometimes sanctions lead to

a situation where a given populace becomes more dependent on the

regime and in reality a situation can develop where the authoritar-

ian regime is consolidated or even strengthened by being targeted by

economic sanctions (Thomas 2013: 28). There is hardly any doubt

that the sanctions have challenged the regime in Damascus, but the

elite around it has chosen to stay loyal. The armed fighting has had

a similar effect, especially after the interventions by IS and other ter-

rorist groups. Seen from the side of the sanctions-sending states this

aspect of the conflict has added new security dimensions to the con-

flict in which the sanctions tend to become secondary. The same goes

for the question of chemical weapons. It is obviously in the interest

SYRIA, INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SANCTIONS 113

of the EU and the United States to get them eliminated, and the

work dealing with them seems so far to be the only relatively success-

ful action undertaken by the international community vis- à -vis the

Syrian regime. Based on United Nations Security Council Resolution

2118 (UN 2013), the last chemical weapons were shipped out of Syria

for destruction on June 23, 2014.

Regional Sanction and the Syrian Regime

Also the Arab League and Turkey have an evident interest in getting

rid of the threat from chemical weapons present in the region, and

the Syrian government and Western-backed opposition forces have

pledged cooperation with chemical disarmament. It adds to the inter-

est of getting rid of the security threat, that for obvious reasons it

has not been possible to involve al-Qaida-linked rebel groups and/or

the IS in negotiations and implementation of the UNSC Resolution.

But the Arab League and Turkey (and also Russia) have in various

ways expressed that they support the elimination of the dangerous

chemicals.

The regional sanctions go back to the middle of 2011. Turkey did

not launch sanctions right away after the unrest started in Syria in

early 2011. Rather, as observed by Ziya Ö nis, Turkey initially encour-

aged the existing regime to reform the political system ( Ö nis 2012).

However, as things developed, Turkey changed its signals and more

explicitly supported the opposition. Over the past decade Turkey has

gradually attempted to steer its foreign policy image in a soft-policy

direction, which fitted well with the Arab people’s pleas for democ-

racy in 2011. The same found expression in the very critical Turkish

rhetoric against Israel, where Turkey became popular among some

Arab state leaders and broadly in the so-called Arab street by criticiz-

ing both Israel and Syria.

The critical stance against the Syrian regime in the civil war in

Syria led to retaliation from the Syrian side and implied, as men-

tioned by Nursin Atesoglu G ü ney, both soft and hard security issues:

“These include an inflow of refugees that now numbers 500,000, the

downing of a Turkish jet and frequent instances of border violations

and mortar shelling” (G ü ney 2013: 55). As a result of these circum-

stances, in the summer of 2011 the Turkish government came to the

conclusion that “the Syrian problem” could only be solved with the

removal of Assad from power (Cornell 2012). The Turkish viewpoint

was furthermore in accordance with the views of the NATO partners

in North America and Europe. It furthermore brought Turkey closer

114 PETER SEEBERG

to the GCC states, which also were very critical of the Syrian regime.

Seen from a Turkish viewpoint this was wise, since the Gulf States

represented strong economic incentives for an expanding Turkish

economy.

Both Ziya Ö nis and Christopher Phillips point at the “delayed”

Turkish reaction to the atrocities in Syria and argue that the spe-

cific phases in the Turkish foreign policy, vis- à -vis Syria after the start

of the uprisings there, can be explained by the relatively good con-

nection between the two countries during parts of the last decade

before 2011, when Turkey attempted to improve relations between

Israel and Syria. Turkish economic sanctions, following the impos-

ing of sanctions by the Arab League, the EU, and the United States,

were launched from November 2011. At the same time Recep Tayyip

Erdogan called upon Assad to step down followed by some harsh

comments in response to highly degrading remarks made by Assad

about the habitus of his opponents in Syria. Erdogan stated that Assad

should “without spilling any more blood, without causing any more

injustice, for the sake of peace for the people, the country and the

region, finally step down” and continued: “look at the killed Libyan

leader who turned his guns on his own people and only 32 days ago

used the same expressions as you” (Burch 2011). As Phillips men-

tions, Turkey later suggested a direct military intervention against the

Assad regime, such as a no-fly zone or a humanitarian corridor, but

without being willing to act unilaterally (Phillips 2012).

The repercussions of the Syrian crisis in the Middle East have been

wide-ranging and caused changes in the regional power balance. The

changes are the result of not only the internal conflict in Syria, but

also significant problems for Egypt and Iraq over later years. Despite

huge democratic deficits, the Gulf States apparently have been able to

deal with the challenges related to the Arab revolts without seriously

being affected. The consequences of this reality seem to be that the

geostrategic balance in the MENA region has changed from being

a situation where several centers in the “traditional” Arab Middle

East (Bagdad, Cairo, Damascus) together with the Gulf Cooperation

Council (GCC) formed a complex structure of dominance to being

a new setup in which the GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia and

Qatar, have obtained a more leading position in the Arab world and

in this process are playing an increasingly dominant role in the Arab

League. These two states stood behind several initiatives related to the

rounds of sanctions against Syria, and also the plans to send observers

into Syria to oversee the conditions for the Syrian people during the

increasing armed confrontations. It should also be mentioned, that

SYRIA, INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SANCTIONS 115

in March 2013 the Arab League invited a coalition delegation led by

Sheikh Moaz al-Khatib to take Syria’s seat in the summit meeting in

Dubai (Droubi and Gladstone 2013).

The Syrian crisis has brought forward political rivalries at differ-

ent levels between the states involved for or against the regime in

Damascus, an important aspect of which has been the attempts at

maintaining traditional alliances and, if possible, establishing new

ones. On one side, the Syrian regime has attempted to hold on to its

relations with Iran, Russia, and China, but also to gain new partners

by a “looking East campaign.” However, this strategy was already

part of the Syrian economic liberalization strategy before the recent

crisis. On the other side, its opponents, for instance in the GCC,

have attempted to gain influence in the Arab world in order to coun-

teract Iran’s foreign policy manoeuvers. An interesting and unusual

example of this is the attempt on behalf of the GCC to invite Jordan

and Morocco to become members of the organization (Heydemann

and Leenders 2011: 650).

An important theoretical point brought forward by Steven

Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders is that the crisis in Syria has also

demonstrated significant abilities by the Syrian regime to adapt to

changing conditions in the Middle East following the Arab revolts

(Heydemann and Leenders 2013). New political alliances and new

kinds of media strategies, as well as brutal violence against the oppo-

sition, are all measures that can be seen as ways of adapting to unex-

pected challenges for the regime. The sanctions imposed by the Arab

League have been used in the media strategies by the Gulf States as

part of their strategic maneuvers in the MENA region and, as stated

by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman: “the league’s actions have been not so

much a result of the ‘Tahrir spirit’ as of the hardheaded, geopo-

litical calculations by the bloc of mostly monarchical Sunni Arab

states headed by Saudi Arabia and Qatar” (Maddy-Weitzman 2012:

71). This point is also mentioned by Eyal Zisser, emphasizing the

strategic interests of Saudi Arabia (Zisser 2012: 109). According to

Lyme, the Arab League sanctions consisted of four elements: sanc-

tions on the financial system; the cutting of Syrian government trade

and financial transactions; the freezing of project funding on Syrian

territory; and the ban of entry and freezing of assets for some of

the individuals also hit by the EU and US sanctions, among oth-

ers, the younger, influential brother of the President, Maher al-

Assad (Military Commander, Member of the Baath party Central

Command) and Rami Makhlouf (Syrian business man and associate

of Maher al-Assad) (Lyme 2012: 28; EU-Union 2013). The Arab

116 PETER SEEBERG

League sanctions did not explicitly mention the president as the tar-

get for their sanctions, probably in order potentially to allow him to

appear at regional meetings (Lyme 2012: 28). But both the sanctions

imposed by the Arab League and the Turkish sanctions against Syria

contain restrictive measures targeted on individuals but by far not

as extensive as with the US and EU sanctions, in connection with

which the individual sanctions are significant if not dominant ele-

ments. The regional sanctions were more general in their approach,

with a focus on trade restrictions, financial measures, and suspen-

sion of (or imposing of restrictions for) funding of specific projects

in Syria.

The complexity in itself leads the international and the regional

actors to be cautious and rather than intervening in the conflict with

the explicit agenda of bringing Assad to stepping down, it seems

that not rocking the boat too much has become the general recent

strategy for the regional external actors intervening in Syria via sanc-

tions. Foreign policy and security interests are, in other words, play-

ing a significant role for the actors sanctioning Syria. As indicated

by Ziya Ö nis, the “ethics versus self-interest dilemma became espe-

cially profound with the onset of the Arab Spring” ( Ö nis 2012). The

point made by Ö nis was primarily a reflection on Turkish foreign

policy interests, but can meaningfully be extended to the foreign

policy interests of the Arab League, the United States, and the EU

as well, and maybe even more explicitly in the last phases of the

development.

Conclusion

The initial interest behind this chapter has been to analyze the sanc-

tions imposed on Syria with respect to their impact on the develop-

ment in Syria and in a regional perspective. Furthermore the ambition

has been to discuss to what degree the ongoing crisis in Syria and the

attempts from regional and international actors to influence the situ-

ation has contributed to political transformations in the Middle East

region. The analysis has focused on sanctions launched by the EU,

the United States, Turkey, and the Arab League, but also discussed

the significant fact that it has not been possible to reach an agree-

ment on sanctions in the UNSC, which might have pressured the

Syrian regime to change its course and make concessions to a protest-

ing populace. As mentioned, it is an important point when dealing

with sanctions in the context of the international community that a

multilateral deciding body does not experience internal conflicting

SYRIA, INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SANCTIONS 117

interests that would ruin the possibility of being effective. This, how-

ever, seems to be the case in several different ways in connection with

the issues discussed in this chapter.

First, the states sanctioning Syria do not constitute a strong

and coherent coalition. The large international players, the United

States and the EU, have their own not necessarily identical inter-

ests that are in accordance with their different roles on the interna-

tional political scene and their approaches toward the Middle East.

As shown, the actual means of applying the sanctions on the part of

the United States and the EU were not very different and relatively

closely timed. But whereas the US sanctions were part of a strategy

that over a long time had a very obvious agenda related to the “war

on terror” following 9/11 and even longer back, when Damascus

was a hub for radical groups and organizations, in May 2011 the

EU launched a sanctions campaign against Syria, which was not

the continuation of sanctions already being implemented. As has

been the case with the lack of consensus on Syria within the UNSC,

the EU has not been able to mobilize consensus among its mem-

ber states on stronger sanctions or any other kind of intervention,

and as a result of that the EU actions have been concentrated on

the sanctions described. The United States has also refrained from

launching other more risky actions in the context of the Syrian cri-

sis. The Turkish and Arab League sanctions contain elements par-

allel to the sanctions imposed by the United States and the EU, but

of course from a different perspective and uncoordinated with the

international sanctions.

Second, there is the more obvious and significant conflict between

the members of the UNSC, where from the start the Russian and

Chinese disagreement with the other members regarding what

should be done against the Syrian regime blocked any possibility

of an efficient intervention based on a mandate from a united inter-

national community. These realities form a basis for an assessment

of the relevance and efficiency of the sanctions as they have been

imposed on Syria since 2011 (and, regarding the US sanctions, also

before the start of the uprising). Generally the outcome of the sanc-

tions has been limited. They have contributed to the crippling of the

Syrian economy and created problems for the Syrian elite, but appar-

ently without being able to separate the regime from its close sup-

porters in the army and in Syrian business life. Probably the persons

belonging to the inner circles have decided to stand together with

the Baath leaders because they fear the possible unknown alterna-

tives more, especially after the intervention by IS in Syria (and Iraq).

118 PETER SEEBERG

The sanctions did not, as mentioned by Giumelli and Ivan, prevent

the Syrian regime from using chemical weapons against its own pop-

ulace. But it was the threats from the United States that forced Syria

to accept the agreement on removing the chemicals from Syria, a

plan that for obvious security reasons became an important activity

seen from the perspective of both the international and the regional

actors.

The development in Syria seems to demonstrate that in a situation

where the targeted state (Syria) has capable allies in the region (Iran,

Hizbullah) and outside the region (Russia, China), and no strong and

well organized opposition, sanctions of the character imposed by the

United States, the EU, Turkey, and the Arab League are unlikely to

succeed. They might, as mentioned by Giumelli and Ivan, have sent a

signal to the regime in Damascus “that there is a line between accept-

able and unacceptable behavior” (Giumelli and Ivan 2013), but as

things developed, the response to the sanctions by the Syrian regime

never really became an important issue.

Faced with the growing complexity of the situation in the Levant

and in Syria in particular, and following the intervention of the IS in

the conflict, the limits of the sanctions became even more obvious.

But the sanctions also represented indications of changing political

realities in the Middle East. First, the sanctions by the Arab League

implied a restructuring of power relations in the Middle East in

favor of the sanctioning Arab states, in particular the economi-

cally strong Gulf States, and added new dimensions to the lack of

regional economic and political integration, demonstrated years

ago by Michael Hudson et al. (Hudson 1999). This tendency was

indirectly reinforced by the Turkish sanctions as well as the inter-

national sanctions, which became part of an overall change of the

geostrategic balance in the region, where the traditional centers

Bagdad, Cairo, and especially Damascus appeared weakened when

compared to Riyadh and the GCC in general. Specifically regard-

ing the Turkish sanctions they, paradoxically, seem to have been

instrumental in reducing the influence of Turkey in the Levant.

Turkey might in reality, as argued by Ziya Ö nis, by its very active

foreign policy vis- à -vis Syria have undermined its image as a neutral

power broker in the region ( Ö nis 2014: 211). Summing up the sanc-

tions probably have not had much of a direct impact on the Syrian

regime as such, but they contributed to laying the foundation for

what might develop into a collapse of the traditional political order

in the Levant, thereby implying a transformation of the state system

in the region.

SYRIA, INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL SANCTIONS 119

Notes

1 . Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) or Islamic State of Iraq and the

Levant (ISIL) decided in June 2014 to rename itself Islamic State (IS).

2 . It was decided to concentrate in this chapter on four sanctioning

actors, namely the United States, the EU, Turkey, and the Arab

League. For an overview and analysis of sanctions against Syria

including both regional and international players, see Lyme (2012).

3 . It is not possible in a book chapter to go into detail regarding the

enormous material documenting the actual sanctions. For an over-

view of the US sanctions, including a table of the recent sanctions,

see Sharp (2011). Regarding the EU sanctions from after 2011, see

the specific EU Council Documents, the first one being “Council

Regulation (EU) No 442/2011 of May 9, 2011 concerning restrictive

measures in view of the situation in Syria” (EU-Commission 2011).

4 . The periodization applied here is developed based on a model for

periodization that I produced for an article on EU sanctions against

Syria, see Seeberg (2015).

5 . This is based on personal observations and informal interviews in

Jordan in 2013 and 2014.

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C H A P T E R 6

The “Syrian Effects” and the Regional

Quest for Human Dignity in the

New Syrian, Egyptian, and

Tunesian Constitutions

Mervat F . Hatem

Introduction

The Arab uprisings of 2011 revealed how authoritarian stability pro-

vided a thick cover on political and economic structural changes in

Arab societies. Of particular importance was the generational divide

produced by decades of neoliberal development whose large youthful

cohorts spoke with many voices during the Arab uprisings demand-

ing liberty, social justice, and human dignity ( karama) . Not only

did these demands highlight the failures of the neoliberal authori-

tarian state, but they also represented the contours of the “dignity

revolutions” (Leigh 2014) as a societal alternative in the Arab public

imaginaries.

The Syrian uprising with its civil and proxy wars witnessed the rise

of the ISIS (Islamic State in Syria and Iraq), which provided revealing

glimpses of the national, regional, and international forces opposed

to the changes identified with the dignity revolutions. They gave fuel

to politics and discourses that underlined the importance of state

security, stability, and sovereignty, that is, a return to the status quo

ante coupled with new forms of political authoritarianism. While the

ISIS presented itself to the Arab public sphere (Lynch 2012) as an

opponent of the old colonial map forced on the Arab state system,

its demand for a caliphate did not enjoy popular support explaining

124 MERVAT F. HATEM

its reliance on new levels of violence to impose social and political

agendas on the peoples and areas it controlled coupled with sectar-

ian narratives that sought to subdue many young men with different

political orientations, women, and minority groups including Shiites

and Christians. As a result, the Syrian uprising and its wars produced

a conservative regional context designed to produce limited political

diversity and change (Beck 2014).

These “Syria effects” highlighted the dangerous security costs of

the restructuring of the Arab body politic through the inclusion of

large youthful non state actors and their complex change agendas that

emphasized dignity broadly defined to include expanded freedoms,

employment, and embodied citizenship rights that protected indi-

vidual bodies of men and women from state/police brutality. These

changes are now discussed as potentially undermining the capacity

of state institutions to fight a new set of dangerous Islamist actors.

At the same time, the failure to deliver dignity broadly defined has

allowed the ISIS to solicit the support of a minority of young Arabs

and Muslims whose disenfranchisement has provided the public face

of regional disorder.

In the next section of the chapter, I discuss the regional political

economy that shaped the experiences and demands of the younger

generations who have challenged the old political economic order

during the Arab uprisings. Their change agendas have not been real-

ized. They have been instrumentalized, however, by different actors

to produce different political outcomes. The study of the Syrian,

Egyptian, and Tunisian constitutions drafted since 2011 is used to

examine the contested state responses to the regional demand for

dignity: while all acknowledge it, they have identified it with old,

conservative, and new definitions of statehood as a marker of change

of its lack thereof.

Understanding the Neoliberal Arab Authoritarian State, Body Politics,

and Dignity

The transition to market economies in the Middle East placed the

burdens of structural adjustment on the shoulders of the educated

younger generations (especially the age group between 15 and 29) as

the last entrants to the labor market (Dhillon and Yousef 2009; Min

et al. 2012). Their exclusion was reflected in high unemployment

rates, which diminished their economic prospects, delaying the age of

marriage and affecting their ability to form families. In Syria, youth

THE “SYRIAN EFFECTS” AND THE REGIONAL QUEST 125

unemployment represented 61 percent of the total number of the

unemployed in 2005, down from 78 percent in 2002. Young women

were twice as likely to be unemployed as the young men (Kabbani

and Kamel 2009: 196–7). In Egypt, the statistics were similarly stark.

More than 80 percent of the total number of unemployed were in the

15–29 age group, with young women almost four times as likely to

be unemployed as young men. This was the highest rate of unem-

ployment for women in the region (Assad and Barsoum 2009: 73). In

Tunisia, the 15- to 29-year-olds made up one-third of the labor force

and three-quarters of the unemployed. The rate of unemployment

among women was again double that of men (Boughzala 2013: 11).

As a result, it was likely that a person’s first job would be in the

informal sector, diminishing prospects for social mobility and delay-

ing marriage and family formation. Privatization, coupled with the

withdrawal of the state from the provision of important social ser-

vices, led to increased dependence on the patriarchal family to cush-

ion the effects of unemployment and/or the resulting downward

mobility. Whereas the old state contract socialized some patriarchal

responsibilities for the education and employment of their sons and

daughters, the neoliberal one privatized these social costs through a

return to the patriarchal family to address individual needs at a time

of crisis. The results were doubly conservative. It extended young

people’s dependence on their parents for longer periods before

they could form their own families. In states where Islamist groups

stepped in to replace the state in the provision of affordable social

services, from transportation to welfare, it spread conservative social

sensibilities.

The forms of economic (market) and social (family) exclusion suf-

fered by the young were intensified by an aging political class that

gave limited policy attention to their needs, for instance, the reform

of the education system so that it developed skills needed in the mar-

ket place, the use of incentives to encourage businesses engaged in

job creation, and finally the supply of affordable housing to reduce

the high cost of marriage. The regional planned transfers of power to

the biological sons of the reigning patriarchs, which segments of the

old political class accepted or could not challenge underlined other

forms of exclusion. During the first decade of the twenty-first cen-

tury, these transfers of power were planned in Syria, Iraq, Egypt,

Libya, and Yemen dominating regional politics. Only Syria managed

a successful transfer of power from Hafiz to Bashar al-Assad in 2000.

Despite the promise of reform that this second generation authori-

tarian rulers was to deliver (Hinnebusch 2012: 95–113), it did not

126 MERVAT F. HATEM

materialize, underlining the insular and limited capacity of the state

to produce significant change.

The Arab uprisings sealed the fate of this particular institutional

scenario by either killing the father in the case of Muammar Gaddafi

in Libya or deposing him in the cases of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and

Ali Abdallah Saleh in Yemen. In Syria, the only successful example of

this transfer, there is presently open rebellion against the young patri-

arch (Dakhli 2013: 293–301). What this showed was that chronologi-

cal age was not the issue but the ability of these states to redefine their

legitimacy by addressing new sets of economic and political challenges

posed by their youthful populations. While the signs of disconnect

between state and society were clearly visible in a body politics domi-

nated by aging patriarchs who governed through equally old political

classes, it was their inability to address major problems that caused

their loss of political legitimacy (Chatel 2014: 1–15).

The trigger events of the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria

underlined national and regional awareness of another side of this

body politics: the state’s disrespect and abuse of the bodies of its

citizens, especially young men. Repeated police harassment and the

confiscation of his cart led the Tunisian Mohammed Bouazizi in Sidi

Bouzid to set himself on fire in December 2010. Earlier in June of

2010, the Egyptian police arrested Khaled Said at an internet caf é

and beat him to death in an adjacent building in full view of a watch-

ful crowd (Ali 2012) Finally, the police arrest and torture of teenagers

responsible for graffiti critical of the government in the Syrian city

of Daraa in March of 2011 provoked similar widespread feelings of

outrage against the state, with the public space where the protesters

gathered named “dignity square” (Abouzeid 2011).

The coverage of these events provided the backdrop for the

demand for human dignity with which the national and the Arab

public spheres became preoccupied, reflecting the interests of the

younger generations and their families in a state that put an end to

police brutality and the routine use of bodily harm, humiliation, and

torture in dealing with its citizens. It also provided a metaphor for

political inclusion associated with a different kind of politics and the

“state to respect the integrity, safety and the autonomy of the body”

(Singerman 2013: 1, 20). These embodied definitions of citizenship

were more substantial than the formal/legal ones granted by the

Arab authoritarian states following the first wave of decolonization.

In contrast to the limited political agency associated with the right

to vote and to run for public office, which was rendered meaningless

by limited choices offered by the authoritarian state, the demand for

THE “SYRIAN EFFECTS” AND THE REGIONAL QUEST 127

dignity imagined a form of body politics that addressed the indi-

vidual’s right to be in the public space without fear. As such, they

redefined the institutional bases, narratives, and discourses that dealt

with the relationship between the state and the individual bodies of

men and women in a new political order. They posed new questions

regarding who could make claims over the body (the individual or

other institutions) and its treatment in public and private spaces.

Finally, the discussion of dignity as a cornerstone for new citizen-

ship rights would not be complete without serious attempts to connect

body politics to other forms of injustice that impacted the individual.

These included correcting economic exclusion based on genera-

tion (youth unemployment), forms of gender-based discrimination

(in education, hiring, promotion, and political representation), and

class inequalities (including the ability to organize into independent

unions to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of its members

with employers and the state for better wages and work conditions), as

well as dealing with subregional and ethnic imbalances that reflected

unequal access to and distribution of social resources.

The Syrian, Egyptian, and Tunisian constitutional processes and

documents shed light on the way the demand for dignity generated

by a new public sphere was handled by the political classes of authori-

tarian and liberal states that responded with discussions of the rights

of the individual and the state in some old and new ways. What they

said about dignity, torture, and the bodies of men and women offer

testimony to the power of the national and regional demand for dig-

nity at the level of political discourse shedding direct and indirect

light on the success and/or failure of the redefinitions of citizenship.

Old and New Constitutional Articulations of the Arab Body Politics (–)

The Syrian Uprising, the 2012 Constitution and the Redefinition of Authoritarianism

In response to the most serious political crisis of his regime, President

Bashar al-Assad developed a two-pronged approach that included a

violent crackdown on his opposition and the drafting of a new consti-

tution. The president selected and appointed members of a commit-

tee that was tasked with the rewriting of the 1973 constitution which

facilitated the state’s domination of society. The drafting process

and the new document gave few appearances of openness to reform

(Mahmud 2014: 7). The preamble continued heavy reliance on the

128 MERVAT F. HATEM

old nationalist discourses associated with the first wave of decoloniza-

tion with its reference to colonial hegemony, national independence,

and Arabism as dominant concepts, philosophies, and political strat-

egies. The dated references to Syria as the “beating heart of Arabism

at the forefront of the confrontation with the Zionist enemy” and

the Syrian Arab army as the “main guarantor of and protector of the

homeland’s sovereignty, security, stability and territorial integrity”

harked back to the language of the 1950s and the 1960s. The only

concession made to the twenty-first century was a changed context

within which the Syrian Arab Republic had to consider “international

peace and security as key objective and strategic choice” in the face of

“international and regional circumstances that targeted its national

sovereignty” (Voltairenet 2012). This was a new regional theme that

was to find echo in other uprisings that threatened the power of the

state. National security offered a new justification for the authoritar-

ian state to concentrate its power in the name of the community to

fight new enemies without reference to the law.

Most analysts agreed that while the removal from the new doc-

ument of article 8 of the old constitution, which allowed the Baath

party to monopolize political power, provided a significant change

in the political rules, it did not challenge the power or the opera-

tion of the state, allowing the president to concentrate power in his

hands serving as the head of both the armed forces and the judi-

ciary branch (Fares 2014) with power to dissolve parliament (Hakki

2012). Under article 155, the president would finish his current term

of office, which ended in 2014, and then would have the right to run

for two seven-year terms, allowing him to govern until 2028 (Hakki

2012: article 88). Meanwhile, article 154 stated that “all laws and

legislation issued before the promulgation of the new constitution

remain in effect until they are amended within a period of three

years.” These included the laws that permitted detention, prohibited

demonstrations, and limited freedom of speech. In other words, it

suspended all liberties and rights pending the outcome of the war.

This clashed with article 33, which characterized “freedom (as) a

sacred right,” and declared that “the state shall guarantee the per-

sonal freedom of citizens and preserve their dignity and security”

(Fares 2014). Because dignity and security were connected in this

formulation, the authoritarian state could claim to respect the “dig-

nity” of its citizens at the same time that it subjected them to new

levels of violence in the name of security. An emerging regional con-

sensus and norm, sanctioned by the Arab League in response to the

Libyan uprising, challenged this practice and its logic accepting the

THE “SYRIAN EFFECTS” AND THE REGIONAL QUEST 129

global “responsibility to protect” principle that rejected the use of

state sovereignty to commit atrocities against one’s citizens (Lynch

2012, Ch. 6).

The chapter titled “rights and freedoms” listed citizenship rights

as including equality of opportunity, the right to work, and the free-

dom of belief (articles 33, 40, and 42 respectively). Article 53 stated

that “no one maybe tortured or treated in a humiliating manner and

the law shall define the punishment for those who do so.” It was

included in the chapter that dealt with the rule of law, not that which

dealt with the rights and freedoms of the individual citizen ignoring

the important role that protection from torture had acquired in the

regional definition of dignity as a citizenship right. The discussion

of torture provided the only reference that the constitution made to

the state’s respect of the bodies of its citizens and it most probably

referred to the bodies of men, not women.

The discussion of women’s rights provided the context for gen-

dered views of the body. “Islamic jurisprudence shall be a major

source of legislation; the state shall respect all religions and ensure the

freedom to perform all the rituals that do not prejudice public order;

the personal status of religious communities shall be protected and

respected” (Lynch 2012: 3, article 3). “Society . . . shall be based on

the basis of solidarity, symbiosis and respect for the principles of social

justice, freedom, equality, and maintenance of human dignity of every

individual” (article 19), and “the family shall be the nucleus of society

and the law shall maintain its existence and strengthen its ties; the

state shall protect and encourage marriage and shall work on remov-

ing material and social obstacles that hinder it” (article 20) (Lynch

2012: 7). Finally, article 23 stated that “the state will provide women

with all the opportunities that effectively and fully contribute to the

political, economic, social and cultural life and the state shall work on

removing the restrictions that prevent their development and partici-

pation in the building of society” (Lynch 2012: 7).

What the articles offered was a complex discussion of the rights of

men and women (as individuals and gendered citizens who had bod-

ies) mediated by powerful social and political institutions. As abstract

individuals, both were entitled to the respect of their freedom, equal-

ity, and human dignity from society, with the state vowing to the

removal of material and social obstacles to marriage, which was an

acknowledgment of the serious effects that high level of unemploy-

ment had on that institution. The state was willing to share power

with the religious and legal establishments that shaped personal sta-

tus laws that defined the roles that men and women played in the

130 MERVAT F. HATEM

family, recognizing the authority of both to leave their imprints on

these bodies and how they were to be treated in this private space.

The state also committed itself to removal of public restrictions

that affected “women” as a gendered group from “development and

participation in the building of society.” In exchange, women were to

participate and serve community interests as well as the state’s agen-

das whatever these might be. During the uprising, the state orga-

nized women into brigades to suggest that Syrian women supported it

(Fatehallah 2013), not its opponents. While the state presented these

brigades as a continuation of its commitment to increasing women’s

public participation in new arenas, they were merely forms of neigh-

borhood watch and/or the inspection of women at checkpoints. They

did not represent women taking on new military roles, but were roles

that groups opposed to the state also took on.

The militarization of the Syrian uprising through increased regime

violence against the opposition had harsh effects on women and men

and their bodies. National and international discussions of these

effects paid more attention to the bodies of the former and ignored the

latter. The initial peaceful phase of the uprising had shown the wide-

spread support that women gave to anti-regime forces. In response,

the regime used its thugs ( al-shabiha) to kidnap and rape activist

women, spreading fear designed to discourage men and women from

joining the opposition (Sha’bou 2014: 15) Here, the state was clearly

not committed to the protection of the bodies of women who sup-

ported its opposition. The constitution only protected the bodies of

women engaged in the most traditional of activities, that is, moth-

ering or the care of children within the family. It was not beyond

using sexual violence and the violation of the honor codes of rural

Syria to discourage women from active participation in the uprising.

Finally, the regime manufactured the myth of “sexual Jihad ” (women

agreeing or being forced to sexually service Islamist opponents of the

regime) to discredit the uprising and the women that supported it

(Sha’bou 2014: 18).

Using Jihadism in the undifferentiated discussion of the regime’s

Islamic opposition, especially with respect to the ISIS with its vio-

lent repressive tactics, allowed the regime to discredit its opponents,

distracting attention from the regime’s equally violent treatment

of women. Polemical discussions stressed the way women were vic-

tims of war and refused to acknowledge the agency of liberal and

Islamist women, who were simultaneously engaged in the public

opposition of the regime and the ISIS (Sha’bou 2014), for example,

the unveiled Razan Zaitouneh, the kidnapped human rights activist

THE “SYRIAN EFFECTS” AND THE REGIONAL QUEST 131

who documented regime violations, and Souad Nawfal, the veiled

school teacher who stood up to the ISIS in the city Raqqa challenged

the narrow representations of the roles played by the secular and the

Islamist in the war and the narrow politics of embodiment and resis-

tance (Gazou 2014). Not only did Zaitouneh and Nawfal defy expec-

tations that Syrian women were narrowly determined by their gender

interests, with secular women supporting and defending the authori-

tarian state and their religious counterparts uncritically accepting the

restrictive political and gender practices of the Islamist groups, but

they also expanded the discussion of embodiment to include standing

up for their beliefs and shedding fear in the fight for dignity.

Finally, there was ample evidence to support the widespread acts of

physical brutality against men by the regime and its Jihadi opponents.

By giving less attention, the discussions reinforced the partial view of

men as the perpetrators, not the victims of civil war. It misses the fact

that the Syrian authoritarian state had subjected its male and female

citizens to levels of violence that challenged the new constitution’s

claim that it protected the dignity of its citizens and the security of

the community.

Egypt, the Mixed Constitutional Legacies of the 2012 and 2014 Constitutions and the Return to the Authoritarian State

Egypt passed two constitutions in 2012 and 2014, which reflected

the divisions of its society and political class, allowing the military to

reclaim power and build a new authoritarian state. The processes used

to draft them represented the intersection of new and old regional

political norms that developed since 2011. While the first constitu-

tion was drafted by the remaining parliamentary chamber that was

not dissolved, the High Constitutional Court in 2012, the second

was drafted by a state commission appointed by the military led gov-

ernment that overthrew the elected President Mohammed Morsi and

his government in 2013. The drafting of the former was generally

boycotted by most liberal and civil political actors contrasting with

the drafting of the latter which was boycotted by most Islamist actors

with the exception of the Salafist Nour Party. It was not surprising,

therefore, that the discussions of these constitutions remain very

polemical. While the liberal critics of the committee that drafted the

2012 constitution claimed that it imposed an Islamist character on

Egyptian society, the Islamist critics of the second committee that

drafted the 2013 constitution criticized it as the creation of the mili-

tary-led government (Brown 2014).

132 MERVAT F. HATEM

To combat the illiberal image of the latter, its defenders made two

claims that provided it with a “popular” fig leaf. First, they claimed

that the second constitution only “amended” that of 2012 allowing

it to indirectly claim the mandate of the 2012 Constituent Assembly.

Second, a member of the 2013 Commission suggested that its mem-

bers were nominated by professional and civil society institutions

providing a “better” representation of society (Ashraf 2013). The

emphasis placed on the popular character of the institutional mecha-

nisms used to draft a constitution was the product of the legacy of

the January 25, 2011 revolution that emphasized “a new way—par-

ticipatory and consensual rather than top down” (Brown 2014) of

conducting politics.

While the 2012 constitution represented a step forward in that

direction, the 2014 one took a step back as the product of a national

context that human rights organizations characterized as the larg-

est state crackdown on the opposition in Egyptian recent memory.

It primarily targeted the members and supporters of the Muslim

Brotherhood but eventually included youthful revolutionaries and

liberal critics. Egyptian Security officials reported that the govern-

ment arrested 16,000 people in the eight months that followed the

military coup, subjecting them to torture and incarceration under

inhumane conditions (Ghaleb 2014; Human Rights Watch 2014). Of

these, 800 were women who were subjected to torture (Leila 2014).

This represented the triumph of the authoritarian legacies of the past

and the use of the new constitution’s much celebrated bill of rights

with its defense of “dignity” to provide political cover for the return

to authoritarianism (Brown 2014).

On the discursive level, a close reading of the two constitutions

also underlined national constructions, which despite claims to the

contrary, were similar. The preamble of the 2012 constitution fore-

grounded the revolutionary demands of “bread, liberty, social jus-

tice and human dignity” as “supported by the blood of the martyrs

and the pain of loss, the dreams of children and the struggle of men

and women.” Its construction of Egyptian history started with the

“great civilization that established the oldest state in the world,

identified the meanings of citizenship, equality, nondiscrimination

and the alphabet, it also launched monotheism, knowledge of God,

the embrace of the various prophets of God and divine messages.”

It then listed the many principles that united all Egyptians in the

desire to build a modern democratic state. They included (1) popular

sovereignty; (2) peaceful circulation of power and political pluralism;

(3) “dignity of the individual that is constructed out of the dignity of

THE “SYRIAN EFFECTS” AND THE REGIONAL QUEST 133

the homeland ( al-watan ) that cannot exist without the dignity of the

woman, in view of the fact that that women were the siblings ( shaqiq)

of men and partners in national achievements and responsibilities;”

(4) liberty as a right; (5) “equality and equality of opportunity for

everyone, male and female citizens, without any discrimination . . . in

their rights and duties;” (6) “rule of law as basis for the liberty of

the individual, legitimate authority and the state’s submission to the

law;” (7) national unity; (8) the armed forces as national institution

that is professional, neutral that does not intervene in politics; (9) a

police that serves the people and protects it, upholds the scales of

justice . . . that respect the dignity of the human being and the rule of

law; (10) “unity as the hope of the Arab nation . . . supported by coor-

dination and brotherhood with the states of the Nile basin and the

Islamic world” (Al-Jam’iyat al-Ta’ssisiya 2012: 7–8).

This centering of the concerns and the narratives of the revolu-

tion in the 2012 constitution was not surprising since the revolution

provided a hospitable context for the Muslim Brotherhood’s ascent

to power. The preamble mixed various religious references to mono-

theism, the prophetic tradition’s less gendered reference to women as

the siblings of men and/or national partners with modern political

concepts like liberty, popular sovereignty, democratic government,

equality, and the rule of law in the definition of the community. The

preamble of the 2014 constitution was not dramatically different in

this regard. Its first page mentioned the ancient Egyptian civilization

as having contributed the “first centralized state.” Egypt was also

described as being “the cradle of religion” and carrying “the great

flag of all divine religions” (Jumhuriyat Misr al-Arabiya 2013: 3).

This was highlighted with references to Moses having grown up in

Egypt, Egyptians embracing Mary and the child Jesus when they

were in their midst, and the many Egyptian martyrs who died in the

defense of their Christian Church. It also stated that when Islam was

revealed, Egyptians were guided by its light, embracing it as a reli-

gion, fighting for and spreading it (Wizarat al-Shabab Jumhuriyat

Misr al-Arabiya 2013). This emphasis on the importance of religion

in Egyptian history was not dramatically different from that offered

in the 2012 constitution. The 2014 preamble devoted its attention;

however, to the history of the Egyptian state and the role it played in

the project of rational enlightenment as well as its support of national

revolutions that extended from the end of the nineteenth century to

the revolutions of January 25, 2011, and June 30, 2013. The army

was represented as a supporter of the desire to live in security and

safety, and as such was politically neutral. It concluded by describing

134 MERVAT F. HATEM

“the constitution as completing the building of a democratic state

with a civil form of government ” (Wizarat al-Shabab Jumhuriyat Misr

al-Arabiya 2013: 5) and “emphasized the principles of Islamic shari’a

as the principal source of legislation whose interpretation could be found

in the totality of the rulings issued by the High Constitutional Court”

(Wizarat al-Shabab Jumhuriyat Misr al-Arabiya 2013: 6, my italics).

In giving the Constitutional Court the role of interpreting the sharia,

the 2014 constitution broke with that of 2012, which gave al-Azhar,

the institution of Islamic learning, that role (article 4) (Al-Jam’iyat

al-Ta’ssisiya 2012: 10).

Both the 2012 and 2014 constitutions developed bills of rights

that were similar in chapters titled “rights and liberties,” but the 2014

constitution gave the state an important role to play in the protec-

tion of these rights. Both foregrounded dignity as “a right for every

human being which the state respected and protected” (articles 31

in the 2012 constitution and 51 in the 2014 one) (Al-Jam’iyat al-

Ta’ssisiya 2012: 16; Wizarat al-Shabab Jumhuriyat Misr al-Arabiya

2013: 18). While article 52 in the 2014 constitution made “torture

in all its forms a crime whose prosecution had no statute of limita-

tion” (Wizarat al-Shabab Jumhuriyat Misr al-Arabiya 2013: 18), no

such article existed in the 2012 constitution. Article 36 of the latter

was included verbatim as article 55 in the 2014 constitution, stating

that “all those who are arrested, incarcerated or whose freedom was

restricted should be treated in ways that preserved their dignity. They

should not be tortured or intimidated or coerced or harmed physi-

cally or morally. They should only be held or confined in places that

are humane, hygienic and subject to judicial review” (Al-Jam’iyat al-

Ta’ssisiya 2012: 16). They were forceful in their condemnation of the

abuse of male and female bodies promising to protect them. While

both constitutions supported the reform of the police that could pro-

vide such protection, the governments of president Morsi and those

that followed him took no such steps leaving the promise of protec-

tion against torture without effective enforcement mechanism.

Both constitutions relied on the 1971 constitution’s older formu-

lations of individual rights and obligations enjoyed by all citizens

(Mclarney 2013). Their definition of equality emphasized sameness

which was common in most Arab constitutions. It was incorporated

as parts of articles 33 of the 2012 constitution and 53 in that of 2014,

which declared that “citizens were the same in eyes of the law and

are equal in rights and public obligations without any discrimination

among them” (Mclarney 2013). Article 53 repeated this formulation

adding the specific forms of discrimination that were forbidden by

THE “SYRIAN EFFECTS” AND THE REGIONAL QUEST 135

law, like those based on “religion, creed, sex, national origin, race,

color, language, handicap, class, political orientation, geography or

any other reason.” It added that “discrimination and calls for hate

were crimes to be punished by law. The state was to take measures

necessary to end all form of discrimination creating an independent

commission for this purpose” (Wizarat al-Shabab Jumhuriyat Misr

al-Arabiya 2013: 18).

These additions to the more generic article 33 of the 2012 consti-

tution were touted by the rapporteur for this section of the 2014 con-

stitution as important improvements on that of 2012, which lacked

specific articles that “stated the equality of male and female citizens,

criminalized discrimination on the basis of sex or gender and devel-

oped a state commission to combat any form of discrimination”

(Al-Ahali 2013; Farouq 2013; Uthman 2013). This was considered to

be evidence of Islamist hostility to women’s rights.

To respond to these failings, the 2014 constitution expanded article

53 to address these concerns. Article 11, which stated the equality of

men and women, became identified as the “women’s article” return-

ing to equality affirming legal language of the 1971 constitution. In

unison with article 10 which stated that the “family formed the basis

of society and was constituted by religion, morality and patriotism,

the state was to contribute to its solidarity, stability and the deepen-

ing of its values,” article 11 affirmed that the “state supported the

equality between men and women in all civil, political, economic,

social and cultural rights. The state will also take measures to secure

women proper representation in legislative chambers according to the

law, support a woman’s right to take on public jobs, high adminis-

trative posts in the government and appointments in the judiciary

branch. It will also be obliged to protect a woman against all forms

of violence, supporting her empowerment and the reconciliation of

her duties to her family and the requirements of work. It will also

provide for the care and protection of motherhood and childhood,

female heads of the household, elderly and needy women” (Wizarat

al-Shabab Jumhuriyat Misr al-Arabiya 2013: 8–9).

It should be pointed out though that articles 6, 8, 9, and 33 of

the 2012 constitution stated and restated their commitment to the

equality of all citizens’ rights, opportunities, and laws (Al-Jam’iyat

al-Ta’ssisiya 2012: 11, 16; Mclarney 2013). Its article 10, which

addressed some of the concerns of women discussed them as part

of the discussion of the “family as the basis of society constituted

by religion, morality and patriotism.” The state and society were to

abide by the authentic character of the Egyptian family securing its

136 MERVAT F. HATEM

solidarity, stability, and deepening its moral values. The state was to

provide free services associated with motherhood and childhood and

help the woman to reconcile duties to her family and public work.

“The state will also give special attention and protection to female

headed household, divorced and widowed women” (Al-Jam’iyat al-

Ta’ssisiya 2012: 11).

Both constitutions underlined their agreement on the use of the

family as providing cultural and institutional contexts that mediated

important values (religious, moral, and patriotic) that shaped gender.

Neither the 2012 nor the 2014 constitutions differed significantly

from the 1971 constitution’s discussion of these issues. This sug-

gested constitutional continuity in the discussion of gender issues.

According to the rapporteur this section of the 2014 constitution,

when the 2012 constitution was found lacking in any area (including

the area of women’s rights), the commission frequently went back

to the 1971 constitution, borrowing from it. 1 The 2012 constitu-

tion relied just as heavily on the 1971 constitution, with one analyst

pointing out that the language dealing with the reconciliation of the

women’s public work and her duties in the family in the 2012 consti-

tution was taken verbatim from it (Mclarney 2013). Lest one think

that the 1971 constitution set the most progressive standard for the

rights of women, this was what it stated: “the state shall guarantee

the agreement between the duties of a woman toward her family and

her work in society, considering her equal status with man in the

field of political, social, cultural and economic life without the con-

travening of the laws of Islamic shari’a” (Mclarney 2013). When that

article found its way into a draft of the 2012 constitution, a public

uproar ensued because of suspicion it would be used by the Islamists

to undermine gender equality. This led them to opt for the general

articulation of gender equality making the point that Islamic society

was not opposed to it. Unfortunately, this also failed with the framers

of the 2014 constitution using it as evidence of their lack of support

for women’s rights.

For all the excitement expressed regarding article 11 of the 2014

constitution, it did not go beyond a reference to future state support

of a gender agenda. Despite intense lobbying by women’s nongov-

ernmental organizations to include quotas for women to overcome

their political underrepresentation, the constitution only referred

to the need for their “proper representation in legislative bodies,

the upper echelons of government, and in the judiciary branch.” It

then reiterated the old state feminist commitment to helping work-

ing women to reconcile their family and work obligations. Then, it

THE “SYRIAN EFFECTS” AND THE REGIONAL QUEST 137

offered a general promise to support motherhood and childhood,

which the 2012 constitution also promised to support through the

provision of free services. Both Islamists and secularists used the

constitution to stress their support of motherhood and childhood as

forms of embodiment. While article 11 promised to protect women

against all forms of violence breaking new grounds, this commit-

ment sat uneasily with article 10 that abided with the moral codes

of the family that are frequently used to support honor killings and

female circumcision.

Finally, the 2014 constitution made a bid for the support of under-

privileged women (female heads of household, elderly, and needy

women), which the 2012 parliament dominated by the Muslim

Brotherhood emphasized as the center of their policy initiatives that

distinguish their gender agenda (Hatem 2013) from those identified

with the liberal and state feminist ones. All of this contributed to

an ambiguous constitutional legacy that highlighted the commonali-

ties and not the exaggerated differences among the 1971, 2012, and

2014 constitutions and their constructions of dignity as the basis of

embodied citizenship.

The Tunisian Constitutional Approach, the 2014 Constitution and the Promise of a Liberal State

Tunisia initiated the Arab uprisings and articulated many of their

demands for dignity, liberty, and social justice as responses to the

history of the postcolonial authoritarian state and its discontent. The

Tunisian political transition was as messy and sometimes as polariz-

ing as that in Egypt, with a deep Islamist-secularist divide, political

distrust, and a long list of grievances that it had to address, including

class, gender, and generational and regional inequalities. The road

map for its political transition led, however, to a different outcome,

with the election of a Constituent Assembly tasked with the draft-

ing of a constitution that also served as the basis of a power-shar-

ing arrangement and the formation of coalition governments (based

on a troika representing the three largest political parties including

the Islamist Ennahda, the secular Congress for the Republic, and

Eltakatol parties). The transition was less hampered by a politicized

military and assisted by strong civil society institutions (especially the

Tunisian General Labor Union, the bar association, and its League of

Human Rights). Still, the last three years have witnessed two political

assassinations, a Salafist insurgency, and a politicized security appara-

tus that frequently threatened to derail the transition.

138 MERVAT F. HATEM

In addition to its reliance on an elected Constituent Assembly that

included key actors in the drafting of the constitution, its approach to

the document as needing to reflect a minimum societal consensus led

to a conscious effort to negotiate different views and concerns (al-Ali

and Romdhane 2014). The process and the document itself set new

regional standards that underlined the importance of political con-

sent and compromise within and among key political parties (Marks

2014). The skeptics may point out that no single political party was

completely satisfied with the constitution claiming it as their own,

but most of the participants were aware that it was the best that could

be accomplished at that historical juncture in view of the reversals

suffered by other Arab political transitions. Of course, the test of

the success of the Tunisian constitutional approach and its document

will be in its future ability to guide the development of a new type

of state.

How did the Tunisian constitution situate dignity as a tangible and

intangible political good in the relationship between the state and its

citizens to produce new definitions of citizenship? The preamble of

the constitution used the goals of the Tunisian revolution as its fram-

ing device and how they represented the “people’s struggle to gain

independence, state building, eliminate autocracy and realize the rev-

olutionary objectives of freedom and dignity . . . responding to the sac-

rifices made by the martyred Tunisian men and women to break with

injustice, oppression and corruption” (Jasmine Foundation 2014).

It included references to both Islam’s moderate and open principles

and universal human rights as the primary foundations of Tunisian

identity. It then listed the features of its new democratic representa-

tive system of government: a civil state where sovereignty belonged

to the people through free elections, separation of power, pluralism,

supremacy of the law, independence of the judiciary, equality of rights

and duties of male and female citizens, and fairness between regions.

It supported the unity of the Maghreb as a step toward Arab unity,

integration with Islamic and African nations, and support for the

right of people to self-determination, including the Palestinians.

There were some similarities and differences between the pream-

bles of the Tunisian constitution and that was passed by Egypt at

the end of 2012. The latter was more likely indebted to the former.

The Tunisian Constituent Assembly had been engaged in the draft-

ing of its constitution since 2011 when president Morsi’s government

scrambled to draft a constitution at the end of 2012 for fear that the

High Constitutional Court was about to dissolve the second parlia-

mentary chamber engaged in that task. The Tunisian preamble used

THE “SYRIAN EFFECTS” AND THE REGIONAL QUEST 139

the revolution and its goals as a framing device, foregrounding the

sacrifices the martyred men and women made for the revolution, a

general reference to Islam’s moderate principles (in contrast to the

Egyptian discussion of its long history of monotheism) and ended by

listing the modern features of democratic government: popular sover-

eignty, peaceful circulation of power, political pluralism, the dignity

of the individual, the equality of male and female citizens, and the

supremacy of the law. Whereas the 2012 Egyptian constitution dis-

cussed the role of Islamic sharia in government and who was to inter-

pret it (al-Azhar), the Tunisian constitution did not because it was a

contested issue that had no place in what was to be a consensus docu-

ment (Gresh 2013; Marks 2014). Sheikh al-Ghannouchi was mindful

of the Egyptian experience in this regard suggesting that “it serves

nothing to win elections, as in Egypt with the Muslim Brotherhood,

if the opposition boycotts them” (Gresh 2013).

So, what did the constitution identify as the Tunisian consensus

regarding the role that religion was to play in society? Article 1 of the

constitution identified Tunisia as a sovereign state with Islam as its

religion, Arabic its language, and a republican government. It had a

civil form of government based on citizenship, the will of the people,

and the supremacy of the law (article 2). The state protected religion,

guaranteed “freedom of belief and conscience and religious practices,

ensured the impartiality of mosques and places of worship away from

partisan instrumentalization. The state is obliged to spread the values

of moderation and tolerance, the protection of all that is sacred pre-

venting attacks on them and it will also commit itself to preventing

the calls of apostasy and incitement of hatred and violence” (arti-

cle 6). The family served as the basic nucleus of society and the state

shall protect it (article 7).

These articles gave the state a contradictory role to play in relation

to religion. It was to protect religion as a personal and an individual

concern, but it was also to move beyond this limited definition to

make sure that it would not be employed in partisan ways, an indi-

rect reference to how religion was used to persecute the Islamists in

Tunisia. It was also obliged to spread a specific set of religious val-

ues identified with moderation and tolerance defending that which is

sacred from attack, criminalizing those who charge others with apos-

tasy and the incitement of hate and violence. What all of this clearly

indicated was that there was limited consensus on the roles that reli-

gion would play in society and/or politics. Article 7, which followed

this expanded discussion of religion, discussed the family as a basic

social constitution without making any reference to religion. This

140 MERVAT F. HATEM

distinguished the Tunisian constitution from its Syrian and Egyptian

counterparts, which discussed it as a constitutive element of the fam-

ily as a social institution.

Chapter two , titled “rights and liberties,” offered an extended bill

of rights that included an expanded definition of dignity and gender

rights. “All citizens, male and female, have equal rights and duties

and are equal before the law without any discrimination. The state

guaranteed individual and collective rights to citizens, both male

and female, and provides them with conditions to lead a dignified

life” (article 21). “The state shall protect human dignity and physical

integrity of the body ( hormat al-jasad) and shall prohibit psychologi-

cal and physical torture. Torture as a criminal offense will not have a

statute of limitations” (article 23). Last but not least, “every prisoner

shall have the right to humane treatment that preserves his own dig-

nity. The state will take into account the interests of the family in any

punishment that deprives one of freedom” (article 30).

Articles 21 and 23 offered a complex definition of dignity as a

basis for citizenship. It was both an individual and a collective right.

All citizens were entitled to it, but it was also segmented by gender

with men and women facing different forms of gender discrimination

that required legal protection. Article 23 criminalized the kinds of

psychological and physical torture with which the authoritarian state

was associated and instituted the state’s respect for the body by mak-

ing the prosecution of these crimes open ended. Finally, it added the

right of all citizens to conditions that allowed them to lead dignified

lives, which included meeting their social and economic needs.

Because the discussions of rights in a Tunisian context almost

always lead to the discussion of the rights of women, this chapter of

the constitution offered perspectives on the old and new rights that

women were to have. The constitution offered the equality-affirming

legal definition of equal (same) rights for men and women found in

older Arab constitutions (article 21). In an early draft, Ennahda had

offered a wording of that article that spoke of the “complementari-

ties between men and women” (Marks 2014), which contributed to

a heated debate, with the critics arguing that this was a backdoor

attempt at introducing gender inequality. Despite Ennahda’s attempt

to argue that the recognition of difference was not the same as accept-

ing inequality, it decided to withdraw that provision to underline once

again its interest in “seeking consensus” (Gresh 2013).

In addition to the equality of rights and duties that all citizens

were to enjoy, as listed in article 21, article 34 stipulated that the

“rights to election, voting and candidacy are guaranteed and the state

THE “SYRIAN EFFECTS” AND THE REGIONAL QUEST 141

shall ensure gender parity in elected bodies.” This contributed to the

preservation of old rights and the addition of new ones. Article 46

described them in the following way: “the state shall commit itself to

protecting women’s achieved rights and seek to support and develop

them. The state shall guarantee equality of opportunity for men and

women and their taking various responsibilities in all fields. The state

shall seek to achieve equal representation for women and men in

elected councils. The state shall take the necessary measure to elimi-

nate violence against women.” The protection of women from vio-

lence emerged as a new measure of dignity, the discussion of gender

difference, and the definition of embodied citizenship rights.

Conclusion

The demand for human dignity was an important contribution made

by the younger generation of men and women in the Arab uprising. It

went beyond the formal rights of citizenship which the authoritarian

state emphasized following decolonization. Because of its potentially

transformative character, the constitutions produced by the Arab

uprisings in Syria, Egypt, and Tunisia responded to it in different way.

There was strong resistance to giving it more than formal acknowl-

edgment by the old authoritarian state in Syria and the new one in

Egypt. Because the Tunisian political transition experimented with a

different type of political process and approach to constitution writ-

ing, it was part of a more complex process of nation building.

The three constitutions added dignity to the list of augmented

old legal rights. In the Egyptian and the Tunisian constitutions,

the demand for human dignity drew attention to the state’s and the

society’s respect for the body of the individual by criminalizing the

use of violence to harm or violate it. This represented a potentially

radical challenge to the authoritarian states and Arab societies, which

tended to privilege community interests (e.g., national independence,

modernization, and national security) in the definition of the state’s

treatment of these bodies and the definition of citizenship rights.

Typically, individuals enjoyed rights only in exchange for service to

their community (i.e., its independence of development) or as long as

they did not clash with state policies and concerns.

It was not surprising, therefore, that the Syrian and the Egyptian

authoritarian states could introduce bills of rights that they could

then ignore or undermine in the name of serving the higher inter-

est of the community and/or that of the state. The discussion of

torture and violence against women in some of these constitutions

142 MERVAT F. HATEM

represented attempts to institute embodied citizenship rights that

broke with cultural discourses of disembodied masculinity and

expanded the definition of the embodied experiences of women

beyond those that socially sanctioned motherhood. It broke the

silence on the taboo discussion of forms of violence to which women

were exposed. In view of this, these new constitutions ref lected old

and new ways of thinking about these issues and dilemmas that

explored the relations between the body and important institu-

tions including the state, the family, and the religious and legal

establishments.

Note

1 . See Nathan Brown for a different view of the 1971 constitution by

the new public sphere: Brown, N. (2014) Constitutional Revolutions

and the Public Sphere, in The Arab Uprisings Explained , Marc Lynch

(ed.) (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 304–5.

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C H A P T E R 7

Israel and a Palestinian State:

Redrawing Lines?

Lorenzo Kamel

Introduction

On November 5, 1904, Leo Amery (1873–1955), later an under-sec-

retary in David Lloyd George’s (1863–1945) national government,

pointed out to Arthur Balfour (1848–1930) that it would be impossi-

ble to put an end to the Anglo-Russian rivalry in Asia until “all those

regions have been fully developed and till our boundaries march side

by side in the same fashion that boundaries do in Europe” (Amery

1904). 1 More than one century later it is becoming increasingly com-

mon to read academic and journalistic analyses aiming at reconsid-

ering the historical role played by Western powers in the Eastern

Mediterranean area by imposing borders and a state system designed

by the West. In a recent article titled “Stop Blaming Colonial Borders

for the Middle East’s Problems,” which appeared in The Atlantic ,

Nick Danforth (2013) pointed out for instance that:

The idea that better borders, drawn with careful attention to the

region’s ethnic and religious diversity, would have spared the Middle

East a century’s worth of violence is especially provocative . . . this cri-

tique . . . overlooks how arbitrary every other border in the world is,

implies that better borders were possible.

According to Danforth, “no commission could have been expected to

find the magic line that got all the Sunnis on one side, the Shiites on

the other” (Danforth 2013). Indeed, for centuries, not only Sunnis

and Shias, but also Christians, Jews, and other religious groups, have

148 LORENZO KAMEL

lived in the region reaching a level of coexistence higher than that

registered in most of the rest of the world; the thesis of the existence

of a “1,400-year war” between Sunni and Shia Muslims, very often

mentioned in our days, is problematic and tends to ignore that the

belonging to a certain sect had been for centuries just one, often sec-

ondary, way of expressing one’s identity.

As happened in other geographical contexts, the cleavages and the

sectarian strife that are increasingly brewing in the region have less

to do with religious differences and more to do with modern iden-

tity politics, primarily related to the introduction of divisive Western-

inspired institutions (such as the municipal councils imposed by

Ibrahim Pasha following the 1831 invasion of Syria), 2 the second

Tanzimat (that introduced the concept of patriotism, or compatrio-

tism, in the Ottoman empire), the outcomes of World War I, as well as

to more recent historical events such as the 1979 Iranian Revolution,

the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, and the repercussions of the “Arab

Spring,” when local communities turned increasingly inward for pro-

tection (Byman 2014: 84).

It is also noteworthy that there are 13 Arab constitutions that

define the nation as “Arab nation,” while only Lebanon and Tunisia

refer to a Lebanese and a Tunisian nationality; this confirms that in

the “Arab world” 3 borders—as well as the very concept of state—are

deprived of the legitimacy and the sacrality that they hold elsewhere.

The imposition of borders, together with the divide-and-rule policies

carried out in the region by Western powers, triggered some of the

most relevant conditions for the perpetual “condition of colonization”

registered in the area after World War I. Tamim al-Barghouti noted

that when the colonial powers were strained during the two world

wars, “their Middle Eastern colonies got their formal independence

and, because of the way they were structured and the elites that gov-

erned them, continued to behave as colonies” (al-Barghouti 2008: 4).

The artificial mono-ethnic and mono-religious order that remained

inculcated in these “neo-colonies” disguised as fulfilled states is now

crumbling—or, in a few cases, is kept alive, for the moment, through

a mixed use of power, force, and violence. Each of the peoples in the

Eastern Mediterranean area is now expected to break the vicious cycle

triggered by the “process of simplification” imposed on them and to

find its own peculiar way to get back into history, rediscovering the

permeability and the specificities that for millennia characterized the

daily life in the region (Kamel 2015: 9–10).

In this “getting back into history” process, Palestinians and the

Palestinian context stand out as a very distinctive case. The reason for

ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE 149

this is rooted in history. In many respects the “Holy Land” represents

in fact a unicum that eludes combinations that are valid in other con-

texts. No other area exists where the histories of a land and of its peo-

ples have been equally instrumentalized (William Blake (1757–1827),

for instance, referred to Jerusalem as a “lovely Emanation of Albion”

(Blake 1804: 146), wondering if Britain was “the primitive seat of the

patriarchal religion” Nowhere has the merging of religion, imperial-

ism, colonialism, and Orientalism (or more precisely its most power-

ful variant, “Biblical Orientalism”) been more successful. It is hard,

in conclusion, to determine an area of the world in which the rising of

an alternative and inclusive local history has been more hindered.

In this chapter I initially shed light on the top-down process

through which present-day Israel/Palestine has been simplified dur-

ing the historical phase in between the end of the ninteenth and the

beginning of the twentieth century. The second section focuses on

the bottom-up process through which the local people are now trying

to emancipate themselves from this process of simplification; it gives

a voice to the Palestinian people’s attempt to write history from below

through museums, archives, or cultural associations. This bottom-up

process is essential in order to provide the right framework to intro-

duce and evaluate the issue of borders today that has become subject

to an internationally led debate on the one- or two-state solution

in which—once more—local realities are all too often ignored. The

analysis is concluded by a reflection about the role of international

consensus and the most likely upcoming regional scenarios.

The Top-Down Process

In the Eastern Mediterranean area the tendency to simplify “alter” in

terms more suitable, comprehensible, and useful to “ego” is perhaps

more evident than ever in the maps created in the decades preceding

and following the beginning of the mandate for Palestine. They were

“tools” that in a first phase (1871–1884), through the geo-theology

of the Palestine Exploration Fund, 4 fished in the mythical past of

Biblical Palestine to apply it to the present reality, and that subse-

quently, beginning with World War I and through a selective choice

of colors, dimensions, and names, imposed a mental framework des-

tined to shape the future of the region (Ben-Zeev 2011: 34). 5

British obstinacy to identify symbols in addition to well-defined

borders, using for this a plethora of terms on their maps (international

boundary, village boundary, district boundary, subdistrict bound-

ary, fiscal block boundary, municipal boundary, triangulation point

150 LORENZO KAMEL

boundary, quarter boundary , qita boundary), did not respond to any

need of the local populations. The latter were largely ignored, show-

ing what Beshara Doumani defined as their “amazing ability to dis-

cover the land without discovering the people” (Doumani 1992: 8).

It is perhaps “Biblical Orientalism”—an under-researched variant

of Orientalism, to which Edward Said (1935–2003) did not devote

the attention one might have expected—that represents one of the

most effective tools for shedding light on the peculiar way through

which the process of “simplification of the other” was applied in the

Palestinian context.

“Biblical Orientalism” can be defined as a phenomenon based on

the combination of a selective use of religion and a simplifying way to

approach its natural habitat: the “Holy Land.” It acted on various lev-

els, with lasting consequences. A plethora of books and maps, in addi-

tion to later phenomena such as evangelical tourism, instilled what

Meron Benvenisti defined as “the imaginary perception of Palestine

based on the Bible” (Benvenisti 2005: 85). Such enormous produc-

tion, often focused on the connections between Biblical events and

the physical characteristics of Palestine, favored the affirmation of

a historical chronology, which only left room almost exclusively for

Biblical times and the Crusades, largely ignoring millennia of pre-

Biblical history as well as centuries of Islamic domination. This con-

tributed to fixing in the collective memory toponyms that in various

ways covered up the original non-Biblical geography and spread the

idea that the names used by the local majority to refer to cities known

for millennia as, just to name a few, Asqalana (‘Asqal ā n in Arabic,

Ashqelon in Hebrew), Akka (Akk ā in Arabic, ‘Akko in Hebrew), Gaza

( Ġ azzah in Arabic, ‘Azza in Hebrew), Ariha (Ar īḥā in Arabic, Yeri ḥ o

in Hebrew), were nothing but awkward attempts to distort, by “ara-

bizing” and “bastardizing” them, the names of ancient Israelite cities,

a perception that, although often unfounded, 6 has had repercussions

visible up to the present day.

In the more than one thousand travel diaries and books that were

written about the “Holy Land” by European authors from the end of

the 1830s to the beginning of the 1900s, the local inhabitants—the

Arab-Palestinian majority, the Jewish minority, and other minor sec-

tions of the population—were often portrayed as a simple appendix

to the ancient Biblical scenery. “Every object,” commented London

painter William Henry Bartlett (1809–1854) about the Jaffa area, “is

novel and Oriental in character, and independent of its picturesque

beauty, is linked by a delicious association with our earliest dreams of

Biblical scenery and incident” (Bartlett 1844: 9).

ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE 151

Already in the sixteenth century Ortelius instilled “black on white”

the idea of a “meta-Palestine” devoid of any history except that of

Biblical gloriousness. It is, however, only in the second half of the

ninteenth century that this approach found its ideal ground and was

converted into imperial politics concerning the area. It is then that

both the “shadowing” process with regard to the local populations

and the impression that the history of the major villages and cities

of the region had its point zero in Biblical times, gained their most

influential formulations.

The Bottom-Up Process: The Attempt to “Get Back into History”

According to an old Spanish saying, when there is a flood the first

thing that is lacking is drinkable water. This analogy also fits well

with the theme analyzed in this chapter. The “Holy Land” is cer-

tainly one of the areas of the world that has been written about the

most. Despite this, the traditions, customs, and expectations of the

majority of the men and women who for centuries lived on it have

been relegated to a subsidiary role. 7 Biblical Orientalism, supported

by a huge number of travel diaries focused on the links between bib-

lical events and the physical characteristics of Palestine, followed by

Zionist and British influence, contributed in various forms to this.

However, the local majority paradoxically also played a certain role

in this process. “Until relatively recently,” noted Mahmoud Ashqar,

director of the Center for Heritage and Islamic Research in Abu Dis,

“the Palestinians paid limited attention to archives, libraries and,

more generally, to everything that could bring the Palestinians back

into history” (Ashqar 2011). Ashqar’s words are an indirect reference

to what Ng ũ g ĩ wa Thiong’o termed “colonial alienation,” a phenom-

enon that in Mandatory Palestine—and, reflecting this, in Palestine

of the decades to follow—created the conditions for a twofold pro-

cess already observed in other contexts. “An active (or passive) dis-

tancing of oneself from the reality around; and active (or passive)

identification with that which is most external to one’s environment”

(Thiong’o 2011: 28).

Following a complex process, in these last few years, large sec-

tors of Palestinian society have demonstrated a willingness to correct

this deficit. The ongoing process, which is leading to the creation of

the first Palestinian archives, can thus be seen as an attempt by the

Palestinians themselves to break the vicious cycle triggered by the

process of standardization, bringing back their own history.

152 LORENZO KAMEL

As the excerpts from the interviews confirm, archives are increas-

ingly linked to the very identity of the Palestinian people, an identity

as “imagined” and “constructed” as any other in history. This per-

ception confirms the validity of the analytical framework developed

by Pierre Nora, according to which “we reinforce our identities by

means of such bulwarks [archives, museums, cemeteries] but if what

they defend was not threatened, there would be no reason to create

them” (Nora 1989: 12).

It is precisely this growing perception of a threat hanging over

their identities, together with a desire to “regain possession” of

their ancient history, that lies at the heart of a series of archival or

“pseudo-archival” initiatives in some way linked to that “obsession

with archives” (Nora 1989: 23) and that “ mal d’archive ” (Derrida

1995: 7 and 142) that have characterized Palestinian society over

the last two decades. A partial list of these initiatives includes the

Palestinian Heritage Center (Bethlehem, 1991), the Khalil Sakanini

Cultural Center (Ramallah, 1996), the al-Quds University’s Centre

for Jerusalem Studies (Jerusalem, 1998), 8 the Badil Resource Center

(Bethlehem, 1998), the Cultural Heritage Resource Centre (Ramallah,

1998). Furthermore, many museums—including the world’s largest

Palestinian Museum, directed by Jack Persekian, which is expected

to open within the Birzeit University campus in late 2015—and gal-

leries have recently been opened with somehow similar aims, a phe-

nomenon that until not many years ago would have been considered

unexpected. A few examples include the Umm el-Fahm Art Gallery

(Umm al-Fahm, 2008), al-Mathaf (Gaza, 2008), 9 the Palestinian

Heritage Museum (Jenin, 2011), and the Mahmoud Darwish Museum

(Ramallah, 2012). Against the background of such attempts, to which

it would be possible to add the numerous cultural associations that

are currently flourishing, 10 it is easy to glimpse what Hanan Ashrawi,

the first woman to be elected to the Palestinian National Council,

called “a defence mechanism reaction among the Palestinians who

insist on preserving their identity at all costs” (Ashrawi 1978: 82).

Perhaps the most successful of the “pseudo-archival” initiatives

referred to earlier is palestineremembered.com , an online project,

almost entirely in English, inspired in some ways by Walid Khalidi’s

book All That Remains (1992)—which was itself influenced by a

cartographic project produced in 1983 by Birzeit University’s geog-

rapher Kamal Abd al-Fattah. 11 Set up in 1999, it brings together

primary sources and images of pre-1948 Palestinian villages and

shows what remains of them. All this is enriched by demographical

and cultural data about the Palestinian people and by hundreds of

ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE 153

messages drawn up primarily by individuals identifying themselves

as members of the ghourba (Palestinian diaspora). 12 Initiatives such

as palestineremembered.com —as well as the relatively new (January

2010) Columbia University’s Center for Palestine Studies —confirm

an increasingly widely felt perception in the Palestinian community.

Creating and consolidating Palestinian archives, paraphrasing Roger

Heacock, director of the new archive at Ramallah’s Birzeit University,

is perceived as “a national priority” (Heacock 2012). 13

An even deeper reading of the Israeli-Palestinian context shows

that such priority is now perhaps more “binational” than ever before.

In realities characterized by strong conflicts, what Flora Kaplan wrote

about museums often being “harbingers of change” (Kaplan 1995:

42) can in fact also be true for archives. The latter have the poten-

tial, among other things, to breathe life into what Michal Zak and

Rabah Halabi have termed “a symmetrical dialogue in an asymmet-

ric reality” (Zak and Halabi 2004: 141). Just how important it is

for their Israeli counterparts, too, that the Palestinians develop their

o wn lieux de m é moire— archives, in this case—is to a certain extent

demonstrated by the prolonged stalemate that is characterizing the

current historical phase 14 and is, mutatis mutandis , confirmed by

the creation and ongoing development of Zochrot (“remembering”

in Hebrew), an Israeli organization which many consider a third way,

a “bridging message” between the two communities. Founded in

2002, Zochrot’s aim, as complex as it is ambitious, to bring Israeli

public opinion closer to the history and traumas of the Palestinian

people, has given it increasingly notoriety. To this end, it organizes

tours of ruined villages, publishes booklets, sets up exhibitions, and

catalogues the accounts of witnesses. All this is directed exclusively

at the Jewish majority of the country. Eitan Bronstein pointed out,

citing a Palestinian involved in Zochrot’s initiatives, that in some

respects its organization is doing “more for the Palestinians than they

are doing for themselves” (Bronstein 2010).

Whether Bronstein’s statement is a simple provocation or a real-

ity less abstruse than it seems is an open question. What is incon-

trovertible, however, is the convergent effort that broad sections of

Palestinian society are making so that it will not be only “external

archives” (British, Israeli, Turkish, Russian, and American, as well

as those of the UN) 15 or the political agendas of Arab countries that

speak or act on their behalf. Thus it will no longer be only muse-

ums such as the Palestine Archaeology Museum (today the Rockefeller

Museum ) 16 —one of the main archaeological museums from colo-

nial times—or archaeological excavations, which are almost always

154 LORENZO KAMEL

conducted by Western and/or Israeli researchers, that explain the his-

tory of their land.

In line with these considerations, Rami Hamdallah, serving at the

time of the interview as rector at Nablus’s An-Najah University, under-

lined that in certain contexts, for Palestine by far and foremost edu-

cation, archives, and libraries are “the basis of everything. They are

the instruments of survival” (Hamdallah 2010). The director of the

Department of Archaeological Heritage of the PNA Hamdan Taha,

who took part in several excavations in the Nablus area, explained that

archaeology gives “Palestinians the opportunity to participate in writ-

ing or rewriting the history of Palestine from its primary sources.” 17

Nazmi Jubeh, director of the History and Archaeology Department

at Birzeit University, stated that “archives are of fundamental impor-

tance to the very identity of our people as well as to the process of

establishing a Palestinian State” (Jubeh 2012). Mustafa Barghouti,

leader of the “ Al Mubadara ” (The initiative) party, complained

that many persons outside the Palestinian territories believe that his

people are “incapable of taking their own past and future into their

own hands, incapable of developing state, archive and research centre

infrastructure worthy of the name, or of appreciating full democracy”

(Barghouti 2009). Adly Yaish, mayor of Nablus since 2005, argued

that “there will be no hypothetical reconciliation between us and the

Israelis as long as it is exclusively the ‘others’ who speak of our present

and our past” (Yaish 2010). These quotations come from politicians

and intellectuals of all colors: this further confirms the existence of a

common Palestinian drive to focus on these aspects.

In this context it is important to stress that the PNA seems increas-

ingly committed to monopolizing the popular feelings that prompted

the “archival wave.” The First Intifada (1987) lost its impetus when

the PLO succeeded in gaining control of the uprising, curbing local

activism. The serious risk exists that something similar could also hap-

pen in relation to the “instruments of survival” to which Hamdallah

referred. A powerful example is represented by a little known episode

related to the Palestinian Digital Archive at Birzeit University. Opened

in June 2011, it holds several thousand documents (documents, pho-

tos, videos), all digitalized and on line at awraq.birzeit.edu . Soon

after its inauguration, five representatives of the PNA went to Roger

Heacock’s office to intimidate him into blocking the project, which

they saw as being in contradiction with the previously announced cre-

ation of a “Palestinian national archive.” This and other related issues

were analyzed in an unprecedented international conference which

took place in March 24–25, 2014, at Birzeit University. During the

ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE 155

meeting, titled “Globalizing Palestine: Birzeit University’s Archive

in an International Perspective—Towards a Chaotic Order,” several

presentations 18 shed light on the trends that Palestinian society is cur-

rently experiencing, on the dangers that the invasive approach shown

by the Palestinian authorities could trigger, and on the connections

between the “archival wave,” the quest for self-determination, and

the endless debate about the one- or two-state solution.

The One- or two-State Solution: The Empty Debate

In a new Arab world, which seems increasingly to be moving away

from nationalism, or at least challenging existing state borders

and questioning the neo-colonial states entrapped in them, the

Palestinians’ attempt to “get back into history” and their struggle for

a separate statehood appears to many (mainly external) observers 19 as

rather odd, if not obsolete. This is even more the case in consideration

of the practical effects of the continuous settlement expansion in the

Palestinian territories: the one-state solution is being increasingly per-

ceived as the only alternative to the current impasse.

Despite appearances, the endless debate over “the only real

alternative”—a single, binational state—to the two-state solution is

a misleading, empty, and counterproductive exercise. It is misleading

because supporting the principle of self-determination for both peo-

ples does not mean rejecting other alternatives. The two-state solu-

tion, in Uri Avnery’s words, “is the first floor, and federation is the

second, one may imagine that the third floor will be a regional union,

on the lines of the present European Union . . . Federation presumes

partners of equal status, if not of equal strength” (Avnery 2013).

The debate is also “empty” because it is based on a wrong assump-

tion. By annexing East Jerusalem and the Golan, but not the whole

West Bank, the Israeli authorities fulfilled several policy goals as

well as ideological purposes. The West Bank is mainly perceived in

demographic terms: how much land can be taken by new and old

settlers without giving the impression that Israel has to take on

responsibility for too many Palestinians? The chances that the Israeli

authorities may express an interest, albeit weak, in the creation of a

single state, or just in the annexation of all the Palestinian territo-

ries, are near to null. 20 The status quo 21 ensures the exploitation of

the Palestinian territories—as well as control of an area considered of

strategic importance for defense purpose—without requiring addi-

tional “inconvenient responsibilities.” In this sense, the Palestinian

156 LORENZO KAMEL

territories represent in many ways a unique case. In other somewhat

similar contexts, such as Tibet, Abkhazia, the Turkish Republic of

Northern Cyprus, Western Sahara, and East Turkestan, the “occupy-

ing powers” of these areas have incorporated the local inhabitants as

their citizens: with all the guarantees, rights, and problems that this

entails (Kamel 2014a). 22

On top of this, the debate on the one- or-two-state solution is

counterproductive in as much as the alternative to the two states

has never been a binational entity, but instead a condition of perma-

nent tension, if not war. As Noam Chomsky once noted, “If you are

serious, you say, ‘how do we get from here to there?’” (Almeghari

2012). 23 In a reality in which one of the two contending parties is

exponentially more powerful than the other—from a political, eco-

nomic, and cultural point of view a single state would soon turn into

a legalized tool for “choking” the weaker party. The idea of creating

a binational state already failed at the time of Brit Shalom (in the

late 1920s), when the attitude of the people, free from the scars of

this last century, would have been in theory far more malleable than

today. The one-state scenario—that in books such as Ali Abunimah’s

One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse

appears as a sort of Lebanon-style confessional government divided

along religious/ethnic lines (Abunimah 2006), while in volumes such

as Caroline Glick’s The Israeli Solution (Glick 2014) looks more like

an ideological plan that deliberately leaves out the Gaza Strip—would

require the absence of a marked imbalance between the two parties.

Thus it is noteworthy that according to a report (“Acting the

Landlord,” June 5, 2013) released by B’Tselem, Israel’s policy in Area

C of the West Bank is anchored in a perception of the area meant above

all to serve Israeli needs. The exploitation of natural resources and the

psychological humiliation that are taking place beyond the “separa-

tion barrier” cannot in any way be justified by the legitimate Israeli

need to rely on safe borders. An internal document compiled in April

2013 under the auspices of the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Zeev

Elkin—recently distributed to all of Israel’s embassies in Europe—

claimed that the settlement-product labeling under discussion among

EU foreign ministers would hurt the Palestinian economy the most.

The latter is an attitude that recalls to mind the times in which well-

known historical figures used to praise the economic opportunities

afforded by the benevolent colonial power to the occupied people.

This further confirms that, today more than ever, the priority is to

dismantle the annexation process that especially in these last few years

has used the “peace process” as a fa ç ade. Such an approach requires

ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE 157

fewer idealistic slogans and effortless “shortcuts” and more practical

forms of pressure. In Am í lcar Cabral’s words, “Tell no lies, claim no

easy victories” (Cabral 1969).

The Role of International Consensus

Since his first address to the Knesset plenum, Naftali Bennett, Israel’s

Minister of the Economy and leader of the Jewish Home party, did

not hide his opinions: “There is no room in our small but wonderful

God-given tract for another state.” 24 The same day (February 12,

2013) Bennett, echoing a not uncommon sentiment among Israeli

politicians, expressed his opposition to relinquishing any parts of the

“Land of Israel” in a peace deal with the Palestinians. It is notewor-

thy that Israel was never asked to formally recognize the Palestinians’

right to their land and never voted in favor of the two-state solution.

On the other hand, several representatives of Hamas, while accept-

ing the idea of a Palestinian state within the 1967 armistice lines,

clarified that they would not explicitly recognize the State of Israel.

Other members explicitly called for Israel’s destruction. On May 5,

2014, Mousa Abu Marzouk, deputy chairman of Hamas’ political

bureau, pointed out that “we would have spared ourselves seven years

of misery under the siege and two wars in 2008 and 2012 had we

wanted to recognize Israel.” 25

In this looming scenario, aggravated by the ongoing state-

funded enlargement of settlements and outposts in the Palestinian

territories, an increasingly mentioned opinion is gaining ground.

Israel, as pointed out among the others by Khalil Shikaki, director

of Ramallah’s Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research,

will be soon forced to choose between two options: “The consoli-

dation of a one-state reality, which would then force it to become

an apartheid state, or granting Palestinians full citizenship.” 26 This

dichotomy, echoed in the United States by several authors, including

Max Blumenthal and Ali Abunimah, ignores or downplays a third

scenario that, in the absence of a more credible outside multilateral

intervention, appears far more realistic: Israel will annex Area C of

the West Bank and will offer to the Palestinians what Bennett defined

as “autonomy on steroids.” 27 This plan does not require any war, or

the fast removal of most of the population residing in the area: to the

relatively few Palestinians that in the coming decade will still reside in

Area C, 28 the State of Israel will grant full citizenship.

Some authors claim that continuing to support the two-state solu-

tion is, from the perspective of the Israeli government, a way to buy

158 LORENZO KAMEL

time. Others believe that it is necessary to put a price on the status quo.

To a certain extent, one can agree with both points of view. However,

to put aside the wide consensus on the principle of self-determination

of both peoples, one of the few important results achieved by the

Palestinians in the last decades, without first obtaining a practical and

realistic alternative would be political suicide, which would hinder

the “get back into history” process and further affect the lives of mil-

lions of human beings. The claim that a binational state or the two-

state solution are the only, or even the main, alternatives currently on

the table is a dangerous illusion that risks deflecting attention from

the real priority: to find (or strengthen) practical forms of pressure in

support of international consensus.

Why is the reference to international consensus relevant? A good

explanation is provided by the example of the Palestinian village of

Umm Rashrash, present-day Eilat. It was taken, without encounter-

ing any opposition, 29 by the Negev and Golani Brigades on March

10, 1949, eight months after the United Nations Security Council’s

Resolution 54 that called for a ceasefire, forbidding any acquisition of

territory from that date. Resolution 54 clarified that a threat to peace

existed within the meaning of Article 39 of the UN Charter, reiter-

ated the need for a truce, and ordered a cease-fire pursuant to Article

40 of the Charter. It was a binding resolution: until 1968, UNSC

resolutions never expressly invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

It is only thanks to an established international consensus—expressed

by 160 countries—that Eilat is today legitimately part of the State of

Israel. The same international consensus established the illegality of

both the settlements and the occupation of the Palestinian territories.

This is even more the case when considering that Israel’s admission to

the United Nations (May 11, 1949) was not unconditional but bound

to compliance with its explanations and assurances on the acceptance

of the UN Charter and resolutions (Israel’s original application for

admission was, not by chance, rejected by UNSC): “Negotiations,”

assured Abba Eban (1915–2002) in front of the UNGA on May 5,

1949, “would not, however, affect the juridical status of Jerusalem, to

be defined by international consent.” 30

Conclusion

“History doesn’t repeat itself,” as Mark Twain allegedly put it, “but

it does rhyme.” The political voids observed in the Middle East

and North Africa at the beginning of the nineteenth century can

be witnessed today as well. At that time, the Ottoman authorities

ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE 159

increasingly lost their grasp on power as their citizens confronted

“European modernity:” this favored the end of an old order and the

rising of new powers and long-lasting dynasties. Most of the coun-

tries in the region are now experiencing a similar process that might

trigger a new groundbreaking moment, this time related to a new

potential state system in the Levant and a partial deconstruction of

the “nationalist myopia.” The contours of this new order are still far

from being clear and the region is experiencing one of the darkest

periods of its history. As Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) argued in

his Prison Notebooks , “the crisis consists in the fact that the old is

dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great vari-

ety of morbid symptoms appear” (Gramsci 1971: 276). However, and

whatever the final outcome will look like, the dynamics currently at

work in the region will probably have a very limited impact on what

some observers image as the imminent “reshaping” of the Israeli-

Palestinian context. Due to their unique past and peculiar present,

Israel and the Palestinian territories will likely experience concrete

changes only in the context of an agreement between two equal par-

ties and, most of all, in the frame of a full internationalization and

“multilateralization” of the conflict in support of international con-

sensus: that is, a return to its original dimension.

Notes

1 . Amery, L. (1904). Letter to Balfour . November 5, 1904.

2 . Ibrahim Pasha’s policies, largely influenced by Western powers,

shaped the sectarian divide of the region and contributed to pave

the way for competing nationalistic narratives. Also the peasant tax

revolt in Mount Lebanon in 1820–1821 played a meaningful role in

this process. Regarding the influence of Druze emir Fakhr-al-Din

(1572–1635)—convinced that a sustainable order cannot be based

but on a equilibrium between the local religious communities—and

the consequencs triggered by the asymmetric demographic balance

registered under his rules (Maronite peasants were encouraged to set-

tle in Southern Druze areas) see Traboulsi (2007: 16–7).

3 . The so-called Arab world includes also part of Africa, the continent

that, together with the Middle East, suffered the most from Europe’s

arbitrary post-colonial borders. For a map about what Africa might

look like if it had never been colonized see: Strohm, R. (2013) The

Colonization Counterfactual. Rachel Strohm, July 29, 2013, available

at: http://developmentdaily.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/alkebu-

lan-1260.jpg , last accessed January 31, 2015.

4 . De Excidio et Conquestu Britanniae is the oldest (560 CE) book writ-

ten by a British citizen on the history of “Insula Albionum” (Great

160 LORENZO KAMEL

Britain’s ancient name). Although there was no Jewish community

living there at the time, Great Britain was referred to by Gildas as “the

new Israel” and the battles fought against the “invading Barbarians”

paralleled with ancient Israel’s battles against the Babylonians and

the Philistines. As Gildas saw it, the British were the Israelites of his

times and the Old Testament provided them with a mirror image of

themselves. “I gazed,” Gildas noted, “on these things and many oth-

ers in the Old Testament as though on a mirror reflecting our own

life” ( De Excidio et Conquestu Britanniae , 1.5–7). Thirteen centuries

after Gildas an updated version of these same mindsets could be seen

in the work of the Palestine Exploration Fund , frequently pushed by

a desire to link Anglican Protestantism to the ancient Israelites and

thus to the concept of “chosen people.” This with the aim of creating

a parallel to show that the ancient “chosen people,” the Israelites, had

been replaced by a new “chosen people,” the English.

5 . Scott emphasized that the maps “are designed to summarize precisely

those aspects of a complex world that are of immediate interest to the

map-maker and to ignore the rest” (Scott 1998: 87).

6 . The cited cities, as well as Jerusalem—a name of Canaanite origins

composed by the prefix “Uru” (“founded by”) and “Shalem” (a

Canaanite God)—Bethlehem—quoted in the Amarna Letters of the

15th cent. BCE as “Bit-Lahmi”—and many others, can trace their

origins and names to a past much more remote than biblical times;

it is to this ancient past that the Arabs of Palestine have often turned

to for the names of the cities they populate. This is confirmed by the

fact that the Arabic names of the cities mentioned in this text, as well

as of dozens of other symbolic places such as Majiddu (Megiddo) or

the Naqab (Negev) Desert, are much more similar to the original

names found in the four-thousand-year old Egyptian hieroglyphics,

or in the Amarna Letters, than to the place names used in Western

languages or in Hebrew.

7 . Issam Nassar noted that “in the absence of a state with a national

archive, museum, or library, the closest thing we have today is the

Institute of Palestine Studies, which has a large library and archive in

Beirut. The fact remains, however, that the core of the archival mate-

rial available to historians of this area is not Palestinian nor is it fully

devoted to the lives of the Palestinians” (Nassar 2009: 140).

8 . Since 2007 the Al-Quds University hosts, in its Abu Dis’s cam-

pus, The Abu-Jihad Center for the Prisoner Movement . The latter is

a museum that, according to its website, “aims to highlight the role

of the Prisoner Movement in Palestinian life” (Mendel and Steinberg

2011: 190–213).

9 . Al Mat’haf (“The Museum”) was opened by Jawdat Khoudary.

According to him, “the idea is to show our deep roots from many

cultures in Gaza . . . Israel has legitimacy from its history. We do, too.”

Bronner, E. (2008). Museum Offers Gray Gaza a View of Its Dazzling

ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE 161

Past. The New York Times, July 25, 2008, available at: http://www.

nytimes.com/2008/07/25/world/middleeast/25gaza.html?_r=2& .

10 . The Rozana Association , just one of many possible examples, was

established in 2007 as a rural development initiative by a group of

Birzeities. It is behind many cultural initiatives such as the Maftoul

Festival , the Birzeit Heritage Week and the tiny Peoples Museum ,

opened on October 2009 in Birzeit.

11 . In the following years the anthropologist Sharif Kana‘nah and the

historian Salih ‘Abd al-Jawad published many works designed to fix in

the collective memory the profound changes that interested Palestine

in 1948. Israel, according to Kana‘nah, “has made the eradication of

Palestinian identity its major goal, cultural struggle has become the

Palestinians’ first priority” (Kana‘nah 2005: 113).

12 . Sam Bahour, creator of the first ICT-specific consulting firm in the

Palestinian territories (1997), noted that “thanks largely to internet

and to an almost physical necessity to regain possess of our past, a

‘fragmented body’, the Palestinian nation, has begun to reunite”

(Bahour 2011).

13 . According to Heacock, “it is impossible to build a state without doc-

uments which speak of the history which shaped it. Before you have

a state you must have an archive. That said, I am aware that, already

in our times, we are perhaps facing a post-national era” (Heacock

2012).

14 . Democracies are capable of projecting their internal values onto for-

eign affairs only when they are dealing with other democracies. When

they are dealing with non-liberal states, on the contrary, their behav-

iour is autocratic. It is for this reason that the birth of a Palestinian

democracy, with fully developed educational, political and legal insti-

tutions, would increase our chances of overcoming the present stale-

mate and building a future on the basis of a relationship of mutual

respect.

15 . The United Nations Archives (UNA) in New York, like its Geneva

branch or, to an even greater extent, the UNRWA offices in Amman,

Gaza and Jerusalem, are principally repositories of documents, videos

and photos relating to post-1948 and post-1967 Palestinian refugees,

files on the administrative and legal aspects of the programs set up

and agreements between the various governments and international

organizations. A significant proportion of the documentation relates

to the condition of children in the post-1948 period. According to a

UN report of August 19, 1948, based on data supplied by Andrew W.

Cordier (executive assistant to the UN Secretary), 300,000–400,000

children became refugees that year. United Nations Archives

S-0158–0005–05.

16 . The Palestine Archaeological Museum was opened in 1938 as a

result of the efforts of J. H. Breasted (1865–1935), the support of

J. D. Rockefeller (1874–1960), and the encouragement of the then

162 LORENZO KAMEL

British High Commissioner in Palestine Lord Plumer (1857–1932).

As the documentation in the museum reports, it was set up “to host

the Department of Antiquities, a vast archaeological library and

the archives.”

17 . Cit. In: Friedman, M. 2011. In Palestinian city, diggers uncover bib-

lical. Associated Press, July 22, 2011, available at: http://news.yahoo.

com/palestinian-city-diggers-uncover-biblical-ruin-105339538.

html , last accessed January 31, 2015.

18 . Including “Oral History and the Absence of State” (by Rosemary

Sayigh), “The Outcome of Palestinian Oral History Projects” (by

Lourdes Habash and Raed Bader), and “Archiving Palestine: The

Conceptual Power of Dissensus” (by Ann Laura Stoler).

19 . An analysis titled “The Day After,” released by the Palestinian

Center for Policy and Survey Research in January 2014, clarified that

“despite strong public perception that the two-state solution is no

longer practical due to continued settlement construction, a major-

ity of Palestinians continues to support that solution. Therefore, for

the time being the stronger impulse among the nationalist elite of all

factions is not to dissolve the PA [Palestinian National Authority].

To the contrary, Palestinians are considering various ways in which

the PA becomes an asset in changing the status quo: Fayyad did so

with his unilateral two-year state building program, Abbas in his UN

bid, and various factions and popular groups in their non-violent

resistance efforts.” Available at: http://www.pcpsr.org/strategic/

papers/2013/finalreport.pdf , last accessed January 31, 2015.

20 . As the most recent book by Benny Morris confirms, the creation of a

single state is often rejected in Israel on racial grounds: “Arabs, to put

it simply, proportionally commit far more crimes (and not only ones

connected to property) and commit far more lethal traffic violations

than do Jews . . . The mindset and basic values of Israeli Jewish society

and Palestinian Muslim society are so different and mutually exclu-

sive” (Morris 2009: 187).

21 . Dimitris Bouris noted that in the Israeli-Palestinian context it is gen-

eral contentment with the status quo that is keeping the peace pro-

cess from moving forward. Hamas “is happy to govern Gaza while

Fatah controls the West Bank and the Israelis are content because the

Fatah-Hamas split reinforces their argument that there is no defini-

tive Palestinian entity to negotiate with.” Cit. in a draft paper (p. 19)

submitted by Hirah Azhar and Justine Louis for the “RegioConf”

organized at Rome’s Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) on January

30–31, 2014.

22 . On this issue see Kamel, L. (2014) Is the EU Adopting a Double-

Standards Approach toward Israel and the Palestinian Territories?

(Part 2). Opinio Juris, January 9, 2014, available at: http://opinio-

juris.org/2014/01/09/eu-adopting-double-standards- approach

ISRAEL AND A PALESTINIAN STATE 163

-toward-israel-palestinian-territories-part-2/ , last accessed January

31, 2015.

23 . Interview with Noam Chomsky: Almeghari, R. (2012) Chomsky

in Gaza: academic boycott “will strengthen support for Israel.” The

Electronic Intifada, October 20, 2012, available at: http://elec-

tronicintifada.net/content/chomsky-gaza-academic-boycott-will-

strengthen-support-israel/11795 , last accessed January 31, 2015.

24 . Winer, S. (2013) Bennett: No Palestine in “God-given” Land of

Israel. The Times of Israel, February 12, 2013, available at: http://

www.timesofisrael.com/bennett-no-palestine-in-god-given-land-of-

israel/ , last accessed January 31, 2015.

25 . Abu Amer, A. (2014) Hamas’ Abu Marzouk says recognizing Israel

a “red line.” Al-Monitor, May 5, 2014, available at: http://www.

al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/05/interview-abu-marzouk-

hamas-israel-fatah-reconciliation.html , last accessed January 31,

2015.

26 . Shikaki, K. (2014). If Kerry fails, dissolution or collapse of the

Palestinian Authority becomes inevitable. Open Democracy, May 4,

2014, available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awaken-

ing/khalil-shikaki/if-kerry-fails-dissolution-or-collapse-of-palestin-

ian-authority-become , last accessed January 31, 2015.

27 . Lazaroff, T. (2014). Bennett: “We’ll annex Area C and offer the

Palestinians autonomy on steroids.” The Jerusalem Post, April 29,

2014, available at: http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/

Bennett-Well-annex-Area-C-and-offer-the-Palestinians-autonomy-

on-steroids-350790 , last accessed January 31, 2015.

28 . The Israeli NGO B’Tselem is monitoring the process of “quite trans-

fer” that is taking place in Area C. B’Tselem. 2015. Facing Expulsion,

May 10, 2015, available at: http://www.btselem.org/facing_expul-

sion_blog , last accessed May 31, 2015.

29 . The State of Israel signed an armistice agreement with Egypt on

February 24, 1949 (it permitted Israel to hold on territories acquired

until October 14, 1948). On the other hand, Transjordanian-Israeli

armistice negotiations started in Rhodes on March 5, 1949.

30 . Eban, A. 1949. Speaking in front of the UNGA, May 5, 1949, New

York, available at: http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/1DB

943E43C280A26052565FA004D8174 , last accessed January 31,

2015.

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C H A P T E R 8

Failed Attempts or Failures to Attempt?

Western Policies toward Palestinian

Statehood

Martin Beck

Introduction

The immediate effect of the Arab Uprisings of 2010/11 on domestic

affairs in Palestine has been rather limited: Some protests, which were

partly inspired by the “Arab Spring” took place, for instance, demon-

strations in different cities of the West Bank in early September 2012;

yet, in general and contrary to predictions of quite a few observers

and scholars, the Palestinians remained strikingly silent during the

heyday of the Arab Spring. However, Palestinian involvement in

another development triggered by the uprisings in the Levant, albeit

not caused by it, is much higher, as the foundations of the state system

in the Levant are at stake. This is a preliminary result of the ongo-

ing civil war in Syria and Iraq, but at the same time, the Palestinian

Authority (PA) headed by Mahmud Abbas put as a priority the dip-

lomatic aim of getting a Palestinian State recognized as such by the

United Nations (UN).

The present chapter deals with the question of Western responses

to Palestinian aspirations of statehood, which would, if realized to

the full extent, alter the basic political geography of the Levant. The

imperial and colonial history of Israel and Palestine in general and

the support of Zionism in the period of the mandatory system in

particular indicate that the West has been continuously interfering

in the conflict for over 100 years. Western support for the establish-

ment of the state of Israel in 1948 and its continuous involvement

168 MARTIN BECK

in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has had an immense impact on the

course of events and the structure of the conflict. Therefore, when

dealing with the question of Western responses to Palestinian state-

hood, a historical perspective is needed. Thus, the present analysis of

the Arab Spring period is preceded by an examination of the Western

approach to the Palestinian issue and the PLO (Palestine Liberation

Organization) in a crucial period of contemporary Middle Eastern his-

tory: the end of the 1970s, when the United States brokered a peace

treaty between Israel and Egypt, thereby sidelining the Palestinian

issue and the PLO and the European attempt to develop an alterna-

tive approach, at least on a declaratory level.

Part 2 of the present chapter ( An Analytical Framing of the

Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Three-Level Game) develops an analyti-

cal framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which is modeled

as a three-level game, covering an intergovernmental, societal, and

international level, the latter of which is at the core of the present

analysis. It is argued that the logic of the “game” can be interpreted

on the basis of a Rationalist and a Constructivist paradigm. The core

part 3 ( Western Policies toward Palestinian Attempts of Acquiring

Statehood ) then presents three empirical analyses of Western responses

to Palestinian ambitions of acquiring statehood—thereby primarily

focusing on the United States and the “Big Three” in the European

Union (EU): France, Germany, and the United Kingdom—before

and after the Arab Spring. All of their major actions make sense from

both a Rationalist and a Constructivist perspective.

An Analytical Framing of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: Three-Level Game

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict can be understood as a three-level

game. Its core consists of an intergovernmental conflict between

Israel and the political representatives of the Palestinians. As Robert

Putnam shows in his pathbreaking analysis, a conflict analysis con-

fined to the governmental level often fails to grasp important aspects

of the conflict (Putnam 1988). Thus, he advocates a two-level analy-

sis that takes into consideration how the societies on both sides influ-

ence the strategic behavior of the actors on the intergovernmental

level. Due to the prominence of the conflict for both the Israeli and

the Palestinian societies, a two-level analysis is certainly advised. Yet,

there is another image that also must be taken into consideration for

a comprehensive analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the inter-

national level.

FAILED ATTEMPTS OR FAILURES TO ATTEMPT? 169

It may be argued that a comprehensive analysis of most intergovern-

mental conflicts needs the international level to be taken into account.

Yet, in the present case the international level is of paramount impor-

tance. There is hardly any conflict that has shaped regional and some-

times even world affairs to a higher degree than the Israeli-Palestinian

conflict and vice versa: both regional and international actors have

interfered in the conflict to an extraordinarily high degree. Only after

the June War in 1967 did the PLO, which was founded in 1964,

develop as an autonomous proto-governmental institution, whereas

before that, Arab states acted on behalf of the Palestinians—or rather

claimed to do so. As proto-governmental but non-state actors, the

different factions of the PLO—as well as Hamas—are particularly

closely intertwined with their regional neighbors. 1 Moreover, the

conflict has been shaped by Western actors for more than 100 years

to an extraordinarily high degree (Smith 2013: Ch. 1–2). Interference

in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by colonial powers, later both by

developing very close ties with Israel and by promoting Palestinian

autonomy and even statehood, has been among the most prominent

Western policies, thereby significantly contributing to the fact that

the Middle East is one of the most penetrated regions of the world

(Brown 1984: 4).

As has been shown elsewhere, on the intergovernmental level

between Israel and Fatah, the conflict constitutes a complex gradu-

ated prisoner’s dilemma that is very difficult to regulate in a peaceful

manner (Beck 2004). The situation between Israel and the Hamas

is even more difficult, inter alia because the two actors have not yet

officially recognized each other as legitimate actors. Rather than mit-

igating the fierceness of the conflict, the societal level further adds to

it. Those social actors that are opposed to making concessions to the

conflicting adversaries—the settlers’ movement in Israel and various

radical and militant organizations in Palestine, respectively—are not

in a majority position in either Israel or Palestine, but some of them

are well organized. When compared to the effect of the societal level,

the impact of the international level appears to be much less clear.

External intervention in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has always

been explicitly based on norms and/or justified by them. Even when

the United Kingdom established a blunt colonial rule after World

War I, they embellished it in the frame of the League of Nations’

mandatory system with the norms of promoting the “development

of self-governing institutions” 2 and “safeguarding the civil and reli-

gious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine.” 3 Arab actors made

reference to very different values and highlighted norms related to

170 MARTIN BECK

anti-imperialism; moreover, justice to the Palestinians has always been

a core argument. In the period of postcolonialism, Western actors

have been referring to Israel as a legitimate actor in the Middle East

and to the Palestinian right of self-determination.

There is a heated debate in the discipline of International Relations

on whether the aims and preferences of actors in politics are genuinely

shaped by norms, as Constructivism insists, or whether they are based

on egoistic self-interest determined by structural factors on the level

of the actors or systems, as Rationalist schools of thought claim. One

of the main issues between Social Constructivism and Rationalism

(such as Institutionalism, Liberalism, and Realism) is actually whether

actors follow the logic of consequentialism or appropriateness. For the

needs of the present analysis, the issue is whether and how the actors’

behavior was genuinely shaped by what norms (condensed to “identi-

ties”) or whether these norms were just used in an instrumental way

to pursue other aims (cf. Hasenclever et al. 2000).

Three clarifications are needed: First, the aim of the present contri-

bution is not to launch two competing paradigms into the empirical

reality like battleships to find out which one prevails over the other.

On the contrary, both paradigms—Social Constructivist appropriate-

ness and Rationalist consequentialism—produce meaningful results.

In fact, the line of argument put forward in the present chapter can

be embedded in two different paradigms, which makes the argument

particularly strong.

Second, applying norms—be they produced by identities or used as

instruments to pursue egoistic self-interest—to the case under exami-

nation does not always produce clear-cut and easily made predictions

as to whether and to what degree external actors will support either

Israel or the PLO. For the Arab states it was often an uneasy issue to

decide how to support the Palestinians—by backing the PLO as led

by Fatah or by competing suborganizations of the PLO, or, by sup-

porting Fatah or Hamas? Has Western policy primarily been based

on the norm of supporting the existence of the state of Israel in the

Middle East or did the norm of national self-determination for the

Palestinians also play a significant role? At first sight it appears as if

the latter question could be easily answered. Looking at the reality of

nearly 50 years of occupation, it seems that “pro-Israeli” norms have

prevailed over “pro-Palestinian” norms (be they based on egoistic

self-interest or identity). However, when one envisions the charac-

ter of the conflict as a three level-game, with the intergovernmental

level at the core of the conflict, the matter appears to be much more

difficult to decide: Given the strong power asymmetry between the

FAILED ATTEMPTS OR FAILURES TO ATTEMPT? 171

PLO and Hamas on the one hand and Israel on the other, it can very

well be argued that without external interference the Palestinian issue

would have been “solved” in a way even much less favorable to the

Palestinians than the way highly constrained autonomy framed by

occupation is to them. In other words, on the one hand, it is correct

that particularly the United States strongly supports Israel sometimes

in a manner that appears to be an unquestioning loyalty. On the other

hand, the United States also sporadically demanded policy changes

(such as a settlement freeze) and they supported the UN Security

Council Resolution 1397 of the year 2002 that praises the Saudi

peace initiative and asks for Palestinian statehood. Thus, even in the

“hard case” of US policies toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one

could argue that a purely power-oriented, “norm-free” policy could

have resulted in an even more pronounced pro-Israeli approach.

Third, one should not forget that it is not only the “others” who

interfere in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but also that the two con-

flicting opponents—sometimes very successfully—attempt to exert

influence on those that interfere in the conflict. The most prominent

examples on the Palestinian side are the attempts of the PLO to create

“a state within a state” in Jordan in the late 1960s and in Lebanon in

the 1970s. Thus, in this period the PLO was attempting to alter the

Arab state system of the Levant (rather than shaping political reality

in Israel/Palestine). Only a massive Israeli military intervention—the

1982 Lebanon War and the forced move of the PLO headquarters to

distant Tunis—brought an abrupt end to this approach of the PLO in

favor of focusing on the occupied Palestinian territories. At the same

time, contrary to Israel, the PLO proved to be incapable of exerting

significant influence within the Western political systems, particu-

larly in US politics. Israel, however, managed to acquire a strong voice

in Washington, DC, a fact that has been pointed out even by Realists

John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007),

for whose theoretical approach the decisive influence of a lobby on

US foreign policy is rather an anomaly.

Western Policies toward Palestinian Attempts of Acquiring Statehood

This section discusses three major cases. First, it addresses the

development of Western declaratory policy toward Palestinian self-

determination, which was first officially launched by the European

Economic Council (EEC), the predecessor of the EU, in 1980.

Thereafter, two cases from the period of the Arab Spring are

172 MARTIN BECK

analyzed: the Western response to the Palestinian initiative “Palestine

194” of 2011, which aims at making Palestine the hundred and

ninety-fourth member of the UN, and related initiatives to upgrade

the status of the PLO in the UN; and the so-called Kerry initiative

of 2013/14, which prompted another round of bilateral negotiations

between Israel and the PLO.

Western Declaratory Policy toward Palestine Prior to the Arab Spring

There is an ongoing heated debate on how to explain the close alli-

ance between the United States and Israel, which was characterized

as a “special relationship” by US President Jimmy Carter on May 12,

1977, and frequently thereafter by his successors (Reich 1996: 233).

The classical Realist explanation that Israel serves strategic interests of

the United States has been challenged by leading Realists Mearsheimer

and Walt (Mearsheimer and Walt 2007) who—by referring to the role

of the pro-Israeli lobby in the United States—put forward an explana-

tion of the “special relationship,” which is based on Liberalism (as con-

ceptualized by Andrew Moravcsik 1997) rather than Realism. Michael

Barnett’s argument against the Realist explanation, however, crosses

the boundaries of Rationalism. As an outspoken Social Constructivist,

he emphasizes the role of shared norms between the United States and

Israel, particularly democratic values (Barnett 1996: 434–41). When

compared to the both intensive and extensive discussion of the rela-

tions between the West and Israel in general and the US-Israeli “spe-

cial relationship” in particular, the basis of the Western relationship

with Palestinian institutions is rather under-researched.

In the early part of the twenty-first century, United States and

European declaratory support for the Palestinian right to statehood is

uncontested. Although UN Security Council Resolution 1397 leaves

considerable wiggle room for interpretation in terms of how to imple-

ment Palestinian statehood on what exact territory, the normative

vision of a Palestinian state peacefully coexisting with Israel is codi-

fied in a very strong way in the formulation “ affirming a vision of a

region where two States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side within

secure and recognized borders.” 4 Less than 50 years ago the Western

actors were far from promoting such a norm. In the wake of the June

War of 1967, the pertinent Security Council resolution, number 242,

only indirectly referred to the Palestinians by demanding “a just set-

tlement of the refugee problem.” 5

The first major document of Western actors that in normative terms

breaks with handling the Palestinian issue as a “refugee problem” is

FAILED ATTEMPTS OR FAILURES TO ATTEMPT? 173

the EEC’s Declaration of the Venice Summit (1980). In terms of

declaratory policy, the Venice Declaration was pathbreaking, first,

because it referred to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people,

and, second, because it demanded the integration of the PLO into the

negotiations, thereby paving the way for a policy that finally aggre-

gated in the demand for Palestinian statehood. 6 As emphasized by

Muriel Asseburg (Asseburg 2004: 183), since the 1980s the European

declaratory policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been

consistently based on the normative orientation of Palestinian state-

hood. With this orientation, the Europeans have managed to shape

the discursive agenda of the international community. Even though

no fully fledged Palestinian state has been established to date, this is

a remarkable achievement of the EU, since US strategic interests in

the Middle East pointed in directions other than setting the estab-

lishment of a Palestinian state as a major normative aim of the inter-

national community, at least until the Gulf War of 1991.

Constructivist and Rationalist Explanations

The policy change of the European actors can be made sense of both

from a Constructivist and an Institutionalist or even Realist point of

view. As Martha Finnemore (Finnemore 1996) argues with respect to

the increase in humanitarian interventions after 1989, major shifts in

foreign policy approaches correspond with shifts in normative stan-

dards. In the present case, the overall normative context for former

colonial people dramatically changed in the frame of decoloniza-

tion in the 1960s and 1970s. With respect to the Middle East, the

United Kingdom and France fought their last major colonial wars in

1956 (the Suez War) and from 1954 to 1962 (the Algerian War of

Independence). The European “discovery” of the Palestinian right

to self-determination in 1980, which was preceded by the European

engagement with the Palestinian issue in the frame of the European

Political Cooperation (EPC) introduced in 1970, fits into the shift-

ing normative pattern of postcolonialism (Bicchi 2007: 92–3).

However, the new European normative orientation toward the

Palestinians can also be understood as the result of changes in

the regional system of the Middle East to which the Europeans

reacted in a way that was based on their egoistic interest to increase

their power. The American-brokered Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty

of 1979, to which the Venice Declaration was a direct European

response, marked a highlight of American power in the Middle East.

By integrating former Soviet ally Egypt into the Western camp, the

174 MARTIN BECK

United States basically managed to end the Cold War in the Middle

East ten years before its global termination. The Europeans, partic-

ularly the former colonial powers France and the United Kingdom,

whose power positions in the Middle East had been superior to the

United States up to the 1950s, however, had to see their powerless-

ness in the light of a world historic event that was—without prior

coordination with the Europeans—fabricated in the country retreat

of the US President: Camp David. Yet, as became apparent in the

“Framework for Peace in the Middle East,” the Israeli-Egyptian

peace brokered in Camp David had one major f law: It was rejected

unanimously by the Arab world due to its failure to fulfill even the

minimum demands of the Palestinians and to give any explicit role to

the PLO, although in 1974 the Arab League had declared the orga-

nization the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. 7

Therefore, after having ended up in a marginal power position in

the Middle East in 1979, the European actors could significantly

enhance their standing in the entire Arab Middle East by a compar-

atively cheap “soft policy” 8 that was supposed to favor Palestinian

interests to a much higher degree than the United States.

Western Policy toward the Palestinians in the Wake of the Arab Uprisings: Virtual Palestinian Statehood and the

Western Viewpoint

Already in August 2009 Salam Fayyad came up with a plan to build

Palestinian proto-state institutions based on principles of good gov-

ernance, thereby creating a Palestinian state rather than talking about

it in fruitless bilateral negotiations with Israel. The Fayyad Plan was

approved by the West since it appeared as an appealing pro-Western

counter-model to the rule of Hamas that had taken over political

reign in the Gaza Strip in March 2007. The World Bank (World Bank

2012: 4), which assisted and closely monitored Palestinian state-

building under the leadership of Fayyad, published a very positive

progress report in 2011, which it confirmed one year later in a report

released in September:

A year ago the World Bank reported . . . on its assessment of the insti-

tution building efforts of the PA noting that “In areas where gov-

ernment effectiveness matters most—security and justice; revenue and

expenditure management; economic development; and service deliv-

ery, Palestinian public institutions compare favorably to other coun-

tries in the region and beyond.”

FAILED ATTEMPTS OR FAILURES TO ATTEMPT? 175

The World Bank (World Bank 2012: 4) also noted that the institu-

tions of the PA

“are reasonably effective, both by any absolute standard one might

have, and especially in comparison to other countries, in the region

or elsewhere.” The institutional assessment of one year ago remains

valid today.

According to the World Bank, the main obstacle impeding sustain-

able growth in the West Bank is not the absence of good governance

but the lack of private investment. Yet, why does the engagement of

the private sector remain low despite a comparatively favorable polit-

ical environment set up by rather effective proto-state institutions of

the PA in the West Bank? To put the answer in a nutshell: Israeli

occupation. To be more specific, the West Bank is still subdivided

according to the Oslo formula in areas A, B, and C. Areas A and

B comprise the major cities and villages of the West Bank that are

governed by the PA (whereby Area A and B differ insofar as internal

security is a prerogative of the PA in Area A, whereas it is a task shared

between the PA and Israel in Area B). 9 Yet, although the vast major-

ity of West Bank Palestinians live in Areas A and B, most parts of

the West Bank territory—Area C—are still under full control of the

Israeli occupational regime. Area C not only comprises all settlements

and areas that are defined by Israel as relevant to its security, but also

areas that cover most resources, particularly infrastructure (e.g., the

roads connecting the Palestinian towns and villages with each other).

Notwithstanding an Israeli policy oscillating between strict mobil-

ity controls organized by military checkpoints (including erecting a

massive separation barrier) and easing restrictions by partially remov-

ing checkpoints and facilitating a passage through them, the basic

problems have remained unchanged ever since the Oslo peace process

in 1993: There is no geographic contingency for Palestinians in the

West Bank; both mobility and access to basic natural and technical

resources is controlled by Israel.

The leadership of the PA concluded from their successful proto-

state building process in 2011 that a fully fledged Palestinian state

should be erected. The PA calculated that its initiative “Palestine

194” would put effective pressure on Israel to terminate the occu-

pation. Thus, since bilateral negotiations with Israel had failed,

the PA intended to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state and to

ask the international community to recognize it. For that purpose,

Mahmud Abbas held a speech in the General Assembly of the UN on

176 MARTIN BECK

September 23, 2011, in which he demanded full membership in the

UN. 10 Although the speech was well received particularly by Arab

members and representatives of many states of the Global South, the

US—backed by some of the most powerful members of the EU—had

already previously made clear that they would veto full membership

in the Security Council.

Mahmud Abbas concluded from the incident that he must set his

sights lower and announced going for an upgrade of the current status

as “non-member observer entity” to a “non-member observer state,”

the so-called Vatican status, in 2012. 11 Contrary to a full member-

ship, the Vatican status can be granted by a simple majority vote of

the General Assembly, leaving no veto power to the United States.

On the one hand, this move of the Palestinian president was a con-

fession of Palestinian powerlessness; on the other, it was consistent

in terms of Abbas’s diplomatic policy approach. At the same time, it

might improve the standing of the Palestinians in the international

system, particularly since the Vatican status put the PA into the posi-

tion to apply for full membership in the International Criminal Court

(ICC) (cf. Dugard 2013: 567–68). 12 In the wake of the July War 2014

in Gaza, Fatah and Hamas publicly expressed the idea of joining

the ICC. 13 On December 31, 2014, Abbas finally signed the Rome

Statute, thereby paving the way for full membership rights commenc-

ing in April 2015. 14

The US reaction to all initiatives of the PA to the UN was unam-

biguous. In the case of the PA’s attempt to become a full member of

the UN, the US Administration clearly announced that they would

put their veto in the Security Council. Although the vote on the PA’s

proposal, which Mahmud Abbas officially submitted on September

23, 2011, was still pending in 2014, there is little if any doubt that

the United States will prevent the approval of the Palestinian pro-

posal. Simply due to the American privilege of being a veto power,

there is no way to overrule the negative vote of the United States and

virtually no indicators that the US Administration could change its

mind. When Abbas received a clear majority in the General Assembly

for his proposal to upgrade Palestine to the same level as the Vatican

in November 2012, the US response was consistent with its reaction

one year earlier: Joined by only eight other states, the United States

opposed the Palestinian proposal.

In comparison to the United States, the members of the EU were

less clear on the issue. This already became rather obvious in the dip-

lomatic entanglement prior to the PA’s submission of its proposal to

acquire full membership and very clear when the PA—frustrated by

FAILED ATTEMPTS OR FAILURES TO ATTEMPT? 177

the US threat to veto its full membership in the UN—applied for

full membership in UNESCO in 2011. The United States opposed

and immediately announced its withdrawal of funding for the UN

Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization as a response to

the organization’s overwhelming yes-vote to accepting the State of

Palestine. 15 The EU, however, proved to be incapable of bridging

the deep cleavages among its members, as the “Big Three” voted in

three different ways: France gave a yes-vote, the United Kingdom

abstained, and Germany opposed in October 2011. 16

Also when Abbas in November 2012 decided to aim for an upgrade

from the status as a “non-member observer entity” to a “non-mem-

ber observer state,” the EU had major trouble coordinating and its

members voted differently (albeit not as spectacularly as one year ear-

lier). Only one member—the Czech Republic—opposed, but some

others, including two of the “Big Three” (Germany and the United

Kingdom), abstained, whereas most members of the EU, including

France, voted yes. 17

Some European parliaments, that of France, for instance, drew

the consequences from the upgrading of Palestine in the UN and

demanded that it be recognized bilaterally as a state. 18 Yet, the first

actual member of the EU to formally recognize Palestine as a state as a

response to “Palestine 194” was Sweden in October 2014. When this

move was harshly condemned by Israel, however, Swedish Foreign

Minister Margot Wallstr ö m hastened to assure the public that she

expected the Scandinavian country’s relations with Israel to remain

excellent. Thus, although Israel, from an official Swedish perspective,

has become the occupying force of a state with which Stockholm

maintains good relations, it appears that Sweden does not envision

putting new forms of pressure on Israel to relinquish occupation, for

instance by seizing a sanction policy against it. 19 Thus, even in the

case of Sweden, the impact of the diplomatic upgrading policy for

Palestine appears to be rather limited in terms of effects on the occu-

pational regime.

Constructivist E xplanations

Taking the persistent Western claims about democratization seri-

ously, one could imagine that those who opposed an upgrade of the

Palestinian membership in the UN would have pointed to the dem-

ocratic deficits of the PA. Prime Minister Salim Fayyad, who was

the architect of the material creation of Palestinian statehood in

the West Bank between 2009 and 2013 when he resigned as prime

178 MARTIN BECK

minister, had been appointed by the president rather than elected by

the Parliament. Moreover, being elected in 2005, Mahmud Abbas’s

democratic legitimacy as the president of Palestine was outdated.

However, none of those major Western actors that opposed the PA’s

initiative did so due to the lack of democratic legitimacy of the PA.

This is so far consistent with recent Western policies toward Palestine,

as when the Fayyad Plan was released in 2009, the democratic defi-

cit was already severe. Thus, the question arises what other reasons

major Western actors such as the United States and Germany had to

oppose “Palestine 194,” thereby ignoring that the World Bank had

vehemently certified the Palestinians to be mature enough to run a

state.

How did the United States legitimize their disapproval of “Palestine

194”? In a speech on US diplomacy toward the Middle East delivered

on May 11, 2011, US President Barack Obama accused the Palestinian

initiatives as “efforts to delegitimize Israel.” 20 Choosing such harsh

wording for rejecting “Palestine 194” enabled the US Administration

to distract attention from the fact that it had declared in December

2010 that it would no longer put pressure on Israel to commit itself to

even a temporary settlement freeze. 21 Then it appeared as if the United

States had conceded that the curtain was drawn on the approach of

achieving a Palestinian state based on bilateral negotiations between

Israel and the PLO.

As clearly as Obama, but with a less dramatic justification, German

Chancellor Angela Merkel opposed the Palestinian proposal by argu-

ing that its unilateral character was counterproductive. 22 On the one

hand, the German response is consistent with its policy toward the

Palestinians ever since the Oslo peace process, according to which

the establishment of the future Palestinian state must be negotiated

with and approved by Israel. On the other hand, when Israeli Prime

Minister Ariel Sharon launched his unilateral initiative of “disengage-

ment” from the Gaza Strip in 2005, Germany did not oppose it. 23

Germany confirmed its—in comparison to the United States—less

abrasive rejection of the “Palestine 194” initiative when it abstained

in the vote of the General Assembly in 2012, whereas the United

States voted no. The German vote, which triggered some harsh reac-

tion from the Israeli side, 24 appears to have resumed the tradition of

“even-handedness” ( Ausgewogenheit ) (cf. B ü ttner 2003), which, due

to its ambiguity and vagueness, tends to alienate everybody. Yet, like

the United Kingdom, which abstained as well, possibly Germany also

hoped that this vote would best serve the interest of resuming bilat-

eral peace talks between the two conflicting parties. 25

FAILED ATTEMPTS OR FAILURES TO ATTEMPT? 179

Explanations Based on Consequentialist Schools of Thought

By vehemently opposing all Palestinian initiatives to obtain a status

upgrade in the UN, the United States strengthened Israel. Two com-

peting Rationalist explanations are available for the US opposition.

From a Realist point of view, the United States supported its most

powerful and reliable ally in the area as a result of US strategic inter-

est in the Middle East, whereas from a Liberalist perspective, the US

vote reflected the effective influence of the pro-Israeli lobby. The very

active role that the Congress played in the negative response of the

Americans to the “Palestine 194” initiative is an indicator that the

Liberalist interpretation is superior to the Realist one in the present

case. 26

Among “The Big Three” in the EU, Germany and the United

Kingdom are traditionally the powers for whom maintaining good

relations to the United States ranks high on the list of foreign policies.

Thus, they tend to view Middle Eastern policies through the lenses

of implications in their transatlantic relations. British support of the

Iraq War 2003 has been interpreted as the United Kingdom being a

junior partner to the United States (Hollis 2003: 25). In the case of

the Federal Republic of Germany, it is debated whether the very first

major policy action toward the Middle East (the 1952 agreement of

so-called indemnification payments to Israel) was already based on

realpolitik rather than on moral values related to taking responsibil-

ity for the Holocaust: A non-ratification of the agreement could have

delayed or even endangered the German track of Westintegration

(Beck 2006: 263, 271). Accordingly, both Germany and the United

Kingdom supported the United States, particularly in the crucial

issue of full membership of Palestine in 2011, whereas in the com-

paratively minor case of the UN vote one year later, they could show

some autonomy vis- à -vis the United States by abstaining.

France’s more pro-Palestinian behavior makes sense from both a

Liberalist and a Realist point of view: The yes votes both in UNESCO

and the General Assembly were popular in the French Parliament and

served to bolster France’s standing in the Arab Middle East. 27

The K erry I nitiative

After the failure of direct negotiations in 2010/11, much US pressure

on both the Israelis and Palestinians was necessary to bring them

back to the negotiation table. Just as the initiative “Palestine 194”

can be traced back to the United States abandoning its attempts to

180 MARTIN BECK

convince the Israelis to concede a settlement freeze (in compliance

with the “Road Map”) in 2010, so, too, can the American insistence

that Israel and the PLO resume negotiations be traced back to its

justification for opposing the PA’s attempt to become recognized as a

state without Israeli approval.

Particularly in complex bargaining situations in which participants

act under a “veil of uncertainty” (James Buchanan), there is (always)

a certain chance of a successful outcome of negotiations (cf. Young

1989). However, in the present case the chances that the conflicting

parties would come up with a sustainable peace (plan) were very low

rather than high ab initio : The conflict adversaries on the govern-

mental level know each other’s positions very well. Thus, it is not very

likely that Israel and the PA will discover new focal points or zones

of agreement during negotiations, which is why the “veil of igno-

rance” is very thin in the present case. Moreover, the positional gaps

between Israel and the PLO are bigger today rather than at the period

when the last serious negotiations for a sustainable peace agreement

were held around the millennium (Camp David 2000; Taba 2001).

Therefore it is not surprising that, according to media reports on

leaked information breaking the maintenance of silence, the bargain-

ing process which started in July 2013 was soon overshadowed by

many differences (Zanotti 2014: 6–8). Moreover, “spoilers” on the

societal level—the settlers’ movement and militant Islamists—were

active on both sides. Thus, it did not come as a surprise that the nego-

tiations failed when in April 2014 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin

Netanyahu took one of the first opportunities to terminate direct

negotiations with the Palestinians as a response to successful recon-

ciliation talks between Fatah and Hamas, despite the fact that the

national unity government that was announced to be formed as a

consequence of the reconciliation had accepted three major demands

of the international community: recognizing Israel, respecting past

agreements, and renouncing violence (Shlaim 2014). 28

Explanations Based on Rationalism and Constructivism

The actual “game” being played by Israel and the PLO from the very

beginning of the negotiations appears to have been less about nego-

tiating peace than about pretend-negotiating peace, that is, avoiding

blame for failed negotiations. The fear of being blamed for another

failure may have created an incentive for the actors to come up with

something substantial. However, in the face of a huge gap in posi-

tions between the two actors engaged in bilateral negotiations, it was

FAILED ATTEMPTS OR FAILURES TO ATTEMPT? 181

more as if the actors had launched mutual mock attacks from the

beginning. Rather than fathoming chances for peace, the logic of

each party was to convince the international community, particularly

the United States, not to put the blame for anticipated failure on it

but rather on the conflict adversary.

In contemporary history the “blame game” was played after failed

negotiations in Camp David in the year 2000, when the Israelis

managed to clearly win it (Baumgarten 2003), thereby traumatiz-

ing the PLO, particularly since Yasir Arafat had asked beforehand

for a guarantee not to be blamed in case the negotiations failed. The

Palestinians learned from that historic experience that they should

not lose the blame game once again. They were successful insofar as

Obama commented after the failure of the Israeli-Palestinian talks in

April 2014 that both conflict parties lacked the will to compromise—

thus, the Palestinians this time achieved quasi a draw. 29

Thus, on the basis of Rationalist consequentialism, it appears

plausible to argue that the Israelis and Palestinians ended up at the

negotiation table primarily because the US Administration pressured

them to do so. After having turned down Palestinian initiatives that

were supported by most members of the international community,

the US Administration had a strong incentive to be proactive again

and appear as the potential peace broker, and thus risked setting up

pretend-peace negotiations. The PLO could not resist the pressure to

go to the table due to its financial dependence on the West, and Israel

had to give something back to the United States for its steadfast sup-

port in opposing “Palestine 194.”

Yet, from a Rationalist point of view the intrinsic question of the

present analysis is why the United States pushed hard for negotiations

when its chances to succeed were considered rather weak from the

very beginning. When Abbas launched his initiatives to get interna-

tional recognition as a state, the US Administration was put in an

awkward position: Although basically in favor of a Palestinian state,

they opposed the initiative by all diplomatic means, thereby appear-

ing to be a passive naysayer without any vision or perspective as to

how to regulate the conflict in a productive way. Many actors in the

international community, particularly among those of the Global

South, even perceived the United States as an actor that would block

any progress in the conflict over Palestine. The Kerry Initiative,

however, seemed to be a suitable tool to show to the international

community that the United States remains at the wheel. Moreover,

when negotiations failed, the United States could then blame both

the Palestinians and the Israelis, thereby shaking off the role as the

182 MARTIN BECK

spoiler of Palestinian statehood. In other words, the United States

could use the (anticipated) failure of the Israeli-Palestinian talks to

distract from their own responsibility for the protracted conflict by

putting the blame on the intransigence of the conflict opponents.

According to Constructivism, the Western attempt to bring Israel

and the PLO back to the negotiation table can be attributed to the

genuine belief that a sustainable regulation of the conflict is only

possible if the representatives of both parties find a joint solution.

According to this perspective, peace between the Israelis and the

Palestinians requires that both parties accept painful compromises.

Thus, according to this perspective, it is primarily about the two pro-

tagonists of the Arab-Israeli conflict coming to terms with each other,

whereas the international community can only serve as an “honest

broker.”

Conclusion

Including the international level as the third analytical image of the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict beyond the intergovernmental and the

societal level is of utmost importance: The West has been actively

engaged in the conflict for over 100 years. Thus, the West has shaped

the conflict to a high degree. Moreover, the conflicting parties have

also been active in engaging external actors.

Norms have always played a central role for Western interference

in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This does not necessarily mean that

Western actors’ behavior followed values based on identities rather

than egoistic self-interests. Rather, the three cases examined—the

development of the Western declaratory policy toward the Palestinian

right to self-determination, the “Palestine 194” initiative, and the

recent peace negotiations brokered by US Secretary of State John

Kerry in 2013–2014—show that the Western policies can be made

sense of from the viewpoints of both Constructivist appropriateness

and Rationalist consequentialism.

It has not been the task of the present contribution to decide whether

one of the schools of thought applied to the three empirical case stud-

ies is superior to the other. Rather, the more modest—but possibly

also more scientifically honest—aim has been to provide plausible dif-

ferent interpretations of major empirical developments and incidents,

thereby enriching our understanding of a complex reality by viewing it

through different lenses. Possibly the desire to take sides may even be

misleading: There is good reason to believe that Western actors—or

some units of Western actors—sometimes actually “genuinely” act

FAILED ATTEMPTS OR FAILURES TO ATTEMPT? 183

on the basis of norms and sometimes “rationally” exploit them in

order to achieve specific benefits. For instance, it is very well possible

that some states uphold the idea of bilateral negotiations between the

Israelis and Palestinians because they genuinely believe that there is

no alternative from a normative point of view, whereas others apply

an instrumentalist approach, which consists of upholding the norm of

a bilaterally negotiated peace in order to empower Israel to maintain

the occupational regime, whereby different units of one state actor

may differ. Moreover, patterns may change over time, either in the

way that a norm that initially was picked up in an instrumental way

becomes “internalized” by the actor or the other way round, that

an actor whose initial behavior was based on norms discovers their

usefulness in serving egoistic self-interests. For instance, in the 1980s

France may have used the Palestinian right to self-determination as

an instrument to regain some influence in the Middle East, whereas

possibly other European states such as Germany at the beginning

genuinely acted on the basis of postcolonial norms. Moreover, some

foreign policy units (of one country) may have internalized these and

related norms, whereas some other units (of some other countries)

who originally acted on the basis of norm appropriateness may have

become “cynical,” upholding them as instruments to pursue egoistic

self-interest, such as fostering their relations with the United States.

The present analysis has revealed that the PA, under the leader-

ship of Abbas, applies strategies to achieve Palestinian statehood that

can be labeled both sophisticated and conformist, for instance going

for the Vatican status when the chance to become recognized as a

full member of the UN with equal rights failed. However “Initiative

194” is assessed from a political perspective, from an analytical view-

point it appears likely that in the foreseeable future major Palestinian

actors will stick to their aim of achieving statehood—and that Israel

will remain determined to prevent that from happening unless the

Palestinian side agrees to conditions of massively constricted sover-

eignty hardly acceptable to them.

Thus, it is rather likely that the issue of Palestinian statehood will

remain on the agenda. In other words, the Palestinians will in a way

most likely contribute to the contestation of status quo border lines in

the Levant. At the same time, it is rather unlikely that a fully fledged

independent and sovereign Palestinian state, peacefully living side by

side with Israel, will be established in the foreseeable future. Moreover,

no indicators were found that other actors in the Levant aiming at

the revision of the present state system were becoming more closely

interlaced with and connected to the conflict over Palestine. Indeed,

184 MARTIN BECK

the Gaza War in July 2014 and the ongoing war waged by the Islamic

State (formerly Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant —ISIS) in Iraq

and Syria have so far been disconnected events—despite geographic

proximity and well-established relations.

If these conflict zones—plus possibly others, particularly in

Lebanon—spilled over and became interwoven, the state system in

the Levant could be revolutionized, possibly with Israel playing an

even stronger role than today. Yet, so far neither the Israelis nor the

Palestinians have attempted to get actively involved in the regional

turmoil which is centered on Syrian territory. Moreover, contrary to

Israel and Hamas, the PA has been pursuing a strictly nonviolent,

diplomatic policy in the wake of the Arab Uprisings, which triggered

turmoil in other parts of the Levant. Due to Western opposition,

particularly that of the United States, the PA’s attempt to achieve

virtual statehood has been a failure if assessed on the criterion of eas-

ing, not to mention ending, occupation. Yet, in terms of diplomatic

upgrades, the PA has been partially successful, which is not much to

the benefit of the Palestinian people living under the harsh reality

of occupation but improves the standing and prestige of Palestine’s

political class. The kind of virtual statehood that the PA has achieved

so far may have some limited impact on occupation in the foreseeable

future, for instance if the International Criminal Court deals with

Israeli war crimes. Yet, a more immediate impact could be that the

Palestinian political class is treated with more or less full diplomatic

respect in international politics. This in turn could make occupation

more bearable to the Palestinian political class, thereby contributing

to a stabilization of occupation. Summa summarum , although the

prolonged Israeli-Palestinian conflict bears the potential of both an

explosive and a stabilizing factor in terms of the state system in the

Levant, trends in the years 2010 to 2014 did not point in the direc-

tion of fueling the turmoil in the Levant.

Notes

1 . For a brief appraisal of the effect of Egyptian politics on the West

Bank and the Gaza Strip since 2011, see Boukhars et al. (2014).

2 . The Palestine Mandate, Council of the League of Nations (1922),

Article 2, available at: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/pal-

manda.asp#art25 , last accessed January 31, 2015.

3 . The Palestine Mandate (endnote 2).

4 . U.N. Security Council Resolution 1397 (2002), available at: http://

www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sc7326.doc.htm , last

accessed January 31, 2015.

FAILED ATTEMPTS OR FAILURES TO ATTEMPT? 185

5 . U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (1967), available at: http://

unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE7006

86136 , last accessed January 31, 2015.

6 . Venice Declaration (1980), European Economic Community,

available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/mepp/docs/venice_declara-

tion_1980_en.pdf , last accessed January 31, 2015.

7 . See Framework for Peace in the Middle East (1978), available

at: http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/

EG%20IL_780917_Framework%20for%20peace%20in%20the%20

MiddleEast%20agreed%20at%20Camp%20David.pdf , last accessed

January 31, 2015.

8 . For the concept of “soft power” see Joseph Nye (2004).

9 . An exception is Al-Khalil (Hebron) where major parts are still under

direct Israeli control (as is the whole of East Jerusalem). Moreover,

the differences between areas A and B have become periodically

blurred since the Second Intifada as a result of the fact that Article 10

in Chapter 2 of the “Israeli—Palestinian Interim Agreement on the

West Bank and the Gaza Strip” (1995), stating that Israel is respon-

sible for “overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding

their internal security and public order,” was taken by Israel as carte

blanche to frequently interfere in Palestine, document available at:

http://www.unsco.org/Documents/Key/Israeli-Palestinian%20

Interim%20Agreement%20on%20the%20West%20Bank%20and%20

the%20Gaza%20Strip.pdf , last accessed January 31, 2015.

10 . A “Full Transcript of Abbas’s Speech at the UN General Assembly”

(September 23, 2011) is available at: http://www.haaretz.com/news/

diplomacy-defense/full-transcript-of-abbas-speech-at-un-general-

assembly-1.386385 , last accessed January 31, 2015.

11 . Al-Jazeera : Palestinians Mull Observer Status at UN, June

8, 2012, available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/mid-

dleeast/2012/06/201268223933362503.html , last accessed

January 31, 2015; Al-Arabiya: Abbas to Make Bid on Sept. 27 to

Obtain U.N. Status, Trades Blame with Hamas over Unity Deal,

September 8, 2012, available at: http://www.alarabiya.net/arti-

cles/2012/09/08/236855.html , last accessed January 31, 2015.

12 . See BBC News Middle East : Q&A. Palestinian Bid for Upgraded UN

status, November 30, 2012, available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/

news/world-middle-east-13701636 , last accessed January 31, 2015.

13 . Guardian : Palestinian Leaders Poised to Join ICC in Order to Pursue

Israel for War Crimes. Diplomats Expect Plan to Join International

Criminal Court and Call for Investigation to Be Used as Bargaining

Chip in Cairo Talks, August 5, 2014, available at: http://www.the-

guardian.com/world/2014/aug/05/palestinian-leaders-icc-israel-

war-crimes , last accessed January 31, 2015.

14 . Independent : Palestinians to Become ICC Member in April, UN

Chief Says, January 7, 2015, available at: http://www.independent.

186 MARTIN BECK

co.uk/news/world/americas/un-chief-says-palestinians-to-become-

icc-member-in-april-9963967.html , last accessed January 31, 2015.

15 . Washington Post : UNESCO Votes to Admit Palestine; U.S. Cuts

off Funding, October 31, 2011, available at: http://www.washing-

tonpost.com/world/national-security/unesco-votes-to-admit-pales-

tine-over-us-objections/2011/10/31/gIQAMleYZM_story.html ,

last accessed January 31, 2015.

16 . Reuters : UNESCO Grants Palestinians Full Membership, October 31,

2011, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/01/

us-palestinians-unesco-idUSTRE79U1ZY20111101 , last accessed

January 31, 2015.

17 . United Nations General Assembly: General Assembly Votes

Overwhelmingly to Accord Palestine “Non-Member Observer State”

Status in United Nations, November 29, 2012, available at: http://

www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/ga11317.doc.htm , last

accessed January 31, 2015.

18 . Guardian : French and Irish Parliaments Call for Recognition of

Palestinian State, December 11, 2014, available at: http://www.the-

guardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/france-ireland-europe-recogn-

ise-palestine-israel , last accessed January 31, 2015.

19 . Jerusalem Post : Sweden Says Relations with Israel Excellent, despite

Recalling of Ambassador, October 31, 2014, available at: http://

www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Sweden-

says-relations-with-Israel-excellent-despite-recalling-of-ambassador-

380392 , last accessed January 31, 2015.

20 . The White House, Office of the Press Secretary: Remarks by the

President on the Middle East and North Africa, May 19, 2011, avail-

able at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/

remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa , last accessed January

31, 2015.

21 . Financial Times : US Drops Jewish Settlement Demand, December

8, 2010, available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bbea6a46-0260-

-11e0-ac33-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3RKoY8aV8 , last accessed

January 31, 2015.

22 . Deutsche Welle : Merkel Will Not Recognize Unilaterally Declared

Palestinian State, April 7, 2011, available at: http://www.dw.de/

merkel-wil l-not-recognize-unilateral ly-declared-palest inian-

state/a-14974756-1 , last accessed January 31, 2015; Deutsche

Welle: Germany Won’t Back Palestinian Quest for UN Membership,

November 11, 2011, available at: http://www.dw.de/germany-wont-

back-palestinian-quest-for-un-membership/a-15525561 , last accessed

January 31, 2015.

23 . Apart from a military withdrawal and dissolution of settlements,

the plan also included the isolation of the Gaza Strip and the cre-

ation of closer ties of East Jerusalem and crucial parts of the West

Bank to Israel (see the critical discussion in Bitterlemons (February

FAILED ATTEMPTS OR FAILURES TO ATTEMPT? 187

9, 2004) with contributions of Ghassan Khatib, Yossi Alpher, Hatem

Abdel Qader, and Gerald M. Steinberg, available at: http://www.

bitterlemons.org/previous/bl090204ed5.html , last accessed January

31, 2015.

24 . Spiegel Online : An Affront from Berlin. Israeli-German Relations

Strained after Abstention, December 3, 2012, available at: http://

www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-abstention-in-un-

palestine-vote-strains-ties-with-israel-a-870606.html , last accessed

January 31, 2015.

25 . Al-Jazeera: UK to Abstain on Palestine UN-Membership Vote,

November 10, 2011, available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/e

urope/2011/11/201111919479442925.html , last accessed January

31, 2015.

26 . Jewish Virtual Library: Congress and the Middle East. House

Resolution Opposing Unilateral Declaration of Palestinian State,

December 15, 2010; available at, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.

org/jsource/US-Israel/HR1765.html , last accessed January 31,

2015.

27 . France24 : France to Support Palestinian UN Status Bid, November

27, 2011, available at: http://www.france24.com/en/20121127-

france-palestine-territories-israel-un-united-nations-status-abbas-

fabius/#./?&_suid=139524116536407653162620975391 , last

accessed January 31, 2015.

28 . Reuters : Netanyahu Tells Abbas to Choose Peace Partners.

Hamas or Israel, April 23, 2014, available at: http://www.

reuters.com/article/2014/04/23/us-palest inian-israel-idUS-

BREA3M0FW20140423 , last accessed January 31, 2015.

29 . Reuters : “Pause” Perhaps Needed in Israeli-Palestinian Talks.

Obama, April 25, 2014, available at: http://www.reuters.

com/article/2014/04/25/us-palest inian-israel-obama-idUS-

BREA3O0RW20140425 , last accessed January 31, 2015.

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C H A P T E R 9

Turmoil in the Levant: Inconclusive

Conclusions

Dietrich Jung

Introduction

“What is IS [the Islamic State] a case of?” This question Jillian

Schwedler posed in an essay published in February 2015 in the

Washington Post. In this article, she discussed the terms that academ-

ics and the broader public use in analyzing Islamist organizations in

general and the IS in particular. 1 Of course, Schwedler had no diffi-

culties in categorizing the IS as a radical and extremist jihadist group.

Yet, how is this group different from other jihadist organizations?

This question has occupied scholars and media pundits in their assess-

ment of the rise of the IS and its warfare in Syria and Iraq. In an essay

for the German newspaper S ü ddeutsche Zeitung , for instance, Volker

Perthes, the director of the German think tank Stiftung Wissenschaft

und Politik (German Institute for International and Security Affairs)

in Berlin, warned the public not to underestimate the significance of

the role of the IS in the Syrian civil war. Instead of talking about a

mere terrorist organization, Perthes suggested considering the IS as

the central actor in a jihadist state-building process, which is “totali-

tarian, expansive, and hegemonic” in its nature. 2 Perthes’s essay raised

immediate responses. In the journal Zenith Naseef Naeem and Daniel

Gerlach, to take only one example, criticized Perthes in that talking

with reference to the IS about a state-building process enhanced its

status and disparaged the concept of the state. 3

In this debate on the IS, normative and analytical arguments often

get mixed up. In the face of the horrific crimes by the IS, it has become

192 DIETRICH JUNG

increasingly difficult to advocate an analytical perspective in the pub-

lic debate. However, this confusion of analytical, ideological, and

normative perspectives can blur the picture of what we observe in this

war in Syria in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Due to the under-

standable focus on the terror regime of the IS and its bold ideological

posture, we might disregard the actual complexities at work in the

current turmoil in the Levant. In this way, we run the risk of turning

a symptom, the rise of the IS, into a cause. Moreover, the situation in

Syria and Iraq seemingly eclipsed the previously paramount role the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict had played in the geopolitical structure of

the region. Only a few years ago, any talk about turmoil in the Levant

would undoubtedly have related to the Palestinian question. How is it

possible to interpret properly these very complex and admittedly puz-

zling observations that we can make since the popular unrest in Syria

turned into open civil war?

This final chapter suggests seeking an answer to this question with

the help of some analytical tools of historical sociology. The entan-

glement of war making and state making has been a core theme of

historical sociologists since the end of the nineteenth century. In the

first section of this chapter I derive an analytical tool kit from this tra-

dition. I depart in this excursion into historical sociology from some

theoretical reflections based on Charles Tilly’s book chapter “War

Making and State Making as Organized Crime.” Through the lenses

of the analytical tools developed in this section, I then discuss some of

the findings and arguments that have been made by the contributors

to this book. This second section focuses on the political economy of

war that has developed in Syria, the sectarianization of the political

scene, and the way in which the Syrian war is embedded in regional

and international political contexts. Emphasizing the historical path

dependency of the current events in the Levant, of which the IS is a

symptomatic expression, the final section ends with some speculative

assumptions regarding the political transformation we might expect in

the region. In applying my specific analytical framework to the discus-

sion of this book, it goes without saying that these are my own rather

than the joint conclusions of the authors or editors of this book.

“War Making and State Making as Organized Crime”: The Theoretical Perspective of

Historical Sociology

In a book chapter that meanwhile has assumed the status of a classic,

Charles Tilly suggested understanding the rise of modern national

TURMOIL IN THE LEVANT 193

states in Europe with the help of an analogy to forms of organized

crime. The core of Tilly’s argument revolves around a social mecha-

nism he attributes to protection rackets. In the social logic of protec-

tion rackets, he identified a main feature of both emerging states and

forms of organized crime. Tilly claimed that “banditry, piracy, gang-

land rivalry, policing and war making” are phenomena that belong to

the same continuum (Tilly 1985: 170). This claim is directed against

theories of the modern state based on ideas such as the social con-

tract or market rationality. Against these classical liberal state theo-

ries, Tilly argued that “coercive exploitation played a large part in the

creation of European states.” Consequently, we should conceive of

the social action of modern state makers as those of coercive and self-

seeking entrepreneurs, similar to actors in organized forms of crime

(Tilly 1985: 169). According to Tilly, European state makers were

engaged in four different but independent forms of activity: war mak-

ing, state making, protection, and extraction. Sociologists have put

these activities under the general heading of “organized violence”

and historically they could take on very different concrete forms

(Tilly 1985: 181).

In the book Coercion, Capital, and European States Tilly fur-

ther elaborated on this theme. Looking at a period of more than

1,000 years of European history, he investigated the interdependent

social mechanisms of the accumulation of the means of coercion by

coercive entrepreneurs, often unwillingly turning into state makers,

and the accumulation of social wealth by civilian entrepreneurs (Tilly

1990). These two intertwined processes of the monopolization of

physical force and the accumulation of capital gradually evolved into

a new kind of reciprocal relationship between military men and a

civilian elite. In this process the mechanism between civic claims to

protection (security) and the emerging states’ need for extraction

(taxation) transformed the violent nature of these social processes in

two significant ways. On the one hand, we can observe a gradual

process of bureaucratization of state-society relations lasting for cen-

turies. At a very late stage of this bureaucratization process, we see

the establishment of the liberal and pluralist democratic state, based

on the rule of law and a relatively free market economy. This histori-

cal “end product” of European state formation serves us as the role

model for successful state building today. On the other hand, the

violent elimination contest of emerging states has been transformed

into a pattern of interaction that appears at the interstate level as the

international system of a “norm-governed society of states” (Brown

2001). In international politics national states interact as mutually

194 DIETRICH JUNG

recognized like-units, as supposedly sovereign actors within the

framework of international law.

According to Tilly both the “civilized” standards of conduct of

the modern national state and those of the norm-governed interna-

tional system of states were the late and non-intended outcomes of

purposeful social actions. The emergence of these standards took

place through centuries-long historical processes of a nonlinear but

path-dependent nature. These processes reflected specific historical

contexts in which the circularity of the state competencies of territo-

rial control and economic extraction evolved. Even more important,

only a few state-making processes eventually resulted in the establish-

ment of fully institutionalized states (Tilly 1990: 160). In perceiving

the emergence of social institutions theoretically as the non-intended

outcomes of purposeful social actions, Tilly argued that the evolution

of modern statehood was characterized by a central paradox: “that

the pursuit of war and military capacity, after having created national

states as a sort of by-product, led to a civilianization of government

and domestic politics” (Tilly 1990: 206).

Charles Tilly’s model of modern state formation is deeply rooted

in the tradition of historical political sociology. This tradition, epit-

omized in the work of Max Weber, conceptualized the rise of the

modern state along the evolution of its core feature: the monopoly

of physical force. In the introduction to Politik als Beruf (Politics as

Vocation) Max Weber presented a brief summary of his conceptualiza-

tion of the historical specifics of the modern state. Weber argued that

the modern state can only be defined by its specific means: violence.

Similar to Tilly, who characterized the early stages of the European

state-making process as being many parties sharing among them the

right to use physical force (Tilly 1985:173), Weber understood the

organization of violence in premodern times as being a plurality of

groups using physical force. Only with the rise of the modern state

can we observe the accumulation of the means of violence in one

specific social institution, which “is held to be the sole source of the

‘right’ to use violence” (Weber 1919: 78). From this perspective,

Weber defined the modern state as being the successful claim to the

monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a certain territory

(Weber 1919: 78). He described the relationship between war making

and state making as a long-lasting process of “political expropriation”

in which all political associations other than the state gradually had

been deprived of the means of coercion (Weber 1919: 83). Contrary

to Tilly, however, Weber stressed in his definition of the modern

state the ideational dimension of modern state formation: The factual

TURMOIL IN THE LEVANT 195

monopoly of the use of violence has to be considered legitimate

by both the rulers and the ruled. Stable systems of modern politi-

cal authority do not rest on a monopoly of coercion alone, but this

monopoly needs legitimacy. With this emphasis on legitimacy, Max

Weber’s core understanding of the modern state is actually “about

the redundancy of the gun,” about the establishment of efficient rule

with the consent of the ruled (Laiz and Schlichte 2015: 6).

In his work on nationalism, Sinisa Malesevic refers to this idea-

tional dimension of modern state making, the need for legitimacy, by

inventing the concept of ideologization. Malesevic argues that even

the most rudimentary social organizations combined the reliance on

coercive power with various kinds of normative justification. With the

establishment of the modern national state, however, this ideological

justification of the legitimate use of physical force attained a much

more significant role. Not only was the rise of the national state due

to the cumulative bureaucratization of the means of coercion, but

also successful state formation rested on a process which Malesevic

terms “centrifugal ideologization” (Malesevic 2013: 12). Building its

normative justification on ideas such as popular sovereignty, the mod-

ern national state has been characterized by an enormous ideological

penetration of its population. In short, “the steady spread of organi-

zational power was paralleled by the expansion of ideological power”

(Malesevic 2013: 12).

Analyzing the emergence of national states and nationalisms,

Malesevic explains the evolution of the modern state through three

processes: the cumulative bureaucratization of coercion; centrifugal

ideologization; and the ways in which bureaucratization and ideolo-

gization “envelope the hubs of micro-solidarity” (Malesevic 2013: 7).

Historically, the interlacement of these processes was highly contin-

gent, and “the popular ideology that binds state sovereignty and

cultural authenticity became significant only once the bureaucratic

apparatus of the state was able to penetrate deeply into the various

pores of each society” (Malesevic 2013: 82). Similar to the German

sociologist Norbert Elias, Malesevic points here to the inseparable

relationship between the development of social macro structures and

individual identities at the micro level. Modern state making has been

a complex process of the intertwined formation of both social institu-

tions and the modern individual (Elias 1994). From the formation of

successful protection rackets to the establishment of modern national

states, however, European history had a long way to go. 4

To sum up these brief theoretical and analytical reflections: The

tradition of historical political sociology provides a reservoir of

196 DIETRICH JUNG

concepts and analytical perspectives that helps us make sense of the

puzzling turmoil in the Levant. Tilly’s mechanism of protection and

extraction, Weber’s definition of the modern state, and Malesevic’s

processes of bureaucratization and ideologization are heuristic tools

for the analytical organization of the historically specific forms of war

and organized violence in Syria today. Their application to social con-

flicts in the Middle East, however, has been contested. Yet the “ana-

lytical hegemony of Europe” in these concepts (Heydemann 2000:

4)—the mere fact that they have been predominantly abstracted

from the European historical experience—does not per se rule out

their methodologically reflected and contextualized application in a

Middle Eastern context. Of course, as Charles Tilly stated himself:

“The Third World of the twentieth century does not greatly resemble

Europe of the sixteenth or seventeenth century” (Tilly 1985: 169).

The Middle East is certainly not what the West once was, paraphras-

ing a famous quote of Daniel Lerner. 5 So far, however, the modern

national state has remained the central social institution for organiz-

ing societies in a global dimension. This is reflected in the fact that

none of the authors in this volume could avoid contextualizing their

case study without making constant references to the state as a social

institution and the society of states as a system of international inter-

action. In this sense the previously presented concepts seem to be apt

for a discussion of the findings and arguments of this book in light

of the more general question of future political transformations and

the status of the state in the Levant. The following section engages

in this discussion putting its focus on the Syrian war economy, the

sectarianization of the war, and the complex pattern of interaction

among local, regional, and international players.

The War in Syria: Political Economy, Sectarianism, and the International

State System

In his analysis of the emergence of new forms of political authority in

Syria, Samer Abboud takes his point of departure in the loss of con-

trol over large parts of territory by the Syrian regime. Indeed, since

its violent repression of the popular uprising in 2011, the Syrian state

has eroded with respect to all three of the core dimensions of Weber’s

definition of the state. First, the regime of Bashar al-Assad has had

enormous difficulty maintaining its claim to the factual monopoly

of physical force even in the capital Damascus, and parts of the mil-

itary defected, forming the oppositional Free Syrian Army (FSA).

TURMOIL IN THE LEVANT 197

Second, the territorial base of the Syrian state has been shrinking

dramatically, leaving large parts of the country to shifting patterns

of territorial control by a multiplicity of rebel groups. 6 Third, the

self-generated ideological legitimation of the Assad system, as once

so aptly described by Lisa Wedeen (Wedeen 1999), has disappeared.

Early attempts by the regime to bolster its legitimacy through a con-

stitutional redefinition of its authoritarian rule were utterly flawed. In

her chapter on the new Syrian, Egyptian, and Tunisian constitutions,

Mervat Hatem concludes that the Syrian regime, with a preamble to

its new constitution harking back to the nationalist language of the

1950s and 1960s, has apparently missed the point behind the public

unrest in the country. Instead of addressing issues of injustice against

individuals such as economic exclusion, gender-based discrimination,

socioeconomic inequalities, or bodily harm, humiliation, and torture,

the constitutional amendments in Syria invoked first of all the “beat-

ing heart of Arabism” and the “exemplary role” of the Syrian army.

From the perspective of political economy, Abboud describes the

increasing fragmentation of the Syrian state apparatus and the emer-

gence of various new power centers over its territory. Yet these power

centers, including the remains of the Assad regime, are still far from

displaying all the organizational bureaucratic capacities and means of

ideological penetration that historical sociologists have used to define

states. Rather, Abboud’s new political authorities represent more

or less advanced protection rackets and proto-states in Tilly’s sense.

They provide a minimum of protection in a situation in which they

themselves contribute to the general lack of security for the Syrian

population. Involved in competitive struggles for the accumulation of

coercive and economic means, these protection rackets are both cause

and result of the situation of “pervasive uncertainty” that, according

to Fred Lawson in his chapter on the civil war in Syria and its role

in reconfiguring regional politics, has engulfed the Syrian war in its

fourth year.

In terms of bureaucratization and ideologization, at least two of

these racketeers seem to have advanced within this social environ-

ment of pervasive uncertainty: the IS and organizations representing

Syria’s Kurdish minority. Lawson describes the quick development of

the IS into an “energetic, radical (Sunni) Islamist movement” that

with the support of former Iraqi Baath military personnel has been

able to expand territorially into large parts of northern Syria and Iraq.

At the same time, the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and

the Popular Protection Units (YPGI) were able to establish zones

of relative Kurdish autonomy in the al-Hasakah province. There,

198 DIETRICH JUNG

the Kurdish militias are fighting against the IS for control over the

local oil-producing areas. The territories under the IS domination

and those under Kurdish autonomy represent two of the four distinct

power centers in Abboud’s analysis. Abboud stresses the relationship

between the capacities of coercive extraction and bureaucratic organi-

zation that characterizes these power centers. The successful military

campaigns of the IS, for instance, were accompanied by the building

of rudimentary institutions of governance, first in the provincial city

Raqqa and then in other areas under the IS control.

Abboud argues that the bureaucratization of the coercive means

of the IS has been following the structuring logic of the Syrian war

economy. According to this logic the rise of the IS was largely due to

its transformation from a predominantly predatory rebel group into

an organization that is able to exert relative extractive control over

certain territories. While the first relies on coercive economic activi-

ties such as theft, smuggling, and kidnapping, the second increas-

ingly extracts its material means from available natural resources and

through the governance of daily life such as through the levying of

tolls and taxes. This development toward more sophisticated means of

extraction by the IS has been confirmed in a paper by the Brookings

Doha Center synthesizing the available evidence, mostly from jour-

nalistic and declassified intelligence sources, from the IS-controlled

territories. The report outlines the diversification of the IS’s eco-

nomic means, comprising a multiplicity of sources such as “oil, gas,

agriculture, taxation, extortion, kidnapping for ransom, black market

antique selling, and other illicit trades” (Lister 2014: 2). The author

of the report traces back the roots of the IS to the prison release of

its “founding father” Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 1999, acknowledging

that the organization has undergone a significant process of orga-

nizational learning since then. In light of these findings, the report

concludes that the IS will remain a terror organization in its funda-

mental structure, but in the year 2014 it also represented “an effective

proto-state being built and defended across Syria and Iraq” (Lister

2014: 30).

The intertwined nature of processes of bureaucratization and ideol-

ogization has also found its expression in the increasing sectarianiza-

tion of the war in Syria. In Fred Lawson’s eyes, the meanwhile fully

sectarianized character of the war is one of its key features as it enters

its fourth year. Right from the beginning, Kurdish groups have tried

to establish autonomous areas at Syria’s northern border. Drawing on

ethnic loyalty and cohesion, they have used their coercive powers to

maintain control over these Kurdish enclaves, rather than directing

TURMOIL IN THE LEVANT 199

them against the regime in Damascus. In this way, argues Abboud,

the Kurdish parties assumed a unique political position insulating

them from both the regime and the opposition. The probably most

advanced instance of state building we so far can observe in the Syrian

war is the Rojava project, which declared the establishment of a tem-

porary autonomous administration over the three Kurdish cantons

of Efrine, Kobani, and Cizire. Since August 2013, this ethnically

designed Rojava project has disseminated information about Kurdish

self-administration via its own website. 7

In his chapter on the rise of sectarianism in Syria, Peter Sluglett

points at the very ambiguous nature of sectarian identities, describing

them as both a “demographic fact” and an “invented tradition.” From

a comparative perspective, Sluglett reminds us of the role of sectarian

identities in wars such as in Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Iraq, and

former Yugoslavia. With reference to the work of Ussama Makdisi

(Makdisi 2000) and David Lloyd (Lloyd 1999), he argues that sec-

tarian violence occurs at specific historical junctures and often under

circumstances that are characterized by the dissipation of former state

authorities. According to these literatures, there is no linear devel-

opment of sectarian conflict into sectarian war. The violent escala-

tion of conflicts, instead, goes along with the conscious mobilization

of friend and foe, often with close reference to ethnic and religious

affiliations. Sluglett’s argument finds the support of other observers

of the Syrian war. Carpenter, for instance, pointed to the fact that it

was multiethnic and multireligious groups who carried out the ini-

tial demonstrations against the regime in Damascus. The military

resistance against the Assad regime, however, then turned out to be

almost exclusively organized by Sunni groups (Carpenter 2013: 1).

The articulation of economic, political, and social disadvantages in

ethnic or religious terms has become widespread in the region. These

references to ethnicity and religion generate conflict dynamics similar

to those that we know from radical forms of nationalist agitation. In

this process, political authorities and public media often play a key

role in defining ideological dividing lines in socioeconomic conflicts.

Simone H ü ser, for instance, argues in her contribution to this book

that the scapegoating of Syrian refugees as being responsible for the

worsening of the economic and social situation in Jordan is a deliber-

ate attempt by the Jordanian regime to gloss over the fundamental

weaknesses of state institutions in addressing the socioeconomic crisis

in the country. Although not a matter of sectarian divides, Amman’s

way of dealing with the Syrian refugee crisis displays similar patterns

of constructing ideological dividing lines between distinct parts of

200 DIETRICH JUNG

populace. The influx of Syrian refugees provides the Jordanian gov-

ernment with an opportunity to distract public attention from the

failure of its own economic policies and to continue its rent-seeking

policies directed toward the international community.

The most important case of sectarianization, however, is the

way in which Sunni resistance groups in Syria closely identify the

Syrian Alawi community, evolved from an offspring of Shiite Islam,

with the Assad regime. In the violent escalation of the Syrian con-

f lict, the Sunni resistance’s scapegoating of Shia Islam in general

and the Alawi community in particular plays an important ideo-

logical role. Peter Sluglett brief ly describes the ways in which many

Alawis made their way into the two key institutions of the Syrian

state, the Baath party and the military. Sluglett argues that this

overrepresentation of Alawis in the Syrian state apparatus met with

a historically rooted contempt of them from Sunni Muslim scholars.

This pejorative image of Alawis goes back at least to the Hanbali

scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), who represents a central ideo-

logical reference for contemporary radical Sunni Salafi groups

such as Jabhat al-Nusra or the Islamic State. Moreover, to follow

Sluglett’s line of argumentation, this sectarian image of the Assad

regime has been strengthened by the close collaboration between

the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian state. Already in the

early 1970s, Sluglett tells us, Iranian and Lebanese clerics declared

the Syrian Alawis to be an authentic branch of Shiite Islam. This

inclusive move by Shiite clerics facilitated the close relationship of

the Assad regime with the Lebanese Hizbullah and the ruling elite

of postrevolutionary Iran. This sectarianization of Syria’s foreign

relations, however, has in fact disguised the rather complex rela-

tionship between Syria’s Alawi community and the Syrian state.

Leon Goldsmith argued convincingly that the Assad regime has

successfully exploited the inherited status of sectarian insecurity

of the Alawi community and submerged Alawite social integra-

tion in Syria. According to him, Alawite insecurity was a “valuable

asset” for the regime, which employed the politicization of reli-

gious antagonisms along the Shite/Sunni divide as a means of its

repressive rule (cf. Goldsmith 2013).

The sectarianization of Syrian foreign policy has been a prede-

cessor for what Carpenter, with reference to an article by Halil

Karaveli, declared to be a regional geopolitical sectarian feud

(Carpenter 2013: 5). In his essay, Karaveli critically assessed the

Turkish policy of regime change in Syria. According to him, the

Turkish government ventured into a form of Sunni sectarian

TURMOIL IN THE LEVANT 201

foreign policy along with Saudi Arabia and Qatar that has been

unprecedented in Turkish republican history (Karaveli 2012). In an

essay for Foreign Affairs, to take another example, Soner Cagaptay

and Marc Sievers analyzed the “great game” between Turkey and

Egypt. They argue that Ankara and Cairo posture themselves as

championing the Sunni cause, in this way pursuing their regional

hegemonic ambitions in the Middle East through sectarian means

(Cagaptay and Sievers 2015). However, Fred Lawson’s chapter

clearly indicates the dilemma that the Turkish government has to

face when engaging in this game of regional sectarian geopolitics.

Lawson describes the foreign policy shifts of the Turkish govern-

ment due to developments in the Syrian war. In light of conflicting

interests with regard to foreign policy aims such as regime change

in Damascus, support for Sunni resistance groups, and obstruct-

ing any form of Kurdish autonomy, the Turkish government made

shifting overtures to Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar at different

points in time.

These varying and to a certain degree paradoxical alignments of

Turkey with Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar might also add support

to Peter Seeberg’s argument that we can observe a transformation

in power in the Arab world. When analyzing the sanctions of the

Arab League and Turkey against Syria, Seeberg interprets the impo-

sition of these sanctions as an indicator for the fact that the GCC

(Gulf Cooperation Council) countries under the leadership of Saudi

Arabia have taken over the previous position of “traditional” Arab

power centers such as Cairo or Baghdad. Consequently, the sanctions

regime together with the foreign policy advances of regional states

might be seen as an ongoing shift in hegemony with regard to the

balance of power in the Levant. Indirectly, this geopolitical shift is

further corroborated by the conclusions drawn in the two chapters

on Palestine. Both Martin Beck and Lorenzo Kamel argue that the

Israeli-Palestinian conflict has developed a logic of its own, setting

it apart from other political fault lines in the region. Indeed, in the

current geopolitics of the region the championing of sectarian causes

seemingly has superseded that of the Palestinian cause.

The sectarianization of the Syrian war, the failure of sanctions

against the Assad regime by the United States, the EU, and the Arab

League, and the relative isolation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

in this current turmoil in the Levant turn our attention toward

the complex ways in which local, regional, and international levels

interlace in the political developments of the region. In his chap-

ter on Western policies toward Palestinian statehood, for instance,

202 DIETRICH JUNG

Martin Beck emphasizes the enormously high degree of interference

by international and regional actors in the Israeli-Palestinian con-

flict. With reference to Carl Brown, Beck stresses the significant role

that this conflict has played in making the Middle East one of the

most penetrated regions of the world. Taking his historical point of

departure in the decline of the Ottoman Empire, Carl Brown devel-

oped a model of relationships for the emerging Middle East. This

model, the “Eastern Question System,” he based on some character-

istic patterns of interaction among regional actors and the states of

the international system. According to the Eastern Question System,

the European states found in the Middle East a convenient arena to

fight out their own rivalries with little risk, whereas regional actors

instrumentalized the great powers to their own ends. The logic of

this center-periphery struggle led to a relatively high confusion of

international and local politics, which Brown expressed in the thesis

of the systemic characteristic of the Eastern Question System that

no outside state has been able to dominate and organize the Middle

East, just as no state from within has been able to do so either (Brown

1984: 270–74).

Once established in the nineteenth century, this systemic relation-

ship, according to Brown, developed further during the twentieth

century. In the process of decolonization, it became a major pattern

of interaction among Middle Eastern states and of their integration

into international politics. Whereas in the chapters by Martin Beck

and Lorenzo Kamel this model by Carl Brown partly resonates with

respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the other chapters in this

volume seem to confirm Brown’s thesis regarding the war in Syria. In

light of the strong power asymmetry in the Israeli-Palestinian con-

flict, Beck argues along the lines of Brown that the conflict pos-

sibly would have been “solved” to the advantage of Israel without

the continuing interference of external powers. 8 The chapters by Fred

Lawson and Samer Abboud show the ways in which in the Syrian war

the complex confusion of local, regional, and international levels has

so far prevented both the resurgence of the power of the Assad regime

and the victory of its opponents. Rather this confusion of interests

has contributed largely to the continuation of war and the increasing

fragmentation of the warring groups. Under the rules of interaction

of the Eastern Question System, a successful transformation of one of

Abboud’s new authorities from a protection racket into a viable state

is hardly to be expected. Instead, the four years of the Syrian war

have been proof of an interaction pattern that suits the perpetuation

of violence.

TURMOIL IN THE LEVANT 203

War Making and State Making in the Contemporary Levant

I have previously argued against the predictive power of the social

sciences and humanities and stick to this position in my final reflec-

tions (Jung 2011b and 2014). This last section, therefore, will give a

temporary, speculative, and subjective assessment on the turmoil in

the Levant based on the analytical perspective I have derived from

historical sociology and the discussion of the selected findings from

the chapters of this book. Given the fact that this is an assessment of

a complex situation in flux, these conclusions necessarily will remain

both inconclusive and of a very tentative character.

In this chapter, I departed from Jillian Schwedler’s question about

the organizational character of the IS, more precisely, whether we can

equate the IS with a state-building process or should consider it as a

mere jihadist terror organization. Through the analytical lenses pro-

vided by Charles Tilly and based on the empirical observations of Fred

Lawson and Samer Abboud, I can fully endorse the position of Volker

Perthes. Indeed, we should understand the rise of the IS in terms of a

jihadist state-building project. The organization has advanced signifi-

cantly with regard to the bureaucratization of its means of coercion,

the ideologization of its actions, the territorialization of its rule, and

the diversification of its economic means (cf. Hashim 2014; Lister

2014). Yet the Islamic State is not the only organization in the Syrian

war that has displayed a gradual move from being a mere protection

racket to a proto-state. In the Syrian war economy, mechanisms of

extraction and protection have been visible in the rise of a number of

competitors to the IS, along the abstract continuum from the ideal

types of protection racket to state. In looking at the Syrian war at

the beginning of 2015, the IS, the Kurdish state project of Rojava,

and the Assad regime represent the most important cases in point. 9

Yet can we expect any of them to develop into “real” states? Do the

observable state-building projects indicate a more fundamental trans-

formation of the state system in the Levant?

At this point in time, I would tentatively answer this question with

no. With regard to the regional political landscape, this turmoil in

the Levant most likely will result in the eventual reestablishment of a

Syrian state within its prewar borders. With its transnationalist, jiha-

dist ideology, the IS has successfully achieved a sort of legitimacy

among its followers, in particular in attracting foreign fighters. 10

The leadership of the IS publicly announced its rejection of the

political boundaries once established after World War I and, at least

204 DIETRICH JUNG

temporarily, transgressed one of them with the proclamation of its

Caliphate in parts of Syria and Iraq (Hashim 2014: 78). Yet the ter-

ritorial rule of the IS largely rests on coercive means. The temporal

and fragmented support that the IS enjoys from parts of the Sunni

population seems to be due to the highly sectarianized nature of the

war rather than being a genuine expression of the legitimacy of its

jihadist state-building project. With regard to the Syrian population

under its territorial control, it is therefore hardly to be expected that

the IS will be able to enhance the legitimacy of its rule. In Iraq, the

IS has been able to strengthen its position due to the economic and

political marginalization of Sunni Iraqis under the Maliki govern-

ment. Furthermore, Iraq’s Sunni-Arab population has been subject

to random violence and kidnappings by paramilitary Shiite groups

such as the Iraqi al-Badr militia. 11 Being caught between the violence

perpetrated by the IS and Shiite militias close to the state, for many

Sunni Iraqis the sectarian choice of the IS might be the better of two

bad alternatives. However, any allegiance to the IS ideology by col-

laborating Sunni tribes, parts of Iraq’s Sunni population, and former

Baath military personal appears to be more a means of temporary

expediency than of ideologically grounded conviction.

In contradistinction to the IS, the Kurdish organizations seem

to rest on relatively broad popular legitimacy. They rule by consent

rather than by the gun. The combination of effective governance with

strong nationalist ideological underpinnings sustains the organiza-

tional achievements of their state building projects. Yet both the IS

and the Kurds face the problem of international recognition. In stark

contrast to the European experience, state building in the Middle

East and other regions of the postcolonial world did not take place

in the absence of any superordinate power structure. Middle Eastern

states evolved within the framework of an existing international sys-

tem. Firmly established norms of interaction and the interest of pow-

erful states have constrained the aspirations of Middle Eastern state

makers. From its outset, modern state making in the Middle East was

dominated by the European state system. Thus the Middle Eastern

state system has not been allowed to operate by the same mechanisms

as state formation in Europe (Lustick 1997). The system of sanctions

against Syria and the influence of regional states on the protection

rackets that have emerged in the Syrian war are ample proof for this

very different context in which Middle Eastern state building works.

Moreover, in the contemporary world, successful state making heav-

ily depends on mutual recognition as a like-unit by other states. In

particular the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has frequently shown the

TURMOIL IN THE LEVANT 205

crucial role of this issue of recognition for any nationalist movement

in the region.

The jihadist ideology of the state-building project of the IS and its

aspiration to establish an Islamic Caliphate transcending the existing

state borders of the international system clearly undermines any expec-

tation of international recognition per se. At the same time, the trans-

nationalist ideological rhetoric of the Caliphate partly contradicts its

attempts to consolidate territorial rule. Ironically, the strength of the

IS’s ideological underpinnings, its transnationalist appeal, weakens its

aspirations to become a state through the control over territory and

people. The defiant position of the IS with regard to the rules of the

society of states is also reflected in the fact that the members of the

society of states almost unanimously view the IS as a terror organiza-

tion. The term “terror organization” therefore not only relates to the

brutal military strategies of the IS, but also epitomizes the complete

refusal of other states to consider the IS as a like-unit.

The Kurdish state-building project faces the fierce resistance of

neighboring states such as Turkey and Iran, as well as the general

reluctance of the society of states to accept “new members.” In terms

of institution building, infrastructure, and political economy, the

Kurdish Regional Government in northern Iraq has resembled a via-

ble state for years. From the analytical perspective of historical sociol-

ogy, the Kurdish state-building process has gone successfully through

processes of the cumulative bureaucratization of coercion and the

centrifugal ideologization, which according to Sinisa Malesevic char-

acterize the successful formation of modern national states. Moreover,

in the battle for Kobani, Kurds from different areas and countries

showed the kind of micro-solidarity that links processes of institution

building with the construction of individual identities in Malesevic’s

theory of state building. Yet, so far, any recognition of the Kurdish

Regional Government as a like-unit by the international community

has been ruled out. There is no immediate reason why this situation

should change, although the Kurdish resistance against the IS might

in future be rewarded in the form of autonomy schemes and federal

arrangements within the boundaries of existing states. There is no

doubt that the war in Syria has severely challenged international bor-

ders in the region. Yet for the time being, we might not expect that it

will draw them anew.

Having the major findings of the chapters of this book in mind,

I argue that the current turmoil in the Levant seems to be part of

a larger but gradual social and geopolitical transformations in the

region. These transformations have been under way for more than

206 DIETRICH JUNG

three decades and, historically, we might find their origins in the

late 1970s. The Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Soviet occupation

of Afghanistan, and the Camp David Peace Treaty between Israel

and Egypt mark historical events that indicate structural changes in

both the social fabric of regional states and the relationship among

them. The Arab Spring and its aftermath show patterns, which grad-

ually have evolved since and in relation to these crucial events: the

increase of popular unrest against despotic regimes, the Islamization

of this political resistance, the transnationalization of Islamist mil-

itancy, a shift in the regional balance of power toward the Gulf,

and the decreasing role of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in domi-

nating Middle Eastern geopolitics. 12 In the analysis of the evolution

of the IS “from al-Qaeda affiliate to Caliphate” by Ahmed Hashim

(Hashim 2014), these larger regional patterns are clearly detectable

as the contextual framework for the organization’s rise. In this sense,

the Islamic State indeed does not represent a cause but a symptom of

the ongoing social, economic, and political changes in the Levant.

These transformative developments have been accompanied by a

series of wars with their origin in the geopolitical alteration of the

Gulf region. The First Gulf War between the Islamic Republic of Iran

and Iraq (1980–88), the subsequent occupation of Kuwait by Saddam

Hussein’s troops (1990), the Second Gulf War, that is, the liberation

of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation by an international alliance (1991),

the low-intensity warfare with which the United States and Great

Britain maintained the non-flight zones over Iraq, the US-led military

occupation of Iraq (2003), and the rise of the IS from an Iraqi jihad-

ist organization to a major player in the Syrian war (2014) are inher-

ently connected with each other. Moreover, the political economy of

the Syrian war inherited firmly established routes and agents of illicit

trades in the region. The new sanctions against Damascus mark the

continuation of decades of economic boycott measures that were at

the heart of Washington’s policy toward Syria and its double con-

tainment policies against Iraq and Iran. These decades of economic

sanctions have strongly contributed to the emergence of a thriving

shadow economy in the region whose illicit trades connect countries

such as Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria.

To be sure, the historical contingencies of both international pol-

itics and the war on the ground rule out any firm prediction about

the future course of events in the Levant. However, looking at the

fragmentation of political authority and the war economy in Syria and

partly in Iraq, it might be instructive to take the lessons of other so-

called new wars into account. Based on her work on the dissolution

TURMOIL IN THE LEVANT 207

of former Yugoslavia, Mary Kaldor coined the concept of “new wars,”

reflecting statistically grounded observations of a transformation of

warfare since the end of World War II. A number of different sur-

veys have shown that forms of classical warfare between states have

been almost completely replaced by various types of intra-state or civil

wars. 13 According to Kaldor, this transformation of war is due to global

forces that have dissolved the previously valid categories of political

order. In these new wars, physical force predominantly appears as

a predatory means for armed groups such as warlord-led militias,

criminal gangs, terror organizations, or independently acting state

security units to blur the distinctions between war, massive human

rights violations, and organized crime (Kaldor 1999: 70). Clearly,

Mary Kaldor’s concept of new wars resembles largely Charles Tilly’s

analogy of war making and state making with organized crime. The

contemporary war in Syria fits neatly into this picture of new wars.

The current turmoil in the Levant, therefore, might repeat the fate of

other violent conflicts in Africa, Asia, or Europe. With the exception

of former Yugoslavia, most of these new wars ended after long periods

of rampant violence with the exhaustion of resources and in the sub-

sequent reconstruction of an often fragile status quo ante.

Notes

1 . The “Islamic State” (IS) has had different names during its evolu-

tion. In this chapter I only apply IS as the name which the organiza-

tion has used to refer to itself since the establishment of its so-called

Caliphate in Syria and Iraq in June 2014.

2 . Perthes Volker (2014) Viel mehr als eine Terrormiliz, S ü ddeutsche

Zeitung , September 25.

3 . Naseef Naeem and Daniel Gerlach: Der ‘Islamische Staat‘ und

Staatlichkeit. Die neue S-Klasse, Zenith, October 2, 2014.

4 . For more elaborated versions of this theoretical perspective based on

historical sociology, see Jung 2011a (Chapter 3) and Jung, Petersen,

and Sparre 2014 (Chapter 2).

5 . In The Passing of Traditional Society, Daniel Lerner (1958) suggested

that modernization is a systemic process in which all contemporary

societies are more or less involved. In this paradigmatic book of clas-

sical modernization theory, Lerner claimed that a basic model of

modernization is at the heart of the modern social transformation.

In his understanding, modernization is based on a specific societal

model supposed to reappear in all modernizing societies regardless

of their cultural differences. Locating the origin of this model in the

West, Lerner metaphorically concluded that the West is what “the

Middle East seeks to become” (Lerner 1958: 47).

208 DIETRICH JUNG

6 . The Carter Centre in Atlanta frequently publishes a “Syria

Countrywide Conflict Report,” which presents an updated account

on the various groups and alliances active on the ground, see: www.

cartercenter.org , last accessed January 31, 2015.

7 . The Rojava website can be found under www.rojavareport.world-

press.com , last accessed January 31, 2015.

8 . Brown argued that the systemic characteristic of the Eastern Question

System is reflected in the fact that all Arab-Israeli confrontations have

been stopped by international diplomatic intervention, yet so far out-

side intervention has not been able to bring about real peace (Brown

1984: 241).

9 . With regard to the Assad regime, we would be better served to talk

about a re-building process after the Syrian state has deteriorated,

largely losing its domestic and international legitimacy and increas-

ingly acting like a mere protection racket.

10 . In March 2015, the International Centre for the Study of

Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) at King’s College in

London estimated the number of foreign fighters among IS mili-

tias to be above 20,000 of which about 20 percent were recruited

in Western Europe, see: http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-

total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-

1980s/ , last accessed January 31, 2015.

11 . Human Rights Watch regularly provides documentation on the vio-

lence against Iraq’s Sunni population on its homepage: www.hrw.

org , last accessed January 31, 2015.

12 . To a certain extent the chapters on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

by both Martin Beck and Lorenzo Kamel document this relative

marginalization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with regard to the

regional map of conflict. While the conflict is still an important issue

in international politics, since the Arab Spring, this conflict has not

really contributed to enhancing the turmoil in the Levant. Not only

was the impact of the uprisings on the Palestinian population limited,

as Martin Beck argues, but also the Gaza War in July 2014 and the

simultaneous jihadist struggle in Syria remained disconnected.

13 . For some statistical surveys, see the data sets produced by the respec-

tive research units at the universities of Uppsala (Eriksson et al. (2003),

Gleditsch et al. (2002) and Hamburg (Gantzel and Schwinghammer

2000).

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Contributors

Samer N. Abboud is an Associate Professor of International Studies

at Arcadia University in Glenside, Pennsylvania. Samer has written

extensively on the Syrian conflict and in 2013 was a fellow at the

German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. He

is the coauthor (with Benjamin J. Muller) of Rethinking Hizballah:

Authority, Legitimacy, Violence (Ashgate).

Martin Beck holds a chair of Contemporary Middle East Studies at the

University of Southern Denmark in Odense. He taught, researched,

and worked as a political advisor in Germany (T ü bingen, Hamburg,

and Bremen), the Middle East (Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and

Iraq), and the United States (Denver, Colorado). He has published

extensively both in German and English on Middle Eastern affairs.

His main current research interests are the recent Arab Uprisings,

the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, international oil politics, and interna-

tional relations of the Middle East. His latest publications and activi-

ties can be found at http://www.sdu.dk/staff/mbeck .

Mervat F. Hatem is Professor of Political Science at Howard University,

Washington, DC. She is author of Literature, Gender and Nation-

Building in Nineteenth Century Egypt, the Life and Works of A’isha

Taymur (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). Her new book project deals with

the comparative study of the gender politics of national (1952) and

postcolonial (2011) revolutions in Egypt. Recent publications on the

2011 revolution include “Gender and Revolution in Egypt” Middle

East Report (Winter 2011) and “Gender and Counterrevolution in

Egypt” Middle East Report (Fall 2013); “Postcoloniality and the

Gender Narratives of the January 25, 2011 Revolution in Egypt,”

On Shifting Ground, Muslim Women in the Global Era , ed. Fereshteh

Nouraie-Simone (New York: Feminist Press, 2014).

Simone H ü ser has been a Research Fellow and Project Coordinator

at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Amman, Jordan, from 2011

until 2014. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from

the University of Bremen, Germany, and graduated with a Master’s

212 CONTRIBUTORS

degree in International Security from the University of Kent, United

Kingdom, in 2011. Simone H ü ser is currently working as a Consultant

in Berlin with a focus on Middle Eastern politics. Her last publication

entitled “Jordan and the Arab Spring: No Challenge, No Change?,”

which she coauthored together with Martin Beck, was published in

January 2015 in Middle East Critique (24/1).

Dietrich Jung is a Professor and Head of Department at the Center for

Contemporary Middle East Studies, University of Southern Denmark.

He holds a Master’s degree in Political Science and Islamic Studies,

as well as a PhD from the Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences,

University of Hamburg, Germany, and has large field experience in

the Muslim world. His most recent books are Orientalists, Islamists

and the Global Public Sphere: A Genealogy of the Modern Essentialist

Image of Islam (Sheffield: Equinox, 2011), and The Politics of Modern

Muslim Subjectivities: Islam, Youth and Social Activism in the Middle

East , together with Marie Juul Petersen and Sara Lei Sparre (New

York: Palgrave, 2014).

Lorenzo Kamel is a historian at Bologna University’s History

Department and a postdoctoral fellow (2014/2015) at Harvard

University’s Center for Middle Eastern Studies. He is the author of

four books, including Imperial Perceptions of Palestine (I.B. Tauris,

2015), and about 20 articles on national and international academic

journals such as the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Peace

and Change, Eurasian Studies, New Middle Eastern Studies, Passato

e Presente, Oriente Moderno. His last project, “Arab Spring and

Peripheries,” edited with Daniela Huber, is forthcoming as a special

issue with Mediterranean Politics.

Fred H. Lawson is a Professor of Government at Mills College

in Oakland, California. He is the author of Global Security Watch

Syria (Praeger, 2013) and editor of Demystifying Syria (Saqi, 2009).

With Morten Valbj ø rn, he is the coeditor of the four-volume series

International Relations of the Middle East (Sage, 2015).

Peter Seeberg is Associate Professor at the Centre for Contemporary

Middle East Studies, University of Southern Denmark. He is also

the Director of Danish Jordanian University Cooperation ( www.

djuco.org ), an academic cooperation project in Amman, Jordan,

since 2009 funded by the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His

most recent publications are (2015, Guest Editor, Special Issue)

“The EU and the Post-Arab Spring,” Middle East Critique , 24 (1)

(London: Routledge); coedited with Zaid Eyadat (2013) Migration,

CONTRIBUTORS 213

Security, and Citizenship in the Middle East: New Perspectives (New

York: Palgrave Macmillan). His articles appeared, among others, in

British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Democracy and Security,

Democratization, European Foreign Affairs Review, Mediterranean

Politics, Middle East Critique, Middle East Policy .

Peter Sluglett is Director of the Middle East Institute at the National

University of Singapore. Previously he was Professor of Middle Eastern

History at the University of Utah, Salt Lake City. He is the coauthor

(with Marion Farouk-Sluglett) of Iraq since 1958: From Revolution

to Dictatorship , 3rd edition (I.B. Tauris, 2001), author of Britain

in Iraq: Contriving King and Country (Columbia University Press,

2007), coeditor of The British and French Mandates in Comparative

Perspective/Les mandats fran ç ais et anglais dans une perspective com-

parative (Brill, 2003), and editor of The Urban Social History of the

Middle East, 1750–1950 (Syracuse University Press, 2008). His most

recent publication (with the cartographer Andrew Currie) is An Atlas

of Islamic History (Routledge, 2014).

Index

Abbas, Mahmud, 167, 175–6, 178

Abdullah, Öcalan, 20

Abu Fadl al-Abbas Brigade, 15

Abu Marzouk, Mousa, 157

Abu-Jihad Center for the Prisoner

Movement, 160n8

Abunimah, Ali, 156, 157

Afghanistan, 65, 66, 206

Afrin (Syria), 14, 16, 20, 21, 71

aid organisations, 92, 94, 136

see also B’Tselem

Ain al-Arab (Kobani, Syria), 14, 16,

17, 20, 71, 199, 205

Ajloun (Jordan), 82, 84, 85

Alawi sect, 40, 41, 45–7, 50, 200

see also Shiis

Aleppo (Syria), 14, 16, 21, 47, 49,

50, 59, 60

All That Remains (Khalidi), 152

Amal (political party), 46–7

Amery, Leo, 147

Anatolia, 16, 17, 18, 20, 26

anti-Shiism, 3–4, 39, 40, 47, 48,

124, 199, 200

Arab League

the PLO and, 174

political reform and, 128–9

sanctions on Syria and, 6, 101,

103–4, 113, 114–16, 117,

118

Arab Spring. See Arab Uprisings

Arab Uprisings (2010–11), 1,

48–50, 57, 123, 206

in Egypt, 6–7, 8, 49, 50, 59, 126

Jordan and, 5, 93

regional power balance and, 102

sectarianism and, 148

social exclusion and, 124–7

in Syria, 6–7, 48–50, 57, 59–60,

102, 123–4, 126, 199

and women, 130–1

in Tunisia, 6–7, 49, 59, 126, 137

the West Bank and, 167

women and, 130

see also constitutions

Arafat, Yasir, 181

archaeology, 153–4

archives, 151–3

Armenians, 26

army, Syrian, 41, 49, 101, 117, 128,

197

defections from, 60, 111

Army of Islam (Syria), 14

see also Islamic Front

Army of Justice (Iran), 19

Army of the Men of the

Naqshbandi Order, 23

Ashqar, Mahmoud, 151

Ashrawi, Hanan, 152

al-Assad, Bashar, 51, 59, 125

calls to step down, 109, 113, 114,

116

al-Assad, Hafiz, 3, 41, 46, 125

al-Assad, Maher, 109, 115

Asseburg, Muriel, 173

Assistance Front for the People of

Syria (JN), 13, 14, 19, 20,

21, 39, 61, 69, 71, 72–3, 74,

200

recruitment in Jordan, 91

Avnery, Uri, 155

Awakenings (al-Sahawat), 22

Azaz (Syria), 16, 17

Azerbaijan, 19, 26

216 INDEX

Baath Party

in Iraq, 23

in Syria, 41, 42, 128, 197, 200

Baczko, Adam, 67, 72

Badr Organization, 22, 25

Bagdad, 23, 24

Bahour, Sam, 161n12

Bahrain, 57

see also Gulf States

Bakonyi, Jutta, 63, 67

Baldwin, David A., 105

Balfour, Arthur, 147

Baluchistan (Iran), 19

Bands of the People of Truth, 15,

22, 23

Barghouti, Mustafa, 154

al-Barghouti, Tamim, 148

Barnett, Michael, 172

Bartlett, William Henry, 150

Barzani, Mas’ud, 18

Battalions of the Free of Syria, 14

see also Islamic Front

Battalions of the Party of God, 22,

23

see also Hizbullah

Bennett, Naftali, 157

Benvenisti, Meron, 150

Biblical Orientalism, 7, 149, 150–1

bin Laden, Osama, 109

Blake, William, 149

Blumenthal, Max, 157

borders

colonial (status quo), 147–8,

159n3, 183, 205

Iraq–Syria, 26, 58

Lebanon–Syria, 66

Syria–Jordan, 81

Syria–Turkey, 13, 15, 16, 17, 20,

58, 113

trade, 64, 66, 67

Bouazizi, Mohammed, 126

Bouris, Dimitris, 162n21

Bronstein, Eitan, 153

Brown, Carl, 169, 202

B’Tselem, 156, 163n28

Buckley, Caitlin Alyce, 103–4

bureaucratization, 193, 195, 196,

197, 198, 205

Bush, George W., 107

Cabral, Amílcar, 156

Carpenter, Ann, 70, 199, 200

Center for Palestine Studies

(Columbia), 153

chemical weapons, 110, 112–13,

118

Chesterman, Simon, 105–6

China, 6, 53n25, 104, 105, 111,

115, 117, 118

Chomsky, Noam, 156

Christians, 13, 16, 124, 147–8

Anatolian Armenians, 26

citizenship. See rights

Cizire (Syria), 199

coercion, and state making, 193–5,

197–8, 203–4

Cold War, 175

colonialism

borders and, 147–8, 149

British, 149–50, 169, 173–4

French, 40–1, 46, 173, 174

Israeli-Palestinian conflict and,

167–70

see also Biblical Orientalism

Commandos (anti-Islamist militia),

20

Congo, 65

Congress for the Republic (Tunisia),

137

consequentialism, 170

and Palestinian statehood, 9, 179,

181, 182, 183

constitutions

Egyptian, 6–7, 131–7, 138, 139,

141–2

Syrian, 6–7, 127–30, 197, 141–2

Tunisian, 6–7, 137–41, 141–2

see also dignity; rights

Constructivism, 170

and Palestinian statehood, 9, 172,

177–8, 182

Cooper, Neil, 66

INDEX 217

councils, and Syrian opposition,

68–9

courts, and Syrian opposition, 65,

68, 69–70, 71, 72

criminality, 66, 67, 74, 198, 204

organized crime, 192–4

Syrian refugees and, 90–1

see also predatory networks

Croatia, 44–5, 199

see also Yugoslavia

Czech Republic, 177

Danforth, Nick, 147–8

Daraa (Syria), 53n22, 59, 126

Daud Brigade, 15

Dawn of Islam Movement, 14

see also Syrian Islamic Front

defections, from Syrian Army, 60,

111

Deir ez-Zor (Syria), 13, 16, 17, 20,

59

democracy

bureaucratization and, 193

democracies and non-liberal

states, 161n14

Egypt as, 7, 132, 133, 134

lack of, 1, 49, 94, 113

Palestinian territories and, 177–8

as shared Israel-US norm, 172

Tunisia as, 138, 139

see also Arab Uprisings;

constitutions; dignity; rights

Democratic Union Party (PYD), 13,

14, 18, 19, 26, 58, 61, 64,

69, 71, 74–5, 197

see also Kurds; Syria

dignity, 6–7, 123–4, 126–7, 132–3,

134, 138, 140, 141

see also constitutions; democracy;

rights

Diyala (Iraq), 22, 23, 25

Diyarbakir (Turkey), 18

Doumani, Beshara, 150

Drezner, Daniel, 105, 106–7

Droz-Vincent, Philippe, 63

Druze, 46, 159n2

“Eastern Question System,” 202,

208n8

see also Brown, Carl

Eban, Abba, 158

education, of Syrian refugees in

Jordan, 85–6

Efrine (Syria), 199

Egypt

Arab Uprisings and, 6–7, 8, 49,

50, 59, 126

assassination of Sadat, 47

Islamism in, 131, 135, 136, 137

Muslim Brethren, 52n18, 132

Israel and, 168, 173–4, 206

Jordan and, 84, 89–90

Muslim Brethren in, 52n18, 132

reforms, 6–7, 126, 131–7, 138,

139, 141–2

privatization in, 43, 125

Syria and, 45

Turkey and, 201

Eilat, 158

Elias, Norbert, 195

Elliott, Kimberly Ann, 105

Eltakatol (party), 137

embargoes, 106, 108, 109, 111–12

see also sanctions

energy, 89–90

see also oil

Ennahda (party), 137, 140

Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 17, 18, 21,

114

ethnic identity, 45

see also nationalism; sectarianism;

state building

European Union

Palestinian statehood and, 8–9,

176–7, 178, 179

sanctions on Syria, 6, 101, 102,

103, 106, 107–13, 16, 117,

118, 119n2, 119n3, 206

Fallujah (Iraq), 21–2, 23, 26

families, 129–30, 135–7, 139–40, 142

patriarchy, 125–6

see also marriage; patriarchy; women

218 INDEX

al-Faruq Battalions, 14

Fatah, 162n21, 170

see also Palestinian Authority

al-Fattah, Kamal Abd, 152

Fayyad, Salam, 174, 177–8

Filiu, Jean-Pierre, 112

financing of conflict, 65–6, 67

see also criminality; predatory

networks; war economy

Finnemore, Martha, 173

Foursan al-Haq Brigade, 69

France

arms embargo in Syria, 108

colonialism, 40–1, 46, 173, 174

Israeli-Palestinian conflict and,

8–9, 177, 179, 183

Free Syrian Army (FSA), 14, 15, 49,

60, 69, 71, 196

Gaddafi, Muammar, 126

Gagnon, Victor, 44–5

Gause, Gregory, 26

Gaza, 1, 156, 162n21, 185n9,

186n23

Gaza War (2014), 8, 208

see also Israeli-Palestinian conflict

gender. See women

Gerlach, Daniel, 191

Germany, 8–9, 177, 178, 179, 183

al-Ghanouchi, Sheikh Rachid, 139

Gildas, 159–60n4

Giumelli, Francesco, 111–12, 118

Glick, Caroline, 156

Goldsmith, Leon, 200

Gorran movement, 18

governance

alternative in Syria, 4–5, 61,

70–4, 197–8

micro-governance, 58, 64–5,

67–70

war economy, 61, 63–7

Gramsci, Antonio, 159

Gul, Abdullah, 16, 19

Gulen movement, 18, 19

Gulf States

émigré workers in, 43

increased power, 6, 118, 201, 206

Jordan’s energy supply, 90

Syria and, 102–3, 114–16, 118

tensions with Iran, 47

see also Bahrain; Qatar; Saudi

Arabia

Haddad, Fanar, 44

Halabi, Rabah, 153

Hama (Syria), 17, 59

uprising (1982), 3, 9, 25, 47

Hamas, 157, 162n21, 169, 170,

171, 174, 184

see also Gaza; Israeli-Palestinian

conflict

Hamdallah, Rami, 154

al-Hasakah (Syria), 13, 14, 16, 17,

20, 59, 197–8

Hashim, Ahmed, 203, 204, 206

Hawks of Syria, 14

see also Islamic Front

Heacock, Roger, 153, 154, 161n13

Hebron, 185n9

Heydemann, Steven, 115

Hizbullah (Party of God), 15, 21,

25, 46, 47, 51, 103, 118, 200

condemned by EU, 108, 110

“Holy Land,” 149, 150–1

see also Biblical Orientalism;

Israel; Palestinian territories

Homs (Syria), 17, 47, 50, 92

honor killings, 130, 137

al-Husayni, Amin, 46

Ibn Taymiyya, 46, 48, 200

Ibrahim Pasha, 148, 159n2

ideologicalization, 195, 196, 197,

198, 205

Idlib (Syria), 16, 20, 69–70, 72

imperialism, and Israeli-Palestinian

conflict, 167, 169–70

Institute of Palestine Studies, 160n7

internet, 161n12

Iran

1979 Revolution, 39, 40, 148,

206

INDEX 219

Azerbaijan and, 26

Gulf States and, 47

Hizbullah and, 200

Iraq and, 3, 23, 24, 25, 26

Iran–Iraq War, 48, 206

Kurds and, 3, 19, 23, 24, 25–6, 205

shadow economy and, 206

Sunnis in, 19

Syria and, 46–7, 51, 57, 115

Turkey and, 18–19, 25–6

Iraq, 1

invasion of (2003), 102, 148,

179, 206

Iran and, 3, 23, 24, 25, 26

Iran–Iraq War, 48, 206

Iraqi refugees, 93

Kurds in, 64, 124, 205

Peshmerga, 17, 20, 23, 25

privatization in, 43

sectarian conflict in, 2, 4, 21–5,

43–4, 45, 199, 204

shadow economy and, 206

Shiis in, 20, 23, 24, 39

Sunni extremism in, 47, 49

Islamic State in, 1, 4, 21–5, 26,

51, 184, 197, 198, 204

Syria and, 15–16, 26, 45, 58,

103, 118

refugees from, 102

see also Islamic State; Kurdistan

Regional Government

(KRG)

Irbid (Jordan), 81, 82, 84, 85, 86,

88, 91

IS/ISIL/ISIS. See Islamic State

Islamic Army of Iraq, 22

Islamic Front (Hawks of Syria

group), 14, 15, 61, 69

Islamic Front for the Liberation of

Syria, 14

Islamic Front in Syria (1980 group),

52n14

Islamic Group of Kurdistan, 18

Islamic Jihad, 47

Islamic State (IS/ISIL/ISIS), 4,

191–2, 206

as anti-Shii, 39, 200

Ibn Taymiyya and, 200

in Iraq, 1, 4, 21–5, 26, 51, 184,

197, 198, 204

in Jordan, 91, 93

name, 119n1, 207n1

in Saudi Arabia, 21

in Syria, 1, 2, 18–19, 51, 74, 112,

123–4, 130–1, 184, 197

areas under control of, 4, 13,

16–17, 49–50, 58, 61, 70,

198, 203, 204

condemned by EU, 110

fragmentation and, 14, 16, 26,

61, 69, 71, 72–3, 102

sanctions and, 117, 118

war economy and, 63, 64

Turkey and, 16–17

al-Zarqawi and, 48, 198

see also Islamism; Jihadism;

sectarianism

Islamism

in Egypt, 131, 132, 135, 136,

137

in Syrian conflict, 13, 14–15, 16,

17, 19, 20–3, 47, 49, 60–1,

102, 131

regional impact, 124, 125

“sexual Jihad” myth, 130

transnationalism of, 206

in Tunisia, 139, 140

welfare provision and, 125

in West Bank, 180

women’s rights and, 130–1, 135,

136, 137

see also Hamas; Islamic State;

Jihadism; religion, in

constitutions; sharia

Ismail, Salwa, 50

Ismailis, 46

Israel

archaeology and, 154

Palestinian memory and, 153

place names, 150, 160n6

regional conflicts and, 8, 9

Turkey and, 113, 114

220 INDEX

Israel—Continued

see also Israeli-Palestinian

conflict; Palestinians

Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 1, 8,

145, 154, 155–8, 159

eclipsed by Syria and Iraq, 192,

206

international context, 167–74,

202, 204–5, 208n8, 208n12

Palestinian statehood and, 167–8,

171, 172, 173, 180–2, 183,

202

Kerry Initiative, 179–80,

181–2

“Palestine 194,” 9, 172, 175,

177, 178, 179–80, 181, 182

state building, 174–5

UN and, 167, 172, 175–6

UNESCO and, 177

see also Fatah; Gaza; Hamas;

Israel; Jerusalem; “Palestine

194”; Palestine Liberation

Organization; Palestinian

Authority; Palestinians; West

Bank

Ivan, Paul, 111–12, 118

Jama’at al-Muslimin, 47

Jarabulus (Syria), 16

al-Jazeera (Syria), 71

Jerusalem

etymology, 160n6

status, 158, 185n9, 186n23

see also Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Jews, 147, 147–8

see also Israel; Israeli-Palestinian

conflict

Jihadism, 3, 5, 53n23, 130–1, 191,

203–4, 205, 206, 208n12

see also Islamic State; Islamism

Jordan

Arab Uprisings and, 5, 93

armistice with Israel, 163n29

education in, 86

energy supply, 89–90

invited onto GCC, 115

Islamic State and, 93

Syria and, 45, 47, 81, 90, 91–2,

93

Syrian refugees in, 79–80, 81,

82–3, 88–9, 91–4, 102

crime rates, 90–1

early marriage, 86–7

education sector, 85–6

employment, 83–4, 85, 86,

111

extremist recruitment among,

91

housing costs, 87–8, 92

unemployment in, 84–5

waste management, 89

Jubeh, Nazmi, 154

Kafr Nabel (Syria), 69–70

Kaldor, Mary, 207

Kana’nah, Sharif, 161n11

Kaplan, Flora, 153

Karaveli, Halil, 200–1

al-Kasasbeh, Moath, 93

Kassab (Syria), 14

Kerry, John, 110

Khalidi, Walid, 152

al-Khatib, Moaz, 115

Khoudary, Jawdat, 160n9

Khuzestan (Iran), 19

kinship. See families

Kirkuk (Syria), 22, 23, 24

Kobani. See Ain al-Arab

Kurdish Front, 16, 17

see also Kurds

Kurdish National Council (KNC),

14, 71

see also Kurds

Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP),

14, 17, 18, 24

see also Kurds

Kurdistan Regional Government

(KRG), 3

Iran and, 23, 24, 25–6, 205

Islamic State and, 51

PJAK and, 19

Turkey and, 18, 20, 25, 26, 205

INDEX 221

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),

18, 19, 20, 24

see also Kurds; Turkey

Kurds, 2

international recognition, 204,

205

in Iran, 3, 19, 23, 24, 25–6, 205

in Iraq, 64, 124, 205

Peshmerga, 17, 20, 23, 25

in Syria, 13, 16, 17, 26, 197–8

autonomous zone in, 14, 18,

71, 72, 197, 198–9, 203

in Turkey, 16, 17–18, 19,

20, 205

see also Democratic Union Party

(PYD); Kurdistan Regional

Government (KRG);

Kurdistan Workers’ Party

(PKK); Popular Protection

Units (YPG)

labor force. See unemployment

Laudati, Ann, 64

League of Arab States. See Arab

League

Lebanese Civil War, 39, 42

Lebanon, 2

arms smuggling from, 66

constitution, 148

PLO in, 171

sectarianism in, 44, 48

Syria and, 15–16, 41, 42, 43, 48,

103

Syrian refugees in, 79, 81, 85,

102

Leenders, Reinoud, 115

Lerner, Daniel, 196, 207n5

Les Troupes Spéciales du Levant

(TSL), 41

Lesch, David W., 109

Levant Front, 21

Liberalism, 170, 172, 179

Liberation Brigade, 19

Libya, 53n23, 53n25, 57, 103–4,

126

Liwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas, 110

Lloyd, David, 44, 199

Local Coordination Committees

(Syria), 60

Madaba (Jordan), 82, 85, 88

Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce, 115

Mafraq (Jordan), 81, 82, 84, 85,

86, 88, 89, 91, 92

Maghreb, 138

Mahmoud Darwish Museum, 152

Makdisi, Ussama, 44, 199

Makhlouf, Rami, 115

Malesevic, Sinisa, 10, 195–6, 205

al-Maliki, Nuri, 22, 23, 24

Maller, Tara, 105

Manbij (Syria), 17, 70, 73

Mardin (Turkey), 17, 20

market economies. See neoliberalism

Maronites, 159n2

marriage

delayed, 124, 125, 129

early, 86–7

al-Mathaf (Gaza), 152

Mearsheimer, John, 171, 172

Merkel, Angela, 178

modernization, 207n5

Morocco, invited onto GCC

Morris, Benny, 162n20

Morsi, Mohammed, 131, 138

Mubarak, Hosni, 126

museums, 153

see also archives

Musil (Iraq), 23, 26

see also Nineveh (Iraq)

Muslim Brethren, 47–8, 132

Muslim Brothers of the Islamic

Union of Kurdistan, 18

Naeem, Naseef, 191

Nassar, Issam, 160n7

nationalism, 8, 44

see also sectarianism; state

building

NATO, 103–4

Nawfal, Souad, 131

Naylor, R. T., 64

222 INDEX

Neighborhood Policy agreements

(EU), 101

neoliberalism, 43, 123, 124–5

Nepstad, Sharn Erickson, 111

Netanyahu, Benjamin, 180

Niblock, Tim, 105, 112

Nigde (Turkey), 16–17

Nineveh (Iraq), 22, 23

see also Musil (Iraq)

nongovernmental organizations,

92, 94, 136

“non-state complexes,” 70–1

Northern Ireland, 44, 199

Northern Storm Brigades, 66–7

Nour Party (Egypt), 131

Obama, Barack, 107, 109, 178, 181

oil

1980s price drop, 42

embargo, 106, 108, 109, 111–12

Turkey–KRG deal, 18

Önis, Ziya, 113, 114, 116, 118

organized crime, 192–4

see also criminality; predatory

networks

Ortelius, Abraham, 151

Ottoman Empire, 1–2, 46, 48, 148,

158–9

Pakistan, 48

“Palestine 194,” 9, 172, 175, 177,

178, 179–80, 181, 182

see also Israeli-Palestinian conflict

Palestine Exploration Fund, 149

see also archaeology

Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO), 168, 169, 170, 171,

174, 180, 181

palestineremembered.com, 152, 153

Palestinian Authority, 9, 154–5,

167, 175–6, 180, 183, 184

see also Fatah; Israeli-Palestinian

conflict; Palestine Liberation

Organization; Palestinians;

West Bank

Palestinian Digital Archive, 154

Palestinian Heritage Museum, 152

Palestinian National Council, 152

Palestinian statehood. See Israeli-

Palestinian conflict

Palestinians, 148–9

archives and, 151–3

Biblical Orientalism, 7, 149,

150–1

identity and, 7–8

refugees in Jordan, 93

see also Fatah; Gaza; Hamas;

Israel; Israeli-Palestinian

conflict; “Palestine 194”;

Palestine Liberation

Organization; Palestinian

Authority; state building;

West Bank

Pape, Robert A., 105

Party for the Free Life of Kurdistan

(PJAK), 19

Party of God. See Hizbullah

Party of the Call to Islam, 24

patriarchy, 125–6

see also families

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, 18

Persekian, Jack, 152

Perthes, Volker, 106, 203, 191

Peshmerga, 17, 20, 23, 25

see also Kurdistan Regional

Government

Phillips, Christopher, 114

place names, in Israel-Palestine,

150, 160n6

Poddera, Sukanya, 70, 71

Popular Movement, 22

Popular Protection Units (YPG),

13, 16–17, 18, 19, 20, 26,

197

see also Kurds

Pouligny, Béatrice, 105–6

predatory networks, 64, 65–6, 74

see also criminality

“process of simplification” in

Palestine, 148, 149

bottom-up, 151–5

top-down, 149–51

INDEX 223

protection rackets, 193

Pugh, Michael C., 66

Putnam, Robert, 168

al-Qaida, 109

al-Qamishli (Syria), 14, 16

Qatar, 21, 26, 49, 51, 102, 114

see also Gulf States

al-Quds Force, 110

al-Ramadi (Iraq), 21–2, 23, 26

Ramtha (Jordan), 91–2

Raqqa (Syria), 16, 17, 18–19, 20–1,

58, 63, 131, 198

Rationalist consequentialism. See

consequentialism

Realism, 172, 179

refugees, 5, 79

in Jordan, 79–80, 81, 82–3,

199–200

labor force and, 83–5, 111

religion, in constitutions, 142

Egypt’s, 133, 139

in Syria’s, 129–30

in Tunisia’s, 139

see also Islamism

Reno, William, 74

rights, 124, 141–2

in Egypt, 132, 133, 134, 135

in Syria, 127, 129

in Tunisia, 138, 140–1

of women, 129–30, 132–3,

135–7, 140–2

Rockefeller Museum, 153,

161–2n16

Rojava Project, 71, 199, 203

Rouhani, Hasan, 19

Rozana Association, 161n10

Russia, 6, 51, 104, 105, 111, 113,

115, 117, 118

sanctions against, 105

Saadeh, Antun, 42

Sadat, Anwar, 47

Said, Edward, 150

Said, Khaled, 126

Salafism, 3–4, 47–8

Salah al-Din (Syria), 22, 23

see also Tikrit

Saleh, Ali Abdallah, 126

Samarra (Iraq), 22, 23

sanctions, 104–7, 112

in Syria, 5–6, 116–18,

201, 204

Arab League, 6, 101, 103–4,

113, 114–16, 117, 118

EU and US, 6, 101, 102,

103, 106, 107–13, 117,

118, 119n2, 119n3,

119n4, 206

Turkey, 6, 113–14, 116, 117,

118

see also embargoes; Syria

Saudi Arabia, 25, 26, 51, 102–3

émigré workers in, 43

Islamic State in, 21

peace initiative (2002), 171

rise of political Shiism and, 39

Syria and, 45, 47, 57, 114

see also Gulf States

Schwedler, Jillian, 191, 203

sectarianism, 2–5, 9–10, 44, 49,

200–1

anti-Shiism, 3–4, 39, 40, 47, 48,

124, 199, 200

in Iraq, 2, 4, 21–5, 43–4, 45,

199, 204

in Lebanon, 44, 48

origins of, 148

in Syria, 9, 13, 39–40, 44, 47–8,

51, 198, 199

see also Islamism; social cohesion

Serbia, 44–5

see also Yugoslavia

settlements, Israeli, 156

sexual Jihad myth, 130

Shamkhani, Ali, 24

sharia, 69–70, 129–30

in Egypt, 134, 136

in Tunisia, 139

see also courts, and Syrian

opposition; Islamism

224 INDEX

Shiis, 147–8

anti-Shiism, 3–4, 39, 40, 47, 48,

124, 199, 200

in Iraq, 20, 23, 24, 39

Syrian conflict and, 13, 15, 16,

20

see also Alawi sect; Hizbullah;

Iran; sectarianism

Shikaki, Khalil, 157

al-Shirazi, Hasan, 46

al-Sistani, Grand Ayatollah Ali

al-Husaini, 23, 24

social cohesion, 91–3, 94

see also sectarianism

Social Constructivism. See

Constructivism

Souqour as-Sham Brigade, 69

South Africa, 104

Staniland, Paul, 62

state building, 10, 192

coercion and, 193–6, 197–8,

203–4

by Islamic State, 191, 203–4, 205

Stuvøy, Kirsti, 63, 67

Supporters of Islam Group, 22

Sweden, 177

Syria

alternative governance in, 4–5,

70–4, 197–8

fragmentation of, 14, 15–16,

57–9, 60–2, 64–5, 66,

67–70, 72–3, 196, 199

Kurdish autonomous zone,

13, 14, 18, 64, 71, 72, 197,

198–9, 203

Islamic-State controlled areas,

4, 13, 16–17, 49–50, 58, 61,

70, 198, 203, 204

regional implications, 74–5

war economy, 61, 63–7

Arab Uprisings and, 6–7, 48–50,

57, 59–60, 102, 123–4, 126,

199

and women, 130–1

Assad regime, 40–3, 51, 59, 125,

127–30, 196–7, 208n9

calls for Bashar to step down,

109, 113, 114, 116

Syrian Army, 41, 49, 60, 101,

1111, 117, 128, 197

unemployment, 125

constitution, 6–7, 127–30, 197,

141–2

Egypt and, 45

fighting in, 1, 2–3, 4, 13–25,

49–50, 101–2, 202, 207

Free Syrian Army (FSA), 14,

15, 49, 60, 69, 71, 196

Islamism and, 13, 14–15, 16,

17, 19, 20–3, 47, 49, 60–1,

102, 131

political economy of, 9–10,

197

sectarianism in, 9, 13, 39–40,

44, 47–8, 51, 198, 199

stalemate, 57–8

Gulf States and, 102–3, 114–16,

118

Saudi Arabia, 45, 47, 57, 114

historical background, 40–3

internal migration, 43, 50

Iran and, 46–7, 51, 57, 115

Iraq and, 15–16, 26, 45, 58, 102,

103, 118

Jordan and, 45, 47, 81, 90, 91–2,

93

Lebanon and, 15–16, 41, 42, 43,

48, 103

Palestinians and, 184

sanctions against, 5–6, 116–18,

201, 204

Arab League, 6, 101, 103–4,

113, 114–16, 117, 118

EU and US, 6, 101, 102, 103,

106, 107–13, 117, 118,

119n2, 119n3, 119n4, 206

Turkey, 6, 113–14, 116, 117,

118

shadow economy and, 206

torture in, 60, 126, 129, 132

see also Baath Party; borders; Islamic

State; Kurds; Syrian refugees

INDEX 225

Syrian Islamic Front, 14

Syrian National Coalition, 68

Syrian refugees, 79–80, 81,

82–4, 85–9, 91–4, 102,

111

Syrian Revolutionary Front (SRF),

14, 61, 66

Tal Abyad (Syria), 16

Tal Brak (Syria), 16

Tal Ma’ruf (Syria), 16

Taliban, 109

Tawhid Brigade, 67

Thiong’o, Ngũgĩwa, 151

Thomas, Andrew, 104, 105, 112

Thürer, Daniel, 61

Tikrit (Iraq), 22, 23, 26

Tilley, Charles, 10, 192–4, 196,

197, 203, 207

torture, 141–2

in Egypt, 7, 134

in Syria, 60, 126, 129, 132

in Tunisia, 140

Truth Brigade, 14

see also Islamic Front

Tunisia

Arab Uprisings and, 6–7, 49, 59,

126, 137

constitution, 137–41, 148

PLO in, 171

privatization in, 43, 125

unemployment in, 125

Turkey

Azerbaijan and, 19, 26

Egypt and, 201

Gulen movement, 18

Iran and, 3, 18–19, 25–6, 201

Islamic State attacks on, 16–17,

20

Israel and, 113, 114

Kurds in, 16, 17–18, 19, 20, 205

Kurdistan Regional

Government and, 18, 20, 25,

26, 205

Kurdistan Workers’ Party

(PKK), 18, 19, 20, 24

Qatar and, 21, 201

Saudi Arabia and, 21, 26, 201

shadow economy and, 206

Shiism and, 39

Syrian conflict and, 15–16, 20,

21, 49, 51, 114

ISIL and, 16, 64

PYD and, 64, 74–5

sanctions, 6, 113–14, 116, 117,

118

Syrian refugees in, 79, 85, 102

see also borders; Kurds; Ottoman

Empire

Turkomens, 13, 16

Twain, Mark, 158

Umm el-Fahm Art Gallery, 152

Umm Rashrash (Palestinian

village), 158

UN Security Council, 6, 104, 105,

111, 116, 117, 171

unemployment, 84–5, 124–5

United Kingdom

arms embargo in Syria, 108

colonialism, 147–8, 149–50, 169,

173–4

Gildas, 159–60n4

Iraq War and, 179

Israeli-Palestinian conflict and,

8–9, 177, 179

post-Ottoman Syria, 40–1

see also European Union

United Nations

Israel and, 158

Palestinian statehood and, 167,

172, 175–7

United Nations Archives, 161

United States

Egyptian-Israel peace deal, 168

in Iraq, 24

Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, 9,

171, 172, 173–4, 179

Kerry initiative, 179–80, 182

Palestinian statehood and,

176–7, 178, 179, 181–2, 183

Syria and, 6, 48, 49, 51, 206

226 INDEX

United States—Continued

sanctions, 101, 102, 103, 104,

106, 107, 108–9, 110, 111,

113, 116, 117, 118, 206

Unity Army, 14

see also Islamic Front

Unity Brigade (Syria), 14, 15, 17

see also Free Syrian Army; Islamic

Front for the Liberation of

Syria

Vatican status, 176, 183

Venice Declaration (1980), 173–4

al-Wahab, Muhammad ibn Abd, 46

Wallström, Margot, 177

Walt, Stephen, 171, 172

war economy, 61, 63–7

Warriors’ Army (Syria), 14

Weber, Max, 10, 194–5, 196

Wennmann, Achim, 64, 65

West Bank, 155–7, 162n21, 167,

175, 184n1, 185n9, 186n23

see also Israeli-Palestinian conflict

women

rights of, 129–30, 132–3, 135–7,

140–2

violence against, 130–1, 141

honor killings, 130, 137

see also families; marriage;

patriarchy

World Bank, 174–5

World War I, 148

Yaarabiyyah (Syria), 17

Yaish, Adly, 154

Yemen, 126

Yugoslavia, 199, 207

Zaatari camp (Jordan), 81, 86, 91,

92

Zaitouneh, Razan, 130–1

Zak, Michal, 153

Zarqa (Jordan), 81, 82, 85, 86, 88

al-Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 4, 48, 198

Zionism. See Israel

Zisser, Eyal, 115

Zochrot, 153