The 15th Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2019 · 2019. 10. 25. · women above the age of 18. A total of 1,000 valid responses were obtained. Respondents were 48.6% male and 51.4%

ANALYSIS PAPER:

The 15th

Joint Public Opinion Poll

Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2019

In Cooperation With:

Japan: Public Opinion Research Center

China: Horizon Research Consultancy Group

October, 2019

The Genron NPO

1

Copyright(c) 2019 The Genron NPO All Rights Reserved.

The Genron NPO and China International Publishing Group conducted joint opinion polls targeting the

citizens of Japan and China in September 2019. This survey has been administered annually since 2005,

when Japan-China relations were at its worst. This year marks the 15th year that this poll has been

conducted. The objective of the survey is to continuously monitor the state of mutual understanding and

perceptions of the Japanese and Chinese public towards one another as well as the changes that ensue

over time.

The opinion poll in Japan was administered through the placement method (in which the survey was

hand-delivered to homes and then collected) between September 7 and September 28, targeting men and

women above the age of 18. A total of 1,000 valid responses were obtained. Respondents were 48.6%

male and 51.4% female. The age range consisted of 2.4% under the age of 20, 11.9% between the ages of

20 and 29, 14.7% between the ages of 30 and 39, 17.5% between the ages of 40 and 49, 14.5% between

the ages of 50 and 59 and 39% over the age of 60. The educational background of respondents were 5.7%

junior high school diploma and under, 49.3% high school diploma, 20.6% junior/technical college

diploma, 21.7% bachelor’s degree and 1.1% master’s degree or higher.

The opinion poll in China was administered through individual interviews between September 7 and

September 20, targeting men and women over the age of 18 in 10 cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou,

Chengdu, Shenyang, Wuhan, Nanjing, Xi’an, Qingdao and Zhengzhou. A total of 1,597 valid responses

were obtained. Respondents were 48.7% male and 51.3% female. The age range consisted of 2.8% under

the age of 20, 20.2% between the ages of 20 and 29, 24.4% between the ages of 30 and 39, 26.2%

between the ages of 40 and 49, 17.8% between the ages of 50 and 59, and 8.7% above the age of 60. The

educational background of respondents were 9.2% junior high school diploma and under, 32% high

school/technical high school diploma, 30.9% technical college diploma, 25.6% bachelor’s degree, 0.6%

double degree and 1.2% master’s degree or higher.

Apart from this opinion poll, The Genron NPO and China International Publishing Group also

conducted the same survey targeting the intellectuals in both countries. This survey targeting intellectuals

was administered together with the public opinion poll in order to complement the general understanding

of the Japanese and Chinese peoples by comparing expert/intellectual perspectives with the results

obtained from the public opinion poll. Most intellectuals in both Japan and China do not depend solely

upon domestic media or the internet as their means of obtaining information on one another’s countries.

Rather, contrary to the general public, intellectuals obtain information by actually traveling abroad or

through direct contact with friends and acquaintances in the other country.

In Japan, the same survey used for the public opinion poll was emailed between September 12 and

October 9 to approximately 2,000 intellectuals consisting of domestic business managers, academics,

press, and government employees who had previously participated in The Genron NPO’s discussions and

<Survey Overview>

2


surveys. A total of 404 responses were obtained. Respondents were 86.4% male and 11.6% female, and

consisted of 1% under the age of 20, 2.2% between the ages of 20 and 29, 5.2% between the ages of 30

and 39, 11.6% between the ages of 40 and 49, 26% between the ages of 50 and 59, and 52.5% over the

age of 60. The educational background of respondents were 0% junior high school diploma and under,

3% high school diploma, 2% junior/technical college diploma, 59.9% bachelor’s degree, and 31.4%

master’s degree or higher.

In China, phone interviews were administered between September 7 and September 20 to 5,350

intellectuals from the Horizon Research Consultancy Group’s database, consisting of 45,000 people

including business leaders, government officials, journalists, experts and public organization officials. A

total of 600 responses were obtained. The educational background of respondents was 13.5 % technical

college diploma, 60.7% bachelor’s degree, 6.8% double degree, 17.2% master’s degree and 1.8% doctoral

degree.

※ Percentages may not add up to 100% in some cases as the numbers here are rounded off to one decimal point and non-responses are

not included.

3


1. Impressions of One Another’s Countries

Impression of the Other Country

The Chinese people’s impression of Japan has improved, with 45.9% stating that they have a

“favorable” impression of Japan, recording the highest this percentage has been since the survey

began in 2005.

By contrast, while there has been some improvement in the Japanese people’s impression of China,

84.7% still have an “unfavorable” impression, showing results that contrast with those of the

Chinese. There was a slight increase in those with a “favorable” impression of China, but this

percentage still only amounted to 15% of total responses.

【Impression of the Other Country】

15.1%

11.8%

33.1%

24.1% 26.6%

27.3%

20.8% 15.6% 9.6%

6.8%

10.6%

8.0% 11.5%

13.1% 15.0%

37.9%

36.4%

66.3%

75.6% 73.2% 72.0%

78.3%

84.3% 90.1%

93.0% 88.8%

91.6%

88.3% 86.3%

84.7%

11.6%

14.5% 24.4%

27.3%

32.6%

38.3%

28.6% 31.8%

5.2%

11.3%

21.4% 21.7%

31.5%

42.2% 45.9%

62.9%

56.9%

36.5% 40.6%

65.2%

55.9%

65.9%

64.5%

92.8%

86.8% 78.3%

76.7%

66.8%

56.1% 52.7%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Japanese public opinion: favorable/ relatively favorable

Japanese public opinion: unfavorable/ relatively unfavorable

Chinese public opinion: favorable/ relatively favorable

Chinese public opinion: unfavorable/ relatively unfavorable

4


Reasons Behind the Impression of the Other Country

The greatest reason for the “favorable” impression of China among the Japanese was the “increased

familiarity of the Chinese due to greater numbers of Chinese visitors and private exchanges” at 40%,

largely surpassing last year’s 32.8%. The overall scheme in which the increase of Chinese visitors

and private exchanges contributed to a more favorable impression of China among the Japanese was

the same as last year.

Among the Chinese, the most popular reason for their “favorable” impression of Japan was, in line

with last year’s trend, the “remarkable growth of Japan’s economy and its high standards of living,”

at 53.1%. Over 40% also cited reasons such as “Japan’s beautiful environments, scenic landscapes

and many sights, including hot springs” (49.7%), “high quality of Japanese products” (49.4%), and

“Japanese politeness, good manners and high cultural standards” (44.6%), showing a diverse set of

reasons for the favorable impression, from tourism and Japanese products to national character.

On the other hand, the greatest factor contributing to the “unfavorable” impression of China among

the Japanese was “continuing territorial issues over Senkaku Islands and Japanese waters/airspace,”

at 51.4%. This percentage, however, has decreased from last year’s 58.6%. While most factors

showed a decrease from last year’s results, uneasiness over China’s “different political system

(one-party rule of the Communist Party)” rose 6 points from 37% last year to 43% this year,

constituting the second most popular reason for the “unfavorable” impression of China among the

Japanese public.

Among the Chinese public, two reasons stood out as contributing to the unfavorable impression of

Japan, following last year’s trend – “Japan’s lack of a proper apology and remorse over its history of

invasion into China” and “Japan’s nationalization of Diaoyu Islands” at approximately 60% each.

5


【Reasons for Favorable Impression】

【Chinese public opinion】

20.0%

25.3%

18.0%

40.0%

30.7%

14.0%

24.7%

8.7%

2.0%

19.3%

6.7% 4.7%

1.3%

25.2% 24.4%

32.8%

29.0%

16.0%

28.2%

12.2%

3.1%

18.3%

7.6%

9.9%

0.0%

0%

20%

40%

60%

China has begun to act as a great

international power

Improved living standards in C

hina due to significant econom

ic development

Am

icable bilateral relations & positive

attitude towards bettering relations

Increased familiarity due to increase in

Chinese visitors and exchanges

Interest in traditional Chinese culture

and history

Interest in Chinese cuisine, recent

Chinese m

usic and literature

Interest in Chinese sights and nature

Earnest and hardw

orking character of the C

hinese people

Large scale of the Chinese people's

words and actions

Inexpensive cost and attractiveness of C

hinese products

Other

No particular reason

No response

2019 (N=150)

2018 (N=131)

53.1%

36.6%

44.6% 49.4% 49.7%

35.2%

19.0%

14.2%

5.7%

0.0% 0.0% 0.0%

51.6%

38.0%

49.2%

44.0% 45.3%

25.0%

14.9% 11.8%

2.9% 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 0%

20%

40%

60%

Rem

arkable growth of Japan's

economy and its high standards of living

Earnest and hardw

orking character of the Japanese people

Japanese politeness, good manners

and high cultural standards

High quality of Japanese products

Japan's beautiful environments, scenic

landscapes and many sights, including

hot springs

Advanced Japanese technologies

Attractiveness of Japanese culture

Stability of Japanese society &

well-

developed infrastracture and legal system

s

Japan's long-term operation of

Overseas D

evelopment A

ssistance (O

DA

)

Other


No response

2019 (N=733)

2018 (N=653)

【Japanese public opinion】

6


【Reasons for Unfavorable Impression】

43.0%

12.2%

2.1%

34.2%

21.1%

29.0% 32.3%

51.4%

42.7%

20.8%

8.3% 6.0%

0.4%

37.0%

4.3%

41.8%

22.4%

33.5% 36.6%

58.6%

48.0%

28.6%

0.0%

8.6% 4.6%

0.7%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

Different political system

(one-party rule of the C

omm

unist Party)

Chinese tow

ards US

-China tension

(new option for 2019)

Military conflict in the past

Criticism

of Japan over historical issues

Incomprehensible patriotic actions and

ideas

Notable m

ilitary reinforcement and non-

transparency

Aggressive acts by the C

hinese as a w

orld power in international society

Continuing territorial issues over

Senkaku and Japanese w

aters/airspace

Actions that go against international

rules

Repeated anti-Japan broadcasts by the

Chinese m

edia

Entrenched nationalism

of the Chinese

people

Other


No response

2019 (N=847)

2018 (N=863)

60.5%

44.1%

56.9%

37.4% 29.0%

24.1%

16.9% 13.4%

16.5%

5.3% 4.2%

0.0%

0.0% 0.4%

54.7%

41.5%

50.5%

37.7%

28.9%

19.4% 17.1%

17.3% 19.6%

6.1% 5.5%

0.0% 1.7% 0.1%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%Japan's lack of a proper apology and rem

orse over the invasion into China

Japan's attempt to encircle C

hina on military,

economic, ideological, etc. w

ith the US

Japan's nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands

which has triggered conflicts

Inappropriate remarks m

ade by certain politicians

Japan's negative attitude towards the O

ne-C

hina Principle

Advertisem

ent of Chinese threat by the

Japanese media

The Japanese people's entrenched

nationalism

Japan's unfaithful attitude towards bilateral

relations, focusing only on economic profits

Japan's arrogance and its attitude of superiority over C

hina

Difference in political system

s

Militaristic trends seen in a certain section of

Japanese society

Other


No response

2019 (N=842)

2018 (N=868)



7


Changes in Public Sentiment from Last Year

Among the Japanese, 65.4% responded that public sentiment towards China has not changed over

the past year. Approximately 20%, however, say that it has worsened (percentage includes

“relatively worsened”).

Half of the Chinese (53.7%) also responded that there has been no particular change in public

sentiment towards Japan over the past year. However, contrary to Japanese responses, the opinion

that it has improved (including “relatively improved”) constituted nearly 30% of all responses (at

29.6%).

【Changes in Public Sentiment Among Both Countries Nationals Since Last Year】

【Japanese public opinion】【Chinese public opinion】

A 1.2% B

4.7%

C 65.4%

D 15.8%

E 7.0%

F 5.9%

G 0.0%

2019 (N=1000)

A 6.6%

B 23.0%

C 53.7%

D 12.5%

E 2.9%

F 1.3%

G 0.1%

2019 (N=1597)

A Improved

B Relatively improved

C No change

D Relatively worsened

E Worsened

F Not sure

G No response

8


2. Current and Future Japan-China Relations

Current and Future Japan-China Relations

While last year’s survey results showed the percentage of Japanese who view current Japan-China

relations as bad falling to under 40% for the first time in 8 years, this year showed a worsening of

views. Up 6 points from last year, 44.8% of the Japanese view current Japan-China relations as bad.

On the other hand, Chinese who view bilateral relations as bad decreased again, falling below 40%

(35.6%) for the first time in 8 years. At the same time, over 30% (34.3%) of the Chinese see current

relations as good.

In terms of changes in bilateral relations over the past year, most of both countries’ respondents

(around 50% of both) replied that there has not been any change. The view that relations have

worsened, however, increased 13 points among the Japanese to 31.8%, while for the Chinese, it

dropped slightly from last year, showing differing understandings among the two countries’ peoples.

【Current Japan-China Relations】

2.1% 3.7%

6.5% 13.0% 15.0%

22.0%

8.8% 7.4%

2.4% 1.3% 2.4%

1.9%

6.7% 7.2% 8.5%

74.0% 69.0%

53.1%

46.1%

36.9%

28.7%

51.7%

53.7%

79.7%

83.4%

71.9% 71.9%

44.9%

39.0%

44.8%

10.5% 10.4%

24.9%

54.3%

72.0% 74.5%

54.5%

42.9%

5.9%

15.0% 12.0%

14.0%

22.8%

30.3% 34.3%

54.9%

41.2%

24.7%

13.1%

20.5%

18.6%

32.3%

41.0%

90.3%

67.2% 67.2%

78.2%

64.2%

45.1%

35.6%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Japanese public opinion: good/ relatively good Japanese public opinion: bad/ relatively bad

Chinese public opinion: good/ relatively good Chinese public opinion: bad/ relatively bad

9


Obstacles to Building Japan-China Relations

While the majority most common answer choice of the respondents from both countries continues to

be “territorial issues,” which they thought as the greatest obstacle to building Japan-China relations,

but this percentage has dropped from last year for both countries. For the Chinese, it continues to be

followed by “economic frictions,” “disputes over marine resources” and “lack of trust,” both

“between governments” as well as “between nationals.” The percentage of those who selected

“nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment,” however, rose 15 points from last year’s 5.4% to 20.4%.

Among the Japanese, those who cite the “lack of trust between governments” rose to over 40%.

Additionally, the responses “economic frictions” and “China’s reinforcement of military forces” also

showed increases from last year. Meanwhile, the percentage of Japanese who cite the “lack of trust

between nationals” fell to under 30%, down 8 points from last year.

【Obstacles to Building Japan-China Relations】


28.0%

43.6%

32.4%

54.4%

17.8%

4.8%

16.0%

3.3%

15.9%

5.6%

18.5%

1.8%

7.9%

4.8%

15.0%

2.4%

1.6%

36.1%

39.6%

32.6%

61.1%

14.4%

5.2%

13.9%

3.4%

17.9%

5.0%

18.7%

1.0%

4.0%

5.2%

15.3%

0.9%

2.3%

0%20%40%60%

Lack of trust between nationals

Lack of trust between governments

Disputes over marine resources (gasfield development in East China Sea)

Territorial issues over Senkaku/ DiaoyuIslands

Economic frictions

US-Japan alliance & Japan'sreinforcement of military forces

China's reinforcement of military forces

Japanese nationalism & anti-Chinesesentiment

Chinese nationalism & anti-Japanesesentiment

Perception of history and education inJapan

Perception of history and education inChina

Inappropriate remarks on China madeby Japanese politicians

Inappropriate remarks on Japan madeby Chinese politicians

Anti-China broadcasts by Japanesemedia

Anti-Japan broadcasts by Chinesemedia

Other

No response

2019 (N=1000)

2018 (N=1000)

24.7%

22.2%

24.9%

51.2%

31.4%

18.7%

10.0%

5.1%

6.4%

20.4%

24.0%

8.7%

8.0%

1.7%

2.6%

0.4%

0.0%

0.4%

27.6%

24.2%

27.5%

55.3%

31.5%

24.0%

8.8%

9.0%

5.4%

25.2%

7.2%

6.3%

1.5%

4.3%

0.6%

0.0%

0.3%

0% 20% 40% 60%

Lack of trust between nationals

Lack of trust between governments

Disputes over marine resources (gasfield development in East China Sea)

Territorial issues over Diaoyu/ SenkakuIslands

Economic frictions

Japan-US alliance & Japan'sreinforcement of military forces

Future of the US-China trade war

China's reinforcement of military forces

Japanese nationalism & anti-Chinesesentiment

Chinese nationalism & anti-Japanesesentiment

Perception of history and education inJapan

Perception of history and education inChina

Inappropriate remarks on China madeby Japanese politicians

Inappropriate remarks on Japan madeby Chinese politicians

Anti-China broadcasts by Japanesemedia

Anti-Japan broadcasts by Chinesemedia

Other

No response

2019 (N=1597)

2018 (N=1548)

10


3. Developing a New Cooperative Relationship

Effective Measures for Improving Bilateral Relations

An outstanding 43.6% of the Japanese feel that “strengthen[ing] trust between the two governments”

is the most effective measure for improving bilateral relations. Adding the percentage of those who

selected “increase[ing] interaction between the two countries’ leaders,” 60% of the Japanese hope for

strengthening relations on a governmental level.

The same trend can be seen in China, where the sum of these two items is 61.6%. Expectations

towards “strengthen[ed] trust between the two governments” have especially grown, up 13 points

from last year.

【Effective Measures for Improving Bilateral Relations】


17.9%

43.6%

16.8%

4.9%

24.6%

11.8%

6.7% 10.7%

0.0%

7.7% 8.8%

12.6%

1.5% 1.8%

10.2%

1.8%

20.3%

39.1%

25.5%

4.4%

28.7%

11.6% 7.7%

0.0%

4.1%

7.8% 8.4%

11.2%

1.6%

0.6%

10.1%

0.6%

0%

20%

40%

Increase interaction between the tw

o countries' leaders

Strengthen trust betw

een the two governm

ents

Resolve historical perception issue

Cooperate on crisis m

anagement and

comm

unication mechanism

s in the East C

hina S

ea

Resolve territorial issues w

ith the Senkaku/

Diaoyu Islands

Cooperate tow

ards resolving North K

orean nuclear issue

Establish peace and order in N

ortheast Asia

Cooperate tow

ards resolving international issues like the prom

otion of global free trade and m

ultilateral cooperation

Form

free trade zones in East A

sia and promote

a global free trade system

Cooperate on issues that A

sia faces

Strengthen econom

ic cooperation in trade &

investment, including F

TA

and free trade zones

Prom

ote further private interaction between the

two countries' peoples

Build a peaceful environm

ent throughout East

Asia

Other

Not sure

No response

2019 (N=1000)

2018 (N=1000)

11



Establishing a New Cooperating Relationship for the Stable Development of the

Global Economy and Peace in East Asia

50% of the Japanese and 60% of the Chinese believe that a new, stronger cooperating relationship

should be established in order to realize peace in East Asia and for the stable development of the

global economy.

【Should a New Cooperating Relationship be Established for Stable, Peaceful Order】


22.9%

38.7% 40.3%

20.4%

32.7%

5.3% 5.0%

12.6%

0.0%

4.6% 5.0% 3.4%

0.0% 1.4% 0.2%

31.1%

26.0%

42.8%

24.0%

30.6%

1.8% 2.9%

0.0%

7.5% 5.0% 8.4%

12.2%

0.0%

1.9%

0.0% 0%

20%

40%

Increase interaction

between

the tw

o countries'

leaders

Strengthen trust betw

een the two governm

ents

Resolve historical perception issues

Cooperate

on crisis

managem

ent and

comm

unication m

echanisms

in the

East

China

Sea

Resolve

territorial issues

with

the D

iaoyu/ S

enkaku Islands

Cooperate

towards

resolving N

orth K

orean nuclear issue

Establish peace and order in N

ortheast Asia

Cooperate tow

ards resolving international issues like

the prom

otion of

global free

trade and

multilateral cooperation

Form

free trade zones in East A

sia and promote a

global free trade system

Cooperate on issues that A

sia faces

Strengthen

economic

cooperation in

trade &

investm

ent, including FT

A and free trade zones

Prom

ote further

private interaction

between

the tw

o countries' peoples

Build

a peaceful

environment

throughout E

ast A

sia

Other

Not sure

No response

2019 (N=1597)

2018 (N=1548)

A Yes

B No

C Neither

D Not sure

E No response

A 53.5%

A 52.5%

B 4.7% B 4.6%

C 26.3%

C 25.7%

D 14.6%

D 16.1%

E 0.9% E 1.1%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1000)

2019(N=1000)

A 63.5%

A 62.2%

B 12.4%

B 12.0%

C 17.1%

C 18.6%

D 6.9%

D 6.4% E 0.1% E 0.8%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1548)

2019(N=1597)

12


4. Importance of Japan-China Relations

How the Importance of Japan-China Relations is Viewed

Nearly 70% of both countries’ respondents consider Japan-China relations to be “important.”

However, there was a 7 point decrease this year in the percentage of Chinese respondents who

consider the relationship “important.”

As for reasons why the relationship is “important,” a 56.8% majority of Japanese respondents

replied “because China is an important trade partner.” However, while the “necessity of Japan-China

cooperation towards peace and development in Asia” was selected by 53.8% of the Japanese, this

percentage fell below 30% for the Chinese (at 27.2%).

【Importance of Current Japan-China Relations】

76.5% 72.6% 73.8% 80.3% 82.1% 81.5%

77.6%

80.3%

74.1% 70.6%

74.4%

70.4%

71.8%

71.4%

72.7%

4.2%

4.2% 4.2% 3.2%

2.9% 2.5% 4.3% 3.3%

5.9% 7.5% 6.8% 5.8% 4.6%

3.3% 3.5%

71.2% 67.2%

86.6% 90.1%

92.5%

83.1%

78.4%

72.3%

65.0%

70.1%

70.8%

68.7%

74.0%

67.0%

8.1% 10.3%

2.3%

5.1%

0.5%

14.8% 15.8%

24.0% 18.7%

14.2% 20.2%

12.4% 9.3%

15.4%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Japanese public opinion: Important/ relatively importantJapanese public opinion: Unimportant/ relatively unimportantChinese public opinion: Important/ relatively importantChinese public opinion: Unimportant/ relatively unimportant

13


Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with the US / Sense of Affinity

Towards the Respective Countries

When comparing Japan-China relations to relations with the US, 48.2% of the Japanese and 39.2% of

the Chinese replied that “both are equally important,” constituting the majority response for both.

However, for the Chinese, “relations with the US are more important” also constituted 35.8% of

responses, up from last year’s 31.5% and almost on par with the percentage of those who feel that

“both are equally important.” Meanwhile, the response that “Japan-China relations are more important”

constituted a mere 4.2% of Japanese and 15.7% of Chinese public opinion, showing no major change

from last year’s results.

Comparing the sense of affinity felt towards one another as opposed to the US, nearly half (49.7%) of

the Japanese feel “more affinity towards the US,” while nearly half of the Chinese feel “no affinity

towards either.” Among the Japanese, 4.8% feel “more affinity towards China.” While this percentage

rose for the Chinese as compared to last year, only 12.3% of the Chinese feel “more affinity towards

Japan.”

【Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with the US】


A 4.5%

A 4.2%

B 30.9%

B 34.8%

C 52.5%

C 48.2%

D 11.7%

D 12.2%

E 0.4%

E 0.6%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1000)

2019(N=1000)

A Japan-China relations are

more important than relations

with the US

B Relations with the US are

more important than

Japan-China relations

C Both is equally important

D Not sure

E No response

A 14.2%

A 15.7%

B 31.5%

B 35.8%

C 46.6%

C 39.4%

D 6.9%

D 8.1%

E 0.7%

E 0.9%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1548)

2019(N=1597)

14


【Sense of Affinity Felt Towards One Another’s Countries as Opposed to the US】

Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with South Korea / Sense of

Affinity Towards the Respective Countries

When comparing the importance of Japan-China relations to that with South Korea, the majority of

both countries’ respondents replied that “both are equally important.” This percentage, however, has

fallen for both countries, down 10 points for the Japanese and approximately 6 points for the

Chinese. Among the Japanese, there has been an increase in those who consider Japan-China

relations as more important than Japan-South Korea relations over the past year. Those who consider

Japan-China relations as more important increased 8 points from last year to 31%. For the Chinese,

the perceived importance of Japan-China and Japan-South Korea relations were equal at around 20%

for each.

In terms of the sense of affinity towards the respective countries, an approximately 40% majority of

both countries’ respondents replied that they feel “no affinity towards either.” However, among the

Japanese, there has been a worsening of sentiments towards South Korea, with an 8 point decrease in

those who feel “more affinity towards South Korea,” at 17.1% this year. At the same time, those

who feel “more affinity towards China” increased close to twofold from last year to 13.2%.

A 4.6%

A 4.8%

B 46.9%

B 49.7%

C 12.4%

C 13.8%

D 21.5%

D 19.7%

E 14.3%

E 11.7%

F 0.3%

F 0.3%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1000)

2019(N=1000)

A 9.9%

A 12.3%

B 19.1%

B 16.8%

C 17.6%

C 15.4%

D 46.4%

D 47.8%

E 6.5%

E 7.0%

F 0.5%

F 0.8%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1548)

2019(N=1597)


A More affinity towards the other

country

B More affinity towards the US

C Equal sense of affinity towards

both

D No affinity towards either

E Not sure

F No response

15


【Importance of Japan-China Relations and Relations with South Korea】


【Sense of Affinity Felt Towards One Another’s Countries as Opposed to South Korea】


A 23.2%

A 31.0%

B 6.2% B

6.9%

C 53.3%

C 43.3%

D 15.2%

D 17.6% E

2.1% E

1.2%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1000)

2019(N=1000)

A 22.4%

A 24.3%

B 20.0%

B 22.7%

C 48.1%

C 42.7%

D 9.1%

D 9.7%

E 0.5%

E 0.6%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1548)

2019(N=1597)

A 6.9%

A 13.2%

B 25.8%

B 17.1%

C 15.4%

C 14.1%

D 36.2%

D 41.9%

E 14.5%

E 12.9% F

1.2% F

0.8%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1000)

2019(N=1000)

A 9.8%

A 9.1%

B 28.2%

B 25.9%

C 18.0%

C 16.4%

D 37.0%

D 39.8%

E 6.7%

E 8.0%

F 0.3%

F 0.9%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1548)

2019(N=1597)

A Japan-China relations are

more important than relations

with South Korea

B Relations with South Korea

are more important than


C Both are equally important

D Not sure

E No response

A More affinity towards the other

country

B More affinity towards South

Korea

C Equal sense of affinity towards

both

D No sense of affinity towards

either

E Not sure

F No response

16


Most Important Foreign Relation

In terms of the most important foreign relation considering the future of their own country, a

strikingly large proportion of Japanese respondents replied the “United States,” at over 60%. For the

Chinese, the percentage of those that selected the “United States” slightly surpassed that for

“Russia,” last year’s majority response. Meanwhile, only 6.8% of the Japanese selected “China” and

14.7% of the Chinese selected “Japan,” both coming in third among the options presented, in line

with last year’s trend.

【Most Important Foreign Relation】


6.8%

0.8%

62.9%

0.8%

0.3%

0.2%

0.1%

0.8%

4.1%

1.9%

1.3%

0.7%

0.2%

0.4%

17.1%

8.2%

1.8%

57.8%

1.1%

0.8%

0.2%

0.1%

1.4%

7.2%

2.0%

0.2%

18.2%

0%20%40%60%

China

South Korea

United States

Russia

United Kingdom

Germany

France

EU

ASEAN countries

India

Africa

Middle East

South America

Other

Not sure

2019 (N=1000)

2018 (N=1000)

14.7%

2.6%

28.9%

26.6%

1.6%

1.6%

0.6%

8.0%

3.6%

0.8%

1.7%

3.0%

1.4%

0.0%

4.8%

18.2%

2.1%

23.3%

30.9%

2.6%

2.2%

2.3%

10.9%

1.5%

0.2%

0.0%

5.8%

0% 20% 40% 60%

Japan

South Korea

United States

Russia

United Kingdom

Germany

France

EU

ASEAN countries

India

Africa

Middle East

South America

Other

Not sure

2019 (N=1597)

2018 (N=1548)

17


5. Basic Understanding of One Another’s Countries

Perceptions of the Social/Political Systems of the Other Country

A 52% majority of Japanese respondents continue to view China as a “socialist/communist” country,

followed by 34.1% who see it as “totalitarian (one-party rule).” Both responses have increased

slightly from last year.

Among the Chinese, a 32.3% majority recognize Japan as a “capitalist” country, however, this

percentage has dropped 17 points from last year’s results. Additionally, the understanding of Japan

as “militaristic” rose 6 points to 32% this year, on par with the view of Japan as “capitalist.”

Meanwhile, views of Japan as “hegemonistic” and displaying “favorism towards great powers” were

chosen by 18.5% (39.5% last year) and 5.8% (12.1% last year) of the Chinese respectively, both

showing a large decrease from last year. On the other hand, there has been a 15 point increase in the

percentage of those who view Japan as “nationalist,” up to 23.6% this year.

【Perceptions of the Social/ Political Systems of the Other Country】


52.0%

9.7%

34.1%

7.2%

16.2%

7.0%

7.3%

2.1%

13.2%

5.0%

11.8%

2.1%

2.1%

49.4%

7.2%

32.6%

5.2%

16.9%

6.1%

10.2%

2.6%

20.4%

3.5%

9.1%

0.2%

4.6%

0%20%40%60%

Communist/ Socialist

Capitalist

Totalitarian (One-party rule)

Democratic

Militaristic

Pacifist

Hegemonistic

Internationally cooperative

Favorism towards greatpowers

Nationalist

Statist

Other

No response

2019 (N=1000)

2018 (N=1000)

6.1%

32.3%

14.3%

10.4%

32.0%

8.4%

18.5%

4.7%

5.8%

23.6%

10.5%

0.0%

4.3%

0.3%

5.0%

48.9%

17.3%

7.6%

25.7%

3.0%

39.5%

1.4%

12.1%

9.0%

2.6%

0.0%

2.1%

0.1%

0% 20% 40% 60%

Communist/ Socialist

Capitalist

Totalitarian (One-party rule)

Democratic

Militaristic

Pacifist

Hegemonistic

Internationally cooperative

Favorism towards greatpowers

Nationalist

Statist

Other

Not sure

No response

2019 (N=1597)

2018 (N=1548)

18


75.6%

23.7%

25.0%

39.6%

7.9%

10.6%

10.5%

4.1%

2.1%

10.0%

1.9%

76.7%

18.4%

17.6%

37.4%

6.8%

11.0%

12.6%

4.1%

4.7%

14.0%

0.3%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Shinzo Abe

Yukio Hatoyama

Yasuo Fukuda

Junichiro Koizumi

Yasuhiro Nakasone

Masayoshi Ohira

Kakuei Tanaka

Shigeru Yoshida

Tomiichi Murayama

None recognized

No response

2019 (N=1597)

2018 (N=1548)

84.9%

15.4%

52.7%

34.4%

55.6%

52.1%

50.6%

87.8%

4.2%

0.7%

82.0%

16.3%

55.5%

34.8%

58.2%

51.9%

49.0%

87.8%

4.4%

0.1%

0%20%40%60%80%100%

Xi Jinping

Li Keqiang

Hu Jintao

Wen Jiabao

Jiang Zemin

Deng Xiaoping

Zhou Enlai

Mao Zedong

None recognized

No response

2019 (N=1000)

2018 (N=1000)

Name Recognition of the Other Country’s Politicians

The most well-known Chinese politician continues to be “Mao Zedong,” recognized by nearly 90%

of the Japanese (87.8%). “Xi Jinping” was on par with Zedong at 84.9%, both significantly

surpassing the remaining responses. Only a tenth recognize “Li Keqiang.” Over 70% of the Chinese

recognize “Shinzo Abe.”

【Politicians Recognized From the Other Country】


19


6. Interactions Among the General Public

Visiting the Other Country

While the percentage of Japanese who expressed a desire to visit China slightly increased this year

at 32.3%, nearly 70% still responded that they do not wish to visit China. This trend has not changed

from last year. Meanwhile, among the Chinese, although the percentage has fallen slightly from last

year, 44.1% expressed a desire to visit Japan.

As for reasons for their desire to visit the other country, the majority of both nationals responded

“visiting the sights and scenery of the country,” while over half of the Chinese respondents also

replied “shopping,” in line with last year’s trend.

【Do You Want to Visit Japan/China?】


A 32.3% A 29.2%

B 67.4%

B 70.6%

C 0.3%

C 0.2%

2019(N=1000)

2018(N=1000)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

A Yes

B No

C No response

A 44.1% A 43.8%

B 53.5%

B 53.9%

C 2.4%

C 2.3%

2019(N=1597)

2018(N=1548)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%


20


7. Historical Issues Between Japan and China

Japan-China Relations and the Influence of Historical Issues

60% of the Japanese and nearly 90% of the Chinese continue to view historical issues as a large

obstacle to Japan-China relations. However, 35.7% of the Japanese and 39.8% of the Chinese

replied that historical issues, while still a large problem, have been “somewhat resolved.”

In terms of the influence of historical issues on Japan-China relations, among the Japanese, the

optimistic view that “historical issues will gradually be resolved as Japan-China relations develop”

and the pessimistic view that “it will be difficult to resolve historical issues regardless of the state of

Japan-China relations” contended with one another, both comprising nearly 30% of Japanese public

opinion.

Among the Chinese, the view that “Japan-China relations will not improve unless historical issues

are resolved” constituted the majority public opinion at 43.6%. However, nearly 40% of the Chinese

also expressed the optimistic view that “historical issues will gradually be resolved as Japan-China

relations develop.”

【Are Historical Issues an Obstacle to Japan-China Relations?】


A 32.3%

A 23.5%

B 29.8%

B 35.7%

C 5.8%

C 8.0%

D 5.8%

D 6.4%

E 26.0%

E 26.1%

F 0.3%

F 0.3%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1000)

2019(N=1000)

A 46.8%

A 47.4%

B 43.3%

B 39.8%

C 7.0% C 9.0%

D 1.6% D 1.9% E 1.3% E 1.9% F 0.0% F 0.0%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1548)

2019(N=1597)A Most historical issues have not

been resolved and they are a

decisively large problem to


B Historical issues have been

somewhat resolved but are still a large

problem

C Historical issues are starting to be

resolved and are no longer a large

obstacle to Japan-China relations

D Historical issues are not a large

problem to begin with

E Not sure

F No response

21


【Historical Issues that Should be Resolved】


29.4%

19.1%

27.9%

21.1%

9.1%

12.5%

8.3%

59.8%

26.7%

27.4%

37.0%

1.5%

4.9%

0.2%

36.6%

21.7%

32.0%

20.6%

7.1%

14.2%

6.6%

64.6%

30.9%

27.2%

38.8%

2.1%

4.3%

0.3%

0%20%40%60%80%

Japanese perception of itsinvasions of China

Depiction of history in Japanesetextbooks

Japan's lack of reparations forWWII, comfort women, etc.

Japan's perception of the NanjingMassacre

Remarks on China by Japanesepoliticians

Broadcasts on China by Japanesemedia

Japan's lack of apology forhistorical events

China's anti-Japan education andtextbooks

China's perception of the NanjingMassacre

Remarks on Japan by Chinesepoliticians

Broadcasts on Japan by Chinesemedia

Other

Not sure

No response2019 (N=592)

2018 (N=621)

60.0%

40.6%

40.0%

51.2%

34.2%

22.8%

25.5%

11.1%

13.1%

7.5%

4.0%

0.0%

0.1%

0.1%

62.2%

40.9%

44.3%

52.2%

37.7%

29.4%

26.5%

12.3%

13.7%

6.4%

2.7%

0.0%

0.0%

0.1%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

Japanese perception of itsinvasions of China

Depiction of history in Japanesetextbooks

Japan's lack of reparations forWWII, comfort women, forced…

Japan's perception of the NanjingMassacre

Remarks on China by Japanesepoliticians

Broadcasts on China by Japanesemedia

Japan's lack of apology forhistorical events

China's anti-Japan education andtextbooks

China's perception of the NanjingMassacre

Remarks on Japan by Chinesepoliticians

Broadcasts on Japan by Chinesemedia

Other

Not sure


2018 (N=1394)

22


【Influence of Historical Issues on Japan-China Relations】

A 22.0%

A 16.1%

B 29.3%

B 32.9%

C 28.9%

C 30.0%

D 19.7%

D 20.6%

E 0.1%

E 0.4%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1000)

2019(N=1000)

A 43.5%

A 43.6%

B 43.9%

B 38.0%

C 9.4%

C 15.4%

D 3.2%

D 2.6% E 0.1% E 0.3%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1548)

2019(N=1597)


A Japan-China relations will not

improve unless historical issues are

resolved

B Historical issues will gradually be

resolved as Japan-China relations

develop

C It will be difficult to resolve

historical issues regardless of the state

of Japan-China relations

D Not sure

E No response

23


8. Security in East Asia

Military Threat

Of those who perceive that certain countries pose a military threat to their country, 84.6% of the

Japanese continued to reply that “North Korea” poses the greatest military threat. Like last year, this

is followed by “China” and “Russia,” however, there has been a significant rise in the percentage of

those who view “South Korea” as a military threat – from 7.6% to 23.3%.

By contrast, a the largest 75.3% majority of Chinese respondents selected “Japan” as the greatest

military threat to their country, followed by the “United States,” which rose from 67.7% to 74.2%

this year. Only 10.3% of the Chinese feel that “North Korea” poses a military threat. At the same

time, there has also been an increase in Chinese respondents who feel that “Vietnam” and “Russia”

pose military threats. The greatest reason why the Chinese perceive Japan as a military threat is

attributed to “Japan’s attempt to encircle China ... in cooperation with the United States,” at 65.5%

of public opinion.

【Are There Certain Countries that Pose a Military Threat to Your Country? 】

A Yes

B No

C Not sure

D No response


A 74.7% A 72.4%

B 7.5% B 6.5%

C 17.7%

C 20.6%

D 0.1%

D 0.5%

2019(N=1000)

2018(N=1000)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

A 55.5%

A 68.7%

B 29.9%

B 21.6%

C 14.6% C 9.7% D

0.0% D

0.0%

2019(N=1597)

2018(N=1548)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

24


【Countries/ Regions That Pose a Military Threat】

57.8%

23.3%

84.6%

35.7%

1.1%

0.1%

7.1%

10.3%

0.1%

0.4%

0.0%

57.5%

7.6%

84.8%

34.0%

1.0%

0.1%

6.6%

13.0%

0.3%

0.1%

0.0%

0%20%40%60%80%100%

2019 (N=747)

2018 (N=724)

75.3%

11.5%

10.3%

16.4%

16.7%

16.7%

5.0%

74.2%

6.2%

0.0%

0.3%

79.4%

21.9%

8.4%

9.5%

16.2%

10.5%

4.4%

67.7%

10.2%

0.0%

0.3%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2019 (N=886)

2018 (N=1064)


China/ Japan

South Korea

North Korea

Russia

India

The Middle East

The US

The EU

Other

No response

Vietnam

25


Possibility of Military Conflict between Japan and China Over Territorial Issues

In regards to the possibility of military conflict between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu

Islands, 38.6% of the Japanese believe that it “will not occur,” up 5 points from last year. While

nearly half (48.3%) of the Chinese feel that it “will occur,” this percentage has fallen 8 points from

last year, and the view that it “will not occur” has risen from 26.6% to 34.3% this year.

【Will Military Conflict Occur Between Japan and China?】

A 10.5% A 11.9%

B 37.8% B

44.2%

C 34.3% C

26.6%

D 16.8%

D 17.1%

E 0.6% E 0.3%

2019(N=1597)

2018(N=1548)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

A 1.3% A 1.4%

B 21.5%

B 26.3%

C 38.6%

C 33.2%

D 38.5%

D 38.5%

E 0.1% E 0.6%

2019(N=1000)

2018(N=1000)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%


A Will occur in the next

few years

B Will occur in the future

C Will not occur

D Not sure

E No response

26


【Solutions to Tensions Over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands】


55.2%

60.1%

53.0%

20.9%

8.3%

5.2%

2.9%

0.0%

57.9%

61.7%

47.8%

26.2%

12.0%

7.5%

1.3%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60%

Japan should be made torecognize the existence of the

territorial disputes throughdiplomatic negotiation

China should take further andactual control of the territories in

order to protect them

Both countries should promptlystart negotiating towards a

peaceful agreement

Resolution should not be hurried,rather, arrangements should be

made to first prevent militaryconfrontations

The issue should be shelved forthe long-term, and both countries

should work on joint venturesinstead

It should be taken the InternationalCourt of Justice for a resolution

based on international law

Not sure


2018 (N=1548)

23.3%

41.0%

24.3%

7.2%

22.8%

19.4%

0.2%

26.2%

44.5%

20.0%

7.9%

24.1%

18.1%

0.3%

0%20%40%60%

Japan should take further andactual control of the territories toprotect them

Both countries should promptlystart negotiating towards apeaceful agreement

Resolution should not be hurried,rather, arrangements should bemade to prevent accidental militaryconfrontations

The issue should be shelved forthe long-term, and both countriesshould work on joint venturesinstead

It should be taken to theInternational Court of Justice for aresolution based on internationallaw

Not sure


2018 (N=1000)

27


Multilateral Framework for Security in Northeast Asia

50% of the Japanese and 65.7% of the Chinese feel the need for a multilateral framework for

discussing security in Northeast Asia.

In terms of nations that should participate in this multilateral framework, over 80% of the

Japanese feel that Japan, China and South Korea should participate. While 62% of the Japanese

selected the US, this percentage has fallen 13 points from last year. Among the Chinese, the US

and Japan were chosen by approximately 60% each.

【Need for a Multilateral Framework for Security in Northeast Asia】


A Necessary

B Not necessary

C Not sure

D No response

A 65.7% A 59.7%

B 21.7%

B 19.9%

C 12.5%

C 20.2%

D 0.1%

D 0.2%

2019(N=1597)

2018(N=1548)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

A 50.0% A 42.8%

B 4.0%

B 4.9%

C 45.9%

C 51.7%

D 0.1% D 0.6%

2019(N=1000)

2018(N=1000)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

28


【Nations that Should Participate in the Multilateral Framework for Security in Northeast Asia】



91.2%

92.2%

80.0%

59.6%

62.0%

60.0%

26.6%

41.2%

31.0%

25.2%

3.8%

0.4%

91.4%

92.5%

80.1%

56.5%

75.2%

65.7%

22.9%

44.4%

33.4%

29.0%

3.5%

0.2%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Japan

China

South Korea

North Korea

The US

Russia

Mongolia

India

Indonesia

Australia

Other

No response

2019 （N=500)

2018 （N=428)

59.9%

85.3%

31.4%

26.0%

62.7%

41.3%

4.6%

6.7%

2.4%

3.8%

0.0%

1.1%

0.3%

69.2%

90.7%

39.7%

36.8%

65.4%

55.4%

5.2%

11.1%

4.5%

5.4%

0.0%

1.2%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Japan

China

South Korea

North Korea

The US

Russia

Mongolia

India

Indonesia

Australia

Other

Not sure

No response

2019 （N=1050)

2018 （N=924)

29


Evaluating Diplomatic Efforts to Denuclearize the Korean Peninsula

In regards to the various diplomatic efforts taken towards the complete denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula by the nations concerned, half of the Japanese (52.4%) believe that these efforts

are “insufficient.” Only 20% or so responded that “sufficient diplomatic efforts are being expended.”

By contrast, Chinese public opinion is situated on the exact opposite pole of the Japanese, with

74.4% evaluating diplomatic efforts as “sufficient” and only 13.2% stating that “diplomatic efforts

are insufficient.”

【Evaluation of diplomatic efforts expended towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula】


A 3.8%

B 18.5%

C 52.4%

D 24.9%

E 0.4%

2019 (N=1000)

A 21.0%

B 53.4%

C 13.2%

D 12.2%

E 0.2%

2019 (N=1597) A Sufficient diplomatic efforts

are being expended

B Relatively sufficient efforts

are being expended

C Diplomatic efforts are

insufficient

D Not sure

E No response

30


9. Economic Relations Between Japan and China

Economic Relations Between Japan and China

In terms of economic relations between Japan and China, the majority of the Japanese continue to

consider a win-win relationship to be difficult, following last year’s trend. On the other hand, over

60% of the Chinese believe that a win-win relationship can be established.

In terms of free trade and economic partnership frameworks that Japan and China should cooperate

on in the future, nearly 40% of the Chinese replied “Chinese participation in TPP11” and “early

realization of a Japan-China FTA.” Nearly 40% of the Chinese also selected “early realization of a

Japan-China-South Korea FTA,” however, this percentage has fallen 10 points from last year.

Cooperation on the “One Belt, One Road” initiative fell 15 points from last year to 29.2%, while

“quick conclusion of the RCEP” also fell 10 points. Meanwhile, among the Japanese, the most

outstanding response was “not sure,” at 63.8%. While 19.4% of the Japanese cite “Chinese

participation in TPP11” and 13.3% feel that a “quick conclusion of the RCEP” should be striven

towards, these percentages remain in the tens. At the same time, only 8.4% feel the need to strive

towards a “Japan-China-South Korea FTA,” down slightly from last year.

【Economic Relations】

【Japanese popular opinion】

【Chinese popular opinion】

Agree with A 9.9%

Relatively agree with A 16.8%

Relatively agree with B 22.6%

Agree with B 22.7%

Not sure 27.5%

No response 0.5%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2019(N=1000)

Agree with A 27.4%

Relatively agree with A 33.4%

どちらかと

いえばＢ

15.2%

Agree with B 18.2%

Not sure 4.7%

No response 1.2%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2019(N=1597)

A The two countries’ economies

complement one another, making it possible to build a win-win

relationship

B The two countries’ economies

compete with one another, making it impossible to build a win-win

relationship

31


【The Future of Economic Relations Between Japan and China】

【Japanese popular opinion】【Chinese popular opinion】

A 7.2% A 5.9%

B 20.0% B 30.7%

C 30.4% C

24.0%

D 14.5% D

6.0%

E 2.3%

E 1.1%

F 25.4%

F 31.9%

G 0.2% G 0.4%

2019(N=1000)

2018(N=1000)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

A 12.9% A 12.4%

B 46.4% B

55.0%

C 23.4%

C 21.1%

D 7.1% D

4.4% E 4.1% E 2.0%

F 5.8% F 4.8% G 0.3% G 0.3%

2019(N=1597)

2018(N=1548)

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

A Will greatly improve

B Will slightly improve

C Will not change

D Will slightly worsen

E Will greatly worsen

F Not sure

G No response

32


10. Issues on World Order and Trade

Free Trade, an Open Economic Order, Multilateralism and the WTO Reform

Approximately 70% of the Japanese and 80% of the Chinese feel that multilateralism, an open

economic order and rule-based free trade are “important” for the future of the global economy.

In terms of the WTO reform currently underway, 48.9% of the Japanese and 78.5% of the Chinese

support the reform. However, nearly half of the Japanese replied “not sure,” indicating that they

cannot decide whether to support it or not.

In terms of the future of the global economic order, 34.8% of the Japanese believe that a rule-based

“free and open” order, even if limited in certain aspects, will continue to be key. However, 26.2%

also expressed the pessimistic view that the “US-centered economic sphere and China-centered

economic sphere will come to oppose one another and divide the world in two.” Meanwhile 38.3%

replied “not sure.”

On the other hand, among the Chinese, over 70% of respondents believe that a rule-based free trade

system and free economic order will continue to develop or, even if partially limited, a “free and

open” system will continue to be key.

【Importance of rule-based free trade, open economic order and multilateralism】


A 70.5%

B 2.0%

C 27.0%

D 0.5%

2019 (N=1000)

A 16.4%

B 65.2%

C 7.1%

D 0.9%

E 10.0%

F 0.3%

2019 (N=1597) A Important

B Unimportant

C Not sure

D No response

A Extremely important

B Important

C Relatively unimportant

D Completely

unimportant

E Not sure

F No response

33


【Support for the WTO Reform】


【The Future of Global Economic Order】

A 48.9%

A 39.7%

B 2.9%

B 3.9%

C 48.0%

C 56.3%

D 0.2% D 0.1%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2019(N=1000)

2018(N=1000)

A 78.5%

A 75.6%

B 7.1% B

11.4%

C 13.5%

C 12.5%

D 0.9% D 0.6%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2019(N=1597)

2018(N=1548)

9.8%

25.0%

26.2%

38.3%

0.7%

33.2%

40.1%

16.4%

10.2%

0.0%

Rule-based free trade system and free economic order willcontinue to develop

While free trade and openness will be partially limited, thecurrent open and free system will basically continue to exist

US-based economic sphere and China-based economicsphere will come to oppose one another and divide the

world in two

Not sure

No response

0% 20% 40%

Japanese public opinion,

2019（N=1000）

Chinese public opinion,

2019（N=1597）

A Support

B Do not support

C Not sure

D No response

34


Influence of US-China Trade War on Japan-China Relations

Tensions between the United States and China are currently intensifying in regards to trade and

digital technologies, and 50.2% of the Japanese are concerned that it will “adversely affect”

Japan-China relations. A 45.7% majority of the Chinese also express a concern over adverse effects

on the bilateral relationship. However, nearly 20% of the Chinese also believe that it will benefit the

relationship.

【Influence of the US-China Trade War on Japan-China Relations】

A 2.7%

B 50.2%

C 8.1%

D 38.2%

E 0.8%

2019 (N=1000)

A 17.8%

B 45.7%

C 26.2%

D 10.0%

E 0.3%

2019 (N=1597) A Will benefit the relationship

B Will adversely affect the

relationship

C Will have no influence on the

relationship

D Not sure

E No response

35


11. The Future of Japan and China and a Cooperative

Relationship in Asia

Most Important Values that East Asia Should Pursue

In terms of values that East Asia should pursue, 60% of the Japanese cite “peace” while nearly 40%

cite “cooperative development.” While showing a slight decrease from last year’s results, 40% of the

Chinese also responded “peace” and “cooperative development.” The two countries were thus in

agreement in terms of attaching the highest importance to these two values.

At the same time, compared to last year’s results, there has also been an increase in Chinese

respondents who view “fundamental human rights” and the “rule of law” as important.

【Most Important Values that East Asia Should Pursue】


43.6%

42.5%

24.9%

21.0%

12.2%

11.1%

17.1%

14.8%

0.0%

0.8%

0.1%

53.2%

49.7%

25.7%

18.0%

14.0%

14.5%

11.0%

11.4%

0.0%

0.1%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

2019 (N=1597)

2018 (N=1548)

Rule of law

Peace

Cooperative development

Democracy

Fundamental human rights

Respect for diversity

Other

Not sure

No response

Freedom

59.4%

38.7%

9.9%

6.3%

17.6%

5.3%

18.4%

14.4%

0.1%

9.8%

0.4%

60.9%

36.4%

13.1%

5.1%

16.5%

4.1%

15.6%

15.3%

0.3%

10.4%

0.4%

0%20%40%60%80%

2019 (N=1000)

2018 (N=1000)

Equality

36


Strengthening Cooperative Relationship to Resolve Bilateral Issues and Challenges

in Asia

Regarding fields that Japan and China should strengthen cooperation on, 70.2% of the Japanese cite

“North Korean nuclear issue and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” while 66.8% cite

“environmental issues like air and water pollution.” These were the two most prominent responses

among the Japanese, in line with last year’s results. Among the Chinese, the majority responded

“strengthen[ing] cooperative relationship regarding trade and investment,” such as the

Japan-China-South Korea and Japan-China FTAs and RCEP, at 28.4%. The “North Korean nuclear

issue and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” was almost on par at 28.2%, however, this

response has fallen 12 points from last year’s 40.4%. The most significant increase could be seen in

the percentage that cited “environmental issues like air and water pollution,” up 12 points to 20.6%

this year.

As for global issues of the highest concern, 56.1% of the Japanese and 39% of the Chinese selected

“environmental pollution and climate change.” At the same time, there was a relative increase in

Chinese respondents who expressed concern over “world poverty” and the “widening wealth gap,”

as compared to the Japanese.

【Strengthening Japan-China Cooperation in Order to Resolve Bilateral Issues and Issues Within

Asia】


A 27.9%

A 27.7%

B 35.6%

B 35.7%

C 3.0% C 2.9% D 0.5% D 0.9%

E 8.3% E 8.0%

F 24.4%

F 24.4%

G 0.3% G 0.4%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2019(N=1000)

2018(N=1000)

A 27.7%

A 21.4%

B 41.6%

B 49.0%

C 7.6% C 9.9%

D 4.7% D 3.6%

E 14.2%

E 13.1%

F 4.1% F 2.8%

G 0.0% G 0.1%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2019(N=1597)

2018(N=1548)

A Agree

B Relatively agree

C Relatively disagree

D Disagree

E No interest

F Neither/ Not sure

G No response

37


【Bilateral Issues and Issues Within Asia that China and Japan Should Cooperate On】



70.2%

66.8%

40.6%

40.0%

28.8%

24.3%

23.9%

23.8%

23.3%

22.8%

22.4%

22.0%

18.4%

15.7%

14.5%

13.7%

10.1%

10.1%

1.6%

0.8%

0.3%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

North Korean nuclear issue and denuclearization of Korean Peninsula

Environmental issues like air and water pollution

Food safety

Establishing peaceful order in Northeast Asia

Protection of intellectual property

Peacebuilding on Korean Peninsula and North Korea's economic development

Increase private exchanges such as those between youth

Cooperation and exchange in military and security fields

Strengthen cooperation on trade and investment such as FTA and RCEP

Public health and disease measures

Resource development in the East China Sea

Renewable energy such as eco-friendly technologies and wind & solar power

Infrastructure development in other developing nations in Asia

Tourism

Founding East Asian Community and regional cooperation in East Asia

Safety issues regarding nuclear power

Further strengthen maritime and air liaison mechanism

Shrinking & aging population

Not sure

Other

No response

2019 (N=635)

28.4%

28.2%

26.5%

23.4%

22.1%

22.0%

20.6%

19.2%

14.1%

13.5%

11.6%

9.7%

9.4%

9.3%

8.6%

7.8%

6.8%

4.2%

0.8%

0.4%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

Strengthen cooperation on trade and investment such as FTA and RCEP

North Korean nuclear issue and denuclearization of Korean Peninsula

Renewable energy such as eco-friendly technologies and wind & solar power

Establishing peaceful order in Northeast Asia

Peacebuilding on Korean Peninsula and North Korea's economic development

Safety issues regarding nuclear power

Environmental issues like air and water pollution

Resource development in the East China Sea

Food safety

Increase private exchanges such as those between youth

Protection of intellectual property

Founding East Asian Community and regional cooperation in East Asia

Infrastructure development in other developing nations in Asia

Cooperation and exchange in military and security fields

Tourism

Public health and disease measures

Further strengthen maritime and air liaison mechanism

Shrinking & aging population

No response

Not sure

Other

2019 (N=1108)

38


【Global Issues of Special Concern】

14.9%

7.3% 10.1%

56.1%

21.8% 19.3% 19.8%

9.0% 5.2%

13.9%

1.4% 1.4% 3.5%

0.1%

4.7% 1.3%

24.2%

11.6% 10.3%

39.0%

23.9%

14.7% 12.5%

5.8%

15.7%

23.8%

5.3% 1.8% 4.2%

0.0% 0.4% 0.4% 0%

20%

40%

60%

World poverty

Epidem

ics/ Com

municable diseases

Refugee crisis

Environm

ental pollution and climate change

Wars &

conflict between nations

Terrorism

Proliferation of w

eapons of mass destruction

like nuclear arms

Cyber attacks

Influence of technological innovations & A

I

Widening w

ealth gap

Managem

ent of international finance

Tax issues such as tax evasion by

multinational enterprises

Future of free trade

Other

Not sure

No response

Japanese public opinion (N=1000)

Chinese public opinion (N=1597)

39


12. Changes in the Influence over the Next 10 Years

and Countries that Should Lead the World

Changes in the Influence of Various Countries in Asia Over the Next 10 Years

While approximately half of both countries’ nationals feel that the influence of Japan in Asia

over the next 10 years “will not change,” 31.7% of Chinese respondents predict that it “will

increase,” showing that, as compared to the Japanese (19.5%), a larger proportion of the Chinese

estimate Japan’s future influence at a higher level.

In terms of the influence of China within Asia, 60% of the Japanese and nearly 90% of the

Chinese believe that it “will increase.” The opinion that the influence of the US “will increase”

was at par with the opinion that it “will not change,” both at a little over 30% among Japanese

respondents. For the Chinese, the view that US influence “will not change” has increased from

last year to 46.9%.

As for South Korea, the view that its influence “will decrease” rose 18 points among the Japanese

to 39.1%, presenting a harsher view of South Korea’s influence.

【Changes in the Influence of Various Countries in Asia Over the Next 10 Years】


A 19.5%

A 58.7%

A 36.2%

A 8.8%

A 15.5%

A 39.6%

B 46.1%

B 16.6%

B 37.0%

B 30.1%

B 46.0%

B 29.0%

C 17.0%

C 6.0%

C 8.7%

C 39.1%

C 10.1%

C 3.9%

D 16.3%

D 17.8%

D 17.0%

D 20.7%

D 27.2%

D 26.4%

E 1.1%

E 0.9%

E 1.1%

E 1.3%

E 1.2%

E 1.1%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

A. Japan

（N=1000）

B. China

（N=1000）

C. United States

（N=1000）

D. South Korea

（N=1000）

E. Russia

（N=1000）

F. India

（N=1000）

40



A 31.7%

A 88.5%

A 34.4%

A 20.0%

A 44.3%

A 20.0%

B 54.7%

B 10.2%

B 46.9%

B 51.3%

B 39.1%

B 53.2%

C 11.7%

C 0.1%

C 16.2%

C 25.2%

C 12.2%

C 21.2%

D 1.9%

D 1.2%

D 2.5%

D 3.6%

D 4.4%

D 5.7%

E 0.0%

E 0.0%

E 0.0%

E 0.0%

E 0.0%

E 0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

A. Japan

（N=1597）

B. China

（N=1597）

C. United States

（N=1597）

D. South Korea

（N=1597）

E. Russia

（N=1597）

F. India

（N=1597）

A Will increase B Will no change C Will decrease D Not sure E No response

41


12.5%

76.2%

2.6%

31.7%

22.9%

2.6%

3.3%

9.8%

2.8%

0.3%

0.3%

0.3%

0.1%

2.4%

0.1%

10.9%

73.7%

2.4%

30.6%

29.1%

3.5%

3.5%

10.7%

2.1%

0.4%

0.3%

0.0%

0.0%

2.1%

0.0%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80%

2019 (N=1597)

2018 (N=1548)

Countries and Regions that Should Lead the World

Approximately 60% of the Japanese believe that the “US” should continue as the world’s

leader. Meanwhile, approximately 70% of the Chinese believe that “China” should lead the

world.

【Countries and Regions that Should Lead the World】


37.5%

13.8%

0.4%

57.1%

4.0%

3.9%

2.8%

13.1%

4.3%

2.9%

0.2%

0.6%

0.2%

23.5%

0.7%

35.3%

11.7%

0.7%

52.8%

5.9%

2.8%

2.3%

12.0%

5.1%

3.2%

0.5%

0.2%

0.0%

27.6%

0.5%

0%20%40%60%80%

2019 (N=1000)

2018 (N=1000)

Japan

China

South Korea

United States

Russia

United Kingdom

Germany

EU

ASEAN

India

Indonesia

Brazil

Other

Not sure

No response

42


13. Evaluation of Media Coverage and Public Opinion

on the Internet

Influence of Media on Japan-China Relations

84.6% of the Chinese believe that the media “contributes” to the improvement of Japan-China

relations and mutual understanding between the two countries’ people. On the other hand, only

26.9% of the Japanese see the media as contributory.

At the same time, a high 80.4% of the Chinese feel that domestic media is “objective and fair” in

regards to reports on Japan-China relations. On the other hand, only 14.9% of the Japanese feel that

domestic media reports are “objective and fair,” while 30.5% view domestic media as “not objective

or fair.”

【Influence of Media on Japan-China Relations】


A Contributes significantly

B Contributes slightly

C Does not contribute at all

D Contributes an adverse

effect

E Not sure

F No response

A 3.4% A 3.6%

B 26.8% B 23.3%

C 19.1% C 24.5%

D 9.0%

D 9.3%

E 41.4%

E 39.0%

F 0.3% F 0.3%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1000)

2019(N=1000)

A 17.1% A 14.8%

B 69.5% B 69.8%

C 8.0%

C 7.7%

D 0.7% D 1.7%

E 4.0% E 4.1% F 0.6% F 1.8%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1548)

2019(N=1597)

43


【Objectivity and Fairness of Domestic Media Reports】

35.0% 31.0% 31.2%

25.4% 23.4%

25.4%

26.8% 19.5%

20.2% 16.4%

16.4% 14.9%

26.0% 24.6%

28.0%

25.9% 23.9%

25.1%

30.5% 30.1% 26.4%

26.4%

30.9% 30.5%

72.3% 72.5%

61.8%

70.3%

64.4%

84.5%

73.9% 75.9%

71.3%

75.0%

80.6% 80.4%

7.1% 17.6%

29.3%

17.4%

21.6%

7.5%

13.3% 14.8%

20.2%

15.8% 11.3% 11.5%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Japanese public opinion (Media reports are objective and fair)Japanese public opinion (Media reports are not objective or fair)Chinese public opinion (Media reports are objective and fair)Chinese public opinion (Media reports are not objective or fair)

44


The Internet as a Reflection of the People’s Will

Among the Japanese, 36.1% believe that the internet does not adequately reflect the will of the

people, surpassing the 24.7% who believe that the internet does reflect public will. 40%, however,

replied “not sure.”

In comparison, 80.3% of the Chinese feel that the internet accurately reflects the people’s will,

although this percentage has decreased from last year’s 86.9%.

【The Internet as a Reflection of the People’s Will】


A Accurate

B Relatively accurate

C Relatively inaccurate

D Inaccurate

E Not sure

F No response

A 2.2% A 2.6%

B 19.6% B 22.1%

C 20.8% C 21.8%

D 12.7% D

14.3%

E 44.4% E

39.1%

F 0.3% F 0.1%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1000)

2019(N=1000)

A 18.2% A 21.9%

B 68.7% B 58.4%

C 6.8%

C 8.3%

D 0.5% D 2.8%

E 5.2% E 6.1%

F 0.5% F 2.6%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1548)

2019(N=1597)

45


14. Background to Mutual Understanding

Degree of Interaction Among the People

Of the Chinese, 20.2% replied that they have visited Japan, showing an increase for the 8th

year in a

row. For both countries’ nationals, the reason for their visit was predominantly for “tourism.”

Among the Chinese, 97.5% replied that they have traveled to Japan “recently within the last 5

years.”

Regarding acquaintances in the respective countries, 19.5% of the Japanese and 8.1% of the Chinese

replied that they have acquaintances in the other country, with a slight increase in both percentages

from last year’s results.

【Prior Travel Experience to the Other Country】

14.4%

12.9%

13.5% 15.4% 14.5%

14.5%

13.4%

16.5%

14.7%

14.3%

15.1% 15.6%

13.8%

13.5%

14.4%

1.3% 1.2% 1.1% 0.4%

0.9% 0.6% 2.1%

1.6%

2.7%

6.4% 7.9%

13.5%

15.7%

18.6%

20.2%

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

Japanese respondents with prior travel experience to China

Chinese respondents with prior travel experience to Japan

46


【Friends/Acquaintances from the Other Country】


A I have close friends from

the other country

B I have acquaintances from

the other country that I can

sometimes talk to

C I don’t have (never have

had) any acquaintances from

the other country

D No response

A 3.7% A 4.1%

B 13.7% B 15.4%

C 82.4% C 80.3%

D 0.2% D 0.2%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1000)

2019(N=1000)

A 2.9% A 2.7% B 4.1% B 5.4%

C 91.1%

C 75.5%

D 1.9%

D 16.3%

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2018(N=1548)

2019(N=1597)

47


Sources of Information

An overwhelming number of Japanese obtain their information on China from Japanese news media

sources and, like last year, television serves as an especially prominent source.

Among the Chinese, over 80% likewise obtain their information on Japan through Chinese news

media outlets. However, sources of information for the Chinese are diversifying, with many people

citing “Chinese TV shows, informational programs and movies” and “Chinese books,” as well as a

certain number also stating that they obtain information through outlets such as Japanese news

media. At the same time, nearly 40% obtain information through internet news sources on cell

phones, signifying a trend different from Japan, where this percentage is a mere 10.8%.

【Sources of Information on Japan-China Relations and Information on the Other Country】


2.9%

1.2%

94.1%

14.9%

29.7%

6.1%

0.4%

0.5%

0.1%

3.0%

10.6%

18.7%

1.1%

0.2%

2.7%

1.4%

95.7%

21.2%

33.2%

5.5%

0.1%

0.7%

0.2%

3.6%

9.6%

16.5%

0.5%

0.6%

0%20%40%60%80%100%

Conversations with Chinesepeople

Visits to China

Japanese news media

Japanese books (includingtextbooks)

Japanese TV shows, newsprograms and movies

Chinese news media

Chinese books

Chinese music

Chinese anime

Chinese TV shows, newsprograms and movies

Discussions by other Japanesepeople

Conversations with family &friends, internet and social media

Other


2018 (N=1000)

3.8%

3.9%

84.5%

35.9%

59.5%

14.5%

4.3%

5.4%

7.7%

16.5%

5.3%

16.9%

0.4%

0.1%

3.7%

4.7%

87.0%

28.9%

49.5%

11.0%

3.0%

5.4%

4.6%

9.7%

5.9%

23.1%

0.0%

0.1%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Conversations with Japanesepeople

Visits to Japan

Chinese news media

Chinese books (includingtextbooks)

Chinese TV shows, newsprograms and movies

Japanese news media

Japanese books

Japanese music

Japanese anime

Japanese TV shows, newsprograms and movies

Discussions by other Chinesepeople

Conversations with family &friends, internet and social media

Other


2018 (N=1548)

48


＜Please send all inquiries about this survey to the address below＞

Authorized Non-profit Organization, The Genron NPO

HSB Teppozu 4F, 1-1-12 Minato, Chuo-ku, Tokyo Japan, 104-0043 Tel/Fax +813-6262-8772 / +813-6262-8773

info<at>genron-npo.net

mailto:[email protected]

Documents

The 15th Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2019 · 2019. 10. 25. · women above the age of 18. A total of 1,000 valid responses were obtained. Respondents were 48.6% male and 51.4%