Ockham and Ockhamism

Ockham and Ockhamism

Studien und Textezur Geistesgeschichte

des Mittelalters

Begründet von

Josef Koch

Weitergeführt von

Paul Wilpert, Albert Zimmermann undJan A. Aertsen

Herausgegeben von

Andreas Speer

In Zusammenarbeit mit

Tzotcho Boiadjiev, Kent Emery, Jr.und Wouter Goris

BAND 99

Ockham and Ockhamism

Studies in the Disseminationand Impact of His Thought

By

William J. Courtenay

LEIDEN • BOSTON2008

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Courtenay, William J.Ockham and ockhamism : studies in the dissemination and impact of his thought / by

William J. Courtenay.p. cm. -- (Studien und texte zur geistesgeschichte des mittelalters ; 99)

Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 978-90-04-16830-5 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. William, of Ockham, ca. 1285-ca.

1349. 2. Philosophy, Medieval. I. Title. II. Series.

B765.O34C68 2008189’.4--dc22

2008016598

ISSN 0169-8028ISBN 978 90 04 16830 5

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CONTENTS

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiPreface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

Chapter One. In Search of Nominalism: Two Centuries ofHistorical Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Received Opinion: From Aventinus to Ehrle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2The Reassessment of Ockham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9Toward a New Assessment of Nominalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

part one

before ockham

Chapter Two. Augustine and Nominalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Chapter Three. On the Eve of Nominalism: Consignification inAnselm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

The Two Realms of Consignification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Consignification and Nomen Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Chapter Four. Nominales and Nominalism in the Twelfth Century . . 39Logic in voce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44Opinio Nominalium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50Toward a History of the Nominales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64Nomina, Mental Language, and Universals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71Abelard, Alberic, and the Nominales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

Chapter Five. Nominales and Rules of Inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

vi contents

part two

ockham’s thought in england and paris

Chapter Six. The Academic and Intellectual Worlds of Ockham. . . 91The Formative Years, 1305–1316 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Oxford and London, 1317–1324 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97Avignon, 1324–1328 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100Munich, 1329–1347 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102Ockham’s Heritage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Chapter Seven. The Reception of Ockham’s Thought inFourteenth-Century England . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

The Earliest Reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109Ockhamism at Oxford in the 1330s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116Robert Holcot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117Adam Wodeham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120Ockhamism after Wodeham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

Chapter Eight. The Reception of Ockham’s Thought at theUniversity of Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

The Introduction of Ockham’s Thought at Paris, 1325–1335 . . . . . 129The Papacy and University Reform: The Crisis of 1338–1341 . . . . 136The Invasion of English Logic, Physics, and Theology: The

Crisis of 1340–1347 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138Conrad of Megenberg and the Scientia Okamica. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143

part three

the crisis over ockham’s thought at paris

Chapter Nine. Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-GermanNation at Paris, 1339–1341 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

The Statutes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159The Arts Statute of September 25, 1339 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159The Arts Statute of December 29, 1340 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167The 1341 Ordinance of the English-German Nation . . . . . . . . . . 176

The Masters of the English Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178Rimini’s Testimony . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

Ockhamism and the Secta Occanica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

contents vii

The Availability of Ockham’s Writings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191The ‘Scientia Occanica’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194The Political Context of the University Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199

Chapter Ten. Force of Words and Figures of Speech: The Crisisover Virtus sermonis in the Fourteenth Century. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209

Meaning and Verbal Sense: the Origins of ‘Virtus Sermonis’ . . . . . . . 210Supposition and Virtuous Words. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217The 1340 Statute Revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219Scripture and Humanism: Metaphoric Language & the

Context of the Statute of 1340 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

Chapter Eleven. The Registers of the University of Paris and theStatutes against the Scientia Occamica . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229

Record-Keeping at the University of Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230The Book of the Rector. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236The Books of the Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

Record-Making at the University of Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249University Scribes and the Creation of Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . 249Datum et Actum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

Oaths Concerning the Statutes ‘Contra Scientiam Occamicam’ . . . . . . 256The Arts Statute of December 29, 1340 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260

Chapter Twelve. The Debate over Ockham’s Physical Theories atParis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267

The Entry of Ockham’s Physics into Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268The Date of Michael de Massa’s Baccalaureate and Vat. lat.

1087 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272Michael de Massa, Conrad of Megenberg, and the Occamistae 274Ockham’s Physics and the Debate over Ockhamism at Paris . . . . 277Ockhamist ‘Scientia’ and the Teaching of Aristotle and His

Commentators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280The Role of Buridan in the Events of 1339–1341 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

Chapter Thirteen. The Quaestiones in Sententias of Michael deMassa, OESA. A Redating . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

The Authenticity of Vat. lat. 1087 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286The Date of Michael de Massa’s Parisian Baccalaureate . . . . . . . . . 289The Content of Vat. lat. 1087 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298

viii contents

Chapter Fourteen. Conrad of Megenberg: The Parisian Years . . . . . 303Lector at the Collège St. Bernard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304Master of Arts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308Student in Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315The Crisis over the Occamistae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 322

Chapter Fifteen. The Categories, Michael de Massa, and NaturalPhilosophy at Paris, 1335–1340 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329

Michael de Massa and the Occamistae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332Ockham’s Doctrina and the Teaching of Aristotle

and Averroes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336The Anti-Ockhamist Statute of December 1340 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337Utrum motus sit realiter ipsummet mobile quod movetur (Vat. lat. 1087,

fols. 70rb–71ra) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339

part four

aftermath

Chapter Sixteen. Ockhamism among the Augustinians: The Caseof Adam Wodeham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349

Gregory of Rimini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353Hugolino of Orvieto . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353John Hiltalingen of Basel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 354Wodeham and the Augustinians as Viewed by Others. . . . . . . . . . . . 355Wodeham and the Spanish Augustinians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357

Chapter Seventeen. Theologia Anglicana Modernorum at Cologne inthe Fourteenth Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359

The Cologne Abbreviation of Wodeham’s Lectura . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361The Presence of English Texts at Cologne . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363Channels of Transmission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 368

Chapter Eighteen. Was There an Ockhamist School?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371Methodological Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375Oxford, 1324–1400 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378

contents ix

Paris, 1339–1346 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380The Hypothesis of a Lost Statute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380The Statutes of September 25, 1339 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 385The Statute of December 29, 1340 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389The Oaths against Ockham’s ‘Scientia’ and the Ockhamists . . . 392

The Ockhamist Tradition at Paris after 1360 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400

List of Manuscripts Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 403Index of Ancient and Medieval Names. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407Index of Modern Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 415

ABBREVIATIONS

AFH Archivum Franciscanum HistoricumAFP Archivum Fratrum PraedicatorumAHDLMA Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen AgeAUP Auctarium Chartularii Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifle and

É. Châtelain, vol. I (Paris: Delalain, 1894)BGPM Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des MittelaltersBGPTM Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des

MittelaltersBRUO A.B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to

A.D. 1500, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957)CIMAGL Cahiers de l’Institut du moyen-âge grec et latinCUP Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, ed. H. Denifle and É. Châte-

lain, 4 vols. (Paris: Delalain, 1889–1897)DTC Dictionnaire de Théologie CatholiqueFS Franciscan StudiesFzS Franziskanische StudienHLF Histoire Littéraire de la FranceHTR Harvard Theological ReviewJHI Journal of the History of IdeasJHP Journal of the History of PhilosophyMS Mediaeval StudiesPJ Philosophisches JahrbuchRTAM Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale

PREFACE

Across the last half-century the impact of the thought of William ofOckham, and most especially the interpretation of the statutes andsurrounding events at the University of Paris in the 1339–1347 period,has generated a large body of scholarship. Earlier participants includedPhilotheus Boehner, E.A. Moody, Giulio Preti, Rupert Paqué, and T.K.Scott. Both Boehner and Moody expressed considerable doubt that thestatute of the Parisian Faculty of Arts in December 1340 against theerrors of Ockhamists was aimed at Ockham, since in their view thepositions condemned were not those of Ockham. Paqué, who assumedincorrectly that Moody was, like Boehner, a Franciscan and that bothwere attempting to rehabilitate the reputation of a Franciscan longviewed as a negative influence in late medieval thought, set out to provethe previous view, namely that the statute of December 1340 was indeeda condemnation of Ockham’s views on supposition and universals.

In 1982 Katherine Tachau and I called attention to some previouslyunnoticed, or at least unremarked, discrepancies in the documents asnormally interpreted. One of these was that the statute of 29 Decem-ber 1340, “de reprobatione quorundam errorum Ockanicorum,” was sealed onthat date with the seals of the four nations and of the rector, but thatthe statute described as the recent statute “contra novas opiniones quorun-

dam qui vocantur Occhaniste” in the contemporary proctors’s register of theEnglish Nation in the Faculty of Arts at Paris was sealed in late January1341. It seemed odd that one and the same document could be officiallysealed at two different times, a month apart. The second discrepancywas that the oaths that bachelors in Arts had to swear before the rectorof the University at the time of their inception as masters and whichincorporated the specific language of the statutes they were swearing touphold, referred to two statutes against the “scientia” of Ockham, oneof which was the prohibition on dogmatizing Ockham’s “doctrina” pro-mulgated in September 1339, and the other a second statute that con-demned Ockham’s “scientia” and affirmed instead the “scientia” of Aris-totle and Averroes, except where they contradicted the faith. Nowherein the statute of 29 December 1340 is there any mention of Aristotle or

xiv preface

Averroes or their “scientia”. The 1340 statute, by contrast, is concernedwith supposition theory, the analysis of authoritative propositions in lec-tures and disputations, and the need to distinguish true and false senses,authorial intent, and common usage. The solution proposed in 1982was that the statute of December 1340 was not one of the two statutesagainst Ockham’s “scientia” referred to in the oaths, and that the otherstatute against Ockham’s “scientia” beyond that of September 1339 wasthe statute that was sealed and promulgated in January 1341 but whichhas not survived, possibly because both statutes against Ockham’s “doc-

trina” or “scientia” were no longer in force by the 1360s.That reinterpretation of texts and events met with initial acceptance,

but by the 1990s it evoked a series of counter-narratives by Hans Thi-jssen and Zénon Kaluza, who reworked or massaged the evidence inan attempt to make these discrepancies in the dates of sealing andthe language of the oaths and the statutes conform to the traditionalnarrative of the condemnation of Ockham’s thought at Paris. In thecourse of their research several advances were made, particularly onJean Buridan’s understanding of the expression “de virtute sermonis.” Andthe debate caused me to explore more deeply the testimony of Michaelde Massa and Conrad of Megenberg, and the procedures of statutecreation and preservation by the nations and faculties at Paris, whichrevealed a less orderly process of archival registration than previouslyimagined. Despite the tendency at times to view participants in thisscholarly discussion as opponents with a hidden agenda rather than ascolleagues in search of the best explanation of the evidence, consid-erable progress has been made even if a commonly agreed upon pic-ture of events has not yet emerged. We know far more today aboutthe personalities involved, the curricular and judicial functioning ofgroups within the university community, the production and preser-vation of university documents and record-keeping, and the nuances inphilosophical language and reasoning during those years. I remain con-vinced that an important statute against Ockham’s “scientia” is missingin the archival record, as are several other statutes that once existed.However, as I conceded in the most recent of these essays (Chapter 15,written in 2000), I am no longer so certain that the statute sealed in lateJanuary 1341 is identical with that lost statute.

Two areas of further research are as deserving of intense scrutiny asthat which has been devoted to the crisis of 1339–1341. One of these isthe period of the 1330s that led up to that crisis. While there has beencontinued interest in the last two decades in Jean Buridan, Michael

preface xv

de Massa, Nicholas of Autrecourt, Bernard of Arezzo, and Conradof Megenberg, more needs to be done. The debate over the ontolog-ical reality of points, lines, and surfaces between atomists and divisi-bilists that involved Buridan, Autrecourt, Massa, Megenberg, Michaelde Montecalerio, and others needs to be moved beyond mathematicsand the problem of continua, and be linked to the discussion of Ock-ham’s physics and his reinterpretation of the categories. Equally fruitfulwould be the examination of commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and onbook II of the Sentences from the late 1320s to 1339 to see whether, and,if so, how divisions on these issues were developing in the 1330s. Similarwork needs to be done on the understanding and use of the expression“de virtute sermonis” in the texts of that same period.

The other area of research that may help clarify the meaning andsignificance of the events of 1339–1341 lies in the 1340s, tracing the samegroup of issues in the works of Gregory of Rimini, Francis of Treviso,John Rathe of Scotland, Alfonsus Vargas of Toledo, John of Mirecourt,Paul of Perugia, James of Épinal, Hugolino of Orvieto, Pierre Ceffons,and the early writings of Nicole Oresme, who was completing hisdegree in Arts at the time of the crisis. Were the anti-Ockhamist statutespromulgated by the Faculty of Arts in 1339–1341 a result of a crisis solelywithin that faculty, or a result of pressure from the Faculty of Theology,or perhaps a concern of certain Arts masters who were completingdegrees in theology? How the issues involved in an Ockhamist “scientia”as well as the practices condemned in the statute of December 1340were discussed by masters of arts and theology in the 1340s will shedlight on the meaning and ultimate fate of those statutes.

The main purpose of the present book, therefore, is to bring togethermy essays that pertain to that debate, beginning with the 1982 arti-cle. Footnotes in my subsequent articles will provide references to thereactions and interpretations of other scholars. I have also includedessays that are more generally concerned with the impact of Ockham’sthought in England and on the Continent, and whether an Ockhamistschool developed in the fourteenth century. Moreover, inasmuch asOckham’s ‘nominalism’ and the discussion of supposition are linked tothe problem of universals, which is traditionally considered to lie at theheart of nominalism, I have included in Part One a series of essays thatprovide a very different view of the meaning and origin of nominal-ism before the thirteenth century that seem relevant to the discussion.Part One, however, is not the background to Ockham’s nominalism

xvi preface

but rather illustrates the complexity of the meaning of nominalism and,correspondingly, of Ockham’s place in that history.

All the articles in this volume, with the exception of one, were writ-ten between 1980 and 2000 and have been arranged thematically, notby date of publication. Because each article had to include the evidencenecessary to support its specific focus and argument, there is some over-lap in the content of certain footnotes. Except for the standardization ofthe form of footnotes, the correction of typographical errors, and in afew cases the restoration of text that was removed at the time of publi-cation, the text of the articles as originally published has been retained.Corrections and bibliographical information on articles or books citedas forthcoming at the time of publication have been inserted in thefootnotes in brackets.

I wish to express my appreciation to the publishers in whose volumesthese essays originally appeared for permission to reprint them. Thelocation of the original publication is acknowledged at the beginning ofeach chapter, along with the date and context (conference, Festschrift,or article) for which the essay was written. I also want to thank EricGoddard for preparing digitalized copies of the articles, seeking per-mission to republish, and for helping with the proofs and indices.Finally I am indebted to Professor Andreas Speer for making these arti-cles accessible as a group and arranging for their appearance in thisseries.

chapter one

IN SEARCH OF NOMINALISM:TWO CENTURIES OF HISTORICAL DEBATE*

Second only to the impact of the introduction of Aristotelian thoughtand the debate over Latin Averroism, the contrasting ontological com-mitments of realism and nominalism has been a topic perennially usedto structure the history of medieval philosophy from the twelfth centuryto the Reformation. As far back as the Parisian nominalist manifestoof 1474,1 the differing approaches of realists and nominalists have beenviewed as a major philosophical dividing line that helps make the his-tory of philosophy understandable as well as explains some of the divi-sions that still exist within philosophy as a discipline. Almost any cur-rent textbook on medieval philosophy will, to some extent, characterizethe early twelfth century in light of the introduction of nominalism, willview the thirteenth century as an age of moderate realism, and the lateMiddle Ages as a period dominated by the revival of nominalism.

The purpose of the following paper is not to correct the “textbook”understanding of the stages of realism and nominalism in the historyof medieval philosophy. Rather it is to look at the changes that haveoccurred in the historiographical understanding of that topic from thenineteenth century to the present. The questions addressed will, forthe most part, be those posed by historians in the last two centuries.What did earlier generations of historians understand nominalism tobe? How applicable did they think the descriptive label ‘nominalist’ wasfor the thought of Roscelin, Peter Abelard, William of Ockham, or latemedieval figures traditionally associated with Ockham? What parallelsdid they see between the thought of Ockham and either Roscelin or

* This paper was read at a conference in Rome in 1989 and published in Gli studidi filosofia medievale tra otto e novecento. Contributo a un bilancio storiografico, ed. A. Maierù andR. Imbach (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1991), pp. 214–233.

1 Edited in F. Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, des Pisaner Papstes Alexan-ders V. (Münster i. W., 1925), pp. 321–326. Although the 1474 document is all but unus-able as an historical account because of inaccuracies and bias, it was the first attemptat providing an account of the meaning, origin, and development of nominalism.

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Abelard? And finally, what was their view of the legacy of Ockhamin the late Middle Ages, and the extent to which one can speak of anominalist movement in that period?

Received Opinion: From Aventinus to Ehrle

The early nineteenth century inherited a reasonably coherent accountof the meaning and history of nominalism in the Middle Ages. Nomi-nalism was understood as a view that universal concepts had no beingor existence outside the mind but were mere names (nomina) or spo-ken sounds (voces). Roscelin was generally seen as its earliest and prin-cipal defender, Abelard as a close disciple of Roscelin, and Ockhamas the figure who revived nominalism and passed it down to the mod-ern period. A major source for this picture, whether direct or indirect,was the summary given in Johannes (Aventinus) Turmair’s history ofthe Duchy of Bavaria, written in the early sixteenth century.2 Aventinussaw realism and nominalism as two opposing ideologies throughout thescholastic period. He traced the origins of nominalism to Roscelin inthe late eleventh century, saw Abelard as a follower of Roscelin and afellow nominalist, and believed that Ockham reintroduced nominalismin opposition to Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. Through Ock-ham’s disciples it spread to the German universities of Vienna andHeidelberg. That picture was adopted and elaborated in the seven-teenth century by César du Boulay in his multi-volume history of theUniversity of Paris, which quoted extensively from Aventinus.3 Charlesdu Cange, writing slightly more than a decade later, augmented thebody of texts considered relevant for the origin and early meaningof nominalism in his entry on “nominales” in his Glossarium.4 Unlike

2 J. Turmair, Annales ducum Boiariae, L. VI, c. 3, in Sämmtliche Werke, vols. 2–3, ed.S. Riezler, vol. 3 (Munich, 1884), pp. 200–202. Like the nominalist manifesto of 1474,Turmair’s account is confused and inaccurate.

3 C.E. Du Boulay, Historia Universitatis Parisiensis a Carolo M. ad nostra tempora (Paris,1665–1673), I, pp. 443–444.

4 C. Du Cange, Glossarium ad scriptores mediae et infimae latinitatis, 3 vols. (Paris, 1678),II, p. 748; entry reprinted in the expanded Maurist edition, 6 vols. (Paris, 1733–1736), IV,pp. 1205–1206, with the addition of an incorrect reference to the 1471–1474 Nominalistdefense printed in vol. 4 (1683) of Étienne Baluze, Miscellaneorum … Collectio veterummonumentorum, 7 vols. (Paris, 1678–1715). The original edition of Du Cange was printedin Frankfurt in 1681 and 1710, and the expanded edition went through many printingsin France, Germany, and Italy. Since Du Cange’s work was viewed as a dictionary,

in search of nominalism 3

Aventinus and Du Boulay, who gave equal attention to the twelfth-and fourteenth-century “phases” of nominalism, Du Cange limited hisdiscussion to late eleventh and early twelfth-century texts. The histo-ries of philosophy that began to appear in the mid-eighteenth cen-tury simply expanded on this foundation without significantly differentconclusions.5 By 1793 the topic merited separate historical treatment,which Christoph Meiners accorded it before the Akademie der Wis-senschaften at Göttingen in that year.6

French surveys of scholastic or medieval philosophy in the early nine-teenth century inherited this standard picture, especially as mediatedthrough Du Boulay and Du Cange.7 Nineteenth-century views werealso influenced by the lingering memory of Jansenism (which someviewed as a re-emergence of Ockhamist nominalism) and the perceivedthreat of empiricism and skepticism in seventeenth-century philoso-phy in England and France. Xavier Rousselot traced elements of thethought of John Locke and Nicolas Malebranche back to Ockham,confirming in his mind a nominalism dominant since the fourteenthcentury.8 And just as the historical account was shaped by the perspec-

not as a historical or interpretive study, it was not cited explicitly, but the content ofsubsequent accounts makes clear that its wide circulation was influential on historicalinterpretation.

5 Johann Jacob Brucker, Historia critica philosophiae, 5 vols. (Leipzig, 1733–1763); 6vols. (Leipzig, 1766–1767), III, pp. 673–674, 740, 847; Johann Gottlieb Buhle, Lehrbuch derGeschichte der Philosophie, 8 vols. (Göttingen, 1796–1804); Buhle, Geschichte der neuern Philoso-phie, vol. 1 (Göttingen, 1800), pp. 835–841, 885–890; Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann,Geschichte der Philosophie, 11 vols. (Leipzig, 1798–1819), VIII, pp. 160–169, 840–842; Ten-nemann, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie für den akademischen Unterricht (Leipzig, 1812).

6 C. Meiners, De realium et nominalium initiis et progressu in Commentationes societatisregiae scientiarum Gottingensis, vol. 12 (1793). Behind Meiner’s work lay not only Brucker’saccount but several earlier theoretical treatises, e.g., Jean Salabert, Philosophia nominaliumvindicata or Tractatus contra aemulos nominalium (Paris, 1661); the anonymous Ars rationis admentem nominalium (Oxford, 1673); Jacobus Thomasius, “Oratio de secta Nominalium,”in Orationes (Leipzig, 1683); Johann Theodor Künneth, De vita et haeresi Roscelini, diss.under Johann Martin Chladini (Erlangen, 1756).

7 Two of the most popular surveys were Joseph de Gérando, Histoire comparée dessystèmes de philosophie, 8 vols. (Paris, 1822–1847); and Xavier Rousselot, Études sur laphilosophie dans le moyen âge, 3 vols. (Paris, 1840–1842).

8 Rousselot interpreted Ockham through the views of John Locke, Nicolas Male-branche, and the Jansenist Antoine Arnauld; see Rousselot, Études, pt. 3 (Paris, 1842),pp. 254–291. It is surprising that Rousselot did not include David Hume in his legacyof nominalism. On the dominance of nominalism from the fourteenth to the seven-teenth and eighteenth centuries, see Rousselot, Études, pt. 3, pp. 289–290: “Après lemaître [i.e., Occam], vint une suite nombreuse de continuateurs, qui conduisirent laphilosophie du moyen âge à l’entrée des temps modernes, et dont quelques-uns même

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tives and received opinions of the early modern period, so too was thepejorative judgment on the philosophical value of nominalism.9

A major shift in that picture came in 1836 with Victor Cousin’sintroduction to his edition of previously unedited writings of Abelard.10

Cousin made a sharp distinction between Roscelin’s nominalism andAbelard’s conceptualism.11 The Historia calamitatum and other witnessesmade it apparent that Abelard had been critical of both Roscelinand William of Champeaux, representatives respectively of nominalismand realism, and thus Abelard’s via media should not be construed asnominalistic despite the views of several twelfth-century observers tothe contrary. Cousin’s view met with gradual acceptance across thefollowing decade.12

French historians had another reason for disassociating Abelard fromnominalism, namely their pride in Abelard as an early representativeor even the founder of French philosophy.13 The English Ockham

la conduisirent au coeur du XVIIe siècle.” M.H. Carré, Realists and Nominalists (Oxford,1946), p. 123: “English philosophy has been dominated by Nominalist theories. Hobbes,Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Hamilton, and Mill express views on the nature of generalideas which are parallel to those of Ockham.” An even more sweeping version of thisview was expressed by Gustav Bergmann, Realism. A Critique of Brentano and Meinong(Madison, 1967), p. 135: “However things might have stood earlier, there is no doubtthat ever since the late Middle Ages nominalism was dominant.”

9 Despite the common perception that nominalism was pervasive from the four-teenth to eighteenth centuries, there were very few works that praised it, an exceptionbeing Jean Salabert’s Philosophia nominalium. The vast bulk of philosophical opinion wasanti-nominalist. In this sense the Thomistic polemic in Thomas de Vio Cajetan, orPetrus Nigri’s Clypeus Thomistarum of 1475 was only enhanced by both the anti-scholasticas well as the pro-patristic treatises of the seventeenth century. See, e.g., Juan LuisVives, De corruptis artibus (Cologne, 1532); Jean Caramuel y Lobkowitz, Bernardus PetrumAbailardum eiusque potentissimos sectarios triumphans (generally cited as Bernardus Triumphans)(Louvain, 1644); Adam Tribbechov, De doctoribus scholasticis et corrupta per eos divinarumhumanarumque rerum scientia (post 1665; 2nd ed. Jena, 1719); Martin Busse, De doctoribusscholasticis latinis, diss. under Jacob Thomasius (Leipzig, 1676).

10 V. Cousin, Ouvrages inédits d’Abélard (Paris, 1836). Cousin translated Tennemann’sGrundriss into French in 1830.

11 Cousin’s view was anticipated by Buhle, Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, I, p. 840,although Buhle had no specific label through which to categorize Abelard’s view.

12 The article on “Scolastique,” in Encyclopédie nouvelle, ed. Pierre Leroux, vol. 8(Paris, 1841), pp. 48–64, granted the distinction between Roscelin’s nominalism andAbelard’s conceptualism but saw the positions as facets of the same view (56) andconsidered Ockham’s doctrine to be that of Abelard (63). On the other hand, Rousselot,Études sur la philosophie, pt. 2 (Paris, 1841), pp. 12–15; Charles de Rémusat, Abélard, 2 vols.(Paris, 1845); B. Hauréau, De la philosophie scolastique, vol. 1 (Paris, 1850) accepted theview that Abelard was not really a nominalist.

13 Hauréau, in his De la philosophie scolastique, vol. 1 (Paris, 1850), p. 268, praised


deserved no such defense. Hauréau even noted that Roscelin, whoseopinions were then known only indirectly through the critiques of hisopponents, might appear less nominalistic if his actual writings hadsurvived.14 Cousin’s assessment was as readily adopted in Germany asin France.15

Although not initially in France, Ockham’s nominalism did undergoa similar relabeling in Germany. In his groundbreaking Geschichte der

Logik im Abendlande, the third volume of which appeared at Leipzig in1867, Carl Prantl questioned the appropriateness of the labels “nomi-nalist” and “nominalism” for Ockham or other late medieval logicians,substituting instead, in the case of Ockham, the labels “terminist” and“terminism,” which he felt more accurately described Ockham’s logicas well as his theory of universals, and was a label derived from the latemedieval period.16 Prantl was also aware of the extent to which theo-logical opposition to Ockham’s thought had influenced presentations ofhis views in histories of philosophy.17 Yet the shift in label from ‘nomi-nalist’ to ‘terminist’ did not significantly alter the prevailing pejorativejudgment on Ockham’s philosophy or his theology.

the appearance of V. Cousin’s 1836 edition of Abelard’s unedited works with thewords: “C’est M. Cousin qui vient d’élever ce monument à la gloire de la philosophiefrançaise.” Picavet felt that Cousin glorified Abelard at the expense of Roscelin; Roscelin(Paris, 1896), p. 21: “Avec Cousin, la légende de Roscelin se complète …. Abélard,chanté par les poètes et resté populaire par Héloïse, devenait le principal fondateurde la philosophie au moyen âge, le précurseur de Descartes, père de la philosophiemoderne.”

14 Hauréau, De la philosophie scolastique, I, p. 270. Almost simultaneously with Hau-réau’s work, J.A. Schmeller published his discovery of a letter of Roscelin to Abelardcontained in Munich, Staatsbibl., Clm 4643 and reproduced by Cousin in his revisededition of Abelard’s works. It was later reedited by Josef Reiners.

15 Wilhelm Kaulich, Geschichte der scholastischen Philosophie, vol. 1: Entwicklung der scho-lastischen Philosophie von Johannes Scotus Erigena bis Abälard (Prag, 1863) relied heavilyon French scholarship, esp. De Rémusat and Hauréau; Albert Stöckl, Geschichte derPhilosophie des Mittelalters, vol. 2 (Mainz, 1865); Friedrich Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichteder Philosophie der patristischen und scholastischen Zeit, 5th ed. by Max Heinze (Berlin, 1877).

16 C. Prantl, Geschichte der Logic im Abendlande, vol. 3 (Leipzig, 1867). Prantl’s work, forall the distortions it is now seen to have introduced into the history of logic, was for itsday an extremely learned study and influential throughout Europe.

17 Prantl, Geschichte der Logik, III, p. 344: “wenn auch spätere Nachkommen, welcheden thatsächlichen geschichtlichen Verlauf nicht kannten oder ignorirten, sich einziggerade diese Seite aus Occam herauslasen und denselben so als den wahren Hort einesnachmals sogenannten ‘Nominalismus’ … verehrten, woraus dann eine theologischePolemik gegen den Occamismus erwuchs, welche unbemerkt bis zum heutigen Tageauf die Geschichtschreibung der Philosophie einen bedingenden Einfluss ausübte.”

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In tracing the history of nominalism Aventinus, Du Boulay, and DuCange, as we have seen, placed its beginning in the generation ofRoscelin in the late eleventh century. Some nineteenth-century histori-ans, such as Cousin, Hauréau, and Prantl, saw the origins of moderatenominalism or conceptualism in the ninth century, specifically in Hra-banus Maurus, John Scotus Eriugena, and Eric of Auxerre. Followingthis line of argument, K.S. Barach devoted an entire study to nominal-ism before Roscelin.18

In his Roscelin published in 1896, Picavet portrayed Roscelin as a fig-ure tragically maligned by sixteenth- and seventeenth-century histori-ans of philosophy, especially Aventinus, Caramuel y Lobkowitz, and DuBoulay, who anachronistically superimposed fourteenth-century hetero-dox nominalism on the eleventh and twelfth centuries, and on Roscelinin particular—a case of mistaken identity that Condillac, Condorcet,De Gérando, and Tennemann simply furthered.19 Picavet’s descrip-tion of Roscelin’s teaching did not differ radically from that of earlierscholars, but he was unwilling to associate it with the pejorative label‘nominalist’. The work of Picavet was blended with the views of ear-lier nineteenth-century historians in the survey of medieval philosophypublished by Maurice De Wulf in 1900, whose popularity is reflected inits many editions.20 In none of these accounts was nominalism consid-ered anything other than a theory that rejected the existential status ofuniversals.

The second monograph (after Barach’s work in 1866) devoted solelyto the origins and early history of nominalism was published in 1910

18 K.S. Barach, Zur Geschichte des Nominalismus vor Roscelin (Vienna, 1866). For earlierexpressions of this view see Cousin, Ouvrages inédits d’Abélard (Paris, 1836), pp. lxxxvff.; Hauréau, De la philosophie scolastique, vol. 1 (Paris, 1850), pp. 141–143, 270; Hauréau,Histoire de la philosophie scolastique, vol. 1 (Paris, 1872), pp. 193–194, 196; Prantl, Geschichteder Logik, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1861), p. 81. In the fifth edition of Ueberweg’s Grundrissder Geschichte der Philosophie, pp. 122–135, the entire history of philosophy from ScotusEriugena to the late eleventh century was presented in terms of the conflict between“Realismus und Nominalismus”. By the eleventh edition, edited by Bernhard Geyer in1927, the elements in ninth-century thought so identified were reduced to (177) “die anNominalismus anklingt,” and the adopted view (205) became “… der Gegensatz alsodes Realismus und Nominalismus. Dieser begegnet uns zum ersten Male im letztenViertel des 11. Jahrhunderts.”

19 F.J. Picavet, Roscelin (Paris, 1896), pp. 17–23.20 M. de Wulf, Histoire de la philosophie médiévale (Louvain, 1900; 2nd ed. Paris and

Louvain, 1905).


by Josef Reiners.21 Reiners rejected the view that there were proto-nominalists before the late eleventh century and grounded the originsof nominalism in the controversy over universals in which Roscelinplayed the principal role. Against the standard interpretation that triedto distance Abelard’s conceptualism from Roscelin’s nominalism, Rein-ers argued that Abelard substituted sermo or nomen in place of Roscelin’svox theory, and that it was Abelard’s position which, by the time of Johnof Salisbury, was labeled ‘nominalist’. Moreover, Reiners reedited theletter of Roscelin to Abelard.

The opening years of the 1920s marked a period of intensive researchon late medieval nominalism. The decade began with the appearanceof two works by Gerhard Ritter that sought to define more preciselythe heritage of Ockham and nominalism in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Germany, especially at Heidelberg. His first work, on Mar-silius of Inghen as representative of an Ockhamist school, revealedMarsilius to be more independent and conservative than Ritter ini-tially had expected.22 This work was immediately followed by a brieferstudy of the meaning of the fifteenth-century Wegestreit between thevia antiqua and the via moderna.23 Ritter surveyed and rejected currentviews of the fifteenth-century conflict, e.g., that it was a revival of thetwelfth-century conflict over universals (Aventinus), that it was a con-flict between the Byzantine/Stoic logic of terminism and traditionalAristotelian logic rather than the problem of universals (Prantl), thatit was a conflict between late scholasticism and a humanist return tothe teaching of the ancients (Hermelink), or that it was a difference inmethods of logical analysis and instruction that had little philosophicimport (Benary).24 Against these interpretations Ritter maintained thatthe controversy was fundamentally one of differences in the methodand content of logic, but a controversy that had theological implicationsas well. Throughout his work Ritter took a broader view of nominalism

21 J. Reiners, Der Nominalismus in der Frühscholastik, BGPM, vol. 8/5 (Münster i. W.,1910).

22 G. Ritter, Marsilius von Inghen und die okkamistische Schule in Deutschland (Heidelberg,1921).

23 G. Ritter, Via Antiqua und Via Moderna auf den deutschen Universitäten des XV. Jahrhun-derts (Heidelberg, 1922).

24 Aventinus and Prantl are cited above in notes 2 and 16. The other works areH. Hermelink, Die theologische Fakultät in Tübingen 1477 bis 1534 (Tübingen, 1906); Fried-rich Benary, Zur Geschichte der Stadt und der Universität Erfurt am Ausgang des Mittelalters,pt. 3: ‘Via antiqua’ und ‘via moderna’ auf den deutschen Hochschulen des Mittelalters mit besondererBerücksichtigung der Universität Erfurt (Gotha, 1919).

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than simply a theory of universals, and his approach to nominalism wasessentially neutral and non-pejorative.

The same cannot be said of the works that immediately followed it,such as the fifth edition of De Wulf ’s Histoire de la philosophie médiévale

(1924) or the studies of Ehrle, Feckes, and Michalski. Stimulated in partby Ritter’s work, Franz Ehrle shaped his 1925 work on Peter of Can-dia into a study of late medieval nominalism, tracing its developmentfrom Ockham, through the controversies at the University of Paris inthe 1340s, to the Wegestreit of the fifteenth century and its implicationsfor the Reformation.25 Ehrle brought to the topic of late medieval nom-inalism a strongly negative judgment—not the negative judgment ofmany nineteenth-century French scholars who saw a nominalist ances-try behind some of the views of John Locke, Nicolas Malebranche, andDavid Hume, but the negative judgment of Thomistic Catholic the-ologians who since the sixteenth century had opposed a voluntaristicsystem based on a theory of ascribed value that they traced to Ockhamand which they felt vitiated dogma on justification, sacramental theory,and ethics.

In the same year as Ehrle’s Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia, CarlFeckes published a study that expressed a negative view of nominal-ism similarly influenced by theological concerns.26 Instead of definingnominalism strictly in terms of the theory of universals or a particu-lar approach to language and logic, Feckes saw potentia absoluta spec-ulation as one of its principal characteristics. For Feckes the distinc-tion of absolute and ordained power, as applied by Ockham and hisfollowers to the doctrine of justification, was a device through whichnominalists could express outrageous and unorthodox views, de potentia

absoluta, while pretending, de potentia ordinata, to believe as the churchbelieves. To him the distinction was a further instance of the skepticaltendencies of nominalism. That view was not substantially undercut byHeinrich Grzondziel’s detailed study of the early history of the distinc-tion of absolute and ordained power, part of which was published in1926, since Grzondziel also assumed that the distinction was misusedby the Ockhamists as part of their corrupt theology.27 Similarly, vari-

25 F. Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V.(Münster i. W., 1925).

26 C. Feckes, Die Rechtfertigungslehre des Gabriel Biel und ihre Stellung innerhalb der nominalis-tischen Schule (Münster i. W., 1925).

27 H. Grzondziel, Die Entwicklung der Unterscheidung zwischen der potentia Dei absoluta undder potentia Dei ordinata von Augustin bis Alexander von Hales (Breslau, 1926).


ous studies of Konstanty Michalski, who had studied at Louvain withDe Wulf, attempted to document the destructive skeptical tendencies oflate medieval nominalism, beginning with his 1920 essay on philosophiccurrents at Paris and Oxford in the fourteenth century.28

When one compares the assessment of nominalism in 1925 withthat of Aventinus, one is struck by how little the basic account hadchanged in four centuries. The definition of nominalism had broadenedbeyond the problem of universals; new texts and further detail hadbeen added; the teaching of Abelard on universals had been relabeled‘conceptualism’ or ‘moderate nominalism’. Yet the basic history andevaluation had remained remarkably consistent.

The Reassessment of Ockham

The decade of the 1920s not only saw the publication of a number ofmajor studies that extended and reenforced the traditional picture ofnominalism, especially those of Michalski, Ritter, Ehrle, and Feckes. Itwas also the decade in which new texts and approaches appeared thatultimately formed the basis for a reassessment of nominalism, both itstwelfth-century and its late medieval history.

The new texts appeared in works by Grzondziel and M.-D. Chenu.As was noted above, Grzondziel, in a Breslau doctoral dissertationin 1926, studied the early history of the distinction of potentia absoluta

et ordinata from Augustine to Alexander of Hales.29 Although not hisprincipal intention, his study made clear that the distinction originatedin the opening years of the thirteenth century, not in late medievaltheology nor in the generation of Roscelin and Abelard. It was not,in origin, connected with nominalism in any sense; it was an orthodoxscholastic distinction used to express the teaching that what God hasdone and will do were chosen from a larger realm of possibility open toGod, and that God’s actions do not exhaust or fully realize his power.Although Grzondziel did not examine the use of the distinction in the

28 The principal essays of Michalski on fourteenth-century philosophy—as rich intheir information on manuscripts as they were biased in interpretation—were assem-bled by Kurt Flash as La philosophie au XIVe siècle. Six études (Frankfurt, 1969). Michalski’sessays helped shape the views of both Maurice De Wulf and Étienne Gilson on latemedieval nominalism.

29 Grzondziel, Die Entwicklung.

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late medieval period, his study suggested a different origin and earlyhistory than had been thought.

A few years earlier (although not published until 1934), Chenubrought together some twelfth- and thirteenth-century statementsabout the teaching of the nominales that suggested it had more to dowith a grammatical theory of the noun as applied to the problem of theobject of belief across time than to the problem of universals.30 Accord-ing to Chenu, the nominales were so called because they believed in theunitas nominis and in the theory that statements of belief expressed indifferent tenses before and after the events of the life of Christ, hadidentical meaning and, once true, were always true (semel verum, semper

verum). Although Chenu did not directly attack the traditional picture ofthe origin and initial meaning of nominalism, his evidence pointed in adifferent direction.

Neither Grzondziel’s nor Chenu’s studies attracted much attention,both because they were not shaped as countertheses and because theydid not circulate among scholars concerned with nominalism.31 Moreattention was accorded to two studies that directly proposed a reassess-ment of Ockham and his relation to nominalism on the basis of textsthat were already known.

The new approach to Ockham’s thought began with Erich Hochstet-ter’s Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms von Ockham in1927.32 Without specifically addressing the meaning and appropriate-ness of the label ‘nominalist’, Hochstetter saw Ockham as a propo-nent of an empiricist epistemology and metaphysics far removed fromthe skeptical and subjectivist interpretations of terminism and nominal-ism. Hochstetter was also among the first to call attention to the shiftin Ockham’s theory of universal concepts, from a fictum theory to anintellectio theory.33 The revised assessment of Ockham was extended by

30 M.-D. Chenu, “Contribution à l’histoire du traité de la foi,” in Mélanges Thomistes(Paris, 1934; written in 1923), pp. 123–140; “Grammaire et théologie aux XIIe et XIIIesiècles,” AHDLMA, 10 (1935–1936), 5–28. The thesis and evidence was re-presented inLa Théologie au douzième siècle (Paris, 1957), pp. 90–107.

31 Grzondziel’s work was largely unread until the 1960s, and Chenu’s two studies onthe teaching of the nominales were not applied to propositional theory or to nominalismuntil Gabriel Nuchelmans’s Theories of the Proposition (Amsterdam, 1973).

32 E. Hochstetter, Studien zur Metaphysik und Erkenntnislehre Wilhelms von Ockham (Berlin,1927).

33 Hochstetter, Studien, pp. 1–12, 78–117. S.G. Tornay, “William of Ockham’s nomi-nalism,” Philosophical Review, 45 (1936), 245–268 and Studies and Selections (La Salle, 1938),attempted to combine the texts into one view, but without success. Ockham’s shift


Paul Vignaux in his 1930–1931 articles on Ockham and on nominal-ism in the Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique.34 While accepting Reiners’sdepiction of the origin and early development of nominalism, Vignauxdisplayed a more sensitive reading of Abelard as well as a more pos-itive assessment of Ockham’s philosophy and theology, particularly asregards his use of the distinction of absolute and ordained power.

Despite the work of Hochstetter and Vignaux, who continued topublish studies taking a new approach to nominalism and Ockham,the negative assessment of both the “school” and its supposed leadercontinued through the next few decades.35 Vignaux’s teacher, ÉtienneGilson, was not moved to revise his views.36 Ernst Borchert’s perspectivewas all but untouched by the work of Hochstetter and Vignaux in hisstudy of the distinction of absolute and ordained power in the lateMiddle Ages (1940), despite the evidence of most of the texts cited inhis work.37 The traditional assessment was also retained by MeyrickCarré in his Realists and Nominalists (1946)—although he accepted thecategorization of Abelard as a conceptualist and the evidence for a shiftin Ockham’s views on universals—, Franz Pelster in his attempt to fillin the gap between twelfth- and fourteenth-century nominalism, in thesixth edition of De Wulf ’s Histoire de philosophie médiévale (1947), and byErwin Iserloh in his study of Ockham’s teaching on grace, justification,and the eucharist (1956).38

in opinion was accepted by J.R. Weinberg, “Ockham’s Conceptualism,” PhilosophicalReview, 50 (1941), 523–528; Carré, Realists and Nominalists, pp. 112–117; Ph. Boehner, “TheRealistic Conceptualism of William Ockham,” Traditio, 4 (1946), 307–335; Boehner,“The Relative Date of Ockham’s Commentary on the Sentences,” FS, 11 (1951), 305–316.

34 P. Vignaux, “Nominalisme” in DTC, 11.1 (1930), cols. 717–784; “Occam” in DTC,11.2 (1931), cols. 876–889.

35 P. Vignaux, Justification et prédestination au XIVe siècle (Paris, 1934); Vignaux, Nomi-nalisme au XIVe siècle (Montréal and Paris, 1948); E. Hochstetter, “Nominalismus?,” FS,9 (1949), 370–403; Hochstetter, “Viator mundi. Einige Bemerkungen zur Situation desMenschen bei Wilhelm von Ockham,” FzS, 32 (1950), 1–20.

36 É. Gilson, The Unity of Philosophical Experience (New York, 1937), pp. 3–121; Reasonand Revelation in the Middle Ages (New York, 1938), esp. pp. 86–89; La philosophie au moyenâge, 12th ed. (Paris, 1947), pp. 638–655; History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages(New York, 1955), pp. 487–520.

37 E. Borchert, Der Einfluss des Nominalismus auf die Christologie der Spätscholastik (Mün-ster, 1940), pp. 46–108.

38 Carré, Realists and Nominalists; F. Pelster, “Nominales und reales in 13. Jahrhun-dert,” Sophia, 14 (1946), 154–161; M. de Wulf, Histoire de philosophie médiévale, 6th ed. (Lou-vain, 1947); E. Iserloh, Gnade und Eucharistie in der philosophischen Theologie des Wilhelm vonOckham (Mainz, 1956). Within this group should be included: Albert Lang, Die Wege der

12 chapter one

Two scholars, who took Hochstetter’s and Vignaux’s interpretationsof Ockham’s thought more seriously, eventually did produce a reac-tion among those committed to the traditional assessment. PhilotheusBoehner, who in 1937 had published with Gilson a history of Chris-tian philosophy in the Middle Ages, began shortly afterwards a moreintensive study of Ockham’s non-polemical works, which led in turn toseries of revisionary studies.39 Boehner’s interpretation of Ockham andhis rejection of the authenticity of the Centiloquium brought an almostimmediate reaction from Anton Pegis and Erwin Iserloh.40 Boehner’sreplies, if not on all points convincing, did remove the Centiloquium

from the list of Ockham’s authentic works.41 With the encouragementof Ph. Boehner and Eligius Buytaert, Franciscan Studies and the pub-lication series of the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure, N.Y.,became vehicles for much of the new research on Ockham.42 The new

Glaubensbegründung bei den Scholastikern des 14. Jahrhunderts, BGPM, 30,1/2 (Münster, 1930);Heinrich Totting von Oyta, BGPTM, 33,4/5 (Münster, 1937); Joseph Lortz, Die Reformationin Deutschland (Freiburg, 1940; 1949).

39 É. Gilson and Ph. Boehner, Die Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie von ihren Anfän-gen bis Nikolaus von Cues (Paderborn, 1937); Boehner, “Manuscrits des oeuvres non-polémiques d’Ockham,” La France Franciscaine, 22 (1939), 171–175; “Zur Echtheit derSumma Logicae Ockhams,” FzS, 26 (1939), 190–193; “Ockham’s Tractatus de praedes-tinatione et de praescientia Dei et de futuris contingentibus and Its Main Problems,”Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 16 (1941), 177–192; “The TextTradition of Ockham’s Ordinatio,” The New Scholasticism, 16 (1942), 203–241; “The Noti-tia Intuitiva of Non-existents according to William Ockham,” Traditio, 1 (1943), 223–275;“The Medieval Crisis of Logic and the Author of the Centiloquium Attributed to Ock-ham,” FS, 4 (1944), 151–170; these articles were reprinted in Boehner, Collected Articles onOckham, ed. E.M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1958).

40 A. Pegis, “Concerning William of Ockham,” Traditio, 2 (1944), 465–480; Pegis,“Some Recent Interpretations of Ockham,” Speculum, 23 (1948), 452–463; E. Iserloh,“Um die Echtheit des Centiloquium. Ein Beitrag zur Wertung Ockhams und zurChronologie seiner Werke,” Gregorianum, 30 (1949), 78–103, 309–346.

41 Boehner, “In Propria Causa,” FS, 5 (1945), 37–54; “Ockham’s Theory of Truth,”FS, 5 (1945), 138–161; “The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham,” Traditio, 4(1946), 307–335; “Ockham’s Theory of Signification,” FS, 6 (1946), 143–170; “Ockham’sTheory of Supposition and the Notion of Truth,” FS, 6 (1946), 261–292; “The Meta-physics of William Ockham,” The Review of Metaphysics, 1 (1947–1948), 59–86; “Ock-ham’s Philosophy in the Light of Recent Research,” Proceedings of the Tenth InternationalCongress of Philosophy (Amsterdam, 1949), 1113–1116; “A Recent Presentation of Ockham’sPhilosophy,” FS, 9 (1949), 443–456; “On a Recent Study of Ockham,” FS, 10 (1950),191–196; all reprinted in Boehner, Collected Articles.

42 O. Fuchs, The Psychology of Habit According to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure,1952); M.C. Menges, The Concept of Univocity Regarding the Predication of God and CreatureAccording to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, 1952); D. Webering, Theory of Demonstration


approach to Ockham was also echoed at Paris in the work of LéonBaudry.43

The other scholar who helped extend the revised understanding ofOckham and its implications for the history of late medieval philosophywas E.A. Moody.44 Moody went beyond a reassessment of Ockham andattempted to separate the Venerable Inceptor from what he still per-ceived as a current of radical skepticism in late medieval thought, par-ticularly as represented by Nicholas of Autrecourt. For Moody, Buridanwas an Ockhamist in the revised sense of that label, while Autrecourtwas not.

The research on Ockham grew rapidly, and the newer literature andreassessment were surveyed frequently.45 Yet as the research of Boehnerand Moody illustrates, the revisionary movement of the 1940s did notresult in a new assessment of nominalism but in an attempt to sep-arate Ockham from nominalism as it was traditionally understood,much along the same lines as the earlier historiography on Abelard.Moreover, nominalism itself had grown beyond the definition of a the-ory of the origin and ontological status of universals. Despite Vignaux’swork, it was generally thought to be, at least in the late Middle Ages,a destructive movement based on the primacy of the individual andthe dissolution of natural theology that was voluntaristic, skeptical, andfideistic.46 Instead of challenging that view of nominalism, revisionaryscholars were content to remove from the ranks of the nominalists and

According to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, 1953); H. Shapiro, Motion, Time and PlaceAccording to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, 1957).

43 L. Baudry, Guillaume d’Occam. Sa vie, ses oeuvres, ses idées sociales et politiques, vol. I:L’homme et les oeuvres (Paris, 1950).

44 E.A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham (London, 1935); Moody, “Ockham,Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt,” FS, 7 (1947), 113–146; “Empiricism and Meta-physics in Medieval Philosophy,” The Philosophical Review, 67 (1958), 145–163.

45 E. Hochstetter, “Ockham-Forschung in Italien,” Zeitschrift für philosophische For-schung, 1 (1947), 559–578; Ph. Boehner, “Ockham’s Philosophy in the Light of RecentResearch”; Boehner, “Der Stand der Ockham-Forschung,” FzS, 34 (1952), 12–31; Tim-otheus Barth, “Wilhelm Ockham im Lichte der neuesten Forschung,” PJ, 60 (1950),464–467; Barth, “Nuove interpretazione della filosofia di Occam,” Studi francescani, 52(1955), 187–204; Helmar Junghans, Ockham im Lichte der neueren Forschung (Berlin, 1968).

46 The broad and negative definition of nominalism can be found in Gordon Leff,Bradwardine and the Pelagians (Cambridge, 1957); Leff, Medieval Thought from Saint Augustineto Ockham (St. Albans, 1958); Armand A. Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New York, 1962);David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought (London, 1962); Francis Oakley, ThePolitical Thought of Pierre d’Ailly (New Haven, 1964). Although using a more preciseand traditional understanding of nominalism, the same negative view can be foundin J.A. Weisheipl, “Ockham and some Mertonians,” MS, 30 (1968), 163–213.

14 chapter one

radical moderni whatever figure was the subject of their study. This pro-cedure, which Ritter had applied in part to Marsilius of Inghen earlierin the century, was applied by Damasus Trapp to Gregory of Rimini.47

Toward a New Assessment of Nominalism

The historiography on nominalism took an important shift in the early1960s through the work of Heiko Oberman.48 Oberman accepted theview that a nominalist movement existed in the late Middle Ages andthat its approach and doctrine were far broader than a theory of uni-versals. He also accepted the view that the names traditionally citedas belonging to this nominalist school, specifically Ockham, RobertHolcot, Adam Wodeham, Jean Buridan, Gregory of Rimini, Marsil-ius of Inghen, Pierre d’Ailly, Jean Gerson, and Gabriel Biel, were insome way linked. He was also convinced that Vignaux, Boehner, andMoody were correct in their reevaluation of Ockham. But Obermanchose to explain the discrepancy between aspects of the thought ofthese late medieval thinkers and the traditional view of nominalismnot by rejecting that categorization of their thought, but by revisingthe definition of nominalism and seeing it as a diverse movement thathad its conservative (Gregory of Rimini), radical (Holcot, Wodeham,Nicholas of Autrecourt, and John of Mirecourt), and mainstream (Ock-ham, Buridan, d’Ailly, Gerson, and Biel) currents. The nominalist labelwas enthusiastically embraced as a dynamic and largely positive forcein late medieval thought, except perhaps on the issue of justification. Itwas also seen primarily as a theological movement whose core doctrinelay not in a theory of universals but in the dialectic of the absolute andordained power of God.

47 In addition to the newer historiography on Ockham, Damasus Trapp attemptedto sever the connection between Gregory of Rimini and nominalism in: “Augus-tinian Theology of the 14th Century,” Augustiniana, 6 (1956), 146–274; “Gregory ofRimini Manuscripts, Editions and Additions,” Augustiniana, 8 (1958), 425–443; “NewApproaches to Gregory of Rimini,” Augustinianum, 2 (1962), 115–130; “ ‘Moderns’ and‘Modernists’ in MS Fribourg Cordeliers 26,” Augustinianum, 5 (1965), 241–270.

48 H.A. Oberman, “Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism with Attentionto its Relation to the Renaissance,” HTR, 53 (1960), 47–76; “Facientibus quod in seest Deus non denegat gratiam. Robert Holcot, O.P., and the Beginning of Luther’sTheology,” HTR, 55 (1962), 317–342; The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cambridge, Mass.,1963).


Discussions of nominalism in the 1960s and 1970s were, for the mostpart, engaged with Oberman’s thesis. While accepting the importanceof the covenantal theme and the use of the distinction of absolute andordained power in Ockham, Rimini, d’Ailly, and Biel, some schol-ars were reluctant to see these figures as part of a unified movementor to apply the label ‘nominalist’ to them, both because Oberman’sdefinition of nominalism was too far removed from either twelfth- orfifteenth-century usage, and because a fifteenth-century label—even ifused correctly—was applied to fourteenth-century figures anachronisti-cally.49 Whatever position was taken on the appropriateness of the nom-inalist label for fourteenth-century thinkers, the period of the 1960s and1970s was marked by intensive study on numerous figures traditionallyassociated with late medieval nominalism.50

49 These views were expressed in Courtenay, “Covenant and Causality in Pierred’Ailly,” Speculum, 46 (1971), 94–119; “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,” inThe Pursuit of Holiness in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, ed. C. Trinkaus andH.A. Oberman (Leiden, 1974), pp. 26–59. See also Courtenay, “Nominalism and LateMedieval Thought: a Bibliographical Essay,” Theological Studies, 33 (1972), 716–734;“Late Medieval Nominalism Revisited: 1972–1982,” JHI, 44 (1983), 159–164. The basisfor this position, as of 1972, was stated in “Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion,”p. 52: “… none of Ockham’s contemporaries ever called him a nominalist. ‘Nominalist’was a twelfth-century term that described a particular position on the question ofuniversals, and when nominales or opinio nominalium were used in the thirteenth century,they described the position of twelfth-century logicians. By 1270 these labels had ceasedto be used and were only reintroduced in the fifteenth century (possibly associatedwith the revival of Albertism and Thomism) to describe a position in logic, or moreaccurately, a way of teaching logic. … When, in the fifteenth century, Ockham’sname occurs in a list of nominales, the intent was to indicate that he shared withothers a particular approach to logic, not that all those named in the list belongedto a school of which Ockham was the founder.” Oberman, however, was influencedby common usage in which (Courtenay, p. 34) “ ‘nominalism’ is only a descriptiveterm for the thought of [those traditionally associated with nominalism].… In this …approach the term ‘nominalism’ loses its specific, traditional content, and runs the riskof being redefined with every new study.” [I have revised my view of twelfth-centurynominalism; see below, n. 62; article reprinted in this volume as Chapter 4.]

50 G. Leff, Gregory of Rimini (Manchester, 1961), to be used with caution; F. Oakley,“Pierre d’Ailly and the Absolute Power of God: Another Note on the Theology ofNominalism,” HTR, 56 (1963), 59–73; E.A. Moody, “Buridan and a Dilemma of Nom-inalism,” in Harry Austryn Wolfson Jubilee Volume, vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 1965), pp. 577–596;R.P. Desharnais, The History of the Distinction between God’s Absolute and Ordained Powerand Its Influence on Martin Luther, doctoral dissertation, Catholic University of Amer-ica (Washington, 1966); J.F. McNamara, Responses to Ockhamist Theology in the Poetry ofthe “Pearl”-Poet, Langland, and Chaucer, doctoral dissertation, Louisiana State University(Baton Rouge, 1968); Steven Ozment, Homo Spiritualis (Leiden, 1969); Heinrich Schep-ers, “Holkot contra dicta Crathorn,” PJ, 77 (1970), 320–354, 79 (1972), 106–136; FritzHoffmann, Die theologische Methode des Oxforder Dominikanerlehrers Robert Holcot, BGPTM,

16 chapter one

One particular avenue of exploration was sparked by E.A. Moody’ssuggested alterations of the traditional understanding of the relationof Ockham and Autrecourt and the significance of the Parisian ArtsFaculty statutes of 1339 and 1340, which had been viewed as anti-Ockhamist. He maintained that the statute of 1339 was not a condem-nation of Ockham but a restriction on the use of his writings pendinguniversity approval, and that the statute of 1340, far from being anattack on Ockham or the Ockhamists at Paris, was directed against ananti-Ockhamist, Nicholas of Autrecourt. Moody’s thesis was rejected byT.K. Scott and Ruprecht Paqué but found a more favorable hearing inthe studies of Courtenay and Tachau.51 It is likely that this chapter inthe dissemination of Ockham’s thought will continue to receive studyin the coming years.

The presumed unity of an Ockhamist tradition in late medievalthought has undergone severe testing in the last decade. KatherineTachau uncovered evidence that neither Ockham’s definition of intu-itive cognition nor his attack on sensible and intelligible species weregenerally adopted, even among those whose names have been mostclosely linked to Ockham, such as Adam Wodeham.52 The presentdirection of research not only casts doubt on a definable nominalist or aunified Ockhamist tradition in fourteenth-century thought, but reveals

n.F. 5 (Münster, 1972); Roy Van Neste, The Epistemology of John of Mirecourt in Rela-tion to Fourteenth Century Thought, doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin (Madi-son, 1972); Hester G. Gelber, Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought,1300–1335, doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin (Madison, 1974); Courtenay,“Covenant and Causality in Pierre d’Ailly”; “John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Riminion Whether God Can Undo the Past,” RTAM, 39 (1972), 224–256, 40 (1973), 147–174;Adam Wodeham (Leiden, 1978); W. Eckermann, Wort und Wirklichkeit. Das Sprachverständ-nis in der Theologie Gregors von Rimini und sein Weiterwirken in der Augustinerschule (Würzburg,1978).

51 E.A. Moody, “Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt,” FS, 7 (1947), 113–146; R. Paqué, Das Pariser Nominalistenstatut (Berlin, 1970); T.K. Scott, “Nicholas ofAutrecourt, Buridan and Ockhamism,” JHP, 11 (1971), 15–41; Courtenay and K.H. Ta-chau, “Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-German Nation at Paris, 1339–1341,”History of Universities, 2 (1982), 53–96; Courtenay, “The Reception of Ockham’s Thoughtat the University of Paris,” in Preuve et raisons à l’Université de Paris. Logique, ontologie etthéologie au XIVe siècle, ed. Z. Kaluza and P. Vignaux (Paris, 1984), pp. 43–64; Courtenay,“Force of Words and Figures of Speech: the Crisis over Virtus sermonis in the FourteenthCentury,” FS, 44 (1984), 107–128 [reprinted in this volume, chapters 8–10].

52 K.H. Tachau, “The Problem of the Species in medio at Oxford in the GenerationAfter Ockham,” Mediaeval Studies, 44 (1982), 394–443; Vision and Certitude in the Age ofOckham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345 (Leiden, 1988).


the heritage of Ockham to be more complex and less widely acceptedthan had previously been supposed.

The most important contribution towards revealing the thought andinterrelation of Ockham and those traditionally associated with himlies in the critical editions that have appeared in the last two decades.Among these are the edition of the non-political writings of Ockham,the edition of the Sentences commentary of Gregory of Rimini, and someof the questions of Robert Holcot and John of Mirecourt.53 Equallyuseful for this issue are the editions of questions from authors opposedto Ockham, such as John of Reading and Walter Chatton.54 Plansappear to be well underway for editions of the works of Jean Buridanand Marsilius of Inghen.

The intellectual climate that produced the conflict of reales and nom-

inales in the fifteenth century has again become an area of intensivestudy in recent years. Some studies have approached the problem fromthe standpoint of the antiqui/moderni conflict, which as a topos had amuch wider range than late scholasticism.55 One critical area of discus-sion has focused on Jean Gerson as theologian and chancellor of theUniversity of Paris, his reform of teaching, and his opposition to aspectsof English thought.56 The other critical area has been the Albertist

53 William of Ockham, Opera philosophica et theologica, ed. Ph. Boehner, G. Gál, etal. (St. Bonaventure, 1967–1984); Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super primum et secundumsententiarum, ed. D. Trapp et al. (Berlin, 1979–1984); H.G. Gelber, Exploring the Boundariesof Reason. Three Questions on the Nature of God by Robert Holcot, OP (Toronto, 1983). Anedition of questions from Mirecourt’s Sentences commentary is presently underway byMassimo Parodi.

54 Steven J. Livesey, Theology and Science in the Fourteenth Century. Three Questions on theUnity and Subalternation of the Sciences from John of Reading’s Commentary on the Sentences(Leiden, 1989); Walter Chatton, Reportatio et Lectura super Sententias: Collatio ad LibrumPrimum et Prologus, ed. J.C. Wey (Toronto, 1989).

55 See, for example, A. Buck, Die “querelle des Anciens et des Modernes” im italienischenSelbstverständnis der Renaissance und des Barocks, Sitzungsberichte der WissenschaftlichenGesellschaft Frankfurt, 11/1 (Wiesbaden, 1973); Elisabeth Gössmann, Antiqui und Moderniim Mittelalter (Munich, 1974); Antiqui und Moderni, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 9, ed. A. Zim-mermann (Berlin, 1974); and the articles by Courtenay, C. Trinkaus, and H.A. Ober-man in JHI, 48 (1987), 3–50.

56 P. Glorieux, “Le chancelier Gerson et la réforme de l’enseignement,” in Mélangesofferts à Étienne Gilson (Toronto–Paris, 1959), pp. 285–298; S. Ozment, “The Univer-sity and the Church, Patterns of Reform in Jean Gerson,” Medievalia and Humanistica,n.s. 1 (1970), 111–126; G. Ouy, “Gerson et l’Angleterre. A propos d’un texte polémiqueretrouvé du Chancelier de Paris contre l’Université d’Oxford, 1396,” in Humanism inFrance at the End of the Middle Ages and in the Early Renaissance, ed. A.H.T. Levi (Manch-ester, 1970), pp. 43–81; W. Hübener, “Der theologisch-philosophische Konservatismusdes Jean Gerson,” in Antiqui und Moderni, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 9, pp. 171–200;

18 chapter one

movement, the Formalists, and the role of Jean de Maisonneuve, anarea recast by the research contributions of Zénon Kaluza.57

Nominalist historiography has not been exclusively preoccupied withOckham, Ockhamism, and the via moderna in the late Middle Ages.Abelard has continued to receive attention. The work of Jean Jolivethas provided a more balanced and critical view of Abelard’s thought,and David Luscombe, in addition to various studies and an editionand translation of Abelard’s Scito te ipsum, has explored Abelard’s influ-ence in twelfth-century intellectual life.58 In conjunction with Jolivet,Vignaux revisited some of the themes that concerned him in the early1930s, especially Abelard and nominalism.59

Twelfth-century nominalism as well as the origin and early meaningof the label nominales have been reopened in the last few years. Scholarsconnected with the Institut for Graesk og Latinsk Middelalderfilologi inCopenhagen have greatly extended the body of references to the opin-

iones nominalium, especially in texts relating to grammar.60 From anotherquarter, Gabriel Nuchelmans reintroduced Chenu’s findings on theory

H.A. Oberman, Contra vanam curiositatem (Zürich, 1974); Z. Kaluza, “Le chancelier Ger-son et Jérôme de Prague,” AHDLMA, 51 (1984), 81–126; Ch. Burger, Aedificatio, fructus,utilitas; Johannes Gerson als Professor der Theologie und Kanzler der Universität Paris (Tübingen,1986); Mark S. Burrows, “Jean Gerson after Constance: ‘Via Media et Regia’ as a Revi-sion of the Ockhamist Covenant,” Church History, 59 (1990), 467–481.

57 W. Hübener, “Robertus Anglicus OFM und die formalistische Tradition,” inPhilosophie im Mittelalter. Entwicklungslinien und Paradigmen, ed. J.P. Beckmann, L. Hon-nefelder, G. Schrimpf and G. Wieland (Hamburg, 1987), pp. 329–353; Z. Kaluza,“Exode 3,14 et Matthieu 6,9: Le qui es dans quelques textes de Henri de Pomerio(1382–1469) et de Heimeric de Campo (1395–1460),” in Celui qui est. Interprétations juives etchrétiennes d’Exode 3,14, Paris 1986, pp. 163–203; Kaluza, “Le ‘De universali reali’ de Jeande Maisonneuve et les epicuri litterales,” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, 33(1986), 469–516; Kaluza, Les Querelles doctrinales à Paris. Nominalistes et realistes aux confins duXIVe et du XVe siècles (Bergamo, 1988).

58 J. Jolivet, “Comparaison des théories du langage chez Abélard et chez les Nom-inalistes du XIVe siècle,” in Peter Abelard, ed. E.M. Buytaert (Louvain and the Hague,1974), pp. 163–178; Jolivet, Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard (Paris, 1982); D.E. Lus-combe, The School of Peter Abelard (Cambridge, 1969).

59 Vignaux, “Note sur le nominalisme d’Abélard,” in Pierre Abélard–Pierre le Vénérable(Paris, 1975), pp. 523–529; “La problématique du nominalisme médiéval peut-elle éclai-rer des problèmes philosophiques actuels?” Revue philosophique de Louvain, 75 (1977), 293–331.

60 Most of this evidence appeared in articles in the CIMAGL by Yukio Iwakuma,Sten Ebbesen, Margarita Fredborg, N.J. Green-Pedersen, and others. Some of therelevant works of these scholars as well as L.M. de Rijk also appeared in StudiaMediewistyczne and Vivarium.


of the unity of the noun in relation to propositional theory.61 Thesesources led Calvin Normore and myself, independently, to set out twomodels for the origin and early meaning of nominalism.62

The state of the question on medieval nominalism has undergonesignificant revision in the last century. In comparison to the new evi-dence and approaches that have appeared since 1930, the descriptionsof nominalism passed down from the sixteenth to the early twentiethcentury seem like slight variations on a standard theme. Yet 1989 doesnot mark the conclusion or even a secure resting point from whichto summarize these research achievements. Too many texts, authors,and details relating to the opiniones nominalium, Abelard, Ockham, andrelated figures have yet to be studied before we can have an adequatepicture of nominalism in either the twelfth century or the late MiddleAges. As limiting as this is for a historiographical survey, it is preciselythe exciting challenge that drives the enterprise of research.

61 G. Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition (Amsterdam, 1973), esp. pp. 178–189.62 C. Normore, “The Tradition of Mediaeval Nominalism,” in Studies in Medieval

Philosophy, ed. J.F. Wippel (Washington, 1987), pp. 201–217; Courtenay, “Nominales andNominalism in the Twelfth Century,” in Lectionum varietates. Hommage à Paul Vignaux(1904–1987), ed. J. Jolivet, Z. Kaluza, A. de Libera (Paris, 1991), pp. 229–250. Seealso the important study of Marcia Colish, “Gilbert, the Early Porretans, and PeterLombard: Semantics and Theology,” in Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains aux origines dela ‘logica modernorum’ (Naples, 1988), pp. 229–250.

part one

BEFORE OCKHAM

chapter two

AUGUSTINE AND NOMINALISM*

The two elements in the title may well appear contradictory to many.Augustine stands as the foundation of orthodox Christian theology inthe West, a thinker with roots in Neoplatonism with which nominalismhas traditionally been juxtaposed, and the great opponent of Pelagianthought that has so often been identified with nominalism. Nominalismhas usually been considered a radical movement in western philosophyand theology: a philosophy strongly opposed to all forms of Platonismand all entities beyond the individual; a philosophy concerned withwords, not things; and one linked to a semi-Pelagian theology thatmakes God a debtor to those who, in this life, make an effort towardtheir salvation (facientibus quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam). What hasthis particular form of Athens or Babylon to do with Jerusalem?

Although it might be enlightening to trace Augustinian elementsin late medieval nominalism, that is not the goal of this paper. Infact, it will be best to rid the mind of what is normally meant bynominalism, either traditional representations or more recent revisions,either philosophical nominalism or theological nominalism. I will bedealing, instead, with the role played by Augustinian texts in the originof the term “nominalist” itself.

Over half a century ago the French scholar M.-D. Chenu madea revolutionary discovery that has never received the attention it de-served.1 In place of the traditional assumption that nominalists were socalled because they believed that universals were only mere names—nomina—that had no basis in external reality, Chenu established that

* Originally presented as a paper in a conference on Augustine at the Universityof the South and published in Saint Augustine and His Influence in the Middle Ages, ed.E.B. King and J.T. Schaefer (Sewanee: The Press of the University of the South, 1988),pp. 91–97.

1 M.-D. Chenu, “Contribution à l’histoire du traité de la foi,” in Mélanges Thomistes(Paris, 1934; imprimatur 1923), pp. 123–140; “Grammaire et théologie aux XIIe etXIIIe siècles,” AHDLMA 10 (1935–1936), 5–28; La Théologie au douzième siècle (Paris,1957), pp. 90–107. Additional examples and discussion occur in A. Landgraf, “Studienzur Theologie des zwölften Jahrhunderts,” Traditio 1 (1943), 183–222; G. Nuchelmans,Theories of the Proposition (Amsterdam, 1973), pp. 165–189.

24 chapter two

the origin of the term “nominalist” did not arise in the context of theproblem of universals at all. The label “nominalist” arose as a gram-matical theory of the unity of the noun that was applied to certainproblems, particularly theological problems that concerned immutabil-ity. What came to be known as the theory of the unity or oneness of thenoun (unitas nominis) was the view that there are primary root meaningsto words, both nouns and verbs, that underlie changing grammaticalforms or inflections. In any given language, a name, spelled identically,may be assigned to several different objects or activities, but the men-tal equivalents of those objects or activities are separate nomina. In theclassic example, canis can mean dog, the constellation, or a river. Eachnoun has a primary meaning or signification, reflected in its stem, thatlies beneath the changing forms produced by case, number, and gen-der. Similarly, each verb has a primary signification, again reflected inits stem, that lies beneath the changing endings of tense, mood, voice,or participial form. Like nouns, verbs have one denotation and manydeclinations. Grammatical forms were viewed as consignifications (vocesconsignificativae) that do not alter the primary signification of a word.And what was applied to words was also applied to statements con-taining a subject and predicate. They also had one primary meaningthat was not affected or altered by changing grammatical inflections,particularly tense forms.

Although not fully explored or developed by Chenu, this theorywas used in the twelfth century to solve problems of immutability: theimmutability of divine knowledge, divine volition, divine power, andof Christian belief. What God knows, wills, or is able to do at onetime remains the same despite that passage of time. Similarly, the arti-cles of the Christian faith are true regardless of the point in time (andconsequent tense structure) of the affirmation. It was on this last prob-lem, perhaps the central one for the entire development, that our firstAugustinian text appears. In adopting a “nominalist” solution to theproblem of divine knowledge, namely that the content of divine knowl-edge remains the same across time despite the fact that we express thisknowledge in different tense forms depending on whether the objectof knowledge lies in the past, present, or future, Peter Lombard citedas authoritative support a passage from Augustine’s homilies on theGospel of John.2 The patriarchs (principally Abraham) believed the

2 Lombard, Sent. I, dist. 41, c. 3 in Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae, vol. I (Grottafer-rata, 1971), p. 293.

augustine and nominalism 25

same truths about Christ as Christians affirm in the creed. The faith ofthe antiqui and the moderni is identical despite the fact that what Abra-ham and Moses believed was in the future tense and what Christiansbelieve is in the past tense. Tempora variata sunt, non fides.3

The object of knowledge and belief was a controversial issue in thetwelfth century. Because of the Augustinian text and related passages inScripture and Augustine, all participants in the debate wished to affirmthe identity of faith. Because the actual article of belief differed in tense(future for Abraham, past for us), the article as statement (enuntiabile)could not be the object of belief without committing one to the positionthat the object of belief changes. But if tense does not matter and thus if“Christ will be born of a virgin” and “Christ was born of a virgin” areessentially identical, then the faith of the Jew, who believes the Messiahwill come, is identical with that of the Christian. Consequently, somethought the object of faith was the actual historical event: the Incarna-tion, Crucifixion, Resurrection, Ascension, etc. Others, however, recog-nized that only statements (enuntiabilia), not events or things (res), couldbe objects of assent or denial. We do not “believe this conference”;what we believe is that this conference is now taking place. To say webelieve in the Incarnation means that we believe the Incarnation tookplace. But that would seem to involve one in statements of belief thatdiffer in tense. The “nominalist” solution to this impasse was to arguethat similar statements of belief, which differ only in tense form, havean underlying identical meaning or signification, just as do nouns andverbs. A statement (enuntiabile), once true, is always true. Semel est verum,

semper est verum.Does the Augustinian passage cited by Lombard have only a superfi-

cial similarity to this nominalist theory of nouns, verbs, and statements,or is the nominalist solution to the problem of the object of belief, asWilliam of Auxerre later asserted, a correct interpretation of Augus-tine’s position?4 Was Augustine, in any sense, one of the fathers of

3 Augustine, Tract, in Ioh., 45, 9 (CCL 36, 392): “Ante adventum Domini nostri IesuChristi… praecesserunt iusti, sic in eum credentes venturum, quomodo nos credimusin eum qui venit. Tempora variata sunt, non fides. Quia et ipsa verba pro temporevariantur, cum varie declinantur; alium sonum habet: ‘venturus est’; alium sonumhabet: ‘venit’; mutatus est sonus, ‘venturus est’, et ‘venit’; eadem tamen fides utrosqueconiungit, et eos qui venturum esse, et eos qui eum venisse crediderunt. Diversisquidem temporibus, sed utrosque per unum fide ostium.…”

4 William of Auxerre, Summa aurea I, tr. 7, c. 1; ed. J. Ribaillier, vol. 1 (Paris, 1980),p. 181: “Sed secundum Nominales qui dicunt: quod semel est verum, semper est verum,

26 chapter two

the theory of terms and propositional analysis that theologians in thetwelfth and thirteenth centuries understood as the essence of Nominal-ism?

Augustine touched on the subject of the object of belief several timesin his early works, for example in De catechizandis rudibus (c. 400) andin a letter to Deogratias written around 409.5 In the letter Augustineaffirmed the identity of belief between Christians (nos) and the Patri-archs (antiqui). There he affirms that faith and salvation do not varywith the change in time nor with the fact that belief is expressed byus in the past tense and was expressed by them in the future tense.The things (res) that are believed do not vary; only the names (nomina)and signs (signa).6 In this passage Augustine seems to associate the termnomen with the outward, changing forms of observance and belief, notthe inward, constant meaning of the faith of those before and after theadvent of Christ. But he was not including syntactical structure andtense form in his use of nomen; the different “names” have to do withdifferent “rites and ceremonies” of the old law and the new gospel.Moreover, it is unclear in the passage whether by res Augustine meansthe events of the life of Christ or statements about those events, but theformer might be the more natural construction.

Augustine returned to this theme around 416 in his homilies onthe Gospel of John. In glossing the passage that the sheep did notlisten to the false prophets before Christ, Augustine remarked thatfaith remains the same for believers before and after Christ. BeforeChrist’s advent, “there were righteous men, believing in the same wayin him who was to come, as we believe in him who has come. Thetimes differed, but not the faith.” He went on to say that verbs varywith tense, and that “he is to come” is one “sound” and “he hascome” is another “sound”. Words, which are signs, change sound (i.e.,

Deus nihil incipit vel desinit scire. Et hoc magis concordat Augustino et Magistro insententiis.”

5 De cate. rud. 3, 6 (CCL 46, 125); Epistula (102) ad Deogratium (CSEL 34, 554–555).6 Epistula ad Deogratium (CSEL 34, 554–555): “Sicut enim nos in eum credimus et

apud patrem manentem et qui in carne iam venerit, sic in eum credebant antiqui etapud patrem manentem et in carne venturum. Nec, quia pro temporum varietate nuncfactum adnuntiatur, quod tunc futurum praenuntiabatur, ideo fides ipsa variata velsalus ipsa diversa est nec, quia una eademque res aliis atque aliis sacris et sacramentisvel prophetatur vel praedicatur, ideo alias et alias res vel alias et alias salutes oportetintellegi.” “Proinde aliis tunc nominibus et signis aliis autem nunc et prius occultiuspostea manifestius et prius a paucioribus post a pluribus una tamen eademque verareligio significatur et observatur.”


grammatical form) with reference to time. What those words signify(significata), however, remains the same. From there Augustine moves toa eucharistic analogy. Just as the Hebrews drank the water that flowedfrom the rock (Exodus 17), so we are nourished by the sacrament onthe altar. The visible species differ; the underlying meaning (significatio)is the same.7

This discussion must be viewed against the background of Augus-tine’s theory of the noun. The primacy of the nominative case of anoun and the present tense of a verb were well established in ancientgrammar. The oblique cases, gender forms, and past and future tenseswere accidental qualities of the principal signification of words. Aristo-tle distinguished between the noun proper and the cases of a noun, justas between a verb proper (present action) and the tenses of a verb (pastand future).8 The essence of the verb was action; the time of that actionwas a secondary, qualitative addition.

The role of the nomen (naming word) was larger than what is nor-mally understood by “noun”. Not only did it usually include pronouns,adjectives and other parts of speech linked to nouns, but verbs couldbe viewed as compounds of the copula est and the predicate—a namedactivity as substantive. “Socrates runs” means “Socrates is running”.Once stripped of its temporal quality and the hidden copula, it was thisnaming function that created the principal signification (the runningSocrates) and united all tense forms of a verb.

These views, adopted by Cicero, were important influences shapingAugustine’s view of language and sign. In De magistro Augustine put

7 See above, note 3. Tract. in Ioh. (CCL 36, 392): “In signis diversis eadem fides;sic in signis diversis, quomodo in verbis diversis; quia verba sonos mutant per tem-pora, et utique nihil aliud sunt verba quam signa. Significando enim verba sunt; tollesignificationem verbo, strepitus inanis est. Significata ergo sunt omnia.” 393: “Utiquecredebant; sed illi ventura esse, nos autem venisse.… Videte ergo, fide manente, signavariata. Ibi petra Christus, nobis Christus quod in altari Dei ponitur. Et illi pro magnosacramento eiusdem Christi biberunt aquam profluentem de petra; nos quid bibamusnorunt fideles. Si speciem visibilem intendas, aliud est; si intellegibilem significationem,eumdem potum spiritalem biberunt.”

8 Arist., On Interp. 2: “The expressions ‘of Philo’, ‘to Philo’, and so on, constitutenot nouns, but cases of a noun. The definition [meaning] of these cases of a noun isin other respects the same as that of the noun proper …” On Interp. 3: “A verb is thatwhich, in addition to its proper meaning, carries with it the notion of time.” “Similarly,‘he was healthy’, ‘he will be healthy’, are not verbs, but tenses of a verb; the differencelies in the fact that the verb indicates present time, while the tenses of the verb indicatethose times which lie outside the present.”

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forward his theory that “every word (verbum) is a noun (nomen).”9 Wordsare verbal signs with specific meaning. “All things which are utteredby the articulate voice with some signification are called words.”10

Nouns are audible signs of things, while the term nomen itself is a signsignifying those nouns that fall under its signification. But the termnomen can mean a noun in the strict sense (as a part of speech), allnoun-related words that signify things or qualities, or simply the subjectof a sentence.

Augustine supported his theory that every word is a noun by theexample that any word, no matter what part of speech, can be thesubject of a sentence and thus be made a noun, as in the sentence “if isa two-letter word.”11 But Augustine understood the distinction betweenobject language and metalanguage, and in this example he meantmore than what would later be understood as material supposition.For Augustine, mental language was primary.12 The mental concept(intellectus) is the true sign of the thing in external reality, and the verbalexpression is a sign of the mental sign, just as the written word is asign of the uttered word. Although Augustine’s example, that any partof speech can be made to be the subject of a sentence, does not provethat every word has a name function, Augustine’s essential point, asMary Sirridge noted some years ago, is that every word is a verbalsign for a thought object that is the same no matter in what languageit is expressed.13 There is a common meaning or mental equivalentfor every word. It can be argued that it is the oneness of this mentalequivalent that Augustine has in mind when he says that every word isa noun.

It should also be noted that Augustine, when considering verbs, dis-tinguished action from tense. Like Aristotle, he maintained the primacy

9 De magistro 5 (CCL 29, 170): “omne verbum nomen et omne nomen verbum est.”Ibid. (CCL 29, 173): “omnibus partibus orationis significari aliquid et ex eo appellari; siautem appellari, et nominari; si nominari, nomine utique nominari.” In defense of hisposition Augustine notes (CCL 29, 174) that Cicero called the preposition coram a nomeneven though it was used as an adverb.

10 Ibid., 4 (CCL 29, 165): “ut verbum sit, quod cum aliquo significatu articulata voceprofertur.” On signification from Augustine to the twelfth century, see G.R. Evans, TheLanguage and Logic of the Bible: The Earlier Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 72–89.

11 Ibid., 5 (CCL 29, 169–175). Augustine uses a different example, but his point is thatany part of speech can be made the subject of a verb when a word is referring to itself.

12 De quantitate animae 32 (PL 32, 1071–1072); De magistro 1 (CCL 29, 157–159).13 M. Sirridge, “Augustine: Every Word is a Name,” New Scholasticism 50 (1976), 183–

192.


of what we would call present tense. Although not using the languageof consignification, tense forms were secondary to the verb. Its princi-pal meaning was contained in the action described as taking place inthe present. This was particularly true in verbs of divine action. Godlives in the eternal present. Even for man, to quote Augustine, “thepast is the soul’s present remembrance; the present is the soul’s presentattention; and the future is the soul’s present expectation.”14

Augustine did not always employ his terminology in the same way. InDe quantitate animae, for example, Augustine defined sonus as the verbalsound that we hear, which includes the sounds made by animals as wellas human speech. A nomen is a higher level of meaningful sound, onewhich signifies.15 But in the passage from the Homilies on John, sonus is,on one level, a meaningful sound. “He is to come” and “He has come”are audibly different because of a difference in tense, reflected in thedifferent forms of the same word. Yet, ultimately, tense has nothing todo with signification. There is an identity of meaning that lies behindthese different grammatical sounds. Augustine might have associatedthat identity of meaning with nomen or intellectus, but he chose instead tolabel it fides.

The context for Augustine’s discussion of the object of faith is bothPlatonic and exegetical. True meaning and reality lie not in the exter-nal visible and audible forms of words but in their internal, sometimeshidden meaning. Words are signs of some other truth. And just as dif-ferent signs can express the same identical truth, so different words andsounds can express or stand for the same identical truth of faith. Differ-ent signs signify the same thing. The concordance of the old and newdispensations, by which the Red Sea signifies baptism, Moses signifiesChrist, the Hebrews signify the Christian faithful, and water from the

14 Confessiones 11,13: “Anni tui omnes simul stant.” “Anni tui dies unus, et dies tuusnon cotidie, sed hodie, quia hodiernus tuus non cedit crastino; neque enim succedithesterno. Hodiernus tuus aeternitas.” In Conf. 11,17 Augustine remarks that the threetimes learned in school do not really exist: “non esse tria tempora, sicut pueri didicimuspuerosque docuimus, praeteritum, praesens et futurum, sed tantum praesens, quoniamilla duo non sunt.” Conf. 11,18: “… non sunt nisi praesentia.” Conf. 11,20: “Quod autemnunc liquet et claret, nec futura sunt nec praeterita, nec proprie dicitur: tempora sunttria, praeteritum, praesens et futurum, sed fortasse proprie diceretur: tempora sunt tria,praesens de praeteritis, praesens de praesentibus, praesens de futuris. Sunt enim haec inanima tria quaedam, et alibi ea non video. Praesens de praeteritis, memoria; praesensde praesentibus, contuitus; praesens de futuris, expectatio.” See M. Colish, The Mirrorof Language, rev. ed. (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1983), pp. 46–48.

15 De quantitate animae 32 (PL 32, 1071–1072).

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rock signifies the eucharist, forms the model for how different verbalsigns (tensed expressions or enuntiables) signify the one faith and essen-tially have one meaning. Here Augustine expresses that one meaningby the theological term fides, not the grammatical term nomen. But thedirection of his thought is not incompatible with the unitas nominis the-ory.

Although not utilizing as developed a theory of grammar and lan-guage as that of the twelfth century, the passage from Augustine’s Hom-

ilies on John comes closer to the position that the object of faith is theenuntiable (to use twelfth-century language) than to the position thatthe object of faith is the event. By significatio Augustine does not meanthe historic event but rather the eternal truth that the event repre-sents and which the article of faith affirms. It would be anachronisticto attribute either a res theory or an enuntiabile theory of the object ofknowledge and belief to Augustine. At the same time, the language heuses could easily be interpreted in the twelfth and thirteenth centuriesas consistent with the nominalist approach. We may be safe in conclud-ing that Augustine was one of the seminal and principal sources behindthe development of the nominalist view of the object of knowledge andbelief, as well as similar solutions to other problems of immutability.

chapter three

ON THE EVE OF NOMINALISM:CONSIGNIFICATION IN ANSELM*

Among the examples Anselm explored in his De Grammatico to illustrateparonymous words, the adjective hodiernum (today’s) was briefly intro-duced.1 Unlike his principal examples, grammaticus (literate) or album

(a white thing), in which both the substance (that which is namedparonymously) and the quality (that from which it derives its name)signify, although in different ways, the paronymous quality that hodier-

num brings to the object or activity so named is temporal in meaning,and therefore, like verbs, so Anselm notes, it consignifies rather thansignifies.2

To those familiar with early medieval logic, this is not a particu-larly remarkable or profound statement on Anselm’s part, which maybe why Desmond Henry did not devote much space in his study ofDe Grammatico to Anselm’s theory of consignification. The theory ofconsignification—an indirect, secondary, or participatory type of signi-fication—was, as a Latin term, at least as old as Priscian and Boethius,and was passed down through the grammatical and logical traditionsto the eleventh century and Anselm’s generation. It received increasedattention in the twelfth century as logicians began to examine howsyncategorematic words (i.e., consignifying words) operated in proposi-tions, and a body of sophismatic literature developed. There would notseem to be any problems, therefore, with what consignification meant,nor how it was used by Anselm or other eleventh- and twelfth-centurywriters.

But the meaning and history of consignification may not be quiteso straight-forward. Two features or problems in particular are worth

* This paper was presented at a conference on Anselm held at Milan in 1989 andsubsequently published in Revista di Storia della Filosofia, 3 (1993), 561–567.

1 Desmond P. Henry, The ‘De Grammatico’ of St. Anselm. The Theory of Paronymy (NotreDame, 1964), pp. 39–41.

2 Ibid., p. 39: “M. ‘Hodiernum’ igitur significat aliquid cum tempore. D. Ita essenecesse est. M. Igitur ‘hodiernum’ non nomen sed verbum, quia est vox consignificanstempus, nec est oratio.”

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some examination. First, the theory of language and propositional truthassociated with the original twelfth-century Nominales in the generationafter Anselm depended in part on a theory of consignification. It isimportant, therefore, to understand consignification in its nominalistcontext and to compare that development to earlier usage, includingthat of Anselm. A second problem is that consignification had a dou-ble ancestry that affected the way it was applied. This is because thesame Latin word, consignificare, and its grammatical variants, was usedto translate two different Greek words, synkategorein and prossemainein.Whether or not those words could be used synonymously or inter-changeably, the two classic passages in which they occurred, and fromwhich the language of consignification derived, addressed, I think, twodifferent syntactical and logical problems.3 Moreover, from the stand-point of grammar, some co-signifying words, such as temporal adverbsand temporal adjectives (e.g., hodiernum) also lived a grammatical life onboth sides of the dividing line between nouns and verbs.

The Two Realms of Consignification

Starting with the second problem, namely the mixed or twin ances-try of the terms consignificatio and consignificare, Priscian knew them asLatin equivalents for the way in which syncategorematic words func-tion. In the grammatical and logical division between interpretationes,i.e. words such as nouns and verbs that signify or have full significa-tion, and the other, non-signifying, parts of speech, such as prepositions,conjunctions, copulas, etc., the latter signified only in combination (i.e.co-signified) with categorematic words. Thus Priscian in his Institutiones

grammaticae translated syncategoremata as consignificantia, and etymologicaldictionaries today will list that as the first, or original, meaning of con-

significare.4

3 The view that these two Greek terms were probably synonyms was suggested byG. Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition. Ancient and medieval conceptions of the bearers of truthand falsity (Amsterdam and London, 1973), p. 124. The classic passage in which sykategor-ein probably lies behind consignificare is Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae, ed. M. Hertz, inGrammatici Latini (Leipzig, 1855), I, p. 54; the other text is Boethius’s translation of andcommentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias 3.

4 Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae, I, 54; Thesaurus Linguae Latinae, vol. 4 (Leipzig,1906–1909), p. 436.

on the eve of nominalism: consignification in anselm 33

Priscian’s contemporary, Boethius, discussed that same issue in hissecond commentary on Peri hermeneias, but did not employ consignificantia

in describing the non-signifying parts of speech that serve only to holdtogether and place in meaningful contexts the two principal parts ofspeech, nouns and verbs. Boethius did use consignificare and consignificatio

in a related but different context, namely in describing the temporaldimension that verbs possess.5 He used consignificare to translate prosse-

mainein.6

It is understandable why consignificare could be used in both thesecontexts. Prepositions and other so-called lesser parts of speech arenot meaningful unless used in combination with nouns and verbs ina proposition or other type of sentence. Tense, like syncategorematicwords, is also not meaningful unless attached to something else. Theconnection between the two contexts is even closer. Verbs can be con-sidered compounds of named activities and a copula. Tense is a func-tion of the hidden copula in the verb. Sedet or currit can be expandedas sedens est or currens est in which the copula est is attached to a gerund,or named activity. And that copula, in turn, as a non-signifying part ofspeech, is among syncategoremata.

Yet from another perspective, the two contexts are markedly differ-ent. Syncategoremata is a classification of certain types of words, whetheror not they are used in sentences, but consignification becomes a prop-erty of such words only when used in a sentence in combination withwords that signify. Prepositions, for example, never signify. And whennot used in a sentence, they do not co-signify either, the latter featurebeing something prepositions acquire in a propositional or sententialcontext. Put another way, signification applies to terms by themselves

5 Boethius, In Peri herm., ed. I (PL 64, 306): “verbum vim temporis in significa-tionibus trahit … hoc solo discrepante quod verbum consignificat tempus, essetquedefinitio ita: Verbum est vox significativa secundum placitum, cujus nulla pars extrasignificativa est; sed quoniam sunt illa nomini verboque communia, proprium autemverbi est consignificare tempus.…” In Peri herm., ed. II (PL 64, 427): “Verbum est voxsignificativa secundum placitum, quae consignificat tempus …. Omne enim verbumconsignificationem temporis retinet, non significationem. … Hoc verbum, sed cum eaipsa agendi significatione praesens quoque tempus adducit, atque ideo non ait verbumsignificare tempus, sed consignificare.” De divisione (PL 64, 886): “secundum positionemvocum significativarum aliae cum tempore, aliae sine tempore, et differentia quidemcum tempore nomini non conjungitur, idcirco quod verborum est consignificare tem-pora, nominum vero minime.”

6 In Boethius’s translation of De interpretatione, as noted by Nuchelmans, Theories,p. 124.

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as well as terms used in sentences. Consignification, properly speaking,like supposition, only applies to terms as they are used in sentences orpropositions.

Moreover, tense is not really a part of speech, except when inter-preted as a copula. Tense is rather a non-independent feature of verbsand some participles and adverbs. Syncategorematic words, on theother hand, are secondary parts of speech, and their being syncat-egorematic is an independent feature they always possess. With theexception of the copula, tense is intimately and always linked to wordsthat signify, namely verbs and verb-like words. Syncategoremata, on theother hand, can be uttered independently of signifying words. And theway in which syncategorematic words function in propositions—a topicthat fascinated twelfth-century logicians and expanded the frontiers ofmedieval logic so much—was generally pursued without taking tenseof verbs into account. Tense had to do with verbs, and verbs were notsyncategorematic terms.

It was clearly the Boethian use and understanding of consignificare thatAnselm adopted. Consignification was a property or function of tenseand as such was intimately tied to verbs, not to the classification ofsyncategoremata in general. In fact, consignification described part of theway verbs and verb-related words signified. And although one could,as has been noted, break or expand a verb into two parts: the typeof activity being asserted, e.g. ‘sitting’, and the copula that permits anassertion about that activity, e.g. ‘you are sitting’, those parts are usuallyexpressed as one verb, ‘you sit’.

Part of what Anselm was saying in this passage in De grammatico—theonly place, as far as I am aware, where Anselm mentions consignifi-cation—is that adjectives and substantive adjectives, such as album orhodiernum, have two meanings or significations.7 In the case of album, theword properly signifies (per se signification) that from which it derivesits name, i.e. whiteness, and obliquely or secondarily signifies (per aliud

signification) that which is named paronymously. In the case of hodier-

num, the word properly signifies that from which it derives its name, i.e.hodie, and obliquely or secondarily signifies whatever object or activity

7 Anselm introduces ‘hodiernum’ as a signifying word; Henry, The ‘De Grammatico’,p. 39: “Ergo ‘hodiernum’ significat id quod vocatur ‘hodiernum’ et ‘hodie’.” Henrytouched on the dual nature of participial forms in Priscian, but did not commentdirectly on the dual status of hodiernum; see The ‘De Grammatico’, p. 141.


is named paronymously. But in the case of hodiernum, since it involvestense and is therefore related to verbs, it consignifies in both cases,rather than signifies.

Consignification and Nomen Theory

Turning next to the origins of nominalism, I have argued elsewhere8

that it seems likely that the position that gave the Nominales their name,if you will pardon the pun, was not a position on the question of uni-versals, nor was it an outgrowth of logic in voce, nor of the teachingsof Roscelinus. It had to do rather with a grammatico-logical theory ofnouns, tensed propositions, and consignification. In the earliest appear-ances of the label Nominales in the second quarter of the twelfth century,the teaching of those so labeled is not indicated; we are only informedthat master Alberic of Paris (the logician, not the theologian of Reims)was a vehement opponent of the Nominalist sect.9 By the third quarterof the twelfth century the Nominales are primarily associated with anddefined by a particular theory of propositional truth, namely that whatis once true is always true (semel verum semper verum), which was princi-pally applied in the area of theology (and may even have originatedthere) to an explanation of the immutability of divine knowledge, will,and power.10 What God at one time knew, willed, or was able to do, healways knows, wills, and can do. That theory (found in Peter Lombardand even earlier in Peter Abelard) was based on a theory of the unityor oneness of the signification of the noun.

Unlike Alberic of Paris, who believed that the oblique cases of nounswere separate nomina,11 the Nominales were good Aristotelians and be-lieved that each noun was one noun, expressed by the nominative case,

8 W.J. Courtenay, “Nominales and Nominalism in the Twelfth Century,” in Lectionumvarietates. Hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904–1987), ed. J. Jolivet, Z. Kaluza, A. de Libera,Paris, 1991, pp. 229–250 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 4].

9 John of Salisbury, Metalogicon II, 10, ed. C.C.I. Webb (Oxford, 1929), p. 78: “Dein-de post discessum eius [i.e., Abelard], qui michi preproperus visus est, adhesi magistroAlberico, qui inter ceteros opinatissimus dialecticus enitebat et erat revera nominalissecte acerrimus impugnatur.”

10 Nuchelmans, Theories, pp. 180–189; Courtenay, “Nominales,” pp. 16–21.11 L.M. de Rijk, “Some new Evidence on twelfth century Logic: Alberic and the

School of Mont Ste Geneviève (Montani),” Vivarium, 4 (1966), 10: “Et notandum quodsecundum Albericum quidem obliqui casus sunt nomina, et pronomina non suntnomina, et omnia adverbia certae significationis sunt nomina, ut ‘bene’, ‘male’.”

36 chapter three

which alone signified, and that the oblique cases were simply formsof that one noun.12 And apart from instances of ambiguity producedwhen the same name is used for different objects, qualities, activities, orconcepts, a noun signifies the same thing regardless of time. Similarly,for the Nominales, a true proposition is not only true across time, but ithas the same meaning at any point in time, regardless of tense. To takethe classic twelfth-century example discussed by Gabriel Nuchelmansin his Theories of the Proposition, what Abraham believed, namely that‘Christ will be born’, is identical in content and meaning with the faithof the first Christians (‘Christ is born’) and all subsequent generations(‘Christ was born’).13 The differing tense of the various propositionsdoes not alter the identity of their meaning and truth. One nomen, manyvoces.

One might well ask how it is that a theory that basically has to dowith the identical meaning and truth value of tensed propositions canbe characterized as a theory of the unity of the noun. The answer, Ithink, lies in the dual character of verbs. Verbs, like nouns, are oneof the two principal parts of speech because they both signify. Andyet verbs are also defined as words that co-signify time (vox consignifi-

cans tempus), to quote Anselm, and Boethius before him. It was recog-nized, although perhaps not adequately explored, that verbs lived intwo worlds. Every verb contained a named activity, which by itself wasa gerund or noun. Every verb also contained a hidden copula that sup-plied the time or tense of the action. This is why Aristotle maintainedthat a verb, “in addition to its proper meaning (i.e., the noun-part),carries with it the notion of time.”14 And in the same chapter of Peri

hermeneias Aristotle went on say that past and future expressions “arenot verbs, but tenses of a verb,” thus paralleling his remark about nounsand cases of nouns. Tense plays the same role in relation to a verb ascases do in relation to a noun. It is the noun and verb that signify, notinflected or tensed forms. And although I know of no text that speaks

12 Aristotle, De interpretatione, 2, transl. R. McKeon (New York, 1941), p. 41: “Theexpressions ‘of Philo’, ‘to Philo’, and so on, constitute not nouns, but cases of a noun.The definition of these cases of a noun is in other respects the same as that of the nounproper, but, when coupled with ‘is’, ‘was’, or ‘will be’, they do not, as they are, forma proposition either true or false, and this the noun proper always does, under theseconditions. Take the words ‘of Philo is’ or ‘of Philo is not’; these words do not, as theystand, form either a true or a false proposition.”

13 Nuchelmans, Theories, pp. 177–185.14 Aristotle, De interpretatione, 3, p. 41.


of the consignification of oblique cases—perhaps the Boethian tradi-tion wedded consignification too closely with the tense of verbs—therelationship of case to noun parallels the relationship of tense to verb.And it is the noun part of the verb that gives it its proper signification.

The inclusiveness of the noun in eleventh- and twelfth-century gram-matical theory was very broad, indeed had been so from the ancientperiod on. Nomen included not only what we call a noun, but pro-nouns, adjectives, and, according to Boethius, adverbs as well.15 Andlike Anselm, Garlandus Compotista seems to recognize a two-fold na-ture of temporal adverbs: a basic meaning, which each signifies, and atemporal meaning, which co-signifies.

Conclusions

Returning to Anselm, the thrust of De grammatico was to highlight orexpound upon the dual signification of paronymous words or, in thecase of hodiernum, a combined signification and consignification. Thesetwo different significations (per se and per aliud) were not on the samelevel, and oblique signification was always secondary and inferior toproper signification. Nor did consignification ever approach the statuslevel of signification. As Nuchelmans expressed it, temporality, in theform of the copula ‘is’, “only adds a certain nuance to the meaning ofthe words to which it is joined.”16

It is exactly the difference between the first level of signification andsecond-level status of consignification that the original nominalist the-ory stressed, in order to ground the sempiternal oneness of meaning oftrue enuntiabilia in the sempiternal identity of the signification of nouns.One nomen, many voces; one signification, many consignifications. In thislight Anselm stands in a direct line of descent from ancient grammati-cal theory to the linguistic theory of twelfth-century nominalism.17

15 Boethius, Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos (PL 64, 766): “atque ideo adverbiaquidem atque pronomina nominibus jungunt, sine tempore enim quiddam constitu-tum definitumque significant, nec interest quod flecti casibus nequeunt, non est hocnominum proprium ut casibus inflectantur.”

16 Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, p. 29.17 Even on the issue of universals, D.P. Henry long ago pointed out that it is

a mistake to consider Anselm to be an extreme realist and Roscelin an extremenominalist; see Henry, The Logic of Saint Anselm (Oxford, 1967), pp. 96–107.

chapter four

NOMINALES AND NOMINALISMIN THE TWELFTH CENTURY*

Over a half century ago two young French scholars, Paul Vignaux andM.-D. Chenu, set new directions for the subsequent study of nomi-nalism in the Middle Ages. Vignaux’s essays on nominalism and Ock-ham in the Dictionnaire de théologie catholique followed earlier scholarshipin seeing Abelard and Ockham as the focal points for twelfth- andfourteenth-century nominalism respectively, yet Vignaux revised andrefined elements of the traditional picture, ultimately producing a newinterpretation, especially for Ockham.1 Chenu’s first essay, written for aDominican volume in celebration of the 600th anniversary of Thomas’scanonization (1323) but published well after Vignaux’s article appeared,contained evidence for a different interpretation of the origin of nom-inalism, evidence that was expanded and assembled into an historicalsequence only in Chenu’s 1935 article.2

Surprisingly, the essays of these two authors, written almost at thesame time and place, affected two different audiences in subsequentscholarship. Vignaux’s articles became one of the principal interpretiveguides for scholars working on late medieval nominalism. Chenu’sarticles, whose titles hid their relevance for twelfth-century nominalism,circulated primarily among those working in twelfth-century grammarand propositional theory. If Chenu, either in 1935 or in 1957, whenhe included in La théologie au douzième siècle a revised version of his

* Originally published in Lectionum Varietates, ed. J. Jolivet, Z. Kaluza, A. de Libera(Paris: J. Vrin, 1991), pp. 11–48.

1 Paul Vignaux, “Nominalisme,” in DTC, XI.1 (Paris, 1930), cols. 717–784; “Oc-cam,” cols. 876–889. Vignaux returned to this theme several times: Nominalisme auXIVe siècle (Paris and Montréal, 1948); “Note sur le nominalisme d’Abélard,” in PierreAbélard–Pierre le Vénérable (Paris, 1975), pp. 523–529; “La problématique du nominalismemédiéval peut-elle éclairer des problèmes philosophiques actuels?,” Revue philosophique deLouvain, 75 (1977), 293–331.

2 M.-D. Chenu, “Contribution à l’histoire du traité de la foi,” in Mélanges thomistes(Paris, 1934; imprimatur 1923), pp. 123–140; “Grammaire et théologie aux XIIe etXIIIe siècles,” AHDLMA, 10 (1935–1936), 5–28; La théologie au douzième siècle (Paris, 1957),pp. 90–107.

40 chapter four

second essay, had spelled out the implications of his evidence for theorigin and meaning of nominalism—or if those working in twelfth-century grammar and logic had called attention to the implications ofChenu’s discovery, the history of scholarship on nominalism might havebeen quite different. As it was, Chenu’s evidence and a larger body ofcitations collected independently by Artur Landgraf were never fullyapplied to the question of the origin and meaning of nominalism.3

Vignaux’s article on nominalism was the culmination of an intensiveperiod of research in the early years of this century conducted primarilyby Reiners, Geyer, Baumgartner, and De Wulf.4 There was general una-nimity among them on the meaning of nominalism. It was a particularview of the existential status of universal concepts. Nominalists werethose who believed that universals were mere names (nomina) or spokensounds (voces). Realists affirmed the existence of universals in things (inrebus) and, in a more extreme form, their existence as things. Severalnineteenth-century scholars had attempted to trace the origins of nom-inalism back to such ninth-century authors as Hrabanus Maurus, JohnScotus Eriugena, Eric of Auxerre, and others.5 Reiners rejected thoseattempts at finding proto-Nominalists and asserted the origins of nomi-

3 A.M. Landgraf, “Studien zur Theologie des zwölften Jahrhunderts,” Traditio, 1(1943), 183–222. After this study was submitted for publication, Calvin Normore mademe aware of an article of his then in the process of publication: “The Tradition ofMediaeval Nominalism,” in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, ed. J.F. Wippel (Washington,1987), pp. 201–217, which also uses Chenu’s evidence to explore the origin and meaningof twelfth-century nominalism. I am grateful to him for sending me a copy of hisassessment, which is particularly perceptive on the interrelation of certain philosophicalpositions attributed to the Nominales. Our general conclusions are reassuringly similar; afew differences will be discussed in the last section.

4 J. Reiners, Der Nominalismus in der Frühscholastik, BGPM, VIII, 5 (Münster, 1910);Bernhard Geyer, “Die Stellung Abälards in der Universalienfrage nach neuen hand-schriftlichen Texten,” in Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie, BGPM, Suppl. 1 (Münster,1913), pp. 101–127; Überweg-Baumgartner, Geschichte der Philosophie der patristischen undscholastischen Zeit (Berlin, 1915); M. De Wulf, Histoire de la Philosophie Médiévale, 2nd ed.(Louvain, 1925); Überweg-Geyer, Die Patristische und Scholastische Philosophie (Berlin, 1928;Basel, 1958).

5 V. Cousin, Ouvrages inédits d’Abélard (Paris, 1836), pp. lxxxv ff.; B. Hauréau, De laPhilosophie Scolastique, vol. 1 (Paris, 1850), pp. 141–143; Hauréau, Histoire de la PhilosophieScolastique, vol. 1 (Paris, 1872), pp. 193, 196; K. Prantl, Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande,vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1861), p. 81; K.S. Barach, Zur Geschichte des Nominalismus vor Roscelin(Vienna, 1866). John Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre. Logic,Theology and Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1981), apparently unawarethat Reiners and Geyer had already adequately responded to Hauréau, Barach, andPrantl, also rejects the idea of nominalism in the ninth century. Marenbon does,however, consider Ratramnus of Corbie to be a conceptualist. Jorge J.E. Gracia,

nominales and nominalism in the twelfth century 41

nalism to lie in a late eleventh-century controversy over universals thatinitially centered on the thought of Roscelin. Abelard’s position, whichwas viewed as a modification of Roscelin’s, was supposedly the versionthat came to be known as “nominalist” by the time of John of Salisbury,since it was Abelard who substituted sermo (to be equated with nomen,according to Reiners) for Roscelin’s vox.6 Within that accepted formu-lation of the meaning and origin of nominalism, scholars before andafter Vignaux concerned themselves with other problems: differencesin the versions of Roscelin and Abelard; the exact nature and degree ofAbelard’s nominalism; the relation of a nominalist view of universals toa nominalist logic; and the lines of continuity (or discontinuity) betweentwelfth-century nominalism and that of William of Ockham, which hadsuch a dominant influence in the late Middle Ages.7

The evidence assembled by Chenu, most of it admittedly from thelate twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, suggested that the label Nom-

inales arose in the context of a debate over the object of belief, especiallyas expressed in tensed statements (enuntiabilia)8 by those living before,during, or after the time of Christ. Just as a passage from Jerome onGod’s inability to restore a woman’s virginity became the problem textfor discussions of the limits of divine power, so a passage from Augus-tine that affirmed the identity of the faith of the Patriarchs, Apostles,and later Christians became the problem text for understanding theobject of faith.9 That object could not simply be the historic event,

Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages (Munich, 1983), also rejectsthe notion of nominalism before the eleventh century.

6 Reiners, Nominalismus, pp. 57–59; Vignaux, “Nominalisme,” col. 718. Reiners’smove from sermo to nomen entails some sleight of hand, as will be discussed below.

7 Matthias Baumgartner and Bernhard Geyer were of the opinion that the ‘Partei-gegensatz’ of Nominales and Reales in the late Middle Ages was a direct descendantof that of the twelfth; Überweg-Baumgartner, Geschichte der Philosophie, pp. 598–599;Überweg-Geyer, Die Patristische und Scholastische Philosophie, p. 575. Holding a differentview, Maurice De Wulf, Histoire de la Philosophie, p. 168, maintained that Ockham andothers in the fourteenth century did not know Roscelin or Abelard, and that thenominalisms of the two periods differed.

8 It is important in the following discussion to distinguish enuntiabilia from proposi-tions. Both are tensed complexa and minimally have subject and predicate. An enuntiabile(or, in Abelard’s language, dictum) is that which is asserted or denied by a proposi-tion. G. Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition (Amsterdam, 1973), pp. 172–173: “Dicta,significata, enuntiabilia are the bearers of truth and falsity in the primary sense, whilepropositiones are true or false only in so far as they are used to assert something true orfalse…”

9 On the Jerome text see W.J. Courtenay, Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought

42 chapter four

since only statements and propositions about events or external real-ity can be affirmed or denied. If it is the articles of faith, as statements,that are affirmed by believers and denied by infidels, and those articleswould be about future events for Abraham and past events for Chris-tians, then in what way can the belief of those living before and afterthe Incarnation be identical? The opinio Nominalium affirmed that theentity or reality signified by the proposition remains the same acrosstime, so that what is true at one time remains true for all time (semel est

verum, semper est verum). Just as there is unity or identity in the principalsignification of a noun (nomen) that underlies the consignification of itsvarious forms (voces consignificativae) or modes of signifying (modi signifi-

candi), such as case, gender, and number, so there is one signification ofa verb that underlies the various consignifications of tense, voice, andmood. And just as many voces are one nomen, so many enuntiabilia areone article of faith.10

Although Chenu did not stress the point, his evidence and develop-mental sequence suggest that the Nominales were so called because theytransformed the grammatical theory of the unity of the noun, with itsroots in ancient grammar and expanded upon by Bernard of Chartresand others, into a theory of the object of knowledge and belief—a the-ory of propositional truth—that was applied to the theological prob-lems of the immutability of the object of faith and the parallel prob-lem of the immutability of divine knowledge.11 All the references to theNominales or opinio Nominalium assembled by Chenu from late twelfth-and thirteenth-century sources (the period containing the vast major-ity of all references to Nominales before the fifteenth century) are of thislatter type. The problem of universals does not enter into it, at leastnot in any direct way, before the third quarter of the thirteenth century.Landgraf, apparently unaware of Chenu’s articles and independentlyuncovering a larger body of similar evidence counter to the traditionalview of the origin and meaning of nominalism, still expressed the hope

(London, 1984), chs. 4 and 8. The text of Augustine is in In Joan., tr. 45, n. 9 (PL 35,1722; CCL 36, 392): “Tempora variata sunt, non fides”.

10 Thus it was expressed by the anonymous author of a group of Quaestiones fromthe early thirteenth century, cited by Chenu, “Grammaire,” 13 (Paris, B.N., Nouv. acq.lat. 1470, fol. 25r): “Sicut plures voces sunt unum nomen, ita plura enuntiabilia suntarticulus unus; et sicut mutatur vox, non tamen mutatur nomen, nam si dicam albus,alba, album, idem est nomen et tamen vox mutatur”.

11 On Bernard of Chartres see John of Salisbury, Metalogicon, I, 24 (55–56); III, 2(124–127); Chenu, “Grammaire,” 14–17.


that it would be possible to bring all these nominalist Lehrsätze together,including the teaching on universals, into a unified picture of the teach-ing of a nominalist “school”.12

Is it the case that a broadly-based nominalist approach to logic, ofwhich the theory of universals was the centerpiece, shifted meaningin the third quarter of the twelfth century and became associatedonly with one of its particular points of doctrine—or is it that thetrue origin of nominalism, as it was understood in the twelfth andthirteenth centuries, lies in the theory of the unity of the noun and thatno well-informed person in that period would have applied that labeleither to a theory of universals or to any of the modern definitions ofmedieval nominalism? Is the development described by Chenu a caseof restricting to one thesis a label that was created for a whole series ofdoctrines or an entire approach to logic—or are those few passages thatseem to connect nominalism with an ars sermocinalis approach to logic acase of the part for the whole, i.e., calling a grammatical approach tologic by the name of a particular sub-group? What is needed, perhaps,is not a secret formula that will blend into the traditional picture theevidence uncovered by Chenu and Landgraf, but some ingredient thatwill separate out the different elements and reveal their developmentalrelationship. Since the earliest references to the Nominales come fromthe third quarter of the twelfth century and the traditional view ofnominalism was shaped by evidence from the late eleventh and earlytwelfth, we need to examine more closely these two termini beforeconsidering the crucial middle period.

12 To readers familiar with the literature on nominalism, especially for the four-teenth century, the different theories for the origin of the label “Nominales” proposedby Reiners and Chenu may seem like two versions of the same position. Discussionsof nominalism and the referents of universal terms in Ockham, Chatton, Crathorn,Holcot, Wodeham, and Rimini are often in the context of the problem of the object ofknowledge; see, e.g., H. Elie, Le complexe significabile (Paris, 1937); E.A. Moody, “A Quodli-betal Question of Robert Holkot, O.P., on the Problem of the Objects of Knowledgeand Belief,” Speculum, 39 (1964), 53–74; H. Schepers, “Holkot contra dicta Crathorn,”PJ, 77 (1970), 320–354; 79 (1972), 106–136; G. Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition(Amsterdam, 1973). If the meaning of “nominalist” were the same, then it would makeless difference whether the Nominales derived their name from the theory that univer-sals were nomina or from the theory that the object of knowledge was a supra-temporalenuntiabile based on the unity of the nomen. As will be shown, it is not just a difference inorigin; it is a difference in meaning.

44 chapter four

Logic in voce

The linked contrasts of vox/res and Nominales/Reales encountered inmedieval sources were long viewed as interchangeable. Since Reales

were usually defined with reference to res, it was natural to assumethat behind the vox side of the first contrast lay the Nominales. So, in theentry on Nominales in his Glossarium of 1678, Du Cange grouped togetherreferences to Nominales and proponents of logic as sermocinabile andin vocibus.13 Scholars eventually separated Abelard’s sermo theory fromRoscelin’s vox theory,14 but both continued to be viewed as differentforms or degrees of nominalism, in part because their theories fellwithin the accepted modern philosophical understanding of “logicalnominalism” in contrast to “logical realism”.

“Logical Realists” are those who believe that the true objects ofphilosophical knowledge are things (res) in external reality, not terms(verba) or enuntiabilia. They assume that concepts, terms, propositions,and logical arguments refer directly to objects and states of affairs inexternal reality. “Logical Nominalists”, on the other hand, assume thatlogic is an ars sermocinalis, that it is about logical entities and the way inwhich language operates, and only indirectly has external reality as itsprincipal object.15 As De Rijk noted in the case of Abelard, the respec-tive realist and nominalist interpretations of universals—although hav-

13 C. Du Cange, Glossarium mediae et infimae Latinitatis, rev. ed., vol. 4 (Paris, 1845),p. 638. The Swiss humanist and historian J. Turmair (Aventinus), Annales ducum Boiariae,ed. S. Riezler, vol. 2 (Munich, 1884), pp. 200–202, and C.E. Du Boulay (Bulaeus),Historia Universitatis Parisiensis a Carolo M. ad nostra tempora, vol. 1 (Paris, 1665), pp. 443–445, had already seen nominalism as a view on universals that began with Roscelin.

14 John of Salisbury, Metalogicon, II, 17, ed. C.C.I. Webb (Oxford, 1929), p. 92: “Aliusergo consistit in vocibus; licet hec opinio cum Roscelino suo fere omnino iam evanuerit.Alius sermones intuetur et ad illos detorquet quicquid alicubi de universalibus meminitscriptum; in hac autem opinione deprehensus est Peripateticus Palatinus Abaelardusnoster, qui multos reliquit et adhuc quidem aliquos habet professionis huius sectatoreset testes. Amici mei sunt…” On Abelard’s theory of universals see Geyer, Die StellungAbälards, pp. 101–127; Geyer, Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften, BGPTM, 12 (Münster,1933), pp. 623–630; M.M. Tweedale, Abailard on Universals (Amsterdam, 1976).

15 On the difference between “logical nominalism” and “philosophical nominalism”see the comments of L.M. de Rijk in his edition of Peter Abelard’s Dialectica (Assen,1956), pp. xci–xciv. At no point in the medieval or early modem development was thereever a question of “philosophical nominalism” or subjectivist conceptualism, i.e., thatwe cannot really know extra-mental things because they are dependent on and shapedby the human mind. This misunderstanding was applied to Abelard by Cousin, Sikes,and Carré, but was corrected by Geyer and others; for historiographic details see DeRijk, and Tweedale, pp. 3–10. In this sense Ockham was also a “philosophical Realist”.


ing received the most attention in discussions of realism and nominal-ism—are only particular applications of these radically different viewson the nature of logic.16 As helpful as these descriptions of nominalismand realism are for understanding Abelard and his contemporaries, itwould be circular to use these definitions to solve the problem of theorigin of the term Nominales or to understand what “nominalist” meantin the twelfth century. The many meanings “nominalist” has had acrossthe last five hundred years is no sure guide to what it meant in thetwelfth century or how the label originated. One must begin afreshwith the twelfth century sources.

There is sufficient evidence that in the closing years of the eleventhcentury and well into the twelfth, there was a controversy over thenature of logic that included discussions of universal concepts. Beforethe middle of the twelfth century, the contrasting positions were invari-ably described in terms of the contrast of res and vox, never res andnomen. Herman, abbot of St. Martin’s at Tournai, reflecting back onevents in the opening years of the twelfth century, has one of thefullest discussions of these different approaches to logic. His contrast isbetween the teaching of some contemporaries (quosdam modernos), suchas Raimbert of Lille, who treated dialectic in voce and those who, likehis own teacher and abbot, Odo, who later became bishop of Cambrai,lectured on logic in re according to Boethius and the ancient doctors.17

Herman identifies logic in voce with new inventions, derived from thebooks of Porphyry and Aristotle, that abandon the traditional exposi-tion of Boethius and the ancients.18 To the list of those who taught logicin voce at the end of the eleventh century, the anonymous author of the

16 Abelard, Dialectica, p. xciii. The priority of the nature of logic over the issue ofuniversals is also characteristic of fifteenth-century nominalism. In the famous Parisiandefense of their view in 1474 the Nominalists (in F. Ehrle, Der Sentenzkommentar Petersvon Candia, Münster i.W., 1925, p. 322) defined themselves as believing that multipleterms and linguistic expressions could be used for the same external things, and thatlogic comprised the ways in which terms function in propositions. Realists, by contrast,were credited in the same document with the view that each linguistic form describedan extra-mental reality, and that logic was directly concerned with things (res), notlinguistic terms (incomplexa, termina, or verba).

17 Herman of Tournai, Liber de restauratione monasterii sancti Martini Tornacensis, inMGH SS. XIV, p. 275: “Sciendum tamen de eodem magistro 〈Odo〉, quod eandemdialecticam non iuxta quosdam modernos in voce, sed more Boetii antiquorumquedoctorum in re discipulis legebat. Unde et magister Rainbertus, qui eodem tempore inoppido Insulensi dialecticam clericis suis in voce legebat.”

18 Ibid.: “in Porphirii Aristotelisque libris magis volunt legi suam adinventitiam novi-tatem quam Boetii ceterorumque antiquorum expositionem.”

46 chapter four

Historia Francica adds Robert of Paris, Roscelin of Compiègne, Arnulf ofLaon, and their master John.19

The most famous of these grammatical logicians was Roscelin,whose identification with dialectica in voce is attested to by Otto of Freis-ing and the author of the Roscelin epigram.20 The “new” approachto logic might never have received so much negative attention hadnot Roscelin developed his theory of universals as voces and appliedhis logic of individuality to the Trinity. It was these latter issues thatincited Anselm of Bec to write letters against Roscelin, the last andmost extended of which was his Epistula de Incarnatione Verbi to PopeUrban II in or shortly after 1093. In this treatise he attacked the con-temporary “heretics of dialectic who think that universal substances aremere words (flatum vocis), and who are not able to understand color assomething different from a material object, or human wisdom as some-thing different from the soul”.21 Whether all of these positions werespecifically or exclusively taught by Roscelin we may never know. The

19 Historia Francica, in Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. M. Bouquet, rev.ed., vol. 12 (Paris, 1877), p. 3: “In dialectica quoque hi potentes exstiterunt sophistae:Joannes, qui eandem artem sophisticam vocalem esse disseruit, Rotbertus Parisiacensis,Roscelinus Compendiensis, Arnulfus Laudunensis. Hi Joannis fuerunt sectatores, quietiam quamplures habuerunt auditores.”

20 Otto of Freising, Gesta Friderici I. imperatoris I, 47, written between 1156 and 1158;MGH SS. XX, pp. 376–377: “Habuit 〈Abelard〉 tamen primo praeceptorem Rozelinumquendam, qui primus nostris temporibus sententiam vocum instituit”; Ph. Jaffé, Biblio-theca rerum Germanicarum, vol. 5 (Berlin, 1869), p. 187:

“Quas, Ruziline, doces, non vult dialectica voces,Iamque, dolens de se, non vult in vocibus esse;Res amat, in rebus cunctis vult esse diebus.Voce retractetur: res sit, quod voce docetur.Plorat Aristotiles, rugas ducendo seniles,Res sibi subtractas, per voces intitulatas;Porfiriusque gemit, quia res sibi lector ademit;Qui res abrodit, Ruzeline, Boethius odit.Non argumentis nulloque sophismate sentis,Res existentes in vocibus esse manentes.”

21 De Incarnatione Verbi, c. 1, in Opera omnia, ed. F.S. Schmitt (Edinburgh, 1946–1961), II, p. 9: “illi utique nostri temporis dialectici, immo dialecticae haeretici, quinon nisi flatum vocis putant universales esse substantias, et qui colorem non aliudqueunt intelligere quam corpus, nec sapientiam hominis aliud quam animam, prorsusa spiritualium quaestionum disputatione sunt exsufflandi”. Between 1090 and 1092 (thedate of Roscelin’s condemnation at the council of Soissons) Anselm wrote againstRoscelin’s teaching on the Trinity in letters to the monk John and Bishop Fulk ofBeauvais.


relevant point is that Roscelin’s theory of universals, just as with hisapproach to logic in general, is linked with the word vox.

The contrast between the teaching of Roscelin and Abelard on uni-versals, as described by John of Salisbury, is between a vox theory and asermo theory.22 Reiners’s attempt to link Nominales with Abelard’s the-ory of universals on the grounds that Abelard substituted nomen forsermo or used them interchangeably is, at best, thin. Nomen or nomina

are terms rarely used by Abelard in discussing universal concepts, andOtto of Freising, who does associate Abelard with a theory of nomina,mistakenly identifies it with a vox theory, not a sermo theory.23 Reiners,

22 See above, note 14.23 Otto of Freising, Gesta Frederici, I, 47 (XX, 377): “Sententiam ergo vocum seu

nominum in naturali tenens facultate, non caute theologiae admiscuit”. In discussinguniversals in his gloss in Porphyry in Logica ingredientibus [Peter Abaelards philosophischeSchriften, ed. B. Geyer, BGPTM, 21.1 (Münster i.W., 1919), p. 16], Abelard does occa-sionally equate sermo and nomen: “Nunc autem ostensis rationibus quibus neque ressingillatim neque collectim acceptae universales dici possunt in eo quod de pluribuspraedicantur, restat ut huiusmodi universalitatem solis vocibus adscribamus. Sicut igiturnominum quaedam appellativa a grammaticis, quaedam propria dicuntur, ita a dialec-ticis simplicium sermonum quidam universales, quidam particulares, scilicet singulares,appellantur. Est autem universale vocabulum quod de pluribus singillatim habile estin inventione sua praedicari, ut hoc nomen ‘homo,’ quod particularibus nominibushominum coniugibile est secundum subiectarum rerum naturam quibus est impositum.Singulare vero est quod de uno solo praedicabile est, ut Socrates, cum unius tantumnomen accipitur. Si enim aequivoce sumas, non vocabulum, sed multa vocabula in sig-nificatione facis, quia scilicet iuxta Priscianum multa nomina in unam vocem incidunt.”Ibid., pp. 17–18: “Videtur autem numquam prorsus universale esse quod appellativum,nec singulare quod proprium nomen, sed invicem excedentia sese et excessa. Namappellativum et proprium non solum casus rectos continent, verum etiam obliquos quipraedicari non habent, atque ideo in definitione universalis per ‘praedicari’ exclusisunt; qui etiam obliqui, quia minus necessarii sunt ad enuntiationem… Sicut autemnon omnia appellativa vel propria nomina necesse est dici universalia vel singularia,sic e converso. Nam universale non solum nomina continet, verum etiam verba etinfinita nomina, quibus, scilicet infinitis, definitio appellativi quam Priscianus ponit,non videtur aptari.” Ibid., p. 24: “Inductis autem auctoritatibus, quae astruere videnturper universalia nomina conceptas communes formas designari, ratio quoque consen-tire videtur. Quippe eas concipere per nomina quid aliud est, quam per ea significari?Sed profecto cum eas ab intellectibus diversas facimus, iam praeter rem et intellectumtertia exiit nominum significatio.” And in his Logica “Nostrorum petitioni sociorum” (ed.B. Geyer, BGPTM, 21, 4, Münster i.W., 1933), p. 522: “Est alia de universalibus senten-tia rationi vicinior, quae nec rebus nec vocibus communitatem attribuit; sed sermonessive singulares sive universales esse disserunt. Quod etiam Aristoteles… ait: ‘Univer-sale est, quod est natum praedicari de pluribus’, idest a nativitate sua hoc contrahit,ex institutione scilicet. Quid enim aliud est nativitas sermonum sive nominum, quamhominum institutio? Hoc enim quod est nomen sive sermo, ex hominum institutionecontrahit.” “Sic ergo sermones universales esse dicimus, cum ex nativitate, id est exhominum institutione, praedicari de pluribus habeant; voces vero sive res nullatenus

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in fact, did not cite any supporting evidence from Abelard but quotedinstead from William of Conches (ca. 1145) and Godfrey of St. Vic-tor (ca. 1176), neither of whom refer to Abelard. In the passage fromWilliam’s Dragmaticon, the group (secta) that reduced logic to nomina hadalready disappeared by his day, and in any event they considered sin-gulars as well as universals to be nomina. “Certain ‘knowledgeable ones’did away with all ‘things’ (res omnes) in logic and sophistical disputation;they retained, however, their names (nomina) and have predicated uni-versals and singulars to exist only in this manner. Thereafter a morefoolish age came upon us which excluded both things (res) and theirnames (nomina) and reduced just to four the names (nomina) of all dis-putations. Moreover, each sect disappeared because neither was fromGod.”24 Godfrey’s reference to the Nominales gives little clue as to whatthey believed, certainly nothing on universals.25 Godfrey’s description of

universales esse, etsi omnes sermones voces esse constat.” Voces are words as voiced intime and place; sermones are the assigned meanings that words have regardless of timeand place of verbal expression. For further discussion on Abelard’s theory of nouns andhis view of universals see M.T. Beonio-Brocchieri Fumagalli, La logica di Abelardo (Milan,1969); J. Jolivet, Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard, Études de philosophie médié-vale, 57 (Paris, 1969), pp. 36–53, 95–104; “Comparaison des théories du langage chezAbélard et chez les nominalistes du XIVe siècle,” in Peter Abelard, ed. E.M. Buytaert(Louvain, 1974), pp. 163–178. Walter Map identified Abelard as the “princeps nominalium”in his De nugis curialium, I, 24, ed. C.L.N. Brooke, R.O.B. Mynors (Oxford, 1988), p. 78,written shortly before 1185, but there is no indication that this label had anything todo with the problem of universals or that the tie with Abelard is based on anythingmore than hearsay. The interesting aspect of Otto’s remark (c. 1157) is his assertion thatAbelard introduced into theology an approach or theory that was developed in the areaof natural philosophy. Again, the connection with a theory of universals is not clearlyindicated.

24 William of Conches, Dialogus de substantiis physicis (Strasbourg, 1567; reprint Frank-furt a. M., 1967), p. 7: “Quod intelligentes quidam res omnes a dialectica et sophisticadisputatione exterminaverunt, nomina tamen earum receperunt eaque sola esse uni-versalia vel singularia praedicaverunt; deinde supervenit stultior aetas, quae et res etearum nomina exclusit atque omnium disputationum ad quattuor fere nomina reduxit;utraque tamen secta, quia non erat ex Deo, per se deficit.”

25 Godfrey of St. Victor, Fons philosophiae, ed. Pierre Michaud-Quantin, AnalectaMediaevalia Namurcensia 8 (Louvain and Lille, 1956), p. 43:

“Addunt hic se socios quidam nominales,Nomine, non numine, talium sodales.”

Two stanzas later, in the middle of the discussion of the Realists, the issue of universalsis introduced in a way that strangely parallels the 1474 Nominalists’s description of theRealists; Ibid., p. 44:

“Namque mens vel cogitet nomen esse genusSolus hoc crediderit mentis alienus,


the Robertini (presumably disciples of Robert of Melun) is the only partof his text that suggests a parallel with William’s first sect.26

The third piece of “evidence” for Reiners’s association of Abelardand nominalism, to be discussed at greater length below, is that Alberic,with whom John of Salisbury studied after he spent a year with Abe-lard, was an opponent of the Nominales. But this does not establish a linkbetween Abelard and the Nominales or prove that the label was derivedfrom disputes over universals. If a label had been invented for defendersof Abelard’s theory of universals, it would probably have been basedon some form of sermo, just as a label for the proponents of this newapproach to logic would probably have been based on vox.

The most fundamental problem in this entire discussion of vox, sermo,and nomen is that the first two words, especially vox, implied exterior,spoken speech. In the tripartite division found in Aristotle, Augustine,and Boethius of mental or interior speech (intellectus or notio), spokenor oral speech (sonus or vox), and written speech (litterae), vox and sermo

were spoken words or expressions, respectively, in a particular spokenlanguage.27 Nomen, on the other hand, for all its various definitions oruses, was not linked to orality nor, indeed, to the word or concept asuttered in any natural language. Things are “named” in each language,but “naming” is common to all languages and, as a linguistic entity, is amental act as well as a verbal one.

Around the middle of the twelfth century we do encounter somedescriptions of a grammatical logic that are connected with the word‘nomen’. In addition to the remark by William of Conches, there is aletter of 1168 in which John of Salisbury contrasts the Nominales and

Cum sit tot generibus rerum mundus plenusCuius genus nomen est semper sit egenus.”

26 Ibid., p. 44:

“Qui de solo nomine fingunt mille fere:Igitur pro nihilo licet hos censere.”

27 Aristotle, De interpretatione, c. 1, English transl. from W.D. Ross edition by OxfordUniversity Press and reprinted in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon (NewYork, 1941), p. 40: “Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and writtenwords are the symbols of spoken words. … the mental experiences, which these directlysymbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences arethe images.” Augustine, De dialectica, 5; De quantitate animae, 32, and De magistro, 1–2.Boethius, in his commentary on De interpretatione, stated that the followers of Aristotledistinguished three orationes: intellectus, vox, litterae. See G. Nuchelmans, Theories of theProposition, pp. 127–128, 145–146, 192–194.

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Reales in what appears to be two different approaches to logic, not twodifferent positions on universals.28 Whether or not these all too briefremarks permit us to see Nominales as a mid-century label for thosewho taught logic in voce, nomen and Nominales are not part of the “label”vocabulary of the early twelfth century.

Opinio Nominalium

The earliest reference to the Nominales occurs in John of Salisbury’sMetalogicon, completed in 1159, where he describes Master Alberic asthe most vehement opponent of the secta Nominalis.29 Since John hadjust been discussing Abelard, and Abelard’s Historia calamitatum showsAlberic to have been one of his major opponents,30 it was natural toassume that Abelard was the leader of the secta Nominalis. Yet, as hasbeen shown elsewhere, the Alberic of Reims mentioned by Abelard andthe Alberic mentioned by John of Salisbury are two different people.31

Moreover, John was a beginning student of logic at Paris when he stud-ied under Abelard and Alberic (1136–1138), both of whom he admired.His move from Abelard to Alberic was not a shift in ideological affil-iation but one occasioned by Abelard’s departure from Paris. Because

28 The Letters of John of Salisbury, vol. 2, ed. and transl. by W.J. Millor and C.L.N.Brooke (Oxford, 1979), p. 450: “Nosti pridem nominalium tuorum eo michi minusplacere sententiam, quod in sermonibus tota consistens utilitatem rerum non assumpse-rit, cum rectum sapientibus indubium sit quod res quaerit philosophia, non verba. Utergo compendiosius agam tecum meorum more realium, …”

29 John of Salisbury, Metalogicon, II, 10, p. 78: “… contuli me ad Peripateticum Palat-inum, qui tunc in monte sancte Genovese clarus doctor et admirabilis omnibus preside-bat. Ibi ad pedes eius prima artis huius rudimenta accepi et pro modulo ingenioli meiquicquid excidebat ab ore eius tota mentis aviditate excipiebam. Deinde post disces-sum eius, qui michi preproperus visus est, adhesi magistro Alberico, qui inter ceterosopinatissimus dialecticus enitebat et erat revera nominalis secte acerrimus impugna-tor. Sic ferme toto biennio conversatus in monte, artis huius preceptoribus usus sumAlberico et magistro Roberto Meludensi….”

30 Abelard, Historia calamitatum, c. 4 & 9.31 E. Lesne, Histoire de la propriété ecclésiastique en France, vol. 5: Les Écoles de la fin

du VIIIe siècle à la fin du XIIe siècle (Lille, 1940), p. 212; M. Grabmann, “Aristotelesim zwölften Jahrhundert,” MS, 12 (1950), 123–162, reprinted in Mittelalterliches Geis-tesleben, III (Munich, 1956), pp. 64–127 at 103; W.J. Courtenay, “Schools and Schoolsof Thought in the Twelfth Century” [to appear in 2008 in a Festschrift for Marcia Col-ish]. Although the fusion of the two Alberics continues in the scholarly literature, thedistinction was recognized by De Rijk, Luscombe, Nuchelmans, Tweedale, Southern,and Ferruolo.


of that, John chose the next best dialectician available on the Mont SteGeneviève where he was then studying, namely Master Alberic, whohad the additional quality of being a vehement or perceptive oppo-nent of the Nominalists. The passage, by itself, is insufficient to identifyAbelard with the Nominales. In fact, although students need not adoptthe teachings of their masters, there is evidence to suggest that Albericand Robert of Melun, under whom John also studied logic at this time,had studied under or been influenced by Abelard.32

John admired Abelard and was supportive of his view of universals,but John was, like Alberic, critical of the Nominales.33 In the letter of1168 to Master Baldwin, archdeacon of Exeter, John remarked: “theopinion of your Nominalists has long been less pleasing to me becauseit grounds everything in words (in sermonibus) and does not regard theusefulness of things (utilitatem rerum), whereas wise men know without adoubt that philosophy seeks things, not words (res, non verba). Therefore,more briefly, I treat you according to the manner of my Realists (meorum

more realium)”.34 Since John mentions the two groups as a rhetorical wayof saying he wishes to offer his friend something more substantial thanmere words, we should not read too much into the passage, but he doesplace himself on the side of the Realists.

Even less clear is the reference to the Nominales and Reales in Godfreyof St. Victor’s Fons philosophiae, written around 1175 or shortly after.35

32 Master Alberic was among those credited in the twelfth century with the author-ship of a book written “In scolis Magistri P. Abailardi”; see the Promisimus gloss onPriscian (Oxford, Bodleian Library, Laud. lat. 67, fol. 22ra), cited in R. Hunt, The His-tory of Grammar in the Middle Ages (Amsterdam, 1980), p. 80. The same work was alsoattributed to masters Mainerius, Valetus, and Garnerus, all of whom were associatedwith Abelard at one time. In addition to Hunt, see D.E. Luscombe, The School of PeterAbelard (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 55–57.

33 See above, notes 14, 28–29.34 See above, note 28.35 Godfrey of St. Victor, Fons philosophiae, p. 43:

“Addunt hic se socios quidam nominales,Nomine, non numine, talium sodales;Alii vicinius assunt quod realesIpsa nuncupavit res, quod sunt vere tales.Nam si pro reatibus variis errorumPoterat realium nomen dici horum,Tamen excusabilis error est eorum;Menti contradicere mos est insanorum.Namque mens vel cogitet nomen esse genus,Solus hoc crediderit mentis alienus,Cum sit tot generibus rerum mundus plenus,

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Godfrey acknowledges the opposition of the two groups, but his punsand spurious etymologies provide no clues to the meaning those labelshave for him. He appears somewhat more critical of the Reales, whichwould fit with his preference for the Parvipontani.36

When, in the last quarter of the twelfth century we begin to encoun-ter numerous references to the opiniones Nominalium, the relation of labeland doctrine, as used by theologians at that time, becomes clear.37 Thelabel is linked not just to a solution to the problem of the object of faithbut to similar solutions for a number of theological problems. Most ofthe problems so addressed involve tensed propositions and immutabil-ity, specifically the immutability of God’s knowledge, God’s will, God’spower, as well as the immutability of faith as it concerns the object ofbelief. The formula “what is at one time true is always true” (semel est

verum, semper est verum) applied equally well to any of the problems ofimmutability. As Chenu suspected, the common feature underlying allthese “nominalist” solutions is the theory of the identity of the princi-pal signification of a noun (unitas nominis) and the corresponding idea ofthe identity of the principal signification of a proposition (unitas enuntia-

Cuius genus nomen est semper sit egenus.Ceterum realium sum quamplures secte,Quas reales dixeris a reatu recte,Quia veri tramitem non eunt directeNec fluenta gratie hauriunt perfecte.”

36 The oft-quoted theory in logic that “from the impossible anything follows” (eximpossibili sequitur quodlibet) is ascribed to the Adamites (presumably the Parvipontani) inTractatus Emmeranus de impossibili positione; see L.M. de Rijk, “Some Thirteenth CenturyTracts on the Game of Obligation,” Vivarium, 12 (1974), 94–123 at 102. The same thesisis ascribed to (or at last defended by) the Nominales in a quaestio contained in Vatican,Bibl. Apost., Vat. lat. 7678, fol. 81rb: “Solutio. Dicendum quod in veritate secundumopinionem quorundam, nominalium scilicet, ex impossibili sequitur quidlibet. Tamensecundum veritatem ex impossibili nihil sequitur. Et hoc est secundum opinionemrealium.” Cited from F. Pelster, “Nominales und Reales im 13. Jahrhundert,” Sophia,12–14 (1944–1946), 154–161 at 157.

37 The labels Nominales, Nominalis, via Nominalium, or opinio Nominalium, which occur inthe writings of Peter the Cantor, the Mazarine anonymous, Peter of Capua, Praeposit-inus, William of Auxerre, Godfrey of Poitiers, Roland of Cremona, Albertus Magnus,Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas, are more than sufficient to identify a set group ofrelated positions encountered frequently in twelfth century works. The principal pas-sages for determining the meaning of Nominales are those in which that label is linkedwith a particular form of argumentation and resulting conclusions. We are also safe inassuming that where those same arguments and conclusions occur, opiniones Nominaliumare under discussion. Conclusions alone are insufficient, since they could have beenarrived at by other arguments.


bilis). Bonaventure recognized this when, in the mid-thirteenth century,he remarked that “the Nominalists are so called because they establishtheir position on the unity of the noun”.38

Although the label nominalis does not appear in these theological textsuntil the last decades of the twelfth century, Chenu and Landgraf wereaware that Peter Lombard had adopted and, in a sense, disseminatedthis approach to problems of immutability. Every gloss or commentaryon the text of the Master had to take a stand on the suitability of thissolution. It was already controversial by 1170, as Peter of Poitiers, oneof Lombard’s strongest supporters, noted.39 By the opening years of thethirteenth century it had joined that small group of issues on whichLombard’s views were not usually followed.40

Lombard first introduced the nominalist solution in the context ofGod’s knowledge of events.41 It was generally recognized in the twelfthcentury that things and events alone could not be direct objects ofepistemic verbs, such as “to know” (scire), “to believe” (credere), or “todoubt” (dubitare). What is known as true or false is not a thing but astatement about a thing, i.e. a state of affairs (modus se habendi), that suchand such is or is not the case.42 This characteristic of epistemic verbs

38 Bonaventure, Sent. I, d. 41, a. 2, q. 2; Opera Omnia, vol. 1 (Quaracchi, 1882),p. 740: “Et ista fuit opinio Nominalium, qui dicti sunt Nominales quia fundabantpositionem suam super nominis unitatem.” And earlier, William of Auxerre, Summaaurea I, tr. 7, c. 1; ed. J. Ribaillier (Paris, 1980), p. 115: “Ista etiam forma fallit secundumNominales qui dicunt quod unum nomen est plures voces.” Cf. Thomas, Sent. I, d. 41,q. 1, a. 5; Opera Omnia, ed. R. Busa, vol. 1 (Stuttgart, 1980), p. 110: “ad unitatem reisignificatae sequitur unitas enuntiabilis, quamvis etiam cum diversa consignificationetemporis proferatur.” Thomas, Quodl. IV, q. 9, a. 2; Opera Omnia III, p. 461: “Sed diversaconsignificatio non tollit identitatem nominis; idem enim nomen dicitur esse per omnescasus et in singulari et in plurali numero.” Thomas does not share this view.

39 Peter of Poitiers, Sententiae V, p. 14: “Tempora enim variantur et verba, sed fidesmanet eadem et significatio. Et aliud modo dicitur hac propositione, aliud dicebaturilla prius, quia una et eadem veritas diversis verbis prolatis secundum diversitatemtemporum diversis propositionibus dicitur. Nec insultet aliquis huic solutioni, donecintellexerit, ne potius ex odio et invectione, quam ex animi iudicio videatur, quoddictum est, contemnere.” One of the earliest of Lombard’s commentators, MasterUdo (ca. 1160–1165), seemed to feel that a res theory better accounted for the differenttimes of ancient and contemporary believers; Bamberg, Staatsbibl., Patr. 126, fol. 42v:“Unus et idem articulus fidei est res ipsa, scilicet Christi passio, et illud verum, scilicetChristum esse passum,” cited by Landgraf, “Studien,” 202; see the statement of MasterMartinus below in note 46.

40 See discussion of this point in Chenu, “Grammaire,” 18.41 Lombard, Sent. I, d. 41, c. 3.42 Abelard, Dialectica, tr. 2, lib. 1, p. 160: “Et est profecto ita in re, sicut dicit vera

propositio, sed non est res aliqua quod dicit. Unde quasi quidam rerum modus habendi

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would seem to apply to divine knowledge just as much as human—atleast when considering the meaning of biblical and patristic statementsabout what God knows or knew. In relation to a specific event fixed intime, God would know it as future before it happened and as past afterit happened. God once knew that the world would be created or thatI would be born, and now knows that the world is created and that Iwas born.43 The enuntiabilia that God knows at different times are notthe same, and the identical enuntiabile is true at one time and false atanother. The seemingly inevitable corollary to affirming the objects ofknowledge to be dicta or enuntiabilia is the mutability of knowledge, bothhuman and divine.

To avoid that undesirable consequence, some theologians arguedthat the object of knowledge and belief was not a declarative statement(enuntiabile) but rather the thing (res) to which the proposition referred.44

Most, however, favored the enuntiabile theory. Although eventually foundunacceptable by thirteenth-century theologians, the nominalist solutionresolved this impass by creating a form of the enuntiabile theory thatremained immutable over time. Beneath the consignification of thepast and future tenses was the signification of a sempiternal present.The sense of the affirmation of belief or the content of knowledgeremains the same regardless of the temporal relation of knower andknown, believer and event.45 Linking the Aristotelian rule, “of anything

se per propositiones exprimitur, non res aliquae designantur.” William of Auxerre,Summa aurea III, tr. 2, c. 2, q. 2; Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposition, p. 184: “verbssuch as credere and scire cannot properly be combined with a designation of a thing—istescit domum suam … is simply not a well-formed expression—but require a complexum astheir complement.”

43 Lombard, Sent. I, d. 41, c. 3; Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae, 2 vols. (Grottaferrata,1971, 1981), I, p. 293, in an opposing argument: “Olim scivit hunc hominem nascitu-rum, qui natus est; modo non scit eum nasciturum; scivit ergo aliquid quod modo nonscit. Item scivit mundum esse creandum; modo non scit eum creandum; aliquid ergoscivit quod modo non scit.”

44 The best discussion of these theories is Gabriel Nuchelmans, Theories of the Proposi-tion, pp. 177–185. Among those favoring a res theory are the anonymous Summa (Vat.lat.10754); anonymous gloss on the Sentences (Naples, Bibl. Naz., VII.C.14, fol. 97vb): “Ergoarticuli sunt res et non enuntiabilia 〈ms.: evangelia〉, et ita passio Christi est articulus”;Praepositinus; Albertus Magnus. Although favoring an enuntiabile approach, the nomi-nalist solution was rejected by Philip of Grève, William of Auxerre, Bonaventure, andThomas, largely at the expense of the oneness of belief between the Patriarchs (antiqui)and contemporary Christians (moderni); anonymous gloss on the Sentences (Paris, Bibl.Maz., 758, fol. 46v): “Haec solum nominalibus videntur esse concedentia 〈sic!〉. Sanequidem potest concedi, quod aliud credimus, aliud antiqui.”

45 Anonymous Summa (Vat. lat. 10754, fol. 5r): “Nominales sunt et fere omnes de hac


that has taken place, it was always true to say ‘it is’ or ‘it will be’ ”,with the grammatical theory of the oneness of a word’s signification,the enuntiabile theory was given the timeless quality of a thing (res).46

In Lombard’s version, the immutability of God’s knowledge is basedon the oneness of the principal signification of “to know” (scire) thatunderlies the different tense forms of past (scivit), present (scit), andfuture (sciet).47

sententia, quod non alii fuerunt articuli, quoniam “Christum esse natum” est verum, etquod semel est verum semper est verum.” Peter of Capua, Summa (Munich, Staatsbibl.,Clm 14508, fol. 39r): “Posset dici secundum opinionem Nominalium, quod Abraamnunquam credidit ‘Christum esse venturum,’ nam ‘Christum esse venturum’ est ipsummodo esse venturum, quod non credidit Abraam. … Sed cum non crediderit Christumdeterminate in aliquo tempore venturum, non credidit Christum nunc venisse, et ideonec Christum venisse, cum idem ponit secundum Nominalem Christum nunc venisseet Christum venisse.” Praepositinus, Summa (Bruges, Bibl. de la Ville, 237, fol. 52v; Paris,B.N. lat. 14526, fol. 34v): “Si dicas, sicut dicunt Nominales, quia quod semel est verumsemper erit verum, secundum eos dicendum erit quod Habraham credidit Christumesse natum, et quod Habraham non credidit Christum esse nasciturum, quia Christumesse nasciturum secundum eos semper fuit falsum….” Bonaventure, Sent. I, d. 41, a. 2,q. 2 (I, 740): “Alii dixerunt contrarium, quia posuerunt quod enuntiabile, quod semel estverum, semper est verum, et ita semper scitur. Et ut melius pateat, videnda est eorumpositio et ratio positionis. Fuerunt qui dixerunt, quod ‘albus,’ ‘alba,’ ‘album,’ cum sinttres voces et tres habeant modos significandi, tamen, quia eandem significationemimportant, sunt unum nomen. Per hunc modum dixerunt quod unitas enuntiabilisaccipienda est non ex parte vocis vel modi significandi, sed rei significatae; sed una resest, quae primo est futura, deinde praesens, tertio praeterita; ergo enuntiare rem hancprimo esse futuram, deinde praesentem, tertio praeteritam, non faciet diversitatemenuntiabilium, sed vocum. … Quia, retenta eadem significatione, enuntiabile semperest verum, et non est idem nisi cum eadem significatio retinetur, ideo dixerunt quodillud quod semel est verum, semper est verum. … Et hoc modo solvit Magister. Et istafuit opinio Nominalium, qui dicti sunt Nominales, quia fundabant positionem suamsuper nominis unitatem.” Quotations taken from Chenu, “Grammaire,” and Landgraf,“Studien”.

46 Different uses of the terms res and articulus have sometimes made the discussionsof individual authors difficult to place. Since res was used variously to mean the historic“event,” the “object” of faith, the “article” of faith, or the content of the article asproposition, it could be used by either side. In the nominalist version res could be thatunderlying thing or unity that made the articles of faith supra-temporal. Similarly,articulus could mean the proposition or the event to which a proposition referred.Master Martinus noted in his Quaestiones (Paris, B.N. lat. 14556, fol. 327v): “Ideo dicuntquidam quod articulus fidei consistit in re ipsa, et in veris quae circa ipsam rem fuerunt;unum enim et idem est fidei articulus, res ipsa, scilicet Christi passio, et idem verum,scilicet Christum esse passum.” A res theory (perhaps better described as an “event”theory) removes temporality by making the object into a single “thing” (incomplexum) orthe event itself. The nominalist form of the enuntiabile theory removes temporality byaffirming the unity of meaning behind the complexum.

47 Lombard, Sent. I, d. 41, c. 3 (I, 293): “De scientia autem aliter dicimus. Scit enimDeus semper omnia quae aliquando scit: omnem enim scientiam quam aliquando

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It was in the context of the problem of divine knowledge that Lom-bard, in order to bolster his argument, introduced the parallel problemof the object of faith.48 The nominalist solution to the latter issue hadpersuasive force for him and others because it appeared to be Augus-tine’s position.49 While tacked on at the end of his discussion as anargument from authority, the problem of the object of belief is one thatreceived equal attention in the late twelfth century and formed the basisfor Chenu’s two articles.

habuit, semper habuit et habet et habebit.” Ibid.: “Sed ad hoc dicimus quia idem denativitate huius hominis et mundi creatione nunc etiam scit, quod sciebat antequamfierent, licet tunc et nunc hanc scientiam eius diversis exprimi verbis oporteat. Namquod tunc futurum erat, nunc praeteritum est; ideoque verba commutenda sunt adipsum designandum. Sicut diversis temporibus loquentes, eandem diem modo per hocadverbium ‘cras’ designamus, dum adhuc futura est; modo per ‘hodie,’ dum praesensest; modo per ‘heri,’ dum praeterita est. Ita antequam crearetur mundus, sciebat Deushunc creandum; postquam creatus est, scit eum creatum. Nec est hoc scire diversa,sed omnino idem de mundi creatione.” The anonymous gloss on the Sentences (Paris,Bibl. Maz., 758, fol. 46v) notes that Lombard has adopted the position of a Nominalist:“Magister in hoc capitulo nominalis est sequens illud: quod semel est verum, sempererit verum.” Simon of Tournai, sometimes grouped with the Porretani, follows Lombardin adopting the nominalist view of divine knowledge and will. Peter of Capua, Summa(Munich, Staatsbibl., Clm 14508, fol. 7v; Vat. lat. 4296, fol. 7vb; Vat. lat. 4304, fol. 7va),on whether God knows, something that he previously did not know, states: “Realisconcedit quod sicut ‘me esse’ est verum et non semper fuit verum, ita ipsum scit modoDeus et non semper illud scivit, nec ideo est scientior quam fuit. Sicut iste videt aliquid,quod prius non vidit, non tamen habet maiorem visum. Nominalis dicit quod sicut‘me esse’ semper fuit verum, ita et Deus semper scivit illud. … Et ideo scivit me esse.Secundum hos nihil scit quod ab aeterno non scivit.” Continuing to the question ofwhether God begins to know something: “Realis dicit quod sicut aliquid potest incipereesse verum, ita Deus potest incipire scire illud quod non est verum. Nominalis dicitquod sicut aliquid potest esse verum, quod non est verum, nec potest incipere esseverum, ita Deus potest scire aliquid, quod non scit, non tamen potest incipere scireillud, sicut iste, qui non est praedestinatus, potest esse praedestinatus, non tamen potestincipere esse praedestinatus.” William of Auxerre, Summa aurea I, tr. 9, c. 2 (I, 181): “Sedsecundum Nominales qui dicunt: quod semel est verum, semper est verum, Deus nihilincipit vel desinit scire. Et hoc magis concordat Augustino et magistro in sententiis.”

48 Lombard, Sent. I, d. 41, c. 3 (I, 293): “Sicut antiqui Patres crediderunt Christumnasciturum et moriturum, nos autem credimus eum iam natum et mortuum; nec tamendiversa credimus nos et illi, sed eadem. ‘Tempora enim’, ut Augustinus, ‘variata sunt’,et ideo verba mutata, ‘non fides’.” For subsequent discussions of Lombard’s position seeabove, note 45.

49 Augustine, Tract. in Joan., XLV, n. 9 (PL 35, 1722): “Tempora variata sunt, nonfides. Quia et ipsa verba pro tempore variantur, cum varie declinantur. Alium sonumhabet ‘venturus est’; alium sonum habet ‘venit’. Eadem tamen fides utrosque conjugit,et eos qui venturum esse, et eos qui eum venisse crediderunt.” For analyses of this andother passages see my “Augustine and Nominalism,” in St. Augustine and His Influence in


All parties to the discussion wished to affirm the immutability ofbelief across time, that what Abraham and St. Peter believed was thesame object of faith believed by later Christians. The most commonform of the res approach protected immutability by maintaining thatthe object of faith was the historic event itself. The nominalist approachprotected immutability by affirming that there was one identical non-temporal significatum underlying the changing tense forms of the articlesof the creed as affirmed by those before, during, or after the eventsof Christ’s life. Just as God knows one truth, which at one time isexpressed in the future tense and at another time is expressed in thepast tense, so Abraham, who believed Christ would be born, believedthe same identical truth as Christians who believe Christ was born.

One interesting feature of the problem of knowledge or belief is thatthe knower or believer is, in a certain sense, passive, and that it isthe reality of fact or event that determines the content of knowledgeor belief. If the flow of time is taken seriously, the content of God’sknowledge not only continually undergoes change, but can be changed(even manipulated) by human activity—a particularly disconcertingnotion in light of belief in God’s omnipotence.50

The mutability of divine knowledge could have been avoided bystressing that God does not know “in time” but as eternal present,and that God does not know by means of propositions. But just asmany twelfth-century discussions of divine omnipotence, in order toassert God’s freedom of choice, hypothesized a moment of deliberationbefore a particular course of action was chosen, so the process ofdivine knowledge was “humanized” and considered sub specie temporis.The question of the object of faith is “cleaner” because the knowersor believers are always human and in time. It permits a solution tothe question of the object of knowledge within the realm of temporalpropositions alone.

The problem of God’s will is closely related to the problem of God’sknowledge, but with some important differences. God who wills, likeGod who knows, is in a static state outside the flow of time, while thatwhich is willed (or known) is in time. Yet in volition, unlike epistemic

the Middle Ages, ed. E.B. King and J.T. Schaefer (Sewanee, 1988) pp. 91–97 [reprinted inthis volume as Chapter 2].

50 Robert Holcot, traditionally considered a fourteenth-century Nominalist, wouldhave been quite compatible with those thirteenth-century res theorists who argued forthe growth and diminution of God’s knowledge on the basis of human events.

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verbs, God actively wills instead of passively knows. The content of thedivine will cannot be theoretically manipulated in the same way as thecontent of divine knowledge unless one makes the divine will as wellas divine knowledge dependent on the outcome of future events withinthe power of man.

The issue of tensed propositions, however, remains the same in thetwo problems. God does not simply will things or facts; he wills that

things exist or that something be the case. Moreover, events and statesof affairs—all that happens or exists—lie within the will of God. As thepassage of time moves facts and events from future, to present, to past,so human descriptions of what God wills change tense and, verbally,the content of what God wills.

Again, a construction parallel to the unitas nominis is the key to thenominalist solution, as adopted by Lombard. Beneath the changingtenses of voluit and vult lies the same identical principal significationand, consequently, the identical enuntiabile of propositions that differonly in tense. The unity behind the root meaning of the verb expressesand safeguards the immutability of the divine will just as much as itdoes the immutability of divine knowledge.51

The verbal parallel to the unitas nominis also provided a solution tothe problem of divine omnipotence. It was widely acknowledged thatGod’s power was limited by his inability to do contradictory thingssimultaneously and did not extend to actions that would contradict thedivine nature. Yet time itself seemed to impose further limitations. Godcould not change the past. A course of action, once taken, not onlydestroyed other possibilities, but certain actions could not appropri-ately be repeated (such as Incarnation and Resurrection). If the range

51 Lombard, Sent. I, d. 44, c. 2 (I, 305): “Ad quod dicimus quia, sicut omnia semperscit quae aliquando scivit, et semper vult quae aliquando voluit, nec unquam aliquamscientiam amittit vel voluntatem mutat quam habuit, ita omnia semper potest quae ali-quando potuit, nec unquam aliqua potentia sua privatur. Non est ergo privatus poten-tia incarnandi vel resurgendi, licet non possit modo incarnari vel resurgere. Sicut enimpotuit olim incarnari, ita et potest modo esse incarnatus; in quo eiusdem rei potentiamonstratur.” Ibid., 305–306: “Et sicut voluit olim resurgere, et modo resurrexisse; inquo unius rei voluntas exprimitur. … Similiter quidquid voluit, et vult, id est omnemquam habuit voluntatem, et modo habet; et cuiuscumque rei voluntatem habuit, etmodo habet; non tamen vult esse vel fieri omne quod aliquando voluit esse vel fieri, sedvult fuisse vel factum esse.” The anonymous gloss on Sentences (Paris, Bibl. Maz., 758,fol. 48r) rejects Lombard’s thesis (I, 43) “quod quidquid semel est verum, semper eritverum. Nos autem concedimus, quod Deus noviter, id est ex tempore, vult me esse in‘a’, voluntas tamen eius est aeterna.”


of God’s activity in the present and future was as unlimited as it pre-sumably was before creation and revelation, then little in the presentorders of nature and grace or in the past itself were certain. On theother hand, if the flow of time increasingly puts facts and events outsidethe power of God and narrows the course of future divine action, thenthe range of divine power is diminished with every moment of time.

Yet, just as there is one root verb beneath the changing tense forms(consignifications) of scivit and scit, or voluit and vult, so there is oneidentical principal signification that lies behind potuit and potest. God’spower or capacity for action is not changed by the passage of time.What God could at one time do, he still can do; and what he can nowdo, he could always do.52

The technique employed in all these solutions is a grammatical the-ory of the nomen, the distinction of one signification and many consigni-fications, as applied to verbs and tensed propositions. The formula that

52 Lombard, Sent. I, d. 44, c. 2 (I, 305–306): “Ita potuit olim nasci et resurgere, etmodo potest natus fuisse et resurrexisse; et est eiusdem rei potentia. Si enim possetmodo nasci et resurgere, non esset idem posse. Verba enim diversorum temporum,diversis prolata temporibus et diversis adiuncta adverbiis, eundem faciunt sensum, utmodo loquentes dicimus: Iste potest legere hodie, eras autem dicemus: Iste potestlegisse, vel potuit legere heri; ubi unius rei monstratur potentia. Si autem diversistemporibus loquentes, eiusdem temporis verbis et adverbiis utamur, dicentes hodie: Istepotest hodie legere; et dicentes cras: Iste potest hodie legere, non idem, sed diversadicimus eum posse. Fateamur igitur Deum semper posse et quidquid semel potuit, idest habere omnem illam potentiam quam semel habuit, et illius omnis rei potentiamcuius semel habuit; sed non semper posse facere omne illud quod aliquando potuitfacere: potest quidem facere aut fecisse quod aliquando potuit.” Anonymous Sent.gloss stemming from Stephen Langton, at I, d. 44, c. 2 (Naples, Bibl. Naz., VII.C.14,fol. 97vb): “Secundum Nominales 〈ms.: nos〉 quicquid potuit, potest. Secundum Realesaliter, quibus haec dubia est: quicquid potuit, potest.” Anonymous Sent. gloss (Paris,Bibl. Maz., 758, fol. 48v) on Lombard’s (I, 44) thesis that just as God always knows whathe sometimes knew, and always wills what he sometimes willed, so he is always able todo what he at some time was able to do; for although he is not now able to be incarnateor to rise, he still possesses the power to do so. The gloss remarks: “Hoc simpliciterfalsum,” since it does not sufficiently recognize changes in time. “Magister autem nonprocedit hac via 〈i.e. make God’s knowledge, will, and power correspond to changesin time〉; immo procedit tamquam Nominalis dicens semel verum semper esse verum.”Bonaventure, Sent. I, d. 44, a. 1, q. 1: “Ad hoc est duplex modus respondendi, sicutad sophisma de scientia. Concesso enim, quod divina potentia secundum veritatemomnino sit immutabilis, secundum positionem tamen Nominalium concedunt hanc:potest quidquid potuit. Et respondent illationi: sed potuit Christum suscitare: ergoet modo potest; respondent, quod non debet inferri sub illo tempore, sed sub alio:ergo potest Christum suscitasse, quia hoc enuntiabile adiunctum verbis diversorumtemporum non est idem. Ideo dicunt, quod propositio est vera, et si aliter inferatur,assignant peccatum in processu secundum figuram dictionis sive secundum accidens.”

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was developed out of this theory was that whatever is at one time true(believed, known, willed, or doable) is always true (believed, known,willed, or doable). Semel est verum, semper est verum.

It should be noted that this formula and theory of the constant truthvalue of enuntiabilia is not a theory about propositions in general. Itdoes not apply to states of activity that may change from moment tomoment (such as the sitting or running Socrates). It applies only tostatements about events or situations at some designated point in time.If it is ever true that the Incarnation or a sea battle will take place(and Aristotle granted the necessity of the latter, once it had occurred),then that truth was always true. It is not the ceasing to perform someactivity that makes a statement true or false, since at one point in timeonly one of several contradictory activities will be taking place. Theissue is the changing tense structure of statements before and after anevent. A Realist (in the twelfth- and thirteenth-century sense) wouldargue that a proposition in the future tense is true before the eventand false after the event. A Nominalist considers the tense structure ofthe proposition to be of little importance and stressed the eternal truthwhich the enuntiable affirms. Most of this discussion concerned twotypes of propositions: those in which the object of knowledge and beliefis an eternal truth of faith; and those in which the one who knows, wills,or acts is himself eternal, namely God.

It would be wrong, however, to understand the unitas nominis theoryas simply a theory of enuntiables that centered on the nature of verbs,tensed statements, and propositional truth. The underlying unity thatlinks “Socrates ran” (Socrates cucurrit) and “Socrates runs” (Socrates currit)is the unity of the noun Socrates just as much as the unity of the verbcurrere—or more precisely, the truth value of the totality signified bythe proposition. The theory of the unity of the noun was applied tothe problem of whether evil intention and the resulting external actconstitute one sin or two. According to the nominalist solution, sincethe same individual, for example Socrates, is the same person (nomen)behind the two stages of action (voces), they constitute one sin by reasonof the unity of the noun.53 Again, this was a view adopted by Lombard,

53 Udo, Gloss on Sent. II, 42 (Bamberg, Staatsbibl., Patr. 126, fol. 33v): “Conceduntenim, quod actus et voluntas sunt diversa non peccata, et tamen quolibet (!) illorum estpeccatum. Et inducunt simile: Iste duo voces, quas isti proferunt, qui vocant Socratem,sunt diversa non nomina et tamen quaelibet illarum est unum et idem nomen cum alia.Quod dictum est de illo, qui solam habet voluntatem et cras perducet ad actum, taleminducunt instantiam: Ecce isti duo proferunt hoc nomen Socrates. Nullum nomen


but the language of nomen-analysis only comes out in the glosses onhis Sentences.54 The now familiar form of nominalist exposition wasprobably applied here. Socrates (at T1) intends to sin at a future time(T2) = Socrates peccabit. Socrates sins at T2 = Socrates peccat. Socrates at

profertur ab uno, quod non proferatur ab alio, et tamen aliqua essentia vocis proferturab uno, quae non profertur ab alio”.

54 Lombard, Sent. II, 42 (I, 567–568): “Quibus alii respondent haec duo diversa esse,non peccata. Non enim peccata sunt, sed peccatum unum.” Later in the same distinc-tion Lombard does employ nomen-analysis (I, 570): “Peccatum ergo est perpetratio mali,delictum desertio boni. Quod et ipsum nomen ostendit. Quid enim aliud sonat delic-tum nisi derelictum? Et quid derelinquit, qui delinquit, nisi bonum? Vel delictum estquod ignoranter fit, peccatum quod scienter committitur. Indifferenter tamen et pecca-tum nomine delicti, et delictum nomine peccati appellatur.” Peter of Poitiers, SententiaeII, p. 14: “Posito quod iste protulerit hanc vocem ‘albus’ et modo proferat hanc vocem‘alba’; iste nullum nomen protulit quod modo non proferat, et nichil fuit prolaturus nisinomen; ergo nil protulit iste quod non proferat.” “Quod postea dicitur contra eos quidicunt quod voluntas et actus sunt diversa peccata et ideo alia satisfactio iniungendaest pro voluntate et alia pro actu, solvi potest dicto quod non sunt due satisfactionesiniugende pro illis duobus peccatis.” “Si autem queratur utrum reatus et actus, siveexterior sive interior, sint duo peccata vel non, dicendum est hoc incongrue dici, sicutsi diceretur: Hoc album et albedo eius sunt vel non sunt, quoniam non est connu-meratio corporis ad suam proprietatem. … Hoc tamen non est pretermittendum quodcontemptus, reatus, actus, voluntas pro uno peccato reputantur non pro pluribus, sicutnomen significat substantiam et qualitatem et intellectum, non tamen significat plura,quia ista tria pro una significatione reputantur.” Simon of Tournai, Les Disputationes,ed. J. Warichez (Louvain, 1932), p. 74: “Licet sint diversi motus hodiernus et hesternus,tamen quia vertuntur circa idem, est enim idem volitum. Ideo non iudicamus diversapeccata, sed unum; sicut diversas voces unum nomen, qui una institutione institutaesunt ad significandum.” Peter of Capua, Summa (Vat. lat. 4296, fol. 27r; Vat. lat. 4304,fol. 27r): “Ad hoc dicunt quidam et hoc dicebat, ut fertur, Abaialardus, quod actus etvoluntas, quamvis sint diversa, sunt tamen idem peccatum, nec habent pro inconve-nienti, si aliquod peccatum est duo, immo etiam tria 〈voluntas et actus et reatus〉.”“Cum vero adiciet actum, non committet aliud peccatum, sed illud idem peccatum.”“Sicut una sola res sit caritas, tamen propter pluralitatem diligendorum plura dantur deea praecepta, scilicet ‘diliges Dominum Deum tuum’ etc., et ‘diliges proximum tuumsicut te ipsum’.” The attribution to Abelard is somewhat misleading. For Abelard itis the intention or volition that is the sin, which is not increased in the eyes of Godby the ability to fulfill that intention. It is one sin by reason of intention, not by rea-son of the unitas nominis. An anonymous Summa, Vat. lat. 10754, fol. 68v, accepts thedual hypothesis of sin, but says: “Ad hoc dicunt quidam, quod licet sint diversa, sunttamen idem peccatum, quod voluntas, immo ex voluntate actus est peccatum, sicutalbus et alba sunt diversa, tamen idem nomen dicitur.” Godfrey of Poitiers, Summa,Paris, B.N. Lat. 15747, fol. 36v, as cited by Landgraf: “Si sequamur viam Nominalium,dicere possumus, quod voluntas et actus sunt idem peccatum. De voluntate concomi-tante dico, non de praeeunte, quae non concomitatur actum. Et omnes illae auctori-tates, quae videntur velle, quod sint diversa peccata, intelligendae sunt de praeeuntevoluntate et actu subsequente, non de concomitante.” He has used here the proviso ofSimon of Tournai. Godfrey continues that some might say there are two sins: “instantiaest in istis vocibus ‘albus’ ‘alba,’ quorum utrumque nomen, non tamen diversa nom-

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T3 has sinned = Socrates peccavit. Once the second proposition is true(or in Abelard’s view, once the first proposition is true), the other twoare also true. The sinning Socrates, if once true, was always true. Onecommentator, Bandinus, used this discussion of sin to make the furtheranalogy that in the Eucharist the flesh and blood of Christ were onesacramentum, just as “I love” and “you love” are one word under twogrammatical forms.55

It also appears that the label Nominales in the late twelfth centurywas not linked solely to the theory of an underlying (common) rootmeaning that lies behind the various forms of a word. The Nominales

were also credited with the view that the same root word or the samegrammatical form could have different meanings depending on con-text, and different words that supposited for the same person or thingwere not necessarily interchangeable. The nomen “Socrates”, for exam-ple, could stand for the substance (or essence) of Socrates or the per-son of Socrates. The substance of Socrates might cease to exist whileSocrates as person might continue to exist. Substance and person arenot identical, just as the human nature of Christ is not identical withthe person of Christ.56 In fact, mistakes in logical argumentation occur

ina.” “Sicut dicerem, quod non protulit hanc vocem, quae est hoc nomen, sed protulithoc nomen, quod est haec vox, posito quod protulit hanc vocem ‘albus’ et non protulithanc vocem ‘alba’.” “Nominatio non fit in vocibus, sed in utente vel in instituente.”Praepositinus, Summa (Erlangen, Universitätsbibl., 353, fol. 24v; see also Chenu, “Con-tribution,” 131): “Ad hoc dicimus consentientes magistris nostris, quod actio et voluntassunt duo peccata.” Hugh of St. Cher mentions Prepositinus as supporting the “two sin”theory, which seems to have become standard in the second half of the twelfth andearly thirteenth centuries (e.g. Stephen Langton), with a few exceptions (e.g. Godfrey ofPoitiers).

55 Bandinus, Sent. II, 42: “Sicut etiam unum sacramentum sunt sanguis et caro, ipsatamen diversa sunt; et unum verbum sunt ‘amo’ et ‘amas,’ licet duae personae sint.”

56 Peter Cantor, Summa de sacramentis III, c. 54, ed. J.-A. Dugauquier, Analecta Medi-aevalia Namurcensia 21 (Louvain and Lille, 1967), p. 480: “quidam eorum dicunt quodcum homo ille assumptus sit persona, Verbum scilicet incarnatum, nullo modo connu-merabilia sunt Verbum et ille homo assumptus. Potest tamen fieri sermo de homineillo ita quod non de Verbo, sicut in secularibus litteris secundum Nominales, qui dicuntquod substantia, quae est Socrates, desinit esse, non tamen Socrates desinit esse. Dis-tingunt enim inter essentiam et personam. Nulla connumeratio est inter Socratem etsubstantiam quae ipse est, tamen possum loqui de illa essentia, licet non loquar deSocrate.” Ibid., p. 493: “Forte non est recte superius hoc nomen ‘aliquid’ ad hoc nomen‘homo’, sicut dicunt Nominales. Unde secundum eos, Socrates est homo qui ipse erit;non tamen est aliquid quod ipse erit.”

The differentiation between substance and person may be linked to other thesesattributed to the Nominales and interpreted by Normore to deny augmentation, change,and motion. In this view, substantial shifts among the parts of a whole do not affect


when different words that stand for the same thing are considered inter-changeable or identical, or when the same word is being used de dicto inone premise and de re in another.57

A few other theses have been attributed to the Nominalists in thetexts and literature. One of these is the view, shared with other groups,that a composite entity should be considered one thing, not a multi-plicity of things joined together.58 Another, far closer to the problemof universals, is the thesis that genera and species are nomina.59 Finally,there are a number of rules of inference in logic, such as: a syllogisticinference does not require further justification; a negative does not fol-low from an affirmative, nor an affirmative from a negative; and any-

the nature of the whole. On the theological plane, Christ continued to exist duringthe three days between crucifixion and resurrection, although his body underwentcorruption. Belief in Christ was just as valid during those three days as before or after.

57 William of Auxerre, Summa aurea III, tr. 2, c. 2, q. 2, when describing the nomi-nalist position on the object of faith, that the same articles of faith are believed in bythe antiqui and the moderni, he remarks that the Nominalists consider the following a“fallacy of accident” (fallacia secundum accidens): “enuntiabilia sunt mutata: enuntiabiliasunt articuli: ergo articuli sunt mutati.” Anonymous gloss on Sentences (Paris, Bibl. Maz.,758, fol. 51r) on I, 46 (God’s responsibility for evil being done): “Opinio quorumdamNominalium fuit: tu audis significatum huius propositionis: ‘angeli canunt’; ergo audisangelos canere. Non sequitur; in propositione enim agitur de dicto, in conclusione dere.”

58 The Compendium logicae Porretanum attributes to the Nominales, Montani, and Cappausesthe position that every composite entity, both a totum disgregativum and a totum contiguum,is one thing, not many; see edition by S. Ebbesen, K.M. Fredborg, and L.O. Nielsen,CIMGL, 46 (1983), 39. Chenu discusses the problem of divine names in his secondarticle, but it is less clear that the theory of the unity of the noun is being appliedhere in the same way as with the other problems. Moreover, I do not know any textof the late twelfth or thirteenth century that identifies any solution to this problem as“nominalist”. Similarly, Landgraf includes the theory of the identity of the soul and itspowers, mentioned by William of Auxerre. But William does not discuss it in terms ofthe unity of noun theory, and the labeling of the view as “nominalist” is not in themanuscripts but in the margin of the 1500 printed edition and probably reflects theassociation of so-called late medieval Nominalists with this view. William of Auxerre,Summa aurea II, tr. 9, c. 1, q. 6: “Quidam tamen dicunt, quod haec tria sunt proprieunum, et intelliguntur hoc de ipsa potentia. Dicunt enim, quod anima idem est, quodsua potentia. Sed dicuntur esse tres potentiae propter diversos actus, cum non sit nisiuna anima et una potentia in essentia. Et hoc volunt habere ex verbis beati Augustini,quae dicunt, quod haec tria sunt una vita, una anima. Et per hoc, quod ipse dixit, quodhaec tria non sunt in anima ut in subiecto, igitur non sunt qualitates animae, sed ipsaanima.” William himself does not adopt this view. Nor is there evidence that anyonein the twelfth or thirteeenth centuries saw the theory of the identity of the soul and itsfaculties as specifically nominalist.

59 Peter of Capua, Summa (Munich, Staatsbibl., Clm 14508, fol. 26v): “Haec oppositionon est contra nos Nominales, quia dicimus genera et species esse nomina.”

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thing follows from an impossibility.60 The place of these theses withinthe teaching of the secta Nominalium will be considered in the last sec-tion.

The content and range of the most frequently cited opiniones Nominal-

ium in the second half of the twelfth century have been examined. Atwhat stage, however, did the application of these theories of the nounreceive the kind of attention that created the label Nominales? Was itamong grammarians, logicians, or theologians? When and where didthe phenomenon originate?

Toward a History of the Nominales

Although Lombard does not cite a source for his “nominalist” opin-ion—he never identifies contemporary opinion beyond the imprecisequidam—Lombard was in fact borrowing, not creating these views.When in 1159 John of Salisbury describes Master Alberic as the impug-

nator nominalis sectae, he was probably describing the situation in 1137 ashe remembered it from his student days.

The primacy of the noun and even the unitas nominis was not arevolutionary innovation of the early twelfth century. Ancient grammarhad always given the central place to the nominative case of a noun andthe present tense of a verb. The oblique cases, gender forms, and pastand future tenses were accidental qualities of the principal significationof words. Aristotle distinguished between the noun proper and thecases of a noun, just as between a verb proper (present action) and thetenses of a verb (past and future).61 The essence of the verb was action;

60 The first of these rules is cited by Normore from the treatise “Haec est,” editedby N.J. Green-Pedersen in Studia Mediewistyczne, 18 (1977), 125–163, on 142, n. 88. Thesecond is attributed to the Nominales in a treatise in Munich, Staatsbibl., Clm 29520/2,edited by Yukio Iwakuma in CIMGL, 44 (1983), 82. The third is attributed to theNominales in the realist quaestiones in Vat. lat. 7678, fol. 81rb.

61 Aristotle distinguishes between the noun proper and the cases of a noun, just asbetween a verb proper (present action) and the tenses of a verb. Arist., On Interp. 2:“The expressions ‘of Philo’, ‘to Philo’, and so on, constitute not nouns, but cases of anoun. The definition 〈meaning〉 of these cases of a noun is in other respects the sameas that of the noun proper ….” On Interp. 3: “A verb is that which, in addition to itsproper meaning, carries with it the notion of time”. “Similarly, ‘he was healthy,’ ‘he willbe healthy,’ are not verbs, but tenses of a verb; the difference lies in the fact that theverb indicates present time, while the tenses of the verb indicate those times which lieoutside the present.”


the time of action was a secondary, qualitative addition. Although notimplied in the idea of the primacy of the nominative case and presenttense, it was a simple step to the thesis that those grammatical formswere close to the core or root meaning of words.

The role of the nomen (naming word) was larger than what is nor-mally understood by “noun”. Not only did it include adjectives andother parts of speech linked to nouns, but verbs could be viewedas compounds of the copula est and the predicate—a named activ-ity as substantive. “Socrates runs” means “Socrates is running”. Oncestripped of its temporal quality and the hidden copula, it was thisnaming function that created the principal signification (“the runningSocrates”) and united all forms of a verb.

Some names are derivative (denominative) according to a hierarchy ofwords: “grammarian” is derived from “grammar” and a “courageousperson” from “courage”.62 In this Platonic preference for the abstractnoun, some grammarians, such as Bernard of Chartres, placed theverbal form (e.g. albet) as a middle stage between the pure grammaticalform (albedo) and the corruption or mixture in which the quality (in thiscase whiteness) inheres in a subject (e.g. albus, alba, or album).63

It could well be argued that the movement beyond the traditionaltaxonomical approach to grammar, as reflected in the works of Donatusand Priscian, toward what comes to be called “speculative grammar”was already underway in the late eleventh century. Anselm’s De gram-

matico, written between 1080 and 1085 as a treatise on paronymy, wasalready concerned with the signification of nomina.64 Although Anselmhimself describes the treatise as one in dialectic, its central question,

62 Arist., Categ. 1: “Things are said to be named ‘derivatively,’ which derive theirname from some other name, but differ from it in termination. Thus the grammarianderives his name from the word ‘grammar’, and the courageous man from the word‘courage’.”

63 John of Salisbury, Metalogicon, pp. 124–125: “Aiebat Bernardus Carnotensis quia‘albedo’ significat virginem incorruptam, ‘albet’ eandem introeuntem thalamum autcubantem in thoro, ‘album’ vero eandem, sed corruptam. Hoc quidem quoniam ‘al-bedo’ ex assertione eius simpliciter et sine omni participatione subiecti ipsam significatqualitatem, videlicet coloris speciem, disgregativam visus. ‘Albet’ autem eandem princi-paliter, etsi participationem personae admittat. Si enim illud excutias, quod verbum hocpro substantia significat, qualitas albedinis occurret, sed in accidentibus verbi personamreperies. ‘Album’ vero eandem significat qualitatem, sed infusam commixtamque sub-stantiae et iam quodammodo magis corruptam; siquidem nomen ipsum pro substantiasubiectum albedinis, pro qualitate significat colorem albentis subiecti.”

64 D.P. Henry, The De Grammatico of St.Anselm: The Theory of Paronymy (Notre Dame,1964).

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whether grammaticus is a substantia or a qualitas, uses the language of thegrammarian, and its analysis is done from the standpoint of grammaras well as logic. In ways that anticipate the problem of the object ofknowledge or faith, Anselm distinguishes between a vox significativa anda vox consignificativa, including tense and temporal words in the lattercategory.65 John of Salisbury’s description of the teaching of Bernard ofChartres in the opening years of the twelfth century simply expands onthis terminology.66

It is unlikely that Bernard of Chartres was the “patron des Nominales”,as Chenu suggested.67 The theory of consignification was at least as oldas Anselm. Allowing for equivocation, the oneness of meaning underly-ing nouns and verbs and the secondary status of tense were fundamen-tal to the Aristotelian and Augustinian heritage.68 The innovative stepcame when the theory of nouns, particularly the theory of the unity ofthe noun, began to be used as a problem-solving technique in logic andtheology—when the Aristotelian view of the inferior status of case andtime over against the primary meaning of the nomen was transformedinto the inferior status of tensed enuntiabilia over against the primary

65 Ibid., p. 39: “Igitur ‘hodiernum’ non est nomen sed verbum, quia est vox con-significans tempus, nec est oratio.” Ibid., p. 41: “Cum enim in definitione nominis velverbi dicitur quia est vox significativa, intelligendum est non alia significatione quamea quae per se est. Nam si illa significatio quae est per aliud, in definitione nominisvel verbi intelligenda est, iam non erit ‘hodiernus’ nomen sed verbum. Significat enimaliquando ea significatione aliquid cum tempore, sicut supra dixi, quod non est nominissed verbi.”

Although the phrase “many voces are one nomen” comes to express nominalist gram-matical theory, it should be noted here that consignification is not identical with voces.Oratio is Anselm’s word for a complex utterance, what would later be called a dictum(Abelard) or enuntiabile (late twelfth century). Vox always meant an incomplex utter-ance which, like Augustine’s sonus, might be either significative or consignificative. Voxincludes noun and noun-related words as well as verbs and verb-related words. Wordsthat consignify are those that signify per aliud rather than per se. For Anselm words thatsignify time are verbs (in present tense); words that consignify time are adverbs (andother tenses), although on these latter points Anselm is vague.

66 John of Salisbury, Metalogicon, p. 124: “Sic a bonitate bonus, a fortitudine fortisdicitur, ut ex ipsa verborum forma perpendatur quodammodo adiacens intellectus.Unde ex opinione plurium idem principaliter significant denominativa et ea a quibusdenominantur, sed consignificatione diversa.”

67 Chenu, “Grammaire,” 14–16.68 For Augustine’s view of the secondary status of tense see Confessiones XI, 13, 17, 18,

and 20; see also the discussion in M. Colish, The Mirror of Language, rev. ed. (Lincoln,Nebraska, 1983), pp. 46–48. For Augustine’s thesis that all words are nouns see Demagistro 5 and the discussion by M. Sirridge, “Augustine: Every Word is a Name,” NewScholasticism, 50 (1976), 183–192; also see note 49 above.


meaning of the supra-temporal enuntiabile. Aristotle accepted the neces-sity of an event, once it had taken place, but propositions about eventsare true at one time and false at another. A proposition in the pasttense affirming a past event is true, but the same proposition wouldbe false before the event. The formula semel est verum, semper est verum

was unAristotelian. But the controversial nature of Bernard’s teaching,referred to by John of Salisbury, had nothing to do with this. It had todo with Bernard’s Platonizing interpretation of the opening chapter ofAristotle’s Categories.69

Unfortunately, the evidence does not allow us to see a gradual move-ment from grammar, into logic, and thence into theology. Well beforethe appearance of the nominalist techniques described above, theworlds of grammar, dialectic, biblical exegesis, and speculative theologywere blended in some of the most orthodox writers. Anselm’s attack onthe opinions of Roscelin before 1092, as well as the works of Anselmhimself, show the depth of penetration of logic into theology. Anselm’scomplaint was not that logic should not be applied to the study ofScripture but rather that it must be done with intelligence by one whois properly trained. Even allowing for the preponderance of theologicalworks among the sources in this period, the Nominales are not gram-marians but logician-theologians who applied the theories of the noun,particularly of the unitas nominis, to logical and theological problems.

It would appear that two steps were taken by the second quarter ofthe twelfth century. One of these was to take the descriptive analysisof nouns and verbs, which distinguished between their signification(proper meaning) and their consignifying modes of signification, anduse that as a problem-solving analytical tool. The second step, closelyallied, was to transfer the principle of identical meaning from thesignification of terms to the signification of enuntiables.

How early either of these steps was taken is conjectural. The lateeleventh-century view of the identity of the soul and its powers, re-ported by Anselm and apparently to be attributed to Roscelin, mighthave been based on a theory of the noun parallel to the identification ofintention and act in the one-sin theory.70 But the same thesis could have

69 John of Salisbury, Metalogicon, 125: “Videbatur etiam sibi tam de Aristotile quamde multorum auctoritatibus niti. Ait enim: ‘Album’ nichil aliud significat quam qual-itatem. Multa quoque proferebat undique conquista, quibus persuadere nitebatur resinterdum pure, interdum adiacenter praedicari, et ad hoc denominativorum scientiamperutilem asserebat. Habet haec opinio sicut impugnatores, sic defensores suos.”

70 See above, note 21.

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been arrived at by other means, just as it was in the fourteenth century.The same holds true for Roscelin’s reputed unwillingness to distinguishbetween color and a material object in which, to use Platonic language,that color inheres.71 In Anselm’s case of the white horse (equus albus)used in De grammatico and De incarnatione Verbi, the identity of colorand substance might have been argued on the basis that in certainstatements albus by itself supposits for horse, much as brunellus meansa brown ass.72 But it seems more likely these positions were derivedfrom a rejection of the existence of abstract qualities (color, wisdom,humanness) apart from individual substances, and a rejection of thedistinction between substance and quality (or to use Anselm’s language,between precise signification and oblique signification). The twelfth-century nominalist distinction of substance and person as well as thetheory of the unitas nominis work in a different direction.

We are much closer to the application of the unitary characterof the signification of nomina in the theological writings of Abelard.In fact, most of the passages in Lombard’s Sentences containing whatcome to be labelled opiniones Nominalium seem to have been directlytaken from Abelard, primarily his Theologia “scholarium”. This includesthe positions on divine knowledge, divine volition, and divine power.73

Although Abelard does not apply this approach to the problem of

71 See above, note 21.72 Anselm, De incarnatione Verbi, c. 1 (II, 10): “Et cuius mens obscura est ad diiudi-

candum inter equum suum et colorem eius: qualiter discernet inter unum Deum etplures relationes eius?” De Grammatico, pp. 40–41: “D. Equum intelligo per nomen albi.M. Nomen igitur albi significat tibi equum. D. Significat utique. M. Nonne vides quiaalio modo quam nomen equi? D. Video. Nempe nomen equi etiam priusquam sciamipsum equum album esse, significat mihi equi substantiam per se, et non per aliud.Nomen vero albi substantiam significat non per se, sed per aliud, id est per hoc quiascio equum esse album. Cum enim nihil aliud significet hoc nomen, quod est ‘albus,’quam haec oratio, quae est ‘habens albedinem’: sicut haec oratio per se constituit mihiintellectum albedinis, et non eius rei quae habet albedinem; ita et nomen. Sed quoniamscio albedinem esse in equo, et hoc per aliud quam per nomen albi, velut per visum:intellecta albedine per hoc nomen, intelligo equum per hoc quod albedinem scio essein equo, id est per aliud quam per nomen albi, quo tamen equus appellatur. M. Videsergo quomodo “albus” non sit significativum eius quod aliquo modo significat, et quo-modo sit appellativum eius cuius non est significativum? D. Hoc quoque video. Signi-ficat enim equum et non significat, quia non eum significat per se, sed per aliud, ettamen equus appellatur albus. Et quod video in ‘albo,’ hoc intelligo in ‘grammatico,’ etin similibus denominativis.”

73 Abelard, Theologia “scholarium” III, c. 5 (PL 178, 1103): “Qui etiam sicut omniasemper scit quae aliquando scit, vel semper vult quae aliquando vult, nee unquamaliquam scientiam amittit, vel voluntatem mutat, quam unquam habuit, ita semperomnia potest quae aliquando potest, nec unquam aliqua sua potentia privatur.”


the object of faith at this point in his work, his treatment of God’sknowledge of Abelard’s birth before and after the event is directlyapplicable to that parallel problem.74 Adverbs that express diversity oftime do not alter the proper designation or the reality of scire, velle, orfacere.75 Without applying that specific technique of analysis, Abelarddid maintain another thesis that eventually became associated with theNominales, namely the primacy of intention and the subordination of theact that seems to have been one of the sources for the one-sin theory.76

74 Ibid.: “Etsi enim scivit olim me nasciturum esse, ne tamen sciat me nasciturumesse, non tamen ideo olim aliquid scivit quod modo non sciat; sed id de nativitate meanunc etiam scit, quod sciebat antequam fieret, licet et tunc et nunc hanc eius scientiamdiversis verbis exprimi oporteret. Quippe quod tunc futurum erat modo peractum est,ideo verba commutata sint ad ipsum designandum; sicut diversis temporibus loquenteseandem diem modo per hoc adverbium ‘cras’ designamus dum adhuc futura est, modoper ‘hodie’ dum praesens est, modo per ‘heri’, cum praeterita est. Antequam itaquenascerer, cum sciret Deus me nasciturum esse, eo quidem tempore quo nascituruseram, nunc quoque nihilominus id scit, scilicet eodem tempore natum esse: sic etidem de eadem nativitate mea nunc quoque vult quod tunc voluit, ut videlicet tuncfieret, quando eam fieri ab aetemo voluit et scivit. Et attende, quod sicuti cum dicimus,Deus scit modo id factum esse, vel vult modo id factum esse; illud ‘modo’, ad diversaconiunctum successum enuntiationis mutat, ita etiam, ut supra meminimus, cum dico,potest modo id facere, idem adverbium coniunctum diversum successum variat.”

75 Ibid., 1103–1104: “Id est cum huiusmodi adverbiis haec verba faciunt, vult etpotest, similiter cum eis successum variantia. Si enim dicatur, potest Deus id modofacere, et ad verbum ‘potest’, adverbia referantur, falsissimum est, quia iam uno tem-pore quamdam habet potentiam, quam alio non haberet. Si vero ad ‘facere’ utraqueconiungantur, verissimum est. Et sicut non ostenduntur diversae scientiae cum dici-tur de ipso, quia scivit olim incarnandum esse, ita et cum dicitur, olim potuit incar-nari, et modo potest incarnatus esse, possibilitas ostenditur. Non enim cum diciturper successionem temporis, Deus incarnatur, et Deus incarnatus est, diversa quaefecerit ostendimus, sed pro eodem quod semel fecerit, ista dicuntur. Sic et cum dici-tur ‘prius’, quia possibile est Deum incarnari, et postmodum dicimus quia possibile estipsum incarnatum esse, nec diversum factum nec diversa possibilitas monstratur, sedpro eodem quod prius erat futurum, et modo est praeteritum, utrumque vere dicitur.Liquet itaque Deum, sicut nec scientia vel voluntate mutari, ita nec etiam possibili-tate. … itaque quod semel scit, semper scit, et quod semel vult semper vult: ita et quamsemel habet potentiam nunquam deponit. Denique, si more hominum dicamus eumaliud posse uno tempore quod alio non possit, propter hoc videlicet solum quod eiconvenit uno tempore id facere quod non convenit alio, nulla eius in hoc impotentiavel potentiae diminutio est intelligenda, cum ad potentiam cuiuslibet minime pertineatquod ei nullatenus convenit, ut inde commendari possit imo e contrario, eius derogaretdignitati.”

76 Abelard, Scito te ipsum, ed. and transl. by D.E. Luscombe as Peter Abelard’s Ethics(Oxford, 1971), pp. 22–24: “Nichil ergo ad augmentum peccati pertinet qualiscumqueoperum executio, et nichil animam nisi quod ipsius est coinquinat, hoc est consen-sus quem solummodo peccatum esse diximus, non voluntatem eum precedentem velactionem operis subsequentem.”

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It is surprising, in a sense, that Lombard derived much of his treat-ment of divine knowledge, volition, and power from Abelard, since itwas against the latter that he shaped most of his forty-third distinc-tion on divine omnipotence.77 Because God always acts in accordancewith his wisdom, justice, and goodness, and because God is outside theflow of time, Abelard maintained that God can only do and could onlyhave done what he did and does do.78 The realms of divine power anddivine will are coterminous, which renders meaningless any discussionof God’s acting otherwise or better. Lombard, on the other hand, likemost of his contemporaries, argued that God’s capacity for action (thatwhich he is able to do) is far larger than what he wills to do. God hasand had the capacity to do many things he does not do, a teachingepitomized in the statement of Augustine: “potuit, sed noluit”.79

The “nominalist” teaching semel est verum, semper est verum was, in fact,neutral or indifferent to the issue of the relation of divine capacity anddivine activity. Through the unity of scivit and scit, voluit and vult, potuit

and potest Abelard could express his belief that God could only willwhat he wills and do what he does. Abelard’s potuit—potest identificationmeant that God can now do what he once could do, but it alsomeant that God could only do what he does. Lombard adopted thesame nominalist teaching and yet adapted it to a distinction betweenpower and will, between capacity and volition/activity. To potuit et potest

Lombard added the Augustinian potuit, sed noluit. Abelard was familiarwith the latter passage, but it was not a text that reflected his view ofthe nature of divine activity.80

It should be noted that Abelard does not cite the Augustinian phrase“Tempora variata sunt, non fides”, which Peter Lombard later blended withthe passage from Abelard’s Theologia “scholarium”. But the Augustinianpassage had been introduced into this discussion before Abelard. It wasused in the Glossa ordinaria on II Cor. 4:13 as elaboration on Paul’sstatement about the Psalmist “we have the same spirit of faith as he

77 Lombard, Libri sententiarum, I, d. 43 (I, 298–303).78 Abelard, Theologia “scholarium” III, 5 (PL 178, 1093–1101); Theologia christiana V

(PL 178, 1324–1330).79 For a fuller discussion, see my Covenant and Causality (London, 1984), ch. 4.80 In his Sic et non, q. 35 and Theologia christiana Abelard cited this passage from

Augustine’s De natura et gratia; see Sic et non, ed. B. Boyer and R. McKeon (Chicago,1976), p. 186; and Theologia christiana (PL 178, 1329). Abelard did not use this text in hislonger and subsequent discussion of divine power in Theologia “scholarium,” where headopts what comes to be known as the opinio Nominalium.


had”. Although Robert of Melun is normally identified as a supporterof a res theory with regard to the object of knowledge and faith, hisbrief discussions are far from clear on this point. By res Robert doesnot mean the event or some object, but the complex statement ofbelief in the articles of faith. He shows the identity of past- and future-tensed statements by saying that the future-tensed statement would beappropriate for us if we put outselves in the place of Abraham.81

Nomina, Mental Language, and Universals

The weight of evidence makes it almost certain that the label Nominales

came into existence as a result of the application in logic and theologyof theories of the noun. Part of the “teaching” or technique concernedthe equivocation of terms as they were used in propositions. Most of itconcerned the theory of the unitas nominis. The label would not appearto have been a result of disputes over the ontological status of universalsor the referent of a universal proposition.82

81 Oeuvres de Robert de Melun, ed. R.M. Martin, vol. 1: Questiones de divina pagina(Louvain, 1932), pp. 46–47: “Queritur, utrum eadem fides sit hominum temporis gratie,et hominum qui fuerunt tempore Legis, Habrae videlicet et ceterum. Augustinus:‘Tempora variata sunt, fides est eadem. Illi crediderunt Christum venturum, nonvenisse’. Ergo aliquod crediderunt ipsi quod non credimus. Item, Abraam Messiam,qui dicitur Christus, credidit venturum. Hoc et Iudei credunt. Ergo, eadem fides estIudeorum que fuit Habrae. Solutio: Eadem credidit Habraam que et nos etsi aliomodo, quia de eisdem rebus. Vel aliter, Abraam credebat a tempore suo Christumincarnaturum, et nos credimus a tempore Abrae hoc idem.”

82 Except inasmuch as some words are universals. Peter of Capua, Summa (Clm14508, fol. 26v; Vat. lat. 4296, fol. 26rb; Vat. lat. 4304, fol. 26rb): “Item genera et speciessunt rerum naturae; ergo sunt a Deo. Pono ergo quod nulla actio sit bona, nichilominusverum est quod hoc genus ‘actio’ est, et ipsum est a Deo. Ergo, aliquod eius individuumest a Deo. Responsio: Haec oppositio non est contra nos Nominales, quia dicimusgenera et species esse nomina, nomina autem omnia, et eorum impositiones a Deosunt.” When Peter of Capua, Summa, q. 47 (Vat. lat. 4296, fol. 40ra; Vat. lat. 4304,fol. 40va), discusses whether a Jew believes God to be a person, since he believes God tobe a rational substance of an individual nature, he remarks: “Catholicus dicit quodhoc nomen ‘persona’ aliter de creatore, aliter de creatura. Et praedicta descriptiodata est de hoc nomine ‘persona’ prout dicitur de creaturis. Cum ergo proponiturcatholico an iudaeus credit Deum esse personam, debet accipire hoc nomen ‘persona’prout accipitur apud eum. Cum ergo hoc nomen ‘persona’ secundum catholicum nonsupponat nisi pro persona Patris vel Filii vel Spiritus Sancti, et iudaeus non credataliquam illarum esse Deum, debet dicere quod non credit Deum esse personam, sicutNominalis concedit Deum esse personam et Realis putat ‘genus’ esse nomen, quiasecundum Nominalem per hoc nomen ‘genus’ non supponitur nisi vox, quam revera

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It might be argued, however, that universals were part of the discus-sion, even an important part. The question of what terms in a propo-sition stand for (what would later be called supposition theory) includesuniversals, and the most visible theological problem to which the uni-

tas nominis was applied, namely the object of knowledge or belief—thatwhich a proposition signifies—is closely related to the problem of uni-versals inasmuch as the logical and ontological status of universals isoften discussed in the context of what terms in universal propositions(e.g., “man is a rational animal”) stand for (supposit).

Although true in itself, this is not as relevant to the origin of theterm Nominales as it might appear. The propositions under discussionin the question of the object of faith or the oneness of sin are allsingular propositions. The same is true for tensed propositions aboutGod’s knowledge, will, and power. Moreover, the ontological status ofuniversals was rarely discussed in terms of nomina, either by Abelardor anyone else. The evidence is clear that the term Nominales usuallyoccurs in the context of the theory of the oneness of the principalsignification of the nomen and only rarely and secondarily in the contextof universals.

Inherent to this nominalist theory is the primacy of mental language.The entity behind the grammatical forms of a word is not just the rootform (lexeme, or stem) but the mental equivalent of the root meaning,which is the same no matter in what language that signification isbeing expressed. What Abraham believed was expressed not only in thefuture tense, it was in Hebrew. St.Paul’s statement of belief, althoughsharing the same tense as that of later western Christians who affirmtheir creed in Latin, would have been in Greek. Presumably what Godknows is also not bound to a specific language. The nomen, therefore,is not only blind to tense; it is the root meaning of a word as mentalincomplexum. Similarly, the dictum or enuntiabile, which forms a timelessobject of knowledge and belief in the nominalist theory, is a mentalcomplexum.

To say that the universal is a vox is entirely different than saying thatit is a nomen. Voces could range from indeclinable articulate sounds thatconvey some meaning (much as the barking of a dog or the call of abird) to signifying and consignifying verbal expressions. Yet in every

Realis putat esse nomen. Sed interrogatus Realis diceret: ego non puto ‘genus’ essenomen, quia ipse dicit aliud significari hoc nomine ‘genus’ quam vocem.”


case vox puts the emphasis on words in a particular language, especiallyas they are voiced or spoken at some instance of time and place. Vox

may be a verbal sign of a mental equivalent, just as a written word isa sign for a spoken word, but it is never mental, always verbalized.Abelard’s sermo (although perhaps not his dictum) may differ amongspoken languages, but it has nothing to do with verbalization. Sermo isthe commonly accepted meaning that a word has, imposed by humanconvention, that remains true and unchanged whether spoken or not.The same sermo underlies each instance of the equivalent verbalized vox.Nomen, on the other hand, is not tied to a particular language becauseit is that common mental equivalent.

The nominalist thesis of “one nomen, many voces” was not a distinc-tion between a noun and other parts of speech, nor was it simply thedistinction between signification and consignification, or between rootmeaning and grammatical inflections—although these latter distinc-tions are getting closer to their teaching. Nomen was a mental entity.The one nomen that lay behind the many voces was a non-inflected, sig-nifying unit of thought that lay behind all its various verbal forms: allthe languages in which that mental entity might be expressed as well asall its grammatical forms in those languages.

This emphasis on mental language was as fundamental to Augus-tine’s outlook as it was to Anselm’s, and those who used the theoryof the nomen as a problem-solving technique linked meaning to mentallanguage. Unlike natural or object languages, where several differentwords can be signs for the same thing (synonymy), or where the sameword can have various meanings, mental language is univocal. More-over, if the object of knowledge is the dictum or enuntiabile as mentalproposition that is supra-temporal because of the way the unitas nomi-

nis is applied to statements, then that can include both particular state-ments about persons, objects, and events (as it usually does) or universalstatements. This is probably what William of Conches meant when heattributed to this group (intelligentes) the assertion that both universalsand singulars (as objects of knowledge) are nomina. But the nominalisttheory of the unitas nominis is indifferent to the ontological status of uni-versal concepts, just as it is indifferent to the question of how we arriveat a universal. It never seems to have addressed the question of whetherthe “meaning” of a word or enunciable that lay behind the grammat-ical forms was some entity separate from words that signify the samething or that signify in the same way, or was only an intention in themind.

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Unlike natural languages in which the names (sermones) for thingsare initially arbitrary and imposed by common convention, mentalnomina are established by God.83 Similarly, the expression (enuntiabile),which is the object of knowledge and belief, is for the Nominalistalso a mental object (or the mental equivalent of an object) that isthe same for all believers. Its commonality and objectivity are derivedfrom the historic event, not imposed by the individual mind. In thissense, the thesis that universal concepts are nomina (i.e. that the term“man” has a supra-linguistic common meaning that, for all practicalpurposes, is innate to the human mind) is essentially realist or, at thevery least, compatible with realism (in the traditional and modernsense).

The application of the theory of the nomen, therefore, concerned par-ticular events, persons, and propositions. Although the theory couldeasily be applied to universal terms, there is very little evidence (specif-ically in William of Conches and later in Peter of Capua) that this wasdone. The only abstract term that enters the discussion is the color“white” (albedo). Viewed from that perspective, the theory of the nomen

is rooted in Platonism, with the primacy of the abstract term albedo

and the positing of a unifying entity that underlies different grammat-ical forms. The Realists of the second half of the twelfth century andinto the thirteenth are those who take more seriously the significanceof time and the particulars of tensed propositions, ultimately acceptingthe mutability of divine knowledge, will, and power, at least as regardsstatements about things in time.84 In the realist view, faith changes overtime and its content increases.

In a way that seems to go directly against the traditional understand-ing of nominalism and realism, the Nominalists were those who soughtunity by hypothesizing an entity beyond the individual particulars ofour temporal world. The Realists were those who took seriously thechanges that time creates, and eventually abandoned strict immutabil-ity. The origins of the views of the Nominales, although dependent to

83 See quotation from Peter of Capua, Summa (Clm 14508, fol. 26v), in the previousnote. Abelard, however, considered both sermones and nomina to have been establishedby human imposition; see above, note 23.

84 William of Auxerre, Summa aurea I, tr. 9, c. 2: “sed de scientia enuntiabilium nonest verum, quia secundum Reales, cum Deus incipit scire aliquod enuntiabile, desinitscire eius contradictorie oppositum. … Sed secundum Nominales, qui dicunt quodsemel est verum semper erit verum, Deus nichil incipit vel desinit scire.…”


some degree on the grammatical observations in the logica vetus ofAristotle, owe far more to Platonism and, in particular, to the thoughtof Augustine.85

Abelard, Alberic, and the Nominales

The earliest occurrence of the term Nominales, as we have seen, isin John of Salisbury’s statement that Master Alberic was a vehementopponent of the secta Nominalium. What did John mean by that remark?The preceding study suggests that the answer lies not in Alberic’stheory of universals but rather in his theory of nomina.

The fundamental teaching of the Nominales was that only the nomi-native case of nouns and the present tense of verbs signify. The obliquecases of nouns, strictly speaking, are not nomina. They are simply voces

that consignify. Similarly, the tenses of verbs and temporal adverbs onlyconsignify and do not affect the principal signification of the nomen.Alberic rejected that view. According to the Introductiones montane minores,Alberic asserted that words in the oblique cases as well as adverbs,which presumably included such time-bearing words as “yesterday”(heri) and “tomorrow” (cras), are separate nomina.86 Alberic rejected thenotion that there was only one nomen behind all the grammatical inflec-tions of a word. He rejected the view that adverbs only consignify. Inlight of what we know of nominalist opinion in the twelfth century,Alberic was certainly, indeed radically, opposed to that view of nomina.

What was Abelard’s position on the oneness of the nomen and whatwas his relation of the secta Nominalium? Abelard shared with most

85 See above, note 68.86 L.M. de Rijk, “Some new Evidence on twelfth century Logic: Alberic and the

School of Mont Ste Genevieve (Montani),” Vivarium, 4 (1966), 10: “Et notandum quodsecundum Albericum quidem obliqui casus sunt nomina, et pronomina non sunt nom-ina, et omnia adverbia certae significationis sunt nomina, ut ‘bene’, ‘male’.” Ibid., 11:“Sciendum vero quod secundum Albericum demonstrative vel relative orationes nonsunt propositiones, sed nec negandum omnia participia esse verba.” See also Hunt,History of Grammar, p. 89: “Nota quod dialectici sub nomine pronomina demonstrativacomprehendunt, relativa vero dicunt consignificare, nec sunt partes orationis; particip-ium sub verbo, quia actionem vel passionem significat; adverbia quae sine respectudicuntur ponunt sub nomine, ut ‘bene’, ‘male’, et similia. … Tamen Montani dicuntdemonstrativa pronomina non esse partes orationis, quia ex demonstratione significant,sed hac ratione deberent dicere verba primae et secundae personae non esse partesorationis, quia demonstrationem habent…”

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grammarians of the early twelfth century the view that the nominativecase of nouns and the present tense of verbs are primary, and thatthe oblique cases and temporal adverbs are not separate nomina butonly consignify.87 All forms of a word constitute one and the samenomen because there is only one imposition of signification. In thishe was neither innovative nor unique. Abelard did, as we have seen,use the theory of the noun in theology as one explanation for theimmutability of divine knowledge, volition, and power. He also in thatcontext adopted the formula that what is at one time known, willed, orable to be done by God, is always and will always be known, willed,or within divine capacity—quod semel est verum, semper est verum. Abelard’sposition is the earliest known instance of the application of the theory ofthe nomen to theological problems of immutability, which may have beenwhat Otto of Freising had in mind in saying that Abelard incautiouslyintroduced into theology a theory of nomina developed for anotherdiscipline.88 The fact that Otto believed that the “sententia vocum seu

nominum” originated “in naturali facultate” is perplexing. One would haveexpected grammar, or perhaps logic. But in Abelard’s division betweenlogic (impositio vocum) and the nature of things (natura rerum), enuntiabilia

are closely tied to physical reality because they concern the adequatio

between discourse and the proprietas rerum—not the nature of things asthey are in themselves (propter se), but as they are propter nomina.89

A second and better-known area of conflict between Alberic andAbelard centered on their views of the relation of a whole to its partsand the relation of a statue to the material substance of which it iscomposed.90 In the view of Alberic and his disciples, a composite whole

87 Abelard, Dialectica, pp. xlii, l–li, 111–115, 121–129, 141, 165–166.88 Otto of Freising, Gesta Friderici I, 47 (MGH SS. XX, 377): “Sententiam ergo vocum

seu nominum in naturali tenens facultate, non caute theologiae admiscuit.”89 Abelard, Dialectica, p. 99: “Logica autem, quae res quandoque non propter se sed

propter nomina tractat, ibi in rebus recte cessat, ubi vocabulis non abundat.” Ibid.,p. 286: “Hoc autem logicae disciplinae proprium relinquitur, ut scilicet vocum imposi-tiones pensando quantum unaquaque proponatur oratione sive dictione discutiat. Phys-icae vero proprium est inquirere utrum rei natura consentiat enuntiationi, utrum itasese, ut dicitur, rerum proprietas habeat vel non. Est autem alterius consideratio alterinecessaria. Ut enim logicae discipulis appareat quid in singulis intelligendum sit vocab-ulis, prius rerum proprietas est investiganda. Sed cum ab his rerum natura non pro sesed pro vocum impositione requiritur, tota eorum intentio referenda est ad logicam.”For further discussion see Beonio-Brocchieri Fumagalli, La logica di Abelardo; “La relationentre logique, physique et théologie chez Abélard,” in Peter Abelard, ed. E.M. Buytaert(Louvain, 1974), pp. 153–162.

90 De Rijk, “Some new Evidence”. See the discussion of these texts in Tweedale,


is an entity in and of itself, beyond the sum of its parts. A house issomething more than the sum of its unassembled parts and also morethan the sum of its assembled parts, which have not changed by beingjoined. Similarly, a knife is something more than, and other than, thebone and steel joined together. It is a separate body (corpus) created byhuman artifice out of two previously existing bodies. What applies tothings created by joining also applies to things created by a processof removal. Alberic perceived the relation of a statue to the stone orprecious metal of which it is composed as two different things. A stonestatue is no longer the stone, just as a gold ring is no longer the gold. Itis a separate body created by the sculptor or artisan.

Abelard rejected the notion that a whole is something other thanthe sum of its parts, or that a statue is a thing different from thematerial of which it is composed or from which it is sculpted. The stoneis not made by the sculptor, nor is what he makes a body, even if itcan be said that he makes a statue, or a house. Human fabrication orconstruction does not cause material or substantial change that createsnew entities. These changes are only changes in form or status. Theartist or craftsman may be the cause or “creator” of a changed status,but not of its physical nature, nor is the statue or house a new corpus.

Abelard used this example of stone and a statue sculpted from itto illustrate his view of the difference between voces and sermones intreating universals.91 Both res and voces are natural in origin; both arecreations of nature or part of nature, just as stone has the status ofstone by divine creation (“a divina substantia”). Sermones are a result ofhuman imposition, just as is the statue. And just as sermones universales

are experienced as voces and are identical with them (although the latterare never universal), so the statue and stone are identical although theyhave different origins.

The nominalist theory of nomina was not initially created as a solutionto the problem of universals nor was that Abelard’s principal use, buthe applied it there as well. In addition to the passage just cited andthe texts provided above in note 23, Abelard applied the theory in his

Abailard on Universals, pp. 103–107, 148–153; and Normore, “The Tradition of MediaevalNominalism”.

91 Abelard, Logica “Nostrorum petitioni sociorum” (Geyer ed.), p. 522: “Itaque nativitasvocis et sermonis diversitas, etsi penitus in essentia identitas. Quod diligentius exemplodeclarari potest. Cum idem penitus sit hic lapis et haec imago, alterius tamen opus estiste lapis et alterius haec imago. Constat enim a divina substantia statum lapidis solum-modo posse conferri, statum vero imaginis hominum comparatione posse formari.”

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discussion of necessary inferences and the relation of enuntiationes to theexistence in re of their subject and predicate terms.92

What implications does this hold for Abelard’s relation to the Nom-

inales? Was Nominales another name for Abelard and/or his immedi-ate disciples? Normore has argued for Abelardian ancestry becausethe seemingly diverse positions attributed to the Nominales in twelfth-and thirteenth-century texts (and the list of such positions is longerthan those mentioned by Normore) can also be found in Abelard’sextant writings or are attributed to him by others, because Walter Mapcalled Abelard princeps Nominalium, and because several of these posi-tions, specifically the nominalist theory of enuntiabilia, the relation of awhole to its parts, and the rejection of augmentation, can be viewed asdifferent facets of Abelard’s theory of statuses and dicta, all of whichderive fundamentally from Abelard’s theory about what makes sen-tences true.93

Since the Nominales are first mentioned as active in Abelard’s lastyears or shortly after his death and the application of the theory ofthe nomen to the problem of the object of faith does not appear beforeAbelard, it seems plausible that his teaching was, at the very least, influ-ential in the development of the positions of that group. At the sametime it must be noted that (1) Abelard made use of a theory of nounsand enuntiabilia that was already in circulation and that the label Nom-

inales was first and foremost tied to a theory of the nomen that Abelardshared with many others; that (2) it is unclear how many of these posi-tions were original or unique to Abelard; and that (3) several of thepositions attributed to the Nominales were attributed variously to severalother groups or schools as well, such as the Parvipontani, Melidunenses,Montani, and Cappauces. Abelard had considerable sympathy for a the-ory of nomina and a technique of problem solving that his colleague,Alberic, found objectionable. This is another illustration of the Platoniccurrent within Abelard’s thought that has not received sufficient atten-tion. Alberic could well have included Abelard among the secta Nom-

inalium, but the latter is probably a larger category and not identical

92 Abelard, Dialectica, pp. 281–286. Abelard’s remarks need to be compared to PeterCantor’s discussion of the sense in which Socrates continues to exist after the destruc-tion of Socrates (see above, note 56); also Tweedale, Abailard, pp. 101–102.

93 Normore, “The Tradition of Mediaeval Nominalism”. Map, De nugis curialium,p. 78: “…magistri Petri, principis Nominalium, qui plus peccavit in dialectica quamin divina pagina.” I find Normore’s explication of the interrelation of these threenominalist positions perceptive and convincing.


with Abelard or his disciples. If the first major twist in this problemrequires us to acknowledge the Platonic background of the nominal-ist theory, the second major twist is that Abelard was a Nominalist orproto-Nominalist, but on a far different set of issues and viewpointsthan previously imagined. And if we include Abelard among the Nom-

inales, then we should include Peter Lombard and his closest follow-ers. On the basis of our present knowledge, however, it might be moreaccurate simply to describe Abelard as a major source and Lombard asheavily influenced by nominalist theory.

How long were the Nominales an active, identifiable group and werethey to be found primarily among dialecticians or theologians? Al-though the most cited nominalist thesis was the application of the nom-

ina theory of enunciables to problems of the immutability of divineknowledge, will, power, and the object of faith, and although one sourcealludes to “realist” and “nominalist” theologians, the Nominales wereprimarily viewed as a philosophical school of thought.94 Support fornominalist theological solutions was already losing ground by the sec-ond decade of the thirteenth century. Ultimately, the formula of semel

est verum, semper est verum was thought to be an unsatisfactory solutionto propositional theory and to problems of immutability. The philo-sophical school does not seem to have fared much better. They appearat least as early as the 1140s and were still active in the early decadesof the thirteenth century. By the time Thomas Aquinas was writing,the Nominales were a thing of the past.95 In the early years the the-ory of nomina and enuntiabilia were applied to many different problems,including the problem of universals.96 By the early thirteenth century,in an atmosphere of growing interest in metaphysical questions, theproblem of universals had become a more central and characteristicissue among the positions defended by the Nominales.97 This is prob-

94 Peter Cantor, Commentary on Job, as cited by Landgraf, “Studien zur Theolo-gie,” 184, from Paris, Bibl. Maz., lat. 178, fol. 22vb: “decernes contemplando rem adlitteram etiam et non tantum nomen Christi, sed deitatem et humanitatem, ut potiussit 〈sic〉 realis quam nominalis theologus.”

95 Aquinas, Summa theologiae I, q. 14, a. 15, ad 3: “Antiqui Nominales dixerunt idemesse enuntiabile: Christum nasci, et esse nasciturum, et esse natum.” Also Albert theGreat, Sent. I, d. 41, a. 6: “antiquam nominalium opinionem.”

96 Abelard at times uses sermones and nomina interchangeably in his discussion ofuniversals; see above, note 23. To say that universals are nomina is not to say they are“mere names”. It rather describes their function as signifying terms in propositionswhose meaning does not change with changes in case or tense.

97 See the fragment of the treatise Positiones nostrae circa universalia (Vat. lat. 7678,

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ably why Albert the Great, in developing his view of universals andparticulars, labelled those who argued for the primacy of particularsknown through sense experience as Epicureans and Nominalists.98 Andit was Albert’s nomenclature, as revived and disseminated through theAlbertists at Paris and elsewhere in the opening decades of the fifteenthcentury, that established the meaning of the labels “Nominalist” and“Realist” that have come down to us.99 That development is betterunderstood when the twelfth-century origin and meaning of the teach-ing of the Nominales is more fully appreciated.

fol. 88r), edited in F. Pelster, “Nominales und Reales,” 158–159; H.A.G. Braakhuis,De 13de Eeuwse Tractaten over syncategorematische Termen, vol. I (Leiden, 1979), pp. 34–35:“Primo consentimus quod universalia sicut genera et species sunt nomina. Secundoponimus, contra opinionem realium, quod nichil est praeter particulare.” The text isnot identified as belonging to the Nominales, but a number of the positions are attributedto that group in other texts. Pelster dated the manuscript to the last half of thethirteenth century on the basis of the style of illumination, while Grabmann suggesteda mid-thirteenth-century date. On grounds of content and style, I am inclined to datethe work not later than the second quarter of the thirteenth century. The first positiohas an interesting parallel in Peter of Capua, Summa (Clm 14508, fol. 26v), cited fromLandgraf, “Studien zur Theologie,” 189: “Responsio: Haec oppositio non est contranos Nominales, quia dicimus genera et species esse nomina, nomina autem omnia eteorum impositiones a Deo sunt.” Several of the positiones in the treatise on universalsfavor Zeno against Aristotle by rejecting augmentation and motion.

98 Albert, Metaphysica III, tr. 3, c. 18, ed. B. Geyer, vol. I (Münster, 1960), p. 157;Metaphysica VII, tr. 5, c. 4 (Münster, 1964), pp. 379–381; Liber de praedicabilibus, tr. 2, c. 2,in Opera omnia, ed. A. Borgnet, vol. II (Paris, 1890), p. 19.

99 On the later history of this problem, see Z. Kaluza, “Le De universali reali de Jeande Maisonneuve et les epicuri litterales,” Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie,33 (1986), 469–516.

chapter five

NOMINALES AND RULES OF INFERENCE*

Among the positions attributed to the Nominales in the twelfth and thir-teenth centuries are several that can be categorized as rules of inferenceor are related to theories of entailment. A list of these along with othernominalist opinions was recently assembled by Calvin Normore in avery stimulating and perceptive article1 Although the entire list of posi-tions attributed to the Nominales seemed initially to Normore to be quitedisparate and unrelated, he concluded that the positions had two thingsin common. First, that they were all positions held by Peter Abelardwho, on the basis of this and other long-known evidence, was cred-ited with the establishment of the Nominalist school. And second, thatthe principal issue that linked most of the nominalist theses was notthe issue of universals but rather the question: what makes propositionstrue?

As listed by Normore, presumably not in any heuristic order, thenominalist positions concerned with inference were:

1. “A syllogistic inference does not require a topical locus.” Thissuggests, for Normore, “that the syllogism is an inference formrequiring no further justification.”

2. “A negative sentence does not follow from an affirmative nor viceversa.”

3. “Not everything follows from an impossibility.”

To that list should be added a fourth, known to but not directly men-tioned or fully discussed by Normore:

4. “Anything follows from an impossibility.”

* This paper was read at the eighth European Symposium for Medieval Logic andSemantics in Freiburg i.B. in 1988 and published in Argumentations-theorie. ScholastischeForschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln korrekten Folgerns, ed. K. Jacobi (Leiden:E.J. Brill, 1993), pp. 153–160.

1 C. Normore, “The Tradition of Mediaeval Nominalism,” in Studies in MedievalPhilosophy, ed. J.F. Wippel (Washington, 1987), pp. 201–217.

82 chapter five

This fourth position is a different and opposing form of the third.Normore thought that it was a later variation on the third position,one that was introduced by some of Abelard’s disciples in the wakeof a devastating counterargument by Alberic of Paris against Abelard’saccount of the truth of conditionals—an event that Christopher Martinhas called “a turning point in the history of logic.”2 The “confusionabout the position of the Nominales on this point,” argued Normore,“is just what one would expect if the Nominales followed Abelard intoAlberic’s trap and then had to find their own way out.”3 But before oneaccepts or even entertains such a dramatic account of the origin andrelation of these two versions of the ex impossibili rule, it should first beasked whether one of the versions may not be a result of a scribal error,a misattribution, or a simple misinterpretation.

Elsewhere I have dealt with the meaning and origin of the Nominales

and the opinio Nominalium.4 Although the label appears to describe a spe-cific school of thought or intellectual approach in the twelfth and earlythirteenth centuries, it is unclear whether the Nominales were entirelyseparate from and competitive with other twelfth-century schools, suchas the Montani, Porretani, Parvipontani, or Meludinenses, or whether someof their positions cut across or overlapped with positions maintainedby the disciples of one of the principal Parisian masters of the secondquarter of the twelfth century. Nor is it certain that the various thesesattributed to the Nominales in the areas of grammar, logic, and theologyare positions held by one and the same group and are subparts of acommon and unified system, nor that each witness is equally reliableand well-informed. Even the commonly accepted belief that the Nom-

inales were the disciples of Abelard or at least derived all or most oftheir positions from him needs further scrutiny. The Nominalist posi-tions concerned with inference, and in particular the third rule and itsvariation, provide just such an opportunity for testing the Abelardianorigin of some of the opiniones Nominalium and their relation to the posi-tions of other twelfth-century schools.

Leaving aside for the moment those texts that seem to link Abelard’sname with the Nominales, the Abelardian origin of the positions attri-

2 C.J. Martin, “William’s Machine,” The Journal of Philosophy, 83 (1986), 564–572.3 Normore, “Tradition”. Unfortunately, Normore (p. 205) continued the misidenti-

fication of Alberic of Paris with Alberic of Rheims.4 “Nominales and Nominalism in the Twelfth Century,” in Lectionum varietates. Hom-

mage à Paul Vignaux (1904–1987), ed. J. Jolivet, Z. Kaluza, A. de Libera (Paris), 1991,pp. 11–48 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 4].

nominales and rules of inference 83

buted to the Nominales requires more than showing that all or most ofthose positions can be found in Abelard. It requires that the earliestformulation of those positions be uniquely or characteristically Abelar-dian. Do the positions listed above establish this?

The first position, namely that a “syllogism does not require a topi-cal justification,” is a statement about certain types of inferences. Theattribution of this view to the Nominales occurs only in one text, ananonymous commentary on Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, containedin Paris, Arsenal 910, fols. 58ra–82vb, dated to the second half of thetwelfth century, and cited by its opening words: “Haec est”.5 The author,an occasional but thoroughgoing opponent of Abelard and the Nom-inalists, rejects the “error of the Nominalists who deny that syllogismsrequire loci … since they say that syllogisms require loci only by way ofenthymemes.”6 The position described appears to be a literal quotationfrom Abelard’s commentary on the “Topics”.7 Abelard does distinguishbetween perfect and imperfect inferences and defines the former cat-egory, of which the syllogism is the principal example, as the type ofinference that does not require further justification by way of externalrules. Abelard’s position in this regard, however, is not unique, and per-haps not even distinctive. The position that a syllogism does not requirea topical locus had a strong foundation in Aristotle and Boethius, andwas a position maintained by many twelfth- and thirteenth-centuryauthors who discussed the issue.8 The counter thesis, that even syllo-gisms require additional justificatory rules, is the more unusual positionand reflects a growth in rule-building at the time at which the text thatattributes this position to the Nominales was written, probably the latetwelfth century.

The second position, that a negative does not follow from an affir-mative, is attributed to the Nominales in a fragment of a twelfth-centurylogical treatise.9 The author advises his reader always to be aware of the

5 N.J. Green-Pedersen, “The Doctrine of ‘Maxima Propositio’ and ‘Locus Differen-tia’ in Commentaries from the 12th Century on Boethius’s “Topics”,” Studia Mediewisty-czne, 18.2 (1977), 125–163, esp. 128, 141–142.

6 Ibid., 142, n. 88 (transcribed from Paris, Arsenal 910, fol. 58va): “error nominaliumqui negant locos esse aptos syllogismis … quoniam dicunt mediantibus enthymemati-bus locos esse aptos syllogismis.”

7 Abelard, Glossae in libro topicorum, in Pietro Abelardo, Scritti di logica, ed. Mario DalPra (Firenze, 1969), p. 319; Green-Pedersen, “The Doctrine,” 128, 142.

8 I am grateful to Sten Ebbesen for pointing this out.9 The reference occurs in Munich, Staatsbibl., Clm 29520/2, as edited by S. Ebbe-

sen and Y. Iwakuma, “Instantiae and 12th Century ‘Schools’,” CIMAGL, 44 (1983),

84 chapter five

school (secta) to which his respondens belongs. Against almost everyone hecan use the device of inferring a modal out of a non-modal (and theconverse), or the implicit out of the explicit (and the converse). Againstthe Nominales one can infer a negative out of an affirmative, and againstthe Melidunenses, the false out of the true or the true out of the false.10

It is unclear in this highly condensed text how these tactics are towork. Either the opponens is to prove that a positum admitted by therespondens conforms to a rule he does not accept, or to pose one or moreinstantiae unacceptable to the respondens that conform to a rule acceptedby the respondens. Only the first of these two procedures would dependupon the Nominales holding that a negative cannot be inferred froman affirmative. The second procedure would require that the Nominales

held the opposite of that position.The position that a negative does not follow from an affirmative is a

rule of inference that can be found in Abelard.11 That theory, however,may have had a wider acceptance and need not be uniquely Abelardianor, for that matter, uniquely Nominalist.12 Again, this attribution tothe Nominales appears in a text authored by one who does not includehimself in that group.

The third and fourth positions, given our present discussion, are themost interesting of the group. They are seemingly incompatible posi-tions on the ex impossibili rule, each supported by only one text. Nor-more derived the version given in the third position listed above froma text preserved in Oxford, Bodleian Library, Canon. misc. 281 andedited by De Rijk in 1975 under the title Obligationes Parisienses, which

81–85, at 82. The companion position, that an affirmative cannot follow from a nega-tive, can be found in an apparently Nominalist text discovered and edited by Iwakuma,Yukio, in Vienna, Bibl. Nat., Pal. lat. 2459, fol. 107ra–114vb. I am grateful for his callingthis text to my attention.

10 Ibid.: “considerato ex qua secta respondens fuerit, facile poterit quis instare gen-eraliter. Contra omnes fere caute ex inmodali inferendo modalem vel 〈e〉converso, vel〈ex〉 explicita inferendo inplicitam vel econverso. Contra nominales autem caute exaffirmativa inferendo negativam. Contra Melidunenses autem ex vero inferendo falsumvel econverso quocumque modo.” The rule “ex nullo falso aliquid sequitur” or “nil exfalso accidere” was defended by the author of the Ars Meliduna; L.M. de Rijk, LogicaModernorum, II.1 (Assen, 1967), pp. 386–390.

11 Abelard, Dialectica, ed. De Rijk (Assen, 1956), III.1, pp. 395–3/97.12 The rule (in the form: “ex nulla affirmativa sequi negativam”) is mentioned

among various solutions to a sophism by the author of the Ars Meliduna, but the aliiare not otherwise identified; De Rijk, Logica Modernorum, II.1, pp. 387–388.


he tentatively dated to the early thirteenth century.13 It was Normore’sconclusion that in this treatise the Nominales are credited with the posi-tion that ex impossibili quidlibet non sequitur. In the Communes obiectiones et

responsiones preserved in fragmentary form in Vat. lat. 7678 and stud-ied by Grabmann, Pelster, and Braakhuis, the position attributed to theNominales is ex impossibili quidlibet sequitur.14

The first of these texts, the Obligationes Parisienses, does not, to mymind, contain precisely the view Normore ascribes to it. The authorwas examining the rule “posito falso possibili, potest concedi et probari quodque

contingens,” which may be rendered “ex falso possibili, quodque contingens

sequitur.” The text goes on to say that the aforesaid rule is not held ina nominalist theory of consequences. The corresponding rule accord-ing to the Nominales would be: “ex falso possibili, quodque contingens non

sequitur,” or “impossibile sequitur.”15 The antecedent in this case is notsomething that is impossible or contradictory, but something that is pos-sible although false. And the consequent in the Nominalist version ofthis rule is not “quidlibet non sequitur” but “quodque contingens non sequitur,”or “impossibile sequitur.” However one is to construe the Nominalist rulethat does not permit them to accept a false but possible antecedent anda contingent consequent, the antecedent has nothing to do with the ex

impossibili rule. These are two different rules, and one is not convertiblewith the other.

13 L.M. de Rijk, “Some Thirteenth Century Tracts on the Game of Obligation, II,”Vivarium, 13 (1975), 22–54 at 31.

14 Vat. lat. 7678, fols. 73a–82a. For discussions of the text see M. Grabmann, DieSophismataliteratur des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts mit Textausgabe eines Sophisma des Boethius vonDacien, BGPTM, 36.1 (Münster i.W., 1940), pp. 33–41, who dates the text to the middleof the thirteenth century; F. Pelster, “Nominales und Reales im 13. Jahrhundert,” Sophia,12–14 (1944–1946), 154–161 at 157, who prefers a late thirteenth century date; andH.A.G. Braakhuis, De 13de eeuwse Tractaten over syncategorematische Termin, I (Leiden, 1979),pp. 33–73, who dates the work to the late twelfth or early thirteenth centuries. My ownexamination of that section of the manuscript dates the hand to the second quarter ofthe thirteenth century and the text before that date.

15 De Rijk, “Some Thirteenth Century Tracts,” 31: “Ex predictis patet veritas huiusregule: posito falso possibili, potest concedi et probari quodque contingens. Verbigratia. In veritate Sortes est niger. Ponatur Sortem esse album. Inde sic. ‘Sortes estalbus et tu non es episcopus’.” “Preterea. Sciendum quod predicta regula non tenetsecundum consequentiam Nominalium. Si enim teneret secundum ipsos, contingeretfalso possibili posito probari quodque impossibile, supposito opposito falsi impossibilisin copulativa cum posito. Fieret enim illa copulativa falsum non sequens secundumNominales. Unde est neganda secundum ipsos. Sed ex opposito illius et posito sequiturfalsum impossibile.”

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The second text is the work of a Realist author who is writing prob-ably in the first half of the thirteenth century. His description of theNominalist position on the ex impossibili rule is contrasted with the posi-tion of the Reales on the same rule in such a way that for the passage tomake sense, the Nominales version reported there could not be simply ascribal error.16 And given the fact that the treatise is by a Realist author,it is unlikely that he would have been grossly misinformed. Thus, theonly reference to the Nominalist position on the ex impossibili rule makesit identical with the version attributed to the Parvipontani: ex impossibili,

quidlibet sequitur.17 From this we can conclude that the Nominales sharedwith the Parvipontani the view that “anything follows from the impos-sible.” From Adam de Petit Pont that rule passed to William of Sois-sons and became the main element in his “machine”, and to AlexanderNecquam, who found nothing objectionable in that argument.18 Fromone perspective, the position was based on the Aristotelian rules ex

impossibili, impossibile sequatur and uno absurdo dato, cetera accident, with theconsequent broadened to include anything.19 From another perspective,however, it undermined the Aristotelian principle. Bonaventure andThomas Aquinas, both of whom rejected the nominalist theory of theunity of the noun, remained faithful to the Aristotelian formulation.20

Normore, on the basis of Martin’s work, has noted that Abelardwas initially a strong defender of the position that everything does notfollow from an impossibility. According to Martin, Abelard was awarethat if the truth of conditionals was based on the principle or condition

16 Vat. lat. 7678, fol. 81rb: “Solutio. Dicendum quod in veritate secundum opinionemquorundam, nominalium scilicet, ex impossibili sequitur quidlibet. Tamen secundumveritatem ex impossibili nihil sequitur, et hoc est secundum opinionem realium.”

17 Among numerous references that attribute this opinion to the school of AdamParvipontanus is the Tractatus Emmeranus de impossibili positione; see De Rijk, “SomeThirteenth Century Tracts on the Game of Obligation, I,” Vivarium, 12 (1974), 94–123at 102.

18 Martin, “William’s Machine”.19 Aristoteles, De Caelo I, c. 12 (281 b 15); Physica I, c. 2 (185 a 11–12). See also Physica

VII, c. 2 (243 a 2).20 Bonaventure, Sent. I, d. 48, dub. 1; Sent. IV, d. 21, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1. Aquinas, Sent.

I, d. 40, q. 3, a. 1; see also his commentaries on Physics and De caelo et mundo. Inhis commentary on Metaphysics, however, Aquinas argues that a necessary consequentcan be inferred from an impossible antecedent, as in: “Si homo est asinus, homoest.” Moreover, in the context of a discussion of the conditional with an impossibleantecedent and consequent: “Si Deus vult peccare, ergo potest peccare,” Aquinasintroduces an unusual maximal proposition: Of whatever a volition is predicated, itscapacity is also predicated, with its topical difference: from volition to capacity; seeQuodlibeta 5.2.2.


of inseparability, (it is impossible for the antecedent to be true if theconsequent is false), then anything could follow from an impossibility.Abelard instead used a containment principle by which conditionalswere true “if and only if the sense of the antecedent contains that ofthe consequent.” Abelard protected his position against inconsistencynot by rejecting conditional simplification but by requiring that in trueconditionals the antecedent and consequent could never be of mixedquality. It was apparently in that context that Alberic created a string ofconditionals that met Abelard’s condition and yet permitted anythingto follow from a contradiction or impossibility.

It is not necessary to see any confusion over the Abelardian and laterNominalist versions of the ex impossibili rule as presented by Normore.They are radically different. The Nominalists believed that anythingfollows from an impossibility, while Abelard maintained that anythingdid not follow from an impossibility. The Nominales and the Parvipontani

may have viewed their ex impossibili thesis only as an expansion orrefinement of the Aristotelian ex impossibili, impossibile sequatur.

The above examination suggests a number of things. First, it ispossible that the Nominales may not be a specific and exclusive labelfor the disciples of Abelard. Abelard shared a number of positionsthat came to be held by the Nominales, but the formative doctrine,namely the theory of the unity of the noun, was older than Abelard,although its application to the problems of omniscience, omnipotence,and the divine will, as well as human belief, may have been initiatedby Abelard. Other positions, particularly the nominalist version of theex impossibili rule, seemingly contradicted Abelard’s avowed position.Abelard may have been a Nominalist (although for reasons other thanthose normally reported), but it is still an open question whether he wasthe founder of that “school”.

On the other side, it would appear that the Nominalists may nothave been direct competitors with most other twelfth-century groups,save the Reales and possibly the Montani (if the latter are to be identi-fied with the disciples of Alberic of Paris, i.e. Alberic de Monte SanctaeGenovefe). The lines of Nominales/Reales may cut across those schoolsthat are more clearly derived from the teaching of a particular twelfth-century master. Those in other schools could adopt Nominalist posi-tions, just as the Nominalists may have adopted positions of othergroups.

There is much still to be learned about the Nominales, and theories ofentailment may hold some of the keys for unlocking that mystery.

part two

OCKHAM’S THOUGHT IN ENGLAND AND PARIS

chapter six

THE ACADEMIC AND INTELLECTUALWORLDS OF OCKHAM*

William of Ockham has long been considered one of the foremost fig-ures in the history of medieval philosophy and theology. As such histhought is often contrasted with that of the other seminal thinkersof high scholasticism: Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Giles ofRome, and John Duns Scotus, as if those were the appropriate andsufficient voices of debate within which Ockham’s thought was devel-oped. The completion of the critical edition of Ockham’s philosophi-cal and theological writings has, on one level, confirmed that pictureand revealed Scotus as the single most important figure on Ockham’sintellectual horizon. The editors, however, along with scholars work-ing on lesser known figures in the early fourteenth century, have at thesame time uncovered a more complex picture of intellectual exchangein which Ockham’s immediate contemporaries—those active between1305 and 1325—exercised a profound impact on his thought, and he ontheirs.

Other contributions of recent scholarship that change or at leastrefine the way Ockham is viewed today are a more extensive knowl-edge of the lives of those with whom he interacted, the educationalsystem of the Franciscan order that determined the physical settingsin which Ockham was active, and the structure and intellectual activ-ity at universities and other studia in England and on the Continent.These allow a fresh examination—a more nuanced picture—of Ock-ham’s intellectual heritage and the influence his thought had on subse-quent generations.

* Originally published in The Cambridge Companion to Ockham, ed. P.V. Spade (Cam-bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 17–30.

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The Formative Years, 1305–1316

William of Ockham was born around 1288 at the rural village of Ock-ham in Surrey, a day’s ride southwest of London. Nothing is knownof his family or social background and thus whether his native lan-guage was French or Middle English. Having joined or, more likely,been given to the Franciscan order as a young boy before the age offourteen, Latin quickly became his language of conversation and writ-ing. When he later went to Avignon, visited Italy, and lived the lasttwenty years of his life in Germany, it was probably through Latin thathe communicated with those among whom he lived.

No Franciscan convent existed in the region of Ockham’s birth,although the Dominicans maintained a convent at the nearby town ofGuildford. Ockham’s earliest education before entering the Franciscanorder was more likely obtained through the local parish priest or per-haps at the house of Austin Canons at Newark.1 His grammatical andphilosophical training, however, was received from the Franciscans inthe opening years of the fourteenth century, probably at Greyfriars2 inLondon, which may also have been his “home” convent.

The London convent was the principal teaching center for the Lon-don custody, one of the seven administrative units into which the En-glish province of the order was divided. Alongside Oxford, London hadthe largest Franciscan convent in England, which was situated on thenorthwest edge of the old city at Newgate with around 100 friars usuallyin residence.3 Its size was needed to facilitate its mission to the largestcity in England and to take advantage of proximity to the royal courtand episcopal residences that lay along the Thames between the cityand Westminster. London Greyfriars was also the principal residence ofthe Franciscan provincial minister for England when he was not abroadon business of the order.

In addition to lectors appointed for instruction in logic, naturalphilosophy, and theology, the London convent profited intellectuallyfrom a flow of students, masters, and officials moving between Oxfordand Paris. Throughout the English phase of Ockham’s life, that is,before he left England for Avignon in 1324 never to return, English

1 On the possibility of Ockham’s contact with Newark Abbey, see C.K. Brampton,“The Probable Order of Ockham’s Non-polemical Works,” Traditio 19 (1963), 469–483.

2 “Greyfriars” was a common term for the Franciscans.3 C.L. Kingsford, The Grey Friars of London (Manchester, 1915), p. 62.

the academic and intellectual worlds of ockham 93

secular and mendicant students crossed the Channel to Paris for studyin arts and theology, bringing back with them ideas and texts, just asOxford learning through the same connections migrated across to theclassrooms and libraries of Paris. Thus, in looking at the intellectualenvironment that Ockham experienced at the London convent, onemust look not only at the personnel and resources of the convent itselfbut at the influences of Oxford and Paris that passed through it in thefirst two decades of the fourteenth century.

What those influences were depends very much on knowing theyears in which Ockham was probably resident in London. We knowthat he was in London in February 1306, when he was ordained sub-deacon at Southwark by Robert Winchelsey, archbishop of Canterbury.4

Because there is no indication that he received a dispensation for beingyounger than the minimum canonical age for that minor order, nor anyreason to believe his order would have delayed his first ordination muchbeyond the canonical minimum, it has been assumed he was eighteenat the time, from which the approximate date of his birth is conjec-tured.5 According to that reasoning, he would have been twenty-ninewhen he began reading the Sentences in 1317–1318, approximately thenormal age for that academic exercise.

How much earlier than the academic year 1305–1306 Ockham wasat the London convent is unknown. He was already in the order before1302 and probably also at London by that date, as training in logic andnatural philosophy usually began around fourteen years of age, and it isthe most likely convent for his reception into the order. He would havecompleted his training in philosophy between 1308 and 1310 and thenadvanced to the study of theology either at London or Oxford.

No information has survived on who might have been lecturingin philosophy at London during these years. Henry de Sutton wasGuardian (that is, principal administrative officer) of the convent from1303 to 1309.6 Adam of Lincoln, Oxford D.Th. (c. 1293) and provincial

4 Registrum Roberti Winchelsey Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi, ed. Rose Graham. Cambridgeand York Society, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1956), p. 981.

5 On the assumption that the minimum age for ordination to the subdiaconatewas twenty-one, Ockham’s approximate date of birth was traditionally given as 1285.The Clementine Constitutions from the Council of Vienne in 1311 probably codifycontemporary practice; Corpus iuris canonici (Clem., lib. I, tit. vi, c. 3), ed. E. Friedberg(Leipzig, 1879), II, col. 1140: “… antiquis iuribus in hac parte praeferri, decernimus,ut, alio non obstante impedimento canonico, possit quis libere in decimo octavo adsubdiaconatus ….”

6 Kingsford, The Grey Friars, p. 55.

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minister for England from 1303 to 1310, would have been at the conventfrequently. John Duns Scotus might have resided there or at Oxfordduring his exile from Paris between June 1303 and April 1304. In fact, atone time or another most of the leading English Franciscan theologiansof this period would have visited London on business of the order.

By 1310 Ockham had advanced to the study of theology. Becausethere was no strict sequence of courses that marked the stages ofthe internal Franciscan educational program before the baccalaure-ate, young friars probably availed themselves of whatever lectures werebeing given so long as there were places in the classroom and the stu-dent had sufficient training to understand the material and analysis.Ockham would have begun his studies in theology either at the custo-dial school in London or at the provincial studium generale with which theLondon custody was affiliated, namely Oxford.

The decision regarding the studium to which Ockham was sent laywith the provincial minister and the provincial chapter. They werealso the ones who chose from among the many students who hadcompleted two or three years of theological study those few (approx-imately six to eight per decade) who would be sent to Paris for thesecond half (another four or five years) of the theological training nec-essary for being appointed a lector in a convent or custodial school.The opportunity of Parisian study was reserved for those who werethought capable ultimately of advancing to the baccalaureate at one ofthe three universities with a faculty of theology: Paris, Oxford, or Cam-bridge. The order supported two students at Paris from each province,and the province could send an additional student at its own expense,which the English province usually did. Selection depended on merit,as determined by the provincial leadership and on the timing of vacan-cies opened by students returning to England. Roger Marston, JohnCrombe, William of Alnwick, and probably John Duns Scotus wereamong those who had been chosen for the lectorate program at Paris.A few English students of Ockham’s academic generation would alsohave been sent. Was Ockham among those few?

We have no evidence that links Ockham to Paris during the yearsin which he would have been eligible for consideration, approximately1312–1316. Ockham’s Reportatio on the Sentences does not reflect anyfirst-hand knowledge of theologians active at Paris at that time. Hisfamiliarity with some of Peter Auriol’s views, presented at Paris in1316–1317, was apparently acquired through reports or notes of others.Although it is unlikely that Ockham had any direct personal contact


with Parisian classrooms, he certainly had access to texts and accountsthat came back to England.

The selection of Ockham for advancement to the baccalaureate atOxford would have been at the direction of Richard of Conington,provincial minister in England from 1310 to 1316, with the agreementor consent of the provincial chapter. Conington was himself a formerregent master in theology at Oxford whose opinions, as expressed in hisfirst Quodlibet, were discussed by Ockham in the prologue, quest. 5, ofhis lectures on the Sentences. Conington belonged to that generation ofEnglish Franciscans who were more influenced by Henry of Ghent thanby Scotus. Yet Conington remained one of the important contemporarytheologians whose ideas were discussed into the 1340s.7

The Oxford to which Ockham was sent for the baccalaureate pro-vided an exciting intellectual environment for the young Franciscan.Henry of Harclay, a secular theologian who had studied at Paris beforereturning to Oxford, was elected chancellor of the university in 1312.In the previous decade at Paris, Harclay had been deeply influenced byScotus and had participated in the editing of Scotus’s work and in thediscussions that created the first generation of Scotists at Paris.8 With hisreturn to Oxford, however, Harclay moved in a different direction and,alongside Richard Campsall, began to criticize assumptions of Scotusin metaphysics and natural philosophy. Harclay formulated positionson the question of universals and the Aristotelian categories that antic-ipated elements in Ockham’s thought as expressed a few years later inthe latter’s Oxford lectures on the Sentences.9

Others active at Oxford between 1310 and 1316 were the seculartheologians Robert of Kykeley (Kigheley), from whom we have a series

7 On Conington see V. Doucet, “L’Oeuvre scholastique de Richard de Conington,”AFH, 29 (1937), 396–442; Stephen F. Brown, “Richard of Conington and the Analogyof the Concept of Being,” FzS, 48 (1966), 297–307; L. Cova, “La polemica controla distinzione formale tra le perfezioni divine nelle Questioni disputate di Riccardodi Conington,” in Parva mediaevalia: Studi per Maria Elena Reina, ed. Barbara Faes deMottoni (Trieste, 1993), pp. 43–86.

8 C. Balic, “Adnotationes ad nonnullas quaestiones circa Ordinationem I. DunsScoti,” in Opera Omnia Duns Scoti, ed. C. Balic (Vatican, 1956), vol. IV, pp. 1*–39*;C. Balic, “Henricus de Harcley et Ioannes Duns Scotus,” in Mélanges offerts à EtienneGilson (Paris, 1959), pp. 93–121.

9 F. Pelster, “Heinrich von Harclay, Kanzler von Oxford und seine Quästionen,” inMiscellanea Francesco Ehrle, vol. I, Studi e Testi 37 (Rome, 1924), pp. 307–356; G. Gál,“Henricus de Harclay: Quaestio de significato conceptus universalis,” FS, 31 (1971),178–234.

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of quodlibetal questions, Antony Bek (future chancellor of Lincoln andlater bishop of Norwich), Simon of Mepham (future archbishop ofCanterbury), and Richard Campsall. Of these Campsall was by far themost important. He was a fellow of Merton College and a master ofarts by 1308, at which time he was probably beginning his studies intheology. He was a bachelor of theology by July 1317, probably havingread the Sentences in the previous academic year. Although in manyways a more traditional mind than his near contemporary Ockham,Campsall applied terminist logic, particularly supposition theory, to theanalysis of theological problems—a method that can also be found inOckham.

After a dispute with the university over the theological curricu-lum, the Dominicans resumed teaching at Oxford in 1314–1315 withNicholas Trevet as regent master in theology. Although Trevet hasbeen described as a Thomist, strict support of Aquinas’s thought wasalready on the wane among younger Dominicans at Oxford and Parisby 1310.10 By contrast, before 1314 Scotism had not established firmroots among the Franciscans at Oxford. Robert Cowton, who lecturedon the Sentences at Oxford sometime between 1304 and 1311 and whomay have remained in residence at Greyfriars favored Henry of Ghent,as did Richard of Conington. The same may be true for the less-studiedWilliam of Nottingham, who lectured on the Sentences at Oxford shortlybefore Cowton and who succeeded Conington as provincial minister in1316. Thus Ockham’s pre-sentential training in theology coincided witha time of weakening interest in Aquinas among English Dominicans,little evidence of supporters of Giles of Rome among English AustinFriars, and only modest support for Scotus among Franciscans.

That began to change by 1314, but only in regard to Scotus. Theanonymous Franciscan sententiarius at Oxford in 1314–1315 was not onlyinfluenced by Scotus but carried Scotus’s theory of “priorities” (signa) inthe Godhead into a discussion of whether God the Father could haveproduced creatures before begetting the Son—a discussion that led tothe condemnation of eight of his propositions in February 1315.11 John

10 F.J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School (Dubuque, Iowa, 1964); W.J. Courtenay, Schoolsand Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton, 1987), pp. 175–182.

11 G.J. Etzkorn, “Codex Merton 284: Evidence of Ockham’s Early Influence inOxford,” in From Ockham to Wyclif, ed. A. Hudson and M. Wilks, Studies in Church His-tory, Subsidia 5 (Oxford, 1987), pp. 31–42; W.J. Courtenay, “The Articles Condemnedat Oxford Austin Friars in 1315,” in Via Augustini, ed. H.A. Oberman and F.A. James(Leiden, 1991), pp. 5–18.


of Reading, who was the Franciscan sententiarius at Oxford in 1315–1316or 1316–1317, was a thorough-going Scotist and was later described byOckham’s socius, Adam Wodeham, as Scotus’s “disciple and most notedfollower.”12 Reading probably remained at Greyfriars until 1322 andwas appointed lector at that convent around 1320. Ockham cited Read-ing in the third question of his prologue, and, when Reading revisedhis lectures on the Sentences he entered into a detailed critique of Ock-ham’s lectures, relying first on Ockham’s initial version (his Reportatio)and then on the revised version (Ockham’s Ordinatio). Finally, Williamof Alnwick, the disciple and redactor of Duns Scotus, returned fromParis to Oxford and became regent master (lector) of the convent—probably in 1316. Although Alnwick’s regency lasted only a year, heprobably remained in England, mostly likely at Oxford, until he wentas a delegate to the general chapter of the order at Assisi in June 1322and stayed in Italy and southern France until his death in March 1333.Thus, Scotism was well established at Oxford Greyfriars on the eve ofOckham’s advancement to the baccalaureate.

Oxford and London, 1317–1324

In the autumn term of 1317, Ockham began his lectures on the Sentences

at Oxford, which occupied his attention across the biennium 1317–1319.13 Only his Reportatio on books II–IV and the citations by John ofReading from the first three distinctions of Ockham’s lectures on Book Iremain from what he presented there. If there is some uncertainty as towhether he only read at Oxford or read first at London (1317–1318) and

12 Wodeham, Lectura Oxon. I, dist. 1, q. 12 (Vat. lat. 955, fol. 70v). On Reading seeW.J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham (Leiden, 1978), pp. 62–63; E. Longpré, “Jean de Readinget le B. Jean Duns Scot,” La France Franciscaine 7 (1924), 99–109.

13 Gedeon Gál has argued that Ockham lectured on the Sentences at London (1317–1318) before lecturing a second time at Oxford (1318–1319); introduction to Ock-ham, Quaestiones in librum quartum sententiarum (Reportatio), ed. R. Wood and G. Gál (St.Bonaventure, N.Y., 1984), pp. 14*–18*. While possible, there is no firm evidence thatthe requirement of reading the Sentences at a lesser studium before doing so at a uni-versity, codified by Benedict XII in 1336, was already practiced two decades earlier. Inthis period the mendicant orders at Oxford lectured on the Sentences across a two-yearperiod, and we know that Ockham was in residence at the Oxford convent by June 1318when he was licensed to hear confessions in the diocese of Lincoln; A.B. Emden, A Bio-graphical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500, vol. 2 (Oxford, 1957), p. 1384. Hadhe lectured at London in 1317–1318, it is unlikely that he would have gone to Oxfordbefore September 1318.

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then at Oxford (1318–1319 or 1318–1320), there is no room for disputeregarding the dates. Ockham’s Reportatio shows he knew William ofAlnwick’s Quodlibeta (1316–1317) and Peter Auriol’s Parisian Scriptum I(1316–1317) but was not yet aware that Auriol had incepted as master oftheology (by October 1318).14

Ockham was principally concerned with the leading minds of theprevious academic generation: Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, andJohn Duns Scotus. Yet Ockham also cited his immediate contempo-raries, John of Reading, who read the Sentences at Oxford a year or twoearlier, William of Alnwick, who may still have been lector at Oxfordin the autumn of 1317, and Peter Auriol, who read the Sentences at Parisin 1316–1318. Knowledge of the latter would have come back to Lon-don and Oxford through English Franciscans returning from the Parisconvent.

Around 1321 Ockham was appointed lecturer in philosophy at one ofthe Franciscan schools in England, probably at the London convent.15

By this time he was a “formed bachelor” awaiting an opportunity tobe selected to proceed to the doctorate at Oxford. At the same conventOckham lived in the company of Walter Chatton, who was lecturerin theology, and Adam Wodeham, a student in theology who alsoacted as Ockham’s socius or assistant. This was the most productivewriting period of Ockham’s career. Between 1321 and 1324 Ockhamproduced his commentaries on the beginning books of logic, namely hisexpositions of Porphyry and Aristotle’s Categories, On Interpretation, andSophistical Refutations. In the same period Ockham wrote his textbookin logic (Summa logicae), his commentary and questions on Aristotle’s

14 John XXII instructed the chancellor at Paris, Thomas de Bailly, on 14 July 1318 togrant the license to Auriol, and we know Auriol was regent at Paris in 1318–1319; CUPII, #772, p. 225; #776, p. 227. Licensing and inception therefore took place between lateJuly and the beginning of the autumn term. For the dating of Ockham’s lectures on theSentences see the introduction to Ockham, Scriptum in librum primum sententiarum: Ordinatio,ed. G. Gál and S.F. Brown (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1967), pp. 34*–36*.

15 Although the original reason for assuming that Chatton and Ockham were notresident at Oxford at this time has been called into question, the references in Ock-ham’s Summa logicae to London suggest, as Gedeon Gál argued, that London was theplace of composition and therefore residence; see Gál’s introduction to Ockham, Summalogicae, ed. G. Gál (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974), pp. 47*–56*; W.J. Courtenay, “Ock-ham, Chatton, and the London Studium: Observations on Recent Changes in Ockham’sBiography,” in Die Gegenwart Ockhams, ed. W. Vossenkuhl and R. Schönberger (Wein-heim, 1990), pp. 327–337. Ockham also determined quodlibetal disputations during thisperiod, which were permitted only to regent masters at Oxford, but could be held byformed bachelors at custodial or provincial studia.


Physics, his treatise on predestination and future contingents, the firstfive groups of his quodlibetal disputations, and probably his treatises onthe Eucharist (Tractatus de quantitate and De corpore Christi).

It was also in this period that some of Ockham’s opinions cameunder attack. John of Reading, who was regent master at OxfordGreyfriars around 1320–1321, frequently attacked Ockham in the redac-tion of his own lectures on the Sentences that was revised between 1318and 1322. Similarly, Walter Chatton, who was lecturing on the Sentences

in the same convent as Ockham between 1321 and 1323 attacked Ock-ham on many points, including the status of universals (leading Ock-ham to alter his opinion), the relation of grace to justification, the statusof quantity and relation, and Eucharistic doctrine. In fact, the writingsof Ockham and Chatton in this period show a surprising degree ofinterdependence and dialogue.16 Similarly, a work on logic written inEngland in this period and incorrectly attributed to Richard Campsallalso attacked Ockham’s views on supposition, universals, and the Aris-totelian categories.17 Among the numerous points of debate betweenOckham and his contemporaries in this period, the principal ones thatwere emerging were Ockham’s position on universals, his belief thatonly substances and qualities are real entities (and thus his interpreta-tion of the other Aristotelian categories), his belief that one could havean intuitive cognition of a nonexistent, his adoption of Scotus’s theoryof divine acceptation in the doctrine of grace and justification, and hisinterpretation of transubstantiation.

It was probably a result of this mounting criticism that Ockhamwas asked to explain his position on relation and the other Aristoteliancategories at a provincial chapter of the order in England in 1323.18 Noinformation regarding his response or any action taken by the chapterhas survived. Within that same year, however, someone, possibly Johnof Reading who went to Avignon in 1322, brought charges at the papalcourt against Ockham for false and heretical teaching.19 Around May

16 S.F. Brown, “Walter Chatton’s Lectura and William of Ockham’s Quaestiones inLibros Physicorum Aristotelis,” in Essays Honoring Allan B. Wolter, ed. W.A. Frank andG.J. Etzkorn (St. Bonaventure, 1985), pp. 81–115; see also Gál’s introduction to Ock-ham, Summa logicae, and J. Wey’s introduction to Ockham, Quodlibeta septem (St. Bonaven-ture, N.Y., 1980).

17 Logica Campsale Anglici, valde utilis et realis contra Ocham, ed. E.A. Synan in The Worksof Richard of Campsall, vol. II (Toronto, 1982), pp. 75–420.

18 G.J. Etzkorn, “Ockham at a Provincial Chapter: 1323. A Prelude to Avignon,”AFH, 83 (1990), 557–567.

19 No summons has survived, but in his letter to the Franciscans gathered at the

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1324, Ockham left England for Avignon, where he took up residence atthe Franciscan convent for the next four years.

Avignon, 1324–1328

The normal route from London to Avignon would have taken Ock-ham through Paris, which was probably his first direct contact with thatuniversity city and convent. Parisian theologians were also very much inevidence at Avignon, which was the center of church life. Although sub-sequent events shifted Ockham’s attention away from philosophy andtheology, Avignon was his first exposure to an international commu-nity of scholars, many of whom had been trained in the more diverseintellectual environment of Paris. The time that was not taken up withresponding to his inquisitors, which must have occupied very little ofhis four years at Avignon, allowed him access to disputations, sermons,and discussions with other scholars, secular and mendicant. Among theFranciscans who visited or resided at Avignon during these years wereJohn of Reading, Francis of Meyronnes, Francis of Marchia, Guiral Ot,Elias of Nabinali, William of Rubione, Pastor de Serrescuderio, andof course Michael of Cesena, the Minister General of the FranciscanOrder, who in addition to earlier visits was in residence from Decem-ber 1327 until May 1328.

All of those appointed to serve on the commission to examine Ock-ham’s orthodoxy were, save one, Parisian doctors of theology. Twoof them were Dominicans whose training dated to a period in whichThomism was obligatory in that order: Raymond Béguin, Patriarch ofJerusalem, and Dominique Grenier, lector at the Sacred Palace andbishop elect of Pamiers. Thomism was also the preferred doctrine ofthe only non-Parisian theologian on the commission: John Lutterell,former chancellor of Oxford. Two others belonged to the Augustinian

general chapter of the order at Assisi in 1334 Ockham said he remained at Avignonfor almost four years until he fled in May 1328. George Knysh has argued that Ock-ham went to Avignon for nonjudicial reasons and only later came under suspicionwhile resident there; Knysh, “Biographical Rectifications concerning Ockham’s Avi-gnon Period,” FS, 46 (1986), 61–92; Ockham Perspectives (Winnipeg, 1994). The weight ofscholarly opinion, however, supports the traditional view; cf. J. Miethke, “Ockham-Perspektiven oder Engführung in eine falsche Richtung? Eine Polemik gegen eineneuere Publikation zu Ockhams Biographie,” Mittellateinisches Jahrbuch, 29 (1994), 61–82.


Hermits and presumably had been schooled in the thought of Gilesof Rome: Gregory of Lucca, bishop of Belluno-Feltre, and John Paig-note, a more recent doctor of Paris. The only member of the com-mission who was not wedded to late thirteenth-century realism andwho was somewhat sympathetic to Scotistic theology was Durand ofSt. Pourçain, a Dominican theologian and bishop of Meaux whose un-Thomistic views had earlier brought him into conflict with theologiansin his order. With the exception of Durand, the commission favored theviews of Thomas and Giles of Rome. At the same time, all were doctorsof theology from Paris or Oxford and were thus familiar with the typesof discourse or scholastic analysis of university classrooms.20

The only works of Ockham that were under review at Avignonwere his lectures on the Sentences, specifically his Ordinatio on Book Iand the Reportatio on Books II–IV. Even before the appointment of thecommission, Lutterell was assigned the task of going through the textof Ockham’s questions on the Sentences that the latter had brought withhim and presented to the pope. In all probability Lutterell’s antagonismagainst Ockham began at Avignon and was not among the issues thatled to his dismissal as chancellor, nor the reason for his departurefrom England to Avignon. Ockham was only a bachelor of theologyat the beginning of Lutterell’s tenure as chancellor, and Ockham nevercame up for examination or licensing and was probably not residentat Oxford after 1321. Lutterell’s conflict with the regent masters in artsand theology at Oxford was personal and probably had to do with theway he exercised the powers of his office. And his move to Avignonwas for career advancement, as the letter of invitation from StephenKettelbergh shows.21 His libellus against Ockham, written at Avignon,was both the sincere reaction of a committed Thomist and a means ofproving himself useful to the papal curia.22

Although the list of propositions initially identified by Lutterell ascensurable contained philosophical as well as theological statements,the commission restricted the investigation to theological propositionsand a reduced number of philosophical statements that had implica-tions for theology. Most of the propositions were taken from the begin-

20 C.K. Brampton, “Personalities in the Process Against Ockham at Avignon, 1324–1326,” FS, 26 (1966), 4–25.

21 Snappe’s Formulary and Other Records, ed. H.E. Salter (Oxford, 1924), pp. 303–304.22 F. Hoffmann, Die Schriften des Oxforder Kanzlers Johannes Lutterell, Erfurter Theologis-

che Studien 6 (Leipzig, 1959).

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ning part of the Ordinatio and from Books III and IV of the Reporta-

tio. Many of the propositions extracted were not concerned with state-ments about the way the orders of nature and grace actually work butwere taken from statements made de potentia absoluta, that is, whethera relationship or combination of qualities, such as the relationship ofmerit and reward, grace and justification, Christ’s human nature andthe inability to sin, are absolutely necessary or only contingently neces-sary, and whether their counterparts are absolutely impossible or onlybecause God so ordained.

Munich, 1329–1347

On the night of 26 May 1328 Ockham fled Avignon in the companyof Michael of Cesena, Bonagratia of Bergamo, and Francis of Marchia,going first to Italy, where they joined the court of Louis of Bavaria, andthen to Munich, where Ockham remained for the rest of his life. Apartfrom the attraction of the imperial court, which brought some scholarsto Munich on diplomatic service, or the presence of the group ofdissidents resident there, such as the Franciscans who had fled Avignonor the secular master Marsilius of Padua, Munich was not a center oflearning for any of the mendicant orders. Without some knowledge ofGerman, which we have no reason to believe he possessed, Ockhamwas more isolated than he had been at Avignon. Latin remained hislanguage of communication both in writing and conversation, but thereligious and scholarly community to which it was limited was small.Ockham probably did not spend all his time in Munich. He may wellhave attended provincial chapters of the southern German (Strasbourg)province of the order, such as were held at Basel in 1340, where he mayhave renewed contact with John of Rodington and Adam Wodeham.23

These years of exile in southern Germany (1329–1347) were dedi-cated to writing political treatises against John XXII and Benedict XIIbecause of Ockham’s conviction that they had fallen into heresy on theissue of apostolic poverty and, in the case of Pope John, on the doc-trine of the beatific vision. Among the most important of the booksand treatises he wrote in this period were his Opus nonaginta dierum and

23 On Wodeham’s and Rodington’s visits to Basel see “De beato Iacobo de PortaBasileae sepulto,” from Chronica fratris Nicolai Glassberger in Analecta Franciscana, vol. II(Quaracchi, 1887), 177–178; Analecta Franciscana, vol. III (Quaracchi, 1897), 637.


his Dialogus. In these writings Ockham examined the meanings of lord-ship (dominium), the relationship of ownership and use, and the ideas oflegal and natural rights. He also addressed the question of authoritywithin the church: the role of the pope, scripture and tradition, a gen-eral council, and the place of secular monarchs in ecclesiastical affairs.Although Ockham’s political writings have often been associated withMarsilius of Padua’s Defensor pacis (1324), some of Ockham’s argumen-tation on the authority of a council and on the authority of the popewas aimed against Marsilius. Ockham remained a stronger believer inpapal authority in the church and in the determination of doctrine evenwhile acknowledging the possibility (for him a reality) of a pope’s fallinginto error.24

Ockham’s Heritage

Although Ockham’s political writings played an important role in dis-cussions of the relation of church and state alongside Marsilius ofPadua’s Defensor pacis from Ockham’s century until today, the mostinfluential parts of his thought from the fourteenth to sixteenth cen-turies were his philosophy and theology. The traditional picture of Ock-ham’s influence claimed him to be the initiator, the “venerable incep-tor”, of a new school of thought in late medieval Europe: nominalism.It supposedly dominated intellectual life at Oxford for almost a half-century, until the advent of John Wyclif. Similarly at Paris, after an ini-tial reaction against Ockham’s thought in 1339 and 1340, he has beencredited with carrying Paris into a nominalistic current that had noserious competitors until challenged by Thomism and Albertism in theearly fifteenth century.

That picture has undergone considerable revision in recent decades.In England Ockham was among a group of fourteenth-century authorswho continued to be cited until the end of that century, yet even hisclosest followers, such as Adam Wodeham, were critical of Ockhamon several issues, particularly in the area of epistemology. Ockham’s

24 B. Tierney, “Ockham, the Conciliar Theory, and the Canonists,” JHI, 15 (1954),40–70; Tierney, Origins of Papal Infallibility, 1150–1350 (Leiden, 1988), pp. 205–238; A.S.McGrade, The Political Thought of William of Ockham (Cambridge, 1974); Ockham, A Letterto the Friars Minor and Other Writings, ed. A.S. McGrade and J. Kilcullen (Cambridge,1995); Das Publikum politischer Theorie im 14. Jahrhundert, ed. J. Miethke (Munich, 1992).

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removal of sensible and intelligible species in his explanation of theacquisition of knowledge was rejected by most of his English con-temporaries, as was his definition of the object of knowledge.25 Ock-ham is better seen not as the leader or center of a movement but asone of many contemporary authors whose opinions were widely dis-cussed, sometimes accepted, sometimes rejected. He became less influ-ential at Oxford in the 1340s because of two countercurrents. One ofthese was Augustinianism as espoused by Thomas Bradwardine, whoattacked Ockham’s views on grace and justification as being Pelagian.26

The other current was realism, which reappeared at Oxford in thelate 1340s. Ockham was still admired by some, such as an anonymousOxford author writing around 1350 who took Ockham’s Sentences com-mentary as the model for his own.27 Yet many of Ockham’s presup-positions in logic, natural philosophy, and theology were discarded oropposed by such figures as Ralph Strode, Richard Brinkley, NicholasAston, and John Wyclif.28

The situation at Paris was somewhat different. Ockham’s philo-sophical writings, principally his Summa logicae, were known at Parisin the late 1320s, and by the mid-1330s Ockham’s natural philosophyhad attracted a following in the arts faculty. After a relatively briefattempt to suppress Ockham’s writings and thought at Paris between1339 and 1342, opposition weakened in the face of a large influx ofEnglish philosophical and theological texts that came into Paris inthe early 1340s. Ockham’s natural philosophy was generally adoptedby the Augustinian theologians Gregory of Rimini and Hugolino ofOrvieto in the 1340s, although they were critical of Ockham in otherareas. By mid-fourteenth century Ockham was an important source for

25 K.H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham (Leiden, 1988).26 G. Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians (Cambridge, 1957); H.A. Oberman, Archbishop

Thomas Bradwardine (Utrecht, 1958); J.-F. Genest, “Le ‘De futuris contingentibus’ deThomas Bradwardine,” Recherches Augustiniennes, 14 (1979), 249–336; J.-F. Genest, Prédéter-mination et liberté créée à Oxford au XIVe siècle. Buckingham contre Bradwardine (Paris, 1992);E.W. Dolnikowski, Thomas Bradwardine: A View of Time and a Vision of Eternity in Fourteenth-Century Thought (Leiden, 1995). For a defense of Ockham against the charge of Pelagian-ism, see R. Wood, “Ockham’s Repudiation of Pelagianism,” in The Cambridge Companionto Ockham (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 350–373.

27 G.J. Etzkorn, “Codex Merton 284. Evidence of Ockham’s Early Influence inOxford,” in From Ockham to Wyclif, pp. 31–42.

28 For further discussion see W.J. Courtenay, “The Reception of Ockham’s Thoughtin Fourteenth-Century England,” in From Ockham to Wyclif, pp. 89–107 [reprinted inthis volume as Chapter 7]; Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England,pp. 193–355.


Parisian scholars, and his influence can be seen in Henry Totting ofOyta (directly and by way of Adam Wodeham), and more especially inPierre d’Ailly. Much depended on the specific issue, and most Scholas-tics of this period chose their positions and arguments without attentionto one school of thought. Despite similarities in the thought of Ockhamand Jean Buridan, the latter represents a different form of terministlogic that was influential on Albert of Saxony and Marsilius of Inghen.29

The situation changed in the fifteenth century with the reemergenceof schools of thought and the division in faculties of arts between aphilosophical preparation based on the Aristotelian commentaries ofAlbert, Thomas, and Giles on the one side (the via antiqua) and a prepa-ration based on the commentaries of Ockham, Buridan, Inghen, andother fourteenth-century authors (the via moderna). Ockham becametextually wedded to the “modern” approach and an important author-ity for the Nominalistae at Paris and universities in Germany. By theend of the fifteenth century Ockham’s name had become identifiedwith a school of thought, and “Ockhamist” took its place alongside“Thomist,” “Albertist,” and “Scotist”.30

The Middle Ages ended with Ockhamism as one school of thoughtmore or less on a par with others. Its reception in more recent times isthe topic for another study.

29 For a more extensive discussion of the early stages of the introduction of Ock-ham’s thought into Paris, see Courtenay, “The Reception of Ockham’s Thought at theUniversity of Paris,” in Preuve et raisons à l’Université de Paris. Logique, ontologie et théologieau XIVe siècle, ed. Z. Kaluza and P. Vignaux (Paris, 1984), pp. 43–64 [reprinted in thisvolume as Chapter 8]; Courtenay, “The Debate over Ockham’s Physical Theories atParis,” in La Nouvelle Physique du XIVe siècle, ed. S. Caroti and P. Souffrin (Firenze, 1997),pp. 45–63 [reprinted in his volume as Chapter 12].

30 Z. Kaluza, Les querelles doctrinales à Paris. Nominalistes et réalistes aux confins du XIVeet du XVe siècles (Bergamo, 1988); M. Hoenen, “Albertistae, Thomistae und Nomi-nales. Die philosophisch-historischen Hintergründe der Intellektlehre des Wessel Gans-fort († 1489),” in Wessel Gansfort (1419–1489) and Northern Humanism, ed. F. Akkerman,G.C. Huisman, and A.J. Vanderjagt (Leiden, 1993), pp. 71–96.

chapter seven

THE RECEPTION OF OCKHAM’S THOUGHTIN FOURTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND*

In the autumn of 1363 Wyclif returned to Oxford to take lodgings atQueen’s College and begin his formal training in theology. The Oxfordof that day was supposedly dominated by the nominalistic philosophyand theology of Ockham and of his disciples, although not exclusivelyso. After a period of initial and vehement opposition to Ockham inthe 1320s, it has been assumed that Ockham’s thought attracted agroup of fervent disciples and influenced many others. The principalOckhamists of the next generation, or what is sometimes called ‘theEnglish school of nominalism,’ are identified in almost any textbook ofmedieval philosophy as being Robert Holcot and Adam Wodeham. Onoccasion other names are added: William Crathorn, Thomas Bucking-ham, William Heytesbury, and John Dumbleton. The areas of disci-pleship vary, but those most frequently mentioned are: a nominalisticmetaphysics, an epistemology of intuitive cognition, a terminist logic,a nominalistic physics, and a semi-Pelagian soteriology. Although anactual head-count is rarely provided, it is taken for granted that by1335 many Oxford authors were sympathetic to Ockham and that Ock-hamist teaching was not effectively displaced by the countervoices ofFitzralph and Bradwardine, a situation that lasted until Wyclif ’s cam-paign against Ockham and the ‘doctors of signs’.

The view that Oxford became largely Ockhamist in the generationafter Ockham, a view repeated rather than critically tested, rests ontwo assumptions: first, the belief that the terminological and criticalinterests of late medieval thought, especially of the fourteenth centuryand especially in England, were products of Ockham’s influence; andsecond, that the philosophical and theological critiques of Bradwardine

* Originally presented at a conference at Queen’s College Oxford in 1985 andpublished in From Ockham to Wyclif, ed. Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks, Studies inChurch History, Subsidia 5 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), pp. 89–107.

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and Wyclif presuppose a unified and entrenched school of nominalismrooted in Ockham’s thought.1

The accuracy of this picture, whose attractiveness assured frequentrepetition, has not gone unchallenged. Over a quarter century agoPhilotheus Boehner pointed out that while Ockham’s thought was in-fluential, “it seems he had few disciples.” “It is difficult,” Boehner wenton to say, “to find an ‘Ockhamist’ school in the same sense as weencounter a Thomist or Scotist school. Ockham’s teachings had, rather,a stimulating effect.”2

But how to trace that effect? A decade before Boehner made thatstatement, E.A. Moody deplored the pattern in histories of later me-dieval thought of describing “the varied teachings and tendencies ofthe late medieval period” as ‘Ockhamist’, both because it attributesideas to Ockham that he did not hold, and because it assumes con-nections that have not in fact been established.3 One encounters that‘blanket designation’ less today, yet the history of the reception of Ock-ham’s thought has been only partially studied. Much remains to bedone as we discover more in reading through the texts already known.Consequently the following account of the English phase of Ockham’sWirkungsgeschichte is meant to update our picture of the reception ofOckham’s thought in the period before Wyclif. But in no sense do theseremarks represent a complete picture. Limitations of time and in thestate of research allow me to treat only a few of the more critical pointsand persons.

Before beginning we must consider a methodological problem: howdoes one identify influence? Some of Ockham’s most distinctive ideaswere ones shared by some of his contemporaries and immediate pre-decessors. There are, we have come to discover, very few ideas or for-mulations that are unique to Ockham. When we find these positionsin authors after Ockham, therefore, can we be sure we are looking atthe direct or indirect influence of Ockham? We are, of course, on saferground if Ockham is expressly acknowledged in the text and/or marginof a manuscript to be the source for an argument or position. Yet even

1 G. Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians (Cambridge, 1957); J.A. Robson, Wyclif and theOxford Schools (Cambridge, 1961).

2 Ph. Boehner, introduction to William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings: A Selection(Edinburgh, 1957; repr. New York, 1964), p. li.

3 E.A. Moody, “Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt: The Parisian Stat-utes of 1339 and 1340,” in FS, 7 (1947), 113–146; repr. in Studies in Medieval Philosophy,Science, and Logic: Collected Papers, 1933–1969 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975), p. 160.

the reception of ockham’s thought 109

this cautious approach is not without problems. Most positions so iden-tified are precisely those against which a scholastic author will shape hisown view. Reliance solely on those references will make it appear thatOckham only had a negative influence and that most of his contempo-raries were opposed to his thought, when the contrary might well bethe case.

In order to construct an account of the reception of Ockham’sthought at Oxford and in England, it is necessary to look closely at thewhole range of testimony: what approaches and conclusions Ockham’sopponents disliked, those that attracted others, and finally those thatmore neutral observers saw as significant, controversial, or innovative.In reconstructing dependence upon or reactions to Ockham’s thought,I have adopted the following guidelines: 1) The attribution of an argu-ment or position to Ockham, either by an author or a contemporaryscribe, whether or not the position is unique to Ockham. This includesall such evidence, from the lists of suspect propositions to the chanceidentification in a single manuscript, in order to identify the controver-sial issues on which contemporaries and later authors felt Ockham hadmade a contribution, whether positive or negative. We must remindourselves, however, that unless we are dealing with a direct quotationor reference to one of Ockham’s works, such evidence only establishesa link in the mind of the author or scribe between Ockham and theposition mentioned; Ockham may not be the sole or even principalrepresentative. 2) The presence in later writers of positions or formu-lations that appear to be unique to Ockham. (I stress ‘appear to be’,since the amount of textual work still to be done on contemporary andearlier fourteenth-century authors is large.) 3) (And with caution andsome misgiving), the presence of a group or constellation of positionsthat from our viewpoint appear to be Ockhamist.

The Earliest Reaction

The initial reaction to Ockham’s thought was swift and largely nega-tive, at least among Ockham’s exact contemporaries or those who wereolder. Reactions ranged from openly hostile to moderately indifferent.Perhaps surprisingly, at this early stage there is little or no indicationthat Ockham had any followers at Oxford. We know of no one atOxford between 1317 and 1327 who can be so characterized, at leastnot without considerable qualification. There are no references among

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his critics to Ockhamistae or sequaces, as Wodeham later would ascribeto Walter Chatton.4 The reaction, therefore, was to Ockham himselfand not to the growth of a following within the faculties of arts or the-ology, as was the case at Paris some years later—a growth in partyallegiance so disconcerting to those of another philosophical or theo-logical persuasion. Some of the reaction may, as Ockham insisted, havebeen motivated by envy and malice.5 Yet the number and standing ofhis critics as well as their geographical distribution suggests more thana personally motivated conspiracy centered at Oxford.

Although the first encounter between Ockham and his critics (specif-ically his Scotistic fellow Franciscan, John of Reading,6 and the chan-cellor of the university, John Lutterell)7 must have occurred at Oxfordbefore 1320, the conflict only becomes visible to us as Ockham andhis critics carried the issues to other studia during the years 1320–1324,specifically to Avignon, London, and Paris. In addition to Reading andLutterell, who had moved their causa to the papal court at Avignon,we have the negative reactions of Chatton8 (perhaps at Oxford before

4 Wodeham, Lect. Oxon. I, d. 1, q. 2 (Vat. lat. 955, fol. 23r): “et adhuc est aliquorummodernorum, Chatton scilicet et eius sequacium…”; Lect. Oxon. IV, q. 5 (Vat. lat. 1110,fol. 114v): “Si autem tu, Chatton, cum sequentibus tuis ponderem….”

5 Ockham, De sacramento altaris, ed. T.B. Birch (Burlington, Iowa, 1930), p. 116:“stimulante invidia”; p. 154: “maliciose proponunt”; p. 210: “propter calumniam prae-sens negotium suscepi”; p. 354: “maliciose calumniarie”.

6 For the biographical details on Reading, see A.B. Emden, BRUO, p. 1554. Onhis thought and relationship to Ockham, see E. Longpré, “Jean de Reading et le Bx.Jean Duns Scot,” La France franciscaine, 7 (1924), 99–109; Stephen F. Brown, “Sources forOckham’s Prologue to the Sentences,” FS, 26 (1966), 36–51, Gedeon Gál, “QuaestioIoannis de Reading de necessitate specierum intelligibilium, defensio doctrinae Scoti,”FS, 29 (1969), 66–156; S. Brown and G. Gál, introduction to William of Ockham,Scriptum in librum primum sententiarum ordinatio, Opera Theologica, vol. I (St. Bonaventure,1970), pp. 18*–34*.

7 Fritz Hoffmann, Die Schriften des Oxforder Kanzlers Johannes Lutterell, Erfurter Theolo-gische Studien 6 (Leipzig 1959); Josef Koch, “Neue Aktenstücke zu dem gegen WilhelmOckham in Avignon geführten Prozess,” in Koch, Kleine Schriften, 2 vols (Rome, 1973), II,pp. 275–365. [It is equally probably that Lutterell’s opposition to Ockham began afterLutterell arrived in Avignon and not earlier at Oxford.]

8 Léon Baudry, “Gautier de Chatton et son commentaire des sentences,” AHDLMA,14 (1943–1945), 337–369; C.K. Brampton, “Gautier de Chatton et la provenance desmss. lat. Paris Bibl. Nat. 15886 et 15887,” Etudes Franciscaines, 14 (1964), 200–205;Gedeon Gál, “Gaulteri de Chatton et Guillelmi de Ockham Controversia de NaturaConceptus Universalis,” FS, 27 (1967), 191–212; Noel Fitzpatrick, “Walter Chatton onthe Univocity of Being: A Reaction to Peter Aureol and William Ockham,” FS, 31(1971), 88–177; G. Gál, in the introduction to William of Ockham, Summa logicae (St.Bonaventure, 1974), pp. 47*–56*; Girard Etzkorn, “Codex latinus Monacensis 8943:Mediaeval Potpourri, Contemporary Consternation,” in Studies Honoring Ignatius Charles


1320 but certainly after 1321, probably at London) and the Logica con-

tra Ockham,9 written probably in England by a Scotist soon after 1324.And we should not forget Walter Burley,10 one of the most prominentEnglish authors reacting to Ockham not long after 1324, since as muchattention has been given to Burley’s critique as to those of Chattonand Reading. But apart from the later dissemination of Burley’s anti-Ockham writings among the English studia, he was not part of theseearly events in England, since he was in the theological faculty at Parisduring these years. Although a Mertonian, Burley’s reaction is part ofthe reception of Ockham’s thought at the University of Paris in the1320s and has to be seen alongside the comments of Francis of Mey-ronnes, Michael of Massa, and perhaps Francis of Marchia.

What were the aspects of Ockham’s thought with which his namebecame identified in the minds of contemporaries? The answer to thatquestion depends on the intellectual milieu of the individual critic. Lut-terell approached Ockham from the standpoint of a conservative, non-Franciscan theologian, and sometimes attacked Ockham for maintain-ing positions that were part of Franciscan theology, occasionally thatof Scotus. Reading and the author of the Logica, however, were firmScotists and attacked Ockham more frequently on issues where hedeparted from the Subtle Doctor. Chatton can generally be placed withthe latter group, although the non-Scotistic influence of Peter Auriol isnoticeable in his thought.

Among all these authors, however, there are some recurring issues onwhich Ockham’s position was thought undesirable or dangerous. Oneof these was Ockham’s rejection of inherent common natures in epis-temology and metaphysics and, correspondingly, his rejection of thetraditional definition of simple supposition in logic. Another, closelyrelated in Ockham’s thought, was his reinterpretation of the Aris-totelian categories, according real status only to substance and quality.In contrast to Paris, where Ockham’s rejection of real status for time

Brady, Friar Minor, ed. R.S. Almagno, C.L. Harkins (St. Bonaventure 1976), pp. 247–268;Etzkorn, “Walter Chatton and the Controversy on the Absolute Necessity of Grace,”FS, 37 (1977), 32–65.

9 The Logica contra Ockham has been critically edited by Edward A. Synan, The Worksof Richard of Campsall, 2 vols (Toronto, 1968–1982), II, pp. 51–444; see remarks of Gál inintroduction to Ockham, Summa logicae, pp. 56*–62*.

10 James A. Weisheipl, “Ockham and Some Mertonians,” MS, 30 (1968), 174–188;S.F. Brown, “Walter Burleigh’s Treatise De suppositionibus and Its Influence on Williamof Ockham,” FS, 10 (1972), 15–64.

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and motion seemed to cause the most controversy, Ockham’s positionon quantity, place, and relation evoked the most attention in England,particularly as they concerned the understanding of Eucharistic pres-ence, the Trinity, and Christology. A third area was epistemology inwhich Ockham’s rejection of sensible and intelligible species, his affir-mation that the proposition itself was the object of knowledge, and hisdefinition and application of intuitive cognition all elicited a strongresponse from opponents. Ockham’s treatment of the intuitive cogni-tion of a non-existent as well as the intuitive cognition of non-existence(as Tachau has recently observed) were often noted. The last area fre-quently mentioned was Ockham’s description of justification (a positionnot far removed from that of Scotus).

Whether or not Ockham was the most important or influential figurearound 1320, he certainly was one of the most controversial. And it wasthese issues that formed the common denominator for opposition toOckham. Yet there were degrees of opposition. Lutterell, Reading, andthe author of the Logica contra Ockham expressed only negative opinionson Ockham. Burley, however, while opposed to Ockham’s nominalismas reflected in his position on universals, on simple supposition, and onthe Aristotelian categories, was sufficiently impressed with the structureof Ockham’s Summa logicae to adopt it in his De puritate artis logicae.11

And Chatton, who opposed Ockham on the widest range of topics,occasionally acknowledged the beauty or persuasiveness of some ofOckham’s argumentation.12 It was apparently in response to Chatton’scritique that Ockham altered his opinion on universals.13

As has been said, our sources allow us to enter only during thesecond battle, with the smoke of the first engagement still very muchin the air. And they allow us to observe skirmishes that took placeoutside Oxford after 1320: at Avignon, London, and Paris. It wouldbe interesting to know, however, how Ockham fared at Oxford, howhis thought was received there during the next academic generation.The early years of 1320–1330 have been ignored for lack of sufficientevidence, and the story picks up again when we come to the last yearsof that decade and to the writings of Rodington, Fitzralph, Holcot, andWodeham. Fortunately, we do have the testimony of a little-known but

11 Walter Burleigh, De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior, ed. Ph. Boehner (St.Bonaventure, 1955); S. Brown, “Walter Burleigh’s Treatise”.

12 L. Baudry, “Gautier de Chatton,” pp. 355–356.13 G. Gál, “Gaulteri de Chatton”.


very observant witness, the Benedictine Robert Graystanes, who waswriting at Oxford around 1322 and who is our only source for Oxfordattitudes toward Ockham after Lutterell and Reading left for Avignonand before Rodington and Fitzralph make their appearance later in thedecade.14

Since Graystanes is not exactly a household name even among thoseworking in the intellectual history of fourteenth-century Oxford, a briefintroduction may be in order. He was a monk from Durham, andhe returned there after university study to become superior. Knowlesknew him as the continuator of the Durham Chronicle, bringing itfrom 1214 to 1336.15 With the death of Bishop Beaumont in 1333 theDurham chapter elected Graystanes bishop, and he was consecratedby William Melton, archbishop of York, and enthroned. Unfortunately,young Edward III was not about to let the richest diocese in Englandslip even briefly from royal patronage. The election and consecrationwere quashed and Edward, with papal backing, appointed his tutorand secretary, Richard de Bury. Graystanes died around 1336.

Graystanes was resident at Oxford in (and no doubt before) 1323–1325.16 His commentary on Lombard’s Sentences can be dated between1320 and 1323. His references to the opinions of his contemporariesare so numerous that the chronological boundary between those heknows and those he does not know is clearly defined. He shows exten-sive knowledge of the opinions of Drayton, Reading, and Ockham,but he is unaware of Chatton, Rodington, or Fitzralph.17 Moreover,he cites Thomas Aquinas frequently, but as Brother Thomas, neveras Saint Thomas, which again suggests a date before 1323. His workdid not circulate widely and, as far as I know, was not cited by subse-quent authors. John Leland saw a copy in the Oxford Carmelite con-vent around 1540.18 It survives today in only one manuscript, whosecorrections and cross-references show it to be a copy of Graystanes’s

14 Emden, BRUO, p. 814. The only known manuscript of Graystanes’s Sentencescommentary is London Westminster Abbey, MS 13 (paginated rather than numberedby folios).

15 David Knowles, The Religious Orders in England, 3 vols. (Cambridge, 1948–1959), II, p. 268.

16 Emden, BRUO, p. 814.17 There is the possibility that Graystanes does cite Rodington, but the truth of the

matter has not yet been resolved. On p. 514, both in text and in margin, Graystanesrefers to Redyngton on the issue of hypostatic union, which may be Reading orRodington.

18 John Leland, De rebus britannicis collectanea, 6 vols. (London, 1774), IV, p. 59.

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autograph, perhaps part of it in the hand of the author himself. Aswith other commentaries of this period, it is extensive in scope, con-taining almost one hundred questions, some of them many folios inlength. Its value for the historian, beyond that of any such documentfrom the period, is that it simply bristles with names of contempo-rary Oxford authors (some twenty-seven), providing a well-informedand well-focused picture of the personalities and intellectual horizonsof Oxford in his day.

The first thing we notice in looking through Graystanes’s commen-tary is the prominence (at least in Graystanes’s view) of figures whohave received only moderate attention. He knew Scotus and Alnwick,Cowton, Reading, and Ockham; and Scotus is among the names mostfrequently cited. But he also had considerable interest in the Carmelitetheologian, Robert of Walsingham, the secular theologians Kykeley,Luke of Ely, Henry of Harclay, and Richard Campsall, and an authorreferred to as Surrey.19 The frequent and extensive citations to the opin-ions of Harclay, sometimes in close association with those of Ockham,is a refreshing reminder that in 1317 Ockham did not represent a rad-ically new departure in Oxford thought. From the vantage point ofGraystanes we can see Ockham as the solidification and first exten-sive and internally consistent expression of positions that were alreadybeing espoused by Harclay and Campsall, some of which have theirmore distant roots in the thought of Peter Olivi. With the death of Har-clay and the election of Lutterell as chancellor in the early autumn of1317 probably the term in which Ockham began his lectures on the Sen-

tences—perhaps more conservative opinions became prominent withinthe leadership of the faculty of theology, and Ockham may have beenthe focus of criticism for opinions that had a wider following.

19 Biographical sketches on these authors are provided in Emden BRUO. In addi-tion, on Walsingham see B.M. Xiberta, De Scriptoribus scholasticis saec. XIV ex ordineCarmelitarum (Louvain, 1931), pp. 111–136; on Kykeley and Ely see A.G. Little andF. Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians c. A.D. 1282–1302 (Oxford 1934). Graystanes’scitations of Kykeley, along with Kykeley’s citations of Henry of Ghent and ‘Brother’Thomas, narrows the terminal dates for Kykeley’s scholastic activity to 1300–1322. Hisclose association with Harclay in Graystanes and in the only manuscript of his Quodli-beta (Worcester Cath., MS F 3) would suggest the period 1305–1315. At the opening ofhis article, “Henricus de Harclay: Quaestio de significato conceptus universalis (FonsDoctrinae Guillelmi de Ockham),” FS, 31 (1971), 178–234, G. Gál reviews the state ofresearch on Harclay. On Campsall see E.A. Synan, The Works of Richard Campsall, 2 vols.(Toronto, 1968–1982).


Ockham’s name is linked in Graystanes’s work to certain issues thatreappear at several points in his commentary: epistemology and certi-tude, especially the intuitive cognition of a non-existent;20 apprehensionand sensible species;21 the necessity of the habit of grace;22 Trinitariantheology,23 and the categories, particularly quantity, relation, and localmotion.24 The first thing that strikes the reader of Graystanes’s com-mentary, especially inasmuch as it was written in what we would taketo be the charged atmosphere of Reading’s and Lutterell’s Oxford, isthat Graystanes is not particularly antagonistic to Ockham, nor does heview him as an opponent whose opinions are to be rejected. Instead,Ockham is one of many recent authors worthy of discussion, no moresignificant than Walsingham, Alnwick, Cowton, or Harclay, and moresignificant than Burley, Campsall, Conington, Drayton, or Reading.

On a number of critical issues Graystanes gives a favorable hearingto Ockham’s position. Although he does not accept Ockham’s defini-tion of intuitive cognition or fully support his view of an intuitive cogni-tion of a non-existent, he does present Ockham’s position as a defenseof epistemological certitude against the doubts of Peter Auriol and, sur-prisingly, John of Reading. Moreover, without directly endorsing them,Graystanes considers Ockham’s interpretation of quantity, relation, andmotion to be defensible within the schools.

In his exposition of fruition (enjoyment) he shared several positionswith Ockham. Like Ockham, Graystanes argued that pleasure was aresult of an act of the will, a result of love, and thus distinct from theact of enjoyment.25 He also believed that things other than God could,inordinate, be enjoyed.26 But these positions were ultimately grounded inScotus’s treatment of fruition, as was Ockham’s attack on the necessityof the habit of grace and the defence of divine acceptation. They revealGraystanes to be at times close to the Scotistic tradition, but they do notnecessarily show him to have been wedded to an Ockhamist version ofFranciscan theology.

20 London Westminster Abbey, MS 13, pp. 1–8, 120–122, 265, 488.21 Ibid., pp. 218, 233.22 Ibid., pp. 27–30.23 Ibid., pp. 265, 273.24 Ibid., pp. 511, 568.25 Ibid., pp. 171, to be inserted on p. 167: “Opinio Petri de Aureolis est quod fruitio

hominis de Deo est tantum delectatio.” Ibid., p. 167: “De primo ergo articulo teneoquod operatio (voluntatis sive fruitionis) et delectatio distinguuntur realiter.”

26 Ibid., p. 158: “Quod aliquid a Deo potest esse obiectum fruitionis inordinate.”

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Although not particularly opposed to Ockham, Graystanes in nosense can be termed an Ockhamist. Nor does he suggest that Ock-ham had any following at Oxford in his day. The same is true forthe other Oxford theologians of the decade, John of Rodington andRichard Fitzralph.27 Unfortunately, neither author identifies contempo-rary opinion very often, which makes our task somewhat harder. Butenough parallels exist to say that both authors knew Ockham’s writings.Rodington incorporates elements of Ockham and Scotus but generallystands closer to the latter. The points where he allies himself with ordeparts from positions Ockham held, are also points that Ockham hadin common with others, so that we cannot be sure whether this repre-sents a specific adoption or rejection of Ockham. We can say that onsome fundamental aspects of Ockham’s approach Rodington differed.He did not adopt Ockham’s notion of universals nor the reduced ontol-ogy of Ockham’s physics. The same holds true for Fitzralph. AlthoughFitzralph has, in the last two decades, been portrayed as a non-, evenan anti-Ockhamist, the evidence is too thin or open to too many inter-pretations to allow us to say anything more than that Fitzralph did notshare the major philosophical and theological tenets of Ockham.

Ockhamism at Oxford in the 1330s

1330 represents a watershed in the traditional assessment of the recep-tion of Ockham in England. The history of Oxford thought in the early1330s is dominated by the names of Robert Holcot and Adam Wode-ham, almost universally acknowledged to be direct disciples and firmsupporters of Ockham. And despite the fact that insufficient textualwork has been done, the assumption is made that many Oxfordiansof the 1330s were to some degree sympathetic to Ockham’s viewpointand adopted some of his approaches and conclusions. Robert of Hal-ifax, Richard Kilvington, William Heytesbury, Thomas Buckingham,and John Dumbleton are just a few of the names sometimes mentionedin this context. Only Thomas Bradwardine is regularly placed outsideof and opposed to the influence of Ockham. Time does not allow the

27 M. Tweedale, “John of Rodynton on Knowledge, Science, and Theology,” doc-toral dissertation, UCLA (Los Angeles, 1965); G. Leff, Richard Fitzralph. Commentator of the‘Sentences’ (Manchester, 1963); K. Walsh, A Fourteenth-Century Scholar and Primate: RichardFitzralph in Oxford, Avignon and Armagh (Oxford, 1981).


development of a thorough ‘score card’ on the degree and nature ofOckham’s influence on the twenty-some-odd authors of Oxford’s rich-est decade in the fourteenth century. Instead, I want to concentrateclosely on those two authors who, more than any others, represent thecore of an Ockhamist tradition at Oxford in the pre-Wyclif era: Holcotand Wodeham.

Robert Holcot

The Ockhamism of Holcot has been a recurring theme in Holcotresearch, from the ground-breaking biographical and exegetical workof Beryl Smalley to the philosophical studies of Fritz Hoffmann, E.A.Moody, and Heinrich Schepers.28 Moody recognized some differences,although he explained away the puzzling identification in Book I, q. 2of the printed edition of Holcot’s commentary on the Sentences thatattacks Ockham for a position directly opposite to what Ockham held.29

Moody saw Chatton as Holcot’s major contemporary opponent, andthat in his attack on Chatton, Holcot was defending positions he heldin common with or derived from Ockham. It was in the area of Hol-cot’s enthusiasm for an extreme nominalistic position on the relation oflanguage and reality, on the nature of propositional truth, that Holcotwent beyond Ockham. But for Moody this was a more extreme elab-oration of essentially Ockhamist notions, which had the two-fold effectin the historiography of reaffirming Holcot to be an Ockhamist andyet establishing some differences between a more traditional or carefulOckham and his more extreme, less careful followers.

Some of Moody’s assumptions and conclusions were overturned bythe textual work of Schepers on the Sex articuli, the Quodlibeta, and Sen-

28 B. Smalley, “Robert Holcot, OP,” AFP, 26 (1956), 5–97; Smalley, English Friars andAntiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century (Oxford, 1960), pp. 133–202; H.A. Oberman, “Faci-entibus quod in se est Deus non denegat gratiam. Robert Holcot, O.P., and the Begin-nings of Luther’s Theology,” HTR 55 (1962) 317–342; F. Hoffmann, “Robert Holcot:Die Logik in der Theologie,” in Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter, Miscellanea Mediaevalia2 (Berlin 1963), pp. 624–639; Hoffmann, Die theologische Methode des Oxforder Dominikaner-lehrers Robert Holcot, BGPTM, new ser. 5 (Münster, 1972); Moody, “A Quodlibetal Ques-tion of Robert Holkot, O.P. on the Problem of the Objects of Knowledge and of Belief,”Speculum, 39 (1964), 53–74; H. Schepers, “Holkot contra dicta Crathorn,” PJ, 77 (1970),320–354; 79 (1972), 106–136.

29 Moody, “Quodlibetal Question,” 54–55, 65–67.

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tences commentary of Holcot.30 Holcot’s major opponent was identifiedas his fellow Dominican, William Crathorn, an extreme nominalist inScheper’s view against whom Holcot defended positions that are com-patible with or essentially Ockhamist. The small intellectual distancebetween Holcot and Ockham opened up by Moody was closed in thepicture presented by Schepers.

Since Schepers’s important articles in the early seventies much tex-tual work has been done and some important new evidence has cometo light which, although not yet published, undoes much of the pictureconstructed by Schepers. Crathorn had already in the earlier literaturebeen identified as an opponent of Holcot. In clarifying the dimensionsof that controversy Schepers discerned Crathorn’s name in a numberof marginal references to names like Caton and Grafton, which he tookto be scribal errors.

I first became uncomfortable with that solution when, in my researchon Wodeham, it became clear that a socius of Wodeham, clearly iden-tified as Grafton, in his opening lecture on the Bible, attacked Wode-ham on the same issue as that on which Holcot’s socius, presumablyCrathorn, again in an opening lecture on the Bible, attacked Holcot.31

The most obvious candidate for Wodeham’s Grafton was a fellow Fran-ciscan, although there was an Austin Friar by that name who was alsocontemporary. Circumstances made clear that Holcot’s opponent hadto be a Dominican, although the name in the Holcot manuscripts atthis place could as often be read as ‘Crafton’ as ‘Crathorn’.32 Sincebachelor lectures on the Bible at Oxford were delivered only after thecompletion of the reading of the Sentences, this would mean that twodifferent people at the same time with almost identical names, one aDominican and the other presumably a Franciscan, completed theirreading of the Sentences early and attacked their respective confreres inthe opening lecture of their scriptural commentaries on essentially thesame issue. The probability of such a coincidence struck me as highlyunlikely, but I could offer no better solution at that time.

A possible solution to the mystery has come about through therecent discovery by Gelber and Tachau of a Dominican theologian,contemporary with Holcot and Wodeham, whose existence had gone

30 Schepers, “Holkot contra dicta Crathorn”.31 W.J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham (Leiden 1978), pp. 95–109.32 Schepers admits as much, “Holkot contra dicta Crathorn,” 340–354.


unnoticed in the earlier scholarship: John Grafton.33 In addition toknowledge of his existence, we may have quodlibetal questions or afragment of his Sentences commentary—one of many new texts thathave surfaced in the last decade.34 For purposes of my argument here, itnow appears that Holcot had two Dominican colleagues against whomhe shaped his own position: Crathorn and Grafton. And, lest thatnews seem to push Holcot more in a Franciscan direction, it shouldalso be noted, as I documented in the Wodeham book, that Holcotopposed Wodeham on several important issues.35 Moreover, many ofthe marginal references that oppose Holcot’s views to those of Ockhamor Chatton can best be taken at face value. In sum, Holcot shapedhis opinions in contrast to at least five identifiable authors: Crathorn,Grafton, Chatton, Wodeham, and Ockham.

It is this last relationship that concerns us: the degree to which Hol-cot can or should be seen as an Ockhamist. I would suggest, onlyin the palest or loosest way. As a Dominican who arrived at Oxfordafter Ockham had left, Holcot was never a student of Ockham andprobably never heard him lecture. Holcot retained species in cogni-tion, although he tried to make them compatible with Ockham’s ‘scien-tific habit’.36 Holcot’s position on fruition differs from Ockham’s. Hol-cot was reluctant to recognize a middle act of the will between enjoy-ment and use.37 He criticized Ockham on the object of knowledge andbelief.38 His understanding of the relation of propositions to external

33 See the forthcoming paper by Hester Gelber, “Finding Faces for Dominicans:Theology at Blackfriars in the Time of William of Ockham”. [Gelber subsequentlysettled on identifying this Dominican as William Crathorn, whose questions on the firstbook of the Sentences survive in manuscripts in Basel, Erfurt, Krakow, and Vienna, alongwith his quodlibetal questions in the Vienna manuscript. For further details, see Gelber,It Could Have Been Otherwise. Contingency and Necessity in Dominican Theology at Oxford, 1300–1350 (Leiden, 2004).]

34 John Grafton [William Crathorn], Quaest. quodl. Vienna, Österreich. Nationalbibl.,Pal. Lat. 5460, fols. 32ra–40rb.

35 Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 95–109.36 K. Tachau, “The Problem of the Species in medio at Oxford in the Generation

after Ockham,” MS, 44 (1982), 394–443; Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham.Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345 (Leiden, 1988).

37 Holcot, Sent. I, q. 3 (4 in printed ed.), a. 2: “Utrum sit aliquis actus medius quinec sit frui nec uti.’ ‘Omnis amor sit fruitio vel usus.… Et quando arguitur quodaliquid diligitur propter se et tamen non ut ultimus finis nec etiam refertur ad aliudactualiter, concedo et dico quod talis dilectio est usus, quando res diligitur propter aliudhabitualiter.”

38 Moody, “Quodlibetal Question”.

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reality differed.39 His use of the distinction between God’s absolute andordained power was less traditional than Ockham’s.40 And his under-standing of the power of the unaided human will, ex puris naturalibus, tolove God above all else, went considerably beyond Ockham’s position.41

The favorable citations to Ockham’s opinions and the areas in whichthey shared a similar approach can better be explained by seeing Hol-cot as an author, largely independent of but drawing upon Ockham asone of many sources, who shared positions that were part of a widerOxford tradition that went back to Campsall, Harclay, and others.

Adam Wodeham

But surely Wodeham qualifies as an Ockhamist. His biography revealshim to have been a close associate of Ockham, dwelling with him inthe same convent in the early 1320s, and showing Ockham his copyof Chatton’s lectures.42 He apparently was the caretaker and editor ofsome of the work that Ockham left behind in England when he wentto Avignon in 1324.43 His major opponents were non-Ockhamists oranti-Ockhamists: Auriol, Reading, Fitzralph, and Chatton. And he hastraditionally been seen as Ockham’s major disciple and defender atOxford in the early 1330s.

The evidence that has been emerging in the scholarship of the lastfive years or more causes us to question or reformulate that assessment.In the Wodeham book I portrayed Wodeham as a disciple who exer-cized considerable independence of mind on particular issues.44 Thenumber of issues has now grown to the point where we either have togive up the notion of Wodeham as a disciple of Ockham or perhaps, as

39 Ibid.40 Courtenay, “The Dialectic of Omnipotence in the High and Late Middle Ages,”

in Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy, ed. T. Rudavsky (Dordrecht,1984), pp. 243–269.

41 Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 95–109; Oberman, “Facientibus quod in se est”.42 Wodeham, Lectura Oxon., I, d. 17, q. 5 (Vat. lat. 955, fol. 161v), with marginal note

in parenthesis: “Ad 14m respondet Ockham (manu sua in margine reportationis meae[of Chatton’s lectures]) quod ille [Chatton] male intellexit articulum.” The reference isto Chatton’s Reportatio. For the relationship of Ockham and Wodeham, see Ockham,Summa logicae, ed. Ph. Boehner, G. Gál, and S. Brown (St. Bonaventure, 1974), pp. 47*–56*; W.J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 63–64, 160–164.

43 Ockham, Summa logicae, pp. 36*–44*.44 Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 63–64.


I would suggest, use the evidence to reshape our notion of what disci-pleship meant in the early fourteenth century.

First, let us examine the tally sheet for issues on which Wodehamdefended, modified, or rejected positions of Ockham. In doing so wemust keep in mind that Wodeham’s positions did not necessarily remainunchanged throughout his life, as if frozen in time. As with Ockham,we are able to view Wodeham’s thought across a number of yearsand take account of possible changes. We glimpse something of himduring the years 1321–1323, when he was in close association withChatton and Ockham, probably in London.45 Chatton’s Reportatio fromthose years mentions objections and arguments of Wodeham.46 Wealso have Wodeham’s later observations about actions, opinions, andwritings from those years.47 We next view his thought in the earliestredaction of his Oxford lectures, around 1330–1332. Finally, we havehis second, post-1334 redaction, and his Lectura secunda, which combinesnew material and some questions from the post-1334 revision withquestions from his earlier London lectures.48

Apart from his obvious close relation to Ockham, the issues on whichthe Wodeham of 1322 is visible to us are all on fine points of logi-cal argumentation and reveal no particular intellectual identity. But ifWodeham is to be believed, it was in this period, against the indivisi-bilist Chatton, that Wodeham developed his view of the infinite divis-ibility of the continuum later adopted by Ockham.49 From the early1330s, however, we have far more to go on. There we find that Ock-ham is Wodeham’s most frequently cited contemporary authority. More

45 See Ockham, Summa logicae, pp. 47*–56*.46 Chatton, Reportatio I, d. 30, q. 2 (Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 15887, fol. 65ra).47 Wodeham, Lectura Oxon. I, d. 17, q. 5 (Vat. lat. 955, fol. 161v); Tractatus de indivisi-

bilibus (Florence, Bibl. Naz., MS conv. sopp. A.III.508, fol. 140ra).48 The Lectura secunda (Cambridge, Gonville & Caius, MS 281) combines questions

from the prologue to his London lectures, revised questions from his Oxford lectures,and new questions that do not appear to be derived from his Norwich, London, orOxford lectures. The presence of the revised questions requires that the Lectura secundabe dated after the Oxford lectures, probably after 1334, which is the terminus postquem for the second redaction of the Oxford lectures.

49 In his Tractatus de indivisibilibus (Florence, Bibl. Naz., MS conv. sopp. A.III.508,fol. 140ra), written after 1324 (since he cites Ockham’s Logica and Tractatus) Wodehamremarked that he had put forward the arguments contained in Ockham’s treatment ofindivisibles before Ockham had written on the subject (meaning the treatise Wodehamknew as Tractatus de sacramento eucharistiae): “Quaere prosecutionem in illo tractatu.Et haec argumenta fere omnia fuerant tua antequam Ockham aliquid scriberet deindivisibilibus.”

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often than not he considers Ockham’s arguments perceptive, chal-lenging, and well formulated. Against the position of Chatton, Wode-ham was an avid defender of Ockham’s view of quantity and motion,two fundamental building blocks of Ockham’s physics that Wodehamattributed to Ockham, not Olivi.50 Wodeham shared Ockham’s nom-inalism and his redefinition of simple supposition.51 They shared thesame view of continua.52 Ockham’s position on grace and justification(specifically divine acceptation and the relative necessity of the habit ofgrace), albeit one derived largely from Scotus, is supported by Wode-ham and attributed to Ockham.53 Finally, we discover in Wodeham thesame approach to logic and language that we do in Ockham’s writings.

At the same time Wodeham seldom accepted anyone’s argumentwithout refining and adding a great deal of his own, and this appliesto Ockham as it does to Chatton, Fitzralph, and Scotus. Wodehammodified or rejected positions of Ockham with alarming frequency—alarming to anyone wedded to the notion that Wodeham was a faithfuldefender of most of Ockham’s thought. Among these positions wereWodeham’s important modification on the object of knowledge, creat-ing the famous formulation known as the complexe significabile that has

50 Wodeham, Lectura Oxon. IV, q. 5 (Paris, Univ. MS lat. 193, fol. 217rb–217va, as editedfrom other manuscripts): “Nolo tamen dicere quod quantitas sit res alia a substantiaet qualitate, et etiam a partibus earundem. Immo, quantitas continua est ipsae partescontinuae in toto, et istae eaedem partes, si discontinuentur, sint quantitas discreta;et hanc viam de partibus et non de toto teneo tum quia reputo eam rationabilioremtum etiam propter calumniam vitandam multorum dampnantium quantitatem essesubstantiam vel qualitatem.” Ibid., a. 5 (fol. 220ra): “Sed istis non obstantibus, teneoidem quod prius, scilicet quod quantitas non est res distincta a partibus substantiaeet qualitatis, quia nihil potest esse quantum sine quantitate.” Ibid., a. 1 (fol. 217va):“Ad primam rationem dico quod quantitas intrinseca motus non est res alia a motuet partibus eius.” “Ad probationem dicendum quod per se loquendo terminus motusaugmenti est res permanens et non successiva, et ideo non est per se loquendo necsimpliciter loquendo quantitas intrinseca motus, et haec loquendo de ultimo terminomotus augmenti.”

51 Wodeham, Lectura Oxon., I, d. 33, q. 2 (Vat. lat. 955, fol. 186r; Paris, Bibl. Mazarine,ms lat. 915, fols. 109ra–109rb). See Hester Gelber, “Logic and the Trinity: A Clash ofValues in Scholastic Thought, 1300–1335,” doctoral dissertation, Univ. of Wisconsin(Madison, 1974), pp. 252–253.

52 Ockham, De corpore Christi; De sacramento eucharistiae; Wodeham, Tractatus de indivis-ibilibus (Florence, Bibl. Naz., MS conv. sopp. A.III.508, fols. 135r–147r); J.E. Murdoch& E.A. Synan, “Two Questions on the Continuum: Walter Chatton (?), O.F.M. andAdam Wodeham, O.F.M.,” FS, 26 (1966), 212–288.

53 Wodeham, Lectura Oxon. I. d. 17, qq. 1–3; W. Dettloff, Die Entwicklung der Akzep-tations- und Verdienstlehre von Duns Scotus bis Luther, BGPTM, 40.2 (Münster i.W., 1963),pp. 329–332.


been closely associated in the literature with the name of Gregory ofRimini.54 In the area of epistemology Wodeham preferred Scotus’s for-mulation of intuitive cognition to that of Ockham; and he retainedspecies in the process of knowledge.55 In his Trinitarian theology Wode-ham abandoned Ockham’s and Scotus’s formal non-identity in divi-

nis, preferring instead the position of Chatton.56 In a similar depar-ture from traditional Franciscan psychology, including that of Ockham,Wodeham rejected the plurality of substantial forms in man, affirm-ing instead that the sensitive and intellective souls are one.57 And whileWodeham accepted Ockham’s identification of the soul with its pow-ers (intellect and will) as well as Ockham’s distinction between thosepowers and their acts (cognition, volition, love, enjoyment, etc.) andbetween most of those acts themselves,58 Wodeham, in contrast to Ock-

54 G. Gál, “Adam of Wodeham’s Question on the ‘Complexe significabile’ as theImmediate Object of Scientific Knowledge,” FS, 37 (1977), 66–102.

55 Tachau, “The Problem of the Species”.56 Gelber, “Logic and the Trinity.” pp. 235–264, 629–648.57 Ockham discussed this issue in his Quodlibeta septem, quodl. II, q. 11, but his most

direct statement occurs in quodl. IV, q. 14, ed. J.C. Wey (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1980),p. 369: “anima intellectiva, sensitiva et forma corporeitatis distinguuntur realiter, etideo potentiae illarum formarum distinguuntur realiter.” Wodeham, Lectura secunda,Prol., q. 1 (Cambridge, Gonville & Caius, MS 281, fol. 106ra): “in homine sit tantumunica anima.” For the full text, see Tachau, “Problem of the Species”.

58 Modern commentators have sometimes confused scholastic discussions of thepowers (or faculties) of the soul (i.e. intellectus and voluntas) with discussions of the actsof those powers (e.g. cognitio, volitio); thus Leff, Richard Fitzralph, p. 97. Both Ockham andWodeham (against Fitzralph) affirmed that intellect and will are one power or faculty,identical with the soul itself, although cognitive and volitional acts are for the most partdistinct from one another and from the soul itself. Ockham, Ordinatio, d. 1, q. 2 (OThI, p. 396): “intellectus et voluntas sunt omnino idem.… Et ita fruitio est in intellectu etest actus intellectus ex quo est actus voluntatis. Sed intendo dicere quod fruitio nonest intelligere nec scire et sic de aliis actibus qui dicuntur actus quocumque modocognitivi. Et isto modo, conformando me modo loquendi aliorum, intelligo quandodico fruitionem esse actum non intellectus sed voluntatis.” Ockham, Reportatio II, q. 20(Oth V, p. 435): “potentiae animae …, scilicet intellectus et voluntas—non loquendo depotentiis sensitivis nunc …—sunt idem realiter inter se et cum essentia animae.… liceteadem sit substantia numero quae potest intelligere et velle, tamen intelligere et vellesunt actus distincti realiter.” In his London lectures, portions of which are preserved inthe prologue to his Lectura secunda, Wodeham argued against any distinction betweenthe soul and its powers (Cambridge, Gonville & Caius, MS 281, fol. 106ra): “potentiaeanimae, etsi non sint distinctae res nec inter se nec ab anima, tamen sunt distinctaerealitates eiusdem rei simplicis, sic quod licet sint idem realiter, distinguuntur tamenaliquo modo a parte rei.” Here Wodeham uses Scotus, not Ockham, as his source.In his Oxford lectures Wodeham maintained that cognition and volition are separatethings (res distinctae) from the soul itself. Consequently love (both amor and dilectio) aswell as enjoyment (fruitio) are res distinctae. See Wodeham, Lectura Oxon. I, d. 1, q. 2, a.

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ham, adopted Auriol’s thesis that pleasure was identical with the act ofenjoyment.59 The list could be extended, and I am certain that subse-quent research will uncover many more.

On balance, do these resemblances and differences make Wodehaman Ockhamist or not? Let me distinguish, to borrow a scholastic device.In the strict sense, no! Wodeham saw himself as free and independent,and his writings show this throughout—an independence of mind thatOckham himself possessed. In the broad or loose sense, yes! He didshare two of the most fundamental views of Ockham: his nominalism,with the rejection of common natures and the redefinition of simplesupposition; and his physics, i.e. the redefinition of the Aristoteliancategories. Inasmuch as those were ultimately the issues that on theContinent came to be most closely associated with Ockham’s nameand with the Ockhamistae, it is still fair, I think, to associate Wodehamwith Ockham.

Ockhamism after Wodeham

The partial ‘Ockhamism’ of Wodeham does not appear to have been aparticular turning point in the direction of Ockham, at least not amongthe Franciscans. On the basis of the research that has been done onsubsequent Franciscans, such as Halifax, Rosetus, Langeley, or Went,we do not find Ockham becoming their principal authority, nor do

2 (Paris, Univ., MS 193, fol. 16vb): “Sed istis non obstantibus, teneo partem oppositam,quod fruitio est res distincta ab anima.” Lectura Oxon. I, d. 1, q. 2, a. 1 (Paris, Univ.,MS 193, fol. 16rb): “Non minus est amor res distincta ab anima quam ipsa cognitio.Sed cognitio est res distincta; ergo, etc.” The questions on the relation of the soul toits faculties and acts were revised and expanded by Wodeham in the second redactionof his Oxford lectures, and that revised form is preserved in the second redaction aswell as in the Caius manuscript (Lectura secunda). Cf. Vat. lat. 955, fol. 21r, later additionin brackets: “Nec in via nec in patria est anima fruitio [sua, sed tam amor viae quampatriae est qualitas recepta in anima vel angelo cum quia in via amor libere elicitur] abanima. Item, quia non minus est amor res distincta ab anima quam ipsa cognitio. Sedcognitio est res distincta.” In changing the subsequent passage in a. 2 to read “Sed nonobstantibus istis teneo quod amor et cognitio sunt vere accidentia recepta in anima,licet hoc efficaciter probari sit difficile,” he marked through the earlier passage, notingin the margin “vacat, quamvis bene”. I am grateful to Stephen McGrade for calling tomy attention the confusion on this issue and the passages in Ockham.

59 Lectura Oxon., I, d. 1, q. 4, a. 2 (Vat. lat. 955, fol. 27r): “Istis non obstantibus, teneoquod fruitio beatifica est realiter delectatio.”


we find any Greyfriar even as favorably disposed as was Wodeham.60

This had less to do, I think, with the controversial nature of Ockham’sthought than it did with the independent nature of subsequent Fran-ciscans. On the other hand we do find growing acceptance of some ofOckham’s positions among certain secular theologians, albeit not Buck-ingham, whose name is most often mentioned in this context.61

Some two decades ago Weisheipl noted that although Ockham’snominalism and natural philosophy remained controversial at Oxfordin the 1330s, they did begin to attract a following among secular mas-ters at Merton College.62 The shift was not immediate. Probably earlyin the decade William Sutton attacked Ockham’s treatment of sim-ple supposition in his Textus de suppositionibus, repeating the objectionsraised earlier by his fellow Mertonian Walter Burley.63 That beganto change by 1335, at least for a number of prominent Mertonians.William Heytesbury accepted both Ockham’s nominalistic interpreta-tion of simple supposition as well as his view of quantity, motion, andtime. The same holds true for John Dumbleton, writing around 1340.But there it seems to end. Admittedly, not everyone has been examined,but those who have do not appear to follow Ockham on those issues.That is true of the Calculator, Richard Swineshead, a major logicianand natural philosopher who did not accept those fundamental tenetsof Ockham. In that, he was apparently joined by the Queen’s Col-lege scholar, Nicholas Aston, shortly after mid-century. Aston, despitehis radical, nominalistic reputation, was a strong realist, as were RalphStrode and Richard Brinkley.64

What can we conclude, then, on the issue of the degree to whichOckham’s philosophy and/or theology were adopted at Oxford inthe second quarter of the fourteenth century, or what role Ockhamplayed in the intellectual currents of that period? The evidence wehave examined does not allow us to talk about an Ockhamist school or

60 Much remains to be done on these authors. On the relation of Halifax andRosetus to Ockham, see: Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 118–121; Tachau, “Problemof the Species,” 432–439.

61 J.A. Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools (Cambridge, 1961), p. 32.62 J.A. Weisheipl, “Ockham and Some Mertonians”; Weisheipl, “Ockham and the

Mertonians,” in The History of the University of Oxford, Vol. 1: The Early Oxford Schools, ed.J.I. Catto (Oxford, 1984), pp. 607–658.

63 Weisheipl, “Repertorium Mertonense,” MS, 31 (1969), 219.64 Z. Kaluza, “L’Oeuvre theologique de Nicolas Aston,” AHDLMA, 4.5 (1978), 45–

82; Joel Bender, “Nicholas Aston: A Study in Oxford Thought after the Black Death,”doctoral dissertation, Univ. of Wisc. (Madison, 1979).

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Ockhamist movement. There is no Oxford parallel to the appearanceof the label Ockhamistae, which did occur at Paris as early as the late1320s. At the other extreme, Ockham’s name and ideas did remain atthe forefront of philosophical and theological discussion. He was in nosense forgotten or ignored. Many of his theological views lived on, notso much because they were Ockham’s but because they belonged to awider consensus, derived from earlier Franciscan and Scotistic thought.Many details of his epistemology, by contrast, were almost universallyrejected at Oxford in the generation after his departure from England.The elements that best survived—indeed the very elements on whichthe continental identification of the Ockhamistae was to depend—wereOckham’s approach to universals, his theory of simple supposition, andhis views on quantity, time, and motion. And it was those features, incombination with Ockham’s attachment to terminist logic in general,that continued to make Ockham controversial in the more conservativeatmosphere of Oxford in the 1360s and 1370s.

Thus when Wyclif attacked ‘Ockham and the doctors of signs’ hewas probably not attacking any widespread and vigorous Ockhamistschool. Ockham was simply one of the more prominent representativesof an approach in logic and metaphysics that Wyclif did not share,indeed, to which he was vehemently opposed. But that was sufficientgrounds for Wyclif, and for what continued prominence is worth, itis probably also sufficient to allow us to continue to speak of theimportance of Ockham for fourteenth-century Oxford thought.

chapter eight

THE RECEPTION OF OCKHAM’S THOUGHTAT THE UNIVERSITY OF PARIS*

One of the most important series of events in the intellectual life offourteenth-century Paris is the group of warnings, disciplinary statutes,and condemnations commonly associated with the introduction of En-glish thought at Paris, particularly that of William of Ockham.1 Thetemporal boundaries of the crisis are the statute of the Faculty of Artson September 25, 1339, which prohibited the authoritative use of Ock-ham’s opinions, and the condemnation in 1347 of propositions takenfrom the Sentences commentary of John of Mirecourt. The Universitylooked back on those years as troubled years. From Pierre Ceffons,through Pierre d’Ailly, to the Nominalists of 1474 the period of 1339–1347 loomed as a time of crisis and conflict in the life of the Universitythat altered the intellectual atmosphere and contributed to the laterdivision between the via antiqua and the via moderna.2 It is not surprising,

* Originally presented at a conference in Paris in 1981 and published in Preuve etRaisons à l’Université de Paris: Logique, Ontologie et Théologie au XIVe Siècle, ed. Zénon Kaluzaand Paul Vignaux (Paris: J. Vrin, 1984), pp. 43–64.

1 CUP, II, n. 1023, pp. 485–486; n. 1041, p. 505; n. 1042, pp. 505–507; n. 1124,pp. 576–587; n. 1125, pp. 587–590. See also F. Stegmüller, “Die zwei Apologien des Jeande Mirecourt,” RTAM, 5 (1933), 40–78, 192–204.

2 For Ceffons’s references to the controversies of the previous years, especially thecondemnation of his fellow Cistercian, John of Mirecourt, see D. Trapp, “Peter Ceffonsof Clairvaux,” RTAM, 24 (1957), 101–154. Pierre d’Ailly, Concepts and Insolubles, transl.P.V. Spade (Dordrecht, 1980), p. 58: “But suppose someone should object to theseconclusions that, among the articles condemned at Paris against Master Nicholas ofAutrecourt, one is ‘To say [that] the sentences “God exists” [and] “God does not exist”signify the same thing, although in different ways, is an error’. I reply that many of histheses were condemned (multa fuerunt condemnata contra eum) out of jealousy, and yet lateron were publicly conceded in the schools.” The Nominalist defense of 1474, printed inC. Du Plessis d’Argentré, Collectio judiciorum de novis erroribus, vol. I, pt. 2 (Paris, 1724),p. 286, contains an extensive description of events, but one whose accuracy on par-ticular points is open to question. On the late fourteenth-century and early fifteenth-century development of the Wegestreit between the via antiqua and the via moderna seeAntiqui und Moderni, ed. A. Zimmermann, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, Bd. 9 (Berlin, 1974),especially the articles by N.W. Gilbert, “Ockham, Wyclif, and the ‘via moderna’,” pp.85–125, and A. Gabriel “ ‘Via antiqua’ and ‘via moderna’ and the Migration of Paris Stu-dents and Masters to the German Universities in the Fifteenth Century,” pp. 439–483.

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therefore, that so many modern scholars have given it close attention.3

In fact, few documents in the Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis havereceived quite as much discussion as these, and few historical problemsso extensively examined have resulted in less agreement.

It may seem unwise to return to this problem in the hope of fur-ther clarification. And yet, a more careful reading of the documentsand sensitivity to a wider academic and ecclesiastical context force usto abandon a number of earlier conjectures and reveal a somewhat dif-ferent picture of those events. The principal elements in that pictureare as follows:

1) The controversy at Paris over Ockham’s thought was narrowlyconfined to a few interrelated issues and began in the 1320s. Theintensified concern evident in the period 1339–1341 was not aresult of any new or broader introduction of Ockham’s writings,nor was it a battle over other aspects of his thought.

2) The prohibition of 1339 was precipitated by several other crisesthat occurred in the period 1337–1347 and which were largelyunrelated to Ockham or Ockhamism. Our failure to perceivethese other crises—our tendency to assume that all the “relevant”documents address the same issue—has been, I suggest, a majorbarrier preventing an adequate reconstruction of events.

3 Among the numerous books and articles on this problem, see: F. Ehrle, Der Sen-tenzenkommentar Peters von Candia des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V, Franziskanische Studien,Beiheft 9 (Münster i.W., 1925); C. Michalski, “Les courants philosophiques à Oxfordet à Paris pendant le XIVe siècle,” Bulletin international de l’Académie Polonaise des Scienceset des Lettres, classe d’histoire et de philosophie, 1919–1920 (Cracow, 1922), pp. 59–88;“Les sources du criticisme et du scepticisme dans la philosophie du XIVe siècle,” Inter-national Congress of Historical Sciences (Bruxelles, 1923–1924), pp. 241–268; “Le Criticismeet le Scepticisme dans la Philosophie du XIVe siècle,” Bull. internat. de l’Acad. Pol. desSciences et des Lettres, classe d’hist./phil. (Cracow, 1927), pp. 41–122; “Les courants cri-tiques et sceptiques dans la philosophie du XIVe siècle,” Bull, internat. de l’Acad. Pol.,classe d’hist./phil. (Cracow, 1927), pp. 192–242; “La physique nouvelle et les differentscourants philosophiques au XIVe siècle,” Bull. internat. de l’Acad. Pol., classe d’hist./phil.(Cracow, 1928), pp. 93–164; “Le problème de la volonté à Oxford et à Paris au XIVe siè-cle,” Studia Philosophica: Commentarii Societatis Philosophicae Polonorum, vol. II (Lwow, 1937),pp. 233–367 [repr. in Michalski, La philosophie au XIVe siècle. Six études, ed. K. Flash(Frankfurt, 1969)]; E.A. Moody, “Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt: TheParisian Statutes of 1339 and 1340,” FS, 7 (1947), 113–146; D. Trapp, “Augustinian The-ology of the 14th Century,” Augustiniana, 6 (1956), 146–274; “Peter Ceffons”; “ ‘Modern’and ‘Modernists’ in MS Fribourg Cordeliers 26,” Augustinianum, 5 (1965), 241–270;Ruprecht Paqué, Das Pariser Nominalistenstatut (Berlin, 1970); T.K. Scott, “Nicholas ofAutrecourt, Buridan, and Ockhamism,” JHP, 9 (1971), 15–41; and N.W. Gilbert, “Ock-ham, Wyclif, and the ‘via moderna’”.


The Introduction of Ockham’s Thought at Paris, 1325–1335

We do not know precisely when Ockham’s various works became avail-able at Paris, nor whether oral reports of his teaching preceded them.Awareness was probably not as early as 1319–1320, as Anneliese Maiersuggested. The seeming parallels between Ockham’s views on quantityand Francis of Marchia’s attack on similar views can be explained inother ways.4 The earliest reaction of which we can be certain is that ofWalter Burley, who may have acquired his knowledge firsthand throughreturn visits to England. Both in his longer version of De puritate artis

logicae and his Expositio librorum Physicorum, Burley attacked Ockham’s

4 Ockham’s rejection of the theory of impetus supposedly created by Francis ofMarchia and Marchia’s rejection of a theory of quantity in a form found in Ockham’sReportatio and De sacramento altaris led Anneliese Maier to believe that each was referringto the other. In order to answer the question of how two authors, reading the Sentencesalmost simultaneously in different universities, could have known the opinions of eachother, Maier divided Ockham’s commentary on the Sentences into several stages. Shesaw the incomplete version of the Ordinatio as the product of pre-Oxford lectures onthe Sentences given at a studium of the Order in 1317–1319. The remainder of that com-mentary (Books II–IV), which would have contained Ockham’s earliest treatment ofquantity and the eucharist, was supposedly lost or never written down for distribution.The next work in sequence was, for Maier, Ockham’s two treatises on the eucharistpublished under the title De sacramento altaris (by 1319). It was this treatise, argued Maier,that Marchia had read when he lectured on the Sentences at Paris in 1319–1320. Ock-ham’s Reportatio on Books II–IV, in which Ockham attacks the theory of impetus, sheviewed as the Oxford lectura and dated to the years 1320–1322. Finally, the Ordinatio wasrevised or completed (the so-called second redaction) by 1323.

Apart from the fact that De sacramento cannot have been written before the summerof 1323, since in it Aquinas is referred to as Saint Thomas, the other evidence couldas easily be explained by conjecturing a pre-Paris series of lectures on the Sentencesby Marchia or, as Stephen Brown suggested in the similar case of John of Reading,a subsequent revision of his Parisian lectures. There is more evidence to suggest thatthe practice of a pre-university reading of the Sentences developed in France before itappears in England. The examples Maier cited to prove that Ockham could have readbefore Oxford are all Parisian.

The Ockham/Marchia problem may be an unnecessary question. Olivi and Ock-ham were not the only authors in that period who denied separate real existence tothe category of quantity, nor are the verbal parallels close enough to Ockham’s text toprove that Marchia could only have been referring to Ockham. For example, Henryof Harclay, whose theory of universals influenced Ockham, identified quantity withextended substance in his Quaestiones ordinariae; see F. Pelster, “Heinrich von Harclay,Kanzler von Oxford und seine Quästionen,” in Miscellanea Francesco Ehrle, I (Rome,1924), pp. 307–356; G. Gál, “Henricus de Harclay: Quaestio de Significato ConceptusUniversalis,” FS, 31 (1971), 178–234. Similarly, Ockham could have had in mind theincipient impetus theory found in Olivi or, more likely, someone writing in Englandshortly before 1317. Ockham’s “tu ponis” suggests an Oxford contemporary more thana Parisian contemporary.

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understanding of simple supposition, universals, and quantity. By 1326Burley had read at least the first part of Ockham’s De sacramento altaris,namely the De quantitate.5 By 1329 he had also read either the Ordina-

tio or the Summa logicae, probably the latter.6 A Danish student in Arts,John Nicholai, made a composite of Ockham’s Summa logicae and partsof Burley’s De puritate while at Paris as a student in 1329.7 Ockham’scommentary on the Physics may also have been known.

By contrast, there is only slight evidence that the principal theologi-cal works were known at Paris in the 1320s, such as Ockham’s Ordinatio,his Reportatio, and Quodlibeta septem.8 In light of the continued discus-sion of intuitive and abstractive cognition at Paris in the 1320s, it isremarkable that there is almost no mention of Ockham’s controversialdefinition of intuitive cognition contained in his Ordinatio and Quodlibeta,if these works were in fact widely known at Paris.9 Apart from Francis

5 The parallels are given in A. Maier, “Zu einigen Problemen der Ockhamfor-schung,” AFH, 46 (1953), 161–194, reprinted with revisions in Ausgehendes Mittelalter, vol. I(Rome, 1964), pp. 175–208, esp. 196–203. Burley may have known Ockham’s writingsearlier. In his Tractatus de formis, dated between 1320 and 1323, Burley attacked a theoryof quantity similar to Ockham’s. The description of the opinion does not seem preciseenough to identify it as Ockham’s opinion rather than Olivi’s or Harclay’s.

6 The longer version of De puritate artis logicae, written by 1329, attacked Ockham’sview of simple supposition. See edition by Ph. Boehner: Walter Burleigh, De PuritateArtis Logicae Tractatus Longior (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955), p. 7.

7 Erfurt, CA 8° 67, fols. 123v–134r, contains excerpts from Burley’s De puritate artislogicae tractatus longior, with the preface: “Hanc extractionem de logica Burle ordinavitfrater Ioannes Nicholai, lector de custodia Lincopensi, provinciae Daciae, quandostuduit Parisius, anno Domini M°CCC°XXIX°, de cuius logicae commendatione prae-misit prologum in hunc modum: Post praecedentem summam editam a Fratre W[illel-mus Ockham] compilavit Burle alium tractatum de logica, in quo pauca continenturutilia, realiter nihil, vel sumpta de priori summa vel de Boethio in libro De categoriciset hypotheticis syllogismis. Quae tamen in ipso iudicavi esse utilia, posita ultra eaquae in summa praecedenti, vel quae sunt contra ea quae dicuntur in illa summa, utopposita iuxta se posita magis elucescant et melius, breviter in sequentibus colliguntur.”Quoted from P. Boehner, G. Gál, and S. Brown, eds., Summa logicae, in Opera philosophicaet theologica. Opera philosophica, I (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974), pp. 25*–26*.

8 Katherine Tachau has recently discovered a Sentences commentary of Parisianprovenance, probably to be dated before 1330, that shows familiarity with Ockham’sOrdinatio and Chatton’s Reportatio. But of the seventeen extant manuscripts of Ockham’sOrdinatio, only three can be traced to fourteenth-century France (Troyes, Bibl. mun., ms718, probably belonging to the Cistercians at Paris; Paris, Bibl. Mazarine, ms lat. 894,probably belonging to the Augustinians at Paris; and Munich, Universitätsbibl., F. 52)and none can be dated before mid-century.

9 On the distinctive character of Ockham’s formulation, see K.H. Tachau, “TheProblem of the Species in medio at Oxford in the Generation after Ockham,” MS, 44(1982), 394–443; “The Response to Ockham’s and Aureol’s Epistemology: 1320–1340,”


of Meyronnes’s awareness that Scotus’s theory of grace and justifica-tion (the acceptatio divina) was one of the issues under investigation inOckham’s trial at Avignon,10 Ockham’s theological views were eitherignored or were unknown at Paris before the early 1340s.

The views of Ockham that were under discussion at Paris in the 1320swere his theory of universals and its effect on his definition of simplesupposition and his reinterpretation of the Aristotelian categories.11 ForOckham abstract nouns create the linguistic misimpression that suchabstractions have real being apart from substances and qualities. Butabstractions, such as whiteness or humanity, do not in his view haveseparate being nor do they inhere in things. They are useful conceptsabstracted from our experience with individual things. Men do not“have” humanity or “share” humanity; each person is a human being,more or less a rational animal. Similarly, physical abstractions, such asmotion, quantity, and time have no absolute being apart from extendedmoving things in succession, namely the res permanentes.

in English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries, ed. A. Maierù (Naples, 1982), pp. 185–217.

10 Francis of Mayronis, Quodl. I, q. 3 (Vat. lat. 901, fol. 7ra): “Circa istam questionem[Utrum Deus possit acceptare hominem in puris naturalibus existentem tanquamdignum vita eterna], quia de facto versatur coram Christi vicario summo pontifice, ideoreducendum est ad memoriam illud quod dicit salvator noster eius predecessori Matth.16°: ‘quodcumque solveris super terram, erit solutum’ etc. et ideo ad determinandumexspectandum est eius iudicium.” Cited from J. Koch, “Neue Aktenstücke zu demgegen Wilhelm Ockham in Avignon geführten Prozess,” RTAM, 7 (1935), 350–380; 8(1936), 79–93, 168–197; reprinted in Kleine Schriften, vol. II (Rome, 1973), p. 312.

11 Of particular interest among the abundant literature on these aspects of Ock-ham’s thought are: S. Moser, Grundbegriffe der Naturphilosophie bei Wilhelm von Ockham:Kritischer Vergleich der ‘Summulae in libros Physicorum’ mit der Philosophie des Aristoteles (Inns-bruck, 1932); E.A. Moody, The Logic of William of Ockham (New York, 1935); Ph. Boehner,“Ockham’s Theory of Supposition and the Notion of Truth,” FS, 6 (1946), 261–292;Ph. Boehner, Medieval Logic (Manchester, 1952); A. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe derspätscholastischen Naturphilosophie (Rome, 1955); H. Shapiro, Motion, Time and Place Accord-ing to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1957); J.A. Weisheipl, “Developments inthe Arts Curriculum at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century,” MS, 28 (1966), 151–175; Weisheipl, “Ockham and some Mertonians,” MS, 30 (1968), 163–213; R. Price,“William of Ockham and Suppositio Personalis,” FS, 30 (1970), 131–140; J. Swiniarski, “ANew Presentation of Ockham’s Theory of Supposition with an Evaluation of someContemporary Criticisms,” FS, 30 (1970), 181–217; S. Brown, “Walter Burleigh’s Treatisede Suppositionibus and its Influence on William of Ockham,” FS, 32 (1972), 15–64; G. Leff,William of Ockham (Manchester, 1974); P.V. Spade, “Ockham’s Rule of Supposition: TwoConflicts in His Theory,” Vivarium, 12 (1974), 63–73; F. Inciarte, “Die Suppositionsthe-orie und die Anfänge der extensionalen Semantik,” Antiqui und Moderni (Berlin, 1974),126–141; and P.V. Spade, “Some Epistemological Implications of the Burley-OckhamDispute,” FS, 35 (1975), 212–222.

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The only source needed for a discussion of these issues in Ockhamwas his Summa logicae, which we know was available at Paris before 1329,along with his De quantitate. Although Burley attacked Ockham’s view ofuniversals and simple supposition, most of the attention at Paris wasfocused on Ockham’s reinterpretation of the categories, especially hisview of quantity, time, and motion. Ultimately at Paris the implicationsfor physics were more controversial than the implications for logic.Ockham’s linguistic approach to physics not only contrasted with thequantitative, mathematical approach of many Oxford scholars in thenext generation, but it posed what appeared to be an alternative viewof the physical universe and its operations.12

Such a picture is suggested by the remarks of Burley’s contempo-rary, Michael of Massa, who lectured on the Sentences at Paris in 1325–1326.13 Massa is the first Parisian author to cite Ockham by name, andalthough he shared with Ockham (and with several earlier Parisianauthors, such as Peter of John Olivi and Durand of St. Pourçain) therejection of species in cognition,14 he was sharply critical of Ockhamon a number of issues. Massa saw Ockham’s physical theory to be arevival of the ancient oneness-philosophy of the Eleatics, which hadbeen rejected by Plato and Aristotle.15 One also receives the impres-sion from Michael’s commentary that Ockham’s natural philosophyhad won a following at Paris, and that Michael was as much (if not

12 Weisheipl, “Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford”; “Ockham andsome Mertonians”; J.E. Murdoch and E. Sylla, “The Science of Motion,” in D.C. Lind-berg, Science in the Middle Ages (Chicago, 1978), pp. 206–264.

13 Damasus Trapp was the first to call attention to these passages, “Notes on SomeManuscripts of the Augustinian Michael de Massa (d. 1337),” Augustinianum, 5 (1965),58–133. [The dating of Massa’s questions on the Sentences has been revised; see Courte-nay, “The Quaestiones in Sententias of Michael de Massa, OESA. A Redating,” Augustiniana45 (1995), 191–207, reprinted in this volume as Chapter 13.]

14 K. Tachau, “Problem of the Species” and W.J. Courtenay and K.H. Tachau,“Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-German Nation at Paris, 1339–1341” Historyof Universities, 2 (1982), 53–96 [reprinted in his volume as Chapter 9].

15 Vatican, Vat. lat. 1087, fols. 70rb, 71ra: “Et quia de realitate motus est unus errorquorundam modernorum qui circa totam Physicam tam quantum ad principia quametiam quantum ad conclusiones ipsius conati sunt innovare errores antiquorum philoso-phorum quos Aristoteles frequentissime reprobat—licet per quasdam fugas grammat-icales huiusmodi errores sustineant, quae modicum valent, sicut alias apparebit—ideostatim pro nunc de errore istorum circa realitatem motus expedio me valde breviter…Moveamus ergo aliquas quaestiones circa realitatem motus more Aristotelis et Com-mentatoris et aliorum philosophorum, praetermittendo insanias modernorum innovan-tium grossitive antiquorum.”


more) concerned over Parisian supporters of Ockham than he was overOckham himself.16

Thus, by the time Ockham was in Avignon awaiting the outcomeof the investigation into his orthodoxy, several of his works were avail-able at Paris and some of his views well-known.17 His “visibility” atParis had a particular character that has not been sufficiently stressed.First, it was Parisian theologians who were concerned about his ideas,for his opinions are cited only in works written by bachelors or mas-ters of theology. Second, these Parisian theologians were concernedprimarily about Ockham’s natural philosophy and, to a lesser extent,the related issues in his logic. They appear to have been unaware ofor unconcerned over his theological opinions. Ockham’s views on theEucharist may have entered the discussion only because of the contro-versial nature of his views on the status of quantity in relation to sub-stance and quality. Third, there is the hint that Ockham’s physics hadbegun to attract supporters at Paris, whether within the Arts or The-ological Faculty is difficult to determine. Massa’s Okanistae may referto such a group, or it could also be nothing more than the commonscholastic practice of giving a plural label to one person’s opinions.Eventually, however, such supporters of Ockham’s physics did appear.The Tractatus de successivis, which contains the heart of Ockham’s teach-ing on time, motion, and place, was extracted from his Expositio in libros

Physicorum by such followers as a concise statement of Ockham’s versionof the new physics.18

Given the revolutionary quality modern historians usually attributeto Ockham’s thought, it is perhaps surprising that there was not moremention of him at Paris in this period. Most areas of his thoughtreceived no attention, and many Parisian theologians ignored his logicand physics as well. By contrast, the writings of Thomas Aquinas, JohnDuns Scotus, Durand of St. Pourçain, and Peter Auriol elicited almostimmediate attention and, in the case of the last two, not because a

16 Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 88v: “Sed secundum istos, contra quos arguo, tempus et primusmotus sunt idem identice, nec differunt nisi conceptibiliter… dixerunt aliqui quodtempus est ipsummet caelum, et in sententiam istorum incidunt Okanistae.”

17 On the trial of Ockham at Avignon see: J. Koch, “Neue Aktenstücke zu demgegen Wilhelm Ockham in Avignon geführten Prozess,” RTAM, 7 (1935), 350–380; 8(1936), 79–93, 168–197; C.K. Brampton, “Personalities at the Process against Ockhamat Avignon, 1324–1326,” FS, 26 (1966), 4–25.

18 The Tractatus de Successivis attributed to William Ockham, ed. Ph. Boehner (St. Bonaven-ture, 1944).

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religious order promoted their thought but because the ideas containedin their works evoked a quick and widespread response. Why did Parisnot view Ockham’s thought as equally worthy of attention?

One obvious explanation, suggested by the evidence reviewed above,is that many of Ockham’s works were probably not readily availableat Paris at that time. Moreover, many of Ockham’s views would, inany event, have been non-controversial at Paris in the 1320s. Most ofhis logic, as contained in his Summa logicae, represented only a reor-ganization of what was then the accepted teaching of the schools.19

Much of his theology, such as his teaching on grace and justifica-tion or his covenantal, pactum theology, were compatible with—indeedin large measure derived from—Scotus, whose disciples dominatedParisian theology in the 1320s and 1330s. It is understandable thattheologians at Avignon, where Thomism was far stronger, would havebeen more critical of Ockham than contemporary theologians at Paris.Finally, Parisian scholars, fully cognizant of their long heritage andunchallenged leadership in philosophy and theology, concentrated theirattention on Parisian authors. Fourteenth-century English scholars whowere familiar names to Parisian theologians were or had been bache-lors or masters of theology at Paris: John Duns Scotus, Robert Cow-ton, Thomas Wilton, William of Alnwick, John Baconthorpe, WalterBurley, and others. One finds only a modest trace—never acknowl-edged by name—of the thought of those whose highest degree wasfrom an English studium generale: Richard of Conington, Henry Harclay,Richard Campsall, John of Reading, or Walter Chatton. The view fromthe Seine in 1328 noted some aspects of Ockham’s thought worthy ofcomment, but whatever they found in Reading, Chatton, Fitzralph, orRodington—if they read them at all—could not in their eyes comparewith the controversies generated at Paris.

Two features of immediate concern to us distinguish the Universityof Paris in the 1330s. One of these is the continued rejection of Ock-ham’s physics. John Buridan, who certainly had access to the Summa

logicae and aspects of whose thought paralleled but were not necessarilyderived from Ockham’s thought,20 opposed the view of quantity, time,

19 G. Gál, Introduction to William of Ockham, Summa logicae (St. Bonaventure, 1974),p. 46*: “Contentio enim circa universalia, praedicamenta et suppositiones terminorummaxime vertebatur. Sed haec non constituunt totam logicam nec magnam eius partem.Maior pars logicae erat possessio communis et pacifica omnium logicorum….”

20 Until the middle of this century the dependence of Buridan on Ockham was notseriously questioned. Since then scholars have become increasingly more cautious on


and motion to which Ockham subscribed.21 Similarly Peter of Aquila,the only Parisian theologian between 1327 and 1342 to cite Ockhamby name, refers to him in a similar context.22 But the discussion overOckham’s reinterpretation of the categories remained on an academiclevel. It did not become a matter of official concern.

The second feature of the 1330s is that Paris seems to lose touch withEnglish thought, a process that begins in the late 1320s. There is no evi-dence before 1340 to suggest that Parisian writers even knew the worksof Richard Fitzralph, John of Rodington, William Crathorn, RobertHolcot, Adam Wodeham, Thomas Bradwardine, Richard Kilvington,Robert of Halifax, Thomas Buckingham, William Heytesbury, or any ofthe other logicians and theologians who revolutionized English thoughtin the period from 1328 to 1338. Admittedly, Parisian masters and bach-elors never possessed the degree of interest in Oxford thought thatOxford scholars maintained for Paris up to 1328. The approved listof books available for copying in Parisian bookstores in 1304 almosttotally ignores any English contributions to scholastic learning.23 WhatParis received from Oxford came primarily through English scholarswho studied or taught at Paris, such as Bacon, Scotus, Alnwick, Burley,and others. But even this modest drift of ideas from Oxford to Parisall but ceased in the late 1320s and early 1330s as France and Englandmoved towards the war that eventually brought prohibitions in bothcountries against scholars going abroad for education. The Procura-tor’s Book of the English-German Nation at Paris, whose earliest extantrecord begins in 1333, reveals only a handful of English students leftat Paris, and even those soon disappear.24 Much of this decline in theEnglish presence at Paris was probably due to the disintegrating polit-ical climate, but much of it was also due to the fact that Oxford hadbecome not only an acceptable alternative to Paris but a preferable one.By 1330 the developments in logic, mathematics, physics, and theology

this issue. In particular, see: M.E. Reina, Il Problema del linguaggio in Buridano (Vicenza,1959); T.K. Scott, “John Buridan on the Objects of Demonstrative Science,” Speculum,40 (1965), 654–673; R. Paqué, Das Pariser Nominalistenstatut; T.K. Scott, “Nicholas ofAutrecourt, Buridan and Ockhamism,” JHP, 9 (1971), 15–41; and The Logic of JohnBuridan, Opuscula Graecolatina, 9 (Copenhagen, 1976).

21 A. Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe der spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie (Rome,1955), pp. 209–219.

22 Petrus de Aquila, Quaestiones in quatuor libros sententiarum (Speyer, 1480; reprintFrankfurt, 1967), Lib. I, dist. xxiii, q. 2.

23 CUP II, pp. 107–112.24 AUP, vol. I: Liber procuratorum nationis Anglicanae (Alemanniae) in Universitate Parisiensi.

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at Oxford were far more exciting than almost anything comparable atParis in the period 1328–1340. Only John Buridan seems to continuethe kind of interests pursued earlier by Marchia, Massa, Gerard Odo-nis, and others from the pre-1328 era.

The Papacy and University Reform: The Crisis of 1338–1341

The situation at Paris changed rapidly in 1338–1339 through the adventof a series of crises that affected the entire University, but most partic-ularly the Faculty of Arts. The first crisis was one of financial supportthrough the papacy. A property dispute between some students in theNorman Nation and some citizens of Valence came before the papalcourt in Avignon in 1338 through the Valence citizens who appealed anunfavorable University judgment.25 In July of 1339 Benedict XII leveledcharges of abuse against Stephen of Langres, the University represen-tative of the Bishop of Senlis, who was the protector and distributorof papal privileges to University members. By September Benedict hadrefused to honor any of the requests on the University’s benefice rolland demanded to see, instead, the University’s documentary evidenceof its privileges, which he intended to reconsider.26

When the Faculty of Arts met in September of 1339, the income of alarge portion of the University community was uncertain. It was in thatatmosphere that the Faculties of Arts, Law, and Medicine instituted aseries of reforms that built upon legislation of earlier years, but whichnow acquired a particular urgency reflected in the rapidity with whichreform statutes were enacted.

One of the issues addressed by almost all the faculties in the Uni-versity was a concern over the disintegration of classroom discipline,proper dress and behavior, and magisterial control over teaching. Lec-tures and disputations in Arts, Medicine, and Law were being inter-rupted by whistling and footstamping, or by contentious questions andcomments from bachelors, masters, and others who had not receivedpermission to speak.27 The second paragraph of the Arts statute of

25 CUP II, pp. 476–477, 482–483; 487–488; 488–489, 497–498, 521–522.26 AUP I, col. 35; CUP II, p. 487.27 CUP II, pp. 492–493, for the Faculty of Medicine: “ad statuendum et ordinandum

propter pacem et tranquillitatem inter magistros ac etiam bachalarios et ad evitandumclamores magistri contra magistrum ac etiam contra bachalarios et bachalariorum adinvicem… nullus sit ausus plus arguere vel alio quoquomodo nisi prius habita licentia


September 25, 133928 in which this problem is addressed and whichhas been interpreted by historians as referring to disruptions caused byOckhamism, has nothing to do with Ockham but was a separate statu-tory item on the problem of classroom discipline, a problem that seemsto have been rampant in almost all the faculties, including Law andMedicine. During this period of reform, and in light of the financialurgency and need to appease Pope Benedict, the Faculty of Arts alsoreaffirmed its right to determine the texts appropriate for lectures anddisputations, public or private. As part of that statute the votes weregathered to prohibit the use of the works and doctrine of one of theprincipal enemies of Benedict XII, William of Ockham, whose viewswere being cited by students and bachelors in the Arts Faculty.29

et obtenta a magistro disputante, sed quilibet taceat ut respondens audiatur.” CUPII, p. 504, for the Faculty of Decrees: “Itemque non impedient doctores vel alioslegentes, seu actus scolasticos exercentes bedellos vel alios officiarios dicte facultatis,sibilacionibus, percussionibus et perturbacionibus quibuscumque.” See also CUP II,p. 486, n. 1024. The fact that student disturbances were common to these threefaculties makes the connection with Ockhamism highly dubious. There was, however,one issue on which Ockham’s physics, particularly his views on motion, time andrelation, challenged some cherished notions in medicine and law, namely astrology.Throughout the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, despite the opposition oftheologians, astrology had become increasingly attractive, even in academic circles.Much of the motivation behind the development of the mechanical clock in the latethirteenth and early fourteenth centuries was to develop an astronomical clock thatwould precisely record the movement of the heavens and make medical predictionsand legal arguments based on astrology equally precise. If movement, relationship, andtime were not realities, then a fundamental presupposition of astrology was removed.Similar motivations explain some of the interest in John of Sacrobosco’s De sphaera. Itwas not by chance that Conrad of Megenberg, one of Ockham’s principal continentalopponents, wrote a commentary on De sphaera in which he attacked Ockham’s physics,and also translated Sacrobosco’s work into German. Moreover, Andalò di Negro, whoalso wrote a treatise on De sphaera, composed his Introduction to Judicial Astrology around1315–1320. On the interrelation of the astronomical clock and medical astrology, seeL. White, “Medical Astrologers and Late Medieval Technology,” Viator, 6 (1975), 295–308, and in Medieval Religion and Technology (Berkeley, 1978), pp. 297–315. On Andalò seeL. Thorndike, The ‘Sphere’ of Sacrobosco and Its Commentators (Chicago, 1949), pp. 35–36.

28 CUP II, p. 485, n. 1023: “Insuper cum nobis liqueat manifeste quod in disputa-tionibus que fiunt in vico Straminum talis abusus inolevit quod bachellarii et alii in dis-putationibus dictis existentes propria auctoritate arguere presumunt minus reverenterse habentes ad magistros, qui disputant, tumultum faciendo adeo et in tantum quodhaberi non potest conclusionis disputande veritas, nec dicte disputaciones in aliquosunt scolaribus audientibus fructuose: statuimus quod nullus magister, bachellarius autscolaris, sine permissu et licentia magistri disputationes tenentis arguat, quam licentiamsibi non liceat petere verbaliter, sed tantummodo signative reverenter.”

29 Ibid.: “Cum igitur a predecessoribus nostris non irrationabiliter motis circa librosapud nos legendos publice vel occulte certa precesserit ordinatio per nos jurata obser-

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If this first piece of legislation prohibiting the use of Ockham asan authority in lectures or disputations was designed in any way toappease Benedict, it was unsuccessful. In the following February Bene-dict suspended the privileges of the University, and in the autumn of1340, prompted probably by interested parties at the University, Bene-dict began inquisitorial procedures against a number of bachelors andstudents in the Theological Faculty, most of them secular theologianswho may have continued to teach in the Faculty of Arts while pursuingtheir theological studies. Among those accused were Nicholas of Autre-court and an English student from Benedict’s own monastic order, theCistercians.30 The University’s privileges were not restored until July1341.31

The Invasion of English Logic, Physics, and Theology:

The Crisis of 1340–1347

The papal charges against certain students in the Faculty of Theologysuggest that alongside the crises over papal support and classroom dis-cipline, the University of Paris was experiencing another, more eventfuland transforming crisis in this period. During the years after 1328 inwhich Oxford-Parisian contact had all but disappeared, the approachto logic and theology at Oxford had undergone a transformation. Trea-tises in logic that supplemented the Aristotelian logica vetus and logica

nova with works on the properties of terms had appeared as early asthe late twelfth century.32 But in the early decades of the fourteenthcentury at Oxford, the number and scope of these treatises increased

vari, et quod aliquos libros per ipsos non admissos vel alias consuetos legere nondebemus, et istis temporibus nonnulli doctrinam Guillermi dicti Okam (quamvis peripsos ordinantes admissa non fuerit vel alias consueta, neque per nos seu alios ad quospertineat examinata, propter quod non videtur suspicione carere), dogmatizare pre-sumpserint publice et occulte super hoc in locis privatis conventicula faciendo: hincest quod nos nostre salutis memores, considerantes juramentum quod fecimus de dictaordinatione observanda, statuimus quod nullus decetero predictam doctrinam dogma-tizare presumat audiendo vel legendo publice vel occulte, necnon conventicula superdicta doctrina disputanda faciendo vel ipsum in lectura vel disputationibus allegando.”

30 CUP II, p. 505, n. 1041.31 CUP II, pp. 521–522.32 L.M. de Rijk, Logica Modernorum, a contribution to the history of early terminist logic, 3

vols. (Assen, 1962–1967); L. Minio-Paluello, Twelfth Century Logic: texts and studies, 2 vols.(Rome, 1956–1958).


dramatically.33 Treatises on supposition grew and absorbed the syn-

categoremata, predicates, relative terms, and other parts of speech. Tothose were added an increasing number of treatises on sophismata, insol-

ubilia, obligationes, and consequentia. In this development Walter Burley,Richard Campsall and William of Ockham played leading roles, butthe tens of others involved reveal a far broader movement. By 1335much of the teaching of logic at Oxford was being achieved throughdebates centered on sophisms that were conducted according to therules of obligations.34 Propositions were analyzed and their true andfalse senses distinguished through recourse to supposition theory, theoperation of syncategoremata, composite and divided senses, literal andmetaphoric meaning, and the other tools of terminist logic. By the timeof Robert Holcot and Adam Wodeham (1330–1332), this approach topropositional analysis had entered theology, and one finds throughoutthe Oxford theologians of the 1330s the language of obligationes accord-ing to which theological sophismata were explored.

Sophismata had played a role in the training of Parisian Artistae in thethirteenth century, specifically in the disputations that preceded deter-

33 C. Wilson, William Heytesbury. Medieval Logic and the Rise of Mathematical Physics(Madison, 1960); Weisheipl, “Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford”; J. Mur-doch, “From Social into Intellectual Factors: an Aspect of the Unitary Character ofLate Medieval Learning” in The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning, ed. J. Murdoch andE. Sylla (Dordrecht, 1975), pp. 271–348; “Subtilitates Anglicanae in Fourteenth-CenturyParis: John of Mirecourt and Peter Ceffons,” in Machaut’s World: Science and Art in theFourteenth Century, ed. M.P. Cosman and B. Chandler (New York, 1978), pp. 51–86;W.J. Courtenay, “The Role of English Thought in the Transformation of UniversityEducation in the Late Middle Ages,” in Rebirth, Reform, and Resilience: Universities in Tran-sition, 1300–1700, ed. J.M. Kittelson (Columbus, Ohio, 1984), pp. 103–162.

34 Weisheipl, “Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford”; M.A. Brown, “TheRole of the Tractatus de obligationibus in Mediaeval Logic,” FS, 26 (1966), 26–35; L.M. deRijk, “Some Thirteenth Century Tracts on the Game of Obligation,” Vivarium, 12(1974), 94–123; 13 (1975), 22–54; 14 (1976), 26–49; P.V. Spade, “Roger Swyneshed’sObligationes: Edition and Comments,” AHDLMA, 44 (1977), 243–285; Spade, “RichardLavenham’s Obligationes: Edition and Comments,” Rivista critica di storia della filosofia,33 (1978), 225–242; A.R. Perreiah, “Insolubilia in the Logica parva of Paul of Venice,”Medioevo, 4 (1978), 145–171; Spade, “Robert Fland’s Obligationes: An Edition,” MS, 42(1980), 41–60; E. Stump, “Medieval Obligationes and Aristotelian Dialectic,” unpublishedpaper read at the Sewanee Mediaeval Colloquium, April 12, 1980; Stump, “Obliga-tions: From the Beginnings to the Early Fourteenth Century,” in The Cambridge Historyof Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg (Cambridge,1982), pp. 315–334; Spade, “Obligations: Developments in the Fourteenth Century,” inThe Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 335–341; Spade, “Three Theories ofObligationes: Burley, Kilvington, and Swyneshed on Counterfactual Reasoning,” Historyand Philosophy of Logic, 3 (1982), 1–32.

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mination, but they did not dominate the teaching of logic at Paris norwere the student’s knowledge and analytical skills tested by “obliging”him to accept and work within the framework of propositions and casesthat were implausible, contradictory, or contrary to common belief. Nordo we find at Paris before 1340 any evidence of a theology influencedby the techniques of solving sophisms within the rules of obligations.On the contrary, in the period from 1328 to 1340 Parisian theologyremained within the categories, style, and approach of the early four-teenth century, limited by the horizons of a declining Thomism, Sco-tism, and Aegidianism.

Some of the English terminist logic was already available in Paris inthe 1320s, most notably Burley’s De puritate artis logicae and Ockham’sSumma logicae. Moreover, Paris had developed its own brand of termin-ism in the writings and teaching of John Buridan. There is no evidenceto suggest, however, that the Arts curriculum or the style of teaching atParis were changed by those influences in the 1320s or early 1330s. Thatsituation appears to have been altered by the introduction into Paris inthe years 1338–1343 of additional works on logic and physics: Kilving-ton’s Sophismata, Bradwardine’s De proportione, Heytesbury’s Sophismata,and a number of theological works that were heavily imbued withthe terminology, interests, and approach of the new logic and physics:Holcot, Wodeham, Bradwardine, Halifax, Buckingham and MonachusNiger.35

Under the impact of this new literature two tendencies developedthat were viewed with alarm by many contemporaries. The earlier ten-dency, primarily in evidence in the Faculty of Arts, was for some stu-dents and masters to adopt a narrow, somewhat sensationalist methodof propositional analysis according to which any proposition that didnot meet the criteria of supposition theory (in its proper senses) wasconsidered false. This meant that all statements that used figurative lan-guage, metaphors, idiomatic expressions or any words ex usu loquendi as

35 These works make their first appearance in Rimini’s commentary, and it is uncer-tain where he came in contact with them. It is probable that he encountered them inthe schools of northern Italy, which had close ties with Oxford in the second quarter ofthe fourteenth century and where the first version of Rimini’s commentary was draftedand probably read. See my “The Early Stages in the Introduction of Oxford Logic intoItaly,” in English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries, ed. A. Maierù (Naples, 1982),pp. 13–32. It is also possible that he gained access to them at Paris, perhaps throughthe library of the Cistercian College of St. Bernard, which was eventually rich in thesesources, which maintained English contacts in the late 1330s and early 1340s, and withwhich the Augustinian Hermits had close ties after 1340.


opposed to proper supposition (de virtute sermonis) were rejected. Thisapproach immediately angered anyone who, along with Burley andOckham, acknowledged the importance of “improper” supposition.36

It also angered anyone who delighted in poetical or rhetorical expres-sions. The most immediate danger from this narrow interpretation ofsupposition, however, was the rejection of statements from the Bibleand the Fathers in which the use of metaphor plays such an importantrole.

This was the issue at stake in the famous statute of the Faculty ofArts issued on December 29, 1340.37 This statute has nothing directlyto do with Ockham or his doctrina, a confusion that developed manydecades later through the misidentification of this statute with a secondstatute contra Okanistae that was issued a month later.38 The style of

36 Ockham uses the distinction between de virtute sermonis and ex usu loquendi fre-quently in his Summa logicae. His fullest treatment, however, is in his chapter De supposi-tione impropria (Pt. I, c. 77), p. 237: “Et ideo multum est considerandum quando terminuset propositio accipitur de virtute sermonis et quando secundum usum loquentium velsecundum intentionem auctorum, et hoc quia vix invenitur aliquod vocabulum quinin diversis locis librorum philosophorum et Sanctorum et auctorum aequivoce accip-iatur; et hoc penes aliquem modum aequivocationis. Et ideo volentes accipere sem-per vocabulum univoce et uno modo frequenter errant circa intentiones auctorum etinquisitionem veritatis, cum fere omnia vocabula aequivoce accipiantur.” Similarly inBurley, De puritate artis logicae, tractatus longior, pt. I, ch. 6: De suppositione impropria, ed.Ph. Boehner (St. Bonaventure, 1955), pp. 46–47: “Et est suppositio impropria, quan-documque terminus supponit praecise pro aliquo, pro quo de virtute sermonis nonpermittitur praecise supponere. Et dividitur suppositio impropria, quia quaedam estantonomastica, quaedam synecdochica et quaedam metonymatica.” “Unde, quandoterminus accipitur pro uno secundum usum loquendi et pro alio de virtute sermonis,tunc est suppositio impropria.”

37 CUP II, pp. 505–507, n. 1042: “…nulli magistri, baccalarii, vel scolares in artiumfacultate legentes Parisius audeant aliquam propositionem famosam illius actoris cujuslibrum legunt, dicere simpliciter esse falsam, vel esse falsam de virtute sermonis, sicrediderint quod actor ponendo illam habuerit verum intellectum; sed vel concedanteam, vel sensum verum dividant a sensu falso, quia pari ratione propositiones Biblieabsoluto sermone essent negande, quod est periculosum.” “…nullus dicat simplicitervel de virtute sermonis omnem propositionem esse falsam, que esset falsa secundumsuppositionem personalem terminorum, eo quod iste error ducit ad priorem errorem,actores enim sepe utuntur aliis suppositionibus.” “…nullus dicat propositionem nullamesse concedendam, si non sit vera in ejus sensu proprio, quia hoc dicere ducit adpredictos errores, quia Biblia et actores non semper sermonibus utuntur secundumproprios sensus eorum. Magis igitur oportet in affirmando vel negando sermones admateriam subjectam attendere, quam ad proprietatem sermonis, disputatio namque adproprietatem sermonis attendens nullam recipiens propositionem, preterquam in sensuproprio, non est nisi sophistica disputatio. Disputationes dyalectice et doctrinales, quead inquisitionem veritatis intendunt, modicam habent de nominibus sollicitudinem.”

38 No internal evidence in the statute of the Faculty of Arts issued on December 29,

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debate and teaching censured in December 1340 was not derived fromBurley, Ockham, or Buridan, all of whom allowed for suppositio impropria

and warned of the dangers that would result from analyzing terms andpropositions de virtute sermonis without regard for usum loquendi.

The second tendency, in evidence in the Faculty of Theology, wasto restructure theological debate, Sentences commentaries and quodli-betal questions around theological sophismata in which the techniquesof the new logic were used, the debate conducted according to rulesof obligations, and problems of logic and natural philosophy addressedwithin a theological structure. Few Parisian Sentences commentaries everreached the stage of development reflected in the English commen-taries of Alexander Langeley, Monachus Niger, or Nicholas Aston. Butthe commentary of John of Mirecourt resembled in structure and washeavily dependent on the English commentaries of the 1330s.39

1340 identifies it as directed against Ockham or against Ockhamists. In fact, thecautionary phrase added at the end of the statute to the effect that the prohibition ofOckham’s doctrine and works issued on September 25, 1339 was still binding, suggeststhat those who drafted the December 1340 statute recognized that it could be read as avindication of Ockham’s thought.

The oft-cited external evidence, such as the rubric for the December 1340 statuteor the statement in the Procurator’s Book of the English-German Nation (AUP I,cols. 44–45) does not establish it as an anti-Ockhamist statute but proves the contrary.The rubric occurs only in the fifteenth-century copy of the Chartularium, after therivalry of the via antiqua and via moderna had begun to affect university politics andwhen the reales were arranging and interpreting documents in their case against thenominales. The statement in the Procurator’s Book establishes that there was, in fact,a “second” statute “contra novas opiniones quorundam, qui vocantur Occhaniste”beyond that of Sept. 25, 1339, but this second statute was drafted and promulgated“tempore procuracionis ejusdem,” that is, during the procuratorship of Henry of Unna,which occurred between January 13, 1341 and February 10, 1341. The December 1340statute had already been promulgated under the seal of the English-German Nationone month earlier. For a fuller examination of these documents, see Courtenay andTachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English German Nation”. [It was commonfor individual documents in the archives of the University of Paris to be identified witha rubric on the back of the folded document, but since no original for the December1340 survives, it is impossible to know if the rubric recorded in the fifteenth-centuryregister reproduced a rubric from an earlier document, and if so, when that rubric wasadded to the document.]

39 C. Michalski, Wplyw Oksfordu na filozofie Jana z Mirecourt (Cracow, 1921);G. Ouy, Un commentateur des “Sentences” au XIVe siècle, Jean de Mirecourt, unpublished thesis,École des Chartes (Paris, 1946); W.J. Courtenay, “John of Mirecourt and Gregory ofRimini on Whether God Can Undo the Past,” RTAM, 39 (1972), 224–256; 40 (1973),147–174 [repr. in Courtenay, Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought (London, 1984)];J. Murdoch, “Subtilitates Anglicanae”.


These two issues or tendencies—a sensationalism born of an overlystrict application of supposition theory in Arts and the restructuring ofapproaches in Theology through the use of sophisms and obligations—respectively lie behind the summoning of Autrecourt to Avignon andthe December 1340 statute of the Faculty of Arts on the one hand, andthe investigation and condemnation of Mirecourt on the other. Neitherissue was related to Ockham or the Ockhamists, a crisis that had itsown separate development, fueled perhaps by the turmoil going on inthe University at the same time.

Conrad of Megenberg and the Scientia Okamica

As was suggested earlier, the views of Ockham that provoked contro-versy in the period 1339–1342, i.e., before the Sentences commentary ofGregory of Rimini, were those on universals, his reinterpretation ofthe categories, and their implications for physics. Ockham’s Summa log-

icae had been available in Paris for a decade or more, and while muchwas said about these aspects of his logic and physics, nothing was eversaid about his understanding of personal supposition or propositionalanalysis de virtute sermonis. The reason for that is quite simple. Ock-ham’s views on these latter two issues in no way departed from theaccepted usage at Paris, while Ockham’s teaching on universals andthe categories differed significantly from the presuppositions of manyand raised the specter of the frequently-condemned Spiritual Francis-can Peter of John Olivi. In the atmosphere of 1339–1341, with the prob-lems of papal financial pressure, student disorder, and a narrow literal-ism among some teachers in the Faculty of Arts, a party within the ArtsFaculty moved to prohibit the dissemination of Ockham’s physics.

The first step in that direction may be seen in the use of the termdoctrina in the prohibition of Ockham’s works in the statute of Septem-ber 25, 1339. A second step was taken in late January or early February1341, when a second statute contra scientiam Okamicam was promulgatedby the Faculty of Arts.40 The text of this second statute is no longerextant, but part of its content can be reconstructed from references toit. In contrast to the statute of September 25, 1339, which concernedthe use of the works and doctrine of Ockham, this new statute was


144 chapter eight

directed “against the opinions of certain ones who are called Ock-hamists.”41 What was now being prohibited was the scientia Okamica, andin its place the “scientia Aristotelis and of his Commentator Averroes” wasbeing required, “except in those cases that are against the faith.”42 Theissues on which Averroes and Ockham can be contrasted are not issuesof propositional analysis but the understanding of universals, the inter-pretation of the predicaments, and the effects on the understanding ofphysics.

The prohibition of Ockham’s physics by the Arts Faculty in 1341 didnot end discussion. Thus the English-German Nation, which seems tohave had these divisions and tensions within its own ranks, went onestep further in the autumn of 1341. They established an ordinance,which many wished to be considered a statute, requiring membersof the Nation to inform on their colleagues if they know of anyonebelonging to or supporting the views of the secta Okamica.43 Anyoneholding such views would be suspended from all academic exercisesin the Nation and University. The Ordinatio of 1341 was accompaniedby an oath that had to be sworn by the candidate in Arts beforethe rector when he came to incept: “You shall swear that you shallobserve the statutes made by the Faculty of Arts against the scientia

Okamica, nor sustain in any way whatsoever the said scientia and similarones, but [sustain instead] the scientia Aristotelis and of his Commentator

41 AUP I, cols. 44–45: “Item tempore procuracionis ejusdem sigillatum fuit statutumfacultatis contra novas opiniones quorundam, qui vocantur Occhaniste, in domo dictiprocuratoris, et publicatum fuit idem statutum coram Universitate apud Predicatores insermone.”

42 CUP II, p. 680: “Item iurabitis quod statuta facta per Facultatem Artium con-tra scientiam Okamicam observabitis, neque dictam scientiam et consimiles sustinebitisquoquomodo, sed scientiam Aristotelis et sui Commentatoris Averrois et aliorum com-mentatorum antiquorum et expositorum dicti Aristotelis, nisi in casibus qui sunt contrafidem.”

43 AUP I, cols. 52–53: “Item in eadem congregatione ordinatum fuit, quod nullusdecetero admitteretur ad aliquos actus legitimos in dicta nacione, nisi prius juraretquod revelaret, si sciret aliquos de secta Occanica ad invicem conspirasse de sectavel opinionibus erroneis fovendis, vel etiam conjuratos esse vel conventicula habereocculta, aliter nisi jure diceret si sciret, ex tunc penam perjurii incurreret. Et hancordinacionem voluerunt equivalere statuto. Facta autem est hec congregatio apudSanctum Maturinum anno Domini supradicto, die veneris proxima post diem sanctiluce ewangeliste hora none Beate Virginis, presentibus magistris Hugone de Duclas,Wernero Wolfram, Johanne Kinhard, Nicholao de Cosfeldia, Gerardo de Marten,Andrea de Swecia, Conrado de Monte Puellarum, Nicholao Drukken de Dacia, etRichardo Scoto.”


Averroes, and of the other ancient commentators and expositors of thesaid Aristotle, except in those cases that are against the faith.”44

1341 represented the high point of the group opposing the adoptionor even use of Ockham’s physics at the University of Paris. Withina few years Gregory of Rimini, who would not have been boundby the statutes of the English-German Nation or the Faculty of Artsin any case, espoused a natural philosophy that paralleled Ockham’son many points, such as on motion, time, and relation.45 Moreover,between 1347 and 1365, all references to and prohibitions of the scientia

Okamica were removed from the list of oaths to be sworn by those of theEnglish-German Nation incepting at the University of Paris.46 For most,Ockham’s physics had again become a matter of academic debate, nota matter of official, university legislation.

The most intense stages in the crisis over Ockham’s physics areassociated with the career of a German member of the English Nation,Conrad of Megenberg (Monte Puellarum).47 Conrad came from the

44 See above, note 42.45 Gregory of Rimini, Sent. I, dist. 28, q. 2, a. l (Venice, 1522; reprint St. Bonaventure,

1955), fol. 132 H [Lectura super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum, ed. D. Trapp andV. Marcolino, vol. I (Berlin and New York, 1984), p. 116]: “Ex quibus evidenter patebitquod nulla relatio est entitas ab omni absoluta entitate et ab omnibus entitatibus abso-lutis distincta.” Rimini, Sent. II, dist. 1, q. 4; in Lectura, vol. IV (Berlin and New York,1979), p. 128: “Nullus motus est aliqua talis res a permanentibus distincta, ut fingitopinio [Burley]. Secunda, quod nec ‘mutatum esse’ est aliqua res talis, qualem ponit.Tertia, quod nec mutatio est res a permanente distincta, ut dicit.” Rimini, Sent. II, dist.2, q. 1; in Lectura, vol. IV, pp. 238–239: “Prima est quod tempus non est aliqua res nonpermanens, sic divisibilis et successiva, ut dicit opinio [Burley]. Secunda… tempus nonest res distincta formaliter inhaerens motui, ut dicit opinio. Tertia, quod instans nonest ‘indivisibile non durans’.” For a fuller discussion see Courtenay, “Role of EnglishThought”.

46 There are only three witnesses to these oaths sworn at inception in the ArtsFaculty. In the earliest list in the Registrum procuratoris for the English-German Nationcovering the period 1347–1365 (Paris, Arch. Univ., Reg. 2, pt. 2) the oath in questiondoes not appear and all references to the statutes contra scientiam Okamicam have beenremoved. In the Liber Rectoris from the early fifteenth century (London, Brit. Lib., Add.17304) there are also no oaths contra scientiam Okamicam. Our only source is C.E. DuBoulay, Historia Universitatis Parisiensis a Carolo M. ad nostra tempora, vol. IV (Paris, 1668),p. 275, who took his list from the Procurator’s Book of the French Nation, which isno longer extant. Either the French Nation continued the oath contra scientiam Okamicamlonger than did the English-German Nation, or that manuscript dated from the pre-1347 period in which the oath was in force. [Correction: the Book of the French Nationdoes exist, recovered after the publication of CUP : Paris, Bibl. Nat., nouv. acq. lat. 2060.For a discussion of it and its relevance to these questions, see Courtenay, “The Registersof the University of Paris and the Statutes against the Scientia Occamica,” Vivarium 29(1991), 13–49, reprinted in this volume as Chapter 11.]

47 On Megenberg see: H. Ibach, Leben und Schriften des Konrad von Megenberg (Berlin,

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area of Nürnberg and, after early education at Erfurt, entered the Fac-ulty of Arts as a lecturer in philosophy at the Cistercian College ofSt. Bernard. He became Master of Arts before 1334. In 1337, whileteaching in the Faculty of Arts and studying theology, Conrad wrote hisPlanctus ecclesiae in Germaniam, a lengthy poem which he dedicated suc-cessively to two papal chaplains in the hope of obtaining a benefice.48

The first part of the poem addresses the political conflict between Louisof Bavaria and the papacy, attempting to explain the German positionin a way that would be understood at Avignon. The political views ofMarsilius of Padua and John of Jandun are mentioned, as are those ofthe “Franciscans,” but Ockham is not mentioned directly. Of greaterinterest is the complaint of the Church against the corruption of theseven liberal arts that has resulted from the pride of the clerks, fromthis “Hebream”, this “vanam gloriam mundi”.49 The sin of grammar is that“language now stumbles into vain things, coins inanities”. The sin oflogic is that “now any man ‘paralogizes’ and deals in sophisms”.50 Inthe second part of the work Conrad continues to rant against the men-dicants, whose stomachs are jars of wine. In particular he attacks andridicules the Franciscans, whom he links with plague. By contrast, Aris-totle and Averroes hold places of honor.51

1938); R. Scholz, Unbekannte kirchenpolitische Streitschriften aus der Zeit Ludwigs des Bayern(1327–1354). Analysen und Texte, vol. I (Rome, 1911), pp. 127–140; vol. II (Rome, 1914),pp. 346–391; Konrad von Megenberg, Planctus ecclesiae in Germaniam, ed. R. Scholz.Monumenta Germaniae Historica, C2: Staatsschriften des späteren Mittelalters, II,1 (Leipzig, 1941); A. Pelzer and T. Kaeppeli, “L’Oeconomica de Conrad de Megen-berg retrouvée,” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique, 45 (1950), 559–616; J. Miethke, Ockhams Wegzur Sozialphilosophie (Berlin, 1969), pp. 133–136, 232, 431; S. Krüger, “Krise der Zeit alsUrsache der Pest? Der Traktat de moralitate in Alamannia des Konrad von Megen-berg,” in Festschrift für Hermann Heimpel zum 70. Geburtstag, vol. II (Göttingen, 1972),pp. 839–883; A.S. McGrade, The Political Thought of William of Ockham: Personal and Insti-tutional Principles (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 4–5; Konrad von Megenberg, Werke: Ökonomik,ed. S. Krüger, Monumenta Germ. Hist., Staatsschriften des späteren Mittelalters, III,5/1 (Stuttgart, 1973); III, 5/2 (Stuttgart, 1977); K. Arnold, “Konrad von Megenbergals Kommentator der ‘Sphaera’ des Johannes von Sacrobosco,” Deutschens Archiv fürErforschung des Mittelalters, 32 (1976), 147–186.

48 Planctus ecclesiae, ed. R. Scholz, M.G.H., SsM II, 1 (Leipzig, 1941).49 Planctus I, ch. 13, p. 32: “Deus hanc maledicat Hebream”; cf. ch. 10, p. 30.50 Ibid., p. 32: “Cespitat in vanis iam lingua, monetat inanis; Floribus est nuda,

rudis et vox, rustica cruda; Iam paralogismat homo quilibet atque sophismat; Ethycamarcescunt, magis et brutalia crescunt.”

51 Ibid., p. 73: “Sunt monachi, quorum stomachi sunt aufora Bachi, Qui fumant,male consumant, que viscera strumant. Pregnans invidia fratrum, regnans symonia,Atque cucullosa vestis pestis studiosa, Omnibus est vere, nolens viciosa timere.” Ibid.,p. 74: “Cordigeri, cum nigriferis scribunt odiose Christi de propriis, Deus, et, scis,


In 1342, having twice been a University nuntius at Avignon, havinglectured on the Sentences, and having acquired both from Benedict XIIand Louis of Bavaria benefices in Regensburg, Conrad left Paris for ateaching post as rector of St. Stephen’s School in Vienna. It was therein 1347 that he wrote his commentary on John of Sacrobosco’s Sphaera

in which he attacked Ockham’s teaching that points and lines are notres distinctae inter se et a corpore.52 Similar views were expressed later in hisEconomica, written between 1348 and 1352 while a canon at Regensburg.In that work Conrad attacked Ockham and his followers “who assertthat relations as well as ‘place’, ‘habit’, ‘where’, ‘when’ outside thesoul are things indistinguishable from absolute things, and affirm thatquantity is the same as substance. They even call motions—in whichthe actions and passions of things are formed—things indistinguishablefrom permanent things”.53

Conrad’s campaign against Ockham culminated in 1354 with hisTractatus contra Ockham. But some common themes that run from hisPlanctus of 1337 to his Tractatus of 1354 enable us to detect the presenceof Conrad in the events at the University of Paris between 1337 and1342. Among the many objections to contemporary thought portrayedin the pages of Economica, Conrad in his third book singled out two thathe felt were especially evil.54 One of these was Ockham’s reinterpre-

non generose. Solvunt hanc pestem divina prophetica, ‘vestem’ cum dixere ‘meumsorti misere beatam’. Si ‘mea’, tunc propria, testatur philosophya.” Ibid., pp. 75–76 “Augustine tace, loquor, optime, cum tibi pace! Omnes doctores sancti, perdistishonores! Summus Aristotelis et Averrois edocuere, Sancti subtiles quod docti nonpotuere.” See also, pp. 76, 78, 80, 89.

52 “Sed hic est advertendum, quod secundum illos, qui negant puncta habere essereale preter animam et similiter lineas, sicut facit frater Wilhalmus et sui, illi dicerent,quod secunda descripcio spere eciam competeret sibi secundum esse suum ymagina-tivum et conceptibile, sed ego non sum istius opinionis, et habet de hoc videri alibi,scilicet in questionibus physicis.” Munich, Bayr. Staatsbibl., Clm 14687, fol. 74ra, asquoted in Sabine Krüger, “Krise der Zeit,” p. 849, n. 55.

53 Sevilla, Bibl. Colomb., Ms. 7-7-32, fol. 94rb: “Aut certe dici potest, quod cleri-cus deficiens in statu scholastico est hic, qui naturas plurium abnegat rerum, quemad-modum frater Wilhelmus de Occham Anglicus atque sui sequaces, qui tam relacionesquam situs, habitus, ubi, quando, asserunt preter animam res indistinctas a rebus abso-lutis atque quantitatem eandem cum substantia rem affirmant. Motus etiam in quibusactiones rerum et passiones firmantur dicunt res indistinctas a permanentibus rebus.”Also in Vat. Pal. lat. 1252, fol. 99r. Quoted from L. Thorndike, University Records and Lifein the Middle Ages (New York, 1971), pp. 409–410, and Krüger, “Krise der Zeit,” p. 848,n. 54. The text is from Economica III, tr. 1, c. 1.

54 Conrad’s attack on Ockham and his followers occurs in chapters 1 and 14, whilehis attack on those who err in logic comes later in chapter 12. In light of his attitude

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tation of the predicaments. The other—an entirely separate issue forhim—was the semi-learned students and masters who in his opiniondo not know how to handle grammar, rhetoric, and logic properly. Inthe Economica, therefore, he gives a fuller explanation for the decline inthe liberal arts to which he alluded in his Planctus, and suggests that thepractitioners of this misunderstanding of grammar, rhetoric, and logicpretend to be superior to other scholars and have fared better in theworld than have the “noble intellects”, perhaps meaning himself.55

A common approach to language is reflected in the errors Conradlists. In grammar he criticizes these wretches (miseri) for rejecting asmeaningless such sentences as “aqua transit in fluviis” or “venti volant”because they attribute an action to the subject that it does not inreality have. To say that “winds fly” is to use an expression everyoneunderstands, ex usu loquendi, but de virtute sermonis the statement wouldbe false, since winds “do not have wings”.56 The same failing comes

toward Ockham, Conrad would have made that connection in chapter 12, had the twogroups been the same.

Although the Economica was completed between 1348 and 1352, it is possible thatparts of it were drafted earlier, or that he incorporated earlier writings into the text.Statements in the first treatise of Book III suggest that it may have been written atParis before Conrad left in 1342. His description of the schools is a description ofthe University of Paris, “mater nostra venerabilis universitas Parysiensis” (ch. 3). Theleading role he gives to theology (ch. 3: “Supreme vero omnium scolarum cathedre…ad legendum libros theologicos”) suggests ties with that faculty at the time of writing.He praises the “scole autentice” (e.g. Paris) and denigrates the “scole leninome,”specifically Erfurt and Vienna, which suggests a time before his close association withVienna and residence at Regensburg. The fact that this portion of his work circulatedseparately also points to the possibility that it may have a separate origin from therest of the Economica. If this conjecture proves correct, it would further explain thesimilarity in wording between chapter 12 and the December 1340 statute of the Facultyof Arts. Against the conjecture, however, is the bitter remark, ch. 12 University Records,pp. 430–431: “Sed huic nostris temporibus in plerisque locis Theutonie cura minimasubministrat quoniam scolarum rectoribus ut deceret minime providetur nec eorumpromotionibus ab episcopis intenditur ut oporteret. Quapropter ab hac sollicitudineilluminati viri apostatare coguntur et aliis statibus minorari,” which could have beenwritten on the eve of his departure from Paris (1342) or after his departure from Vienna(1348).

55 Economica III, tr. 1, ch. 12, from Thorndike, University Records, p. 431: “Surgunt-que miseri quidam qui se numquam dignos noverunt discipulos et quod penitus nesci-unt docere presumunt atque, quod condolendo refero, tales nobilibus ingeniis potiusseductores quam doctores preficiuntur… Quia tamen ignorantiam propriam ignorantelatis frontibus magistraliter incedunt et paucissima cognoscentes de quolibet disputantplene.”

56 Ibid.: “Gramaticam indignis molestant derisibus affirmantes quod nulla partiumorationis constructio est transitiva… Quapropter aqua non transit in fluviis secundum


out in the area of rhetoric, where these miseri reject as meaninglessexpressions such as “bouquet of words” or “colors of sentences”. Again,what is being rejected are metaphors, indeed all figures of speech.Conrad is quick to note that this attitude leads to heresy when appliedto Scripture, since the Bible uses figures of speech continually. “Andif, de virtute sermonis, these expressions are false, it would follow thatrhetoric would have no power of expression in the most beautiful kindsof metaphor.”57 Finally, in logic they consider themselves learned whenthey have mastered a dozen so-called insolubilia or a poor half-dozenobligationes. Even wise old men spend their time sweating over theseworthless things (vilibus insudare).58

These two distinct problems, the “trivial” errors and the Ockhamisterrors, were not new to Conrad in the period 1347–1354. The former isalluded to in the Planctus of 1337 and the latter can be surmised fromConrad’s association with the events of 1339–1341 at Paris. At the timeof the December 1340 statute, Conrad was procurator of the English-German Nation.59 Many of the errors listed in that statute concern therejection of all propositions that are not true de virtute sermonis, that is,considering any proposition false that uses a figure of speech. Moreover,

eos neque venti volant, quoniam alas non habent. Nec poterit dici quod una partiumorationis regat aliam secundum modorum significandi proportiones, quia intellectushumanus omnes partes orationis regit et dirigit. Proprietates enim partium orationisnichil sunt ut dicunt.”

57 Ibid.: “Rethoricam eloquentiam adeo sua cecitate postergant ut nec flores verbo-rum nec colores sententiarum capiant sed flores in pratis crescere et colores varios pic-tores componere et pulchre variare ad instar nature affirmant. Qualiter hii dulciloquiasacrarum interpretentur scripturarum quevis ratio disposita noscit. Nec est dubiumhereses ex hiis innumeras pululare. Scriptura etenim sacra non semel uterum vir-ginalem virgam notat et filium inde conceptum florem appellat. Et si de virtute sermo-nis iste orationes false sunt, sequitur rethoricam in pulcherrimis speciebus transsump-tionis nullam ad orationes habere virtutem et sic rethorica quasi evanuit tota.”

58 Ibid.: “Loycam autem se scire divulgant cum duodena vocatorum insolubiliumaut obligationum senarium pauperem siliore grandibus impresserunt visibus cecitati.Negant hii quaslibet consequentias tam ratione materie congruas, quia naturas rerumpenitus ignorant, quam etiam ratione forme convenientes, quoniam ad latitudinemloyce minime pervenerunt. Quid plura tantus error est in hiis auctus ut etiam senumcanicies non abhorreat hiis vilibus insudare.”

59 AUP I, col. 44 (Dec. 13, 1340 to Jan. 10, 1341). According to Miethke, Ockhams Weg,p. 232, Bernd Michael, in a forthcoming work on Buridan, concluded that Megenberginitiated the Arts statute of December 1340 [Michael, “Johannes Buridan: Studienzu seinem Leben, seinen Werken und zur Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa desspäten Mittelalters,” diss. Freie Universität Berlin, 1985, Teil 1, pp. 191–192].

150 chapter eight

some of the wording of the prologue of the statute is reminiscent ofphrases encountered in the Planctus and Economica.60

Conrad’s second complaint was met shortly after he left office asprocurator. In late January or early February of 1341 the Faculty ofArts passed a statute against the scientia Okamica, and in the followingmonths, as we have seen, the English-German Nation, with Conradtaking an active part, attempted to uncover and expel all those in itsmidst who sympathized with the physics of Ockham.61

It is perhaps significant that the date of Conrad’s departure fromParis (1342), probably without inception as a master of theology, wasthe same year in which Gregory of Rimini returned to Paris to lectureon the Sentences, a work in which he adopted positions that paralleledmost aspects of Ockham’s physics. One also finds in the 1340s atParis an increasing number of Ockham’s works in circulation andcitations of his opinions, although often critically. Attention was shiftedfrom Ockham’s physics to his epistemology and teaching on grace andjustification. But the real issues of 1342–1347 concerned the impactof English thought after Ockham and the controversies sparked by arevival of Augustinianism.

The transformations at Paris after 1342 are not likely to have pleasedConrad. Ockham’s physics was once again receiving a hearing. Mendi-cant and monastic theologians were even more prominent than before,and their efforts were being rewarded by university and church. Incomparison, Conrad saw his life as a struggle. He no doubt remem-bered his difficulties in financing his education. His early attempts atsecuring benefices had been poorly rewarded. And he now found him-self surrounded by mendicants whose careers seemed to prosper farbetter and more rapidly than his own. The continued anger and dis-appointment reflected in the Economica and the subsequent Tractatus de

moralitate in Alamania were in part a residue of his university experienceand, in part, born of the realization that the decade between his depar-ture from Paris and the writing of the Economica had brought him onlya minor teaching position in Vienna and a minor place in the cathedralat Regensburg.

60 CUP II, p. 506: “…nonnulli in nostra artium facultate quorundam astutiis per-nicionis adherentes, fundati non supra firmam petram, cupientes plus sapere quamoporteat, quedam minus sana nituntur seminare, ex quibus errores intolerabiles nedumcirca philosophiam, sed et circa divinam Scripturam, …huic morbo tam pestiferoremediare cupientes eorum fundamenta prophana et errores….”

61 AUP I, cols. 44–45, 52–53.


Conrad may have made one last attempt at influencing events atParis. In the eventful summer of 1346 Conrad was back in Avignonand Clement VI drafted his famous letter to the University of Paris.62

Clement criticized those masters and scholars in Arts who were labor-ing hard on the wrong things (scientiis insudantes), who had abandoned“the texts of Aristotle and of other masters and ancient expositors[Averroes?], who ought to be followed insofar as they do not departfrom catholic faith, and other true expositions and writings that sus-tain that scientia”, and turn instead toward “other various and extra-neous sophistical doctrines (extraneas doctrinas sophisticas), which in cer-tain other studia are said to be taught.”63 The vagueness of the state-ment is unfortunate, but behind it one can detect the echo of the anti-Ockhamist oath of 1341. In light of that oath there is probably rea-son to assume that Clement was referring to Ockhamist physics, whichwere not only being taught in aliis studiis, for example in the Oxfordof William Heytesbury and John Dumbleton, but were even taught atParis by an Augustinian Hermit who had in the previous year beenmade Doctor of Theology, ex gratia, by Clement himself.64

Just as interesting is Clement’s criticism of the theologians, whoabandon the Bible and the Fathers (in whom there is no “vanitatis et

curiositatis noxia”) in favor of philosophical questions and “aliis curio-

sis disputationibus”, thus spreading pestiferous seeds.65 Here there is afaint echo of the Arts statute of December 1340, but far more the lan-guage of the debate over proper and improper speculation, the distinc-

62 For Conrad’s return to Avignon in 1346, see Ibach, Leben und Schriften, p. 15, andKrüger, Werke: Ökonomik, p. 14. Clement’s letter is printed in CUP II, pp. 587–590.

63 CUP II, p. 588: “Nam nonnulli magistri et scolares artium et philosophie sci-entiis insudantes ibidem, dimissis et contemptis philosophi et aliorum magistrorum etexpositorum antiquorum textibus, quos sequi deberent in quantum fidei catholice nonobviant, ac veris expositionibus et scripturis, quibus fulcitur ipsa scientia, ad alias variaset extraneas doctrinas sophisticas, que in quibusdam aliis doceri dicuntur studiis, etoppiniones apparentes non existentes et inutiles, et ex quibus fructus non capitur, seconvertunt….”

64 CUP II, p. 557.65 CUP II, p. 588: “Plerique quoque theologi, quod deflendum est amarius, de textu

Biblie, originalibus et dictis sanctorum ac doctorum expositionibus (ex quibus vera illaacquiritur theologia, cui non attribuendum est quicquid ab hominibus sciri potest, ubiplane nulla vanitatis et curiositatis noxia reperitur, sed hoc quo fides saluberrima…)non curantes, philosophicis questionibus et aliis curiosis disputationibus et suspectisoppinionibus doctrinisque peregrinis et variis se involvunt, … et ommissis necessariissupervacua docere… pestifera pululant quandoque semina, et in perniciosam segetem,de quo profecto dolendum est, coalescunt.”

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tion between sapientia and vana curiositas.66 Here the campaign is not somuch against idle speculation into the hidden secrets of God as it isthe importation into theology of questions, approaches, and the tech-nical vocabulary of sophismata, insolubilia, and obligationes. This had beenonly a minor concern of Conrad, but it was a major concern of theDominicans, whose opinions carried considerable weight at Avignon.Already in May of 1344 the Dominican General Chapter had legislatedagainst those reading “ad hanc vaniloquii et curiositatis stultitiam,” and in1346, shortly after Clement’s letter, these prohibitions “de scientiis vanis

et curiosis” were repeated.67 But on this issue, unrelated to Ockham,the tide of English logic, physics, and theology had its effect on Paris.Conservative pressure from outside and possibly within the Universityresulted in a double attitude: public rejection of subtilitates Anglicanae andprivate, enthusiastic study of those same subtleties. Richard de Burywas probably not the only Oxfordian who found that awkward positionhumorous.68

Of the various controversies that confronted the University of Parisduring the years 1339–1347, the one that had the most long-rangeeffect on the University was the introduction of the newer Englishthought, an event in which Ockham’s writings played only a smallpart. With regard to Ockham, attention was shifted from his views onthe predicaments and physics to his epistemology, conceptualism, andteaching on grace and justification, that is to say, shifted exactly to thoseelements in Ockham that had attracted the most attention in Englandand Avignon between 1318 and 1335. To that extent, the introduction atParis of the wider English context of Ockham’s thought was probablyresponsible for that shift.

66 On the development of these terms and the conflicting attitudes in the high andlate Middle Ages, see H.A. Oberman, Contra vanam curiositatem, Theologische Studien,113 (Zürich, 1974).

67 CUP II, p. 550 (May, 1344): “…intellexerimus nonnullos in nostro Ordine legentesad hanc vaniloquii et curiositatis stultitiam devolutos ut spreta tam salubri solidaquedoctrina peregrinis doctrinis et variis abducantur, adeo ut ipsam veritatis doctrinamaudeant ausu temerario frivolis lacerationibus improbare….” CUP II, pp. 591–592:“Cum Ordo noster in soliditate [veritatis] fundatus, de scientiis vanis et curiosis noncurans veritati scientie et doctrine semper studuerit virtute constantie inherere….”

68 The Philobiblon of Richard de Bury, ed. and transl. by E.C. Thomas (London, 1888),p. 89, 212, “our English subtleties, which they denounce in public, are the subject oftheir furtive vigils”.


If Conrad lost the battle to condemn Ockham’s physics (at least untilthe rise of Albertism and Thomism in the fifteenth century), the fullerreception of English logic and the early stirrings of humanism at Parisapparently extinguished the narrow approach to supposition againstwhich the December 1340 statute was directed. It is perhaps ironic thatin the victory over Conrad’s second principal concern, the preservationof metaphoric language and the validity of figures of speech, the logicalwritings of Burley and Ockham—both opposed by Conrad—may haveplayed a more important role than the attitudes of the rhetoriciansand proto-humanists for whom poetic expression was as valuable asscientific precision.

part three

THE CRISIS OVER OCKHAM’S THOUGHT AT PARIS

chapter nine

OCKHAM, OCKHAMISTS, AND THEENGLISH-GERMAN NATION AT PARIS, 1339–1341*

The events in the Arts Faculty at Paris in the years 1339–1340 havelong been a focal point for discussing the spread of Ockham’s thoughton the Continent. The documents edited by Heinrich Denifle in theChartularium Universitatis Parisiensis1 seemed to reveal in a straightforwardand dramatic manner the stages of a crisis in the Arts Faculty andin the University as a whole. On September 25, 1339, the Arts Fac-ulty reaffirmed its right to determine the list of books that could belectured on, and forbade the use of Ockham’s writings. They furtherprohibited anyone in the Faculty from lecturing or listening to lectureson Ockham, either in public or private gatherings, and from holdingdisputations concerning his work, or even from referring to his opin-ions in lectures or disputations. A year later, on November 21, 1340, anumber of Parisian students and bachelors of theology, among themNicholas of Autrecourt, were called to Avignon to answer charges oferroneous teaching. On December 29, 1340, a series of opinions andpractices, presumably associated with the supporters of Ockham, werecondemned by the Arts Faculty. Autrecourt was eventually condemnedat Avignon in 1346, and, in 1347, at Paris.

Until 1947 these documents and events were perceived as stages inone unfolding drama. What began as a reprimand in 1339 developedinto a prohibition in 1340 and eventually led to the condemnations ofNicholas of Autrecourt and John of Mirecourt, and to the formulationof a list of erroneous propositions that came to be known as the NewParisian Articles of 1347–1350.2 At the centre of the debate was Nicholas

* Coauthored with Katherine H. Tachau and originally published in History ofUniversities, 2 (1982), 53–96.

1 CUP II, n. 1023, pp. 485–486; n. 1041, p. 505; n. 1042, pp. 505–507; n. 1124,pp. 576–587; n. 1125, pp. 587–590.

2 The literature on this chapter of the University’s history is vast. On the writingsand events of these years see in particular: J. Lappe, Nicolaus von Autrecourt: sein Leben,seine Philosophie, seine Schriften, BGPM, VI, 2 (Münster i. W., 1908); C. Michalski, “Lescourants philosophiques à Oxford et à Paris pendant le XIVe siècle,” Bulletin international

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of Autrecourt, the supposed leader of the Ockhamist party at Paris. Themajority of masters took action against him and, by implication, againstOckham.

In 1947, however, E.A. Moody attempted to show that the documentof 1339 preventing the use of Ockham as an authoritative source wor-thy of exposition in lectures or citation in disputations, was unrelated tothe statute of 1340.3 The latter, in Moody’s estimation, concerned theteaching of Autrecourt, whom he dissociated from Ockham. Moodyalso examined the role of Buridan whom he believed had played aninstrumental role, as rector of the University, in the promulgation of the1340 statute—a fact which, if true, complicates any evaluation of Buri-dan’s attitude toward Ockham. Subsequently, both T.K. Scott, Jr., andRuprecht Paqué have questioned Moody’s solution and argued that thestatute of 1340 was aimed at Ockham, and that some of Autrecourt’steaching which was condemned was derived from Ockham.4

The matter is far from settled, despite the extensive and detailedstudy that has been given to the problem. There is, as yet, no agree-ment on the exact relation of the thought of Ockham and Autrecourt,nor of Ockham and Buridan. Among the aspects in need of clarifica-

de l’Académie Polonaise des sciences et des lettres. Classe d’histoire et de philosophie, 1919–1920(Cracow, 1922), 77–79; C. Michalski, “Les sources du criticisme et du scepticisme dansla philosophie du XIVe siècle,” International Congress of Historical Sciences: La Pologne auVe congrès international des sciences historiques (Bruxelles, 1924), 248, 267–268; C. Michalski,“Le criticisme et le scepticisme dans la philosophie du XIVe siecle,” Bulletin internat.de l’Acad. Polon. des sciences et des lettres. Classe d’hist. et de philos. (Cracow, 1927), 65–66,106–109 [reprinted in Michalski, La philosophie au XIVe siècle. Six études, ed. K. Flash(Frankfurt, 1969)]; J.R. O’Donnell, “The Philosophy of Nicholas of Autrecourt and hisAppraisal of Aristotle,” MS, 4 (1942), 97–125; J.R. Weinberg, Nicolaus of Autrecourt: A Studyin 14th Century Thought, (Princeton, 1948). On John of Mirecourt and the New ParisianArticles see G. Tessier, “Jean de Mirecourt: philosophe et théologien,” HLF, 40 (1966);W.J. Courtenay, “John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God CanUndo the Past,” RTAM, 39 (1972), 224–256; 40 (1973), 147–174 [reprinted in Courtenay,Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought (London, 1984)].

3 E.A. Moody, “Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt: The Parisian Stat-utes of 1339 and 1340,” FS, 7 (1947), 113–146; reprinted in E.A. Moody, Studies in MedievalPhilosophy, Science, and Logic (Berkeley, Calif., 1975), pp. 127–160. Moody’s position wasanticipated in some respects by Ph. Boehner, “Ockham’s Theory of Supposition andthe Notion of Truth,” FS, 6 (1946), 261–292; reprinted in Collected Articles on Ockham, ed.E.M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1958), pp. 232–267.

4 Ruprecht Paqué, Das Pariser Nominalistenstatut. Zur Entstehung des Realitätsbegriffs derneuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft (Berlin, 1970); T.K. Scott, Jr., “Nicholas of Autrecourt,Buridan, and Ockhamism,” JHP, 9 (1971), 15–41. See also L.D. Davis, “The IntuitiveKnowledge of Non-Existents and the Problem of Late Medieval Scholasticism,” NewScholasticism, 49 (1975), 410–430.

ockham, ockhamists, and the english-german nation 159

tion is the place of the English-German Nation in the crisis at Paris.The extant records of the Nation and of the Faculty of Arts are part ofa body of evidence suggesting that the crisis over the use of the worksand opinions of Ockham at Paris may have been principally a crisiswithin the English-German Nation, and that the frequent referencesto the ‘Ockhamists’ may well have referred not to Autrecourt, but tomasters, bachelors, and students in the Arts Faculty, some of whombelonged to the English-German Nation.

The Statutes

The Arts Statute of September 25, 1339

To all who shall view this present writing, each and every master of thefour Nations, namely of the French, Picard, Norman, and English, ever-lasting greeting in the Lord. He, who is not afraid of transgressing thosethings which the ancients decreed concerning legitimate and reasonablepractice, especially since he was bound by oath to observe it, would seemto deviate from the path of truth and not have God before his eyes.Since, therefore, we have sworn to observe a certain ordinance whichwas issued by our predecessors, who were not unreasonably concernedas to the books to be read publicly or privately among us; and becausewe ought not to read certain books not admitted by them or customarilyread elsewhere; and since in these times some have presumed to dog-matize the doctrine of William called Ockham, publicly and secretly byholding small meetings on this subject in private places—despite the factthat this doctrine has not been admitted by those in authority, has notbeen customarily read elsewhere, and has been examined neither by usnor by others to whom this might pertain, for which reason it does notappear to be free from suspicion—; hence we, mindful of our well-being,and considering the oath which we made to observe the abovementionedordinance, decree that henceforth no one shall presume to dogmatize thesaid doctrine by listening to it or lecturing on it publicly or in private,or by holding small meetings for disputing said doctrine, or by citing itin lecture or in disputations. If anyone should presume, however, to actagainst the above or any part thereof, him we suspend for a year, duringwhich time he may not obtain any office or degree among us, nor exer-cise in any way any office or degree already held. Moreover, if anyoneshould obstinately fail to observe the above statute, we will forever placehim under the aforesaid penalty.

Furthermore, since it is manifestly clear to us that in the disputationswhich take place in the rue de Fouarre, such abuse has developed, thatbachelors and others present at these disputations dare to argue on

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their own authority, showing little reverence toward the masters who aredisputing, and making such a tumult that the truth of the conclusionbeing debated cannot be arrived at, so that the said disputations are notin any way fruitful for the listening scholars; we therefore decree that nomaster, bachelor, or scholar argue without the permission and licence ofthe master holding the disputations, which licence he is not permitted torequest orally but only in writing with proper reverence. If any bacheloror scholar should act against the aforesaid, we wish him to be subjectedin every respect to the same penalties as in the previous statute. If anymaster should presume to argue in disputations, unless he becomes quietwhen required to do so by the master holding the disputations, we decreethat he is to be punished by being deprived of three lectures.

Enacted at St. Julian in our congregation of the Faculty, specially con-voked for legislating, in the year of our Lord 1339, on the Saturday afterthe feast of the blessed apostle Matthew. In witness of which we cause tobe affixed our seals with the signet of the rector.5

5 CUP II, pp. 485–486, n. 1023: ‘Universis presentes litteras inspecturis omnes etsinguli magistri quatuor nationum, videlicet Gallicorum, Picardorum, Normanorum etAnglicorum, salutem in Domino sempiternam. A tramite rationis deviare videtur necDeum habere pre oculis qui que ab antiquis sunt statuta super re licita necnon rationiconsona, transgredi non veretur, maxime cum ad hec juramenti vinculo fuerit obliga-tus. Cum igitur a predecessoribus nostris non irrationabiliter motis circa libros apudnos legendos publice vel occulte certa precesserit ordinatio per nos jurata observari,et quod aliquos libros per ipsos non admissos vel alias consuetos legere non debemus,et istis temporibus nonnulli doctrinam Guillermi dicti Okam (quamvis per ipsos ordi-nantes admissa non fuerit vel alias consueta, neque per nos seu alios ad quos pertineatexaminata, propter quod non videtur suspicione carere), dogmatizare presumpserintpublice et occulte super hoc in locis privatis conventicula faciendo: hinc est quodnos nostre salutis memores, considerantes juramentum quod fecimus de dicta ordi-natione observanda, statuimus quod nullus decetero predictam doctrinam dogmatizarepresumat audiendo vel legendo publice vel occulte, necnon conventicula super dictadoctrina disputanda faciendo vel ipsum in lectura vel disputationibus allegando. Si quistamen contra premissa vel aliquod premissorum attemptare presumpserit, ipsum perannum privamus, et quod per dictum annum obtinere honorem seu gradum inter nosnon valeat nec obtenti actus aliqualiter exercere. Si qui autem contra predicta inventipertinaces fuerint, in predictis penis volumus perpetue subjacere.

Insuper cum nobis liqueat manifeste quod in disputationibus que fiunt in vicoStraminum talis abusus inolevit quod bachellarii et alii in disputationibus dictis exis-tentes propria auctoritate arguere presumunt minus reverenter se habentes ad mag-istros, qui disputant, tumultum faciendo adeo et in tantum quod haberi non potestconclusionis disputande veritas, nec dicte disputaciones in aliquo sunt scolaribus audi-entibus fructuose: statuimus quod nullus magister, bachellarius aut scolaris, sine per-missu et licentia magistri disputationes tenentis arguat, quam licentiam sibi non liceatpetere verbaliter, sed tantummodo signative reverenter. Si quis autem bachellarius autscolaris contra premissa aliquid attemptaverit, penis in precedenti statuto positis modoet forma quibus supra omnino volumus subjacere. Si quis autem magister in dispu-tationibus arguere presumat, nisi requisitus a magistro disputationes tenente taceat,ipsum privatione trium lectionum decrevimus puniendum. Acta fuerunt hec apud


This statute of the Faculty of Arts, signed, sealed, and promulgatedon September 25, 1339 by the four nations comprising that Facultyand by the rector of the University, has traditionally been consideredthe first document testifying to the crisis precipitated by the spread ofOckham’s teaching at Paris. Drafted at the beginning of the autumnterm, the document presumably constituted a response to problemsthat had arisen in the previous academic year or years, i.e., 1338–1339or somewhat earlier.

The statute contains two sections. The first reaffirms the time-hon-oured right of the regent masters in Arts to specify which books areacceptable texts for lectures, whether public or private. This statutoryreaffirmation of corporate magisterial control over books read for theArts degree, was intended to stop the practice, on the part of some,of using the opinions and some work or works of Ockham as a basisfor lectures. The severity of the penalty indicates the seriousness withwhich the masters viewed the problem: a first offense would be pun-ished with suspension from office or promotion for a year, while furtherdisobedience would make those penalties permanent. The ‘offenders’were not masters but advanced students, bachelors, or those who hadrecently been licenced, since those same penalties are repeated in thesecond paragraph as applying only to bachelors and students.6

The second section concerns bachelors and ‘others’—probably in-cluding advanced students (e.g., opponents and respondents) and regentmasters—who presume to debate the opinions of the masters presidingat disputations, and with such controversy and tumult that the magis-terial determination cannot be settled.7 Anyone who does not have anofficial part in a disputation must obtain permission in advance fromthe presiding masters. Students and bachelors who do not comply are

Sanctum Julianum in nostra congregatione facultatis nobis specialiter ad statuendumvocatis anno Domini millesimo trecentesimo tricesimo nono, sabbato post festum beatiMathei apostoli. In quorum testimonium sigilla nostra cum signeto rectoris duximusapponenda.’

6 The penalty for a master in this and other statutes of the same period wasdeprivation of a certain number of lectures (usually three to five) and the income theselectures provided. Suspension from lecturing and being promoted for a year appliedonly to those beneath the level of master.

7 Disputations were held under the direction of a master whose task it was to givethe final determination of the question. Before that stage was reached, the question wasdebated by an ‘opponent’, who posed objections, and a ‘respondent’, who answeredthose objections. The disputation formed an important part of the academic exercisesof each faculty.

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to suffer the penalties detailed in the first section; disobedient mastersare to be penalized financially by being suspended from lecturing forthree teaching days.

It is usual to infer from this statute, as do Moody and Paqué, that theteaching of Ockham had resulted in such disruption that the Faculty ofArts felt compelled to restore order. The inference is tenuous, however,and is not supported by the text. The structure and language of thedocument do not imply that its authors related, as effect to cause,the disorder described in the second paragraph to the issue addressedin the first.8 On the contrary, not only does the document comprisetwo sections, but two distinct statutes. That it was so conceived by thosewho drafted it is stated in the second section, where the penalties setforth in the first section are described as ‘in the preceding statute’ (inprecedenti statuto). When, subsequently, an oath was instituted for all thoseincepting in Arts requiring them to swear to observe the requirementsof the second section of this document, the regulation on disputationsis described as the ‘statute contained in the other of the aforesaidtwo statutes concerning the scientia Okamica’. The meaning of the lastpart of this statement will be discussed below.9 For the present, it isimportant only to note that we are dealing with two separate decrees,the connection of which, if any, is unclear.

The two decrees promulgated in the statute of September 25 were, infact, part of a series of decrees enacted at that time by the regent mas-ters in Arts, who intended to reassert magisterial authority in the con-duct of lectures and disputations. On the following Monday, Septem-ber 27, 1339, the masters of the four nations again met in congregation,this time at St. Mathurin, to specify academic dress and proceduresfor expelling improperly attired students and masters from the class-room.10 The concerns of this document were unquestionably not doc-

8 The statute is not couched as are those where cause and effect are shown, usingsuch connections between paragraphs as praeterea. See, for contrast, CUP II, pp. 483–484, n. 1022: “Cum … Eapropter, generale Capitulum cupiens talibus scandalis obviare…” or the second paragraph of the Medical Faculty’s statute, CUP II, pp. 492–493,n. 1029.

9 See below, pp. 173–176. That the first paragraph of the act of September 25, 1339was viewed as a separate statute is supported also by the fact that the late-fourteenth orearly fifteenth-century copy of it preserved in Cracow, Bibl. Jag. 1391, fol. 49va does notcontain the second paragraph.

10 CUP II, p. 486, n. 1024: “Universis presentes litteras inspecturis omnes et sin-guli magistri quatuor nacionum, videlicet Gallicorum, Picardorum, Normanorum, etAnglicorum, salutem in Domino sempiternam. Justum esse censetur hos qui aliis presi-


trinal. Again the two levels of sanction were imposed: one year’s sus-pension for students and bachelors; deprivation of the right to lecturefor three teaching days for masters. Some, perhaps all, of this legis-lation was inscribed into the lost statute book of the English-GermanNation, lest any member plausibly claim ignorance as an excuse fortheir infringement.11 Four months later, in January 1340, the Faculty ofArts approved yet another statute, this time legislating the permissabledays for inception.12

dent velud deputati ad eorum eruditionis officium, maxime eorum officium exercendoseu quid commune pertractando, aliquali decentia habitus insigniri. Cum igitur ex reievidentia nobis appareat, quod nonnulli magistri congregationes et disputationes insuis mantellis, collobiis, seu tabardis ingredi non abhorreant, nec non in disputation-ibus bachelarii aut scolares in alio habitu, quam in capa manicata, ad sedes presumantaccedere, ex quibus posset grave contra nos oriri scandalum in futurum: hinc est quodnos super hiis providere cupientes statuimus quod decetero magistri ad disputationessue congregationes accedant in habitu decenti, videlicet capa, epitogio longo vel breviforrato. Et si in alio habitu accesserint, voces eorum in dictis congregationibus pro nullishabeantur.

Et requisiti in congregationibus generalibus vel facultatis per rectorem, in congre-gatione nationis per procuratorem, qui rector et procurator per quemcumque mag-istrum, in dicta congregatione existentem requisiti per suum juramentum eos requirereteneantur, in disputationibus per magistrum disputationes tenentem exire non exeant,tribus lectionibus ordinariis noverint se privatos. De bachelariis autem et scolaribus sicduximus ordinandum: quod si moniti per magistrum disputantem disputationes nonexeant, per annum sit eis omnis actus scolasticus interdictus.

Acta fuerunt hec apud S. Maturinum in nostra congregatione facultatis nobis spe-cialiter et expresse ad statuendum vocatis, anno Domini millesimo CCC tricesimonono, die lune post festum beati Mathei apostoli. In quorum testimonium sigilla nostracum signeto rectoris duximus apponenda.”

11 Matthew of Sweden recorded in the Liber procuratorum that during his term asprocurator of the English-German Nation, from September 24 to October 22, 1339,he saw to it that “two statutes, enacted in the Faculty of Arts and approved under theseals of the four nations and of the rector’s ring, were copied publicly into the Nation’sbook.” AUP I, col. 35: “Duo statuta facta in facultate et approbata quatuor nacionumsigillis et signeto rectoris fecti copiari in libro nacionis per manum pubplicam. Solvitautem contribucionem et pro dicta copia de pecunia, in qua nacioni tenebatur, etresiduum pecunie, in qua obligatus fuit, indulgebat sibi nacio, cum semel super hocfecit congregacionem nacionis.” The Procurator’s Book of the English-German Nationcontains the procurator’s record of the official enactments, meetings, promotions, elec-tions that fell within the terms of the elected leader of the Nation, who was chosen oncea month. CUP II, p. 501, n. 1037 mentions the complaint of the Picard Nation that ifstatutes continue to be enacted when ordinary lectures are not being held, the mastersmay well be absent and therefore ignorant of the statutes that, by their inception oaths,they have sworn to uphold.

12 CUP II, pp. 493–494, n. 1031: ‘Universis presentes litteras inspecturis omnes etsinguli magistri quatuor nationum, videlicet Gallicorum, Picardorum, Normanorum etAnglicorum, actu regentes Parisius in artium facultate, salutem in Domino sempiter-

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This active period of legislation was not limited to the Arts Fac-ulty. On November 22, 1339, the Faculty of Medicine ordered signed,sealed, and perpetually observed, a statute aimed at promoting ‘peaceand tranquility’ among the masters and students within its purview,and at ‘avoiding the shouts of master against master, master againstbachelor, and of bachelors against each other.’13 Specifically, the statute

nam. Noverint universi presentes pariter et futuri, quod nobis ex mandato venerabiliset discreti viri magistri Symonis de Weuchy nationis Picardie, tunc temporis rectorisUniversitatis Parisius, congregatis, ut moris est, positoque in deliberatione nostra pereundem rectorem, an placeat statuere quod nullus bachelarius seu licentiatus in art-ibus Parisius posset incipere per quamcunque viam in artium facultate, nisi in die quain eadem facultate actu et ordinarie legeretur: super quibus sic positis in nostra delib-eratione per eundem rectorem, ut premittitur, nos omnes et singuli magistri antedictiseu nationes prefatam facultatem constituentes habita primitus matura deliberatione,diligenti perscrutatione et consilio peritorum et expertorum in factis predicte nostrefacultatis, unanimi consensu, nullo penitus discrepante, deliberavimus et per modumexpedientis pro communi utilitate ac honore dicte facultatis ordinavimus, ac etiamsolempniter statuimus quod nullus bachelarius vel licentiatus in artibus Parisius ullounquam tempore futuro posset in dicta facultate per quemcumque modum incipere,nisi die tali in qua eadem facultate actu et ordinarie legetur, nisi tamen per eandemfacultatem ad hoc specialiter, sufficienter et expresse vocatam cum eo vel cum eis fueritdispensatum. Quod quidem presens statutum habuimus et habemus ratum, gratum,et pro correcta reputavimus simpliciter ejus formam, promittendo ipsum quantum dejure possumus perpetuo inviolabiliter observare. Acta fuerunt hec apud S. Maturinumin congregatione nostre facultatis nobis sufficienter et specialiter ad statuendum vocatisanno Domini MCCC tricesimo nono, die mercurii duodecima mensis Januarii. In quo-rum testimonium sigilla nostra una cum signeto rectoris hiis presentibus litteris duximusapponenda.’

13 CUP II, pp. 492–493, n. 1029: ‘Noverint universi quod anno Domini millesimotrecentesimo tricesimo nono, die lune in vigilia beati Clementis, Hugone Sapientisdecano facultatis medicine, vocata facultate predicta per bidellum juratum, ut morisest, ad statuendum et ordinandum propter pacem et tranquillitatem inter magistrosac etiam bachalarios et ad evitandum clamores magistri contra magistrum ac etiamcontra bachalarios et bachalariorum ad invicem, et ad communem utilitatem scolariumstudentium in dicta facultate, et ut veritas quesiti in disputationibus melius inquiratur,ordinavit et statuit quod quilibet bachalarius arguat unum argumentum incipiendoab uno fine, et sic consequenter more solito usque ad alium finem ita quod nullussit ausus plus arguere vel alio quoquomodo nisi prius habita licentia et obtenta amagistro disputante, sed quilibet taceat ut respondens audiatur. Et ut melius veritasargumentorum secundum ejus intentionem habeatur, voluit etiam quod ad hoc omnesbachalarii per suum juramentum tam presentes quam futuri astringantur. Si quis autembachalarius inventus fuerit rebellis contra predictum statutum, voluit et statuit quod inanno jubileo sequenti primo ad licentiam non admittatur, sed potius totaliter per totamfacultatem pro inhabili ad concurrendum in disputationibus cum aliis et ad dictamlicentiam pro anno, ut superius est expressum, reputetur.

Statuit etiam et ordinavit quod magistri exeuntes in predictis disputationibus, factissuis primis argumentis, ut moris est, incipiendo ab antiquiori nullus sit ausus arguereper suum juramentum et sub pena amissionis quinque lectionum primarum ordinar-


proscribes deviation from customary, straightforward argument; inter-ruption of disputants; and additional arguments interjected into thedisputation without the prior permission (petita et habita licentia) of theofficiating master. The signers of this statute announce that these regu-lations are enacted for the better investigation of the truth of the matterinto which a disputation inquires; hence, they require that present andfuture bachelors alike shall swear to uphold the statute. Any bachelorwho rebels against the statute is not to be licenced; that is, the statutespecifies, the entire Faculty of Medicine must treat him as unqualifiedto participate in disputations for an entire year. To promote enforce-ment, masters too are obliged under oath to observe these regulations,under pain of suspension of lectures for five teaching days.

Similarly, on October 12, 1340, the Faculty of Canon Law passed leg-islation concerning a range of academic issues, including, for example,prerequisite preparation for legal study, minimum attendance require-ments, and the scheduling of lectures on the Decretales and Decretum.14

Several items, however, echo the statutes already issued by the Facul-ties of Arts and Medicine. Masters, bachelors, and students are to wearproper academic garb; they are not to disrupt the lectures of doctors orbachelors ‘by whistling, stamping, and disturbance of any sort;’ they are

iarum in replicationibus, nisi petita et habita licentia primitus a magistro disputante.Ordinaverunt etiam quod uno arguente, tam bachalario quam magistro, alter ipsumnon impediat sub penis impositis. Presentibus ad hec reverendis doctoribus et magistris… una cum dicto decano. Et concesso postea petito a dicto decano ab aliis magistrisregentibus in villa Parisiensi in predicta facultate, voluit insuper ut ad perpetuam reimemoriam inviolabiliter observetur, quod istud statutum in litteris redigatur magno sig-illo facultatis sigillatis, ac etiam in libro facultatis copia redigatur in scriptis, et deuteroprestatuto habeatur. Acta fuerunt hec anno et die supradictis mensis Novembris.’

14 CUP II, p. 504, n. 1040: ‘Itemque portabunt vestes, presertim superiores, honestaset decentes; religiosi vero pro vestibus superioribus habebunt flocum aut cucullam, velalium habitum, secundum statum sue religionis.

Itemque ipsi, cujuscumque status sint vel condicionis, non deferent sotulares ros-tratos seu fenestratos, caligas rubeas seu soleatas, nec capucia nodata, seu alios habitusvel colores pannorum a jure prohibitos.

Itemque non impedient doctores vel alios legentes, seu actus scolasticos exercentesbedellos vel alios officiarios dicte facultatis, sibilicionibus, percussionibus et perturba-tionibus quibuscumque.

Item, in disputacionibus, repeticionibus, lecturis solempnium decretalium, proposi-tis, harengis, et festis doctorum, deferre tenebuntur graduatis antiquioribus et majoribusin sedibus recipiendis, ita quod decetero primam et secundam banchas pro hujusmodigraduatis et aliis supra expressis dimittent scolares in talibus actibus vacuas, prout etiamest in theologica facultate fieri consuetum.

Itemque non audient jura canonica extra vicum Clausi Brunelli, nisi juxta disposi-cionem facultatis.’

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to observe academic rank in seating themselves at lectures, disputations,or feasts; and they are not to attend lectures in canon law outside thestreet in which the official lectures in canon law are held.

When viewed in the context of the disciplinary legislation of theFaculties of Arts, Medicine, and Law between September 1339 andOctober 1340, the disruption of disputations was a university-wideproblem of disorderly conduct met with a university-wide effort tore-establish orderly teaching. Ockham’s thought was not the cause ofthe disruptions in Medicine and Law; at most his opinions may havebeen used as a means of disrupting lectures and disputations in Arts.It is probably safer to conclude, however, that the two sections of thestatute of September 25, 1339, are simply two items in a longer list ofdisciplinary decrees, otherwise unrelated.

Three further observations concerning the first of the two statutesenacted on September 25 should be noted. In the first place, as Boeh-ner and Moody correctly noted, Ockham’s opinions are not con-demned in this statute. The first paragraph states instead that, sinceOckham is not yet recognized as a legitimate authority among themasters of Arts, no one should lecture on his writings or cite him indisputations as if he were. The masters render no evaluation of Ock-ham’s thought, nor do they address the issue of whether Ockham’sbooks might, at some future time, be added to the list of recognizedauthoritative texts.

Secondly, the doctrina Guillermi dicti Okam to which the documentrefers cannot have been Ockham’s theological teaching, which lay out-side the legitimate authority of the masters of Arts, but must havealluded to Ockham’s philosophical oeuvre: his writings in logic orphysics.15 Thirdly, Nicholas of Autrecourt cannot have been the occulttarget of the statute. At the time of the statutes enacted on Septem-ber 25, 1339, Nicholas had all but completed his theological education;he had ceased to be a student in Arts more than a decade earlier.16 Yet

15 There were numerous University prohibitions against masters and bachelors inthe Arts Faculty discussing points of theology. For example, CUP II, p. 675: ‘nullamquestionem pure theologicam disputabitis, ut de Trinitate vel Incarnatione.’ See alsothe introduction to Iohannis Buridani tractatus De consequentiis, ed. H. Hubien, PhilosophesMédiévaux 16 (Louvain/Paris, 1976), pp. 8–9.

16 CUP II, p. 505, n. 1041, in the letter of Benedict XII to William, Bishop of Paris,November 21, 1340, citing Autrecourt to Avignon, the latter is described as ‘licentiatum… in theologia,’ an academic rank that required at least ten years of theological studybeyond the master of Arts. On March 4, 1338, when he is made a canon of Metz,he is described as ‘master in Arts and bachelor in Theology and in Law’; Reg. Vat.


the statute prohibiting the dogmatizing of Ockham was, as the sanc-tions reveal, directed against advanced students and bachelors in theArts Faculty, not against masters (who presumably had not participatedin such an innovation in the Arts curriculum). Even had Nicholas stillbeen teaching in the Arts Faculty in 1338–1339 while completing histheological studies, he had long since ceased to be part of the groupwhose behaviour had occasioned the statute.

The Arts Statute of December 29, 1340

To all who may see the present writing, from all and each of the regentmasters at Paris in the Faculty of Arts, greeting in the Lord. Everyoneought to prevent errors to the best of his ability and to preclude byevery means the path to those, especially since by them knowledge of thetruth may be concealed. But since it has come recently to our attentionthat some in our Faculty of Arts, adhering to the pernicious cunning ofcertain men, not founded on firm rock, seeking to know more than isfitting, are striving to disseminate unsound views from which intolerableerrors not only about philosophy but even concerning divine scripturemay arise in the future; desiring to remedy such a pestiferous disease, wehave collected their profane assumptions and errors in so far as we could,decreeing concerning them in this wise:

Namely, let no masters, bachelors or scholars in the Faculty of Artslecturing at Paris venture to say that any famous proposition of theauthor whose text they are lecturing on is false absolutely or is falseaccording to the literal sense of the utterance (de virtute sermonis), if they

Benedict XII, an. 4, p. 2, ep. 43, fol. 39v. That would place his reading of the Sentencesin or before the academic year 1337–1338. While it is true that masters of Arts whowent on to a higher faculty were still bound by oath to obey the statutes of the ArtsFaculty and their Nation and not to reveal their secrets, legislation of 1339 designedto quiet Autrecourt would have originated in the Faculty of Theology. By contrast, thefirst clause of the 1339 statute of the Faculty of Arts was aimed at bachelors of Arts thenteaching in that Faculty. Paqué acknowledges that Autrecourt, as licentiate in theology,lies outside the scope of the Arts legislation of 1339–1340; Pariser Nominalistenstatut,pp. 176–177.

It should also be noted that the statutes of the Faculty of Arts are binding only onthose who are or were members of that Faculty. The Oath sworn by the doctors of thehigher faculties who had not reigned in Arts when attending the General Congregationdiffered from the oath of those who had reigned in Arts. Non-M.A.s swore only toobserve the privileges, statutes, law, liberties, and customs of the University. Thosewho had incepted in Arts swore, in addition, to observe the privileges, statutes, etc.of the Faculty of Arts and specifically of their Nation. As Rashdall expressed it, MedievalUniversities, vol. I (Oxford, 1936), p. 324: ‘… the consent of all faculties would have beenpractically necessary to make a resolution or statute binding upon all.’

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believe that the author had true understanding in positing it. Instead, letthem either concede it or distinguish the true sense from the false sense,because by the same reasoning propositions from the Bible would have tobe denied in their literal wording (absoluto sermone), which is perilous. Andsince an utterance (sermo) has no sense (virtus) except by the impositionand common usage of authors and others, therefore the sense of anutterance (virtus sermonis) is such as authors commonly employ it and asthe material demands, since utterances are to be received according tothe subject matter.

Further, let no one state of any proposition which would be false accord-ing to the personal supposition of its terms, that the proposition is falseabsolutely or according to the literal sense of the utterance (de virtute ser-monis), since this error leads to the prior error, and authors frequentlyemploy other suppositions [rather than personal supposition].

Further, let no one say that no proposition is to be distinguished, sincethis leads to the aforesaid errors, because if the pupil receives one senseof the proposition and the doctor understands another, the pupil willbe falsely informed until the proposition is distinguished. Similarly, ifthe opponent [in a disputation] receives one sense and the respondentunderstands another sense, it will be a disputation in name only, if adistinction is not made.

Further, let no one say that no proposition is to be conceded if it isnot true in its proper sense, because to say this leads to the aforesaiderrors, since the Bible and authors do not always employ words intheir proper sense. Therefore, one ought rather to attend to the subjectmatter in affirming or denying utterances (sermones) than to the propertyof the utterance (ad proprietatem sermonis). For a disputation concerningthe property of the utterance and receiving no proposition except in itsproper sense is nothing other than a sophistical disputation. Dialecticaland doctrinal disputations which aim at investigation of truth have slightregard for names.

Further, let no one say that there is no scientific knowledge (scientia) ofthings which are not signs, that is, which are not terms or expressions,since in the sciences we use terms for things which we cannot carry todisputations. Therefore, we have scientific knowledge of things, albeit bymeans of terms or expressions.

Further, let no one assert without distinction or explanation that Socratesand Plato, or God and creature are nothing, since those words at firstsight sound bad, and since such a proposition has a false sense, namely, ifthe negation implicit in this word ‘nothing’ should be understood to fallnot only on ens singly but on entia plurally.

If, moreover, anyone should presume to violate the above articles or anyof them, him we expel and reject from our society now and for the futureand wish to be considered expelled and rejected, saving in all respects


what we have decreed elsewhere as to the doctrine of William calledOckham, which we wish firmly maintained in every way.

Given at Paris under the seals of the four nations, namely French, Picard,Norman and English, together with the signet of the rector of the Uni-versity of Paris, A.D. 1340, the Friday after Christmas.17

17 CUP II, pp. 505–507, n. 1042: ‘Universis presentes litteras inspecturis omnes et sin-guli magistri actu regentes Parisius in artium facultate, salutem in Domino. Erroribusobviare, quantum potest, unusquisque tenetur, et viam omnimode ad eos precludere,maxime cum ex hiis possit agnitio veritatis occultari. Verum quia ad nostram noviterpervenerit notitiam, quod nonnulli in nostra artium facilitate quorundam astutiis per-niciosis adherentes, fundati non supra firmam petram, cupientes plus sapere quamoporteat, quedam minus sana nituntur seminare, ex quibus errores intolerabiles nedumcirca philosophiam, sed et circa divinam Scripturam, possent contingere in futurum:hinc est, quod huic morbo tam pestifero remediare cupientes eorum fundamenta pro-phana et errores, prout potuimus, collegimus, statuentes circa illa per hunc modum:

Videlicet quod nulli magistri, baccalarii, vel scolares in artium facultate legentesParisius audeant aliquam propositionem famosam illius actoris cujus librum legunt,dicere simpliciter esse falsam, vel esse falsam de virtute sermonis, si crediderint quodactor ponendo illam habuerit verum intellectum; sed vel concedant eam, vel sensumverum dividant a sensu falso, quia pari ratione propositiones Biblie absoluto sermoneessent negande, quod est periculosum. Et quia sermo non habet virtutem, nisi eximpositione et usu communi actorum vel aliorum, ideo talis est virtus sermonis, qualitereo actores communiter utuntur et qualem exigit materia, cum sermones sint recipiendipenes materiam subjectam.

Item, quod nullus dicat simpliciter vel de virtute sermonis omnem propositionemesse falsam, que esset falsa secundum suppositionem personalem terminorum, eo quodiste error ducit ad priorem errorem, actores enim sepe utuntur aliis suppositionibus.

Item, quod nullus dicat quod nulla propositio sit distinguenda, quoniam hoc ducitad predictos errores, quia si discipulus unum propositionis sensum recipit, et doctoralium intellexerit, discipulus falso informabitur, donec propositio distinguetur. Similitersi opponens unum sensum recipiat, et respondens alterum sensum intelligat, disputatioerit ad nomen tantum, si non fiat distinctio.

Item, quod nullus dicat propositionem nullam esse concedendam, si non sit vera inejus sensu proprio, quia hoc dicere ducit ad predictos errores, quia Biblia et actores nonsemper sermonibus utuntur secundum proprios sensus eorum. Magis igitur oportet inaffirmando vel negando sermones ad materiam subjectam attendere, quam ad pro-prietatem sermonis, disputatio namque ad proprietatem sermonis attendens nullamrecipiens propositionem, preterquam in sensu proprio, non est nisi sophistica dispu-tatio. Disputationes dyalectice et doctrinales, que ad inquisitionem veritatis intendunt,modicam habent de nominibus sollicitudinem.

Item, quod nullus dicat scientiam nullam esse de rebus que non sunt signa, id est,que non sunt termini vel orationes, quoniam in scientiis utimur terminis pro rebus,quas portare non possumus ad disputationes. Ideo scientiam habemus de rebus, licetmediantibus terminis vel orationibus.

Item, quod nullus asserat absque distinctione vel expositione, quod Socrates et Plato,vel Deus et creatura nichil sunt, quoniam illa verba prima facie male sonant, et quiatalis propositio sensum unum habet falsum, videlicet si negatio in hac dictione ‘nichil’implicita intelligeretur cadere non solum super ens singulariter, sed et supra entiapluraliter.

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This statute, enacted by the Faculty of Arts on December 29, 1340,is disciplinary in nature and is concerned with styles of argumenta-tion and the analysis of propositions, not with particular philosophicalpositions. Its focus is the loss of intellectual rigor resulting, or likely toresult, from misapplications or ignorance of the rules of logical anal-ysis. Yet some historians have argued that the practices condemnedwere derived from Ockham’s writings and that the statute, in correctingcontemporary abuses, was ultimately directed against Ockham. Thisassumption, proposed by Michalski, rejected by Boehner and Moody,and revived by Paqué and Scott,18 is based on two kinds of evidence:internal and external. The internal evidence consists in the supposedparallels between Ockham’s views and the practices censured in thestatute. The external evidence comprises several statements that seem-ingly identify this document as a censure of Ockhamist errors.

The internal evidence unfortunately proves little. Everyone acknowl-edges that Ockham’s name is not connected with the practices pro-scribed in the body of the document,19 but only appears at the end ofthe text as part of a reference back to the legislation of September 25,1339. Without such a direct ascription to Ockham, the parallels pro-posed remain unconvincing, especially since they are often taken out ofcontext or concern supposition theory or propositional analysis de vir-

tute sermonis that either do not accord with Ockham’s views or are notunique to Ockham.20 On the other hand, even though the articles bear

Si quis autem contra premissa, vel aliquod premissorum attemptare presumpserit, anostro consortio ex nunc prout ex tunc resecamus et privamus, resecatum et privatumhaberi volumus, salvis in omnibus que de doctrina Guillelmi dicti Ockam alias statu-imus, que in omnibus et per omnia volumus roboris habere firmitatem. Datum Pari-sius sub sigillis quatuor nationum, videlicet Gallicorum, Picardorum. Normannorum etAnglicorum, unacum signeto rectoris Universitatis Parisiensis, anno Dommini MCC-CXL, die verneris post Nativitatem Domini.’

18 C. Michalski, “Le problème de la volonté à Oxford et a Paris au XIVe siècle,”Studia Philosophica: Commentarii Societatis Philosophicae Polonorum, 2 (Lwow, 1937), 255–261;P. Boehner, Collected Articles, pp. 248–253; E.A. Moody, Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Sci-ence, and Logic, pp. 127–160; R. Paqué, Das Pariser Nominalistenstatut; T.K. Scott, “Nicholasof Autrecourt, Buridan, and Ockhamism.”

19 The rubric, stating that the statute concerned ‘reprobatione quorundam errorumOckanicorum,’ will be discussed below, p. 171.

20 For a discussion of Ockham’s understanding of de virtute sermonis see Boehner, Col-lected Articles, pp. 248–253, and more recently, F. Inciarte, “Die Suppositionstheorie unddie Anfänge der extensionalen Semantik,” in Antiqui und Moderni, Miscellanea Mediae-valia, 9 (Berlin, 1974), pp. 126–141. On supposition theory in Ockham and his contem-poraries, in addition to the above, see: P. Boehner, “Ockham’s Theory of Suppositionand the Notion of Truth,” in Collected Articles, pp. 232–267; E.A. Synan, “The Univer-


little resemblance to Ockham’s actual theories and methods, those whodrafted the list of articles may have thought that these practices wereOckhamist or that persons in the Arts Faculty were engaging in thesepractices in the name of Ockham. No matter how faint or strong theecho of Ockham in the articles of December 29, 1340 is felt to be, thistype of internal evidence can never tell us whether the regent mastersdid or did not have Ockham specifically in mind. The only importantclue is the final paragraph of the statute, which reminds the readerthat the prohibition on using Ockham’s works as texts for lectures anddisputations is still in force. This addition suggests, as Moody rightlyobserved, that those who drafted the statute suspected that it could, butintended that it should not, be construed as any legitimation of Ock-ham’s writings.21

The external evidence associating the 1340 statute with Ockhamism,however, looks sufficiently convincing on the surface. First, the statute,even in the manuscript, bears the rubric ‘Statutum facultatis, de reprobatione

quorundam errorum Ockanicorum.’22 Second, the Procurator’s Book of the

sal and Supposition in a Logica attributed to Richard of Campsall” in Nine MediaevalThinkers, ed. J.R. O’Donnell (Toronto, 1955), pp. 183–232; John Buridan, “Tractatusde suppositionibus,” ed. M.E. Reina, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, 12 (1957), 175–208, 323–352; P. Boehner, “A Medieval Theory of Supposition,” FS, 18 (1958), 240–289;P.T. Geach, Reference and Generality (Ithaca, 1962); D.P. Henry, “Ockham, Suppositio, andModern Logic,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 5 (1964), 290–292; G.B. Matthews,“Ockham’s Supposition Theory and Modern Logic,” The Philosophical Review, 73 (1964),91–99; T.K. Scott, “Geach on Supposition Theory,” Mind, 75 (1966), 586–588; C. Gia-con, “La suppositio in Guglielmo di Occam e il valore reale delle scienze,” in Arts libérauxet philosophie au moyen âge (Montreal, 1969), pp. 939–947; R. Price, “William of Ock-ham and Suppositio Personalis,” FS, 30 (1970), 131–140; J. Swiniarski, “A New Presen-tation of Ockham’s Theory of Supposition with an Evaluation of Some Contempo-rary Criticisms,” FS, 30 (1970), 181–217; A.R. Perreiah; “Approaches to Supposition-Theory,” The New Scholasticism, 45 (1971), 381–408; L.M. de Rijk, “The Developmentof suppositio naturalis in Mediaeval Logic,” Vivarium, 9 (1971), 71–107, 11 (1973), 43–79;S.F. Brown, “Walter Burleigh’s Treatise De Suppositionibus and Its Influence on Williamof Ockham,” FS, 32 (1972), 15–64; G.B. Matthews, “Suppositio and Quantification inOckham,” Noûs, 7 (1973), 13–24; P.T. Sagal, “Refuting and Defending Supposition The-ory,” The New Scholasticism, 47 (1973), 84–87; P.V. Spade, “Ockham’s Rule of Supposi-tion: Two Conflicts in His Theory,” Vivarium, 12 (1974), 63–73; S.F. Brown, “GerardOdon’s ‘De Suppositionibus’,” FS, 35 (1975), 5–44; C. Knudsen, “Ein Ockhamkritis-cher Text zu Signifikation und Supposition und zum Verhältnis von erster und zweiterIntention,” CIMAGL, 14 (1975), 1–26; P.V. Spade, “Some Epistemological Implicationsof the Burley-Ockham Dispute,” FS, 35 (1975), 212–222; M.M. Adams, “What doesOckham mean by ‘Supposition’?” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 17 (1976), 375–391;P.T. Geach, “Distribution and Suppositio,” Mind, 84 (1976), 432–435.

21 Moody, Studies in Medieval Philosophy, pp. 158–159.22 Paris, Arch. Univ., Reg. 100 (formerly 94), p. 67, n. 59.

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English-German Nation a few months later refers to a recent statuteof the Faculty of Arts against certain new opinions of those called‘Occhanistae.’23 Finally, an oath formula from 1341 listing the things tobe sworn before the rector by one incepting in Arts, includes extractsfrom two statutes de scientia Okamica.24 One of the extracts comes fromthe statute of September 25, 1339. Would not the other refer to thestatute of December 29, 1340?

Moody was probably right in believing that the rubric was an inter-pretation rather than a fact, although he gave the wrong reasons.Paqué noted that the rubric was not an editorial insertion by Deni-fle, as Moody thought, but occurs in the manuscript copy of the statute,namely the Chartulary of the University of Paris from 1200 to 1355.25

The manuscript, however, is not a contemporary record book in whichstatutes were successively entered as they were enacted. It is copied inone hand of the fifteenth century, and the documents rearranged to suita conceptual rather than a strict chronological arrangement.26 Thereis no way to know when the rubric was attached to the statute. Weonly know this occurred by the time the fifteenth-century copy was pre-pared.

Although the Chartulary is not a contemporary witness to the eventsof 1340, the second piece of external evidence comes from a source thatis, namely the Procurator’s Book of the English-German Nation.27 Thismanuscript is a record book in which the elected head, or ‘procurator’of the English-German Nation, recorded the Nation’s acts during themonth of his term. The succession of mid-fourteenth-century hands

23 Paris, Arch. Univ., Reg. 2, fol. 40v; AUP I, cols. 44–45.24 C.E. Du Boulay, Historia Universitatis Parisiensis a Carole M. ad nostra tempora, vol. IV

(Paris, 1668), p. 273; CUP II, p. 680; Paqué, p. 24.25 Moody, Studies in Medieval Philosophy, p. 157: “It is the presence of this [final]

sentence in the statute of 1340 which caused the editors of the Chartularium to describeit as an anti-Ockhamist measure.…” On this point see Paqué, p. 23. The manuscript isParis, Arch. Univ., Reg. 100 (formerly 94), p. 67, n. 59.

26 For all the discussion of the rubric, it is surprising that no one thought to date themanuscript in which it appears. The rubric would reflect the intention of the authorsof the statute only if it was added at the time of the statute. But there is no manuscriptevidence to support that view.

27 The date of the register (Paris, Arch. Univ., Reg. 2) can be established by the mul-tiplicity of hands changing several times a year, the mid-fourteenth-century characterof the various scripts, and by the watermarks of the paper, which place it around 1340.The paper used came from northern Italy or southern France; see C.M. Briquet, LesFiligranes (Leipzig, 1923), n. 5747, 15771, 15753.


confirms that the manuscript is a contemporary rather than a latercopy; but its contents go no further than the Chartulary to establish theDecember 1340 statute as an attack on Ockhamists. On the contrary, ifaccurate, the record of the English-German Nation argues against iden-tifying the December 1340 statute as the statute against the Ockhamists,for the procurator Henry of Unna of Denmark, whose term ran fromJanuary 13, 1341 to February 10, 1341, recorded that:

Moreover, during the term of the same procurator a statute of theFaculty [of Arts] against the opinions of certain ones who are calledOckhamists was sealed in the house of the said procurator, and thesame statute was published before the University in a sermon at theDominican convent.28

If the statute of the Faculty of Arts against the new opinions of theOcchanistae was sealed and published during the procuration of Henryof Unna—and there is no reason why such a precise account writ-ten during his term or within a few months thereafter should not beaccurate—then it was sealed and published between January 13, 1341and February 10, 1341. But the statute we have just examined wasalready published under the seals of the four nations and the seal ofthe rector of the University, Alain of Villa Colis,29 at the end of Decem-ber 1340.

Similarly, the oath formula of 1341 leads one to conclude that thestatute of December 1340 is not a statute against the Ockhamists. Therelevant sections of the oath are as follows:

Moreover, you shall swear that you shall observe the statutes made bythe Faculty of Arts against the scientia Okamica, nor sustain in any way

28 AUP I, cols. 44–45: ‘Item tempore procuracionis ejusdem sigillatum fuit statutumfacultatis contra novas opiniones quorundam, qui vocantur Occhaniste, in domo dictiprocuratoris, et puplicatum fuit idem statutum coram Universitate apud Predicatoresin sermone.’

29 Michalski seems to have been the first to assume, erroneously, that Buridan wasrector at the time of the statute, an error Moody perpetuated and which led him toquestion Ockham’s influence upon Buridan; Moody, Studies in Medieval Philosophy, p. 129.The rector was, however, chosen once every three months, at regular meetings for thatpurpose noted in the University calendar, CUP II, pp. 709–716. The procurator Conradof Megenberg records that he and Alain were elected the same day, i.e. December 23,1340 (AUP I, col. 44). Paqué, Pariser Nominalistenstatut, pp. 70–71, corrected Michalski’sand Moody’s error, but he assumes that the legislation of December 29 was probablyworked out before December 23, while Buridan was still rector. There is nothing sinisterin Buridan’s ceasing to be rector on the eve of the December 29 statute. One shouldalso be careful not to assign too great a legislative role to the rector, Buridan or anyother.

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whatsoever the said scientia and similar ones, but [sustain instead] thescientia Aristotelis and of his Commentator Averroes, and of the otherancient commentators and expositors of the said Aristotle, except inthose cases that are against the faith.

Moreover, you shall observe the statute contained in the other of theaforesaid two statutes concerning the scientia Okamica, namely that nomaster, bachelor or scholar should argue without the licence of themaster holding the disputations, which licence he is not permitted torequest orally but only in writing with proper reverence.30

The second oath is a direct quotation from the second section of thestatute of September 25, 1339. It does not say that the second sectionof that statute concerns the scientia Okamica, but rather that this oath orstatute can be found in a statute concerning the scientia Okamica, which iscertainly the case.

If the text of the second oath comes from this statute of 1339, the textof the first oath—or at least its subject matter—was probably derivedfrom the other of the two statutes against the scientia Okamica. But thestatute of—December 1340 says nothing about Aristotle or Averroes.The legislation does not concern anyone’s doctrina or scientia. It is anattempt to end a superficial and misleading style of argumentation andpropositional analysis.

Further evidence regarding the content of the second statute contra

scientiam Okamicam is given in the 1474 defense of nominalism by itsproponents:

The Faculty of Arts … made a statute in which it enjoined that thesaid doctrine should not be taught because it was not yet approved andexamined. And later it instituted an oath by which all swore not to teachthe same doctrine in cases where it was contrary to faith. [And this can

30 CUP II, p. 680: ‘Item jurabitis quod statute facta per facultatem artium contrascientiam Okamicam observabitis, neque dictam scientiam et consimiles sustinebitisquoquomodo, sed scientiam Aristotelis et sui Commentatoris Averrois et aliorum com-mentatorum antiquorum et expositorum dicti Aristotelis, nisi in casibus qui sunt contrafidem.

Item observabitis statutum contentum in altero predictorum duorum statutorum descientia Okamica, scilicet quod nullus magister, baccalarius aut scolaris sine licentiamagistri disputationes tenentis arguat: quam licentiam sibi non liceat petere verbaliter,sed tantummodo signative reverenter.’ In Paris, Arch. Univ., Reg. 3, fol. 57v, the firstof the two oaths and, from the second, the phrase ‘contentum in altero predictorumduorum statutorum de scientia Okamica, scilicet’ are missing, but they appear in DuBoulay, Historia IV, p. 273, where they were taken from the Procurator’s Book of theFrench Nation and where the oath is dated to the year 1341.


be found expressly in the Book of the Rector.] And in the same book arenoted four respects in which it is asserted that Ockham erred….31

Here we have a description of the first paragraph of the statute ofSeptember 25, 1339, a description of the oath of 1341 (with a significantdistortion), and a description of another statute listing four errors ofOckham. This last reference does not resemble the statute of December1340 either in structure or in content, for that statute prohibits sixarguments without attaching Ockham’s name to any.

The implication of the external evidence is that there were twostatutes against the Ockhamists. One is found in the first paragraphof the statute of September 25, 1339. The second was drafted andpromulgated in late January or early February 1341 and was eitherlost or removed when the statutes were revised, perhaps at a timewhen Ockham’s writings were considered more acceptable, as was thecase in the third quarter of the fourteenth century. In the text of theArts-Faculty oaths copied in the Procurator’s Register of the English-German Nation in 1365, all prohibitions against (and even mention of)the scientia Okamica are absent. The statute of December 1340 is not thesecond statute against the scientia Okamica. Like the second section of thestatute of September 25, 1339, it was a disciplinary measure designedto correct teaching abuses in the Arts Faculty. There are no groundsfor assuming that either the disruption of disputations or the style ofanalyzing propositions had anything to do with a crisis over Ockham.

Were the statute in question less famous, the possibility that theprocurator and the oath testify to a statute now lost would occasionlittle surprise. In the first place, the statute approved by the Faculty ofArts in December 1340 is not simply one of an isolated pair, the otherbeing that of September 25, 1339. Rather, as has been shown, bothoccur within a series of statutes enacted over the course of the sixteenmonths separating them. This fact removes the grounds for assum-ing that the December promulgation is the second of a pair and theonly statute to which Henry of Unna could be referring. More impor-tantly, there are obvious gaps in the records of the English-GermanNation, as for example, months in which no procuratorial records were

31 Translation taken from Lynn Thorndike, University Records and Life in the Middle Ages(New York, 1944; 1971), p. 357; document appears in Du Plessis d’Argentré, Collectiojudiciorum de novis erroribus, vol. I, pt. 2 (Paris, 1724), pp. 286–288. The bracketed sentencedoes not appear in Thorndike’s translation. For the Latin text, see note 104.

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kept.32 Nor is the second statute against the scientia Okamica the onlyexample of a statute of the Arts Faculty passed at that time whichdid not survive among the University statutes. In the summer of 1340Conrad of Megenberg (Monte Puellarum) noted that during this periodas procurator,

It was ordered by the Faculty of Arts that each of its masters actuallyregent in the Faculty is to wear his boneta or bereta on his head in all hispublic activities. Moreover, it was ordered that there be benches in theschools of the artists.33

The statute to which Conrad refers does not appear in the Chartularium

Universitatis Parisiensis.Knowledge that there had once been two statutes against the scien-

tia Okamica continued into the following century. The fifteenth-centuryversion of the University chartulary, mentioned above and written ata time of growing animosity between the via antiqua and the via mod-

erna (with which Ockham’s name was allied), attempted to include bothstatutes against the Ockhamists. For reasons of topic similarity or dra-matic effect, the organizer of that manuscript ignored chronologicalsequence and placed the statute of December 1340 (no. 59) immediatelyafter that of September 25, 1339 (no. 58), perhaps adding the rubric aswell. Whatever his motives, the second document he chose was not, infact, the second statute against Ockhamist errors.

The 1341 Ordinance of the English-German Nation

The English-German Nation’s concern over the Occhanistae grew moreheated in the course of 1341. At the beginning of the autumn term,almost nine months after the second statute against the scientia Okamica

and when Henry of Unna was again procurator, a decision originallymeant as a statute binding all members of the Nation was passed andentered in the Procurator’s Book:

32 For example, AUP I, cols. 35–36, where no records were kept for the period ofmid-November to mid-December, 1339.

33 AUP I, col. 40: ‘… ordinatum fuit per facultatem artium, ut unusquisque mag-istrorum actu regentium in facultate artium in actibus publicis portaret bonetum sivebyrretum in capite suo. Item, quod haberentur scampna in scholis artistarum.’ Simi-larly, the statute of January 1340 of the Faculty of Arts, which was signed and sealed inthe same manner as those of September, was apparently never entered into the Procu-rator’s Book of the English-German Nation; see AUP I, cols. 36–37.


Moreover, in the same congregation it was ordained that henceforth noone would be admitted to any legitimate acts of the said nation unlesshe first swear to reveal if he knows any from the secta Occanica to haveconspired together concerning the fostering of the sect or of erroneousopinions, or even to be sworn members or to hold small, secret meetings;otherwise, except by telling under oath if he knew, he would then incurthe penalty of perjury. And those present wished to make this ordinanceequivalent to a statute. This congregation took place at St. Mathurin inthe above mentioned year of our Lord [1341] on the first Friday after thefeast of St. Luke the Evangelist, at the ninth hour of the Blessed Virgin[Notre Dame], those masters present being Hugh of Douglas, WernerWolfram, John Kinhard, Nicholas of Cosfeld, Gerard of Marten, Andrewof Sweden, Conrad of Megenberg, Nicholas Drukken of Denmark, andRichard the Scot.34

This interesting document has received far less attention than it de-serves. In order to eradicate the so-called Ockhamists from their midst,the masters were instituting an oath, required of everyone before par-ticipating in any official acts of the Nation. Not only are masters, bach-elors, and scholars expected to inform on their colleagues, but shouldanyone not take the oath, he is ipso facto suspended from participatingin the academic life of the Nation. Anyone taking the oath who is laterdiscovered to have known more than he revealed, would be guilty ofperjury. This decision was adopted at a meeting of the regent and non-regent masters of the Nation.

In the Liber procuratorum this statute is marked through, as though tobe deleted or recopied in the Nation’s book of statutes. Perhaps thisis the work of the commission selected by the Nation a year and ahalf later, charged with ordering and reforming the Liber procuratorum by‘adding, diminishing, and clarifying the statutes and regulations’ of theNation.35 It is, therefore, not clear whether this statute was in forcebeyond June, 1343; but at the time of its signing—presumably with

34 AUP I, cols. 52–53: ‘Item in eadem congregatione ordinatum fuit, quod nullusdecetero admitteretur ad aliquos actus legitimos in dicta nacione, nisi prius juraretquod revelaret, si sciret aliquos de secta Occanica ad invicem conspirasse de sectavel opinionibus erroneis fovendis, vel etiam conjuratos esse vel conventicula habereocculta, aliter nisi jure diceret si sciret, ex tunc penam perjurii incurreret. Et hancordinacionem voluerunt equivalere statuto. Facta autem est hec congregatio apudSanctum Maturinum anno Domini supradicto, die veneris proxima post diem sanctiLuce ewangeliste hora none Beate Virginis presentibus magistris Hugone de Duclas,Wernero Wolfram, Johanne Kinhard, Nicholao de Cosfeldia, Gerardo de Marten,Andrea de Swecia, Conrado de Monte Puellarum, Nicholao Drukken de Dacia, etRichardo Scoto.’ This ordinance was also noted by Paqué, pp. 25, 35. AUP I, col. 64.

35 AUP I, col. 64.

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the consent of the procurator—nine masters were present. Those ninerepresented well over half the regent masters in the Nation.36

As interesting as the names of the signers of the ordinance are, thenames of the masters who did not sign and, by implication, were notpresent at the meeting is worth attention. There were probably manyreasons for absence, but among the non-signers was one master whowas sympathetic to Ockham or, at the very least, knew someone whowas. It is to the members of the English-German Nation that we mustnow turn.

The Masters of the English Nation

In 1339–1341, the English Nation at Paris had no English masters andprobably no English students. Hostilities between France and Englandmade Parisian study too difficult for the few English students Paris hadbeen able to attract in the previous decade. The same circumstancesdiscouraging the attendance of Englishmen encouraged growing num-bers of Scots to study at Paris where, until 1341, their king was resi-dent as the guest of his French allies.37 The composition of the EnglishNation was about equally divided among Scots, Germans, Dutch, andScandinavians. The conflict over the secta Occanica within the Nation,therefore, concerned Continental supporters and opponents, not Ock-ham’s countrymen.

Among the members of the Nation present on both occasions in 1341when opposition to the secta Occanica resulted in official action, was theDane, Nicholas Drukken. Some of his teaching has been preserved,for his lectures on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics survive in two manuscripts,both evidently written at Paris and one dated 1342.38 At that point

36 Those who were apparently regent at the time but who did not sign were Robertde Ffyf (de Cupir), regent master since 1340; Ulrich of Augsburg, regent since 1337;Suno of Sweden, regent since 1337; Suno Karoli of Sweden, regent since 1340; WalterWardlaw, regent since 1341; and probably Matthew of Sweden.

37 On the Scots at Paris see Donald E.R. Watt, “Scottish Masters and Students atParis in the Fourteenth Century,” Aberdeen University Review, 36 (1955–1956), 169–180;“University Graduates in Scottish Benefices before 1410,” Scottish Church History SocietyRecords, 15 (1973) 77–88; “Scottish Student Life Abroad in the Fourteenth Century,”Scottish Historical Review, 59 (1980), 3–21; “University Clerks and Rolls of Petitions forBenefices,” Speculum, 34 (1959), 213–229; A Biographical Dictionary of Scottish Graduates toA.D. 1410 (Oxford, 1977).

38 Nicholas Drukken’s commentary is preserved in Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Bibl.


Nicholas was already a master of arts, and he is designated magister bythe scribe who copied the lectures which, however, he expressly statesare Nicholas’s cursory lectures. This means that the lectures must havebeen delivered while he was a bachelor of arts, that is, before he waslicenced, since it was the duty of bachelors rather than masters todeliver the less-detailed, cursory reading of the approved texts.39 Theyears in which Nicholas is most likely to have lectured are 1338–1340,although the records for the years in which he would have ‘determined’are missing.40 Once they resume, however, Nicholas Drukken’s career atParis is well-outlined, and the frequency with which his name appears,as the offices to which he was elected, witness his rank among thepreeminent members of the Nation during the 1340s.

Although Nicholas does not actually name Ockham, his lectureson the Prior Analytics show indisputable familiarity with the latter’sSumma logicae, parts of which Nicholas silently incorporates verbatiminto his own commentary. From the Venerable Inceptor, Nicholas tac-itly accepts aspects of his theory of consequences, as well as his under-standing of supposition. On this last issue, which draws our attentionbecause so much modern controversy has focused on whether the sec-ond item prohibited in the Arts statute of December 1340 constitutesa proscription of Ockham’s theory, Nicholas sharply disputes the alter-native proposed by Ockham’s first Parisian critic, Walter Burley. More-over, when Nicholas criticizes Burley, he does so by name.41

der Stadt, CA 8° 74, fols. 1ra–34rb; and in Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 16621, fols. 249r–274r. The Erfurt manuscript is written in a single, Parisian hand, bearing the date1342. On Nicholas Drukken, see also: Jan Pinborg, “Nicolaus de Dacia—en dansklogiker fra det XIV århundrede,” Catholica, 25 (1968), 238–239; and Niels Jørgen Green-Pedersen, “Nicolaus Drukken de Dacia’s Commentary on the Prior Analytics—WithSpecial Regard to the Theory of Consequences,” CIMAGL, 37 (1981), 42–69. Green-Pedersen’s edition of the commentary along with an edition of Drukken’s Tractatus desuppositionibus edited by S. Ebbesen in Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi12 (Copenhagen, 1997).

39 Erfurt, CA 8° 74, fol. lra: ‘Circa librum Priorum. Omissa recommendatione,quia lectura est cursoria, quaeritur utrum syllogismus sit possibilis. Et arguitur primoquod non, quia aliquis syllogismus fuit et corrumpebatur et numquam regenerabatur:’fol. 34rb: ‘Expliciunt quaestiones magistri Nicolai de Dacia supra librum Priorum’.

40 The Liber Procuratorum is missing 13 folios, from 1333–1337. The date of Drukken’scursory lectures can only be approximately established by the date of his inception asregent master in 1341 (AUP I, cols. 44–45). The minimum time between determination(B.A.) and inception (M.A.) was one year, but the average in the English-GermanNation in this period was two or three years.

41 Green-Pedersen, “Nicholaus Drukken de Dacia’s Commentary,” analyzes thepoints of agreement. The relevant comparisons include Nicholas (Erfurt, CA 8° 74,

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It is not clear how much we should infer from Nicholas’s silencewhen it comes to naming Ockham as his source. If the lectures weredelivered before the autumn of 1339, then, as far as we know, the useof Ockham as an authority had not yet been a matter of legislation.In any event, if it is unclear whether Nicholas’s use of Ockham wasspecifically proscribed by the statute of September 25, 1339, it is evidentthat a work in which he did so continued to circulate after that date,with no recorded penalty for its author. It is therefore worth noting thatNicholas Drukken was one of the masters of the English Nation whosigned the ordinatio of September, 1341. He also changed promoters inthe autumn of 1340, incepting in January 1341 under Henry of Unnaof Skåne (then part of Denmark). It was Henry who, in the samemonth, as procurator of the English Nation provided his lodgings forthe signing and sealing of the second statute of the Arts faculty directedagainst the Occanistae.

If the proscription of the secta Occanica embraced the knowledge orcitation of Ockham’s Summa logicae, then it is possible that the notentirely uncommon change of mentor42 signals, in Nicholas’s case, a‘changing of sides’ for reasons of conscience or in order to be pro-moted. It is more likely, however, that the change was innocuous, sinceJohn Rathe, under whom Nicholas Drukken was licenced in May 1340,had ceased to act as a regent master in Arts by the autumn term of1340,43 and Nicholas was forced to find another promoter. Thereafterhe continues to appear in the records of the English-German nation,being elected procurator in November 1342, and again in February1343.44 In May of that year he was commissioned with other senior mas-

fols. 28ra–30ra); Ockham, Summa logicae, I, c. 64, in Opera philosophica et theologica. Operaphil. I, ed. Ph. Boehner, G. Gál, S. Brown (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974), pp. 195–197.

42 See, e.g.: Norman de Lesseley, who determined under Rathe in 1339, and inceptedunder Wardlaw in 1342; Thomas de Kinnemund, who determined under Kinhard in1340, but incepted under Wardlaw, 1342; Johan de Misna determined under Ulrich ofAugsburg, 1341, and was licenced by Werner Wolfram in 1341 (the event occurs twicein the records: AUP I, cols. 50, 51–52), but incepted under Ulrich again; and within thesame month in 1342: Bertold of Constance was licenced under Burchard of Constance,but incepted under Ulrich of Augsburg (AUP I, col. 57). Such examples could easily bemultiplied; see also Wardlaw and Portirstona, below.

43 Rathe’s name ceases to appear in the Liber Procuratorum with the end of the Springterm, AUP I, col. 39.

44 AUP I, cols. 45–46, Nicholas was short of the funds required to be inscribed onthe roll of benefice requests to be taken to Avignon. For Nicholas’s stints as procurator,see AUP I, cols. 60–61.


ters to reform the Liber procuratorum.45 In the meantime, his name alongwith Henry of Unna’s and, doubtless, most of the Nation, had beenincluded in the University’s roll of petitions for benefices. The resulthad been favourable, giving us the first record of a series of beneficeswith which he was provided at Aachen, Köln, Ribe, and Worms, mostof them after Nicholas had ceased to appear in Paris documents. Beforethat occurred, however, he had served three further terms as procura-tor, and had been elected rector of the University.46 Although his namedrops out of the Paris records after 1345, he probably continued—asothers did—to study there in a higher faculty, as he was later (1352)granted papal permission to be absent from his benefices for threeyears while pursuing his studies. It is likely that he studied theol-ogy, for in 1355 near the end of his life, he obtained appointment astreasurer at Worms at the request of the cardinal bishop of Auxerre,Petrus de Croso, who was also provisor of the Sorbonne.47 Several of

45 AUP I, col. 64.46 In March, 1342, the University began to organize the list (AUP I, cols. 55–56);

Nicholas’s and Henricus de Unna (Skåne)’s benefices are recorded in DiplomatariumDanicum, 3. Raekke, 1. Bind, 1340–1343 (København, 1958), pp. 216–220, n. 227–230,dated June 19, Avignon [also in Rotuli Parisienses. Supplications to the Pope from the Universityof Paris, ed. W.J. Courtenay, vol. I (Leiden, 2002), pp. 158–159, 241], and are followedby other grants and dispensations from Avignon and Villeneuve (the papal summerresidence) over the next month for Danes, some specified as scholars (pp. 223–226,n. 236–241), which indicates that they are a response to a benefice roll. See Watt,“University Clerks,” for a list of dates when Paris, is known to have drawn up such aroll. On Nicholas’s terms as procurator, see AUP I, cols. 66–67, 78, 80–81; he was rectorin March 1344 (AUP I, col. 69). Evidently he also taught for or leased space for teachingfrom the French Nation; AUP I, col. 78 records the subsidy from his own Nation.

47 In April, 1345, Nicholas was provided with a canonate at Köln with expectation ofprebend; Dipl. Danicum, 3. Raekke, 2. Bind, 1344–1347 (København, 1959), pp. 125–126,n. 143–144. On the 15th–20th of October 1351, a series of benefices and dispensationswere granted at Villeneuve for Danish scholars. Nicholas Drukken was provided witha canonate with expectation of prebend at Worms in exchange for the benefices atKöln; Dipl. Danicum, 3. Raekke, 3. Bind 1348–1352 (København, 1963), pp. 382–385,n. 494–495. The permission to remain absent from Worms to pursue studies ‘in locoubi studium vigeat generale’ is addressed to ‘Nicolao Drucken de Dacia canonicoWormaciensi magistro in Artibus’, July 4, 1352; Dipl. Danicum, 3. Raekke, 3. Bind,pp. 450–452, n. 570–571. The timing of this permission seems to coincide with thesubmission of a roll from Paris, AUP I, cols. 157–158, and Nicholas’s petition is after aseries of papal grants from late June (Dipl. Danicum, ibidem, pp. 443–446).

On 14 Dec. 1355, Nicholas was provided as treasurer of Worms at the request ofPetrus de Croso (Crozo), who claimed him as ‘magistri in artibus familiaris et continuicommensalis sui…’ Dipl. Danicum 3. Raekke, 4. Bind 1353–1356 (København, 1966),pp. 303–304, n. 368, which also lists him as canon of Worms, Ribe, and Aachen. Thestatement that Nicholas is a member of the Cardinal’s household and ate at his table

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Nicholas’s colleagues from the English-German Nation of 1339–1345enjoyed more illustrious careers; nevertheless, this is not the career ofa man ostracized from the academic life of his Nation and Univer-sity. Possibly the statute or ordinatio against the secta Occanica was notenforced; possibly his colleagues did not recognize Nicholas’s indebt-edness to Ockham’s thought or perjured themselves in maintainingsilence on the matter; probably, however, his adoption of aspects ofOckham’s logical thought was not what he and his colleagues had inmind when they instituted their oaths.

Among the Scots whom Nicholas would have known well while amaster of Arts were a number who became influential servants oftheir king, David II, and of the popes at Avignon. Two of the mostsuccessful were John Rathe and Walter Wardlaw.48 Already as juniormembers of the English Nation they—like many of the Scots whowould study under them—enjoyed political patronage, if not also eachother’s. As their postgraduate careers developed, so the Scots’s ‘youngboys’ network’ matured as well. For many Scots, the nexus of thatnetwork seems to have been Walter Wardlaw.

Wardlaw was a slightly younger contemporary of Nicholas Drukken,and studied under the same master, John Rathe. Determining underRathe in the spring after the famous Arts statutes of September 1339,and licenced by him in May or June 1340, Wardlaw received the M.A.under their fellow Scot, John of Kinhard, between April and June 1341,when Rathe was no longer serving as regent master. Their ties werenot broken at that point, however, for by the mid-1340s Wardlaw hadevidently followed Rathe into the study of theology, as he was preparedto begin lecturing in September 1349, and eventually became doctor

may indicate membership in the Sorbonne. Sorbonne documents show other collegemembers to have been members of Petrus de Croso’s household. See, for example,Geoffrey Lemaresch in 1346, described in P. Glorieux, Aux origines de la Sorbonne, I (Paris,1965), p. 301, and Elias de Corson, ibid., p. 308. On Petrus de Croso as provisor of theSorbonne see AUP I, cols. 41 and 162, and Glorieux, Aux origines I, p. 322.

Nicholas had died by 9 July 1357, when his benefices were provided to others; Dipl.Danicum, 3. Raekke, 5. Bind, 1357–1360 (København, 1967), pp. 41–46, n. 42, 46.

Given the standard nature of these benefices often used to support academic careers,there seems no reason to expect that Nicholas ever resided at Köln, Aachen, Ribe, orWorms, especially as he had concurrent canonries at the last three.

48 For their academic biographies, see Watt, Biographical Dictionary. To Rathe (or deRate, in Watt) and Wardlaw should be added William Grenlaw (de Viridi Monte), whobecame Papal Collector for Scotland and who helped Rathe and Wardlaw as well asmany other Scots at the papal curia. Although an influential member of the Nation,Grenlaw’s forte seems always to have been administration and diplomacy.


of Theology by 1358. In that year Rathe, who had in the meantimebecome the bishop of Aberdeen, seems to have assisted Wardlaw inobtaining a position as canon there. Wardlaw would not have neededRathe’s help in acquiring benefices much longer, for he had alreadyembarked on his career as secretary and envoy of the Scottish king.Eventually Wardlaw became bishop of Glasgow and, in 1383, the firstScot ever to be named a cardinal.

His career before he left Paris in 1357 was already unusual, forduring the seventeen years following his inception as a master of Arts,he remained regent for at least a part of almost every academic year,serving several times as procurator and at least once as the University’srector, in spite of his own advanced studies and nascent diplomaticcareer. When he left Paris behind him, he had sponsored at least fortyScots, twenty other students from Scandinavia, Germany, and the LowCountries, and even three Englishmen, for their Arts degrees.49

There is every reason to expect, therefore, that Wardlaw played amajor role in shaping the attitudes of the Nation as a whole. Unfor-tunately, none of Wardlaw’s lectures from his long teaching career hasyet been securely identified, although it seems probable that two Aris-totle commentaries of a Magister Gualterus Scotus deriving from Parisduring the years when he was by far the most important teacher inthe English Nation, are his.50 Until the identification is certain, how-

49 Wardlaw’s three Englishmen were at Paris in May, 1345. One, Robert Semeremay be the Robert Seymer studying at Oxford in 1342 according to Emden, BRUO III,p. 1675. The Scot, Thomas de Wedale who was procurator, carefully noted that thethree Englishmen were Anglici, AUP I, col. 82. Watt implies that Wardlaw’s teachingmay actually have helped attract Scottish students to Paris, in “Scottish Masters andStudents,” pp. 172–173; and Watt, Biographical Dictionary, p. 570. We can assume fromWardlaw’s readiness to lecture in 1349 that he had begun the study of theology withinthe first year of incepting, i.e. 1341, because we have some evidence of the length ofprior study required. In 1366, a student of theology might be permitted to deliver‘cursory’ lectures on the Bible only after six years of theological study; two more yearswere necessary before he was allowed to lecture on Lombard’s Sentences. These statutesapplied to seculars, i.e. those students not members of religious orders. The statutesof 1366 binding within the Theological Faculty are recorded in CUP II, appendix,pp. 698–707, n. 1189–1190. If anything, the length of study required was longer twodecades earlier.

50 Watt, Biographical Dictionary, p. 570, proposes Wardlaw as the author of QuaestionesMetaphysicae in Oxford, Bodleian MS Canon, misc. 226, fols. 43–46; we would liketo suggest also that the Quaestiones libri De anima in Sevilla, Bibl. Colombina, 7-7-13,fols. 65r–86r may be his. The explicit states: ‘Expliciunt quaestiones libri De animadisputatae Parisius secundum magistrum Gualterum Scotum. Et ego Jacobus eas scripsianno eiusdem nativitatis 1350 die martis de sero transacta prima hora quinta decima

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ever, we can only guess his attitude towards the secta Occanica and/orOckham from the circumstances of his career and friends. Certainly, henever suffered for any sympathies he may have borne towards Ock-ham, and it seems likely that he found some value in at least partof Ockham’s work. Although not present when the ordinatio was cre-ated in the autumn of 1341, he was presumably bound by it. Yet, thereis no evidence to suggest that he hindered Nicholas Drukken; and hewas present when, in May 1349, the Scot Richard of Portirstona, whohad determined and licenced under two of Wardlaw’s own students,deposited a copy of Ockham’s Logic with the Nation as a pledge for hislicencing fees.51

If Wardlaw saw nothing reprehensible in the ownership of Ockham’sLogic, it may be because he, like Nicholas Drukken, had been taughtby someone whose interest in Ockham’s opinions at the time of theordinatio of 1341 probably already went beyond the Summa logicae. Thiswas John Rathe who, by 1340, had been regent in Arts for many years.52

He was licenced in 1333, probably incepted in 1334, and, as notedabove, remained regent until the end of the academic year 1340. Whilehe was a regent in Arts, he was also a student in theology, giving up hisregency when he began to ‘oppose’ in theology.53 In 1342, he becamecursor, that is, a bachelor of the Bible, and in 1343 he began his lectureson the Sentences of Peter Lombard.54 As none of John Rathe’s workseems to have survived, the commentaries of his fellow bachelors onthe Sentences are the principal witnesses to his opinions. Two colleaguesin particular, the Augustinian Hermits Gregory of Rimini and AlfonsoVargas of Toledo, recorded their disputes with John Rathe, whom theycalled ‘Johannes Scotus.’55 It is fortunate that, in the absence of Rathe’s

die mensis decembris.’ Among the manuscript’s contents, in addition to treatises byKilvington and Burley we know were read at Paris, are the work of Oresme andWardlaw’s student Johannes de Wesalia. The manuscript is described in Charles Lohr,“Aristotelica Hispalensia,” Theologie und Philosophie, 14 (1975) 558–561.

51 AUP I, cols. 135, 137. Portirstona determined under Thomas de Wedale and waslicenced by William de Brenueth. Portirstona’s fees were unusually high, ‘XXX solidi’,in a nation which graduated their fees on the ability to pay. In Portirstona’s year, thosewho were charged at all were generally expected to pay 4 or 5 solidi to incept or belicenced. The book left with the nation was evidently considered sufficient collateral.

52 Watt, Biographical Dictionary, p. 465.53 Ibid.54 Rathe was a socius both of Gregory of Rimini (1343) and Alphonsus Vargas of

Toledo (1344). See Rimini, Lectura super primum et secundum sententiarum, ed. D. Trapp andV. Marcolino (Berlin, 1978–).

55 References to Rimini’s Lectura are to the Venice edition of 1522 (repr. St. Bonaven-


own words, Rimini is his opponent, for when we are in a positionto compare Rimini’s quotations with their sources, his has proven anaccurate and reliable record.56

Rimini’s Testimony

It is in the company of Ockham that Rathe appears in Rimini’s com-mentary. Whatever his sympathies for the Venerable Inceptor on someissues, Rimini was quite critical of many aspects of his thought, includ-ing his epistemological and psychological views.57 Chief among theopinions Ockham had advanced which Rimini had already attemptedto refute in several questions of his commentary before encounteringRathe’s position were Ockham’s elimination of sensible and intelligiblespecies and his understanding of intuitive cognition.58

ture, N.Y., 1955) and to the critical edition cited in the previous note. On Vargas seehis Sentences commentary, In primum sententiarum (Venice, 1490; repr. N.Y.: Cassiciacum,1952) and J. Kürzinger, Alfonsus Vargas Toletanus und seine theologische Einleitungslehre (Mün-ster i.W., 1930).

56 In the questions we discuss, for example, he quotes Ockham verbatim. His quo-tations from Adam Wodeham are so exact that they have enabled us to identify Wode-ham’s Lectura secunda and establish some of the content of his London lectures. SeeCourtenay, Adam Wodeham (Leiden, 1978), pp. 30–32, 123–131; G. Gál, “Adam of Wode-ham’s Question on the ‘Complexe Significabile’ as the Immediate Object of ScientificKnowledge,” FS, 37 (1977), 66–102.

57 The major areas in which Rimini was critical of Ockham were epistemologyand the doctrine of justification and grace. By contrast, however, Rimini acceptedmost aspects of Ockham’s natural philosophy, specifically his concept of time, motion,and relation. See Courtenay, “The Role of English Thought in the Transformationof University Education in the Late Middle Ages,” in Rebirth, Reform, and Resilience:Universities in Transition, 1300–1700, ed. J.M. Kittelson (Columbus, Ohio, 1983), pp. 103–162; Tachau, “The Response to Ockham’s and Aureol’s Epistemology: 1320–1340,” inEnglish Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries, ed. A. Maierù (Naples, 1982), pp. 185–217.

58 Rimini’s additiones are, in the opinion of the editors of the Rimini edition, for themost part earlier versions of arguments, articles, and questions that appear in the finalversion of his Lectura (1343–1346); see Lectura, vol. IV (Berlin, 1979), pp. xxxiv–xxxix.This means that II Sent., d. 7, q. 3, additio 36 (Lectura, V, pp. 98–117) probably predatesII Sent., d. 7, q. 3 (Lectura, V, pp. 118–162). In the former, Gregory discusses Ockham,with frequent cross-references back to his own I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, (e.g., p. 109, line 10).Rimini also discusses Ockham’s epistemology in II Sent., d. 7, q. 2 in a manner intendedto amplify remarks from the same discussion in book I, d. 3.

From the thirteenth century most scholastics had explained the processes of visualperception and the various psychological activities dependent upon it as requiringthe impression of object-generated images, or ‘species’, upon the sense organs. SeeAnneliese Maier, “Das Problem der Species sensibiles in medio und die neue Natur-

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The existence of species had been challenged at Paris by an influ-ential minority of scholars, some of whose works Ockham evidentlyknew. At least one author writing in the 1320s after Ockham, Michaelof Massa, had also disputed the existence of species, but he seemsnot to have read Ockham’s arguments.59 Although Ockham alludes tohis objections to species in his logical treatises, only the earlier Sen-

tences commentary contains any extensive argumentation against theirhypothesis.60 Rimini, who named Ockham rather than his Parisian pre-decessors as the author with whom he disagreed, knew Ockham’s viewsfrom the Sentences commentary, as a comparison of their treatmentsdemonstrates.61 Moreover, as Rimini recognized, Ockham’s eliminationof species was part and parcel of his understanding of intuitive cogni-tion, elaborated only in his theological work.62

philosophie des 14. Jahrhunderts,” Freiburger Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Theologie, 10(1963), repr. in Ausgehendes Mittelalters, II (Rome, 1967), pp. 419–451; Tachau, “The Prob-lem of the Species in medio at Oxford in the Generation after Ockham,” MS, 44 (1982),394–443.

59 Maier, “Das Problem,” discusses Durand of Saint-Pourçain and Peter of JohnOlivi, among others; Auriol describes Gerard of Bologna’s elimination of species, forwhich see Tachau, “The Response”.

For Massa, see Vatican, Vat lat. 1087, fols. 206va: “Sequitur secunda conclusioprincipalis pro prima parte, videlicet quod ab obiecto visibili non causatur in medioaliquid alterius rationis in esse nature ab ipso. Et per istam conclusionem volo haberequod ab obiecto visibile nihil causatur in medio, sed immediatus effectus eius sit ipsavisio causata in potentia visiva …. Pono ergo primam particulam negativam istiussecundae conclusionis sic: nulla apparet necessitas ponendi speciem representativamobiecti causatam ab ipso obiecto in medio…” Massa’s arguments continue throughfol. 211va. On Massa and the authenticity of this work, see D. Trapp, “Notes on SomeManuscripts of the Augustinian Michael de Massa (d. 1337),” Augustinianum, 5 (1965),58–133.

60 The pertinent sections of the Sentences commentary include II Reportatio, qq. 14–18, of which q. 14–15 is edited in Philotheus Boehner, “The Notitia Intuitiva of Non-Existents According to William Ockham: With A Critical Study of the Text of Ock-ham’s Reportatio and a Revised Edition of Rep. II, Q.14–15,” Traditio I (1943), 223–275.Brief discussions occur in Ockham’s Expositio in Librum Porphyrii de Praedicabilibus, c. 2,‘De specie’ in Opera philosophica et theologica. Opera philosophica II (St. Bonaventure, 1978);Expositio in librum Perihermenias Aristotelis, I, n. 5 (ibid., pp. 350–351).

61 See e.g. Rimini, II Sent., d. 7, q. 3, pp. 137–138; Ockham, II Rep., q. 14–15 T(Boehner, “Notitia Intuitiva,” pp. 256–258).

62 Ockham, Ordinatio, prol., q. 1, in G. Gál, S. Brown, eds., Scriptum in librum primumSententiarum: Ordinatio, in Opera philosophica et theologica. Opera theologica, I (St. Bonaventure,N.Y., 1967), pp. 3–75. Ockham discusses intuitive and abstractive cognition, and thehypothesis of species again in several of his Quodlibetal questions, ed. J. Wey, Operatheologica IX (St. Bonaventure, 1980).


Ockham’s definition of intuitive cognition has usually been misreadby modern scholars, regardless of their sympathies for or antipathiestowards him. The consequence has been to obscure the fact that,while the great majority of fourteenth-century scholastics accepted adichotomy of intuitive and abstractive cognition, Ockham’s notion ofthe former was unique when he expounded it and, once his Sentences

commentary began to be read or quoted, easily recognizable to anyreader as Ockham’s. It is therefore a useful index of the availability ofthe Sentences commentary. While many described intuitive cognition asa direct, non-inferential mode of knowledge of an object’s existence,Ockham defined intuition as ‘that cognition by means of which weknow an object to be when it is, and not to be when it is not.’63

Whatever Ockham intended by the phrase ‘not to be when it is not,’his contemporaries construed it as expanding the scope of notitia intuitiva

to include direct, simple, non-discursive awareness that an object doesnot exist when it is not present to the percipient. Moreover, Ockhambelieved that direct awareness was impossible if perception occurredthrough the mediation of species; arguing that their existence was notconfirmed by the facts of sense-experience, he held that perceptioncould be explained without positing them.64

Rimini considered Ockham’s elimination of species mistaken, for inhis view it removed the ability to explain perception, memory, andabstractive thinking while, at the same time, conflicting with the evi-dence of the senses and the authority of Augustine and Aristotle.65

In this, Rimini agreed with those who had read Ockham’s Sentences

commentary in England during the previous two-and-a-half decades.Those readers of the 1320s–1330s, including the one scholar who actu-ally numbered Ockham among his teachers, had rejected his formula-tion of intuitive cognition as well. At Paris, Rimini is the first to dis-play unmistakable familiarity not only with the exposition of knowledge

63 See Alessandro Ghisalberti, “L’Intuizione in Ockham,” Revista di filosofia neoscolas-tica, 70 (1978), 207–226; Tachau, “The Response”.

Ockham gives this definition several times in his Sentences commentary and Quodli-beta. See especially, II Rep., q. 14–15 (Boehner, p. 248): “Intuitiva est illa cognitio medi-ante qua cognoscitur res esse quando est, et non esse quando non est”; Ordinatio,prol. q. 1, pp. 26–27, 31: “Notitia intuitiva rei est talis notitia virtute cuius potest sciriutrum res sit vel non, ita quod si res sit, statim intellectus iudicat eam esse et eviden-ter cognoscit eam esse …” pp. 71–72; “Ad septimum dubium dico quod per notitiamintuitivam rei potest evidenter cognosci res non esse quando non est vel si non sit…”

64 See Tachau, “The Problem of the Species in medio”.65 Rimini, II Sent., d. 7, q. 3 additio 36, d. 7, q. 3, pp. 138–139.

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in Ockham’s Sentences commentary, but also with the objections pre-sented by such Oxford authors as Holcot, Crathorn, and Wodeham,upon whose arguments Rimini drew.66

Rimini indicates that after he had composed the lengthy answers toOckham in the lectures on the third distinction of book I, his socii JohnRathe and Francesco of Treviso, a Dominican, defended the VenerableInceptor’s stance. It is therefore in response to them, Rimini says, thathe returns to the matter, although he has already treated it. In fact,the first of the two questions on book II, distinction seven aimed atRathe and Treviso replaces a questio additionalis aimed at Ockham, andretains many of its arguments. Throughout, Rimini makes it clear thathe construes Rathe’s and Treviso’s position as but a variation uponOckham’s, and objectionable on the same grounds.67

According to Rimini, Rathe denied species in part on the groundsthat they are not experienced, an argument he shared with Ockham.Gregory, however, insists that he always experiences such images whenhe thinks of absent objects. As further support, he reminds Rathe of aseries of experiences described by Augustine and Aristotle, and that are‘common to all’, i.e. to everyone’s experience. When Rathe responds

66 Tachau, “The Problem of the Species in medio,” discusses the reactions of Holcot,Chatton, Reading, Crathorn, Wodeham, Rosetus, and Halifax. See also Tachau, “TheResponse,” for Rimini’s knowledge of Crathorn; Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, pp. 123–131, and “The Role of English Thought” for Rimini’s role as the first Parisian to bedirectly acquainted with Ockham’s theology or with the numerous English theologiansand logicians after Ockham.

67 Rimini, II Sent., d. 7, q. 3, p. 119: “Quamvis autem materia primi articuli sitaliqualiter pertractata in primo libro distinctione 3, questione 1, ad pleniorem tamendiscussionem eius et propter collationem de ipsa habitam in Principiis librorum Sen-tentiarum inter quosdam baccalaureos concurrentes mecum in Lectura et me voloiterum aliqualiter eam hic tractare, non replicando tamen quae in Primo dicta suntnisi quatenus oportuerit propter aliqua obiecta vel dicta contraria contra illa”; d. 7,q. 4, p. 162: “… non existentia non possunt nec a nobis nec ab angelis naturalitercognosci in se ipsis seu intuitive, quod idem valet apud me, et hoc ipsum etiam tenui inPrimo distinctione 3, questione 1, oppositum autem tenuit quidam valens baccalaureusmecum in Lectura concurrens, et de hac materia conferendo simul dicta sunt hinc etinde quam plura quae interseri huic operi utile iudicavi, idcirco nunc quaero, utrumaliquid non existens possimus naturaliter intueri seu intuitive cognoscere.”

The editors identify Gregory’s socii following Gregory’s own indications in margine.Among the arguments employed in both d. 7, q. 3 and the quaestio additionalis aimed atOckham are the same ‘pro’ and ‘con’ arguments; compare also pp. 107, 124.

For Francesco of Treviso, see: Thomas Kaeppeli, O.P., Scriptores Ordinis PraedicatorumMedii Aevi, vol. I, A–F (Rome: 1970), p. 390; and C. Grimaldo, “Due inventari domeni-cani del secolo XIV: tratti dall’Archivio di S. Nicolò di Treviso presso l’Archivio diStato in Venezia,” Nuovo Archivio Veneto, n.s. 36 (1918), 129–180.


that these experiences ‘are not common to him’, Rimini is franklyincredulous.68 To judge from later scholastics’s continued appeal to suchexamples of man’s awareness of species, Rimini’s disbelief would havebeen widely shared.69

Although it is conceivable that Treviso’s and Rathe’s rejection ofspecies was influenced by the Parisian tradition of, e.g., Durand of St.Pourçain and Michael of Massa,70 there are clear indications that thealignment with Ockham was conscious and deliberate. Rimini impliesthat Rathe’s definition of intuitive cognition was required for the elimi-nation of species; when Rimini actually describes his opponent’s defini-tion of the modes of cognition, it appears that Ockham was the primarysource of Rathe’s understanding.71 Rimini states that Rathe and Trevisoagreed in their distinction of intuitive and abstractive cognition:

It was said by two bachelors … that vision in the exterior sense isintuitive cognition, by virtue of which such contingent truths can beknown; but thinking about an absent thing is abstractive cognition, bymeans of which such contingent truths cannot be known.72

68 Rimini, II Sent., d. 7, q. 3, p. 120, lin.15 – p. 121, lin.4.69 See, e.g., Peter Ceffons, I Sent., q. 18, Troyes, Bibl. municipale, MS. 62, fols. 45ra-rb;

Pierre d’Ailly, Quaestiones super libros Sententiarum cum quibusdam in fine adjunctis (Strasbourg:1490; repr. Frankfurt: 1968), I Prol, q. 1 [p. 84] where, in response to a series of suchexperientiae used by Peter Auriol, d’Ailly insists upon species. Ceffons’s commentary datesfrom 1348–1349 (Paris); d’Ailly’s to just after 1375. We cite them here because theirdiscussions were typical and, in d’Ailly’s case, influential.

70 Within a couple of years after having returned to Italy, Francesco had donatedhis collection of books to his convent in Treviso. Among the items listed in the inven-tory, published by Grimaldo, “Due inventari,” are Durand of St. Pourçain’s Sentencescommentaries; an abbreviatio of Peter Auriol’s Sentences commentary; and Gregory ofRimini’s Scriptum in primum Sententiarum. Treviso’s ownership of Gregory’s commentarywould have permitted him to discover that Gregory considered him to be in agreementwith Ockham’s epistemology, had Treviso been in any doubt on the matter. See alsobelow, note 84.

71 Rathe’s thinking, as Rimini describes it, does not appear to have been influencedonly by Ockham; Auriol may have been a source for his claims that “visio est apparentiaobiecti visibilis” (Rimini, II Sent., d. 7, q. 4, p. 176), or that “visio intuitiva potest essenaturaliter nonexistentis, immo aliquando de facto est” (ibid., p. 177). This last claimOckham denied (a point which Rimini obscures in introducing the question, n. 67above). For the differences between Auriol’s and Ockham’s views that suggest bothunder the surface of Rathe’s statements, see Tachau, “The Response”.

72 Rimini, II Sent., d. 7, q. 4, p. 122: “Sed ad hanc dicebatur a duobus consociisbaccalaureis quod alia ratio erat, scilicet quod visio sensus exterioris est notitia intuitiva,cuius virtute tales veritates contingentes cognosci possunt; cogitatio vero rei absentis estnotitia abstractiva, per quam non possunt tales veritates cognosci”.

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This definition paraphrases Ockham’s,73 although Ockham furtherinsists that without a concomitant intellectual intuitive cognition, sen-sitive cognition is not sufficient to achieve knowledge of contingenttruths.

That Ockham’s definition is at issue is made obvious by Rimini whocontends at this point that Rathe’s and Treviso’s definition makes senseonly if they mean to call that cognition intuitive ‘by means of which anobject is known to be when it is, or not to be when it is not, and [bymeans of which] other contingent truths [concerning it are known].’74

Rathe’s further arguments prove that this was indeed his own position.Ockham had held that because of the evidence that intuitive cognitionprovides of existence or non-existence, the intellect achieves an ‘evidentjudgment’ by virtue of which it assents to propositions concerning theobject’s existence.75 This is the epistemological principle Rathe applieswhen responding to Rimini’s renewed defense of species. No one canhave a cognition, Rathe claims, that ‘terminates immediately in anobject and, although unaware of his cognition, have an evident judg-ment by virtue of which he assents to [the proposition] “this is known tome”.’ Such a cognition is assumed, Rathe thinks, by those who believerecollection or knowledge of absent objects requires species.76

73 Ockham, Ordinatio, prol., q. 1, p. 24, lin.11–24; p. 25, lin.15–17; p. 27, lin.10–15;p. 32, lin. 10–11.

74 Rimini, II Sent., d. 7, q. 3 (Lectura, vol. 5, p. 122): “Hoc non valet, quia quaero,quam notitiam et qua ratione dicis intuitivam alicuius rei. Aut enim eam quae imme-diate terminatur obiective ad illam—et ideo dicis eam intuitivam, quia sic immediateterminatur—et tunc sequitur quod, si cogitatio interior immediate terminatur ad remextra, ipsa est notitia intuitiva eius; et ulterius sequitur illatum. Vel eam dicis intuitivamut aliqui moderni dicunt, qua potest sciri rem esse, si est, vel non esse si non est, et aliaeveritates contingentes de illa….” See above n. 63, for Ockham’s definition. It shouldbe noted that Rimini’s use of the plural aliqui moderni does not indicate more thanone opponent; Auriol, Chatton, and Ockham frequently employ such a locution whenquoting verbatim from one opponent, identified by name either in margine or in textu.Thus, it seems to have been a form of scholarly courtesy in most academic writing.Only rarely, when the formula is supported by further contextual evidence that pluralopponents are really intended, is it safe to infer that the author used the expressionliterally.

75 Above, n. 63: Boehner, “Notitia Intuitiva,” p. 248E.76 Rimini, II Sent., d. 7, q. 3, p. 143: “Contra conclusionem tamen istam ambo

praefati socii baccalaurei arguerunt, probare volentes quod talis recordatio vel cogni-tio absentium non immediate obiective terminatur ad speciem rei existentem in anima.Arguit autem unus [mg.: Joannes Scotus] sic primo: Nulla cognitio terminatur immedi-ate ad aliquod obiectum, quam habens non potest experiri se cognoscere illud sic, quodhabeat evidens iudicium quo assentiat huic [complexo] ‘hoc cognoscitur a me’. Sedhabens cognitionem de rosa non presente non potest experiri se cognoscere speciemrosae, igitur etc. Minor patet, quia nullus cogitans de rosa reputat se habere evidens


Given Rathe’s and Treviso’s rejection of species, and the former’suse—as well as definition—of intuitive cognition according to Ock-ham’s teaching, Rimini was evidently justified in treating their argu-ments as an ensemble. These few glimpses into Rathe’s thinking reveala theologian undeterred from adopting Ockham’s epistemology in theface of general disagreement and his own Nation’s earlier legislationagainst the secta Occanica. If his later theological career is any indication,he may well have been inclined to lecture on the philosophical works ofOckham when a regent master in Arts.

Whatever Rathe’s role in promoting Ockham’s opinions may havebeen while a master of Arts, his agreement with the latter when abachelor lecturing on the Sentences was publicized by the member ofhis generation whose own commentary was perhaps most influential.In light of Rimini’s one-time reputation as the instigator of the con-demnations of Autrecourt and Mirecourt,77 it is worth noting that noblot on Rathe’s career resulted from his disputes with Rimini. Instead,the very pope who oversaw the condemnation of Autrecourt in 1346 atAvignon, Clement VI, elevated Rathe to the see of Aberdeen four yearslater.78

Ockhamism and the Secta Occanica

The Availability of Ockham’s Writings

By the time Portirstona left his copy of Ockham’s Logic in the English-German Nation’s hands, copies must have been readily available atParis. The hypothesis that Burley was at Paris when he composed hisrejoinders to Ockham’s logical and physical views in the mid-1320shas not been challenged and accords with the manuscript evidence.79

At any rate, it was at Paris that the Swedish Franciscan, JohannesNicholai, prepared his abbreviatio of Burley’s De puritate artis logicae toaccompany the teaching of Ockham’s Summa logicae, as we know fromhis preface to the manuscript with exactly that arrangement copied at

iudicium quo assentiat huic ‘species rosae absentis cognoscitur a me’.” Brackets signalour insertions.

77 But see Courtenay, “John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini”.78 Watt, Biographical Dictionary, pp. 465–466.79 See Weisheipl, “Ockham and Some Mertonians,” MS 30 (1968), 180–187.

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Visby in Götland in 1339, when Johannes Nicholai was lector of theconvent at Linköping. He notes that he prepared the extracts fromBurley that complemented Ockham, whose logic he preferred, on thefew points where the latter’s exposition was insufficient.80 JohannesNicholai’s compendium is preserved at Erfurt, where there is a secondmanuscript containing both Ockham’s Summa logicae and Burley’s De

puritate. This manuscript bears a date supporting a Parisian provenance,for the scribe writes that he has finished copying the Summa logicae onthe twenty-third of February, in 1339 according to the more Gallicorum,81

that is, in 1340.

80 Erfurt, CA 8° 67, has the following colophon: “Explicit tractatus logicae fratrisWillelmi Okkam de provincia Angliae [doctoris sed deletum est] sacrae theologiae, divi-sus in tres partes et unaquaque pars est distincta per capitula, quem scripsit [Arno Petripartim erasum] de custodia Norvegiae in Wysbi, anno Domini M°CCC°XXXIX° cuiusmemoria sit in pace. Amen”. The excerpta from Burley’s De puritate artis logicae tractatuslongior, has the following preface: “Hanc extractionem de logica Burle ordinavit fraterIoannes Nicholai, lector de custodia Lincopensi, provinciae Daciae, quando studuitParisius, anno Domini M°CCC°XXIX°, de cuius logicae commendatione praemisitprologum in hunc modum: Post praecedentem summam editam a Fratre W[illelmusOckham] compilavit Burle alium tractatum de logica, in quo pauca continentur utilia,realiter nihil, vel sumpta de priori summa vel de Boethio in libro De categoricis ethypotheticisi syllogismis. Quae tamen in ipso iudicavi esse utilia, posita ultra ea quae insumma praecedenti, vel quae sunt contra ea quae dicuntur in illa summa, ut oppositaiuxta se posita magis elucescant et melius, breviter in sequentibus colliguntur.—Explicitprologus extractoris, incipit prologus auctoris: Suppositis significatis terminorum, etc”.Quoted in P. Boehner, G. Gál, and S. Brown, eds., Summa logicae, in Opera philosophica ettheologica. Opera philosophica I (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974), pp. 25*—26*.

81 Erfurt, CA 4° 259, described in W. Schum, Beschreibendes Verzeichniss der Amplonianis-chen Handschriften-Sammlung zu Erfurt (Berlin, 1887), p. 508; and Summa logicae, pp. 20*–21*.The explicit on fol. 157 reads: “Explicit Summa supra totam logicam. Completa a Ven-erabili Inceptore theologiae magistro Guillermo Okam anglico, fratre ordinis minorumfratrum. Completa anno Domini M CCC XXXIX more Gallicorum, vicesima tertia diemensis februarii”.

At Paris at this time the members of the English-German Nation reckoned the yearas beginning on March 25, according to the English practice. The University itself,however, followed the French calendar, where the year began with Easter, while otherssuch as the Germans used the Roman practice, which began the year on January 1.The confusion this could cause led several procurators whose terms of office includedthe period January to April to note carefully whether they were dating their terms moreGallicorum. See, e.g. Andreas Freouati of Småland, AUP I, col. 27: “Anno Domini 1338more Gallicano, et secundum alios 1339, undecima dies mensis Marcii…” Since Easterin 1339 fell on March 28, the scribe of the procurator’s book was contrasting his datingwith that used in Germany. Similarly, the scribe of the Erfurt manuscript would havespecified the ‘French custom’ only if in France, where the prevailing reckoning was nothis own. The most likely place for him to have been when he copied both Burley andOckham in 1340 was Paris.


A further manuscript, tied to Paris by its handwriting, remains theretoday. Of Ockham’s writing, it includes most of the Summa logicae, thefirst treatise of his De sacramento altaris (known to medieval readers alsoas De quantitate), and the extract from his Expositio physicorum concernedwith motion, the De successivis. The manuscript also holds Gerard Odo-nis’s logical writings, presumably copied at Paris, and Burley’s De puri-

tate, together with others of his treatises concerning logic and physics.82

We know that at least one of the latter was read by Parisian artistae,from the refutation it provoked from Conrad of Megenberg.83

Theologians outside the English-German Nation were clearly ac-quiring copies of Ockham’s Summa logicae during the decade in whichPortirstona appears in the Nation’s records. Francesco of Treviso owneda copy by 1347. It was one of 130 books acquired during his years ofstudy away from the convent that had ‘received and nurtured’ himas a Dominican, and to whom he donated the entire collection inorder to enrich the convent’s library. This he doubtless achieved.84

Francesco’s opponent in the dispute over cognition, Gregory of Rimini,also obtained his own copy of the Summa logicae at some point, andone may reasonably suppose he had done so by the time he debatedFrancesco and John Rathe.85 There is nothing furtive about either’spossession, although, of course, the Arts statute of September 25, 1339would never have applied to either mendicant.

It would appear, then, that possession of copies of Ockham’s Summa

logicae was not unusual at the time of or shortly after the Arts statuteof 1339. That statute, of course, applied to the use of Ockham’s worksin lectures and disputations, not to possession, and it was binding only

82 Paris, B.N. lat. 6441. The manuscript contains, among other items, Burley’s Depuritate, fols. 1ra–18vb; his De consequentiis, fols. 18vb–22rb; his Tractatus primus (here entitledDe activitate qualitatum sensibilium), fols. 22va–32va; his De intensione et remissione formarum,fols. 34rb–48va. Ockham’s Summa logicae, partes II et III, fols. 93ra–126rb, is preceded byhis De quantitate seu De corpore Christi (part of the De sacramento altaris) and the Tractatus desuccessivis.

83 On Conrad see below, note 95. His treatise is in Vienna, DominikanerklosterMS 160/130, fols. 89V–91V, entitled “Tractatus mag. Chunradi de Monte Puellarumqui probat oppositum quarte conclusionis principalis ipsius Burley”; cf. Weisheipl,“Ockham and Some Mertonians,” p. 184, n. 6.

84 Grimaldo, “Due inventari,” pp. 149–154.85 Registrum Generalatus Matthaei Asculani, Cod. Romae, Archivum Generale

Augustinianum Dd 1, fol. 116r. This information was kindly provided by Dr. VenicioMarcolino.

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on those who were or had been in the Arts Faculty. But if Ockham’slogic were at the centre of contention and were viewed with suspicionby the Arts Faculty and the English-German Nation, it seems remark-able that Richard Portirstona should use his copy of the Summa log-

icae as surety for his debt to the Nation, or that the Nation shouldhave accepted it without comment. If the assumption is correct thatthe statute of September 25, 1339 was intended only to prohibit theintroduction of new textbooks until such time as their suitability couldbe determined, the increasing appearance of copies of Ockham’s Logic

at Paris in the following two decades suggests that it may have beeneventually accepted as a text. In 1356 the Nation accepted as securitydeposit another copy of that work, bound together with Euclid’s Ele-

ments.86 In company with Euclid, Ockham’s Logic looks suspiciously likea textbook. At the very least, the number of copies in circulation atthe time indicates that the work was considered important, useful, andperhaps even popular within the University community.

It will be recalled, moreover, that the first evident use of Ockham’slogical positions by an author within the Nation that can be docu-mented is Nicholas Drukken’s, and that a copy of his lectures was madewithin two years after the Nation recorded the Arts statute against ‘thenew opinions of those who are called Occanistae,’ and enacted their ownordinatio. To the fomenting of what erroneous opinions did the mastersobject?

The ‘Scientia Occanica’

The first clue to the Faculty’s objections lies in the oath of 1341 dis-cussed above in section I. The new masters must teach Aristotle’sviews—except in cases where his teaching conflicts with the faith—together with the amplification of Averroes and other authoritativecommentators. By stating that the masters must do so instead of teachingOckhamist scientia, the oath informs us that the objection to Ockhamistscientia was not that it conflicted with theological doctrine—on whichthe Arts Faculty could make no ruling—but that it conflicted with theteaching of Aristotle and his commentators, principally Averroes. Couldthe Faculty of Arts have had in mind Ockham’s logic? In all probability,no. It is unlikely that they viewed the reorganization of logic achieved

86 The text belonged to Jacob Fortis, and the Nation evaluated it at 33 solidi; AUP I,col. 195.


in the Summa logicae as competing with the ‘Aristotelian’ arrangement ofthe logica antiqua, especially as they never proscribed Burley’s De puritate,which was similarly structured. Moreover, it would be difficult to viewthe bulk of Ockham’s logic as a direct challenge to the authority ofAristotle and Averroes. Most of Ockham’s logic reflected the commonteaching of the schools.87 The only aspect of Ockham’s logic that couldbe construed as departing from Aristotle and Averroes—the aspect thathad in fact disturbed Walter Burley at Paris as early as 1326–1328—wasOckham’s reinterpretation of the categories (particularly the praedica-

menta of quantity, relation, time, and motion).88 This was an issue thatappeared in one form or another in most of Ockham’s pre-1324 works,and although not a major part of his logic, it was a major part of hisnatural philosophy, namely his physics. Ockham tells us himself, in thesecond prologue that he wrote to his Expositio physicorum, that his innova-tive efforts to expound Aristotle’s intent might be misread as a refutationof him.89

The precise points of Ockham’s reconstruction of Aristotle uponwhich modern attention has focused, were epitomized in his De quanti-

tate and in the excerpt from his physics commentary, De successivis.90 TheParisian manuscript already mentioned containing these two treatisestogether with the Summa logicae and other physical and logical works,

87 Cf. G. Gál, introduction to Ockham’s Summa logicae, p. 46*: “Contentio enimcirca universalia, praedicamenta et suppositiones terminorum maxime vertebatur. Sedhaec non constituunt totam logicam nec magnam eius partem. Maior pars logicae eratpossessio communis et pacifica omnium logicorum, et de hac parte Burlaeus longe anteOckham multa plane et perspicue scripserat”.

88 Ockham’s reinterpretation also concerned the related problems of universals andsimple supposition; see Weisheipl, “Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford,”MS, 28 (1966), 157–161; Brown, “Walter Burleigh’s Treatise De Suppositionibus”.

89 For the prefatory remarks to Ockham’s Expositio physicorum, see Brampton, “Per-sonalities at the Process against Ockham at Avignon, 1324–1326,” FS, 26 (1966), 4–25,esp. 12–13; G.E. Mohan “The Prologue to Ockham’s Exposition of the Physics of Aris-totle,” FS, 5 (1945), 235–246; Vladimir Richter, “Zum Incipit des Physikkommentarsvon Ockham,” PJ, 81 (1974), 197–201. In contrast to the oath of 1341, the decree ofDecember 29, 1340 is concerned in part with the theological errors that might developfrom certain types of argumentation.

90 See Tractatus de successivis attributed to William Ockham, ed. Ph. Boehner (St. Bonaven-ture, N.Y., 1944); E.A. Moody, “Ockham and Aegidius of Rome,” FS, 9 (1949), 417–442;H. Shapiro, Motion, Time and Place according to William Ockham (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.,1957); J.E. Murdoch & E.D. Sylla “The Science of Motion,” in Science in the Middle Ages,ed. D.C. Lindberg (Chicago, 1978), pp. 206–264; W. Wallace, “The Philosophical Set-ting of Medieval Science,” in Science in the Middle Ages, pp. 91–119.

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is not unusual.91 Its contents illustrate not only the interest that Ock-ham’s teaching on quantity, substance, time, and motion drew, but alsothe means of becoming familiar with his doctrine without studying hisentire Physics commentary. If there were many who depended on suchextracts for their knowledge of Ockham’s physics, they may have beenmore willing than he to offer theses derived from it in explicit opposi-tion to Aristotle and Averroes. At any rate, the two Parisian authors ofthis period who have left a record of their opposition to ‘Ockhamists’pinpoint these doctrines as the area of controversy.

The first reference to Occanistae is in the Additiones to what is probablythe Sentences commentary of Michael of Massa, O.E.S.A., read at Parisin 1326. If these Additiones are his, the appearance of Occanistae predatesany other reference by about fifteen years. The Additiones contain aseries of questions devoted to time, duration, and motion, in whichthe author repeatedly disputes those who hold that time (or motion)is identical with the res permanens.

In contrast to “certain contemporaries who have attempted—bothwith respect to physics as a whole as well as with respect to its princi-ples and even its conclusions—to reintroduce the errors of the ancientphilosophers that Aristotle frequently refuted,” Michael defends thereality of motion “according to the custom of Aristotle and Averroesand other philosophers.”92 The error of these moderns rests upon con-

91 An examination of the introduction to the critical edition of the Summa logicaereveals other cases, e.g. p. 16* n. 17; pp. 27*–28*, n. 53. The Vienna manuscriptcontaining Conrad of Megenberg’s refutation of Burley also contains part of the Summalogicae, as the editors note, p. 32*, n. G; see above, note 83. Paris B.N. lat. 6441 isdiscussed above, note 82.

92 Vatican, Vat. Lat 1087, fols. 70rb, 71ra: “Duodecima quaestio … erat ista: Utrumduratio successiva, quae est ipsum tempus, sit realiter idem quod motus cuius estpassio …. Et quia de realitate motus est unus error quorundam modernorum quicirca totam Physicam tam quantum ad principia quam etiam quantum ad conclu-siones ipsius conati sunt innovare errores antiquorum philosophorum quos Aristote-les frequentissime reprobat—licet per quasdam fugas grammaticales huiusmodi erroressustineant, quae modicum valent, sicut alias apparebit—ideo statim pro nunc de erroreistorum circa realitatem motus expedio me valde breviter …. Sic ergo error isto-rum tamquam abusio dicatur. Et accedamus ad inquisitionem magis utilem de reali-tate ipsius motus. Nec oportet philosophum volentem proficere, confundere realitateseorum et confugere ad proprietates grammaticales ut habeatur fuga de non explicandorealitates eorum et difficultates physicas circa ipsas. Immo quantum possumus investi-gare [possumus] debemus explicare [ms: explicite] de quidditatibus rerum. Moveamusergo aliquas quaestiones circa realitatem motus more Aristotelis et Commentatoris etaliorum philosophorum, praetermittendo insanias modernorum innovantium grossitiveantiquorum”. Cf. D. Trapp, “Notes on some Manuscripts of the Augustinian Michael


fusing grammatical analysis with an explanation of physical reality. Ifthe contemporaries who accept the erroneous opinion are anonymoushere, Michael names them elsewhere when referring back to this priorexposition:

But according to those against whom I am arguing, time and first motionare identical, differing only conceptually.… Some have said that time isthe same as the heavens, and the Ockhamists concur with that opinion.93

Later, in discussing successive motion, he names Ockham and refers hisaudience back to these questions on the reality of motion, time, andduration.94

Michael’s identification of the Occanistae is confirmed by Conrad ofMegenberg in at least two treatises. In his Questions on the Sphere ofSacrobosco, Conrad states:

But here it must be pointed out, that according to those who denythat points (and similarly lines) have real being outside the soul—asFrater William and his [followers] do—they would say that the seconddescription of the sphere also follows suit according to its imaginable andconceivable being. But I am not of this opinion, and concerning thismatter one has to look elsewhere, namely in [my] physical questions.95

The questions on the Physics to which Conrad here refers have not yetbeen identified, but he elaborates on this opinion in his Commentaryon the Economica:

Or certainly one can say that the cleric is deficient in scholastic statuswho denies the natures of many things, in the manner of Frater Williamof Ockham the Englishman and his followers, who assert that relationsas well as ‘place’, ‘habit’, ‘where’, ‘when’ outside the soul are things

de Massa (d. 1337),” Augustinianum, 5 (1965), 58–113. Trapp has identified the questionson the Sentences in this manuscript as Michael of Massa’s. But note Massa’s denial ofspecies, above, note 59. [Massa’s lectures on the Sentences has been dated later in Courte-nay, “The Quaestiones in Sententias of Michael de Massa, OESA. A Redating,” Augustiniana45 (1995), 191–207, reprinted in this volume as Chapter 13.]

93 Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 88v: “Sed secundum istos, contra quos arguo, tempus et primusmotus sunt idem identice, nec differunt nisi conceptibiliter … dixerunt aliqui quodtempus est ipsummet caelum, et in sententiam istorum incidunt Okanistae”.

94 Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 135v.95 Munich, Bayr. Staatsbibl., Clm 14687, fol. 74ra, as quoted in Sabine Krüger,

“Krise der Zeit als Ursache der Pest? Der Traktat de mortalitate in Alamannia desKonrad von Megenberg,” Festschrift für Hermann Heimpel zum 70. Geburtstag, vol. II (Göt-tingen, 1972), pp. 839–883, on p. 849, n. 55.

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indistinguishable from absolute things, and affirm that quantity is thesame as substance.96

And once again, repeating the critique of Michael:

They even call motions—in which the actions and passions of things areformed—things indistinguishable from permanent things.97

The Quaestiones in Ioannis de Sacrobosco sphaeram were written, accordingto the colophon, in 1347. At that time Conrad was already teachingat Vienna, in a post possibly secured partly as a result of the lettersof commendation to the Duke of Austria and community of Viennahe sought and obtained from the English-German Nation in 1340,two years before he left Paris permanently.98 During the period 1339–1341, Conrad was an active and prominent regent master within theNation. He happened to be procurator when Wardlaw ‘determined’,and Nicholas Drukken was licenced under John Rathe.99

More importantly, Conrad was among the masters present when theordinatio of September 1341, binding the Nation to prevent the conspir-acies of the secta Occanica and their fomenting of erroneous opinions,was approved.100 He was also procurator in the month before Henry ofUnna oversaw the signing and sealing of the statute against the ‘newopinions of certain persons called Ockhamists’ the previous January.Perhaps that statute resulted from initiatives during Conrad’s term,for he recorded only that ‘in his term, nothing was done which was

96 Yconomica III, tr. 1, c. 1, in Sevilla, Bibl. Colomb., Ms. 7-7-32, fol. 94rb, quoted inKrüger, “Krise,” p. 848, n. 54. A portion of this commentary on the pseudo-AristotelianEconomica is edited in Thorndike, University Records, as ‘De commendatione cleri’ fromVatican, Pal. lat. 1252. This quotation occurs on pp. 409–410. The first two volumesof Conrad’s treatise have been edited by Krüger, Konrad von Megenberg, Werke: Ökonomik.Monumenta Germ. Hist., Staatsschriften des späteren Mittelalters, III, 5/1 (Stuttgart,1973); III, 5/2 (1977).

97 Ibid., p. 848, n. 55.98 AUP I, col. 43 for Conrad’s request to the English-German Nation; Krüger,

“Krise,” p. 842, states that Conrad was rector of St. Stephen’s school in Vienna from1342–1348; afterwards he taught in Regensburg. Conrad’s Quaestiones in sphaeram Iohannide Sacrobosco bears the date ‘anno 1347’ in the title (Munich, Bayer. Staatsbibl., Clm14687, fol. 71ra); cf. Klaus Arnold, “Konrad von Megenberg als Kommentator der‘Sphaera’ des Johannes von Sacrobosco,” Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters,32 (1976), 147–186; and Mieczysław Markowski, “Komentarze do ‘traktatu o sferze’Jana z Holywood zachowane w sredniowiecznych rekopisach panstwowej bibliotekiBawarskiej i biblioteki uniwersyteckiej w Monachium,” Studia Mediewistyczne, 20 (1980),127–144, esp. 130–131.

99 AUP I, cols. 37–38.100 Above, note 34.


brought perfectly to completion.’101 If so, the statutes probably pro-scribed the physical doctrine to which Conrad continued to objectthroughout his later teaching career. That is all the more reason notto view the statute of December 27, 1340 as aimed at Ockham, sincenone of its concerns relates to physics or the categories (praedicamenta).Certainly we can only draw inferences concerning how instrumental arole Conrad’s was in condemning the secta Occanica; but if we seek theinstigators of those statutes and of the ordinatio, Conrad would appearto be the logical place to start. Carrying his polemic against Ockhambeyond the confines of the University, he repeatedly attacked Ockham’spolitical views as well as his physics. At the time Ockham’s name firstappears in Parisian documents, Conrad had already been to Avignonas nuntius for the University of Paris and had composed the first ofhis polemical treatises, the Planctus ecclesiae in Germaniam (1337), whichopposed political views similar to Ockham’s and which Conrad pre-sented to the papal chaplain. In light of Conrad’s ties to the Avignonpapacy, the wider world of church politics outside the University mayalready have been a factor in its internal affairs in the late 1330s.102

The Political Context of the University Crisis

The Parisian Nominalists, when pleading their cause with the Kingof France in 1474, suggested that the legislation of 1339 to 1341 wasin part politically motivated. The biased nature of that source alongwith some obvious distortions and factual errors has led historians todismiss its usefulness as testimony to events almost a century and a halfearlier, however useful it might be as an insight into the crisis of the via

antiqua and the via moderna at Paris in the fifteenth century.103 And yet

101 AUP I, col. 44: ‘Procuracio magistri Conradi de Monte Puellarum …. In cujustempore nichil est factum, quod perfecte ad actum duceretur’.

102 A copy of Conrad’s Planctus, in Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 3197A, contains the colophon:“Explicit Planctus ecclesiae in Germaniam, editus a Conrado de Maegenberg, quiParysyus dicitur de Montepuellarum, anno Domini M°CCC°37°, in die circumcisionisdomini, anno vero nativitatis sue 28vo.” Conrad’s selection as nuntius is recorded inAUP I, cols. 22–23, and confirmed by references in his own works; see his mention ofhis first of several trips, quoted in Krüger, Ökonomik, I, p. xiv. For his ties to Avignonand political polemics, see Krüger’s introduction to the Ökonomik, I; A.S. McGrade, ThePolitical Thought of William of Ockham: Personal and Institutional Principles (Cambridge, 1974),pp. 4–5; and J. Miethke, Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie (Berlin, 1969), pp. 133–136, 431.

103 On the origins of the struggle between the reales and nominales in the fifteenthcentury, see N.W. Gilbert, “Ockham, Wyclif, and the ‘Via Moderna’,” in Antiqui und

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the surprising number of instances where the account parallels what weknow from other sources suggests that we give it more serious attention:

Among the nominalists the first to be condemned is said to have beenWilliam Ockham, whom John XXII persecuted, first because the saidWilliam Ockham took opposite sides from the pope on the heresy of thesouls of the blest, which the same pope said would not see God face toface before the day of final judgment, and similarly he said that the soulsof the damned would not suffer in hell before that day ….

A second reason why John XXII persecuted Ockham was because inhis Dialogue he defended the royal authority by holy scripture and theutterances of popes and general councils and doctors of the church ….

For these reasons John XXII bestowed many privileges upon the uni-versity of Paris that it might condemn this doctrine of Ockham’s. Yetthe said university was unwilling to condemn it. But the faculty of arts,overcome by importunity, made a statute in which it enjoined that thesaid doctrine should not be taught because it was not yet approved andexamined. And later it instituted an oath by which all swore not to teachthe said doctrine in cases where it was contrary to the faith. [And thiscan be found expressly in the Book of the Rector.] And in the same bookare noted four respects in which it is asserted that Ockham erred, noneof which, as is evident to one reading them, is contrary to the faith. Andthe first article is found in none of his writings. Nay, he frequently heldthe contrary both in his logic and his theology. And so there is an errorof fact, which is intolerable.

Also, the same pope ordered one of the cardinals to examine Ockham’sdoctrine. But although he raised many objections against Ockham, yetthey found nothing that they dared to condemn. Nor did any condem-nation result from the articles examined by that cardinal.104

Moderni, ed. A Zimmermann, Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 9 (Berlin, 1974), pp. 85–125,esp. 92–97 on the document of 1474. In the same volume see also A. Gabriel, “ ‘Viaantiqua’ and ‘via moderna’ and the Migration of Paris Students and Masters to theGerman Universities in the Fifteenth Century,” Antiqui und Moderni, pp. 439–483, andthe discussion of this document on pp. 446–453.

104 C. Du Plessis d’Argentré, Collectio judiciorum de novis erroribus, vol. I, pt.2 (Paris,1724), pp. 286–288, p. 286: “Item inter Nominales primus qui legitur fuisse condem-natus fuit Guillelmus Okam, quem Johannes XXII persecutus est, primo quia dic-tus Guillelmus Okam fuerat eidem Papae contrarius in haeresi de animabus beatis,quas idem Papa dicebat non videre Deum facie ad faciem ante diem ultimi judicii,et similiter dicebat animas damnatorum ante diem illum non cruciari in inferno….Secundo Papa Johannes XXII eundem Okam persecutus est quod in Dialogo suoper Scripturam sacram et per dicta summorum Pontificum et Conciliorum general-ium et Doctorum Ecclesiae deffendit auctoritatem regiam …. Propter has causas idemJohannes XXII multa privilegia dedit Universitati Parisiensi ut ipsam doctrinam Guil-lelmi Okam condemnaret. Dicta tamen Universitas noluit eam condemnare. Sed Fac-


Certain details are confused in this account, such as the failureto distinguish clearly events that occurred during the pontificate ofJohn XXII from those that transpired under Benedict XII. We can alsounderstand the nominalists’s desire to make the documents conformwith their attitudes, such as pretending that the oath of the Arts Facultyproscribed the thought of Ockham only in those things that were con-trary to the faith, or making Ockham’s defense of the German emperorappear to be a defense of the French monarchy. Yet the account is accu-rate on a surprising number of points: the dispute between Ockhamand John XXII, the Arts statute of 1339, most of the oath of 1341, theexistence of a second statute against Ockham, and the failure of theAvignon commission to conclude its investigation of Ockham with anactual condemnation. The most interesting suggestion in the account isthe belief that the pope, through the power of patronage, pressured theUniversity into taking a stand against Ockham, and that it was only theArts Faculty that succumbed. Is there any truth to their suspicion?

The events in the crisis at Paris over Ockham’s teaching and theflurry of legislative activity in the various University faculties designedto promote order and good teaching coincide remarkably with the pon-tificate of Jacques Fournier, Benedict XII (1334–1342).105 Fournier was a

ultas Artium importunitate victa fecit Statutum in quo cavetur dictam doctrinam nonesse dogmatizandum, quia nondum erat approbata et examinata. Et postmodum insti-tuit juramentum quo juraverunt omnes dictam doctrinam non dogmatizare in casibusin quibus est contra Fidem. Et expresse habetur in libro Rectoris. Et in eodem libronotantur quatuor Articuli in quibus asserebat dictum Okam errasse; quorum nullus, utclare patet intuenti, est contrarius Fidei. Et primus Articulus in nullo librorum reper-itur. Immo contrarium ejus habetur frequentissime et in Logica et in Theologia ejus.Et ita est ibi error facti, qui non est tolerabilis.” The translation of the text is fromThorndike, University Records, pp. 356–357, with the addition of the bracketed sentence,which does not appear there.

105 On the career of Benedict XII see J.M. Vidal, “Notes sur les oeuvres du papeBenoit XII,” Revue d’Histoire ecclesiastique, 6 (1905), 557–565, 785–819; P. Glorieux, Reper-toire des Maitres en Théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle (Paris, 1933), II, pp. 265–266; P. Fournier,“Jacques Fournier (Benoit XII),” HLF, 37 (1938), 174ff.; J. Koch, “Der Kardinal JacquesFournier (Benedikt XII) als Gutachter in theologischen Prozessen,” in Die Kirche und ihreÄmter und Stande. Festgabe für Joseph Kardinal Frings, ed. W. Corsten, A. Frotz and P. Lin-den (Cologne, 1960), pp. 441–452; repr. in J. Koch, Kleine Schriften, vol. II (Rome 1973),pp. 367–386; A. Maier, “Zwei Prooemiem Benedikts XII,” Archivum Historiae Pontificiae, 7(1969), 131–161, repr. in A. Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter, vol. III (Rome, 1977), pp. 447–479; see also A. Maier, “Eine Verfügung Johannis XXII. Über die Zustandigkeit derInquisition für Zaubereiprozesse,” AFP, 22 (1952), 226–246, and in Ausgehendes Mittelalter,II, pp. 59–80.

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Cistercian monk and a conservative theologian who had been educatedat Paris early in the century. The last stages of his formal educationand University teaching gave him his first contact with popular andacademic heresy at Paris. While regent master of Theology from 1310to 1317 he took part in the trial of Marguerite Porete, declaring thearticles taken from her book to be heretical [see correction in note].106

He witnessed the crisis over the orthodoxy of the Sentences commen-tary of Durand of St. Pourçain.107 Moreover, he attended the Councilof Vienne, which condemned the Beguines as well as certain teachingsof Peter of John Olivi.108 The same council restored episcopal power inthe inquisitorial procedure of rooting out heresy and set the stage forFournier’s post-University career. His election as abbot of Fontfroidein 1311, succeeding his uncle, had not interrupted his Paris career,but his election as bishop of Pamiers in 1317 led him to give up hisregency and enter upon a decade of heresy hunting in his diocese inthe Pyrenees.109 From 1325 until his election as pope Benedict XII in1334 he resided at Avignon as a principal inquisitor for cases of heresyamong university theologians. As one of the final stages in such trialshe evaluated the work of the commissions that investigated Olivi (1325),Ockham (1327), Michael of Cesena, Meister Eckhart (1328), ThomasWaleys (1333–1334), and a host of others.110 He almost invariably foundthe accused to be heretical. Although Fournier opposed John XXII’sview of the Beatific Vision and was instrumental in its eventual revo-cation, he never released Thomas Waleys from the papal prison dur-ing his pontificate despite the fact that Waleys’s imprisonment was a

106 R. Lerner, The Heresy of the Free Spirit in the Later Middle Ages (Berkeley, 1972),pp. 71–72, 80. [The Cistercian master of theology who was among those condemningMarguerite Porete has been identified by Lerner as Jacques de Dijon, later abbot ofPreuilly; see Lerner, “A Note on the University Career of Jacques Fournier, O. Cist.,later Pope Benedict XII,” Analecta Cisterciensia, 30 (1974), 66–69. Fournier did notbecome master of theology until 1313.]

107 Fournier took no part in these proceedings, but he was present in Paris when thedebate over Durand’s views took place. Later, on other issues, Fournier had occasion todefend Durand.

108 Lerner, The Heresy of the Free Spirit, p. 80.109 This period of Fournier’s career provided material for E. Le Roy Ladurie’s Mon-

taillou: The Promised Land of Error (New York, 1979).110 Glorieux, Répertoire des Maitres, II, p. 265; Koch, “Der Kardinal Jacques Fournier”;

Th. Kaeppeli, Le procès contre Thomas Waleys O.P. (Rome, 1936); B. Smalley, “ThomasWaleys O.P.,” AFP, 24 (1954), 50–57; B. Smalley, English Friars and Antiquity (Oxford,1960), pp. 75–79.


direct result of his forceful objection to John XXII’s position.111 Nor didFournier relax the campaign against the other foes of John XXII, par-ticularly Ockham, whom he viewed as heretical on issues of the Trinityand apostolic poverty.

Fournier’s campaign against antinomianism and heresy may havebeen one of the influences behind his reforms of the religious orderssoon after his elevation to the papacy, accompanied by a thoroughrestructuring of higher education throughout Europe. The reformsspanned the years 1335 to 1339. Some reforms were achieved throughdirect papal ordinances; such as those for the Cistercians (1335), Bene-dictines (1336), Franciscans (1336), and Austin Canons (1339).112 Otherswere undertaken by the orders themselves with the encouragement ofthe papacy, such as those for the Augustinian Hermits (1338).113 Theeducational system of the Dominicans, with whom Benedict had closeties, was not reorganized. With the possible exception of the Fran-ciscans, these ordinances were not the result of any papal suspicionover orthodox teaching, and they probably defined in writing manythings that were already being practised. But they do reflect the papaldesire for tighter organization and procedures with regard to educationamong the religious orders.

One aspect of the papal ordinance of 1336 for the Franciscans de-serves our attention.

Lest new works of any doctrine whatsoever happen to be communicatedor published incautiously or dangerously through the brothers of thisOrder, we strictly admonish that no brother without the approved exam-ination and previously obtained special licence of the Master and Gen-eral Chapter presume to publish, disseminate, or copy within or outsidethe Order any new theological, legal, or philosophical work, specifically abook, pamphlet, summa, compendium, postil; expositions, glosses, tract,collect, compilation of questions or of sermons edited by anyone. More-over, whoever presumes to attempt this should realize that he will be sus-pended from all scholarly and legal activities and from the use of books.Moreover, the aforesaid examination of a book should be done by fourbrothers of that Order, masters in the theological faculty, specially so del-egated by the General Chapter.…114

111 Kaeppeli, Le Procès; Smalley, English Friars, pp. 76–78; Koch, ‘Der Kardinal JacquesFournier’.

112 “Ordinationes Benedicti XII,” AFH, 30 (1937), 332–386; M. Briek, De EvolutioneIuridica Studiorum in Ordine Minorum (Dubrovnik, 1942); CUP II, pp. 448–451, 463–465,469–471, and 480–481.

113 CUP II, pp. 477–479; for further reforms of the Cistercians, see CUP II, pp. 479,483–485.

114 CUP II, p. 470: “Ne autem nova cujusvis doctrine opera per fratres ipsius Ordinis

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The legislation of 1335–1339 for the religious orders is paralleled byconcurrent reforms that the Nations instituted at Paris. The Universitylegislation of 1339–1341, therefore, continued an effort, discernable inParisian documents from 1335,115 to eradicate abuses. Nevertheless, theincreased frequency of legislation beginning in the autumn of 1339 hada more immediate cause. The records of the English-German Nationfrom the winter of 1338/39 indicate that University members eyed withgrowing concern a property dispute between two Arts scholars of theNorman Nation and some citizens of Valence.116 In the previous sum-mer Stephen of Langres, the University representative of the Bishopof Senlis, the protector and distributor of papal privileges to Univer-sity members, had involved himself in the dispute on the side of thescholars, and the citizens, in turn, had taken their case to the papalcourt in Avignon. The Faculty of Arts was not slow to recognize theopportunity offered the pope to involve himself in the University’s inter-nal affairs. Fournier’s reform zeal was well-known to them; Conrad ofMegenberg and other nuntii sent with benefice rolls in the previous fewyears presumably reported on the attitude of the papal curia to Parisiandevelopments. Expecting the worst, the University manoeuvered in thespring of 1339 to avoid papal ire. In July 1339, however, Benedict lev-elled charges of abuse against Stephen of Langres and the University,and threatened to revoke the University’s privileges. The news reachedParis in September, as the procurator of the English-German Nationwho oversaw the inscription of two statutes of that month also recordedthe empty-handed return of the nuntii sent to Avignon with the Univer-sity’s benefice roll. Not only unsuccessful in their mission, they brought

incaute, vel periculose communicari aut publicari contingat, districte precipimus quodnovum opus theologicum, juridicum, vel philosophicum, scilicet librum seu libellum,summam, compendium, postillam, expositiones, glossas, tractatum, vel collectionem,seu compilationem questionum, vel sermonum, a quocumque fuerit editus, vel edita,seu editum, nullus frater sine subscripto examine, ac ministri et Capituli generalis priusobtenta licentia speciali, intra vel extra Ordinem publicare, communicare, vel copiarepresumat. Si quis autem hoc attemptare presumpserit, omnibus scolasticis et legitimisactibus ac usu librorum se noverit ipso facto fore privatum. Predicti autem operisexamen fiat per quatuor fratres ejusdem Ordinis in theologica facultate magistros adhoc per generale Capitulum specialiter deputatos ….”

115 CUP II, pp. 443–447.116 AUP I, cols. 26, 28–32. The major documents in the case can be found in CUP

II, pp. 476–477, 482–483, 487–488, 488–489, 497–498, 498–499, 521–522. Stephen ofLangres had ties with the University beyond his administration of privileges. He hadbeen procurator of the French Nation, rector of the University, and in 1338 was alicentiate in law.


the pope’s demand to see the University’s documentary evidence for itsprivileges, which he intended to reconsider.117

When Benedict refused the requests in the University’s benefice roll,the income of a large part of the University community was at stake.Hence, although the reforms decreed in the autumn of 1339 built uponearlier legislation, the papal threat doubtless added urgency. It was inthat atmosphere that the Arts Faculty in September 1339 undertookto reform itself and, among various items of legislation, reaffirmed itsright to determine the texts appropriate for lectures and disputations,specifically prohibiting the works of one of the principal enemies ofBenedict XII: William of Ockham. Is it not, therefore, possible thatConrad of Megenberg, or others similarly ill-disposed toward Ockham,used the papal rejection of the University’s benefice roll as leveragein persuading their colleagues to pass legislation prohibiting the useof Ockham’s works as authoritative texts? If their action was in anyway designed to appease Benedict, it was unsuccessful. In February1340 Benedict suspended the privileges of the University. In the follow-ing autumn Benedict, probably prompted by interested parties at Paris,began inquisitorial procedures against a number of bachelors and stu-dents in the Theological Faculty at Paris, most of them seculars, includ-ing Nicholas of Autrecourt. Among the accused were two English stu-dents from his own Order, the Cistercians.118 The University’s privilegeswere not restored until July 1341.119

The atmosphere changed in 1342 with the death of Benedict XIIand the election of Pierre Roger as Clement VI. Roger was also a Parisdoctor of Theology but one of more liberal temperament.120 The Cis-tercian Richard of Lincoln was cleared of the charges of holding ‘fan-tastic opinions.’121 The cases against most of the Parisian students calledto Avignon were dropped. Thomas Waleys was finally freed from the

117 AUP I, col. 35; CUP II, p. 487.118 The white monk Henry of England was called to Avignon in November 1340

along with Autrecourt; CUP II, p. 505. Before 1342 a second Cistercian, Richard ofLincoln, was accused by Benedict XII of holding opiniones phantasticae; CUP II, pp. 541–542. For additional discussion see Courtenay, “John of Mirecourt and Gregory ofRimini,” RTAM, 39 (1972) 226–230.

119 CUP II, pp. 521–522.120 On Pierre Roger as theologian see A. Maier, “Der literarische Nachlass des Petrus

Rogerii (Clemens VI.) in der Borghesiana,” RTAM, 15 (1948), 332–356, 16 (1949), 72–98, and in Ausgehendes Mittealter II, pp. 255–315; François de Meyronnes–Pierre Roger,Disputatio (1320–1321), ed. J. Barbet (Paris, 1961).

121 CUP II, pp. 541–542.

206 chapter nine

papal prison and allowed to return to England.122 In keeping with ear-lier papal concerns, however, the trial of Autrecourt was brought tocompletion, followed by Clement’s letter of correction to the Univer-sity.123

The legislation in the various faculties of the University of Paris dur-ing the years 1339–1341 should probably be viewed as a secular coun-terpart to the educational legislation for the mendicant and monas-tic orders in the previous few years. These reforms were directly orindirectly encouraged by Benedict XII, who gave some of them theadded prestige and universality of papal legislation. Although little inthe reforms directly concerned philosophical or theological opinions,Benedict certainly felt that an orderly classroom and sound doctrinewent together.

The crisis over Ockham’s works and the secta Occanica at Paris thushas two faces. To the degree that it was a real problem of internal con-cern at Paris, it was a concern limited to the Arts Faculty and primarilya crisis within the English-German Nation, probably over the physicsof Ockham, his reinterpretation of the categories (praedicamenta). Thereis no evidence that the Faculty of Theology was involved, nor that thetheology or logic of Ockham ever came into question. To the degreethat it was a problem of external pressure, the pressure was to reassertmagisterial control over academic exercises and to correct abuses in themethod of arguing, lecturing, and debating. It was a pressure appliedmore to the non-mendicants in the University than to other groups,and it was probably applied to all faculties alike. To that degree, theArts statute of December 1340 concerned with misleading analysis ofpropositions is perhaps related to the calling of Autrecourt and oth-ers to Avignon for similar abuses in theological teaching. But neitherevent had any particular relation to Ockham’s works or Ockhamism.That dimension of the crisis was simply the way in which the Arts Fac-ulty responded to events, which allowed a long-simmering dispute overOckham’s physics to flare into the open. The opponents of Ockham’sthought could use the crisis and the fact of the anti-Ockham pope topurge their faculty of the Ockham-sympathizers in their midst.

How long the Arts prohibitions on Ockham’s philosophical teachingremained in effect is unknown, but they probably did not long sur-vive the death of Benedict XII. By 1343 Gregory of Rimini was openly

122 Smalley, English Friars, pp. 78–79.123 CUP II, pp. 587–590.


teaching positions in physics that paralleled Ockham’s. Although Rim-ini was not subject to the statutes of the Arts Faculty and was, in fact,sharply critical of Ockham on other issues of philosophy and theol-ogy, the ease with which Rimini espoused Ockham’s natural philosophywithout opposition suggests that Ockham had become a figure whoseworks and ideas could be discussed openly and adopted or rejected ontheir own terms, not on the basis of party lines within the Arts Facultyor between the University and Papacy.

chapter ten

FORCE OF WORDS AND FIGURES OF SPEECH:THE CRISIS OVER VIRTUS SERMONIS

IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY*

On the Friday after Christmas in 1340 the Arts Faculty at the Universityof Paris, during the rectorship of Alain de Villa Colis, enacted a statutelisting propositions and types of argumentation that should not beused in the schools by any master, bachelor, or scholar under pain ofexpulsion from the faculty forever.1 Most of the articles in that statuteconcerned arguments employing the phrase de virtute sermonis, to theeffect that propositions taken from authoritative sources should notsimply be called false, de virtute sermonis. This statute was identified inthe fifteenth-century manuscript of the Chartularium as being directedagainst Ockhamist errors—a rubric repeated in Denifle’s edition of theChartulary and expanded upon by Michalski, who attempted to linkthe expression de virtute sermonis to Ockham’s theory of language andpersonal supposition.2 That interpretation was subsequently rejected ashighly unlikely by Boehner and Moody, but has been resurrected anddefended by Ruprecht Paqué in his book-length study of this statute,and by T.K. Scott.3

As has been established elsewhere,4 this statute was mislabeled andwas not one of the two anti-Ockhamist statutes promulgated in the

* Presented at a conference on Ockham at St. Bonaventure, N.Y, in 1985 andpublished in 1988 in Franciscan Studies, 44 (1984), 107–128.

1 CUP II, 505–507, n. 1042.2 The relevant section of the manuscript of the Chartularium, whose somewhat

topical structure was rearranged and added to in Denifle’s edition, is Paris, Arch. Univ.,Reg. 100 (formerly 94), p. 67, n. 59. C. Michalski, “Le probleme de la volonté à Oxfordet à Paris au XIVe siecle,” Studia Philosophica 2 (1937), 255–261.

3 Ph. Boehner, “Ockham’s Theory of Supposition and the Notion of Truth,” FS, 6(1946), 261–292, reprinted in Collected Articles (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1958), pp. 232–267;E.A. Moody, “Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt: The Parisian Statutes of1339 and 1340,” FS, 7 (1947), 113–146, reprinted in Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science,and Logic (Berkeley, 1975), pp. 127–160; Ruprecht Paqué, Das Pariser Nominalistenstatut(Berlin, 1970); T.K. Scott, “Nicholas of Autrecourt, Buridan, and Ockhamism,” JHP,9 (1971), 15–41.

4 W.J. Courtenay and K.H. Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-Ger-

210 chapter ten

same period at Paris—one in September of 1339 that is still extant,and one early in 1341 that no longer exists, but which can be partiallyreconstructed from references to it in the 1341 oaths of the arts facultyand in the Nominalist defense of 1474. Even so, the 1340 statute withwhich we are here concerned did appear in the midst of a crisis overthe degree to which Ockham’s writings and views should be used in theschools, and a study of the meaning and function of the phrase de virtute

sermonis, particularly in the fourteenth century, may hold some answersfor its original context and purpose.

As far back as 1946 Boehner attempted to erase many of the mis-understandings about the meaning of the expression de virtute sermonis

and shed light on Ockham’s use of it.5 The persuasiveness of his anal-ysis was handicapped by his need for brevity (it was given as an asidein the context of another article), by a few unfortunate mistakes, andprobably by the ad hominem assumption by many that Boehner had avested interest in freeing Ockham from the taint of heresy. Yet whenBoehner’s analysis is considered on its own merits, it is essentially cor-rect. It is only insufficient in the degree of attention given to the pre-and post-Ockhamist history of the phrase de virtute sermonis and the lim-itation of discussing it only in the context of supposition theory, lead-ing to the mistaken inference that the expression de virtute sermonis wasequivalent to and interchangeable with proper supposition, as opposedto improper supposition, or ex usu loquendi.

Meaning and Verbal Sense: the Origins of ‘Virtus Sermonis’

Although the specific phrase de virtute sermonis is not found, so far as Iam aware, before the thirteenth century, the distinction of which it is apart, namely between the literal and derived meanings of a word, goesback to Greek grammar, just as do many of the names used today forthe various figures of speech, e.g. synecdoche, metonymy, or metaphor.Aristotle distinguished between proper and metaphoric language, andgave some attention to the different types of metaphor.6 The subsequent

man Nation at Paris, 1339–1341,” History of Universities, 2 (1982), 53–96 [reprinted in thisvolume as Chapter 9].

5 Boehner, Collected Articles, pp. 248–253.6 Aristotle, Rhetorica III, 2–4. In his discussion of style Aristotle uses the word arete,

which was rendered into Latin as virtus. Because of Aristotle’s distinction of proper

the crisis over virtus sermonis 211

contributions of the Stoics and Alexandrians to the study of rhetoricand earlier Greek poetry led eventually to a more formal study ofgrammar, especially as embodied in the popular Techne grammatike onceattributed to Dionysios Thrax.7 By the first century B.C. the Romanworld was making comparable strides in linguistics, especially throughsuch works on grammar and rhetoric as the Ad Herennium, Varro’s De

lingua latina and Cicero’s De inventione rhetorica, and Topica.For the next few centuries grammatical study entailed two research

frontiers of use to philosophers and rhetoricians alike. One of thesewas to identify the precise meaning of similar words.8 The goal amongRoman rhetoricians was precision in language and the attainment ofpure Latinity. In order to arrive at the proper meaning of each word,whether that meaning was natural or assigned, considerable effort wentinto defining precise meaning among synonyms on the assumptionthat each word had its own character or special meaning. Treatises de

proprietate sermonum or Differentiae formed a favored type of grammaticalwork in the ancient, medieval, and renaissance periods and would havebeen familiar to any Parisian scholastic in the fourteenth century.9

terms and metaphorical terms, thirteenth- and fourteenth-century commentaries onhis Rhetorica continue to use the language of locutio propria and locutio impropria, e.g. inGiles of Rome.

7 Dionysios Thrax, Ars grammatica or Techne, ed. G. Uhlig in Grammatici graeci, Pt. I,Vol. I (Leipzig, 1883). Dionysios Thrax, in his analysis of nouns, had distinguishedbetween primitive words and derived words, but for the latter he was mostly concernedwith the categories of root meanings of proper names, not figures of speech. Onthe development of Greek grammatical theory see Jan Pinborg, “Classical Antiquity:Greece,” in Current Trends in Linguistics, ed. T.A. Sebeok, 13 (1975), pp. 69–126, andhis citations of the earlier contributions of Detlev Fehling. Pinborg also accepts DiBenedetto’s arguments on the authenticity and redating of the Techne. I am gratefulto Sten Ebbesen for his helpful remarks on this and related issues.

8 The ancient semantic division between those who asserted that words had mean-ing by nature and those who asserted that language was man-made, ad placitum, hadlong since resulted in a compromise that favored what was assumed to be the originalmeaning of words, based on a natural relationship between the thing and the word thatexpressed or symbolized it. Present linguistic usage, particularly the anomalies that hadarisen as derived meanings moved further away from primitive words and those seman-tically related to them, was the key to uncovering the archeological layers of derivedmeaning, the history of each word, and etymologically arriving back at its original,natural meaning.

9 For example in Cicero, Isidore, Bede, Alcuin, and later writers. For the history ofthe tradition see Myra Uhlfelder, De Proprietate Sermonum vel Rerum. A Study and CriticalEdition of a Set of Verbal Distinctions, Papers and Monographs of the American Academyin Rome, vol. 15 (Rome, 1954). I would like to thank Fannie LeMoine for directing meto this study and to the Ad Herennium.

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The second research frontier was to identify the different meaningsof the same word. The research goal remained the same: to isolatethe proper or root meaning of a word by separating out or peelingoff the accretions of acquired meanings. It was in this context thattransferred or figurative meanings were discussed, and if philosopherswere primarily interested in precise, proper meanings of words, rhetori-cians recognized, alongside etymological reasoning, the persuasivenessof arguments based on the image-power of figurative language. Discus-sions of the difference between literal and transferred meanings wereequally prevalent in the ancient period, received frequent treatment inthe Middle Ages, and were familiar to any fourteenth-century Parisianscholastic.10

In talking about the meaning or sense of a word, the Ad Herennium

employed the term potestas verbi.11 Potestas covered any meaning, mul-

tiplices potestates, and was not limited to proper meaning.12 Varro andCicero used the term significatio in a similar unrestricted sense, andCicero used an additional term, vis: the force or meaning of a word.13

The image behind vis is the same as that behind potestas: power or force,but for Cicero the vis verbi was usually its root meaning and was usefulto the orator as a way of developing an argument, namely etymologi-cally.14 Although Cicero discussed disputes that centered on the mean-ing of words in statements of past authors and fully recognized prob-lems of ambiguity and differences between literal and intended mean-ing, disputes over a vis verbi centered on the definition or root mean-ing of a word or phrase.15 That usage was generally followed by laterauthors, and the etymological context of vis placed it for several cen-

10 The importance in this regard of the treatments by Cicero, Augustine, Isidore,and others will be discussed below.

11 Ad Herennium IV, 31: “Restant etiam decem exornationes verborum.… Nam earumomnium hoc proprium est, ut ab usitata verborum potestate recedatur atque in aliamrationem cum quadam venustate oratio conferatur.”

12 Ad Herennium IV, 53: “Ea reperientur facile si noverimus et animum adverterimusverborum ancipites aut multiplices potestates.”

13 For significatio verbi see Varro, De lingua latina 9, 40; significatio scripti in Cicero, Departitione oratoria 31, 108; 38, 132. Cicero, Ad Brutum Orator 32, 115: “Noverit primum vim,naturam, genera verborum et simplicium et copulatorum”; Oratio pro Balbo 8, 21; Epist.ad familiares 6, 2, 3; De finibus 2, 2, 6.

14 Cicero, Topica 8, 35: “Multa etiam ex notatione sumuntur. Ea est autem, cum exvi nominis argumentum elicitur; quam Graeci ‘etymologia’ appellant, id est verbum exverbo veriloquium.”

15 Cicero, De inventione I, 12–13: “tum vis verbi quasi in definitiva constitutione, inquo posita sit, quaeri.”


turies on the fringe of the more general division between literal andderived meanings.16

The contrast between literal and figurative meanings of words, thelatter known as tropoi, fascinated grammarians and rhetoricians alike.Quintillian mentions the heated battle in his day between the gram-marians and philosophers over the number and subcategories of tropoi

or tropi, as they were known in Latin.17 But by the fourth century thir-teen types of figures of speech had been agreed upon, the numberadopted by Isidore and later writers.18 Scaurus and Diomedes definedtropus as “a mode of adorned discourse in which the meaning of anexpression is transferred from its proper signification to an improperone.”19 Thus the phrases modi locutionum, locutio figurata, and verbum trans-

latum became expressions for figurative meaning. And although mod-ern Latin dictionaries will often distinguish between transferred mean-ing and figurative meaning, that distinction is far less clear in the lateantique.20

Perhaps the most sensitive area in which the distinction betweenliteral and figurative meaning was discussed was in the understandingof Scripture. It was recognized on all sides that biblical language washighly figurative, and Augustine in particular attempted to establishrules for determining when scriptural words or phrases should be takenliterally, when figuratively—a distinction of great importance to him.21

16 Quintillian refers to the root meaning of metonymy, Institutiones oratoriae 8, 6, 23:“Metonomia, cuius vis est, pro eo, quod dicitur, causam, propter quam dicitur, ponere.”That would also seem to be the way in which Augustine uses it De doctrina christiana III,ch. 1.

17 Quintillian, Inst. 8, 6, 1: “Tropus …, circa quem inexplicabilis et grammaticis interipsos et philosophis pugna est, quae sint genera, quae species, qui numerus, qui cuiquesubiciatur.”

18 Ad Herennium IV, 31 knew ten tropes. Donatus mentions the thirteen types thatbecome standard. See Isidore, Orig. I, 37, 1: “ex omnibus Donatus tredecim usuitradenda conscripsit.” An excellent discussion is provided in J. Fontaine, Isidore de Sevilleet la culture classique dans l’espagne wisigothique, vol. I (Paris, 1959), pp. 125–156.

19 Diomedes, Gramm., cited from Fontaine, Isidore, p. 143: “Tropus est, ut ait Scaurus,modus ornatae orationis et dictio translata a propria significatione ad non propriam.”See earlier Quintillian, Institutiones oratoriae 9, 1, 4: “est igitur tropus sermo a naturali etprincipali significatione translatus ad aliam.”

20 Transferred meaning describes the application of a word outside its original ormain meaning, such as the application of an action of a living being transferred toinanimate objects or abstractions. Figurative meanings depend on figures of speech.

21 Augustine discussed the problem at many points in his writing, including DeTrinitate, De dialectica, and the entire third book of De doctrina christiana. Cassiodorusreferred to a work of Augustine under the title De modis locutionum specifically dealing

214 chapter ten

He described literal meaning through such phrases as ad litteram, locutio

propia, in verbis propriis, ad proprietatem verborum. Figurative meaning wasdescribed as tropos, modus locutionum, locutio translata, locutio figurata, or in

verbis translatis.The grammatical and exegetical distinction between literal and fig-

urative meanings of words, especially as discussed in the writings ofDonatus (the grammarian) and Augustine was passed down throughthe centuries.22 In discussions of signification at the opening of thetwelfth century we find the distinction between literal and figurativemeaning still expressed in the language of proper and improper locu-tion. Master Ulger of Angers defined accidental predication as the figu-rative meaning or improper locution in which a word is used in anothersense from the one it normally or properly has.23 Abelard’s preface toSic et non makes the difference between the usus and proprietas of words amajor reason for the seemingly divergent opinions among the fathers.24

By the thirteenth century, however, virtus was beginning to replace vis

and proprietas as the word most frequently used to express the force,

with figures of speech in Scripture, which may refer to Locutionum in Heptateuchum.Augustine, De doctrina christiana III, ch. 1, Corpus Christianorum, 32 (Turnhout, 1962),p. 77: “ne vim naturamve earum, quae propter similitudinem adhibentur.…” Ibid.:“sciat ambiguitatem scripturae aut in verbis propriis esse aut in translatis.…” Ibid.,ch. 5 (CCh 32, 82): “Sed verborum translatorum ambiguitates. … Nam in principiocavendum est, ne figuratam locutionem ad litteram accipias.” Ibid., ch. 29 (CCh 32,100): “Sciant autem litterati modis omnibus locutionis, quos grammatici graeco nominetropos vocant, auctores nostros usus fuisse multiplicius atque copiosius, quam possuntexistimare vel credere.…” Ibid. (CCh 32,101): “qui nullos grammaticos audierunt et eo,quo vulgus utitur, sermone contenti sunt. Quis enim non dicit ‘sic floreas’? qui tropusmetaphora vocatur.” Ibid. (CCh 32, 102): “quia cum sensus, ad proprietatem verborumsi accipiatur, absurdus est.…” The degree of importance Augustine attached to thisissue is reflected in his willingness to borrow the rules used toward the end of De doctrinachristiana from a Donatist work.

22 The literal/figurative distinction receives extensive treatment in Priscian, Cas-siodorus, Isidore, and throughout the tradition of medieval textual exegesis, principallybiblical.

23 Abelard, Dialectica, ed. L.M. de Rijk (Assen, 1956), p. 168: “Magister autem nosterU. accidentalem praedicationem secundum figurativam atque impropriam locutionemtotius enuntiationis accipiebat; impropriam autem locutionem eam dicebat ‘cuius verbaaliud sententia proponunt quam in voce videantur habere’; veluti cum Homero iammortuo dicitur: ‘Homerus est poeta,’ ac si diceretur: ‘Homeri opus existit quod exofficio poetae composuit’.”

24 Abelard, Sic et Non, ed. B. Boyer and R. McKeon (Chicago, 1976–1977), pp. 88–90: “cum frequenter eveniat ut verborum propria significatio nonnullis sit incognita autminus usitata. Quibus quidem si ad doctrinam, ut oportet, loqui volumus, magis eorumusus quam proprietas sermonis aemulandus est, sicut et ipse grammaticae princeps etlocutionum instructor Priscianus edocet.”


sense, or literal meaning of a word. So we find Bonaventure using theexpression de virtute sermonis in discussing the meaning of alius in theproposition Deus genuit alium Deum.25 Similarly, Aquinas used equivalentexpressions, such as ex virtute vocabuli, ad virtutem vocabulorum, in virtute

dictionum, and once ex vi verborum—always in the context of significa-tion.26 Modist commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici elenchi also used theexpressions de vi vocis and de virtute sermonis in dealing with problems ofequivocation.27

It is in the fourteenth century that the distinction between virtus

sermonis and usus loquendi becomes commonly used. And more oftenthan not, it is the English authors who employ it most frequently. FatherSynan, in his edition of Richard Campsall’s Questions on Prior Analytics,noted Campsall’s use of the distinction.28 As Synan observed, “Devices

25 Bonaventure, Sent. I, d. 4, q. 2 (Quaracchi, 1882) I, p. 100: “Sed licet ista distinctioin locutionibus theologicis propter quendam proprium modum loquendi locum habeat,tamen quantum esset de virtute sermonis, non esset distinguenda.…” Sent. I, d. 5, a.1, q. 1 (I, pp. 142–113): “Sancti enim quandoque ad confundendas haereses expressiusloquuntur, quam proprietas sermonis sustineat.” Sent. III, d. 5, a. 1, q. 5 (III, p. 129):“Et propterea locutio figurativa, in qua significatur per synecdochen ‘caro’ sumi prototo homine, simpliciter respuitur, pro eo quod magis recedit a sermonis proprietateet ab expressione veritatis, et approximat intellectui erroris.—Qua de causa multaenegantur locutiones a doctoribus theologiae, ne paralogizentur et decipiantur simplices,qui nesciunt vocabulorum virtutes.” Sent. III, d. 8, a. 1, q. 1. Sent. III, d. 11, a. 2, q. 1, ad1 (III, p. 250): “… Sancti aliquando multum expresse loquuntur, amplius quam admittatcommunis usus, ob aliquid exprimendum; et tales sermones non oportet extendi, sedmagis sunt exponendi. Et sic est in praedicto sermone, cum dicunt, Christum essecreaturam; hoc autem dicunt secundum humanam naturam, et vere loquuntur; nontamen oportet, sermonem istum trahi ad communem usum.” Sent. IV, d. 11, p. 2,dub. 2 (IV, p. 265): “… sicut in signis vocalibus duplex attenditur significatio, scilicetpropria et allegorica; ita et in hac duplici significatione simul accipitur in theologia.…Et sicut fallit regula sophistarum in primis signis, quia in theologia dictio simul accipiturmoraliter et litteraliter et allegorice; sic fallit in his signis, quia unum principaliter etproprie significant, et aliud allegoricae.”

26 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theol. I, q. 29, a. 4: “ex virtute vocabuli essentiamsignificet.” Thomas’s phrase “ex virtute vocabuli” is an exact equivalent to “de virtutesermonis,” and by it Thomas means the obvious, direct verbal meaning which, if leftby itself, would lead to a heretical interpretation or the rejection of the doctrine as false.Summa theol. I, q. 36, a. 1, ad 1: “prout sumitur in virtute duarum dictionum.” Summatheol. I, q. 36, a. 2, ad 3: “ex vi illorum verborum.” Cf. Sent. I, d. 10, q. 1, a. 4, ad 1.

27 Incertorum Auctorum Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos, ed. S. Ebbesen, CorpusPhilosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi, VII (Copenhagen, 1977), pp. 46, 107, 111, 127–130, 147, 151, 159, 182, 284, 290, 292, 295–296, 300, 336–339, 346, 365, 370; Simon ofFaversham, Quaestiones super Libro Elenchorum, ed. S. Ebbesen et al., Pontifical Institute ofMediaeval Studies, Studies and Text, 60 (Toronto, 1984), pp. 74, 95–96, 137, 192–195,228–229. I am grateful to Sten Ebbesen for calling these passages to my attention.

28 The Works of Richard of Campsall, Vol. I: Questiones super librum priorum analecticorum,

216 chapter ten

such as supposition do not always solve the ambiguities that arise fromordinary language and Campsall is often to be seen distinguishingbetween what might be gathered plausibly from the strict force ofan expression and what a man, competent in the idiomatic use ofthe language at issue, would judge spontaneously to be the intentionof a speaker who conformed in this expression to that usage.”29 Asthe analysis of propositions increasingly became a central part of thetraining in logic in the fourteenth century, training in the various waysof responding and distinguishing took a more prominent place, both inthe classroom and in the written products of scholastic debate. Somedistinctions were applied to the proposition as a whole, such as thedistinction between the composite and divided senses; or the distinctionbetween viewing a proposition from the standpoint of God’s poweras ordained, in which case the proposition “homo potest salvari sinegratia” is false, or viewing the same proposition from the standpointof God’s power taken simply or absolutely, in which case it is true.30

Other distinctions were applied to terms in a proposition, such asstrict sense vs broad or large sense, literal vs transferred meaning, orthe application of the various forms of supposition.31 Thus, just as thefrequency of the distinction of absolute and ordained power increasedin the first quarter of the fourteenth century, so too the distinctionbetween virtus sermonis and usus loquendi. And we need to keep in mindthat they functioned as distinctions or pairs, not as isolated expressions.They were used to show in what sense a proposition was true and inwhat sense false.

ed. E.A. Synan (Toronto, 1968), p. 45: “et ideo, quelibet talis est neganda de virtutesermonis, admisimus, tamen, tales ex usu loquendi …; dicendum est quod secundaproposicio, accepta de virtute sermonis, est falsa.” Ibid., 141: “et istud potest concedide virtute sermonis; alio tamen modo accipiendo hoc adverbium, magis est ex usuloquendi.”

29 Ibid., p. 27.30 For the importance of “distinguo” and the composite and divided senses, see

N. Kretzmann, “Sensus compositus, sensus divisus, and Propositional Attitudes,” Medio-evo, 7 (1981), 195–229. The role of the potentia absoluta, potentia ordinata distinction inpropositional analysis has been largely overlooked. See my “The Dialectic of Omnipo-tence in the High and Late Middle Ages,” in Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence inMedieval Philosophy, ed. T. Rudavsky (Dordrecht, 1984), pp. 243–269.

31 Some of these distinctions were used in legal argumentation, such as betweenstrict construction and wider interpretation, or between the letter of the law and theintention of the law.


Supposition and Virtuous Words

The fullest discussion of virtus sermonis in Ockham occurs in his Summa

logicae in the chapter dealing with improper supposition. We should,therefore, examine for a moment the development of the concept ofimproper supposition and its connection with our distinction.

The earliest mention of improper supposition appears to be in thelogical treatise known as Cum sit nostra, written in England toward theend of the twelfth century and revised in the course of the thirteenth.32

In the section on supposition, the author listed various types of suppo-sition, including toward the end suppositio geminata (supposition of joinedsubjects, predicates, or adverbial phrases), suppositio antonomatica (title inplace of a personal name, or a personal name for a type), suppositio

metonomatica (substitution of cause for effect, or effect for cause, or anassociation name for the true name), suppositio sinodochica (part for thewhole or whole for the part), and suppositio impropria (substitution of thename of a nation for its people). The interesting feature here is thatimproper supposition is considered to be one type of a variety of sup-position forms based on figures of speech. Moreover, the phrase de virtute

sermonis is not used in this context.Most thirteenth-century treatises on supposition do not mention fig-

ures of speech or improper supposition. Roger Bacon, however, does soin his Sumulae dialectices, drawing heavily upon Cum sit nostra but leavingout synecdoche and distinguishing between ‘modus loquendi’ and ‘veri-tas.’33 Walter Burley, in a treatise written around 1301, also relied uponCum sit nostra, but he restructured the discussion to place under im-proper supposition all types of supposition based on figures of speech.34

Burley is the first to introduce the phrase de virtute sermonis into the dis-cussion of supposition. All forms of improper supposition are based onfigures of speech and use words ex usu loquendi, not de virtute sermonis.

Ockham’s treatment of supposition in his Summa logicae is based onBurley’s treatise, with some important differences.35 In his discussion of

32 Logica “Cum sit nostra,” ed. in L.M. de Rijk, Logica modernorum, II.2 (Assen, 1967),pp. 447–448.

33 Roger Bacon, Sumulae dialectices in Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, fasc. 15, ed.R. Steele (Oxford, 1940), pp. 287–288.

34 Stephen Brown, “Walter Burleigh’s Treatise De suppositionibus and Its Influence onWilliam of Ockham,” FS, 32 (1972), 15–64.

35 Ockham, Summa logicae, ed. Ph. Boehner, G. Gál, and S. Brown (St. Bonaventure,1974), pp. 236–238.

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improper supposition Ockham adopts Burley’s explanatory distinctionbetween de virtute sermonis and ex usu loquendi. He briefly summarizes,however, the types of improper supposition and quickly moves into aplea for the central importance of improper supposition, since manyauthoritative statements, indeed most, entail ambiguities of this kind.“Thus, it is important to determine when a term and a propositionare being taken de virtute sermonis and when secundum usum loquentium oraccording to the intention of the author. The reason is because thereis hardly a word which is not in some way employed equivocally invarious places in the books of the philosophers, saints, and authors.And therefore those always wishing to take a word univocally and injust one sense frequently err about the intentions of authors and in theinquiry after truth, since almost all words are employed equivocally.”36

Neither Burley nor Ockham intended to equate proper suppositionand de virtute sermonis, or improper supposition and ex usu loquendi. Theywere only saying that forms of improper supposition depended onwords whose signification was not proper or literal. Thus the expressionde virtute sermonis came into supposition theory only inasmuch as onecannot talk about the supposition of terms without first agreeing ontheir meaning. Throughout the discussion the phrase de virtute sermonis

functions as an element of signification, although Ockham did, in amove akin to synecdoche, apply the phrase to propositions as well as toterms within them.

In a sense, supposition theory was poorly equipped to deal with fig-ures of speech, idiomatic or colloquial expressions, or intentions of anauthor. Supposition concerns subjects and predicates and thus nouns ornoun-like words, while figures of speech often depend upon the trans-ferred meaning of verbs, and idiomatic expressions often depend uponsome unusual use of an adverb. In order to apply supposition theory toa sentence like Sol currit or Aqua currit, one has to rephrase them as Sol est

currens or Aqua est currens in which the word “running” supposits improp-

36 Ibid., p. 237: “Et ideo multum est considerandum quando terminus et propositioaccipitur de virtute sermonis et quando secundum usum loquentium vel secundumintentionem auctorum, et hoc quia vix invenitur aliquod vocabulum quin in diversislocis librorum philosophorum et Sanctorum et auctorum aequivoce accipiatur; et hocpenes aliquem modum aequivocationis. Et ideo volentes accipere semper vocabulumunivoce et uno modo frequenter errant circa intentiones auctorum et inquisitionemveritatis, cum fere omnia vocabula aequivoce accipiantur.” Ockham does not mean toimply that authors use words equivocally, but that readers often understand words indifferent senses.


erly for “sun” or “water.” For sentences in which the elements haveundergone several stages of transferred meaning, or idiomatic expres-sions, such as Horace’s “asellum currere doceas” (“you teach an ass to run”)or “litus arare” (“to plow the beach”)37 which mean “to labor in vain,”similar to our “coals to Newcastle,” the colloquialisms have to be trans-lated back into proper terminology before supposition theory can evenbe applied. Supposition theory cannot decipher the language of thosewho, like Alice, mean what they say even if they don’t say what theymean.

The 1340 Statute Revisited

We are now equipped to turn out attention to the controversial Parisianstatute of 1340. Four of the six articles reassert the importance ofdistinguishing between the various senses of words used in propositionstaken from past authorities in order to clarify the true meaning ofthe author. The first article requires that those lecturing should notcharacterize statements in authoritative texts as simply false de virtute

sermonis if they know the author intended something true, but shouldalso distinguish the true from the false sense.38 The article remarkson the dangers failure to “distinguish” holds for biblical exegesis, andargues that the true meaning of words (virtus sermonis) is determined bycommon usage and is not restricted to literal meaning.

The second article attacks those who limit true propositions to thosein which the subject and predicate supposit personally and literally,since that leads to the same unfortunate results as the practice con-

37 Horace, Satire 1, 1. 91. On litus arare as a common medieval example of amphibolysee Sten Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi, vol. I(Leiden, 1981), p. 183: Klemens Kopp, Fallaciae ad modum Oxoniae. Ein Fehlschlusstraktataus dem 13. Jahrhundert, unpublished dissertation, Cologne, 1985.

38 CUP II, n. 1042: “Videlicet quod nulli magistri, baccalarii, vel scolares in artiumfacultate legentes Parisius audeant aliquem propositionem famosam illius auctoris cuiuslibrum legunt, dicere simpliciter esse falsam, vel esse falsam de virtute sermonis, sicrediderint quod auctor ponendo illam habuerit verum intellectum; sed vel concedanteam, vel sensum verum dividant a sensu falso, quia pari ratione propositiones Bibliaeabsoluto sermone essent negandae, quod est periculosum. Et quia sermo non habetvirtutem, nisi ex impositione et usu communi auctorum vel aliorum, ideo talis estvirtus sermonis, qualiter eo auctores communiter utunter et qualem exigit materia,cum sermones sint recipiendi penes materiam subiectam.”

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demned in the first article.39 The third article directly attacks those whorefuse to distinguish true and false senses of a proposition.40 And thefourth article prohibits saying that only propositions that are literallytrue should be conceded.41 Again the authors of the statute affirm thatone should concentrate less on the proper or literal meaning (ad pro-

prietatem sermonis) and more on context, subject matter, common usage,and the intention of the author.

Although the fifth article does not concern the need to distinguish atrue meaning from a false literal meaning, it may be related. It rejectslimiting scientific knowledge to terms (single words) and expressions(phrases), presumably written or spoken, and instead affirms knowledgeto be of things by means of such signs.42

Ruprecht Paqué, in his lengthy analysis of the articles of the statute,ignored the fact that the first four articles concern the need to distin-guish a true intended meaning from a false literal meaning.43 Instead,he interpreted these articles to condemn any description of a propo-sition taken from an authoritative text as being literally false, and tocondemn limiting supposition to personal supposition—two practicesthat he attributed to Ockham, attempting to prove against Boehnerand Moody that the statute was specifically directed against Ockhamand his followers. His surprising misreading of a few short paragraphs

39 Ibid.: “Item, quod nullus dicat simpliciter vel de virtute sermonis omnem propo-sitionem esse falsam, quae esset falsa secundum suppositionem personalem termino-rum, eo quod iste error ducit ad priorem errorem, auctores enim saepe utuntur aliissuppositionibus.”

40 Ibid.: “Item, quod nullus dicat quod nulla propositio sit distinguenda, quoniamhoc ducit ad praedictos errores, quia si discipulus unum propositionis sensum recipit,et doctor alium intellexerit, discipulus falso informabitur, donec propositio distinguetur.Similiter si opponens unum sensum recipiat, et respondens alterum sensum intelligat,disputatio erit ad nomen tantum, si non fiat distinctio.”

41 Ibid.: “Item, quod nullus dicat propositionem nullam esse concedendam, si nonsit vera in eius sensu proprio, quia hoc dicere ducit ad praedictos errores, quia Bibliaet auctores non semper sermonibus utuntur secundum proprios sensus eorum. Magisigitur oportet in affirmando vel negando sermones ad materiam subiectam atten-dere, quam ad proprietatem sermonis, disputatio namque ad proprietatem sermonisattendens nullam recipiens propositionem, praeterquam in sensu proprio, non est nisisophistica disputatio. Disputationes dialecticae et doctrinales, quae ad inquisitionemveritatis intendunt, modicam habent de nominibus sollicitudinem.”

42 Ibid.: “Item, quod nullus dicat scientiam nullam esse de rebus quae non sunt signa,id est, quae non sunt termini vel orationes, quoniam in scientiis utimur terminis prorebus, quas portare non possumus ad disputationes. Ideo scientiam habemus de rebus,licet mediantibus terminis vel orationibus.”

43 Ruprecht Paqué, Das Pariser Nominalistenstatut.


of this fourteenth-century document is matched only by his appallingmisinterpretation of Ockham’s teaching on supposition. Ockham wasacutely sensitive to the ambiguities and complexities of language andfrequently called his reader’s attention to the need to consider context,figures of speech, and intention of an author when evaluating the truthor falsity of propositions. Wherever he used the phrase de virtute sermo-

nis, as he did frequently, it was in the context of distinguishing the truefrom the false sense of words, and the other side of the distinction, ex

usu loquendi, was either expressed or implied.In order to separate the true and false senses of biblical or theo-

logical expressions, most scholastic authors, including Bonaventure andThomas, used the expression de virtute sermonis or its equivalents and rec-ognized that authoritative statements were false if taken literally. Along-side the authors of the 1340 statute, Ockham and every other goodAristotelian recognized that spoken language is a matter of impositionand human convention, as Boehner already noted. The only point onwhich Ockham might have departed from the letter if not the spiritof the articles of 1340 is the attempt within the statute to define virtus

sermonis as “commonly accepted meaning,” including all forms of com-mon usage, rather than simply literal meaning—an approach similarto that found in the earlier Modist commentaries. The statute requiresdisputants to look equally at (1) the principal meaning of words, and(2) their context (materia subiecta). Interpreting the virtus sermonis as “com-monly accepted meaning,” however, undercuts the original purpose ofthe distinction, namely between literal meaning on the one hand andcommon usage and intention on the other.

Scripture and Humanism:

Metaphoric Language & the Context of the Statute of 1340

If the 1340 statute was not aimed at Ockham, either directly or indi-rectly, against whom was it drafted and what was the controversy reallyabout? It was not directed against Autrecourt, who had long sinceceased to teach in the arts faculty at Paris.44 There is, in fact, no reasonto assume that all the articles were directed against one specific per-

44 For the dating of Autrecourt’s career and the impossibility of his being connectedwith the 1340 statute, see Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockhamists, and the English-German Nation” [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 9].

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son or even group at Paris in the year or years immediately precedingDecember 1340, but may instead have to do with types of argumen-tation and propositional analysis that were considered unacceptable inlectures and disputations. Fortunately for our understanding of the pur-pose of the statute and the extent of the crisis that lay behind it, we dohave some contemporary and slightly later witnesses to what appears tohave been more than a passing disagreement among Parisian arts mas-ters. The evidence suggests that alongside the controversy over the sci-

entia Occamica at Paris, there was a separate and largely unrelated crisisover approaches to propositional analysis in academic debates, a crisisthat influenced events at Oxford as well as Paris and that lasted into the1370s.

The first evidence comes from Conrad of Megenberg, regent masterin arts at Paris in the late 1330s and early 1340s and later rector andteacher in the schools of Vienna and Regensburg.45 From his lengthypoem Planctus ecclesiae in Germaniam written at Paris in 1337 to his Tracta-

tus contra Ockham written at Regensburg in 1354, Conrad was disturbedby what he felt to be the intellectual corruptions of his day. One ofthese was Ockham’s physics, which he attempted to drive out of Paris,or at least the English-German nation, during the years 1339–1341, andwhich he continued to oppose in his works written between 1347 and1354. The second, and for him a separate issue, was the abuse of lan-guage or the corruption of the liberal arts. In his Planctus the secondproblem is portrayed as a result of insufficient learning.46 However, in

45 On Megenberg see: H. Ibach, Leben und Schriften des Konrad von Megenberg (Berlin,1938); R. Scholz, Unbekannte kirchenpolitishe Streitschriften aus der Zeit Ludwigs des Bayern(1327–1354) Analysen und Texte, vol. I (Rome, 1911), pp. 127–140; vol. II (Rome, 1914),pp. 346–391; Konrad von Megenberg, Planctus ecclesiae in Germaniam, ed. R. Scholz,Mon. Germ. Hist., C 2: Staatsschr. des späteren Mittelalters, II, 1 (Leipzig, 1941);A. Pelzer and T. Kaeppeli, “L’Oeconomica de Conrad de Megenberg retrouvée,” Revued’histoire ecclésiastique, 45 (1950), 559–616; J. Miethke, Ockhams Weg zur Sozialphilosophie(Berlin, 1969), pp. 133–136, 232, 431; A.S. McGrade, The Political Thought of Williamof Ockham (Cambridge, 1974), pp. 4–5; Konrad von Megenberg, Werke: Ökonomik, ed.S. Krüger, Mon. Germ. Hist., Staatsschr. des spätern Mittelalters, 111, 5/1 (Stuttgart,1973), III, 5/2 (Stuttgart, 1977); “Krise der Zeit als Ursache der Pest? Der Traktat demortalitate in Alamannia des Konrad von Megenberg,” Festschrift für Hermann Heimpelzum 70. Geburtstag, II (Göttingen, 1972), pp. 839–883; K. Arnold, “Konrad von Megen-berg als Kommentator der ‘Sphaera’ des Johannes von Sacrobosco,” Deutsches Archiv fürErforschung des Mittelalters, 32 (1976), 147–186; Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockham, Ock-hamists, and the English German Nation”; Courtenay, “The Reception of Ockham’sThought at the University of Paris,” in Preuve et raisons à l’Unversité de Paris, ed. Z. Kaluzaand P. Vignaux (Paris, 1984), 43–64 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 8].

46 Planctus I, ch. 13, p. 32: “Cespitat in vanis iam lingua, monetat inanis; Floribus


his Economica, written in a bitter personal mood between 1348 and 1352,he provides more detail on these semi-learned students and masterswho in his opinion do not know how to handle grammar, rhetoric, andlogic. These wretches (miseri), who by 1350 appeared to him to havebeen better rewarded than he by the world, reject as meaningless anyproposition that attributes to the subject an action that it does not, inreality, have. Thus they reject as false such propositions as “aqua transit

in fluviis” or “venti volant,” since de virtute sermonis water does not havefeet and winds do not have wings.47 Similarly in rhetoric they reject asmeaningless such technical metaphors as “bouquet of words” or “col-ors of sentences,” since flowers only grow in meadows, and painters usecolors to compose and vary in a beautiful way a likeness of nature.48

The views that Conrad attributes to some younger German scholars,probably some of his former colleagues and associates at Paris, closelyresemble the approaches condemned in the 1340 statute. But were thesemasters and students simply unlearned, as Conrad implies, were theyattempting to undermine or ridicule the university system by taking

est nuda, rudis et vox, rustica cruda; Iam paralogismat homo quilibet atque sophismat;Ethyca marcescunt, magis et brutalia crescunt.”

47 Economica III, tr. 1, ch. 12, from L. Thorndike, University Records and Life in theMiddle Ages (New York, 1971), p. 431: “Surguntque miseri quidam qui se numquamdignos noverunt discipulos et quod penitus nesciunt docere presumunt atque, quodcondolendo refero, tales nobilibus ingeniis potius seductores quam doctores preficiun-tur.… Quia tamen ignorantiam propriam ignorant elatis frontibus magistraliter ince-dunt et paucissima cognoscentes de quolibet disputant plene.… Gramaticam indignismolestant derisibus affirmantes quod nulla partium orationis constructio est transitiva.… Asserunt enim quod nihil transeat nisi pedes habeat. Quapropter aqua non transitin fluviis secundum eos neque venti volant, quoniam alas non habent. Nec poterit diciquod una partium orationis regat aliam secundum modorum significandi proportiones,quia intellectus humanus omnes partes orationis regit et dirigit. Proprietates enim par-tium orationis nichil sunt ut dicunt.” The examples of a laughing meadow, flying arrow,or running water were standard in the sophismata tradition at Oxford (see Kopp, Fallaciaead modum Oxoniae, pp. 42–43) and by this period at Paris as well.

48 Ibid.: “Rethoricam eloquentiam adeo sua cecitate postergant ut nec flores verbo-rum nec colores sententiarum capiant sed flores in pratis crescere et colores varios pic-tores componere et pulchre variare ad instar nature affirmant. Qualiter hii dulciloquiasacrarum interpretentur scripturarum quevis ratio disposita noscit. Nec est dubiumhereses ex hiis innumeras pululare. Scriptura etenim sacra non semel uterum vir-ginalem virgam notat et filium inde conceptum florem appellat. Et si de virtute sermo-nis iste orationes false sunt, sequitur rethoricam in pulcherrimis speciebus transsumptio-nis nullam ad orationes habere virtutem et sic rethorica quasi evanuit tota.” The phrase“colores sententiarum” probably refers here to excessive coloring of words in a proposition,but it could also be a positive expression in logic, referring to the persuasiveness of theargument (“argumentum non habet colorem”), not its style.

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absurdly narrow positions on propositional truth and attacking theiropponents with smug replies, or was there a more serious purposebehind those who insisted that only “fish gotta swim, birds gotta fly”?

A second piece of evidence comes from the Summa logicae of RichardBrinkley, composed at Oxford around 1360 or a few years earlier.49 Herefers to the practice in contemporary logic of emphasizing spoken andwritten terms rather than concepts in the mind, even to subordinatemental concepts to vocal expression. Thus those contemporaries con-cede or deny propositions according to the proper meaning of vocalexpressions (secundum proprietatem vocis), and the meaning of spoken orwritten terms, ad virtutem sermonis, functions as a type of first cause forthe truth or falsity of the proposition.50 Others, such as Brinkley himself,determine the truth or falsity of propositions according to the conceptsin the mind, not the proper meaning of the words.

Much of this discussion in Brinkley, who was a realist like Wyclifa few years later, is blended with his juxtaposition of realism andterminism. And with Brinkley’s phraseology we stand at the beginningof the eventual division between reales and nominales. Yet enough of thecontroversy over the primacy of literal meaning in logical discourse anddisputation remains for us to see behind this conflict of realism andterminism an earlier conflict between the primacy of literal meaningsand the primacy of mental intentions on the part of authors. Brinkleyalso echoes the spirit if not the letter of the fifth article of the 1340statute, which objected to limiting scientific truth to vocal terms andexpressions and gave primacy instead to the things for which signsstand.

Our last witness is Angelus Dobelin, an Austin Friar who lectured onthe Sentences at Paris in 1374–1375.51 Dobelin would appear to have taken

49 G. Gál and R. Wood, “Richard Brinkley and his ‘Summa logicae’,” FS, 40 (1980),59–101.

50 Gál and Wood, “Richard Brinkley,” 67: “Admittit tamen usus modernorum huius-modi propositiones vocales, credentes eas esse veras, sive intellectus consideret de sup-positis subiecti in talibus propositionibus sive non; credentes logicam esse in vocibus,non subordinatam conceptibus in anima. Sed nitentes subordinare conceptus in animaipsis vocibus, omnem propositionem concedunt vel negant secundum proprietatemvocis. Ideo ad virtutem sermonis respiciunt tanquam ad causam primam in proposi-tionibus admittendis vel negandis a logico.”

51 On Angelus Dobelin see A. Zumkeller, “Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters.Vertreter und Philosophisch-theologische Lehre,” Analecta Augustiniana, 27 (1964), 236;D. Trapp, “Angelus de Dobelin, Doctor Parisiensis, and His Lectura,” Augustinianum, 3(1963), 389–413; W. Eckermann, Wort und Wirklichkeit (Würzburg, 1978), pp. 272–276.


to heart the view expressed in the last part of article one in the 1340statute. For him every positive statement in holy Scripture is de virtute

sermonis true. The virtus sermonis is nothing other than the significationapplied to words by theological doctors and grammarians, and there isno proposition in sacred Scripture that is not true according to someusus loquendi.52 Dobelin’s use of the terminology obliterates the acceptedlanguage for the distinction between literal and transferred meanings,although in light of 1340 one can be sympathetic. In opposition towhat was felt to be a one-sided use of the expression de virtute sermonis,Dobelin and the authors of the 1340 statute were reclaiming virtus

sermonis for the intended meaning of words, whether literal or figurative.His concluding statement reflects the atmosphere a generation earlier:Those who say less well, that in Scripture there are many statementsthat are de virtute sermonis false, ignore the modi loquendi according towhich such statements are true, and know only one idioma and considerall other idiomata false.53

The embittered reflections of Conrad of Megenberg, in particular,suggest that the statute of 1340 was directed against a specific groupof masters and bachelors at Paris who were engaged in a certaintype of explication and defense in conceding or rejecting propositions.Whether they or their opponents identified them with the secta occamica

at Paris is not known. Their approach to sense, reference, and mentallanguage were radically opposed to that of Ockham, but restrictinglogic to written and spoken propositions does suggest the influenceof at least one English author, Robert Holcot, even if limiting truepropositions only to those literally true does not.54

52 Angelus Dobelin, Sent. I, prol., as cited from Eckermann, p. 273: “omnia dictasacrae scripturae assertive posita de virtute sermonis sunt vera. Probatur. Nam vir-tus sermonis non est aliud quam usus significandi sermonem proferentis et audientisinstitutus per doctores et grammaticos. Sed nulla propositio sacrae scripturae est, quinsecundum usum aliquem loquendi sit vera, quem usum non solum in theologia, sed insaecularibus litteris et scientiis habemus institutum.”

53 Ibid.: “quod illi minus bene dicunt, quod in sacra scriptura multa dicta de vir-tute sermonis sint falsa, licet a sic dicentibus ignorentur modi loquendi, quibus taliadicta vera sunt et tales assimilantur illis, qui nescirent nisi unum ideoma dicentes con-sequenter omnia dicta per aliorum ideomata esse falsa.”

54 See E.A. Moody, “A Quodlibetal Question of Robert Holcot, O.P. on the Problemof the Objects of Knowledge and of Belief,” Speculum, 39 (1964), 53–74. A similarposition can also be found in a slightly earlier English Dominican, Hugh Lawton; seeHester Gelber, “I Cannot Tell a Lie: Hugh of Lawton’s Critique of Ockham on MentalLanguage” FS, 44 (1984), 141–179.

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The narrow approach to signification adopted by this anonymousParisian group, their negative attitude toward transferred meaning andfigures of speech, and their behavior in the classroom appear reason-ably clear. The opposing voices of the theologians, protecting the truthof the metaphoric language of Scripture, and the voices of humanisti-cally-minded scholars, such as Megenberg, protecting the truth of thepoetic language of literature, formed a united front. What is not clear isthe motivation of our anonymous arts masters, the proponents of truthsolely de virtute sermonis. Were they simply trying to be shocking, annoy-ing, and difficult for their students and colleagues, subtly poking funat the seriousness of the academic exegetical enterprise? The rejoinderthat winds can’t fly because they don’t have wings certainly annoyedMegenberg and no doubt brought ripples of laughter throughout thedisputation hall. Or were they serious in their enterprise, with an ide-ological position that cut across the fields of grammar, rhetoric, andlogic?

There are aspects of the problem that would suggest that the issueswere ideological. As was already recognized in the ancient period, phi-losophy works best—at least from one point of view—if every word hasits own meaning and only one meaning. The fact that common speechis not so precise is no license for logicians not to use words strictly orproperly. In the encounter between external reality and mental lan-guage, spoken and written terms and propositions hold a central posi-tion. Only they are communicated from one person to another. Onlythey can be the bearers of truth or falsity. Only they are the form inwhich authoritative statements come down to us. To talk ad mentem auc-

toris is to hypothesize. Logic as well as exegesis is about the meaningand use of terms in propositions, not about things or mental intentions.It may well be that toward the middle of the fourteenth century onthe Continent, particularly at such a major center as Paris, the primacyof literal, proper meaning was being reasserted at the expense of theflexibility of language, both from the side of biblical exegesis and thehumanist love of antiquity. For a time in the twelfth century there hadbeen an attempt in biblical exegesis to emphasize the literal and down-grade the metaphorical and allegorical senses of Scripture.55 Only if aliteral explanation failed should one have recourse to any other inter-pretation. But Scripture had multiple senses, and one need not exclude

55 B. Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1952).


another. The preference for the allegorical and tropological senses ofScripture in the fourteenth century may have sparked some counter-affirmation of the literal. A more likely source, however, might perhapsbe found in the humanist reassertion of the ancient goal of pure Latin-ity and proprietas verborum.

It may well be, however, that our Parisian defenders of virtus sermonis

were not so ideological, that the context of the dispute may havebeen more practical or pedagogical. As the 1340 statute makes clear,the physical setting of the problem was the classroom and primarilythe academic disputation, which formed the central part of scholastictraining and examination. Beneath the level of the formal, magisterialdisputations, which at least in their subsequent written form are one-sided and limit the role of the opponent, the normal type of debatemore evenly matched the skills and opportunities of both opponentand respondent. All disputations had rules that limited the ways inwhich a respondent could reply, and disputes conducted under therestrictions of obligation were even more confining. The respondentcould concede, reject, or distinguish propositions thrown at him, andhis ability to work his way successfully through the attempted trapsrevealed his knowledge of grammar, of signification and supposition, ofsyllogistic logic and the various types of fallacy, as well as his quicknessof reasoning and his verbal skills. Academic success for both opponentand respondent depended on scoring points if not actually winningthe debate. Yet cornering an opponent was difficult if he could alwayswork his way out of a tight spot by distinguishing, particularly if onecould use the escape route of claiming that the difficult proposition athand was really using metaphoric language or that the author of theproposition had something entirely different in mind than the actualwords would suggest. If one had to accept or reject propositions onthe basis of their literal meaning, one could more swiftly defeat arespondent and conclude the debate.56

Whatever the motivation behind the party in the Parisian arts facultythat refused to distinguish true and false meanings and insisted ontaking words, phrases, and propositions only in their literal sense, they

56 Curiously enough, a number of later fourteenth-century logicians do not mention‘distinguo’ among the possible responses in an obligational disputation. In England thesewere: Roger Swyneshead, Martinus Anglicus, Richard Billingham, and John Wyclif; onthe continent: Albert of Saxony, William Buser, Marsilius of Inghen, John of Holland,Peter of Candia, and the Logica magna attibuted to Paul of Venice. I am grateful to JennyAshworth for this information.

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were not expressing views that were in any sense ad mentem Ockham.Ockham was a thorough defender of the primacy of mental languageand intended meaning, and saw the art of distinguishing as the key tosuccessful scholastic analysis. In a world where meanings matter, thesun does run its daily course and time does fly, even if not de virtute

sermonis.

chapter eleven

THE REGISTERS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PARISAND THE STATUTES AGAINST

THE SCIENTIA OCCAMICA*

Two of the controversial points in the on-going debate over the mean-ing and context of the so-called anti-nominalist arts faculty statuteof December 29, 1340 are (1) the degree of authoritative weight tobe assigned to the rubric that accompanies the statute in its pub-lished version in the Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis as well as themanuscript from which it was edited; and (2), whether the statute orstatutes referred to respectively in the Proctor’s Register for the Englishnation and in the first of the two arts faculty oaths concerned with thescientia occamica is or is not identical with the statute of December 29,1340.1 In the previous issue of Vivarium Hans Thijssen argued for theaccuracy of the rubric and the correspondence between the December1340 statute and the statute referred to in the Proctor’s Register and inthe arts faculty oaths.2 His analysis rests primarily on two points: (1) cer-tain similarities between the content of the December 1340 statute andearlier critiques of Ockham’s thought, particularly that of John Lut-terell; and (2) Thijssen’s belief that all the evidence can be accountedfor on the basis of the documentation edited in the Chartularium. Thediscrepancy between the date of the edited statute (Dec. 29, 1340) and

* Originally published in Vivarium, 29 (1991), 13–49.1 The statute of December 29, 1340 appears as document #1042 in CUP II, pp.

505–507, edited from Paris, Archives de l’Université, Reg. 100 (formerly 94), p. 67. Therubric reads: “Statutum facultatis de reprobatione quorundam errorum Okanicorum”.For the Liber procuratorum of the English nation, see AUP I, cols. 44–45. The twooaths that mention statutes against the scientia occamica were edited in CUP II, p. 680.Previous discussions of the statute can be found in E.A. Moody, “Ockham, Buridan,and Nicholas of Autrecourt: The Parisian Statutes of 1339 and 1340,” FS, 7 (1947),113–146; R. Paqué, Das Pariser Nominalistenstatut (Berlin, 1970); T.K. Scott, “Nicholasof Autrecourt, Buridan and Ockamism,” JHP, 9 (1971), 15–41; W.J. Courtenay andK.H. Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists and the English-German Nation at Paris, 1339–1341,” History of Universities, 2 (1982), 53–96 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 9].

2 J.M.M.H. Thijssen, “Once Again the Ockhamist Statutes of 1339 and 1340: Somenew perspectives,” Vivarium, 28 (1990), 136–167.

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the period (Jan. 13-Febr. 10, 1341) during which the Proctor’s Registerstates that a “statute against the new opinions of certain ones calledOckhamists” was “sealed” in the lodgings of the proctor and promul-gated in a sermon at St. Jacques is explained by Thijssen by hypothe-sizing a period of several weeks between a draft stage of the document(associated with the word “datum”), supposedly reflected in the editeddocument of December 29, 1340, and the official sealing and promul-gation of the statute (to which the word “actum” would supposedly havebeen applied).

Since the issue of the rubric as well as the interrelation of the entryin the Proctor’s Register, the oaths, and the Dec. 1340 statute dependon the methods and reliability of university record-keeping—a subjectall but invisible when using the published editions—it might be usefulfor this and similar questions about other documents to go behind thepublished Chartularium and examine these issues in more detail in lightof the university manuscript cartularies themselves and what they revealconcerning the process of document production and preservation, theorigin and dependability of rubrics, and whether the absence of theterm “actum” in the statute of Dec. 29, 1340 bears the significance thatThijssen has assigned it.

Record-Keeping at the University of Paris

The published Chartularium for the University of Paris, edited by Hein-rich Denifle and Émile Châtelain in the 1890s, is a work of the highestscholarship which for the most part obviates the need to consult themanuscripts that lie behind it. Yet its chronological structure and thefact that it was compiled from many different types of sources hidesthe original structures of university cartularies as well as the history ofthe manuscript records and methods of document preservation in thethirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Denifle’s and Châtelain’s interestswere two-fold: to collect as full a documentation as possible for themedieval university of Paris, and to ensure the accuracy of the text ofeach document. In doing so, they had to abandon the structural formof the manuscript cartularies, and apart from occasional comments,they did not provide much discussion of the history of various formsof university record-keeping in their introductions and footnotes to thevolumes of the Chartularium. Moreover, while they mentioned after eachdocument the manuscript source or sources on which they drew, they

the registers of the university of paris 231

did not list all manuscripts in which a document occurred, thus some-times inadvertently giving the misleading impression (as in the case ofthe statute of Dec. 29, 1340) that a document was extant in only onemanuscript.

It should also be noted that the editors of the Chartularium did notinitially have access to the full range of university records now avail-able. At the time Denifle and Châtelain began the Chartularium, the onlyknown “books of a nation” still extant were those of the Norman nation(Chartres 595, formerly 662) and a copy of the Book of the PicardNation (Paris, Univ. Arch. [Sorbonne], Reg. 100, formerly Reg. 94),which was made for or came into the possession of the English nation.3

This meant that the official parchment books of privileges and statutesfor the French, Picard, and English nations were all missing and con-sidered lost. It must have been greeted with mixed emotions when, dur-ing and after the publication of the Chartularium, these lost manuscriptsbegan to surface: first the Book of the English Nation (Paris, Bibl. Nat.,nouv. acq. lat. 535), described by Châtelain in 1891;4 then the Book ofthe French Nation (Paris, Bibl. Nat., nouv. acq. lat. 2060), describedby Henri Omont in 1914.5 Apart from a fragment (Paris, Bibl. Ste.-Genevieve 1655), the Book of the Picard Nation remains lost, and

3 A ‘table of contents’ appears on p. 57 of Univ. Reg. 100 within a compositequire that runs from p. 49 through p. 58h. The document does not describe thecontents of this manuscript but is a partial copy of what appeared on the last quireof its exemplar: “Iste liber confectus est ad opus nationis Picardorum in quo primocontinentur evangelia quedam et calendarii universitatis; secundo privilegia papalia;tertio privilegia regalia; quarto statuta universitatis; quinto facultatis artium statuta;sexto statuta dicte nationis; ultimo scilicet tabula premissorum que sequitur.” Theword: ‘Picardorum’ was struck through and ‘Anglicane’ added above in a later butfourteenth-century English hand. This suggests that the scribe was copying from aPicard exemplar (either on behalf of the Picard nation or the English nation) and thatthe correction was made when the manuscript came into the possession of the Englishnation. It should be noted, however, that Reg. 100, p. 61, contains the same scribalerror as the Book of the English Nation, fol. 102r, namely the recopying of CUP I, #328under the rubric that belongs with CUP II, #549—a mistake not found in the books ofthe French and Norman nations. This means either that the Picard exemplar containedthe same error and that the Book of the English Nation and Reg. 100 derive from thatversion, which seems the most plausible explanation, or that Reg. 100 was copied fromthe official Book of the English Nation for the Picard nation but was retained by theEnglish nation.

4 É. Châtelain, “Le ‘Livre’ ou ‘cartulaire’ de la nation d’Angleterre et d’Allemagnedans l’ancienne université de Paris,” Memoires de la société de l’histoire de Paris et de l’Ile-de-France, 18 (1891), 73–100.

5 “Le ‘Livre’ ou ‘cartulaire’ de la nation de France de l’université de Paris,” Mémoiresde la société de l’histoire de Paris et de l’Ile-de-France, 41 (1914), 1–130.

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the Chartres manuscript was almost entirely destroyed during WorldWar II.6 Fortunately its contents had been meticulously described byOmont in 1917.7

The discussions of sources in the first two volumes of the Chartularium

concerned the contents and value of various manuscripts, but did notgo into the process of university record-keeping in any detail. The latterissue had been discussed earlier by Charles Thurot, to the satisfaction ofChâtelain. Thurot was of the opinion that the faculties and arts nationsof the University of Paris maintained from earliest times books andregisters of the privileges, statutes, and activities of the university andits constituent units.8 Each corporation within the university supposedlypossessed a book (livre, liber) and several registers (registre, papirus). It wasThurot’s view that the “book” contained the statutes and privileges ofthe university and was on parchment. The “registers” contained theaccounts of the meetings of the faculty or nation and were on paper.9

Thurot and Châtelain also believed that the surviving manuscriptsconfirmed these distinctions and, in some cases, were the very booksand registers sometimes referred to in university documents.

The problem with Thurot’s description is that it suggests (1) a clear-cut distinction of books and registers, and (2) that books were on parch-ment and registers were on paper. A register, however, can be either acartulary of statutes and privileges or a sequential record of magiste-rial deliberations. Paris, Univ. Archiv., Reg. 2 is of the latter type andis on paper, while Paris, Univ. Archiv., Reg. 100 (94) is of the formertype and is also on paper. Neither the distinction of book vs. register

6 According to Mme. M.-H. de Pommerol at the Institut de Recherche et d’Histoiredes Textes in Paris, some fragments still remain.

7 H. Omont, Le ‘Livre’ ou ‘cartulaire’ de la nation de Normandie de l’université de Paris,Société de l’histoire de Normandie, Mélanges et documents, ser. viii (Rouen/Paris,1917).

8 C. Thurot, De l’organisation de l’enseignement dans l’Université de Paris au moyen-âge(Paris/Besançon, 1850), pp. 18–37, esp. p. 36, n.l; É. Châtelain, “Le ‘Livre’ ou ‘car-tulaire’ de la nation d’Angleterre,” 73–78.

9 Under ‘books’ Thurot listed the Book of the Rector (London, Brit. Libr., Add.17304); a fragment of the Book of the Picard Nation (Paris, Bibl. Ste. Geneviève9092 〈presumably 1655〉); and the Book of the Norman Nation (Chartres 662). Underregisters Thurot listed that for the arts faculty (after 1478); that of the French nation(1444–1456); that of the Picard nation (1477–1484); that of the English nation (1320! to1492) = Univ. Arch., Reg. 2ff. The manuscript inventories from which Thurot derivedhis information were describing specific manuscripts for identification; they were notdescribing genres of documents differentiated by title or writing surface.


nor that of parchment vs. paper were maintained in any uniform way.10

The only rule with regard to writing surface is: the more important thevolume, the more likely to be on parchment. But whether on parch-ment or paper, all these volumes could by the seventeenth century bereferred to interchangeably as books or registers. A more accurate dif-ferentiation would be: Book of the Rector (privileges and statutes of theuniversity and arts faculty); Books of a faculty (privileges and statutesof the university and one of the other faculties: theology, canon law, ormedicine); Books of a nation (privileges and statutes of the university,arts faculty, and a specific nation); Books of the proctors (sequential reg-isters of each nation); and Books of the receptors (account books of thenations).

Even restricting our attention to the cartularies (i.e., the registers orbooks of the rector, faculties, and nations respectively), these finishedvolumes obscure the fact that the preservation of records by the cor-porations that made up the university of Paris (e.g., faculties, nations,colleges, convents) was a more varied and less organized process thanis generally recognized. The first stage consisted in the accumulationof original documents or diplomas, which would have been preservedin the treasure chests of the faculty, nation, or college under the super-vision of their respective officers (rector, dean, proctor, etc.). Many ofthese originalia have survived, often with their seals intact, and are foundin the archives of the university (Sorbonne) and the Archives nationales.It should also be noted that originalia do not have rubrics, althoughoccasionally one might be written in a later hand on the reverse side ofthe document.

A second stage consisted in the copying or inscription of documentsinto a register which, in the case of the university or the faculty ofarts, would have been maintained by the rector, and in the case of thenations of the arts faculty, by the proctor of each nation. If it was cus-tomary for documents to be inscribed into a register soon after an itemof new legislation was created or a new privilege received—and the sur-viving evidence suggests this was ad hoc, not standard procedure—thearrangement of such registers would have been sequential, as are docu-

10 Châtelain in 1891, while directing his readers to Thurot’s account, mentionedthat the 1624 account of the documents of the English nation listed: (1) “ung ancientlivre de parchemin” containing the statutes, rights, and privileges of the university; (2)“livre des statuts de l’Université”; (3) “onze livres couverts en parchemin”; etc. All thesemanuscripts, including the sequential registers, were called livres, which were either “ofparchment” or “covered in parchment”.

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ments in papal, episcopal, or notarial registers. But unlike popes, kings,and bishops, the university of Paris had no bureaucracy and, in partic-ular, no chancery at any level (nation, faculty, or university). There wasno specific group of scribes steadily and exclusively employed for thepreparation and preservation of university documents. Various unitswithin the university did employ scribes, but it was apparently notuntil the fourteenth century that the same individual was consistentlyemployed for such tasks, and even then it is unclear whether his respon-sibilities extended beyond the preparation of original documents andpossibly recording them in his own notarial register. Whatever registersexisted were the responsibility of the proctors and rectors, whose termof office changed monthly or quarterly, respectively.

Some type of register or registers did exist by 1260. In that year anarts faculty statute mentions the “inregistration” of previous legislation;in 1272 a register of the arts faculty is mentioned; and in 1288 the rectoris directed to record the name of the elected proctors in his register.11

The last, and possibly the “inregistration” noted in 1260,12 refer tosequential registers similar to those of the nations that have survivedfrom the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, in which the actions ofthe nation during a proctorship were recorded sequentially severaltimes a year. The earliest extant registers of this type are those of theEnglish-German nation from 1333, written, as one would expect, indifferent hands. In those, as the editors of CUP noted, the name ofthe proctor and often the elected rector are recorded, and statutes of

11 CUP I, #363 in 1260: “Nos magistri artium quatuor nationum regentes Parisiusordinationi sive statuto per nos sive per antecessores nostros anno Domini M°CC°LIXfacto et inregistrato [referring to CUP I, #333 in 1259] hos tres articulos sequentesde communi consensu dignum duximus adjungendos …”; CUP I, #441 in 1272: “Utautem hec omnia inviolabiliter valeant observari, fide corporali prestita in manu rec-toris nostre facultatis nos omnes et singuli magistri juravimus et nos omnes ad hocspontanee concessimus astringendos. In cujus rei memoriam hoc idem statutum in Reg-istro nostre facultatis sub eisdem verbis scribi fecimus ac etiam ordinari;” and CUP II,#549 in 1288: “Volumus insuper rectorem ad hoc adstringi, ut procuratores singularumnationum, aut vices ipsorum gerentes necnon diem electionis eorundem suo registroinscribat, ne ex hoc defectus aliquis, ut alias visum est, in compoto generali rectorislegatur.” The CUP text has been revised according to London, Brit. Libr., MS Addit.17304, fol. 112r, and Paris, BN, nouv. acq. lat. 535, fol. 102v.

12 While the statute of 1272 (#441) referring to a register of the arts faculty appearsin the Book of the Rector, the earlier documents concerned with “inregistration” (#333and 363) are not found there but are found in the books of the nations, suggesting thatthey were preserved at the level of the nations. This would have been either the Liberprocuratorum or an early version of the Libri nationum.


the nation, arts faculty, and university are occasionally included, butwithout rubrics.

If the surviving sequential proctor’s registers are any indication, theinclusion of statutes was the exception, not standard working proce-dure.13 And since neither the Register of the arts faculty in its 1272form nor the pre-1355 form of a Liber nationis survive, we have no wayof knowing what type of documents were included, how efficient orthorough the recording practice was, or even if these were sequentialregisters. In fact, no sequential register of privileges and statutes hassurvived, perhaps because that was never its form; or because it waseventually replaced by a different type of register, to be discussed in amoment; or because it was not rigorously maintained, since separatedocuments—the originals themselves—were preserved by the facultyand nations. It is revealing in this regard that when the French nationinventoried the contents of its chest (archa nationis) in October 1339, nomention was made of a Book of the Nation (i.e., a register of statutesand privileges), although the originalia stacked in a “basket” in the chestwere itemized.14

The registers that have survived are arranged systematically accord-ing to type of document and issuing agency, regardless of date of issue.In the case of the Book of the Rector, statutes concerning oaths forthe rector and examiners appear at the front of the register along witha gospel page ensuring the solemnity and binding quality of the oathsworn by the candidate or officer whose hand was placed on the reg-ister. Papal privileges come next, arranged by pontificate, followed bythe statutes of the university and its various faculties, without muchregard to date of issue or enactment. The books of the nations are evenmore rationally organized. All extant registers, with the exception ofthe records of the proctors and receptors of the nations, are of this sec-ond type—far easier to consult in locating privileges and legislation on

13 For example, the Liber procuratorum for the English nation included the text ofstatutes of the nation in 1333 (AUP I, col. 15) and 1341 (AUP I, cols. 52–53) as wellas a university statute from 1343 (AUP I, col. 62) and an arts faculty statute from 1355.It also mentioned the registration in their Liber nationis of the two arts faculty statutes of1339 (AUP I, col. 35; CUP II, #1023 and #1024). But it failed to include or mention thearts faculty statute of Jan. 1340 (CUP II, #1031), the nation’s statute of June 1342 (CUPII, #1061), or any other university statutes from this period.

14 CUP II, pp. 491–492, #1028, copied from Du Boulay’s Historia, where it wascopied from the proctor’s book for the French nation. A copy of a statute of 1424 inthe Book of the English Nation (Paris, Bibl. Nat., nouv. acq. lat. 535, fol, 146r) noted:“et habetur originale in archa nationis cum aliis libris et statutis.”

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particular topics. The fact that the sequential registers of the proctorsand receptors have survived in their original form is because these werethe original and only copies, and there was never a subsequent rationalrearrangement, nor any need for such. But the survival of early versionsof a rationalized register of the Book of the Rector and the absence ofany similar sequential register does cast some doubt on whether thereever was a sequential version of the Book of the Rector or, for thatmatter, the books of the nations.

The Book of the Rector

The oldest form of the rationalized register for the university and artsfaculty is preserved in Vatican, Regin. 406 and Paris, Bibl. Nat., nouv.acq. lat. 936 (formerly Cheltenham, Phillips 876), both dating to theopening years of the fourteenth century. Each manuscript is a copy ofan early redaction of the Book of the Rector containing the privilegesand statutes of the university and arts faculty. The Vatican manuscriptgives no clues regarding its early possessors, but the fact that it was theexemplar for the latter redaction of the Liber rectoris suggests that it wasprobably in the possession of the rector.15 The Phillipps manuscript,although not a copy of Vat. Regin. 406 nor the latter of it, derived fromthe same source and belonged to the Norman nation.16 Neither registeris complete or free of error, as Denifle and Châtelain recognized. Themost recent document in the Phillipps manuscript is the 1302 statutecontaining the oaths for the librarii and stationarii,17 while the Vaticanmanuscript includes the pecia lists for c. 1275 and 1304.18 This suggeststhat these manuscripts were copied early in the fourteenth century,probably before 1312.19

15 See below for the discussion of the later redaction, London, Brit. Libr., Ms. Addit.17304.

16 At the end of the manuscript one finds the articles to be sworn before the proctorby bachelors of arts incepting in the Norman nation (fol. 72v), followed by a financialrecord for the Norman nation in 1292.

17 Vat., Regin. 406, fol. 73v; Paris, B.N., nouv. acq. lat. 936, fol. 69v; CUP II, pp. 97–98, #628.

18 Vat., Regin. 406, fols. 64r–68v; CUP I, pp. 644–650, #530, and CUP II, pp. 107–112, #642.

19 The next series of documents preserved in the later redaction of the Liber rectoris(London, Brit. Libr., Addit. ms. 17304, fols. 113r–114v) are several university statutesdating to 1312. A reform of university record keeping, to be discussed below, was


For the vast majority of items in these two cartularies the contentand sequence of documents is identical, witnessing to a common sourcethat dates to the last years of the thirteenth century or to the openingyears of the fourteenth. The structure of this version is: (1) Oaths forelecting the rector and for the examiners at Ste. Geneviève; (2) Papalprivileges; and (3) Statutes of the university and arts faculty. Royalprivileges were placed among the statutes of the university. The dateof issue or enactment has been almost entirely ignored. The statute of1289 for the election of the rector is the second document (f. 1) in bothmanuscripts, indicating that the present structure was created after thatdate.

There are, however, important differences between the two manu-scripts. The Vatican manuscript contains five letters of Gregory IX notfound in the Phillipps manuscript, while the latter contains three lettersof Innocent IV, two letters of Alexander IV, and a letter of 1256 fromfour archbishops not found in the Vatican manuscript.20 Further, theVatican manuscript contains eight statutes for the faculty of medicinethat are not included in the Phillipps manuscript.21 The same is truefor the 1254 and 1255 letters of the university complaining about theDominican possession of two chairs in theology and, as was statedabove, for the famous pecia lists.22

How thorough was either of these manuscripts in preserving all theimportant privileges and statutes of the university and arts faculty?Were there any important documents that were included in one andnot the other, or that were missed entirely? While one might arguethat the pecia lists and the statutes for a faculty other than arts (inthis case medicine) should not have been included in the Book of theRector (and might therefore have been intentionally excluded in thePhillipps manuscript), the absence of important papal privileges in bothmanuscripts and the absence in the Phillipps manuscript of the letter

attempted in 1316 (CUP II, pp. 193–194, #734). If the “updating” and reorganizationof the Book of the Rector to 1302 was a result of that reform, it is puzzling why thestatutes of 1312 would not have been included.

20 Those found in Vat. Regin. 406 and not in the Phillipps manuscript, Paris, B.N.,nouv. acq. 936, are: CUP I, #89, #90, #91, #112, and #116. Those found in thePhillipps manuscript and not in Vat. Regin. 406 are: CUP I, #164, #204, #239, #268,#350, and #351.

21 CUP I, #434, #444, #451, #452, #453, #454, #455, #456.22 Dominican documents: CUP I, #230 in Vat. Regin. 406, fol. 49v, and CUP I,

#256 in Vat. Regin. 406, fol. 44v; pecia documents: CUP I, #530 in Vat. Regin. 406,fol. 64r, and CUP II, #642 in Vat. Regin. 406, fol. 66v.

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over the dispute with the Dominicans cannot be so explained. Themost remarkable omission, however, goes to the Vatican manuscript:the 1200 privilege of Philip Augustus recognizing the community ofmasters and scholars, which was included in the Phillipps manuscriptbut which was not picked up by the scribe of the Vatican manuscriptand consequently was not included in the London manuscript, whichwas copied from Vatican, Regin. 406.23 Among the documents thatshould have been included in the pre-1304 register but which do notappear in either manuscript are five papal privileges, one universitystatute, and two arts faculty statutes.24 Two of these documents, the artsfaculty statute that resolved a dispute between the chancellor and theuniversity and the privilege of Nicholas IV granting the ius ubique docendi

date to 1292—no more than ten years before the compilation of thesetwo cartularies and thus well within recent university memory!

How accurate were the scribes of these two manuscripts with regardto the documents they did include? Generally reliable, but not errorfree. Ignoring those instances where scribal changes might be justifiedand therefore might not be errors, there are several instances that arein the latter category. At fol. 22r the Vatican manuscript repeats a letterof Innocent IV, while the Phillipps manuscript does not. At fol. 24v thescribe of the Vatican manuscript copied the wrong rubric for the 1249statute on the oaths for the election of the rector, namely the rubricfor the following document (fol. 25r), where it is repeated. The Phillippsmanuscript has the correct rubric for each document. On fol. 30r theVatican manuscript dropped a rubric, and did so again on fol. 44v. Onfol. 53v the Vatican manuscript again gives the wrong rubric, namelythe same rubric that it gave correctly for an earlier document onfol. 49r. Again, the Phillipps manuscript has the correct rubrics.

The later redaction of the Book of the Rector, London, Brit. Libr.,Ms. Addit. 17304, generally referred to as the “official” Liber rectoris,incorporates the earlier text along with later privileges and statutes.25

23 CUP I, #1 in Paris, B.N., nouv. acq. 936, fol. 51r.24 The papal letters are CUP I, #376, #385, #421, #512, and CUP II, #578. The

university statute is CUP I, #505. All but the first two papal letters were eventuallyincluded in the books of the nations. One of the arts faculty statutes (CUP II, #579) waspicked up by the scribe of the later Liber rectoris (London, Brit. Libr., Ms Addit. 17304,fol. 143v) and placed towards the end of the earlier portion between documents of 1366and 1384. The other, CUP I, #231, does not appear in any register.

25 The beginning and ending quires of the manuscript date from the sixteenthcentury, but the central portion (fols. 25r–148r) includes the earliest documents up to theend of the fourteenth century. Additional documents (fols. 148v–174v), almost all dating


For the earlier documents the London manuscript follows the samesequence as Vat. Regin. 406 and was, for that portion, undoubtedlycopied from it.26 Wherever the Vatican manuscript failed to include aprivilege or statute, the London manuscript continued that omission,with one exception.27 Wherever the Vatican manuscript attached thewrong rubric to a document, so too the London manuscript continuedthat error. It is unfortunate that the scribe of the later version of theBook of the Rector relied solely on the Vatican manuscript, uncorrectedby the witness of other copies, such as the Phillipps manuscript, whichfor all its omissions did at least have the rubrics correct.

In the later redaction contained in the London manuscript, no at-tempt was made to reorganize the entire body of legislation by incor-porating subsequent privileges and statutes into the rationalized struc-ture that had been created by the early fourteenth century, nor evento structure subsequent documents in any similar way. The sequenceof post-1304 documents is without a consistent order, with papal privi-leges interspersed among statutes of the university and various faculties.There are, however, sub-groupings. This section begins with six uni-versity statutes (1312–1318) in chronological order but interspersed withtwo privileges of Innocent VI (1358 and 1359). Those documents arefollowed by eight privileges of John XXII, roughly contemporary withthe last two university statutes in the previous group. Next the registerswings back to university statutes (one of them dating to 1395), inter-spersed with a duplicate copy of a privilege of John XXII recorded ear-lier, and an arts faculty statute of 1355. Then follows a group of six artsfaculty statutes (1338–1367), one papal privilege (1366), and four univer-sity statutes dating between 1292 and 1385. The early appearance of thestatute of 1395 in this section (fol. 127r) in the hand of the original scribeestablishes that the oldest portion (i.e., the majority) of the manuscriptwas copied at the very end of the fourteenth century or in the openingyears of the fifteenth.

The arrangement of post-1304 documents in the London manuscriptdoes not, then, follow a straight chronological order that one would

to the fourteenth century, follow in a similar hand. Most of the remaining statutesconcern the reforms of Estouteville.

26 In the places where the sequence of documents in Vat. Regin. 406 and thePhillipps manuscript differ, the London manuscript follows Vat. Regin. 406, includingits scribal errors. As far as I am aware, this fact has not been remarked on.


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expect in a sequential register. There is also no attempt to merge thefourteenth-century documents into the plan retained for those of thethirteenth century, nor to create any parallel or new order accordingto subject, type of document, or issuing agency. The sequence of docu-ments is what one would expect if diplomas were entered in whateverorder or grouping they were removed from safe keeping in the chestof the rector and copied directly into a formal register. In a paral-lel way, records relating to the office of the rector ranging from 1314to 1382—again with almost no chronological sequence—appear laterin the manuscript in the cursive hand of a different scribe.28 More-over, a substantial number of university documents, most dating to thefourteenth century, failed to be included in the London manuscript.In contrast to the ten papal privileges included, at least eighteen weremissed.29 Over against the eleven university statutes, agreements, andletters included, at least twenty were missed.30 Arts faculty statuteswere better represented but similarly incomplete.31 Whatever circum-stances explain this erratic collection and arrangement of documents,this manuscript was prepared at the beginning of the fifteenth centuryusing Vat. Regin. 406 and an assortment of fourteenth-century origina-

lia.What might explain this situation? The evidence suggests either that

the Book of the Rector was not properly maintained in the fourteenthcentury, or that a better-organized register, whether sequential or ratio-nalized, once existed but was lost or destroyed, forcing later universityofficials to restore the record as best they could. In either case, it isremarkable that the scribe of the London manuscript did not incor-porate the rationalized structure and more extensive documentation

28 London, Brit. Libr., Ms. Addit. 17304, fols. 165r–174v. The sequence of dates runs1326, 1355, 1314, 1317, 1380, 1361, 1367, etc. The records could not have been copiedfrom an earlier sequential register, but were probably transcribed from small piecesof parchment or paper, such as one finds in the cartons of the university archives forteaching appointments.

29 A partial count reveals the following privileges missing in the Liber rectoris: CUP I,#421, #512; CUP II, #578, #726, #727, #729, #738, #739, #741, #754, #836, #908,#908a, (conservation of #908), #1021, #1055, #1068, #1120, #1120a (conservation of#1120).

30 Again, a partial count reveals the following to be missing: CUP II, #724, #728,#728a, #731, #733, #734, #736, #737, #810, #825, #845, #861, #955, #988, #1032,#1046, #1064, #1095, #1109, #1137.

31 The London manuscript of the Liber rectoris does not include the arts faculty statuteof Febr. 1254 (CUP I, #231) or that of Dec. 29, 1340 (CUP II, #1042).


found in any of the books of the nations that existed at Paris at theend of the fourteenth century, just as he did borrow the content andstructure of the thirteenth-century Book of the Rector. There appearsto have been little or no sharing of resources between the office of therector and the officers of the nations. By itself, the London manuscriptwitnesses to a collapse, at least toward the end of the fourteenth cen-tury, in the system of recording important documents in an official reg-ister of the arts faculty and university, whether sequentially or rationallyreordered.

Before leaving the Book of the Rector, two points relevant to thepresent inquiry should be noted. First, the arts faculty statute of 1339contra scientiam occamicam appears in this later version of the principalregister of the university and arts faculty (fol. 135r), but the statute ofDec. 29, 1340 does not.32 Second, the oaths for bachelors incepting inthe arts faculty are included (fols. 129v–130v), but only three of the oathsadded in the fourteenth century (CUP II, 680, #1185, n. 16) appearthere; most, including the oaths concerning the scientia occamica, aremissing. What significance, if any, should be assigned to these omissionswill be discussed later.

The Books of the Nations

A third group of registers are the libri nationum. These are cartulariesthat belonged to each nation and contained the privileges and statutesof the university, faculty, and a particular nation (a category absent inthe Liber rectoris).33 Of these, the Liber nationis for the French nation (Paris,Bibl. Nat., nouv. acq. 2060), the English nation (Paris, Bibl. Nat., nouv.acq. 535), and a copy of the non-nation part of the Book of the PicardNation (Paris, Univ. Reg. 100, formerly Reg. 94) in the possession ofthe English nation are extant, and we have a good description of thenow destroyed Book of the Norman Nation (Chartres 595).34 Only the

32 Thijssen’s statement, 162: “the 1340 statute does occur in the Liber Rectoris” isuntrue.

33 These need to be distinguished from the sequential registers of the proctor that goback at least as far as the early fourteenth century. Those of the English nation survivefrom 1333 on, and were obviously earlier; see AUP I. The Picard nation refers to such abook in 1329 (CUP II, 324, #890): “in papyro nationis … registrare”; and in 1355 (CUPIII, 38, #1228): “inscribere in papyro nationis statim et in presentia nationis.”

34 Caesar E. Du Boulay, Historia Universitatis Parisiensis, 6 vols. (Paris, 1665–1673),relied heavily on the Book of the French Nation. Fortunately Henri Omont publisheda folio-by-folio description of the Book of the Norman Nation, which allows a close

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last two, however, were available for use in 1890 by the editors of theChartularium.35

The structure and sequence of documents in these libri nationum areessentially identical, which proves they stem from the same reorderingof documents that apparently occurred in the third quarter of the four-teenth century.36 More remarkable is the fact that the overall structureand sequence, as well as the specific documents included, differ sub-stantially from the Liber rectoris. It is unlikely that the libri nationum, in thecommon redaction reflected in these manuscripts, were derived fromany known version of the Liber rectoris. Not only has the sequence ofthirteenth-century documents been totally rearranged, but a third ofthe papal privileges and both royal privileges found in the Liber rectoris

are missing in the libri nationum, along with several university and artsfaculty statutes. This is strange, since these documents were retained inthe later redaction of the Liber rectoris. The structure of the books of thenations, based upon the system adopted in the early redaction of theLiber rectoris, was also modified. Royal privileges were inserted as a sep-arate category and placed immediately after papal privileges; statutesof the arts faculty were similarly separated from those of the universityand placed after them; and statutes of the nation were separated fromboth university and faculty statutes and placed at the end. Within thosegroupings, the sequence of documents for the thirteenth century bearsalmost no relation to their ordering in any manuscript of the Book ofthe Rector. Either the libri nationum represent a new beginning in uni-versity document organization in the third quarter of the fourteenthcentury, which is the most likely explanation, or they have a line ofdescent different from all other extant cartularies.

comparison with the books of the other nations that have survived. In the case of theFrench and Picard nations we also have fragments of copies of both those registers,some of which contain additional documents; for the French nation: Paris, Bibl. Nat.lat. 9950, fols. 33r–39v; for the Picard nation: Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 9950, fols. 1r–32v;Paris, Bibl. Ste. Geneviève 1655. And Reg. 100 may reflect the Book of the PicardNation more than that of the English nation.

35 Denifle and Châtelain did use Du Boulay’s Historia, which included texts tran-scribed from the cartularies of the French and Picard nations. In the case of the Frenchnation, those transcriptions can now be checked against the original for accuracy.

36 As will be discussed below, these extant manuscripts were not copied at thesame time, and thus the date of the last document included in each is one of severaldifferences among them. There are more differences in the sequence of papal privilegesthan any other section.


The redaction common to these libri nationum was assembled in thethird quarter of the fourteenth century, although some of the manu-scripts or parts of them were copied later. The steps in this process forthe English nation are recorded in the Proctor’s Register. The decisionto prepare a Book of the Nation on parchment was made in 1356, butthe task of reassembly and copying was not done until the 1360s andnot complete until around 1368.37 In light of the content of these books,a similar date for the common portion should probably be assignedto those of the other nations as well. Unfortunately, only the copythat belonged to or derived from the Picard nation (Univ. Reg. 100)can be dated on the basis of watermarks. It was apparently copied inthe 1380s.38 The other extant libri nationum are on parchment and canbe dated only approximately by handwriting and by the date of themost recent documents that are in the hand of the main scribe.39 Allthese manuscripts include an arts faculty statute of Dec. 1355 (CUP

III, #1229), which in the books of the French and Norman nations

37 AUP I, cols. 199–200: “Item 22 die Julii, videlicet die sancte Marie Magdalene,post sermonem apud Sanctum Maturinum facta congregatione nacionis ad ordinan-dum et statuendum, diliberatum fuit concorditer, quod fieret Liber nacionis de pergameno,in quo scriberentur statuta et privilegia nacionis et Universitatis, et deliberatum fuitquod super modo faciendi fieret una alia congregacio.” As will be shown, the OxfordCorpus Christi College fragment (Ms 283, fols. 155r–159v) proves that the English nationalready had a register, probably unbound, by the end of the thirteenth century. Thisdecision of 1356 was not to create the first such record, but to create or copy a new reg-ister on parchment. Assuming Paris, B.N., nouv. acq. lat. 535 is the result of this effort,the realization of this project probably took more than a decade, as Denifle and Châte-lain recognized; AUP I, col. 199n: “deliberatio nationis nonnisi post decem annos, i.e.post an. 1366, effectum habuit. … 20 Decemb. mentio fit libri rubei nationis, qui circa an.1368 scriptus fuisse videtur.” In the calendar in the manuscript, Febr. 22 is non-legiblebecause of the mass for Pope Urban V (1362–1370). Since the latest document in themanuscript, fol. 31v, is for June 5, 1366, this cartulary was done on or after that date;AUP I, col. 3. Moreover, the entry on Dec. 20, 1368 in the proctor’s records of thenation (AUP I, col. 322) mentions that the oaths for the “inrotulatores” were recentlywritten in libro rubeo nacionis, which itself was “noviter conscripta ante articulos antiqui-tus jurari consuetos.” This is what is found in B.N. nouv. acq. lat. 535, fol. 132r.

38 Four watermarks appear on the paper used in this register: Ox head [withoutprecise parallel in C.M. Briquet, Les Filigranes, 4 vols. (Paris, 1907; rev. ed. Amsterdam,1968), V. Moshin and S. Traljich, Filigranes des XIIIe et XIVe siècle (Zagreb, 1957), orG. Piccard, Die Ochsenkopf-Wasserzeichen, 3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1966), but close to Briquet,#14118]; tongs [Briquet #14083]; double transverse cross [no precise parallel, but closeto Briquet #5768 and #5769]; and a letter M surmounted by a cross, similar to ones inBriquet from the region of Paris, 1380–1383.

39 Both the Book of the French Nation and the Book of the English Nation includethe statutory reforms of Cardinal Estouteville in 1452 and have notes and documentsfrom the sixteenth century on what were once blank folios.

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was placed after the oaths but in the Book of the English Nation (andpossibly the Picard nation) was placed at the end of the arts facultystatutes, before the oaths. The different locations of its inclusion mayindicate that it was promulgated shortly before the time of the initialordering of documents. On the basis of date-of-last-document-includedand its placement, most of the Book of the French Nation was copiedat some point between 1355 and 1366, since it does not include a papalprivilege of 1366 (CUP III, #1318/1319) and contains a version of theinception oaths that predates 1365. The Book of the English Nation wascompleted c. 1368.40 The Book of the Norman Nation was copied after1366, since it includes the papal privilege mentioned above.

Was there no older form of a privilege and statute book for any ofthe nations, or did the register form of statutory record-keeping at thelevel of the nations only begin in the 1350s and 1360s? Two fragmentsof document records relating to the English nation survive from the latethirteenth century. One of these is Cambridge, Corpus Christi College103, pp. 107–112. The documents all relate to the 1245–1255 crisisbetween the university and the Dominicans. While the subject matterwould be appropriate for inclusion in a Book of the English Nation,other contexts might also explain the collection of these documents.The second fragment, however, undoubtedly came from an early typeof a Book of the English Nation: Oxford, Corpus Christi College, Ms.283, fols. 155r–159v. All documents contained in this fragment relate tothe period 1251–1277, and all concern the English nation either directlyor indirectly. The fragment begins with the statutes of the Englishnation regarding inception and determination, followed by statutes,papal letters, and legal records in chronological order. Not only is theorder of the documents random and chronologically sequential (whichrecalls the first type of register, although here the scribal hand is thesame); most of the documents found in this fragment were not includedeither in later versions of the Book of the English Nation or in eitherredaction of the Book of the Rector. This applies not only to statutes ofthe English nation, which would never have been part of the Book ofthe Rector, but applies as well to documents relating to the universityand its arts faculty. Were these documents replaced by later legislationand therefore dropped from later collections, or is it the case that theprocess of transmission failed to preserve important records?



It is evident from any examination of redactions of the Book ofthe Rector and the books of the nations that there does not seem tohave been any concerted effort to discard older legislation when it wasreplaced or superseded by newer statutes. The statutes of the earlythirteenth century were retained in the collections of the fourteenthand fifteenth century despite the fact that they had long since beenmodified or replaced by subsequent legislation, often preserved sideby side. Statute books should, therefore, be characterized not so muchas reflections of current practice or legislation “in force” at the timethey were copied, but as memorial books for the records of present andpast generations, the revered heritage of university, faculty, and nation.This does not mean, however, that all relevant documents—even someof the most important privileges and statutes—were always preservedin these collections, since inclusion depended on scribal access to theoriginal diploma or an earlier register, which might be overlooked orabsent from the chest of the rector or nation. The general rule, with afew exceptions, was: once included, always included; once overlooked,always overlooked.

This process of transmission and its occasional failures has been seenin the relation of the early and later redactions of the Book of the Rec-tor. The same can be illustrated through a closer look at the Oxfordmanuscript. The statutes of the English nation that begin the Oxfordfragment do not appear in the Book of the English Nation. Moreover,the papal privilege and the letters of the university, which occur onlyin the Oxford fragment, would also not have been intentionally dis-carded. In fact, one of the documents in the Oxford fragment, namelythe 1256 agreement between the university and Dominicans, whichalso appears in the Cambridge fragment, in the Book of the EnglishNation, in the Phillipps copy of the Book of the Rector, but not in theVatican copy (and therefore not in the later redaction of the Book ofthe Rector)—no more important than several other documents in theOxford fragment—is the only document in that fragment that is extantin other manuscripts. The obvious conclusion is that the scribe whoprepared the Book of the English Nation in the second half of the four-teenth century did not have access to this earlier collection. The declineof English students at Paris in the 1320s and their exodus in the 1330smay explain the break in documentation, especially if an English proc-tor, charged with the responsibility of the “safe keeping” of the nation’srecords, may have taken it back to England. No matter how impor-tant, if documents were not copied into multiple registers or into a reg-

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ister that served as an exemplar for others, their chances of survivalapart from the original diploma was greatly reduced. The scribe of therevised Liber nationis, however, probably did have access to an earlierversion of a statute book for the nation. The English nation possessed aLiber nationis in 1339 separate from its Liber procuratorum, since the lattermentions the copying of arts faculty statutes into such a register.41

But were all four nations keeping statutory registers before the mid-dle of the fourteenth century? The 1339 inventory of the possessionsof the French nation suggests that that nation was not, and there mayhave been no uniform practice in this matter.42 Although it is not nec-essarily the case that a Book of the French Nation, if one then existed,would have been kept in the chest of the nation, that was the normalplace for the safe keeping of all possessions, and once such registers areknown to exist, the chest is the only location mentioned for preserva-tion.43 But whether or not a Book of the French Nation should havebeen mentioned, if one existed, it is certainly likely that all originalia

would have been kept together in the chest. Consequently, the origi-nal diplomas found in the chest are probably an accurate reflection ofwhat the French nation possessed at that time. The selection is rathermeager yet informative. Most of the documents are papal and lega-tine privileges from the thirteenth century, several of them duplicates.There are no statutes for the university, only one for the arts faculty—not the contra Ockham statute of the previous month—and four statutesfor the French nation, all probably from the early fourteenth century.44

41 AUP I, col. 35: “Duo statuta facta in facultate et approbata quatuor nacionumsigillis et signeto rectoris fecit copiari in libro nacionis per manum pubplicam.” See above,note 12.

42 CUP II, pp. 491–492, #1028 for the inventory of the chest of the French nation.It is interesting in this regard that episcopal registers in the thirteenth and fourteenthcenturies seem to have been an almost uniquely English phenomenon.

43 The inventory of the chest of the Picard nation in 1382 (CUP III, #1470) contained“unus magnus liber papyreus, ubi continentur facta et deliberationes nationis,” i.e. thesequential register of the nation. Along the lines of what was found in the chest of theFrench nation, ibid.: “due parve arce lignee continentes diversa instrumenta unacumdiversis aliis literis sigillatis sigillis diversis, in quarum una sunt magne litere sigillatemagno sigillo nationis Picardie. Item sex alii libri papyrei antiqui cum pluribus aliisliteris seu instrumentis existentibus in parvula arca existente in magna prenominata.”From a 1424 statute in the Book of the English Nation (Paris, Bibl. Nat., nouv. acq. lat.535, fol. 146r): “et habetur originale in archa nationis cum aliis libris et statutis.”

44 Two of these nation statutes can be identified and are dated to 1328 and 1336.One cannot assume the documents not found in the chest had been discarded afterbeing copied in a register, since the papal and legatine privileges found there, some of


It is remarkable how few documents from the fourteenth century wereamong the collection.

Returning to the books of the nations, how effective were they inpreserving the privileges and statutes of the university, faculty, andnations? In general, far better than the Liber rectoris. For thirteenth-century papal privileges, as we have seen, they were less complete thaneither early manuscript of the Book of the Rector, but they containedmore university and arts faculty statutes from the thirteenth centuryas well as royal privileges from that period. And if those responsiblefor producing the books of the nations had access to any copy of theearlier Book of the Rector, it was the version contained in the Phillippsmanuscript.

For the fourteenth century the coverage of the libri nationum is evenbetter. They have a far greater number of documents than the Londonmanuscript of the Book of the Rector. For papal privileges the libri

nationum have twenty as opposed to the ten found in the Liber rectoris,and fourteen of that twenty are not in the latter register. For universitystatutes the libri nationum have fourteen as opposed to the eleven foundin the Liber rectoris, and five of those fourteen are not found in the latterregister. The number of arts faculty statutes is more balanced: each hassix, of which five are the same in both registers.

While the compilers of the libri nationum were more thorough, theydid not preserve all the relevant fourteenth-century documents. Miss-ing for the first half of the century are at least eleven papal privi-leges;45 three university statutes;46 and one arts faculty statute.47 More-over, the manuscripts show the same type of scribal errors found in themanuscripts of the Book of the Rector.48

them in duplicate, are also in one or more registers, except for a temporal privilegewhose effectiveness had expired.

45 CUP II, #767, #768, #769, and #770, all found in the London manuscript. Alsomissing are: CUP II, #726, #729, #739, #741, #754, #836, #1021. This information isbased on a partial scan of CUP II.

46 CUP II, #881, #884, and #1051. [The university statute mentioned in the proc-tor’s register of the English nation (AUP I, col. 62) does not appear in any register.]

47 CUP III, #1258. Since the books of the Norman and English nations were copiedafter 1366, there is no reason why this statute of 1363 should have been missing otherthan through oversight.

48 For example, confining our attention just to the section containing the arts facultystatutes, the scribe of Univ. Reg. 100, p. 61, recopied CUP I, #328 under the rubric forthe following document, CUP II, #549. The Book of the English Nation (Paris, B.N.,nouv. acq. 535, fol. 102r) makes the same mistake.

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Several conclusions emerge from this comparison of the Book ofthe Rector and the books of the nations. The first is that becausethese registers attempted to be formal, definitive, rationally structuredbooks of statutes and privileges, and because they were copied longafter the official diplomas were signed and sealed, the text of thedocuments they contain along with their dates were based on theofficial diplomas or on copies of official diplomas in an earlier liber

nationis. It would have run counter to the intent and function of thebook for a draft form of any document, including the arts faculty statuteof December 1340, to have been used instead of the final version.49

The second, and somewhat surprising conclusion is the evident lackof coordination between the rectorate and the nations with regard torecord preservation and registering. In compiling a book of privilegesand statutes c. 1360, the nations made little or no use of the Book ofthe Rector and, consequently, omitted important legislation. Similarly,when the Book of the Rector was “updated” around 1400, the scribemade no use of the statute registers then in the possession of eachof the four nations, and thus overlooked a large body of fourteenth-century documents. The third conclusion is that the registration ofdocuments (as distinct from the retention of originalia) may not havebeen a continuous procedure either among rectors or the nations, butwas undertaken only when the need was felt.

This situation resulted from several factors. One factor was the de-gree of importance the two types of document preservation had forthe rector and proctor, whose terms in office were extremely brief bymodern standards. Among the responsibilities of either office record-

49 Thijssen, 164, believes that the reference to the affixing of seals, mentioned in thecolophon of the December 1340 statute, “was included in anticipation of the actualsealing: this saved the preparation of yet another diploma. The clause may not beread as a proof that the statute was really sealed on December 29, 1340, becauseour source for the statute is the chartulary and not the actual diploma with the sealsattached to it. The time-interval that passed between the drafting and validating of thestatute is explained by the nature of the assembly that took place on December 29,1340. The assembly was an assembly of regent masters of the Faculty of Arts andtheir decisions were recorded in a statute, which, like all statutes, was copied downin the university’s chartulary.” Apart from the fact that there is no such thing as “theuniversity’s chartulary,” unless he means the Liber rectoris, which does not contain thisstatute, that is not how the registration of documents occurs even in sequential registers.If a meeting only produced a draft, it would never be copied into any register. And if,following Thijssen’s assumptions, the final document should contain an actum clauseand the date associated with it, it is puzzling how a draft would save the preparation ofanother diploma.


keeping was important, although perhaps not the highest priority. Itusually took the form of ensuring that internally-generated documents,such as statutes and letters were completed and sent, and copies pre-served in their original form, i.e., as diplomas, which would be placedin the chest of the rector and/or nation. The preservation of incomingdocuments, such as papal, legatine, royal, or episcopal letters and priv-ileges, while desirable, probably depended more on the timing and cir-cumstances of arrival. In either case, the inscribing of documents into aregister was an additional process, and one not immediately necessary.With such short terms in office and no chancery, this task might well beneglected.50

In this process it appears that the officers of the nations were moreconscientious than were the rectors. Even though the turnover amongproctors was more frequent than for the rector—almost monthly asopposed to four rectors per year—most masters could expect to beproctor at least once every two years and might therefore be moreconcerned about the affairs of the nation and faculty, while the rec-torship passed among a potentially far larger group. More importantly,the nations were the principal unit of self-identification for masters andstudents in the arts faculty.51 The faculty and its rector could do littlebeyond what the nations, speaking through their proctors, authorized.This applies not only to the creation and issuing of documents; it alsoapplies to their preservation.

Record-Making at the University of Paris

University Scribes and the Creation of Documents

We know nothing directly about the scribes who produced either theearly or later versions of the Liber rectoris or those who produced the libri

nationum. Presumably they were drawn from the pool of public notariesactive in Paris who operated under imperial and apostolic authorityand who had some connection with the university. We at least knowsomething about the scribes who prepared the original diplomas, since

50 The only personnel in the rectorate or nations with multi-year tenure were thebedels and, eventually, an employed scribe. In the higher faculties a dean would oftenhold office for a number of years, based on seniority or election.

51 Pearl Kibre, The Nations in the Mediaeval Universities (Cambridge, Mass., 1948).

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these documents, unlike the copies in the registers, with one exception,carry the names of the scribe and witnesses.52

The university tended to employ one or more scribes on a frequentbasis, and their activity on behalf of the university might extend for aconsiderable period of time. One notary by the name of Bonamicus (ofBologna), who was drafting documents for the university in 1267, wasstill employed in such tasks in 1289.53 On the other hand, universitydiplomas from the late thirteenth century reveal the names of severalscribes employed by the university to draft its documents.54

By 1316 the university licensed and appointed an official universityscribe. The holder of that office at the time was Radulphus Benedicti,who was still active in that office in September 1321.55 He is the firstscribe known to identify himself as acting not only by imperial andapostolic authority, but by university authority as well.56 Whatever thesituation had been before, the employment of a university-appointedscribe by December 1316 should have improved the preservation of uni-versity documentation. In addition to the reappointment of RadulphusBenedicti for the following year (1316–1317) and the promulgation of astatute containing the oath of office for the university scribe, the uni-versity expressed its concern that the frequent turnover among mastersand the brief term of office for the rector created a situation in which

52 The arts faculty statute of 1355, the last to be copied into the common text of thebooks of the nations, did include a full diplomatic colophon. This may be because thescribe of that statute, Simon Quinimo, may have had some hand in the selection andarrangement of documents for the books of the nations.

53 CUP I, #416; CUP II, #560.54 E.g., Gaufridus de Plesseio (CUP II, #587), Aubertus de Maconvilla (CUP II,

#602), Gaufridus dictus Ligator (CUP II, #616), Anthonius Sicti de Vercellis (CUP II,#703).

55 CUP II, #724; CUP II, #733; CUP II, #734; CUP II, #736. On Sept. 9, 1321 (CUPII, pp. 246–247, #800) Radulphus recorded a public apology given by Nicholas deAnesiaco, OP, to the rector and proctors of the arts faculty. It is significant that Ralph isacting as notary for the arts faculty, not just the university. In a university document ofAugust 1325 (CUP II, pp. 286–287, #845) the scribe was Herveus de Insula. Herveuswas still drafting documents for the university in April 1341 (CUP II, pp. 515–518,#1051).

56 CUP II, #733; “Et ego Radulphus Benedicti clericus Rothomagensis diocesis, pub-licus apostolica et imperiali auctoritate venerabilisque matris Universitatis Parisiensisnotarius ….” By the second quarter of the fourteenth century (and possibly much ear-lier) the nations had their own official scribes. The scribe of the Norman nation in 1337was paid twenty solidi per year for his services; CUP II, #1008. The scribe who copiedtwo statutes into the Liber nationis of the English nation in 1339 was paid for that task,perhaps in addition to an annual salary; AUP I, col. 35.


past decisions and legislation of the university body might be forgot-ten or inaccurately remembered.57 Their remedy seems to have been tohave continuity in the office of university scribe not only for the prepa-ration of all university documents but presumably for recalling the con-tent of university transactions and possibly overseeing the preservationof the originalia. No mention is made of a register!

The principal task of the university notary was the preparation andauthentication of official documents. He was expected to attend allfaculty meetings that might result in legislation. Documents embodyingfaculty decisions were to be prepared by him, often at the meetingwhere final action was being taken. And he oversaw the signatures ofthe witnesses and the attachment of seals.

Legislative procedures in the university are clear, even if the numberof meetings needed to produce any particular statute are unknown.58

Neither the university nor the arts faculty discussed issues as a bodyof the whole, but deliberations were held at the same place and time.Once the rector had presented the issue or an item of proposed legisla-

57 CUP II, #734: “Injuriatur memorie frequenter oblivio, et longinquitate sepe fittemporis, quod res clara presentibus redditur obscura futuris, et sic interdum recisarepululant, suscitantur sopita, et sepulta resurgunt. Unde adversus oblivionis dispen-dium de scripture suffragio prudentium cautela non immerito providere curavit. Ut igi-tur Universitatis nostre negotia futuris temporibus peragenda roboris saniori firmitatevallentur, potissime quia labilis est hominum memoria, ut predicitur, nostrique magistrifluunt et refluunt continueque mutantur, rectorque sepissime mutatur, ex quibus fre-quentius evenire contingit quamplurima nostra negotia tam deliberata quam alia suboblivionis velamine in grave nostri prejudicium et gravamen pertransire, de notarionobis tam utili quam honesto, qui in nostris congregationibus et aliis locis nobis neces-sariis intersit, scribenda conscribat et si opus fuerit in publicam formam modo debitoreducat, ex unanimi consensu, provido et deliberato consilio duximus providendum,per cujus manus omnes littere seu scripture a nostra Universitate emanentes….”

58 Thijssen’s description of the sequence of legislative action in the arts faculty, 163–166, needs correction at numerous points. It is not the case that meetings of the nationswere often held “immediately following those of the faculty.” Nor is it the case thatdefinitive legislation in the faculty of arts required the presence of non-regent masters.Nor was the sealing of statutes done by each nation at a separate time and place.The nations met independently of or in conjunction with the arts faculty. The meetingthat resulted in the December 1340 statute was a meeting of regent masters of thefour nations and had full legislative authority. And for the sealing of a document to belegal, it was necessary for all signatories and witnesses to be present at the same timeand place. Diplomas did not “make the rounds throughout the Nations to be actuallyapproved by seal.” They were sealed at one ceremony, either at the legislative meetingitself or at some designated place later. It was not just the signature and seal of theEnglish nation that was affixed in the lodgings of Henry de Unna; it was the one andonly sealing ceremony.

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tion at the meeting, the constituent units (nations in the case of the artsfaculty; nations and faculties in the case of the university) caucused sep-arately in designated areas of the church and then reported the resultsof their deliberations through the proctors and deans. If there was una-nimity, the notary prepared the document, which was then read foraccuracy, signed and sealed. If there was a division of opinion, separateviews were reported in the document before it was made official.59

It was expected that the university notary would, in the company ofdesignated masters, bring the great seal of the university from the chestin which it was kept to university meetings that were expected to resultin legislation.60 Wherever possible, this would be done at the meeting in

59 CUP II, #1051, p. 517: “facultas artium remansit in dicto capitulo, et ipsa in dictocapitulo per nationes more solito divisa ad deliberandum super premissis, et posteainvicem redeunte et unita….” The difference in results is illustrated by documentsthat survive as originalia and in registers. CUP II, #881 illustrates a swift decision inwhich the rector’s draft (cedula), which was never copied in any register, was summa-rized into statutory form: “… anno ejusdem MCCC vicesimo octavo, die tercia mensisSeptembris …, in mei notarii publici et testium infra scriptorum presentia constitu-tus … circa horam tercie in congregatione generali apud S. Maturinum Parisiensem,tenens in manu sua quandam cedulam, legit ibidem quedam statuta in eadem cedulacontenta coram omnibus ibidem existentibus, cujus quidem cedule tenor dicta statutacontinentis sequitur in hec verba. … Qua quidem cedula sic ibidem publice lecta etin deliberatione posita, deliberavit decanus in medicina … Et eodem modo deliber-averunt decretiste et theologi. Super quibus omnibus prefatus rector petiit a me publiconotario sibi fieri publicum instrumentum. Acta fuerunt hec Parisius anno, indictione,mense, die, loco, pontificatu et hora predictis, presentibus ad hec venerabilibus et dis-cretis viris magistris … Et ego Garinus de Pruvino … dum hec omnia et singula fierentet ordinarentur, presens fui, et super hoc publicum instrumentum scribi feci et in for-mam publicam redegi ….” CUP II, #845, by contrast, records the division of opinion:“… anno ejusdem millesimo trecentesimo vicesimo quinto, indictione octava, xxvj diemensis Augusti …, in mei magistri Stephani de Lingonis rectoris …, notariique pub-lici ac testium subscriptorum presentia in capitulo Beati Maturini Parisiensis in gen-erali congregatione dicte Universitatis, quibusdam factis et negotiis per nos rectorempredictum ibidem propositis et in deliberatione positis … Primo, nos rector predictusdeliberationem facultatis artium retulimus et referimus in hunc modum … secundumdeliberationem duarum nationum. Alie autem due nationes deliberaverunt quod …Deliberationem vero facultatis medicine retulit … Deliberationem vero facultatis decre-torum retulit … Deliberationem vero facultatis theologie … Acta fuerunt hec in capit-ulo Beati Maturini predicto parum post horam tertiam, die, indictione, mense et pontif-icatu predictis … In cujus rei testimonium sigillum dicte Universitatis una cum signo etsubscriptione publici notarii infrascripti presentibus est appensum. Datum anno, indic-tione, die, mense et pontificatu predictis.” Both are cases of a meeting in which thedecision, document preparation, witnessing, and sealing occurs on the same day. SeeKibre, The Nations, pp. 102–104; H. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages,rev. ed. (Oxford, 1946) I, pp. 410–411.

60 CUP II, #698: “… nulla littera cujuscunque modi magno sigillo Universitatisdecetero sigilletur, nisi prius per Universitatem visa et perquisita fuerit examine dili-


the presence of the masters. For university statutes the process of sealingwas relatively simple, since only the seal of the university was required.The sealing of an arts faculty statute was a more complex matter, sinceit required the seal of each of the four nations along with the seal of therector. There were instances in which the sealing of a statute did nottake place at the meeting that enacted it, but this unusual procedurewas noted in the colophon of the document.61

Datum et Actum

Since Thijssen has called attention to the wording of the diplomaticcolophons of university statutes and used his understanding to arguethat the date of the arts faculty statute of December 1340 is the dateof a draft (indicated by the word datum without actum), which was sub-sequently sealed and promulgated (i.e., made official as actum) betweenmid-January and early February, some consideration of that issue mustbe addressed here. Even though the nature of surviving registers indi-cates that they do not contain draft copies, a correct understanding ofthe relation of datum and actum clauses in university statutes leads to thesame conclusion.

First, in contrast to Thijssen’s assertion,62 it is not the case that themajority of university statutes bear a colophon that includes a clausewith both datum and actum or actum and date. Of the twenty arts facultystatutes recorded in the books of the nations for the thirteenth andfourteenth centuries, fourteen have only a datum clause or date (eight

genti. Huic adicientes, ut deinceps clavis arche et cophini, in quo sigillum supradictumreponitur, portata per servientem aliquem sine aliquo magistro ad sigillandum nul-latenus admittatur, sed cujuslibet facultatis teneatur unus magister cum clavi in locosigillationis personaliter interesse.”

61 CUP I, #219: “Anno Domini MCCL tertio … Hanc autem ordinationem seustatutum a nobis approbatum et editum sigilli nostri munimine fecimus roborari. Ac-tum est hoc statutum anno predicto mense April. Sed propter additionem clausule deemenda facta per memoratum comitem posterius, que nondum exhibita erat quandoeditum est hoc statutum, sigillata est carta ista iiii non. Septembris, anno predicto.”This text, taken from the original diploma, was reproduced almost verbatim in theregisters: London, Brit. Libr., Addit. 17304, fol. 90v; Paris, B.N., nouv. acq. lat. 535,fol. 75r; Paris, B.N., nouv. acq. lat. 2060, fol. 70r–70v. [A statute of the French nationapproved on February 26, 1328 (Paris, Bibl. Nat., nouv. acq. lat. 2060, fol. 110r; CUP II,#872) but which was not sealed until later (CUP II, #897), was registered without anyfinal notarial clause or mention of sealing.]

62 Thijssen, 165: “Leafing through the chartulary one will find that most statutes endwith the standard formula: Datum et actum … or the slightly variant formula Actafuerent (sic) ….”

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of which also refer to the attachment of seals),63 and only six eithercarry actum and a date or an actum and datum clause.64 An actum clauseis also missing in twenty of the thirty-four university statutes that havecolophons and in most of the statutes of the four nations.65

Nor it is the case that where only one of these terms occurs, datum isattached to the draft of a document and actum to its official release orpromulgation. They refer to two different types of information. Datum

refers to the date of the document, which is often identical with thedate of the meeting at which deliberation and legislative action tookplace.66 Actum refers to the place of the meeting where action was taken,often identical with the issuing of the document.67 In practice, as both

63 CUP I, #137, 187, 246, 328, 333, 363, 441, 461, 485; CUP II, #544, 549, 554, 570,1042.

64 CUP I, #561, CUP II, #1012, 1023, 1024, 1031, 1229.65 The university statutes bearing only datum or date are CUP I, #230, 256, 413, 478,

505; CUP II, #575, 685, 697, 698, 699, 722, 724, 733, 734, 737, 776, 810, 825, 1057,1064. Noting some of these “datum only” statutes, Thijssen, 165, speculated this mightbe because the person who convoked the meeting is mentioned in the document. Butall meetings of the arts faculty and university were called by the rector.

66 Among arts faculty statutes: CUP I, #441, 485; CUP II, #554. A statute of1272 (CUP I, #441) best illustrates this form. In the opening section of the statutethe date and place of the meeting is given: “de communi consensu nullo ex nobiscontradicente die veneris precedente diem dominicam qua cantatur Letare Jerusalem[i.e. April 1], convocatis propter hoc magistris omnibus et singulis in ecclesia sancteGenovese Parisiensis [i.e. Ste. Geneviève], statuimus et ordinamus …” And at theend: “Datum Parisius anno Domini M.CC. septuagesimo primo, prima die Aprilis”[i.e., April 1, 1272]. Acta or actum could also be used to indicate that the documentwas prepared and issued on the same day as the deliberations: CUP I, #462 (acta exdeliberatione); CUP II, #845, #1051.

67 CUP II, #561: “sigilla quatuor nationum presenti cedule sunt appensa. Actumanno Domini M.CC. octuagesimo nono apud Sanctum Julianum Pauperem die venerispost festum beati Dyonisii.” CUP II, #1023: “Actum fuerunt hec apud Sanctum Julia-num in nostra congregatione facultatis nobis specialiter ad statuendum vocatis annoDomini millesimo trecentesimo tricesimo nono, sabbato post festum beati Mathei apos-toli. In quorum testimonium sigilla nostra cum signeto rectoris duximus apponenda.”CUP II, #1024: “acta fuerunt hec apud S. Maturinum in nostra congregatione facultatisnobis specialiter et expresse ad statuendum vocatis, anno Domini millesimo CCC tre-cesimo nono, die lune post festum beati Mathei apostoli. In quorum testimonium sigillanostra cum signeto rectoris duximus apponenda.” CUP II, #1031: “Acta fuerunt hecapud S. Maturinum in congregatione nostre facultatis nobis sufficienter et specialiterad statuendum vocatis anno Domini MCCC tricesimo nono, die mercurii duodecimamensis Januarii. In quorum testimonium sigilla nostra una cum signeto rectoris hiispresentibus litteris duximus apponenda.” The last three probably have identical formbecause they would have been drafted by the same university scribe. CUP II, #1229:“In cujus rei testimonium presenti statuto sigillum rectoris una cum sigillis quatuornationum, videlicet Gallicane, Picardie, Normanie et Anglicane et earum consensuunaque cum signo et subscriptione subscripti notarii duximus apponenda. Datum et


De Boüard and Giry noted, the terms were often used interchangeablyto mean the place and date of official action.68 The choice of languageseems to have depended as much on the model employed by a particu-lar notary as on anything else.69

In assessing the meaning to be assigned to the presence or absenceof either of these terms in a statutory colophon, it is important todistinguish between the form of a statute as it appears in the Liber

rectoris or the libri nationum and the form of the original diploma. With afew exceptions, the text recorded in the registers is a slightly truncatedtext in which the invocatio, the list of witnesses, and the subscriptio andnotarial conclusion (the “Et ego” paragraph) have been removed. Toestablish whether all official sealed diplomas of statutes have an actum

clause, we have to compare originalia. Only two diplomas of arts facultystatutes have survived, one from 1254, which was not included in anyregister, and the statute of 1355, which was included in the books ofthe nations but in its full diplomatic form. Since the university scribeusually prepared documents for the arts faculty, originalia of universitystatutes, of which we have many, allow us to compare the diplomaticand register forms of statutes.

Confining our comparison to the originalia of fourteenth-century stat-utes that have seals or have the marks of having had seals, we findthat the date of the official document is identical with the date ofthe meeting at which action was taken.70 It should also be noted that

actum in congregatione nostre facultatis tam regentium quam non regentium ad hocspecialiter convocatorum et apud Sanctum Julianum Pauperem Parisius congregatorumanno Domini M.CCC. quinquagesimo quinto, decima die mensis Decembris, indic-tione nona, pontificatus ….” This last is more detailed because its text was edited fromthe original diploma.

68 A. Giry, Manuel de diplomatique (Paris, 1894), pp. 578, 581–582, 585–589; A. deBoüard, Manuel de diplomatique française et pontificale (Paris, 1929), pp. 295–296.

69 The flexibility of notarial language is illustrated in the arts faculty statute ofMarch 1338 (CUP II, #1012) in which actum applies to a scribal copy, not the originaldocument. As edited in CUP this is not immediately apparent, but the relevant text inthe manuscript registers reads at the beginning: “In nomine Domini, amen. Datum percopiam. Universis praesentes…;” and at the end: “Datum apud S. Maturinum Parisiusin nostra congregatione facultatis nobis ad statuendum vocatis anno Domini M.CCC.tricesimo septimo, sexta decima die mensis Martii. In quorum testimonium sigillanostrarum quatuor nationum praesentibus duximus apponenda. Acta fuit haec copiaanno superius expresso indictione sexta vicesimosecundi die mensis Martii pontificatus….” Acta in this case means the date of this copy, not the date of the meeting at whichaction was taken, and the statute sealed, six days earlier.

70 CUP II, #733: “anno Domini MCCC sexto decimo, die sabbati ante festumbeati Nicolai Hyemale Parisius apud Sanctum Maturinum in nostra congregatione

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often no reference is made to the attendance of non-regents, whosepresence was not required for legislative action. Whether the place anddate apply to a final meeting or to the only meeting, the scribe waspresent and the document sealed on that day. Where this is not thecase, scribes are careful to note the difference in dates.71 When actum

is used, it applies to the meeting at which the deliberationes and decisionoccurred, before sealing, not to a promulgatio after sealing, as the statutecited above in note 61 illustrates. More to the point, in diplomas ofstatutes with evidence of the seals still present one finds datum by itselfmore often than actum or actum et datum.72

Oaths Concerning the Statutes ‘Contra Scientiam Occamicam’

The oaths concerned with the scientia occamica were part of a seriesof oaths added to those to be sworn by bachelors in arts when theycame before the rector to incept.73 The original twenty-seven oaths

generali tunc inibi facta … In cujus rei testimonium presentes litteras per RadulphumBenedicti, auctoritate apostolica et imperiali nostrique collegii memorati notarium, fierimandavimus nostreque Universitatis sigillo una cum signo et subscriptione ejusdemcommuniri. Datum Parisius in capitulo beati Maturini, anno et die supradictis. ¶Et ego….” #734: “… Parisius in capitulo Sancti Maturini in nostra congregatione generalidie sabbati ante festum beati Nicholai hyemale anno Domini millesimo CCCXVI …In quorum testimonium presentes litteras per eundem notarium nostrum confectasnostre Universitatis sigilii munimine duximus roborandus. Datum anno et die sabbatipredictis Parisius in nostra congregatione generali et capitulo Sancti Maturini ….”#736: “Datum et actum Parisius in nostra congregatione predicta, anno Domini ….”#825: “Datum ut supra.” #845: “Acta fuerunt hec in capitulo Beati Maturini predictoparum post horam tertiam, die, indictione, mense et pontificatu predictis ….” #870:“In cujus rei testimonium sigillum nostrum presentibus litteris duximus apponendum,anno, die et loco supradictis.” Other statutes in diploma form in which the datum oractum clause refers to the time and place of the meeting: CUP II, #722, #724, #737,#774, #776, #810, #881, #1051, #1057, #1064, #1229.

71 See above, note 61.72 CUP I, #413 (Paris, Arch. univ., carton 6, C.5.a); #478 (Arch. univ., carton 4,

A.19.i); #505 (Arch. univ., carton 7, D.13.a); CUP II, #722 (Arch. univ., carton 3, A.7.b,A.7.c, and carton 7, D.12.b); #724 (Paris, Arch. nat., M 68, n. 2); #733 (Arch. univ.,D.18.ss); #734 (Arch. univ., carton 7, D.15.a); #737 (Arch. univ., carton 1, A.1.h); #776(Arch. univ., carton 6, B.1.c); #810 (Arch. univ., carton 5, B.1.g); #825 (Arch. nat., M.68, n. 6); #1057 (Arch. univ., carton 7, D.12.d); #1064 (Arch. nat. M 68, n. 26 & 27).

73 The oaths have been variously dated in the secondary literature. The date of 1341was conjectured by Du Boulay on the basis of other oaths created in July 1341 andthe date of the two known statutes. The date of 1356, which was given in Châtelain’saccount of the Book of the English Nation (“Le ‘livre’ … de la nation d’Angleterre,” 93)


were created in the thirteenth century, and subsequently a list of elevenwere joined to them.74

As with individual statutes and privileges in the Book of the Rectorand the books of the nations, the precise manuscript evidence for theseadditional inception oaths is not clear from the critical apparatus inthe published edition. Denifle and Châtelain gave their sources as Univ.Reg. 3 and the British Library manuscript of the Book of the Rector,but the latter, although composed at the end of the fourteenth century,includes only four of the additional oaths, and Univ. Reg. 3 has adifferent reading for both of the Ockham-related oaths with which weare concerned. The text printed in the edited Chartularium was takenfrom Du Boulay’s Historia, which in turn was copied from the recordsof the French and Picard nations.

At the end of June 1341 the French nation ratified the statutes thatconcerned the oaths to be sworn by those being examined for licencingat Notre Dame or Ste. Geneviève. It was Du Boulay’s conjecture, whichseems reasonable, that the statutes against the scientia occamica wereadded to the oaths of inception at about the same time and wouldhave applied to the entire arts faculty, not just to the French nation.The only extant manuscript that witnesses to the original version ofthese oaths occurs in the Book of the French nation, which as we haveseen was prepared between 1355 and 1366. The Book of the EnglishNation, prepared between 1366 and 1368, has a different version of thetext, just as does the Proctor’s Register for the English nation in thesection between 1365 and 1368. The “Picard” copy of the Book of theNation (Univ. Reg. 100), whose form if not execution dates between1355 and 1366, contains only a few oaths copied from the last sectionof its exemplar and inserted in the midst of the papal privileges. Thetext of the Book of the Norman Nation can no longer be checkedfor information on this issue. If date of composition is any guide, themodel behind the Picard copy probably corresponded to the versionthat appears in the Book of the French Nation, while the Book of theNorman Nation may well have shared the version of the Book of the

is not given in the manuscript and is based on the book being planned and legislated in1356.

74 CUP I, #501; CUP II, #1185, n. 16. The first document (#501) as edited doesnot present the oaths as separate items. The fourth oath: “Non habebitis sotularesrostratos nec laqueatos nec fenestratos, nec induetis supertunicale scissum in lateribusnec habebitis mitram in capite quamdiu legetis sub capa rotunda, vel disputabitis” isactually three separate oaths in the fourteenth-century list.

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English Nation. It seems unlikely that versions of an oath that appliedto all incepting bachelors in arts would differ by nation. The two extantversions therefore probably reflect changes across time.

What is the difference between the two versions? In the earlier ver-sion there were two oaths. The first obliged the incepting bachelor toswear to observe the statute made by the faculty of arts against the scien-

tia occamica and not to sustain in any way that or any similar scientia butuphold the scientia of Aristotle, his Commentator Averroes, and of otherancient commentators and expositors of Aristotle except in matters thatare against the faith.75 The second oath was to observe the statute inthe other of the aforesaid two statutes de scientia occamica, namely that nomaster, bachelor, or scholar is permitted to argue without the permis-sion of the master in charge of the disputation.76 In the second versionthe first of these two oaths was removed and the second oath was short-ened to remove any mention of the statutes against the scientia occamica.77

This change was intentional, and it occurred sometime between 1355and 1365. Although the truncated version of the inception oaths in theBook of the Rector c. 1400 also omits any mention of statutes contra sci-

entiam occamicam as well as the statute of Dec. 29, 1340, the large numberof unintentional omissions in that manuscript makes its witness on thisissue essentially meaningless.78

Thijssen has argued that the first of these oaths refers to the artsfaculty statute of December 1340—or possibly to the first half of theSeptember 1339 statute—even though there is no direct parallel be-

75 The Book of the French Nation (Paris, B.N., nouv. acq. lat. 2060, fol. 100v);cf. CUP II, #1185, n. 16: “Item, jurabitis quod statuta facta per facultatem artiumcontra scientiam Okanicam observabitis, neque dictam scientiam et consimiles sub-stinebitis quoquomodo, sed scientiam Aristotelis et sui Commentatoris Averrois et alio-rum antiquorum commentatorum et expositorum dicti Aristotelis, nisi in casibus quisunt contra fidem.”

76 Ibid.: “Item, observabitis statutum contentum in altero predictorum duorum statu-torum de scientia Okanica, scilicet quod nullus magister, baccalarius aut scolaris sinelicentia magistri disputationes tenentis arguat: quam licentiam sibi non liceat petereverbaliter, sed tantummodo significative reverenter.”

77 Proctor’s Book of the English Nation (Univ. Reg. 3, fol. 58r); Book of the EnglishNation (Paris, B.N., nouv. acq. lat. 535, fol. 136v): “Item, observabitis statutum quodnullus magister, bachelarius ac scolaris sine licentia magistri disputationes tenentisarguat: quam licentiam sibi non liceat petere verbaliter, sed tantummodo significativereverenter.”

78 The London manuscript of the Book of the Rector does contain the 1339 statutewith its reference not to dogmatize Ockham. If the absence of the Dec. 1340 statute waspart of a plan to remove all references to statutes contra scientiam occamicam, that sectionof the 1339 statute would have been removed as well.


tween the text of the oath and the text of those statutes. But this posi-tion is based on a misunderstanding of the relation of oath to statute.The oaths for inception in the arts faculty are based on statutory leg-islation and almost invariably take their wording from the actual textof the statute.79 In this case, the text of the statute must have includedsome reference to the scientia Aristotelis et sui Commentatoris Averrois, etc. Aswas pointed out in the 1982 article, that language does not appear inthe statute of Dec. 29, 1340.80

The list of new oaths also reveals two others for which there is nota corresponding statute extant. The twenty-eighth oath (the first of thenew oaths) mandating and describing a “capa nova rotunda” is one of

79 For example, compare the first oath (CUP I, p. 586): “Vos legetis lectiones ordi-narias in capa rotunda, vel in pallio” and the statute (CUP I, p. 79): “Nullus mag-istrorum legentium in artibus habeat capam nisi rotundam, nigram et talarem, saltemdum nova est. Pallio autem bene potest uti.” The twenty-fourth oath (CUP I, p. 587):“vos non estis citra vicesimum primum annum vestre etatis” and the statute (CUP I,p. 78): “Nullus legat Parisius de artibus citra vicesimum primum etatis sue annum.”The twenty-fifth oath (CUP I, p. 587): “audivistis per sex annos de artibus” and thestatute (CUP I, p. 78): “sex annis audierit de artibus ad minus.” The twenty-sixth oath(CUP I, p. 587): “legetis per duos annos continue nisi rationabilis causa intervenerit”and the statute (CUP I, p. 78): “protestetur se lecturum duobus annis ad minus, nisirationabilis causa intervenerit.” The twenty-seventh oath (CUP I, 587): “libertates sin-gulas facultatis et consuetudines facultatis honestas et totius Universitatis privilegia def-fendetis, ad quemcumque statum deveneritis” and the statute (CUP I, p. 614): “cumipse incepit in artibus, juravit servare libertates Universitatis, ad quemcumque statumdeveniret.” And turning to the oaths added in the fourteenth century, the thirty-secondoath (CUP II, p. 680): “jurabitis quod statutum de habitibus portandis ad congrega-tiones et disputationes observabitis” and the statute (CUP II, p. 486): “statuimus quoddecetero magistri ad disputationes seu congregationes accedant in habitu decenti.” Thethirty-fourth oath (CUP II, p. 680): “observabitis statutum … quod nullus magister,bachelarius ac scolaris sine licentia magistri disputationes tenentis arguat: quam licen-tiam sibi non liceat petere verbaliter, sed tantummodo significative reverenter” and thestatute (CUP II, p. 485): “nullus magister, bachellarius aut scolaris, sine permissu etlicentia magistri disputationes tenentis arguat, quam licentiam sibi non liceat petereverbaliter, sed tantummodo signative reverenter.” The thirty-fifth oath (CUP II, p. 680):“non dabitis testimonium de aliquo scolari, nisi vobis juraverit quod intendit esse verusvester scolaris” and the statute (CUP II, p. 36): “nomina propriorum scolarium scribereteneantur, ut bonorum cognitionem habeant … de ipsis legitimum testimonium deferrevaleant.” The thirty-seventh oath (CUP II, p. 680): “vos jurabitis quod observabitisstatutum de modo legendi sine penna, videlicet sic ac nullus scriberet coram vobis,sicut fiunt sermones in Universitate, et sicut legunt in aliis facultatibus legentes” andthe statute (CUP II, p. 39): “ac si nullus scriberet coram eis, secundum quem modumfiunt sermones in Universitate et recommendationes, et quem lectores in ceteris facul-tatibus insequuntur.”

80 Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists,” 61–62.

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these. The other is the thirty-sixth oath, which refers to the arts facultystatute de prepositione rectoris, which was probably passed in the summerof 1347 and led to a confrontation with the faculty of theology anda summons to Avignon. The statute is specifically mentioned in May1354 but does not appear in any register.81

The Arts Statute of December 29, 1340

We are now in a position to turn our attention to the controversialArts statute of 1340, the history of its reception, and the meaningof its rubric and date. Two corrections to earlier assumptions, myown included, need to be made. First, the statute survives in threemanuscripts, not one, as had earlier been thought.82 Moreover, thedating of Univ. Reg. 100, cited as the source of the document in thepublished Chartularium, while a decade or two earlier than I initiallythought, is no longer relevant, since the critical portion of one ofthe manuscripts in which it appears can now be dated between 1355and 1366. This does not by itself authenticate the rubric, since allthe books of the nations derive from the same model produced bythe reorganization of documents in the late 1350s or early 1360s andtherefore are not independent witnesses to the form and content of thedocuments recorded.

As we have seen, the arts faculty statute of Dec. 29, 1340 was copiedinto a register sometime between 1355 and 1366.83 There is thus a min-imum of fifteen years and a maximum of twenty-six years between theoriginal statute in the form of a diploma and its first known recording

81 Reg. Supplic. Innocent. VI, an. 2, fol. 100, cited in CUP II, #1143, and CUP III,#1217: “in facultate artium … certa tunc statuta facultatis ejusdem ….” See also AUP I,cols. 110–111. The oath was included among the oaths recorded in the proctor’s registerof the English nation between 1365 and 1368 (Arch. univ., Reg. 3, fol. 58r) but wassubsequently struck through.

82 In addition to its inclusion in Univ. Reg. 100, pp. 67–68, Paris, B.N., nouv. acq. lat.535 (Book of the English Nation), fol. 107r, and Paris, B.N., nouv. acq. lat. 2060 (Bookof the French Nation), fol. 94v, it was in Chartres 595 (Book of the Norman Nation),fol. 122r–v, and probably in the Book of the Picard Nation (still lost).

83 It may, of course, have been copied into an earlier Liber nationis, such as thatmaintained by the English nation, but no mention of the statute occurs in the proctor’sregister for late December 1340 to early January 1341, and the statement in late January1341 about the sealing of a statute against Ockhamist errors does not mention anyinregistration.


within a register. That interval was not a quiet period for the Universityof Paris. The years between 1340 and 1360 witnessed the increase ofpapal pressure for university reform, the defeat of the French at Crécy,Calais, and Poitiers and the subsequent political disruptions, the BlackDeath, and civil strife in Paris with the revolt of Étienne Marcel. Thedecision by the English nation (and probably the other nations as well)in and around 1356 to create what became the present books of thenations probably responded to what was perceived as an unsatisfactorysituation in university document preservation.

It is important to note, in contrast to these potential disruptions, thatthere was continuity during these years in the office of university scribe.In the 1350s Simon Quinimo from the diocese of Tulle, master of arts inthe French nation by 1349, was university scribe, and it is highly likelythat he played some role in the creation of the books of the nations.84

When he assumed that office is unclear, but he was already acting asnotary for individual masters and for the English nation in the spring of1342.85 Thus he was active as a notary only a few years after the eventsand documents of 1339–1341. If he participated in the arrangementof documents and the adding of rubrics, one would assume he couldidentify them correctly. After fifteen or twenty years, however, that maynot have been an easy task, since Simon was not the scribe who wouldhave handled the documentation of the arts faculty or university in1339–1341.86

Since the statute of Dec. 29, 1340 does not survive as a diploma, wehave no way of knowing whether a rubric might have been inscribed onits obverse side. In any event, such contemporary rubrics are rare. Therubric was most likely added at the time the document was preparedfor inclusion in a register. But when was that? If it was included in anyof the pre-1355 libri nationum, such as that of the English nation, it wouldprobably have received a rubric at that time. But we have no way ofknowing that. All we are certain of is that a rubric was added by thetime of its appearance in the post-1355 libri nationum. Both the Bookof the Rector and the books of the nations contain examples wherethe wrong rubric was attached to a document.87 That does not mean

84 CUP II, #1165, p. 633; CUP III, #1196, 1220, 1221, 1223, 1229, 1254.85 CUP II, p. 522n; CUP II, #1061.86 Herveus de Insula was still the principal university scribe in April 1341; CUP II,

#1051.87 See above, pp. 238 and 247.

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the statute of Dec. 29, 1340 falls into that category but only that suchmistakes were not uncommon.

Turning next to the question of whether all documents (privileges,statutes, university letters) were preserved in the extant cartularies, orwhether important documents might be overlooked, there are numer-ous cases of such omissions in every single manuscript that has sur-vived.88 Some of these omissions include the most important legislationof the university promulgated less than ten years before the creationof a register that should have contained them.89 But since the regis-tration of documents was an occasional matter that depended on theinitiative of university officials and on the originalia preserved in thechests of the nations and the rector—and the 1339 inventory of thecontents of the chest of the French nation reveals the gaps in that formof preservation—the possibility of missing documentation was almostinevitable. Fortunately, the editors of the Chartularium could, as far aspossible, supplement the contents of the registers from originalia thatwere not included. Such a procedure, however, could not and did notrecover all university legislation. One arts faculty statute from the sum-mer of 1340, described by Conrad of Megenberg, is no longer extant,nor are at least two statutes mentioned in the inception oaths anddiscussed above.90 Moreover, when the pattern of extant arts facultystatutes is scrutinized, it becomes apparent that there are brief periodsfrom which we have many statutes (especially 1288–1290, 1338–1340)and other periods (1291–1337, 1341–1354) from which we have no sur-viving arts faculty statutes. The lack of faculty legislation during numer-ous decades in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is most likelya result of poor preservation, not inactivity. And as the 1340 statutementioned by Conrad of Megenberg indicates, even the periods thatare well represented have omissions. It should be acknowledged, how-ever, that the common effort that produced the books of the nationsundoubtedly drew upon the documents preserved in various chests ofthe nations, and that the inclusion rate for arts faculty statutes is higherthan for papal privileges or university statutes. It did not, however, evenfor the arts faculty statutes achieve complete preservation.91

88 See above, pp. 237–240, 242, 245, 247.89 See above, p. 238.90 For the 1340 statute see AUP I, col. 40, discussed in Courtenay and Tachau,

“Ockham, Ockhamists,” 63. For the lost statutes that correspond to the oaths, seeabove, pp. 259–260.

91 See above, pp. 245–249.


All that evidence together only establishes the possibility that the textof a statute might be lost or an incorrect rubric might be assigned to astatute. It does not establish that such things occurred in this instance.The question of whether the arts faculty statute of Dec. 29, 1340 is oris not identical with the statute against Ockhamist errors sealed severalweeks later rests on the discrepancy in dates, which Thijssen attemptedto resolve through his differentiation of datum and actum, and on thelanguage of the first oath contra scientiam occamicam.

As we have seen, both datum and actum in university and arts fac-ulty statutes, whether together or alone, usually refer to the meetingat which deliberation and action took place. Moreover, numerous uni-versity statutes whose colophons have only a datum clause survive indiploma form, signed and sealed. Thus the solution put forward byThijssen is not really workable. The meeting that resulted in this statutetook place on or before December 29, 1340.

Why possibly before? Thijssen was correct in pointing out that thetext of the statute does not mention a place of meeting, which wasusual with most university and arts faculty statutes. The December 1340statute belongs to a group of statutes, more numerous in the thirteenthcentury, that do not mention a place or date of meeting in the text butonly give a date or date and city in the colophon, as is customary forpapal or royal letters.92 Several statutes in this form survive as sealeddiplomas.

It is quite likely that in such cases the meeting had already takenplace and that the date in the colophon is the date of the issue of thedocument, which would have come at or after the meeting. In thatcase the sealing of the diploma would also have occurred on or beforeDecember 29, 1340. And unless we believe there were two statutesagainst Ockhamist errors passed in the winter of 1340–1341, we wouldhave to assume, as Tachau and I did earlier, that a rubric that belongedto a statute of Jan./Febr. 1341 was mistakenly attached at a later time tothis statute of December 1340.

But another possibility must be considered, namely that the sequenceof events in December and January 1340–1341 may have paralleledthose for the university statute of 1253 (CUP I, #219) in which thesealing of a diploma was delayed. In this instance the date in the

92 Those in this category using actum are CUP I, #42 (sealed diploma), #200; thoseusing datum are CUP I, #187, #246, #256, #328, #333, #363, #413 (sealed diploma),#461, #478 (sealed diploma), and #575.

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colophon of the document would be the date of the meeting thatapproved the statute, whose actual sealing may have been delayedseveral weeks for reasons unknown. The document itself would thenhave been prepared at the time of sealing and backdated to the meetingat which action was taken.

The main obstacle to this second hypothesis is the absence in thedocument of any statement about a delay or a difference in dates,such as one finds in #219 (both in the diploma and in the regis-ters) or in #1012 (in the registers). If this was the sequence of events,it is also surprising that Conrad of Megenberg, who was proctor ofthe English nation in late December and who was an ardent anti-Ockhamist, would not have made some comment in the Proctor’s Reg-ister about the passage of such a statute, just as he did about anotherarts faculty statute approved in the summer of 1340, but now lost.

Despite these difficulties I am now inclined to accept the secondhypothesis as a possibility because the difference in dates, viewed inlight of the CUP document #219, is no longer the insurmountableproblem it seemed in 1982. Moreover, this hypothesis better accordswith the two statements that appear in the Proctor’s Register, namelyConrad’s statement that nothing that was done was brought to com-pletion (a point that Thijssen makes, even if ad actum does not havethe meaning he assigns it), and the reference during the proctorship ofHenry de Unna which mentions the sealing of a statute but says noth-ing about a meeting of the arts faculty or the passage of a statute. Thereading of the statute at St. Jacques in sermone was informational and forthe entire university; it was not a meeting of the faculty of arts. Finally,the statute that was sealed in Jan./Febr. 1341 was described as a statuteagainst Ockhamist errors, not a statute against the scientia occamica. Thedistinction in wording may seem trivial, but there is a close correspon-dence between the rubric attached to the statute of December 1340and the description in the Proctor’s Register. That can be explainedby the false attribution of a rubric, such as occurred on occasion. Butif statutes in this period were occasionally copied into a pre-1355 Liber

nationis soon after their enactment, as occurred with the two statutesof September 1339, then the possible attachment of a rubric would becloser to the date or dates of the statute itself.

Whichever hypothesis one wishes to entertain—and both are tena-ble—the role of the English-German nation in this affair remains cen-tral. Whatever the content and date of the statute against Ockhamisterrors, that document was not sealed at a meeting of the faculty of arts


nor at any of its normal places of assembly. The ceremony of sealing,which would have been attended by the rector, Alain de Villa Collis, anotary (probably the university scribe, Herveus de Insula?), the proctorsof the four nations, and several representative witnesses, took place inthe lodgings of Henry de Unna, proctor of the English-German nation.

All that being said, there is no reason to assume the first oath contra

scientiam occamicam refers to the arts faculty statute of December 1340.As was noted, the necessary correspondence in wording between oathand statute is lacking. It is within the range of possibility that thefirst oath refers to the first paragraph of the September 1339 statute,as Thijssen speculated “for the sake of completeness,” but that wouldrequire that the terms doctrina in the statute and scientia in the oathare interchangeable, that the insistence on the scientia of Aristotle andhis Commentator was taken for granted in the statute because of theParis arts curriculum, and that the term statutum in the oaths was usedin multiple senses to cover the entire statute, both paragraphs of thestatute, and for the excerpted sentence from the second paragraph thatbecame the text of the second of these oaths. But if the statement inthe Proctor’s Register of Jan./Febr. 1341 is rejoined to the statute ofDecember 1340, the need to seek a lost statute for the first of the twoanti-Ockhamist oaths had been reduced, but not eliminated.

Although the sequence of events in the autumn and winter of 1340–1341 constructed by Thijssen will not work, his article did provide thestimulus for a reexamination of university statutes that does createa sufficient explanation of the evidence. Further, his examination ofthe content of the December 1340 statute in light of John Lutterell’sLibellus against Ockham does deserve serious consideration. And whatof the lost statute? There is no question that the accuracy of documentpreservation at the University of Paris was not perfect and that severalarts faculty statutes from this period were not preserved because of lossor removal. There is less reason today, however, to think that the statuteagainst Ockhamist errors was among them.

chapter twelve

THE DEBATE OVER OCKHAM’SPHYSICAL THEORIES AT PARIS*

Over a decade ago I co-authored an article with Katherine Tachauon the controversy over Ockham and Ockhamism at Paris that hasprovoked attention and debate, particularly in the last few years.1 Thedebate has centered on whether the famous or infamous Parisian artsfaculty statute of December 1340, the so-called “Nominalist statute,” isor is not identical with the statute described in the proctor’s book ofthe English nation as a statute against Ockhamist errors.2 That debate,sometimes referred to as the “lost statute” debate, has generated a sub-stantial body of new information about the administrative, legal, and

* Originally presented at a conference at Nice in 1993 and published in La NouvellePhysique du XIVe siècle, ed. S. Caroti and P. Souffrin (Firenze: Leo S. Olschki, 1997),pp. 45–63.

1 W.J. Courtenay and K.H. Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-Ger-man Nation at Paris, 1339–1341,” 1982, 53–96 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 9];Courtenay, “The Reception of Ockham’s Thought at the University of Paris,” 1984(1),43–64 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 8]; Courtenay, “Force of Words and Figuresof Speech: The Crisis over ‘Virtus sermonis’ in the Fourteenth Century,” 1984(2), 107–128 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 10]; Z. Kaluza, “Le Statut du 25 septembre1339 et l’Ordonnance du 2 septembre 1276,” in Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert:In memoriam Konstanty Michalski (1879–1947), ed. O. Pluta (Amsterdam, 1988), pp. 343–351; J.M.M.H. Thijssen, “Once Again the Ockhamist Statutes of 1339 and 1340: SomeNew Perspectives,” Vivarium, 27 (1990), 136–167; Courtenay, “The Registers of the Uni-versity of Paris and the Statutes against the ‘Scientia Occamica’,” 1991, 13–49 [reprintedin this volume as Chapter 11]; Kaluza, “Les sciences et leurs langages. Note sur leStatut du 29 Decembre 1340 et le prétendu statut perdu contre Ockham,” in Filosofiae teologia nel Trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi, ed. L. Bianchi (Louvain–La Neuve,1994), pp. 197–258; Kaluza, “La crise des années 1474–1482,” in Philosophy and Learning.Universities in the Middle Ages, ed. M.J.F.M. Hoenen, J.H.J. Schneider, G. Wieland (Lei-den, 1995), pp. 293–327; Courtenay, “Was There an Ockhamist School,” in Philosophyand Learning, pp. 263–292 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 18]. Also of relevanceto these issues: Courtenay, “The Preservation and Dissemination of Academic Con-demnations at the University of Paris in the Middle Ages,” in Les Philosophies moraleset politiques aux Moyen Age, ed. C. Bazán, E. Andújar, L. Sbrocchi (New York–Ottawa–Toronto, 1995), pp. 1659–1667.

2 The December 1340 statute is published as document #1042 in CUP II, pp. 505–507. For the entry in the Liber procuratorum of the English nation, see AUP I, cols. 44–45.

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documentary operations of the University of Paris as well as the inter-nal mechanisms and procedures for judging the orthodoxy of scholasticopinion. To the extent that attention has been given to the doctrinal,not just the documentary side of this question, recent discussion hasbeen concerned almost exclusively with the meaning and context ofthe arts faculty statute of December 1340.3 What has not been part ofrecent debate is the question of what aspect or aspects of Ockham’sthought, apart from the ambiguous evidence of the 1340 statute, wereunder discussion at Paris in the second quarter of the fourteenth cen-tury, and what specific positions contemporaries identified or character-ized as belonging to the Occamistae. It was one of the major assertionsof that 1982 article that all references to the thought of the Occamistae,apart from the contested witness of the 1340 statute, concern the impli-cations of Ockham’s physical theories derived from or closely linkedwith his reinterpretation of the Aristotelian categories. It is that issuewhich the following paper reexamines.

There are several facets to this problem worth review. One, thestages in the entry of Ockham’s physics into Paris, and the reactionto or assimilation of those theories. Second, the place of Ockham’sphysical theories in the battle over Ockhamism at Paris in the 1339–1341 period. Third, the respective roles of Conrad of Megenberg andJean Buridan in this process and in the crises of 1339–1341.

The Entry of Ockham’s Physics into Paris

Most of the surviving evidence relevant to the introduction of Ock-ham’s writings and thought into Paris suggests that this occurred intwo stages: the almost immediate circulation of Ockham’s treatise onquantity and his Summa logicae in the 1320s; and the subsequent appear-ance, presumably in the mid-to-late 1330s, of Ockham’s theologicalwritings and, presumably, his other works in logic and natural philos-ophy.4 These two decades reveal somewhat different reactions. In the

3 E.g., J.M.M.H. Thijssen, “Once Again,”; his chapter on the statute in a forthcom-ing book on academic condemnations [Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200–1400 (Philadelphia, 1998), pp. 57–72]; and Z. Kaluza, “Les sciences et leurs langages”.

4 A fuller account can be found in Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists,”71–72; Courtenay, “The Reception of Ockham’s Thought at the University of Paris,”pp. 44–47; K.H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology andthe Foundations of Semantics, 1250–1345 (Leiden, 1988), pp. 15–19, 336–340. A different pic-

the debate over ockham’s physical theories at paris 269

1320s we find Walter Burley, while regent master of theology at Paris,attacking Ockham’s views on simple supposition, universal concepts,quantity, and motion, but doing so in the style of normal scholasticdebate.5 It is difficult to determine which works of Ockham Burley hadat hand in Paris beyond the Summa logicae, but Burley’s reaction is evi-dent in several works, most especially in the revised version of his De

puritate artis logicae, written between 1324 and 1329, and in the final ver-sion of his Expositio librorum Physicorum, begun after 1324 and dedicatedto the masters and scholars at Paris.6 It was also at Paris in 1329 thatJohn Nicholai, a Franciscan? from Denmark, made an extract fromBurley’s De puritate of those sections that complemented or contrastedwith Ockham’s Summa logicae.7 It is less easy to establish the role Jean

ture was constructed earlier by Anneliese Maier, who believed that Ockham’s opinionswere already in circulation at Paris in 1319, and that Francis of Marchia’s defense ofthe real status of quantity was directed against Ockham. She also saw a fully-developedopposition to Ockham’s natural philosophy in the 1320s, first with Marchia, followedby Walter Burley (1324–) and Jean Buridan (1328–) and had little interest in stages orlevels of intensity in that opposition. The reception-history of Ockhamism at Paris looksdifferent if approached through reaction to the Occamistae and through the writings ofMassa and Megenberg, of which Maier was unaware.

5 A. Maier, Ausgehendes Mittelalter. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geschichte des 14. Jahrhunders,vol. I (Rome, 1964), pp. 175–208, esp. 196–203; Maier, Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik[Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik, vol. V] (Rome, 1958), p. 46, which citesBurley’s critique of the Ockhamist view of motion without mentioning Ockham. ForBurley’s critique of Ockham in his expanded version of De puritate artis logicae, seePh. Boehner’s introduction to his edition of De puritate (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955),p. 7.

6 The termini for dating the expanded version of De puritate are set by its useof Ockham’s Summa logicae, which was completed by 1324, and the earliest datedmanuscript containing extracts of this version of Burley’s treatise: Erfurt, Wiss. Bibl.,CA 8º 67. Burley left Paris in 1327, but in light of his travels and other obligationsbetween 1327 and 1329, a Parisian setting for the revision of his De puritate is more likely.By contrast, the revision of his Expositio librorum Physicorum, also placed after 1324 onthe grounds of its familiarity with Ockham’s Summa logicae, was probably completedafter he left Paris, since its dedication to “carissimis amicis suis et dominis, magistriset scolaribus Parisius in philosophia studentibus” (Oxford, All Souls College, Ms 86,fol. 1) suggests absence, just as does Thomas Bradwardine’s dedication of his Summade causa Dei to the masters and scholars at Merton College Oxford—a work probablyconceptualized at Oxford but completed at London in 1344. On the manuscripts ofBurley’s works, see J.A. Weisheipl, “Repertorium Mertonense,” MS, 31 (1969), 185–208;BRUO I, pp. 312–314.

7 Erfurt, Wiss. Bibl., CA 8º 67, fols. 123v–134r; fol. 123v: “Hanc extractionem delogica Burle ordinavit frater Ioannes Nicholai, lector de custodia Lincopensi, provinciaeDaciae, quando studuit Parisius anno Domini M.CCC.XXIX ….” If John Nicholaiwas already a friar when he studied at Paris, he would have been a student in thetheological faculty. When, a decade later, he was lector at the Linköping convent, his

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Buridan played in the critique of Ockham at Paris in the 1320s. Veryfew works of Buridan can with any certainty be placed before 1340, atleast in the redactions that have survived, and his Quaestiones in libros

Physicorum on which Maier relied so heavily is not among them.8 Con-sequently, while the many differences between Ockham and Buridan inmatters of supposition, the object of knowledge, and the meaning of theexpression de virtute sermonis can be dated before 1340, the differences innatural philosophy cannot.9 More relevant for the present inquiry isthe tone in which Buridan introduces and critiques Ockhamist posi-tions, which are never identified as such in his writings. The positionsare taken seriously and treated with scholastic dignity. They are notviewed as destructive of the intellectual enterprise or the doctrine of theChurch. To that extent, Buridan’s reactions to Ockhamist positions atany point in his career are no stronger in tone than Burley’s critiqueof the 1320s, although Buridan arrived at his position from far differentphilosophical presuppositions. The issue of Buridan’s personal involve-ment in the events of 1339–1341 will be addressed later.

To return to the question at hand, the crucial points of Ockham’snatural philosophy, specifically his reinterpretation of the Aristoteliancategories and his refusal to grant existential status to quantity, relation,motion, and time apart from res permanentes, were all contained in his

extract was bound in with Ockham’s Summa logicae as an appendix. For the full prefatorytext see the introduction in Guillelmus de Ockham, Summa logicae, ed. P. Boehner,G. Gál, S. Brown, Opera Philosophica, vol. I (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974), p. 26*.

8 Maier, Metaphysische Hintergründe der spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie [Studien zur Na-turphilosophie der Spätscholastik, vol. IV] (Rome, 1955), p. 210, dated Buridan’s Quaestionesin libros Physicorum shortly after 1328 (“nicht vor 1328, aber wahrscheinlich auch nichtlange danach entstanden ist”); B. Michael, Johannes Buridan: Studien zu seinem Leben,seinen Werken und zur Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa des späten Mittelalters, diss. FreieUniversität Berlin, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1985), pp. 567–571, did not address the date ofcomposition; J.M.M.H. Thijssen, Johannes Buridanus over het Oneindige. Een onderzoek naarzijn theorie over het oneindige in het kader van zijn wetenschaps- en natuurfilosofie, diss. Univ.Nijmegen, 2 vols. (Nijmegen, 1988), II, p. 379, placed it after 1350, “perhaps evenafter 1355”. The Expositio in libros Physicorum, which may precede it, was written in1350. Buridan’s Quaestiones longae super librum Perihermeneias, which contains views onsignification and supposition of terms that differ from those of Ockham, has been datedaround 1325 by R. van der Lecq in her edition of the work (Nijmegen, 1983). TheQuaestio de puncto, which was apparently written against Michael de Montecalerio andsheds no light on reactions to Ockham, is dated by Michael, pp. 446–452, around 1335.

9 In all probability Buridan commented on the Physics before 1340, but we haveno texts or citations that establish his views in that period. They may well have beenidentical with those expressed later, but they may have shifted as they developed.


Summa logicae and were known at Paris in the 1320s.10 More importantly,while controversial, Ockham’s views were not considered scandalous,except for the witness of Michael de Massa, which I shall addressdirectly. By contrast, Parisian reaction in 1339–1346 appears far moreheated. In addition to the statute of 1339 prohibiting the use anddissemination of Ockham’s doctrina, Conrad of Megenberg, in variouswritings between 1337 and 1354, considered Ockham’s physical theoriesto be a pestilence that needed thorough eradication.11 Most of themanuscript evidence thus suggests a change from civilized debate toviolent controversy, either because the full implications of Ockham’sphysics were not sufficiently apparent in the 1320s, or because attitudesand circumstances, both within and without the University of Paris,changed in the 1330s.

It may seem surprising, but for the early dissemination of Ockham’sphysical theories at Paris we must look to the Summa logicae, not his vari-ous commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics. Comparatively few manuscriptcopies of the latter works have survived, and none is of proven Parisianprovenance until the last quarter of the fourteenth century.12 Yet it islikely that both Ockham’s Expositio in libros Physicorum and his Summula

philosophiae naturalis were in fact known at Paris before 1350. Sectionsfrom those works were extracted and combined to form the treatiseknown as De successivis, the earliest appearance of which is at Paris.13

One piece of evidence, however, does not fit that picture of a fifteen-year delay in the onset of an aggressive Parisian reaction to Ockham’sphysics. The commentary on book II of the Sentences contained in Vat.lat. 1087 and attributed by Damasus Trapp to Michael de Massa, who

10 Ockham’s views on quantity, motion, and time appear repeatedly in the sectionsof his Summa logicae. See, in particular, in the critical edition (St. Bonaventure, 1984), I,c. 6 (20–22); c. 8 (30–33); c. 44 (132–149); c. 50 (159–171); c. 54 (177–179); c. 59 (188–190).

11 See Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists,” 74–75; Courtenay, “TheReception of Ockham’s Thought at the University of Paris,”, pp. 50–54; and thediscussion below.

12 Exceptions are the fragment of Ockham’s Expositio in libros Physicorum in Paris, B.N.lat. 6441, fols. 90ra–92vb, and the copy of Ockham’s Summula in Paris, B.N. lat. 15880,bequeathed to the Sorbonne in 1399 from the estate of Étienne de Chaumont, masterof theology (to be distinguished from the regent master of medicine by the same namewho was active in the 1320s and 1330s). On Étienne de Chaumont the theologian seeKaluza, “Le problème du ‘Deum non esse’ chez Étienne de Chaumont, Nicolas Astonet Thomas Bradwardine,” Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum, 24 (1979), 3–19.

13 See Boehner’s introduction to Guillelmus de Ockham, The Tractatus de successivisattributed to William Ockham, ed. with study by Ph. Boehner (St. Bonaventure, 1944), esp.pp. 27–30.

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purportedly read the Sentences at Paris in 1325–1326, contains a sharpcritique of Ockhamist physics. The author of that work not only attacksOckham’s theories of time and motion but does so with a level of angerand intensity that matches that of Megenberg. Moreover, in this text theauthor specifically attributes those views on motion to a group he callsthe Occamistae—a label otherwise known only through the documentsof the Parisian arts faculty in the 1339–1341 period. The major questionposed by this text is this: if a group known as the Occamistae were activeat Paris by 1326, and if their views in physics were already controversialat that time, why is there no other mention of these issues between 1326and 1339, and why did members of the university community wait until1339 or 1340 to take any action against those views?14

The Date of Michael de Massa’s Baccalaureate and Vat. lat. 1087

Some of the cross-references in Vat. lat. 1087 to the same author’scommentary on book I of the Sentences are sufficiently precise to makeit all but certain that the author of the commentary in Vat. lat. 1087 isthe same as the author of the commentary on book I found in severalmanuscripts and attributed there to Michael de Massa.15 It is not thecase, however, that the content of Massa’s questions on books I and IIof the Sentences, in the forms in which they have survived, date to hisyear or years as sententiarius at Paris.

The educational program of the Augustinian Hermits, the religiousorder to which Michael de Massa belonged, differed from those of the

14 It is unlikely that university politics, under pressure from Benedict XII, couldalone be sufficient reason why there is no mention of either the Occamistae or of thecontroversial nature of Ockham’s thought at Paris between 1326 and 1339.

15 Massa’s commentary on book I survives in several manuscripts: Bologna, Collegiodi Spagna 40; Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 2214, fol. 234vb: “Hic liber est scriptum in pri-mum Sententiarum Michaelis de Masa ….”; Florence, Biblioteca Nazionale, ms. Conv.Soppr. C. VIII. 794; and the first eight distinctions in Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale“Vittorio Emanuele III”, ms. VII. C. 1. It was also abbreviated twice in the early15th century, once by Andrea [de Biglia?] OESA of Milan (Oxford, Bodleian Library,Canonici misc. 276, and the prologue in Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vat-icana, ms. Vat. lat. 1084, fols. 144–152), and by Johannes de Marliano OESA of Milanbetween 1410 and 1430 (Bergamo, Biblioteca Civica, ms. A. 3. 21; Pavia, Biblioteca Uni-versitaria, ms. 226). For a full discussion of the evidence for the authorship of Vat. lat.1087 and for the dating of its content, see Courtenay, “The Quaestiones in Sententias ofMichael de Massa, OESA. A Redating,” Augustiniana, 45 (1995), 191–207 [reprinted inthis volume as Chapter 13].


other mendicant orders in the fourteenth century.16 For those beingtrained in theology, after an initial five or six years of study at a studium

generale, such as Paris, the best candidates were designated lectores andentered upon a long period of teaching in the studia of the order intheir home province. After a decade or more of teaching theology,including lecturing on the Sentences, candidates were chosen from thisgroup to return to Paris and lecture on the Sentences as a bachelorof theology and eventually proceed to licensing and inception as amaster (doctor) of theology. Consequently, the drafting of questions thatwould eventually comprise a Sentences commentary took place over along period of time, which would include the pre-baccalaureate stageas lector, the baccalaureate stage as sententiarius, and the post-sententialstage as baccalaurius formatus during which the bachelor engaged indisputations and other academic exercises, including sometimes lectureson the Aristotelian corpus.17 Massa’s Quaestiones in primum sententiarum,as it survives in Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 2214, may be a lectura lectoris

(i.e., a pre-baccalaureate version) and may date as early as 1323. Onthe other hand, Massa’s Quaestiones in secundum sententiarum, survivingonly in one manuscript (Vat. lat. 1087), is a fusion of questions thatderive from the edited version of Massa’s Parisian lectures on book II(which he refers to as his opus ordinarium) and from subsequent questionswritten as additiones or as disputed questions. At what point between1323 and his death in 1337 Massa actually lectured on the Sentences atParis cannot be determined with any precision. Inasmuch as he diedat Paris in May 1337 while still a bachelor of theology, that he wasconsidered relatively young in years at that time, and that without papalintervention Parisian statutes required candidates to wait a minimumof six years between the beginning of their lectures on the Sentences andbeing licensed in theology, it is likely his term as sententiarius should beplaced around 1330 or 1332.18

16 E. Ypma, La Formation des professeurs chez les Ermites de Saint Augustin de 1256 à 1354(Paris, 1956).

17 Ockham’s commentaries and questions on Aristotelian logic and physics werecomposed after he lectured on the Sentences, while he was awaiting promotion tothe doctorate. Similarly, Hugolino of Orvieto’s commentary on Aristotle’s Physics wascomposed at the same stage of career; see W. Eckermann, Der Physikkommentar Hugolinsvon Orvieto OESA (Berlin–New York, 1972).

18 For Massa’s status at the time of his death: D.A. Perini, Bibliographia Augustiniana,vol. II (Florence, 1931), p. 191: “decessit Parisiis die 10 mai anno 1337, cum adhuc essetBaccalaureus et in florida aetate, sepultusque fuit in nostra ecclesia, et in eius sepulchrosubsignata volumina a se edita ….” For the six-year waiting period between reading

274 chapter twelve

Whatever the year or years in which Massa lectured on the Sentences

at Paris, the passages in Vat. lat. 1087 that attack Ockhamist physics andrefer to a group known as the Occamistae belong to questions writtenafter Massa’s opus ordinarium super secundum sententiarum that were addedto that work. We may assume, therefore, that they reveal an academicand intellectual landscape at Paris that probably dates to the mid-1330s,not a decade earlier. Michael de Massa may still be the earliest evidenceof a concern over Ockhamist physics and the Occamistae at Paris, butthat evidence is probably much closer to the events of 1339–1341 thanwas previously thought.

Let me turn now to the witness of Massa and Megenberg on theteaching of the Occamistae and the place of physics in the controversyover Ockham’s thought at Paris.

Michael de Massa, Conrad of Megenberg, and the Occamistae

Apart from the rubric of the December 1340 statute, occurrences ofthe label Occamistae or Parisian references to the teaching of Ockhamand his disciples are tied to positions in natural philosophy, specificallythe limiting of real categories to substances and qualities, and theimplications of this for the understanding of the other categories as wellas time and motion. That is the context in which Michael de Massamentions and attacks the Occamistae. That is also the context for Conradof Megenberg’s critique of Ockham in his Economica.

Taking Massa first, he introduces the opinion of the Occamistae in hisquestions on duration and time. “Some have said that time is the heav-ens themselves, and this is the opinion of the Occamistae.”19 This is oneversion of an error (abusio he calls it) to which he alludes many timesin this section of his work, and this “modern” position on time, just as

the Sentences and promotion to the doctorate, see CUP II, p. 272, #822: “Non obstan-tibus quod a tempore lecture sue libri Sententiarum sex annorum spatium minime sitelapsum, per quorum spatium de consuetudine seu statuto ejusdem studii debent, utdicitur, bacalarii expectare, priusquam ad magisterium in dicta scientia presententur…”; and CUP II, pp. 551–552, #1093: “necnon libros Sententiarum laudabiliter, cumjam sit in secundo anno inclusive post eandem lecturam …. Non obstantibus quod atempore lecture sue libri Sententiarum sex annorum spacium minime sit elapsum, perquorum spatium de consuetudine seu statuto ejusdem studii debent, ut dicitur, bacalariiexpectare, priusquam ad magisterium in dicta scientia presententur ….”

19 Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 88va: “dixerunt aliqui quod tempus est ipsummet caelum, et insententiam istorum incidunt Okanistae.”


its counterpart on motion, is contrasted to the views of Aristotle andthe “ancient” commentators on this issue.20 “Concerning the reality ofmotion there is one error of certain contemporaries that concerns thewhole of physics, both its principles and its conclusions, by which theywish to restore the errors of the ancient philosophers whom Aristotlereproved.”21 Massa’s opponents attempt to sow the seeds of falsehoodamong the truths of physics, and in his graphic language, their argu-ments are more deserving of vomit than of reasoned response.22 Theerror being attacked is the denial of the reality of motion as a res extra

animam, and more broadly, the reduction of real entities to substanceand quality.23 Massa equates the errors of this contemporary groupwith those of Parmenides and Melissus dismissed in the first book ofAristotle’s Physics.24 Although Massa’s principal target is the contempo-

20 Ibid., fol. 71ra: “Sic ergo error istorum tamquam abusio dicatur. Et accedamus adinquisitionem magis utilem de realitate ipsius motus. Nec oportet philosophum volen-tem proficere, confundere realitates eorum et confugere ad proprietates grammaticalesut habeatur fuga de non explicando realitates eorum et difficultates physicas circa ipsas.Immo quantum possumus investigare, 〈tantum〉 debemus explicare de quidditatibusrerum. Moveamus ergo aliquas quaestiones circa realitatem motus more Aristoteliset Commentatoris et aliorum philosophorum, praetermittendo insanias modernoruminnovantium grossitive antiquorum.”

21 Ibid., fol. 70rb: “Et quia de realitate motus est unus error quorundam modernorumqui circa totam Physicam tam quantum ad principia quam etiam quantum ad conclu-siones ipsius conati sunt innovare errores antiquorum philosophorum quos Aristote-les frequentissime reprobat, licet per quasdam fugas grammaticales huiusmodi erroressustineant, quae modicum valent, sicut alias apparebit.” … “Sed iste error est contraAristotelem et Commentatorem.”

22 Ibid.: “Hic est unus errorum quorundam modernorum qui secundum rei ver-itatem conantur diffundere inter vera dicta physicae multa semina falsitatum, et inomnibus tamquam verbosi habent recursum ad verba gramaticalia sophisticae utendoeis. Nec forte melior modus esset nisi nauseare super dictis eorum et dicere: Con-tra verbosos ‘noli contendere verbis’ 〈IITim. 2:14〉, quia secundum veritatem erroresipsorum non sunt cum magna diligentia pertractandi. Et ideo expediamus nos de illoerrore quem asserunt circa realitatem motus, dicunt enim quod motus non est distinc-tus a mobili sed est realiter ipsummet mobile.” The image of nausea was also used byConrad of Megenberg, Werke: Ökonomik III, ed. S. Krüger [MGH Staatsschriften desspäteren Mittelalters III, 5] (Stuttgart, 1984), tr. 1, c. 1, p. 7: “Et deficientes quidemclerici nausigraphi dici poterint eo quod nauseam praetendant in scripturis rerum autnaturae distinctae ascriptarum. Dicitur enim nausigraphus a ‘nausea’ et ‘graphos’ quodest scriptura.”

23 Ibid., fol. 71ra: “Sed constat quod movens non causat mobile nec locum; ergoaliquam realitatem ponam ab utroque distinctam. Alias plus dicetur contra erroremistorum quando tractabo generalem abusionem quam ponunt, videlicet quod in eodemsupposito numquam concurrunt nisi duae distinctae realitates, scilicet substantia etqualitas.”

24 Ibid., fol. 70va: “Qua ratione mobile est idem realiter cum motu quo movetur, per

276 chapter twelve

rary group he labels Occamistae, he also sees their positions in naturalphilosophy to be grounded in the writings of Ockham.25

Unlike the critique of the Occamistae by Massa, whose death in 1337conveniently dates that critique a few years before the events of 1339–1341, Conrad of Megenberg attacked Ockham and his followers byname only in writings that were completed and circulated between 1347and 1354. But that is the only difference. The tone of Megenberg’scritique is as agressive and sarcastic as that of Massa. Moreover, hisexplicit attack is exclusively on Ockham’s interpretation of the praedica-

menta and the implications of Ockham’s position for physics. In his com-mentary on John of Sacrobosco’s Sphaera, written in 1347 in Vienna,Megenberg attacked Ockham’s view that points and lines are not res dis-

tinctae inter se et a corpore.26 The same opposition to Ockham in the area ofphysics can be found in Megenberg’s Economica, whose third book—theone containing his attack on Ockham and his followers—reflects backon his Parisian environment and may contain portions drafted beforehis departure from Paris in 1342.27 There Megenberg attacked Ockhamand his followers for asserting that relations as well as the praedicamenta

of ‘place’, ‘habit’, ‘where’, and ‘when’ are indistinguishable from abso-

te pari ratione inest idem realiter est quiete qua quiescit cessante motu. Sed hoc positosequitur …., et ita redibit error Parmenidis et Mellissi, quem reprobat Aristotelis primoPhysicorum.”

25 Ibid., fol. 135va: “Sed arguitur ulterius pro opinione Okam primo sic: quantitassuccessiva quae est motus vel tempus non est res distincta a mobili cuius est subiective.Patet consequentia quia magis videtur differe successivum et permanens quam per-manens et permanens, ceteris aliis habentibus se uniformiter. … Praeterea, arguo sic:relatio realiter non est res addita fundamento; igitur nec accidens quod est quantitasest res addita fundamento. … Praeterea, actio et passio et quaecumque entia respectivanon dicunt res additas entibus absolutis; ergo nec quantitas est res addita substantiaecorporali, quamvis tamen constituat diversum praedicamentum. … Ad ista tria simulrespondeo ….”

26 Megenberg, Quaestiones in Ioannis de Sacrobosco sphaeram (Munich, Staatsbibl., Clm14687, fol. 74ra), as quoted in Krüger, “Krise der Zeit als Ursache der Pest? Traktat dermortalitate in Alamannia des Konrad von Megenberg” in Festschrift für Hermann Heimpelzum 70. Geburtstag, vol. II (Göttingen, 1972), pp. 839–883, at 849, n. 55: “Sed hic estadvertendum, quod secundum illos, qui negant puncta habere esse reale praeter ani-mam et similiter lineas, sicut facit frater Wilhalmus et sui, illi dicerent, quod secundadescriptio spaerae etiam competeret sibi secundum esse suum ymaginativum et con-ceptibile, sed ego non sum istius opinionis, et habet de hoc videri alibi, scilicet in quaes-tionibus physicis.”

27 For the arguments on which a pre-1342 provenance are based, see Courtenay,“The Reception of Ockham’s Thought at the University of Paris,” p. 63, n. 54. [Seeabove, pp. 147–148.]


lute things, or for asserting that quantity is the same as substance, orthat motion is indistinguishable from permanent things.28

Ockham’s Physics and the Debate over Ockhamism at Paris

Was Ockham’s natural philosophy the primary issue of Ockhamismat Paris in the late 1330s, as the witness of Massa and Megenbergwould suggest, and as the 1982 article maintained, or was it only one ofseveral issues, perhaps not even the major one? More pointedly, if onebelieves the rubric of the arts faculty statute of December 1340 to beauthentic and appropriate, identifying it as a statute against Ockhamisterrors, why is there no mention of any teaching in the area of naturalphilosophy or physical theory—the most irritating aspect of Ockham’sthought for Conrad of Megenberg, who was proctor of the Englishnation at the time the 1340 statute was drafted and approved?

There is no question that hermeneutical theory, or more precisely,the techniques of propositional analysis and the philosophical presup-positions that lay behind them, were important concerns in the facultiesof arts and theology in the late 1330s. These are the principal issues atstake in the arts faculty statute of December 1340. These are also tech-niques against which Conrad of Megenberg railed in his Planctus of 1337and in book III, chapter 12 of his Economica, although without attribut-ing them to Ockham or to his followers.29 Similar views are mentioned

28 Megenberg, Werke: Ökonomik III, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 7: “Aut certe dici potest, quod clerusdeficiens in statu scholastico est hic, qui naturas plurium abnegat rerum, quemad-modum frater Wilhelmus de Occham Anglicus atque sui sequaces, qui tam relationesquam situs, habitus, ubi, quando asserrunt praeter animam res indistinctas a rebusabsolutis atque quantitatem eandem cum substantia rem affirmant; motus etiam inquibus actiones rerum et passiones firmantur, dicunt res indistinctas a permanentibusrebus.” Also cited in edition from Vatican, Pal. lat. 1252 by L. Thorndike, UniversityRecords and Life in the Middle Ages (New York, 1944), pp. 409–433, at 409–410, and Krüger,“Krise de Zeit,”, p. 848, n. 54. Megenberg, Ökonomik III, c. 14, pt. 1, a. 43, pp. 75–76, indiscussing article 141 of those condemned at Paris in 1277: “Unde claudicat frater Wil-helmus de Occham, qui quantitatem eandem rem cum substantia dicit esse, quia tunctranssubstantiata substantia panis etiam quantitas eius in substantiam Christi transsub-stantiaretur; quod tamen non est verum, cum sentiamus figuram et quantitatem panisin sacramento eukaristiae remanere.” Ibid., pt. 6, a. 19, p. 146, in discussing art. 200of the same condemnation: “Ille articulus est contra Wilhelmum de Occham et suossequaces, qui ponunt motum temporis et omnes successiones praeter animam res indis-tinctas a permanentibus rebus.”

29 Conrad of Megenberg, Planctus ecclesiae in Germaniam, ed. R. Scholz [MGH, SsMII, 1] (Leipzig, 1941), whose poetic structure does not lend itself to a precise delineation

278 chapter twelve

and rejected by Jean Buridan in his Summulae, but again without identi-fying the aliqui.30 Summarized briefly, the position under attack in thesedocuments limited supposition to personal supposition and limited themeaning of terms to their literal meaning, de virtute sermonis. Accordingto the proponents of the view under attack, the truth or falsity of propo-sitions could and should be judged by these restrictive principles. Thesepositions were not literary creations of Megenberg, Buridan, and othersagainst which they could place their own views. They were positionsand techniques being employed in the schools of Paris in the late 1330sand were matters of grave concern.

Whether those who employed these techniques of propositional anal-ysis formed a unified group, and if so, whether they considered them-selves or were considered by others to be Occamistae, are questions thathave not yet been definitively answered. Only in the disputed rubric ofthe December 1340 statute are these positions characterized as “Ock-hamist errors”. Megenberg, who rarely missed an opportunity to attackOckham, and as proctor of the English nation in December 1340 wouldhave participated in drafting the arts faculty statute, does not mentioneither Ockham or the Occamistae in connection with these “errors” ingrammar, rhetoric, and logic, which he attacked at length.

of the linguistic literalists; cf. pp. 32, 73. Megenberg’s Economica III, c. 12 (Ökonomik III,p. 47), however, is more explicit: “Gramaticam indignis molestant derisibus affirmantesquod nulla partium orationis constructio est transitiva …. Asserunt enim, quod nichiltranseat, nisi pedes habeat. Quapropter aqua non transit in fluviis secundum eos, nequeventi volant, quoniam alas non habent. Nec poterit dici, quod una pars orationisregat aliam secundum modorum significandi proportiones, quia intellectus humanusomnes partes orationis regit et dirigit. Proprietates enim partium orationis nichil sunt,ut dicunt.” Ibid., p. 48: “Rethoricam eloquentiam adeo sua caecitate postergant, ut necflores verborum nec colores sententiarum capiant, sed flores in pratis crescere et coloresvarios pictores componere et pulchre variare ad instar naturae affirmant. Qualiter hiidulciloquia sacrarum interpretentur scripturarum, quaevis ratio disposita noscit, necest dubium haereses ex hiis innumeras pullulare. Scriptura etenim sacra non semeluterum virginalem virgam vocat et filium Dei inde conceptum florem appellat. Et side virtute sermonis istae orationes falsae sunt, sequitur rhethoricam in pulcherrimisspeciebus transsumptionis nullam ad orationes habere virtutem, et sic rethorica quasievanuit tota.”

30 Jean Buridan, Summulae dialecticae, tractatus IV: De suppositionibus, c. 3, M.E. Reina(ed.), “Giovanni Buridano, ‘Tractatus de suppositionibus’,” Rivista critica di storia della filosofia,12 (1957), 175–208, at 203: “Quidam enim dixerunt illam esse falsam ‘homo est species’de virtute sermonis, quia principalis suppositio est personalis …; dicunt isti 〈quod〉de virtute sermonis veritas vel falsitas debet attendi secundum certam et principalemsuppositionem, ideo secundum suppositionem personalem.” Cited and discussed inJ. Biard, Logique et théorie du signe au XIVe siècle (Paris, 1989), p. 176.


Each sentence in the 1340 statute has across the years undergone adegree of analysis applied only to major political documents, such asMagna carta or Unam sanctam.31 That is not purely a result of curiosity orthe importance of the issues to which the document supposedly speaks.It also reflects the degree of emotional commitment that many schol-ars feel concerning the outcome of this debate. Only recently has thisdetailed analysis moved beyond the attempt to prove or disprove Ock-ham’s presence (or footprints) behind the condemned articles of thestatute. The subtle reading of the language of the statute by Joël Biardand Hans Thijssen, using the viewpoints and discussions in the writingsof Jean Buridan and John Lutterell, has advanced our knowledge con-siderably. Ockham’s direct teaching has receded from center stage tobe replaced by perceptions of an Ockhamist source, albeit distant andoften distorted, behind the positions being condemned in 1340.

Although it still holds the primary attention of some scholars, it isof only minor concern—a way of defending the appropriateness of the1340 rubric—whether the condemned positions parallel or might havehad their origin in Ockham’s teaching. The struggle to fit that partic-ular slipper on the foot of the Venerable Inceptor still goes on, but themost perceptive critics have admitted that it only fits partially, or can bemade to fit only by a very superficial or distorted reading of Ockham.32

It is certainly possible that those who espoused the positions and prac-ticed the techniques under attack in 1340 could have claimed (or couldhave been viewed as having) Ockhamist paternity, whether legitimateor not. But the relation of Ockham to the Parisian Occamistae is not thesignificant question. It is more important to understand the place ofthese positions at Paris in the late 1330s, to identify their adherents ifpossible, and to determine whether the positions condemned in 1340were the principal positions that characterized the Occamistae.

31 E.g., Paqué, Das Pariser Nominalistenstatut. Zur Entstehung des Realitätsbegriffs der neuzeit-lichen Naturwissenschaft (Occam, Buridan und Petrus Hispanus, Nikolaus von Autrecourt und Gregorvon Rimini) (Berlin, 1970); Biard, Logique et théorie, esp. pp. 162–202; Thijssen, “OnceAgain the Ockhamist Statutes,” and Censure and Heresy, pp. 57–72.

32 The best treatment to date is J. Biard, Logique et théorie, pp. 162–202.

280 chapter twelve

Ockhamist ‘Scientia’ and the Teaching of Aristotle and His Commentators

As has been noted, all references to the teaching of the Ockhamistsin Parisian writings apart from the rubric of the 1340 statute concernissues in natural philosophy, particularly those of motion and time.33

The reference to Ockham’s doctrina in the arts faculty statute of Septem-ber 1339 is too vague to identify any particular aspect of his teaching,but the term doctrina does appear more descriptive of philosophical posi-tions than of the techniques of propositional analysis condemned in theDecember 1340 statute.

More informative is the phrase “Aristotle, his Commentator (namelyAverroes), and the ancient commentators” that occurs in Michael deMassa, the arts faculty oath of 1341 against Ockhamist scientia, and inthe letter of pope Clement VI in 1346. First, the “commentatores antiqui”referred to here are not those of the Hellenistic or Roman periodsbut the pre-fourteenth century scholastic commentators, most of themmendicant authors. The list of exemplars for rent c. 1275 from thebooksellers shop (stationarii) belonging to the Sens family—a list thatreveals but does not exhaust the list of texts in demand for study andteaching at Paris—includes as guides to the interpretation of Aristo-tle only the commentaries of Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Mete-

orologica and “Physiognomia” (probably meaning his questions of Aris-totle’s Physics), Simplicius on the Praedicamenta and Perihermenias, andThemistius on De anima.34 By contrast, the list of 1304, probably fromthe same stationarius, no longer offers these texts. In their place wefind mendicant commentaries produced in the second half of the thir-teenth century. Specifically, these were: Thomas on Metaphysics, Physics,

33 It has been established by Stephen Dumont that the marginal identification ofthese issues as Ockhamist in the printed edition of Peter of Aquila’s Quaestiones inquatuor libros sententiarum (Speyer, 1480; reprint Frankfurt, 1967), Lib. I, dist. 23, q. 2,does not occur in the manuscripts but is a late medieval (mis)identification. Thiscorrects information given in Courtenay, “The Reception of Ockham’s Thought atthe University of Paris,” p. 46. Nevertheless, it remains the case that Aquila, around1334, was concerned with these issues.

34 CUP I, pp. 644–645, #530. On the booksellers lists and the Sens family, see R.and M. Rouse, “The Book Trade at the University of Paris, ca. 1250 – ca. 1350,” inLa Production du livre universitaire au moyen age: exemplar et pecia, ed. L. Bataillon, B. Guyot,R. Rouse (Paris, 1988), pp. 41–114. Themistius was still an important source for theinterpretation of De anima in the second decade of the fourteenth century, as revealed bythe opening section of Burley’s Expositio; cf. J.A. Weisheipl, “Repertoriun Mertonense,”201.


De caelo, De anima, De sensu, Ethics, Politics, and summae on the Perihermenias

and the Posterior Analytics; Albert on the old logic, the Prior and Posterior

Analytics, the Elenchi and Topics, Physics, De generatione, De caelo, Meteorolog-

ica, De anima, De sensu, and many others; and Giles of Rome on Physics,De generatione, De anima, the Elenchi, and Posterior Analytics.35 When in the1320s and 1330s newer commentaries arrived on the scene by WalterBurley, William of Ockham, and John Buridan, their validity and valuewas naturally compared with those that had been for more than a gen-eration the accepted and approved commentators within the universitycurriculum, namely those of Thomas, Albert, and Giles. Consequently,in any contrast between the views of one of these recent commenta-tors, such as Ockham, and the older commentators, the latter categorylinked Aristotle and Averroes with Albert, Thomas, and Giles.

Secondly, the contrast between these traditional, accepted commen-tators on the one side, and Ockham and his followers on the other wasnot a particularly meaningful contrast in the context of the debate overthe techniques of propositional analysis or the applications of personalsupposition and literal meaning, de virtute sermonis. Ockham’s reinterpre-tation of the categories and its implications for physics is, however, avery appropriate contrast with these older commentators. Thus whenthe oath of 1341 requires adherence to the two “statutes against theOckhamists,” namely adherence to the “scientia of Aristotle, his Com-mentator, and other commentatores antiqui” and the rejection of the scientia

of Ockham, that oath cannot, as I have argued before, include refer-ence to the statute of December 1340, which has nothing to do with thescientia of Aristotle. It has to refer to statutes for which that contrast ismeaningful, namely a statute or statutes aimed at Ockham’s interpreta-tion of the categories. The phrase “Aristotle, his Commentator, and theolder commentators” is code language for the debate over the praedica-

menta and Ockhamist physics.But is it not still possible that the Occamistae, in the eyes of their

opponents, were known for two different sets of “errors”: errors in theirinterpretation of the categories and its implications for physics, anderrors in their analysis of propositional truth?36 And is it not possiblethat at some level these issues were seen as related?

Two possible connections suggest themselves. At several points in

35 CUP II, pp. 110–111, #642.36 Thijssen, “Once Again the Ockhamist Statutes,” 145, has interpreted the closing

line of the December 1340 statute, “saving in all respects what we have decreed

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his discussion of motion, Massa characterizes the position of his oppo-nents in natural philosophy as grammatical; at least in the way theyillustrated or argued their position.37 The characterization of errors inphysical theory as grammatical errors may provide a link by which thetechniques of propositional analysis rejected in the statute of Decem-ber 1340 and the Ockhamist views on time, motion, place, and relationmight be viewed by contemporary opponents as related. Joël Biard iscertainly correct in noting that the relationship of grammar and logicin the fourteenth century is very different from what it was in the earlytwelfth.38 Yet Megenberg’s characterization of the rejection of the valid-ity of figures of speech in determining propositional truth as “trivial”errors relating to grammar and rhetoric, and Massa’s characterizationof Ockhamist physics as grounded in sophistical grammar does suggestthat some contemporaries traced these “errors” back to grammar andlanguage.

Secondly, behind the techniques of propositional analysis con-demned in the 1340 statute lie issues of the relationship of languageand reality, the object of knowledge, and the certitude of knowledge, allof which ultimately do concern the understanding of physical nature.39

But our ability to see the connection between natural philosophy andlanguage analysis, which was certainly there in the fourteenth century,does not and cannot prove by itself that the 1340 statute was aimed atthe errors of the Ockhamists.

elsewhere as to the doctrine of William called Ockham, which we firmly maintain inevery way,” as a reference to the continuing prohibition of other teachings of Ockhamnot specified in this statute. It may, however, be a simple reminder that the September1339 statute was still in force.

37 Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 70va: “Nunc autem loquendo physice et ad rem et non recur-rendo ad subiectum et probatum propositionis et ad suppositum et ad appositumpropositionis grammaticaliter.” Ibid.: “Sed quies vere et realiter et non solum gram-maticaliter contrariatur motui et tamen non contrariatur mobili, ergo motus et mobilenon sunt eadem realitas.” Ibid.: “… per quascumque connotationes et per quascumquefiguras grammaticales tu conaris salvare quod una res sit quandoque motus et quan-doque quies, et ego per easdem salvabo tibi quod eadem res sit quandoque albedo etquandoque nigredo ….” Ibid.: “Praeterea, quia tu fugis ad propositiones grammaticales….”

38 Biard, Logique et théorie, pp. 14–20, 201–202.39 This is why Paqué employed the term “Naturwissenschaft” in a book that discussed

precisely those issues.


The Role of Buridan in the Events of 1339–1341

Let me finally turn to the crisis and legislation of 1339–1341 and the roleof Jean Buridan in those events. It has now been established, at least tomy satisfaction, that the positions being affirmed in the December 1340statute (i.e., the positions supported by the arts masters who approvedthe statute) coincide with the views of Buridan, even if the positionsunder attack bear only a pale resemblance to Ockham’s views. Butthe fact that Buridan would have been sympathetic to the wording ofthat statute does not, by itself, make him its author or moving spirit.Buridan cannot have been the only arts master at Paris whose viewson supposition, signification, and the virtus sermonis were in accord withthe positions defended in the statute. Nor can he have been the onlyone whose views in physics were indebted to Giles of Rome.40 Buridanhad a substantial reputation in the arts faculty by 1330, and it is difficultto believe that his views would not be given attention and respect in1340. But to see him as the author of the 1340 statute attributes tohim a power he did not have, and is based on a misperception ofthe administrative structure of the university. In matters of doctrine,power in the university lay with the chancellor and the regent mastersin theology, not with the arts faculty.41 In that regard, the legislationof 1340 represents a unique usurpation of internal judicial authority,motivated both by philosophical concerns in the arts faculty and bycontinuing political pressures from Avignon through Benedict XII’ssuspension of university privileges.42 Power within the arts faculty laywith the nations and with the senior masters in each nation, amongwhom the office of proctor and collectively the office of rector rotated.The rector served at the pleasure of the nations, and while his powerto represent the university and arts faculty ad extra was considerable, hispower within the arts faculty was limited. He kept the seal and registersof the faculty; he called and presided at meetings; he could block actionif proper procedure was not followed; he could put a question beforethe assembled body. Most importantly, he was elected only for a three-

40 On the dependence of Buridan’s Physics commentaries on that of Giles, see Maier,Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik, p. 53: “Aegidius ist ja überhaupt für Buridan und seineSchule der eigentliche Vorläufer, der expositor schlechthin, dessen Ansichten oft, und fastimmer mit voller Zustimmung, zitiert werden.”

41 Courtenay, “Preservation and Dissemination of Academic Condemnations”.42 For the political context of these events, see Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockham,

Ockhamists,” 75–79; Kaluza, “Le Statut du 25 septembre 1339”.

284 chapter twelve

month term and was rarely re-elected until several years had passed.Thus while it is true that the initiation of action that led to the statuteof December 1340 might well have begun between October and mid-December, when Buridan was rector, he would only have been oneof several arts masters—Conrad of Megenberg included—who wouldhave had a hand in the statute of December 1340 and any otherlegislation against the opinions of the Occamistae that may have beenundertaken at that time.

In light of the likelihood that Michael de Massa’s additiones to his com-mentary on book II of the Sentences, with their bitter condemnation ofOckhamist physics, was a product of Paris in the 1330s, not the 1320s,the following picture emerges. Ockham’s Summa logicae and his views innatural philosophy were known at Paris in the 1320s but do not appearto have posed a serious problem in the minds of contemporaries. Onlywhen a group arose that used Ockham to undermine traditional phys-ical theory and possibly to create a rather bizarre theory of proposi-tional analysis, was there a crisis that resulted in the prohibition on theuse of Ockham’s works in the arts faculty. Put another way, it was notthe introduction of Ockham’s writings or views that brought a reactionat Paris but rather the appearance of the Occamistae as a group and theapplications they made of Ockham in the areas of physics and proposi-tional analysis.

chapter thirteen

THE QUAESTIONES IN SENTENTIAS OFMICHAEL DE MASSA, OESA. A REDATING*

Michael de Massa’s Quaestiones in Sententias remain one of the richestunedited and, for the most part, unstudied texts of the fourteenth cen-tury. The preliminary ground work was laid by Damasus Trapp almosta half century ago, but very little use has been made of Massa’s worksince then.1 This is due in part to the fact that Massa was rarely cited inmedieval texts and therefore is thought to be a relatively minor figure.A more important inhibiting factor, however, comes from the fact thatTrapp’s attribution to Massa of the anonymous Quaestiones on book II ofthe Sentences contained only in one manuscript, Vat. lat. 1087, has notbeen universally accepted, thus calling into question what texts actuallybelong to Michael de Massa.2 This doubt has been generated not bystylistic differences but by the fact that several medieval authors citedMichael de Massa’s questions on book I of the Sentences, but no oneever cited his questions on book II.3 Moreover, the content of someof the questions in Vat. lat. 1087, especially the physical theories of the

* Originally published in Augustiniana, 45 (1995), 191–207.1 A.D. Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century,” Augustiniana, 6 (1956),

146–274, at 163–175; “Notes on some Manuscripts of the Augustinian Michael de Massa(† 1337),” Augustinianum, 5 (1965), 58–133.

2 For questions on the authenticity of Vat. lat. 1087, see W.J. Courtenay and K.H.Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-German Nation at Paris. 1339–1341,”History of Universities, 2 (1982), 53–96, at 73 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 9,p. 196]; Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham (Leiden, 1988), p. 318.

3 E.g., Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super primum et secundum sententiarum, ed. D. Trappand V. Marcolino, vol. I (Berlin and New York, 1981), p. 85; Alfonsus Vargas of Toledo,In primum sententiarum (Venice, 1490; rpr. 1952), cols. 18, 75, 111, 152, 160, 188, 251, 288,335, 445, 535, 572, 576, 579, 585. Massa’s commentary on Book I survives in severalmanuscripts: Bologna, Collegio di Spagna 40; Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 2214; Florence,Bibl. Naz., conv. soppr. C.VIII.794; and the first eight distinctions in Naples, Bibl. Naz.,VII.C.1. It was also abbreviated twice in the early 15th century, once by Andrea [deBiglia?] OESA of Milan (Oxford, Bodl. Libr., Canonici misc. 276, and the prologue inVatican, Vat. lat. 1084, fols. 144–152), and by Johannes de Marliano OESA of Milanbetween 1410 and 1430 (Bergamo, Bibl. civ. A.3.21; Pavia, Bibl. Univ. 226). On Bigliasee J.C. Schnaubelt, “Andrea Biglia (c. 1394–1435). His Life and Writings,” Augustiniana,43 (1993), 103–160.

286 chapter thirteen

Occamistae, would appear to belong chronologically closer to the debatesthat erupted over Ockham’s thought at Paris at the end of the 1330s,while Massa’s commentary on the Sentences has been dated by Trapp to1325–1326, a decade and a half earlier. Apart from the fact that it com-pletely escaped contemporary notice, the major problem with Massa’sauthorship of the text in Vat. lat. 1087 is this: if a group known as theOccamistae were active at Paris by 1325, and if their views on physicswere already controversial at that time, why is there no other mentionof that group or those issues at Paris between 1326 and 1339?

The following re-examination of the evidence will concentrate onthree points: the authenticity of Vat. lat. 1087 as a work of Michael deMassa; the dating of Massa’s time as sententiarius; and the origin andassembling of the questions included in Vat. lat. 1087.

The Authenticity of Vat. lat. 1087

The first task is, of course, to establish whether the commentary onbook II of the Sentences, found only in Vat. lat. 1087, is unquestionablyby Michael de Massa. Much of the evidence on which Trapp basedhis conclusion that Michael de Massa was the author of this text is,upon examination, suggestive but ultimately inconclusive. The fact thatVat. lat. 1087 was copied by the same scribe and belonged to the sameowner as Bologna Univ. 2214, a manuscript of Massa’s commentary onbook I, does not prove that the same person ‘authored’ both works.4

Moreover, the cross-references in book II to that author’s commentaryon book I are too general or too standard to establish that they referspecifically to Massa’s commentary on book I and to no one else’s.5

4 Both manuscripts are copied in a fourteenth-century textualis hand common touniversity book production. Neither hand could be characterized as Littera Parisiensis.That the hand of the two manuscripts is identical is established by the common forma-tion of letters and by the frequent use of elongated, archaic (Uncial and Caroline) initialletters, especially the ‘N’, ‘A’, and ‘E’. These paleographical characteristics suggest Ital-ian provenance. Both manuscripts were in the possession of Thomas Parentucelli deSarzana (later Pope Nicholas V), who gave Bologna, Univ. 2214 to the Bologna conventof the Augustinian Hermits on behalf of Nicholas Albergati, Cardinal protector of theAugustinians. Vat. lat. 1087 remained in the papal library.

5 For example, Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 58r refers to the author’s earlier treatment on thesubject of theology, a standard topic of many prologues on the Sentences (Trapp, “Notes,”105). The same is true for references to discussions in his Prologue of Auriol’s theory ofexperientiae and notitia abstractiva (Vat. lat. 1087, fols. 183r–183v, 191v, 214v; Trapp, “Notes,”

the quaestiones in sententias of michael de massa 287

At two points, however, the parallels seem closer. The author of thecommentary on book II, as Trapp already noted, refers several times tohis discussions of creatio actio in distinctions five and nine of book I, andalthough there are no verbatim parallel passages that would establishpositive proof, Massa does discuss that issue in distinctions five andnine of book I more than would be true for most authors.6 More telling,however, is a reference in Vat. lat 1087, fol. 182r, that identifies its authoras a member of a religious order (“omnes doctores nostri”) and whichappears to be a reference back to the question contained in Bologna,Univ. 2214, fol. 50v.7

Univ. 2214, fol. 50v Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 182rb

De quarto articulo ubi restat … dictum fuit in prologoinquirendum: Utrum Deus ut libri Sententiarum in quaes–est subiectum habitus theo- tione illa: Utrum subiectumlogici contineatur sub obiecto theologiae contineaturadaequato nostrae potentiae et sub obiecto adaequatosub obiecto adaequato habitus metaphysicae. Tamen omnesmetaphysicae, patet ex dictis doctores nostri.…quid sit tenendum.

A subsequent user of Univ. 2214, believing the text in Vat. lat. 1087to be by the same author as Univ. 2214, noted in the margin of Univ.2214, f. 134va: “De tota materia istius quaestionis quaere in additionibussecundi proprii [sic],” referring to the question “Utrum creatio actiosit realiter idem quod actus aliquis absolutus intrinsecus ipsi Deo”in the Vatican ms, fol. 17v. All references, however, in the text (asopposed to the margin) of Univ. 2214 to matters treated in book II

127, 130), whether the existence of God is per se nota in dist. 2 (Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 179v;Trapp, “Notes,” 69, 127), of the augmentation and diminution of qualities in dist. 17(Vat. lat. 1087, fols. 72v, 91vb; Trapp, “Notes,” 109, 112), on numerical form in dist. 24(Vat. lat. 1087, fols. 69v, 88v; Trapp, “Notes,” 109, 110), of cause and effect in dist. 36(Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 48r; Trapp, “Notes,” 101). In some cases, an earlier treatment of atopic appears in Bologna, Univ. 2214 in a different distinction from the one referred toin Vat. lat. 1087; cf. Trapp, “Notes,” 106, 109.

6 See, for example, Vat lat 1087, fols. 11v, 18r, 19v, 20r, 21r, 21v, 22r, 23r.7 If this particular wording is more common than I think it to be, then the evidence

for attributing Vat. lat. 1087 to Michael de Massa would be weakened. Similar languagedoes occur in other authors in the body of a question, but not as a question title; see,e.g., Scotus, Ordinatio, Prol., pt. 3, q. 3 in Opera omnia, vol. I (Rome, 1950), pp. 98, 114;Ockham, Ordinatio, Prol., q. 9, in Opera theologica, vol. 1 (St. Bonaventure, 1967), pp. 230–231; Thomas of Strasbourg, In primum Sententiarum, Prol., q. 3 (Venice, 1564), fol. 13v.


as well as to books III and IV are in the future tense, describingan as-yet unrealized plan, and are not cross-references to the textof Vat. lat. 1087.8 Similarly, the references in Univ. 2214 to sexterni

extraordinarii are not references to the additiones found in book II, but arereferences to missing sections that were to have been inserted into orattached to book I.9 Thus, despite the fact that some of the evidenceand argumentation of Trapp does not prove his case, the evidenceisolated here makes it almost certain that Vat. lat. 1087 was indeedwritten and edited by the same author as that of the commentary foundin Bologna, Univ. 2214. Moreover, Michael de Massa’s authorship ofthe commentary found in Bologna, Univ. 2214 is beyond question.He is mentioned in the colophon of that manuscript as the author.10

8 E.g., Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 2214, fol. 220vb: “sicut patebit in secundo libro”; Bo-logna, Bibl. Univ. 2214, fol. 223va: “sicut videbitur in secundo libro de gravi moventese”; Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 2214, fol. 226ra: “… pertranseo tum quia pro parte tetigisuperius aliquas de gravioribus difficultatibus circa istam materiam, d. 31, tum etiamquia istam quaestionem et alias duas sequentes intendo diffuse a proposito resumerein secundo libro …”; Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 2214, fol. 226rb: “Respondeo quia materiamistam intendo magis a proposito determinare in secundo libro …”; Bologna, Bibl. Univ.2214, fol. 225va: “licet in hoc falsum dicant sicut videbitur, Deo duce, in tertio libro.”The same holds true for most of the text in the Vatican manuscript. Vat. lat. 1087,fol. 15ra: “Et quia non intendo hic deducere quaestionem sub isto sensu: Utrum depotentia Dei absoluta possit alicui creaturae communicari a deo potentia creandi, namista quaestio locum habebit circa principium quarti libri sententiarum”; Vat. lat. 1087,fol. 17va: “quaere in quaestione illa: Utrum Deus possit quodcumque ens corruptumreparare, libro quarto f.” (the ‘f ’ probably a scribal misreading of ‘s[ententiarum]’); Vat.lat. 1087, fol. 17vb: “de quibus videbitur circa principium quarti libri sententiarum”; Vat.lat. 1087, fol. 66rb: “probam in prima quaestione quarti libri ….” Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 69vb:“Hoc locum habet tractari in quarto libro et de hoc ibi videbitur”; Vat. lat. 1087,fol. 73vb: “Sed de hoc videbitur in quarto libro”; Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 77va: “Sed de istamateria nihil dico ad praesens definitive, dicam de hoc in quarto libro sententiarum”;Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 94ra: “Sic implicaretur difficultas Utrum Deus posset facere motumin instanti. Et de ista difficultate videbitur in quarto loco, et ideo pertranseo” (again,‘loco’ probably a scribal misreading of ‘libro’); Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 94va: “… quia dicuntaliqui quod entitas aevi, de facto contingenter intrinsece successio, potest fieri a Deotota simul. Sed de hoc videbitur in quarto libro”; Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 175va: “Et de istisquattuor quaestionibus agetur in tertio libro in tractatu de partibus imaginis.” Ibid.: “Etde istis quattuor quaestionibus agetur in quarto libro in tractatu de beatitudine.”

9 Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 2214, fol. 198ra: “De aliis vero tribus quaestionibus motis circaistam distinctionem require in sexternis extraordinariis in quibus tetigi succincte punctadifficultatum.”; Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 2214, fol. 210vb: “De ultima quaestione, scilicetUtrum verbum in divinis dicatur notionaliter, dicetur in sexterno extraordinario ubipatet quod dicitur notionaliter.” It should be noted, however, that some questions inthe additiones to book II are also called quaestiones extraordinariae.

10 Bologna, Univ. 2214, fol. 234vb: “Hic liber est scriptum in primum SententiarumMichaelis de Masa ….”


And the numerous citations of the opinions of Michael in the Sentences

commentaries of Gregory of Rimini and Alfonsus Vargas of Toledomentioned above—all references to book I—can be found in this work.

The Date of Michael de Massa’s Parisian Baccalaureate

But did Michael de Massa lecture on the Sentences at Paris in 1325–1326?We have very few biographical details for Michael de Massa. We knowthat he came from Massa in the region of Siena and belonged to theBeccucci family. We also know that he was definitor for his province atthe General Chapter of the Augustinian order at Venice in June 1332,and that he died at Paris in May 1337 while still a bachelor of theologyand was buried with copies of his writings at the Augustinian conventin Paris.11 The dating of his Sentences commentary to 1325–1326 wasproposed by Trapp on two pieces of evidence. Michael’s opinions arecited in a quodlibetal question of the Augustinian, James of Pamiers (deAppamiis),12 thought to have been given early in 1326 on the basis thatsome of the authors cited were active in 1325–1326 and that Durand ofSt. Pourçain is cited in the Quodlibet as bishop of Le Puy, a positionhe ceased to hold in 1326. Secondly, Trapp introduced supportinginformation that Massa in his commentary on book I (Univ. 2214,fol. 130r–130v) referred to Alexander of S. Elpidio as prior general ofthe Augustinian order—an office Alexander ceased to hold in February1326 when he became bishop of Amalfi. Since Massa frequently citeshis fellow Augustinian, Gerard of Siena, who read the Sentences at Parisc. 1322–1323, Massa’s commentary on book I of the Sentences wouldseem to have been written between 1323 and 1326.

The evidence for a terminus ante quem of 1326 based on James ofPamiers and Alexander of S. Elpidio is not as certain as has beenassumed. First, the Quodlibetal question of James of Pamiers, contraryto what has been said of it, was probably not composed in 1325–

11 D.A. Perini, Bibliographia Augustiniana II (Firenze, 1931), pp. 191–192.12 F. Pelster, “Zur ersten Polemik gegen Aureoli: seine Quästionen und sein Correc-

torium Petri Aureoli, das Quodlibet des Jacobus de Apamiis O.E.S.A.,” FS, 15 (1955),30–47, at 44: “Quantum ad primum respondet frater Michael de Massa nostri ordi-nis quod sine aliqua repugnancia essencia et relatio vel quecunque alia, nisi aliudrepugnet, possunt esse vere duo positiva et habere per consequens veram dualitatemsine omni distinccione et non-ydemptitate et negacione unius ab alio, servatis propriispositivis.”


1326, nor was it necessarily held at Paris. The terminus post quem for thequodlibet is 1324, since in one of the questions James refers to a quaestio

that master Francis of Marchia determined at Avignon, and Franciswas lector at the Franciscan convent in Avignon from 1324 to 1328.13

The fact that James also cites the views of Guiral Ot (Gerard Odonis)on the distinction of essence and relation, and the latter completed hislectures on the Sentences in 1326, suggests a terminus post quem of 1325 or1326.14 But 1326 is not the terminus ante quem. The reference to Durand asbishop of Le Puy is found only on the margin of the Leipzig manuscriptof the quodlibet in a later hand that also describes James of Viterboas “doctor inventivus”.15 If a later owner of the Leipzig manuscriptremembered Durand for his eight years as bishop of Le Puy rather thanhis last years as bishop of Meaux, it has no bearing on the terminus ante

quem of James’s Quodlibet. Nor is it the case that those whose opinionsare cited in the Quodlibet need have been present at the disputation. Ifthe Quodlibet was determined at Paris, it must date to around 1332.Only regent masters could determine such disputations at a studium

generale, and James was still a bachelor at the general chapter at Parisin 1329 but was a doctor of theology by the time of the general chapterat Venice in 1332.16

13 Ibid., at 44: “Contra istas raciones arguit magister Franciscus de Ma[rchia] inquadam questione, quam determinavit in curia …”

14 Ibid., at 42: “Ad idem arguunt quidam alii. Rand: Geroldus Odonis”. The datefor Odonis’s Sentences commentary, his earliest known work, is given in the colophonto Madrid, Bibl. Nac., Ms. lat. 65, fol. 203v. James of Pamiers apparently also refers toThomas de Fabiano as “quidam doctor nostri ordinis” (Trapp, “Augustinian Theology,”174), and Fabiano was fulfilling his one- or two-year term as regent when, in May1328, he is so addressed by John XXII (CUP II, pp. 310–312, #875). [Accordingto C. Schabel, “The Sentences Commentary of Gerardus Odonis, OFM,” Bulletin dePhilosophie Médiévale, 46 (2004), 115–168, Odonis previously lectured on the Sentences atToulouse, and his Parisian lectures should be dated 1326–1328 or 1327–1328.]

15 Ibid., at 42: “L Rand in Hand des 14/15 Jahrh. Dominus Durandus episcopusAniciensis de ordine predicatorum et Iacobus de Viterbio doctor inventivus.” SeeLeipzig, Univ. Bibl., ms 529, fol. 102. There were at least two Augustinian theologiansby the name of James of Viterbo. The reference is undoubtedly to the famous successorof Giles of Rome at the end of the thirteenth century, not the bachelor of theology whoread the Sentences in 1328–1329 (CUP II, pp. 310–312, #875).

16 D. Trapp, “J. von Pamiers,” Lexikon für Theologie and Kirche, V (1960), col. 835; seealso: “Antiquiores quae extant definitiones capitulorum generalium Ordinis,” AnalectaAugustiniana, 4 (1911–1912), 81 and 108. Formed bachelors could determine Quodlibeticdisputations at a lesser studium of the order, but if that is the context of Pamiers’sQuodlibet, it would still be dated closer to 1330.


What is certain is that at the time James of Pamiers wrote his quodli-betic question, Michael de Massa’s views had come to his attention.And apart from the approximate date of Pamiers’s regency, the onlysecure terminus ante quem for his Quodlibet is that provided by AlfonsusVargas of Toledo’s citation of Pamiers’s Quaestiones quodlibetales et ordinar-

iae in the former’s Super primum Sententiarum given at Paris in 1344–1345.17

Trapp’s other piece of evidence for the 1325–1326 date is more sub-stantive but also more complicated. Toward the beginning of questionthree of distinction eight on the problem of divine attributes, Michaelintroduces in succession the opinions of Henry of Ghent, ThomasAquinas, “our father general” (meaning the prior general of the Augus-tinian order at that time), followed by Godfrey of Fontaines. These cita-tions, all of which mention specifically (although not always correctly)the title and question of each author’s work being cited, are indicatedin the margin of Bologna, Univ. 2214, fol. 130ra, in the same scribalhand as “O.H.”, “O.T.”, “O.G.”, and “O.Goth”, respectively. Threecolumns later Michael refers to “magister Alexander,” meaning Alexan-der of S. Elpidio, who is frequently cited in Michael’s commentary onbook I as “magister Alexander” or occasionally “frater Alexander”.The marginal reference to “O.G.” opposite the textual identificationof “a certain venerable doctor, namely our father general in his firstQuodlibet, q. 2” could stand for “opinio Generalis,” but it could alsostand for the first name of the authority cited, as in every other case inthe margins of this manuscript, except for Scotus, who is cited by lastname or as Johannes Scotus.18 If Alexander was the prior general inquestion, it is surprising that the marginal abbreviation, which Massahimself created, was not “O.A.” or “O.Alex,” just as was done laterwhen “op. mgri. Alex.” in the margin identifies “op. alterius doctor”in the text. Consequently, the question needs to be explored whetherthe general referred to by Massa was Alexander of S. Elpidio or, possi-bly, William of Cremona (i.e., “O[pinio] G[uillelmi]”), who became theAugustinian general immediately after Alexander in 1326 and remainedso until his death in 1342.

17 J. Kürzinger, Alfonsus Vargas Toletanus und seine theologische Einleitungslehre, BGPTM,XXII, 5–6 (Münster i.W., 1930), pp. 84–87.

18 It should be noted that the scribe was not simply transferring to the margin whathe read in the text. As with many fourteenth-century Sentences commentaries, thesemarginal notes in Michael de Massa’s commentary often identify authors (usually morecontemporary authors) who are not referred to in the text by name (e.g., “quidam,”“alii,” “quidam alius doctor”).


The position of Alexander (de Marchia) of S. Elpidio on the divineattributes was cited and discussed by at least two authors apart fromMichael de Massa. As described by Gerard of Siena and Thomas ofStrasbourg, Alexander agreed with Henry of Ghent that the distinctionof attributes in God was a distinction of reason “ad intra” that didnot entail any comparison in the created order, “ad extra”. Alexandermodified Henry’s position by insisting that the distinction of attributes“ad intra” was not based on any internal comparison or negotiative actbut by a simple awareness or intuition.19 Gerard of Siena added thefurther information that Alexander’s position was put forward in thesecond question of his first Quodlibet.20

In addition to Michael de Massa’s reference to the position of theAugustinian general on the divine attributes, Michael also refers threecolumns later to the position of Alexander of S. Elpidio on the sameissue as if the position of Alexander is being introduced for the firsttime. His description of Alexander’s position at this point coincides withthe position attributed to Alexander by Gerard of Siena and Thomasof Strasbourg.21 When that position is compared to the position ofthe Augustinian general described earlier by Massa, the positions are

19 Gerard of Siena, In primum Sententiarum, dist. 2, q. 2, a. 3 (Chicago, Univ. Libr.ms 22, fol. 38rb): “Ideo sit alius modus dicendi quem ponit magister Alexander [marg.:Opinio magistri Alexandri de Marchia] 1 suo quodlibet, q. 2, dicens quod distinctioattributorum sumitur per intellectum divinum ad intra, non quod per actum nego-tiativum, sicut probat praefata opinio, sed per simplicem intuitum. … Talis distinctiorationis in essentia divina est prior distinctione reali in creaturis; ergo distinctio attrib-utorum in essentia divina non sumitur ex creaturis; et per consequens ab intra. …Ergo per simplicem intuitum illam distinctionem reducit in actum sine omni compa-ratione ad extra.” Thomas de Strasbourg, Commentaria in IV Libros Sententiarum, I, d. 6,a. 3 (Venice, 1564), p. 45: “Dicit ergo ille doctor [marg.: Alexander ordinis S. Augus-tini], quod rationes attributales sunt potentia distinguibiles in essentia divina, et per hocdiffert ab aliis de formalitatibus, qui dicunt, quod sint actu formaliter distinctae. Perhoc autem, quod dicit intellectum divinum ea distinguere ab intra, differt ab illis, quiponunt talem distinctionem fieri solum in ordine ad creaturas. Et addit tertio, quodtalis distinctio fiat per simplicem intuitum, et non per intellectum comparante divinamessentiam sub ratione unius attributi ad seipsam sub ratione alterius attributi: quia eoipso, quod potentialiter sunt in divina essentia quantum ad istam distinctionem ratio-nis per simplicem intuitum intellectus perfecte essentiam cognoscentis, talis distinctioreducitur in actum, et per hoc differt ab illis, quorum rationes adduxi proxime anteistum.”

20 This information is contained in the Chicago manuscript (see previous note), inPadua, Bibl. Univ., ms 2229, and probably in other manuscripts of Gerard as well.

21 Michael de Massa, In primum Sententiarum, d. 8, q. 3 (Bologna, Univ. 2214, fol.130vb): “Est autem alia opinio alterius doctoris [marg.: op〈inio〉 mag〈ist〉ri Alex〈andri〉]quae dicit quod attributa divina distinguuntur secundum rationem absque omni habi-


similar but not identical. The general’s position, as described by Massa,does reject any internal comparative ratiocination and does employthe distinctive “Alexandrine?” phrase “per simplicem intuitum”, but inplace of a distinction “secundum rationem,” Massa attributes to theAugustinian general a distinction “actualiter et completive”—languagethat does not appear in any of the three descriptions of Alexander’sposition, but which Massa did apply in his descriptions of the positionsof Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines.22

On the basis of these passages, it is difficult to determine whetherthese citations in Michael to the opinion of the Augustinian generaland to Alexander represent one and the same person or two differentauthors. The presence of the phrase “per simplicem intuitum” in bothpassages does not solve the problem, since William of Cremona, writ-ing after Alexander, might well have adopted that part of Alexander’sargument. Yet the matter can be brought nearer to a solution. In 1932Victorin Doucet described a Naples manuscript (Bibl. Naz. VII.C.6)that contained, among other works, the first three questions from ananonymous Quodlibet (fols. 7ra–10rb) which, two years later, he identi-fied as belonging to Alexander of S. Elpidio on the basis of the cita-tion in Gerard of Siena mentioned above.23 Now that we have three

tudine ad extra, et hoc per divinum intellectum non quidem collationum vel negotio-rum, sed attingentem simplici intuitu essentiam divinam.”

22 Ibid., fol. 130ra: “… opinio cuiusdam venerabilis doctoris, scilicet patris nostrigeneralis, quam ipse ponit primo suo quodlibeto, q. 2, ubi ipsi dicit quod attributadivina distinguuntur actualiter et completive, et fiunt completive plura per actumintelligendi divinum absque omni collatione in composita ad intra vel ad extra, sedper simplicem intuitum intellectus divini.” Compare this with Massa’s description ofHenry of Ghent’s position, fol. 130ra: “quod attributa divina distinguantur non quidemactualiter et completive ante omnem actum cuiuscumque intellectus, sed actualiter etcompletive distinguantur per actum intellectus divini, non quidem actum simplicemintuitive transeuntem prius quidem super realem distinctionem divinarum personarumad intra ….” and Massa’s description of Godfrey of Fontaines’s position, fol. 130ra:“quod attributa divina distinguuntur actualiter et completive ….” How this is achieveddiffers between Henry and Godfrey. For a discussion of the last two authors’s positionson the divine attributes, see J.F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines(Washington, 1981), pp. 115–123.

23 V. Doucet, in his review of Glorieux’s Repertoire des Maitres en Théologie de Paris, inAFH, 27 (1934), 587: “Le Quodlibet est cité par Gérard de Sienne, I Sent.: Est aliusmodus dicendi quem ponit magister Alexander [en marge: opinio mag. Alexandri de Marchia] 1°suo quodlibet, q. 2, dicens quod distinctio attributorum sumitur per intellectum divinum ad intra,non quod per actum negotiativum … sed per simplicem intuitum (Padoue, Bibl. Univ. 2229,f. 44a). Or cette citation correspond exactement et pour tous les points, au Quodlibetanonyme de MS. de Naples, Nat. VII. C. 6 (f. 7a–10b), que nous avons decrit dansl’AFH XXV, 1932, 520. II n’y a pas de doute, nous avons là un des quodlibets


descriptions of Alexander’s position and supporting argumentation aswell as Massa’s description of the position of the Augustinian general,the Naples manuscript needs to be rechecked. William of Cremona alsoauthored several quodlibets. Two questions from his third quodlibetappear in that same Naples manuscript, and the first question of thequodlibets attributed to Alexander by Doucet refers to a question in itsauthor’s third quodlibet.24 In the form in which we have it, the lattertext was edited and probably reorganized after later quodlibets werecompleted. In light of that, it is not impossible that two authors, closelyrelated in time, place, and religious order, might arrange their questionsin a similar topical sequence.

There is one other piece of evidence, however, noted but not utilizedby Trapp, that does support an early date for the version of Massa’scommentary on book I contained in Bologna, Univ. 2214. Throughoutthat manuscript Aquinas is referred to as “frater Thomas,” never “sanc-tus Thomas,” suggesting a date of composition before (or at least notlong after) Thomas’s canonization in July 1323.25 The other Bolognesemanuscript of Massa’s In primum sententiarum, Collegio di Spagna Ms40, changes almost all these references to “sanctus Thomas”. Such achange might seem natural for any scribe copying a text after 1324, butas was noted above, Univ. 2214 itself was copied by the same scribe asVat. lat. 1087, which refers to Aquinas as “sanctus Thomas”. Assumingthat these last two manuscripts were copied after 1324, probably after

d’Alexandre de Sant’Elpidio.” P. Glorieux, La littérature quodlibétique, vol. II (Paris, 1935),p. 302. Question 2: “Utrum distinctio attributorum in essentia divina sumatur percomparationem ad extra vel ad intra.” Only the first three-and-a-half questions of thisanonymous Quodlibet appear in the manuscript (fols. 7ra–10rb), but there is a list inthe prologue of all fifteen questions. In the first question the author refers to his thirdquodlibet, which means that his regency lasted at least two years (i.e., two quodlibetsper year). Glorieux refers to the numbering of the questions as a “particularité” which,added to some other “formules de style,” initially suggested to him the authorshipof Henry of Friemar, OESA or some other Austin Friar. The contents of the fullmanuscript are described in V. Doucet, “De Cod. Neapolitano. VII.C.6,” AFH, 25(1932), 518–524.

24 Naples, Bibl. Naz., VII.C.6, fols. 72vb–73va; cf. Glorieux, La littérature quodlibétiqueII, p. 116. The questions are listed as six and seven in sequence in this Quodlibet, but inreverse order in the manuscript, which indicates they were known by numbers. It mayalso be that the two questions from “magister Guillelmus” in the Naples manuscript,fols. 10va–14rb, that follows immediately upon the anonymous quodlibetic questions, arealso by William of Cremona.

25 The fact that in Bologna, Univ. 2214 Scotus is cited as “Johannes Scotus” alsosuggests an early date.


the death of Massa, it is surprising that the scribe remained faithful tohis exemplar of book I in this regard and did not correct Thomas’stitle. Indeed, the change from “frater Thomas” to “sanctus Thomas” inthe two Bolognese manuscripts may not be a result of scribal correctionbut the result of a later redaction. The text of the Collegio di Spagnamanuscript differs at a number of points from that found in Univ. 2214and also has passages not found in the latter manuscript.26 But werethose changes introduced when Massa revised his text after reading theSentences at Paris, or does the text found in Univ. 2214 represent a pre-Parisian version?

Trapp was ultimately convinced that 1325–1326 was the date forMassa’s Parisian baccalaureate, but at various points in his 1956 articlehe also referred to Massa’s commentary on the Sentences as a lectura

lectoris, a series of lectures or questions written during the period ofthe lectorate, that is the period between the five years initial studyin theology and the point at which, if one were fortunate, one waschosen to return to Paris as sententiarius.27 During these years as lector,which could last well over a decade, one taught in the various studia ofthe province. Gregory of Rimini, for example, after his years of initialstudy at Paris, lectured for twelve years in various studia in northernItaly (specifically Bologna, Padua, and Perugia) before being appointedto read the Sentences at Paris.28 Similarly, the period of lectorate andbaccalaureate for Dionysius de Mutina was fourteen years inclusive.29

The Sentences of Peter Lombard was one of the major texts on whichlectures would be needed in the provincial studia, and lectors no doubtfulfilled that task out of curricular need as well as preparation for theirtime as sententiarius in a studium generale. This was not a peculiarity ofthe Augustinian educational system. It became common in the four-teenth century for prospective bachelors to read the Sentences at a lesserstudium of the order before advancing to the level of bachelor at Paris.

26 Compare, for example, Bologna, Univ. 2214, fol. 47r and Bologna, Collegio diSpagna 40, fol. 38v; Univ., fol. 50r–50v, and Spagna, fols. 43v–44r; Univ., fol. 55v, andSpagna, fol. 52r–52v.

27 E. Ypma, La formation des professeurs chez les ermites de Saint Augustin de 1256 à 1354(Paris, 1956), pp. 42–45.

28 CUP II, p. 557, #1097. For a re-examination of these biographical details, seeV. Marcolino, “Einleitung,” in Gregorius Ariminensis OESA Lectura Super Primum etSecundum Sententiarum, ed. A.D. Trapp and V. Marcolino, Bd. 1 (Berlin, 1981), pp. xi–xvii.

29 CUP II, p. 404, #952: “qui tam in Parisiensi quam in aliis studiis generalibusquatuordecim annis legerat et Sententias in dicto studio Parisiensi compleverat.…”


Pre-university lectures on the Sentences have survived for Peter Auriol,Walter Chatton, Adam Wodeham, and the Augustinian John of Bur-gos.30

It has commonly been assumed that pre-university lectures on theSentences were written within two or three years of becoming a univer-sity sententiarius. But this impression is derived from the fact that allbachelors usually spent the year before their first sentential lecture inpreparation for that task, and some of the pre-university lectures citedabove, most of them Franciscan, can be placed in the years immediatelypreceding the official university lectures. But no other mendicant orderhad as long a period of pre-baccalaureate teaching as the Augustini-ans, and the examination and appointment of lectors within the Augus-tinian order credentialed them to lecture on any of the required textsof the theological program. Thus, if the text of Bologna, Univ. 2214 isa lectura lectoris, as Trapp suspected, then the reference to the opinionof the prior general on divine attributes is just as much a part of thepre-university lectures as referring to Aquinas as “frater Thomas”. Andin light of the fact that the lectorate credentialed one to lecture on anyof the required texts, there is no way of determining at what point inthe lectorate one might begin to compose lectures on the Sentences.

There is no easy way to determine whether the version of Massa’sIn primum sententiarum belongs to his baccalaureate or to his pre-bacca-laureate years as lector, and if the latter, when during his lectorate theymight have been written. Yet the fact that Michael de Massa died atParis while relatively young and still a bachelor of theology31—at leasttwelve years after the text of his commentary on Book I in Univ. 2214—I am inclined to view that text as a pre-Parisian, pre-baccalaureate

30 K.H. Tachau, “French Theology in the mid-fourteenth century,” AHDLMA, 51(1984), 41–80, at 55–59. John of Burgos read the Sentences at Amiens five years beforehe revised them for presentation at Paris as sententiarius. James of Pamiers’s citation ofMassa’s opinions does not change this picture, since Pamier’s Quodlibet, as we haveseen, could date to the mid-to-late 1330s, after Massa’s baccalaureate. Moreover, citinganother scholar before the latter’s baccalaureate, while unusual, is not unheard of. Wal-ter Chatton cited and discussed the opinions of one of his own precocious theologicalstudents, namely Adam Wodeham, some eight or ten years before Wodeham becamesententiarius at Oxford; see G. Gál, introduction to Ockham, Summa logicae, pp. 53*–54*.[Gerard Odonis lectured on the Sentences at Toulouse before lecturing at Paris, and it ispossible that Durand of St. Pourçain also gave his first lectures at a provincial studium.]

31 Perini, Bibliographia Augustiniana II, p. 191: “decessit Parisiis die 10 mai anno 1337,cum adhuc esset Baccalaureus et in florida aetate, sepultusque fuit in nostra ecclesia, etin eius sepulchro subsignata volumina a se edita ….”


version of the commentary he later gave as sententiarius at the GrandsAugustins convent in Paris. That latter event need not have occurredbefore he was appointed definitor for his province at the Venice chapterin 1332. Gregory of Rimini, while lector at the convent of Bologna in1338 was appointed definitor for that province at the General Chapterin Siena, four years before he became sententiarius at Paris.32 In short,Massa’s reading of the Sentences at Paris must have occurred after that ofGerard of Siena, c. 1323, and before Massa’s death in 1337, but none ofthe evidence described above requires us to date his Parisian lectura atany particular point within that range.

Trapp was inclined to date Massa’s baccalaureate early, in 1325–1326, and to explain his failure to advance to the doctorate on groundsof his being blocked or delayed for ideological reasons, namely that hissupposed adherence to the “ultra-Aegidians” placed him out of favorduring the generalship of William of Cremona.33 But if one dates hisbaccalaureate later, in the late 1320s or early 1330s, then what appearsto be a delay in promotion to the magisterium becomes more under-standable. Parisian statutes in the 1320s and 1330s required a mini-mum six-year period between reading the Sentences and promotion tothe magisterium, during which time the formed bachelor was expectedto be in residence at Paris and to participate in disputations.34 Sincethere is no evidence that Massa sought or obtained a papal exemp-tion from this rule (i.e., promotion ex gratia), as many others did duringthe pontificate of John XXII, we may assume that the rule applied tohim. The normal waiting period may have been delayed even more bypapal intervention in the process of appointments to read the Sentences

and promotion to the magisterium at Paris. Since only one bachelor ina religious order could read the Sentences in any one academic year, and

32 Marcolino, “Einleitung,” p. xii.33 Trapp, “Augustinian Theology,” 170–173.34 In a letter of 1323 requesting promotion ex gratia of Pierre Roger (later Clement

VI), John XXII referred to the six-year rule, CUP II, p. 272, #822: “Non obstantibusquod a tempore lecture sue libri Sententiarum sex annorum spatium minime sit elap-sum, per quorum spatium de consuetudine seu statuto ejusdem studii debent, ut dici-tur, bacalarii expectare, priusquam ad magisterium in dicta scientia presententur ….”And in a similar letter in 1344 from Clement VI on behalf of Bertaud of St. Denis,CUP II, pp. 551–552, #1093: “necnon libros Sententiarum laudabiliter, cum jam sit insecundo anno inclusive post eandem lecturam …. Non obstantibus quod a temporelecture sue libri Sententiarum sex annorum spacium minime sit elapsum, per quo-rum spatium de consuetudine seu statuto ejusdem studii debent, ut dicitur, bacalariiexpectare, priusquam ad magisterium in dicta scientia presententur ….”


since promotion to the magisterium by any means entailed an obliga-tion of regency (at least for the better part of an academic year) andresidency (part of which could be fulfilled as magister non regens), everypapal insertion into the sequence of candidates established by the gen-eral chapter of the order meant a delay in the advancement of some-one else. Despite the attempts of the Augustinian order to ensure thatpromotions per litteram or per bullam did not disadvantage those seekingpromotion rigorose, these interventions probably did cause delays. Therecords of the Augustinian general chapters during the later years ofJohn’s pontificate attest to the tensions caused by papal intervention.And it was probably to accommodate the needs of candidates in thereligious orders that during the 1332–1334 period John attempted tobend Parisian practice by pressuring the chancellor to allow designatedmendicants to read the Sentences during the summer vacation, begin-ning as soon as the one reading during the academic year could bepersuaded to “complete” his lectures.

Neither the six-year rule nor the interposing of other candidates canexplain a delay of more than twelve years between the baccalaureateand Massa’s status as bachelor at the time of his death. We are probablylooking, therefore, at a textual legacy that includes a pre-Parisian Lectura

lectoris (c. 1324 sqq.), a Parisian Lectura baccalaurii (c. 1332 in light ofhis academic rank and place of residence at the time of his death in1337), and possibly questions that derive from a later source or revision(c. 1333–1337). It is to this last problem that I now turn.

The Content of Vat. lat. 1087

Unlike Massa’s In primum sententiarum, his commentary on book II ofthe Sentences in Vat. lat. 1087 contains questions derived from differentacademic occasions or periods in the editorial process. Portions of thatmanuscript are referred to as his Lectura ordinaria or Opus ordinarium,35

35 The term lectura ordinaria appears only once in Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 25va (“quia detali entitate fuit quaestio a proposito in lectura ordinaria super secundum sententiarumquaestione quinta in universo”) and refers to q. 5 on fol. 34ra, which, although the firstquestion in that section, is the fifth question of those designated as opus ordinarium, thefirst four appearing on fols. 1ra–17vb. The term opus ordinarium appears on fol. 52rb (“Sedantecedens fuit probatum in opere ordinario circa principium secundi sententiarumquaestione illa: Utrum Deus possit aliquid de novo creare”); fol. 53va (“quaere eas intertia difficultate principalis quaestionis super secundum sententiarum in opere ordi-


while other sections are designated as additiones and, for two questions,quaestiones extraordinariae.36 Trapp discussed these different text units atsome length, believing that Massa intentionally constructed his ques-tions on the Sentences, even the pre-Parisian version, as distinct text units.Trapp viewed the term opus ordinarium as Massa’s title for his Lectura lec-

toris, composed before he became a bachelor at Paris. During the yearbefore his year or biennium as Parisian sententiarius, and probably con-tinuing while he read at Paris, Massa supposedly wrote a series of newquestions that became his additiones. According to Trapp, the phrasessexterni extraordinarii and quaestiones extraordinariae are simply other expres-sions for these additiones. The implication of this view is that all textunits would have been produced either before Massa became a bache-lor of theology or during his year or years as sententiarius. At one point,however, Trapp suggested that some of the additional questions mightderive from quaestiones disputatae.37

Another view is, however, possible. Nowhere does Massa use thephrase Lectura lectoris. He does use the expressions Lectura ordinaria andopus ordinarium. In light of the fact that in university usage ordinatio

was the term applied to the version of a work revised and edited forpublication, it is unlikely that Massa would use such an expression torefer to pre-baccalaureate questions on the Sentences. It is more likelythat Massa meant by that title either his first revised version of hissentential questions from his Parisian baccalaureate, or at least the

nario”); fol. 61rb (“expositum fuit circa principium primae quaestionis super secundumsententiarum in opere ordinario”); fol. 68va (“et istam difficultatem tractabo in opereordinario in materia de angelis”—a section that never got added); fol. 91vb (“multi-pliciter probavi quaestione prima difficultate secunda in opere ordinario super secundolibro sententiarum”); fol. 94vb (“nec tamen difficultatem istam intendo pertractare nuncad praesens, sed pertractabo in materia de angelis in opere ordinario super secundumlibrum sententiarum”—again, in the future tense). All these cross-references, includingthe reference to the lectura ordinaria, are found in the additiones, not in the opus ordinariumitself.

36 The term additiones appears in Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 51vb as a cross-reference from asection of the opus ordinarium to a question in the additiones: “in additionibus, quaestioneprima: Utrum creatio actio sit actus aliquis absolutus intrinsecus ipsi Deo”. But thattitle also occurs internally within the additiones; e.g. fol. 91rb: “quia tamen de istamateria tractavi a materia [sic] et diffuse superius in quaestione 9 in additionibus:Utrum videlicet Deus possit facere creaturam quae duret per unicum instans tantum”;fol. 131vb: “Item superius in principio additionum in materia de creatione in quaestioneilla: Utrum ….”. Within the sequence of additional questions, the two on duration arecalled quaestiones extraordinariae.

37 Trapp, “Notes,” 111.


“official” version presented as sententiarius. It is important to note inthis regard that Massa never refers to his commentary on book I as hisopus ordinarium. Only a substantial portion of his questions on book IIare referred to in that manner. And that portion dates after 1326, sinceAlexander of S. Elpidio is referred to as “reverendus magister bonaememoriae”.38

At the same time, both Massa’s commentaries on books I and II referto text units separate from the main body of those works. In the case ofbook I, these additional text units are referred to as sexterni extraordinarii,presumably meaning quires containing one or more questions that werenot part of the original text.39 One of these references is to an additionalquestion on the Trinity that was probably to have been part of book I.The other is a reference to questions on motion that may be referringto material eventually included in book II.

The quaestiones extraordinariae that survive are found only in book II,belong together with the additiones, and may well be chronologically thelast questions written, as the name suggests. Whether or not these laterquestions derive from a different academic context, such as questionson Aristotle’s Physics, they were written after the initial questions onbook II of the Sentences.40 Although in the form in which they survivethey were designed or redesigned as additional questions on the Sen-

tences, it is unclear whether their fusion into one volume was Massa’splan or was an assembly that took place after his death. All cross-references to the additiones that specify a location within the same vol-ume, as indicated by superius, are internal to the additiones and do notindicate whether the additiones were to be bound in with the opus ordinar-

38 Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 97vb (at the beginning of questions that belong to the opusordinarium). Alexander died in 1326.

39 Bologna, Univ. 2214, fol. 198ra: “De aliis vero tribus quaestionibus motis circaistam distinctionem require in sexternis extraordinariis in quibus succincte tetigi punctadifficultatum.” Ibid., fol. 210vb and Bologna, Collegio di Spagna 40, fol. 73vb: “De ultimaquaestione, scilicet: Utrum verbum in divinis dicatur notionaliter, dicetur in sexternoextraordinario, ubi patet quod dicitur notionaliter.”

40 It was not unusual for mendicants in the period between the lectures on theSentences and promotion to the doctorate to lecture on Aristotle. Ockham’s questionson Aristotle’s Physics belong to this period in his career, as do those of Hugolino ofOrvieto; cf. W. Eckermann, Der Physikkommentar Hugolins von Orvieto OESA (Berlin, 1972).There are other instances of fourteenth-century authors, for example Walter Chatton,incorporating into their Sentences commentaries questions derived from disputations; cf.S.F. Brown, “Walter Chatton’s ‘Lectura’ and William of Ockham’s ‘Quaestiones InLibros Physicorum Aristotelis’,” in Essays Honoring Allan B. Wolter, ed. W.A. Frank andG.J. Etzkorn (St. Bonaventure, 1985), 81–115, at 93.


ium. In fact, at one point in the additiones (Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 54vb), thosequestions are described as a separate work: “sicut dictum fuit superius,quaestione 1 et quaestione 3 istius operis in principio,” presumably todistinguish it from his opus ordinarium. It should also be noted that thefirst group of additional questions (fols. 17v–34v) has many internal ref-erences to itself as being in different parts of one “sextern”. But at thetime the additional questions were being edited, the opus ordinarium wasalso undergoing revision, not all of which found its way into the Vati-can manuscript. Twice Massa referred to his questions on angels (in thefuture tense!) that were to have been part of the opus ordinarium.

The questions that concentrate on issues in physics, primarily ques-tions on motion and time, all belong to the additiones and were writtenafter the sentential questions on book II. It is in these questions thatwe find the references to the Occamistae and to Ockhamist physics. Theinclusion or fusion of these questions within the body of Massa’s In

secundum sententiarum, which seems to have been an incomplete processat the time of his death and was left, as Trapp suggested, to a laterscribe or editor, makes it likely that these later questions belong to thelast years of Massa’s life. Dating both the editorial process as well asMassa’s questions in additionibus to the 1330s helps explain why, apartfrom the undatable reference to Massa by James of Pamiers, Massa’s In

primum sententiarum is not cited by other authors until Gregory of Rim-ini did so in 1342, and why Massa’s In secundum sententiarum, in a stateof revision at the time of his death, was never cited by anyone. It alsoexplains why the content of Massa’s In secundum sententiarum, especiallythe sections entitled by Massa himself as the additiones, reflect contro-versies that, according to all other evidence, became a concern at Parisin the mid-to-late 1330s. Michael de Massa may still be the earliest evi-dence of those concerns, but that evidence appears to be much closerto the events of 1339–1341 than previously thought.

chapter fourteen

CONRAD OF MEGENBERG: THE PARISIAN YEARS*

Conrad of Megenberg was one of the most important and produc-tive German scholars in the generation before Henry of Langenstein,Henry Totting of Oyta, and Marsilius of Inghen, and like the latterthree secular masters, he received much of his higher education atParis. Yet since almost all of Conrad’s writings postdate his departurefrom Paris in 1342, much that has been written about him concerns hispost-Parisian career at Vienna and Regensburg. The following studyattempts to present a more detailed picture of the Parisian phase ofConrad’s career. When, in his Ökonomica, Conrad described the idealcourse of study, he looked back to Paris as the model university, the set-ting of true learning.1 Yet, at the same time his examples of false teach-ing, particularly in the area of the seven liberal arts, were also derived inlarge measure from his experiences in Paris.2 It would not be an exag-geration, therefore, to say that Paris had a fundamental shaping effectnot only on Conrad’s educational formation but on his philosophicalviews as well.

The details of Conrad’s academic career are largely derived froman autobiographical passage in his Ökonomica in which he refers to hisearly studies and teaching at Erfurt, followed by his years at Paris.3 Astraditionally interpreted, Conrad went to Erfurt at the age of seven in

* Originally published in Vivarium, 35 (1997), 102–124.1 Conrad of Megenberg, Ökonomica, III, tr. 1, c. 20, ed. Sabina Krüger, MGH,

Staatsschriften des späteren Mittelalters, III, 5 (Stuttgart, 1984), III, pp. 196–199.2 Megenberg, Planctus ecclesiae, ed. R. Scholz, MGH, Staatsschriften des späteren

Mittelalters, II, 1 (Leipzig, 1941), p. 32; Ökonomica III, tr. 1, ch. 12.3 Megenberg, Ökonomica, III, tr. 1, c. 21; III, pp. 200–201: “Cumque minoris etatis

extra limina paterna me exulare fecerat teneritas, in Erfordiam me transtuleram etsubito me ad se sociaverat pietas sociorum. Quibus prope septennis cellariis prefuirepeticionibus, quousque fama clarescente ad cathedram publice lecture me sustuliteiusdem studii magistratus, quam, ut noscit fama lativola, scolasticis actibus quasiannuus venerabiliter excolui. Et mox Parisius me receperam, ubi divini atque sanc-tissimi viri beati Bernhardi ordinis fratres felicissimi providerant michi de necessariisatque in lectorem philosophie me susceperant, quousque supradicto receperam pro-cessu lauream doctoratus et octennuus sedis gubernator dilectus universitatis filiushonorabar.”

304 chapter fourteen

1316, moved to Paris in or before 1334, and left Paris for Vienna in1342.4 By the time she edited the third book of the Ökonomica, Krügersuspected that “septennis,” like “annuus” and “octenuus” used later in thepassage cited above in note 3, might refer to a period of time, inthis case to Conrad’s years as repetitor at Erfurt rather than his agewhen he arrived there.5 Similarly, “octenuus” refers to his years as regentmaster in the arts faculty at Paris, not the entire period of residency. Acloser reading of that passage suggests two distinct phases in his Parisresidency: several years at the beginning in which he was lector at theCistercian convent while studying in the arts faculty, followed by eightyears as regent master. Since we know he left Paris in 1342, we canplace his regency from 1334 to 1342, his determination, licensing, andinception in arts probably in 1334, and his years as a student in the artsfaculty c. 1330–1334, or slightly longer.

Lector at the Collège St. Bernard

Conrad’s Parisian period began with his appointment as lector in phi-losophy at the Cistercian house of studies, the Collège St. Bernard.6

How he came by this appointment, mentioned only autobiographicallyin his Ökonomica, is unclear. It may have been arranged through con-tacts in Germany before leaving Erfurt, or he may have approachedthe Cistercians in Paris after he arrived there to help finance his studiesin the arts faculty. According to his own description, it entailed roomand board (and perhaps some additional remuneration) in return for

4 J. Trithemius, De scriptoribus ecclesiasticis in Bibliotheca Ecclesiastica, ed. J.A. Fabri-cius (Hamburg, 1718), p. 157; Helmut Ibach, Leben und Schriften des Konrad von Megen-berg (Würzburg, 1938), pp. 1–2; S. Krüger, introduction to Megenberg, Ökonomica, I(Stuttgart, 1973), pp. 1, 13–14. The year of his birth (and thus his age when he wentto Erfurt) is based on the “explicit” to his Planctus, p. 94, and Ibach, Leben, p. 1: “annoDomini 1337 … anno vero nativitatis sue 28.” Ibach, following Trithemius, placed Con-rad’s move to Paris in 1334, but Kaeppeli and Krüger realized Conrad’s reference to aeight-year period (octenuus) refers to his time as regent master of arts, not to his entireresidence in Paris.

5 Megenberg, Ökonomica III, p. 200, n. 995. In fact, seven years is young to have thedegree of maturity and freedom suggested by his description of his move to Erfurt: “metranstuleram.”

6 Conrad of Megenberg, Ökonomica, III, tr. 1, c. 21, p. 201. Cited also in T. Kaeppeli,“L’Oeconomica de Conrad de Megenberg retrouvée, II: Le texte entier du ms. 7-7-32de la Bibliothèque Colombine de Séville,” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique, 45 (1950), 569–616,at 591, n. 2.

conrad of megenberg: the parisian years 305

instruction.7 It also located him at the foot of Mont-Ste-Geneviève, notfar from the Rue du Fouarre. But an appointment of this kind at thislate a date in the development of university instructional programs forreligious orders was unusual and needs to be put in context.

It is well known that religious orders, both mendicant and monastic,sought university training only in the higher disciplines and refused toallow their students to take degrees in university arts faculties. On theother hand, training equivalent to the arts degree was necessary forsuccessful study in theology, and in place of requiring all theologicalcandidates to have previously reigned in arts, universities did requirethat the content and methods of that education be acquired beforeproceeding in theology, and that a certain number of years of studyin arts outside an arts faculty at a university be completed. If religiousorders rejected university arts training and degrees, they had to developtheir own internal system of philosophical instruction, which in turnrequired resources and personnel within the religious orders.8

When a religious community sought to improve the quality, breadth,or academic standing of their instructional program by relying onteachers from outside their order, it was usually because they did notyet have among their members those with adequate qualifications todo such teaching. This was the reason why the Franciscans at Oxford,not long after their foundation, invited Robert Grosseteste to be lec-tor for Greyfriars.9 This was also the reason why the Benedictines atChrist Church, Canterbury, employed Franciscan lecturers to provideadequate pre-university instruction.10 But at the time Megenberg wasappointed, the Cistercian house of studies at Paris had been in exis-tence for almost a century, and its principal lector occupied a chair as

7 Ökonomica III, 1, 21, p. 201: “ubi divini atque sanctissimi viri beati Bernhardiordinis fratres felicissimi providerant michi de necessariis atque in lectorem philosophieme susceperant.…”

8 As these requirements in grammar, logic, and natural philosophy applied to theCistercians, see Statuta Capitulorum Generalium Ordinis Cisterciensis ab anno 1116 ad annum1786, ed. J.M. Canivez, vol. III (Louvain, 1935), pp. 430–434 (for 1335) and 467 (for1341).

9 R.W. Southern, Robert Grosseteste (Oxford, 1986), pp. 74–75; M.W. Sheehan, “TheReligious Orders 1220–1370,” in J.I. Catto (ed.), The History of the University of Oxford,vol. I: The Early Oxford Schools (Oxford, 1984), p. 197.

10 W.J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton, 1987),pp. 67, 90. At one time the Cistercians also sought such help from the Franciscans,which the order blocked; see Krüger’s note in Ökonomica III, p. 201, n. 997, who citesthe article of G. Müller in Cistercienser-Chronik, 19 (1907), 54.


regent master in the faculty of theology. It seems strange, therefore, thatthey would employ an outsider, especially a secular scholar, to providetraining in logic and natural philosophy.

Part of the answer lies in the difference between the educationalsystems of the monastic orders in the fourteenth century and thoseof the mendicant orders. By the middle of the thirteenth century themendicant orders had a primary commitment to education which,in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, developed intoa diversified and tiered structure in which philosophical training andsome of the theological training was provided in convents and studia atthe provincial level before students were sent to university convents.11

It does not appear that the monastic orders, which became interestedin the benefits of university training and established houses of studiesat Paris by the middle of the thirteenth century, ever created a formalsystem of pre-university instruction in local monasteries. The kind ofinstruction that led to university degrees in theology and canon lawwas of a technical, scholastic nature that differed in content, form, andpurpose from the lectio divina that lay at the heart of monastic letters andlearning. And while mendicant convents were sub-units within an orderthat could move members around according to the needs of the order,individual monasteries remained independent units in which monasticobedience and stabilitas were to one’s own monastery and abbot, not toa higher level of affiliated organization. In order to preserve the missionand tranquility of the monastic life, it may well have proved moreadvisable to send those selected for university degrees to a universityhouse of studies for their philosophical training as well as their studiesin the higher faculties. As a result, one would have in monastic housesof study a proportionately larger group of younger students pursuingtheir training in arts than one would ever find in a university mendicantconvent.

It is understandable, therefore, that substantial numbers of Cister-cian students at the Collège St. Bernard, needing to remain cloisteredand yet needing to acquire a high level of philosophical training, mayhave led to hiring the occasional outsider to provide such training inthe lecture halls of the convent. The need in the period after 1321 mayhave been particularly acute inasmuch as the order took over owner-ship of the house of studies from Clairvaux and pressured Cistercian

11 Courtenay, Schools and Scholars, ch. 2.


monasteries, under threat of visitation and financial penalties, to sendmore students to Paris.12 The internal resources in teaching personnelthat existed before 1321 may not have been able to accommodate theinflux of young pupils in the following decade. In any event, knowledgeof Conrad’s appointment in this capacity at St. Bernard is as importantfor what it tells us about the Cistercian educational system at this timeas for what it tells us about Conrad himself.

What did Conrad bring to the Collège St. Bernard and what influ-ence might it have had on him? Conrad had already taught whilestudying in Erfurt, and presumably brought those skills and subjectareas to his lectorship at St. Bernard. The core of his teaching wouldhave been logic and natural philosophy, probably with some trainingin grammar, if necessary. Had Conrad not had this appointment at St.Bernard, the normal source of financial support at his level, if needed,would have been as a grammar teacher to secular students. And inaddition to what he knew when he first came to Paris, he could intro-duce into St. Bernard whatever he thought useful that he picked upin his own training in the arts faculty. In the other direction, namelythe college’s influence on Conrad, it may have encouraged a conser-vative theological outlook. Conrad would undoubtedly have come intocontact with Jean de Bruxelles, a longtime Cistercian student in Paris,who attained his doctorate in theology in 1333.13 Moreover, Conradwould probably have had access to the convent library, which was sub-stantial by the early fourteenth century—an advantage for a student inthe arts faculty that was usually available only to those who were con-nected with a college, and no secular college apart from the Sorbonneor Navarre had a library to rival that of St. Bernard or the mendicantconvents.14

Assuming that Conrad’s teaching at St. Bernard coincided with hisstudies in the arts faculty before determination and licensing, whenwould this have been? Conrad does not appear in the university com-

putus of 1329, but since that document is incomplete, its silence inthis matter cannot be used to place Conrad’s arrival after the aca-demic year 1329–1330.15 In fact, one section of the Latin Quarter that

12 This suggestion was put forward by Krüger, Ökonomica III, 1, 21, p. 201, n. 997.13 E. Kwanten, “Le Collège Saint-Bernard à Paris,” Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique, 43

(1948), 469.14 A. Vernet and J.-F. Genest (eds.), La bibliothèque de l’abbaye de Clairvaux du XIIe au

XVIIIe siècle (Paris, 1979).15 This document, printed in CUP II, pp. 661–671, and dated by its editors to


is not well covered in the computus is the area around the Collège St.Bernard, which itself was exempt from university taxation, althoughConrad would not have qualified for that exemption.16 Nor does Con-rad’s name appear in the records of the English-German nation thatsurvive for 1333, but again, that only means he had not yet becomea master of arts, which we know from his own remarks, and did notdetermine or receive the license in that year. Students in arts below thelevel of determination were never mentioned in the proctor’s register.In light of Conrad’s position when, in 1337, he does begin to appear inthe records of that nation, we would not be far wrong in placing hisearly studies in arts at Paris (and thus the period in which he was alsofor a time lector in philosophy at St. Bernard) in the 1328–1334 period(or 1330–1334 if his Erfurt preparation was taken into account), at anage somewhat older than many of his fellow students. If Conrad movedout of the Collège St. Bernard when he became regent master in arts,his departure ironically would coincide approximately with the comple-tion of philosophical studies and the beginning of theological studies ofa young and later controversial Cistercian monk, Jean de Mirecourt.

Master of Arts

If Conrad accurately reported the length of time he reigned in arts atParis, he incepted in the arts faculty early in the academic year 1334–1335.17 Unfortunately, the quires of the proctor’s register for the English-German nation from June 1333 to August 1337 are lost, and when thatrecord resumes at the end of August, during the proctorship of Ulrichof Augsburg, Conrad ranks among the senior regents in the nation.18

He had been the promoting master of Suno of Sweden when the latterwas licensed, probably in the spring of 1337.19 He was apparently at that

between 1329–1336, can now be dated to the academic year 1329–1330 and has beenreedited in Courtenay, Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century (Cambridge, 1999),pp. 218–246.

16 It should be noted in addition that almost no one below the level of bachelor ofarts is mentioned by name in this computus.

17 Financial resources and academic progress permitting, the normal pattern at thistime was to determine during Lent, be licensed between April and June, and incept inSeptember at the beginning of the academic year.

18 AUP I, col. 18.19 AUP I, col. 19, for late September. 1337: “Item dominus Suno de Swecia incepit


time the receptor for the funds allocated for the candles at Notre Dame.20

We also know of two other activities in which he had been engagedin the preceding months. One of these was the writing of his Planctus

ecclesiae in Germaniam, which he completed some four months later onJan. 1, 1338.21 The other was his deep involvement in a dispute withthe French nation and with a master Christianus. Conrad’s behaviorin that dispute had already resulted in the suspension of his universityprivileges, and he had petitioned the nation to help finance a letter ofappeal to Avignon.22

The initial cause of dissension between the French nation and theother three nations is not known, but it is evident that Conrad’s vigorin defending the position of the English nation against the French ledthe rector, Johannes de Vimarcio, to suspend his privileges and powersas master, probably sometime during the summer of 1337 or in the pre-vious academic year. Conrad’s writings reveal him as a person of strongopinions, and the records of his nation reflect an aggressive personalitynot inclined toward compromise. His actions at times created problemsfor himself and his nation, which probably made some of his colleaguesuncomfortable.23 But his willingness to defend aggressively his own con-victions had its uses, and with the backing of master Ulrich, Conrad

sub magistro Philippo Scoto; [sub] magistro Chunrado de Monte Puellarum, sub quofuit licenciatus, incipere non potuit, quia privatus fuerat.”

20 AUP I, col. 18: “utrum placeret per modum expedientis quod quedam pecunia,qua tenebatur magister Chunradus nacioni, daretur ex parte nacionis… que quidempecunia erat deputata pro luminaribus Beate Virginis. …” But in mid October 1337, itappears that John Rathe was handling accounts on behalf of the nation; AUP I, col. 21:“ad audiendum compotum magistri Johannis Scoti de Rathey de expensis factis adcuriam.…”

21 Planctus, p. 94: “Explicit planctus ecclesie in Germaniam editus a Conrado deMegenberg, quod Parysius dicitur de Monte puellarum, anno Domini M.CCC.37 indie circumcisionis Domini, anno vero nativitatis sue 28.” In dating this reference toJan. 1, 1338, it is assumed that Conrad was following Parisian practice (in more Gallicano),which began the calendar year with the following Easter, rather than the German andpapal practice, which began the year on Jan. 1. In the proctor’s register for the English-German nation, the entry for Mar. 11, 1339 reads (AUP I, col. 27): “Anno Domini1338 more Gallicano, et secundum alios 1339.… Nota quod plures Alemanii incipiuntannum in Circumcisione Domini, licet Galici in festo Pascatis.” In the same text theentry for Jan. 14, 1340 in AUP I, col. 36 reads: “Item pertransito illo mense in annoDomini 1340 secundum curiam Romanam, die scilicet 19 kalendas Februarii. …”

22 AUP I, cols. 18–20.23 Conrad’s illegal presence at the election of the rector in October 1337 (AUP I, cols.

19–21) found support among some colleagues while others preferred to remain neutral.No one in the nation appears ready to have challenged Conrad directly.


was often chosen to represent the position of the nation in externalnegotiations.

The particular episode that led to Conrad’s suspension involved aconflict with a master Christianus. In the context of the dispute, onewould assume he belonged to the French nation and may even havebeen the proctor of that nation at the time of the dispute.24 The Chris-tianus in question is certainly not Christianus de Elst, since Elst, whobelonged to the English-German nation, was not active in the affairs ofthe nation at this time, and the Christianus in question who attendedthe meeting to elect a new rector on Oct. 10, 1337, was not listed amongthe masters of the English-German nation attending that meeting. Norwould it make sense for the three nations, including the English nation,in a dispute with the French nation, to have aligned themselves againsta master from the English nation. For similar reasons we can alsoexclude Christianus Guys or Ghis of St. Omer, who was undoubtedlya regent master in arts in 1337, but who would have belonged to thePicard nation.25

Conrad made his presence felt at the October meeting of the fac-ulty of arts at St. Julian-le-Pauvre, called to elect a new rector, whichmaster Christianus also attended. The outgoing rector, Johannes deVimarcio, under whose authority Conrad had been suspended, wouldnot begin the meeting, i.e., place in deliberation the matter of choos-ing electors, because Conrad was present, despite the fact that he wastotally deprived of university privileges.26 After some delay, Conrad leftthe meeting long enough for deliberations to begin and for electorsto be chosen by the French, Norman, and Picard nations. But beforethe English nation chose its elector, Conrad returned and sat with his

24 The critical apparatus in the edition of the proctor’s register for the English-German nation is not helpful on this point. He is identified in a footnote (AUP I,col. 20, n. 11) as Christianus Bonifacii, but that is almost certainly a duplication of thefootnote for master Grimerius Bonifacii (AUP I, col. 20, n. 8), who was at the timeproctor or receptor for the Norman nation. The compiler of the index, on the otherhand, assumed him to be Christianus de Elst, a German master who incepted in theEnglish nation probably in the second half of 1333 and appears active in the affairs ofthat nation from 1344 on, but not in the period from 1337 to 1344 (AUP I, cols. 14, 18,70).

25 Christian Guys had completed reading the Sentences when his name was placed ona rotulus in 1349 (CUP II, p. 654). He was regent master of theology in 1353, but whengranted a canonry in his home diocese of Thérouanne in 1342, he was described as“magister in artibus, qui multo tempore Parisius regens in artibus fuit” (CUP II, p. 655,n. 16).

26 AUP I, col. 20: “ab Unversitate fuit totaliter privatus.”


nation, which produced considerable confusion and delayed the choos-ing of an elector for the English nation which, when done, was rejectedby the rector because of the participation of Conrad.

Conrad’s lack of academic status in the arts faculty and university (“atota Universitate fuit perpetuo privatus propter maleficium suum”) didnot prevent his participation in the business of his nation. At its meet-ing on October 21 Conrad, because of his reputation for hard dealingon behalf of the nation (“quia rigorosum erat, cum factum fuerit nacio-nis”), was chosen to represent the nation in the appeal to Avignon bythe Picard, Norman, and English nations against the French nation.

Conrad’s mission to Avignon on behalf of his nation (and himself)began in late October and apparently continued into January. Whilehe was there, matters in Paris came to a head. In late Novemberthe French nation denounced the other three nations and separatedfrom them, carrying the dispute to a higher level but also precipitatingthe application of resolution procedures laid down in the agreementworked out by the papal legate, Simon de Brie, in 1266.27 The Englishnation consulted its own copy of the agreement on the resolution ofdisputes, which called for the appointment of seven judges: three seniorregents in the faculty of theology and four regents in the faculty ofcanon law. Initially a settlement was proposed that all actions takensince the election of the rector be revoked, including the privation ofJohannes de Vimarcio that the three nations had imposed. The Englishnation, at least, refused to accept this solution and preferred to letmatters take their course. In late December or early January matterswere worked out by the judges, peace was restored, and the suspensionsof Conrad and Johannes de Vimarcio were lifted “propter bonum paciset ex communi sensu ambarum partium.”

While in Avignon, Conrad was active on his own behalf as wellas the affairs of his nation. In addition to presenting the appellatio, hesought a patron within the curia and dedicated his Planctus to the papalchaplain, Johannes de Piscibus, in the hopes of obtaining a benefice.The attempt was unsuccessful, and Conrad eventually returned to Parisdisappointed and bitter.28

27 AUP I, col. 23; CUP I, pp. 449–458, #409.28 Planctus, p. 69: “tibi nil datur Avignonis”; p. 92: “Cap. 30, in quo scriptor ostendit

beneficium sibi collatum inutile esse propter plures precedentes ipsum.” Ibid.: “Parysiusredeam, numquam plus talia queram.” Whether he returned directly to Paris or onlyafter his sojourn in Germany in 1338 and 1339 is unclear, since his name does not


The resolution of the dispute restored Conrad’s standing in theuniversity and his ability to earn income through teaching and thepromotion of candidates, but it did not satisfy his financial need orhis career ambitions. Probably in the summer of 1338 he returned toGermany to raise money by selling family land.29 He also continuedhis quest for a powerful patron by dedicating a revised edition of hisPlanctus to Arnold de Verdala, another papal chaplain who at the timewas papal legate to the court of Louis of Bavaria.30

How long Conrad remained away from Paris is unclear. His namedoes not reappear in the proctor’s register of the English-Germannation at Paris until December 1339,31 but inasmuch as few names ofregent masters appear in that record in the previous three months,there is no reason to assume he did not resume teaching in October1339 and may thus have been present at the September meeting of thearts faculty that proscribed the use of Ockham’s writings.32 Conrad’sabsence had not diminished his standing among his colleagues. He waselected proctor of the nation for three successive terms in 1340, fromFebruary into May.33 After a one-month term in which Ulrich served,Conrad was re-elected at the end of June and served until Ulrich waselected at the end of August.34 Conrad again served a one-month termfrom December 1340 into January 1341.35 He also served as receptor forthe nation in 1340, completing his term of office in October of thatyear,36 and as one of the examiners for the Lenten examinations thatyear at Ste. Geneviève.37

reappear among the records of the nation until December 1339, but the section of theproctor’s register from December 1337 until December 1338 is lost.

29 Ibach, Leben, p. 118; Krüger, Ökonomica I, p. xv. [Conrad was spared from sell-ing property through receiving a loan or gift from a friend. For details see Courte-nay, “Conrad of Megenberg as Nuntius and his Quest for Benefices,” in Konrad vonMegenberg (1309–1374) und sein Werk. Das Wissen der Zeit, ed. C. Märtl, G. Drossbach,and M. Kintzinger, Zeitschrift für Bayerische Landesgeschichte, Beiheft 31, Reihe B(Munich, 2006), pp. 7–23.]

30 See second dedication in Planctus, pp. 17–18. Arnold de Verdala was then dean ofFenoillet and in March 1339 was made bishop of Maguelonne, near Montpellier.

31 AUP I, col. 36.32 CUP II, pp. 485–486, #1023; AUP I, col. 35.33 AUP I, cols. 37–38.34 AUP I, cols. 39–41.35 AUP I, col. 44.36 AUP I, cols. 39–40, 42.37 AUP I, cols. 36–37.


When Conrad returned to Paris for the 1339–1340 academic year,he found a university preoccupied with a crisis with the papacy thathad begun in the winter of 1339 as a property dispute between somecitizens of Valence and two arts students in the Norman nation.38 Bythe summer of 1339 the affair had grown into a dispute between thepapacy and the university in which Benedict threatened to suspendthe university’s privileges and rejected the rotuli of benefice requeststhat the university nuncii had brought to Avignon. None of the actionstaken by the arts faculty in the fall of 1339 appeased Benedict XII, whosuspended university privileges in February 1340. Privileges were notrestored until July 1341.

Since Conrad did not yet have a benefice in 1339, those events mayonly have had an indirect effect on him. But they may have providedan opportunity for the arts faculty to take a harder line against theteaching of an important papal opponent, William of Ockham. Andassuming the anti-Ockhamist attitudes of Conrad were already presentin 1339, he may have played a central role in urging his nation and thearts faculty to take action against Ockham’s teaching and that of theOckhamists.

What we do see of Conrad’s actions in the proctor’s register for1339–1340 is more academic than political, which is to be expected.Several students determined under him in the spring of 1340, specifi-cally Suno Karoli of Sweden (to be distinguished from the Suno of Swe-den who incepted in 1337), Nicholas Gossek of Poland, and Thomasde Caliga Rubea of Trier. Suno was licensed under Conrad in Mayor June of that year, and incepted under Conrad in early Septem-ber.

But Conrad was equally concerned about obtaining a position withbetter remuneration. In November of 1340 the nation supported hisappeal to the Duke of Austria and the city of Vienna.39 He was ap-pointed nuntius to convey the arts faculty’s rotulus of petitions to Avignonin February 1341.40 When he left on that mission is unclear. In March

38 CUP II, pp. 476–477, 482–483, 487–488, 488–489, 497–498, 498–499, 521–522;AUP I, cols. 26, 28–32. See the discussion of the affair in W.J. Courtenay and K.H.Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-German Nation at Paris, 1339–1341,”History of Universities, 2 (1982), 53–96, at 77–79 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 9,pp. 204–206].

39 AUP I, col. 43. He also purchased a royal privilege for the sizable sum of 35 solidi;AUP I, col. 45.

40 AUP I, cols. 45, 46.


1341 two students determined under him: Johannes Arneri of Swedenand Burchard of Constance,41 and another student, John of Witten-berg, was licensed under Conrad in the same month.42 The April–Mayperiod would appear to be the most likely time for a diplomatic tripto Avignon. In June 1341, when Burchard of Constance was licensedunder him, Conrad must have been back in Paris.43 He was certainlyin Paris for the September 1341 meeting concerning the Ockhamistsect.44 In February 1342 he made preparations to leave Paris. The class-room allocated to him, namely the scola ad septem artes super terram, wasaccorded to his former pupil, master Suno Karoli of Sweden.45 Conradremained until the end of the month in order to oversee the determina-tions of several students: Eghno, John Swavus, Bertold Swavus, Henryof Constance, John of Trier, and Ulrich of Saxony.46 By March 16, 1342Conrad was already in Germany.47

The sources for Conrad’s years at Paris thus provide considerableinformation on his political and administrative activities as regent mas-ter in arts. But what of his teaching? No commentaries attributable toConrad on the texts of the arts curriculum have been identified, exceptfor his Quaestiones on John of Sacrobosco’s De sphaera, which was writ-ten at Vienna and completed there in 1347.48 A short but importanttreatise critiquing Walter Burley’s views on contrary forms has survivedand dates to the end of his regency at Paris, or shortly thereafter.49 But

41 AUP I, col. 46.42 AUP I, col. 47.43 AUP I, cols. 50, 52.44 AUP I, cols. 52–53.45 AUP I, col. 54.46 AUP I, cols. 54–55.47 Ibach, Leben, p. 4.48 München, Bayr. Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14687, fols. 71ra–95vb. The work is dated

by its explicit as well as the fact that Conrad, on fol. 90va, cites Heinrich von Nürn-berg’s commentary on the De Sphaera. See Ibach, Leben, pp. 65–66; Krüger, ÖkonomicaI, pp. xix–xx. De Sphaera was a text in the Paris arts curriculum, and it is conceiv-able that Conrad’s work was begun in that setting. It should also be noted that thesame manuscript, fols. 1r–57v, contains a commentary on De Sphaera that may be byMegenberg.

49 Vienna, Dominikanerkloster, ms 401/130, fols. 83rb–91va. The date and proba-ble location of the treatise is suggested by his already having lectured on the Sen-tences (fol. 83rb: “In prima questione quarti sententiarum dixi. …”) and by the explicit(fol. 91va): “Explicit tractatus magistri Chonradi de monte puellarum, rectoris uni-versitatis parisiensis, quo probat oppositum contra Wurley in illa conclusione quodforme contrarie sint eiusdem speciei specialissime.” Citation taken from Kaeppeli,“L’Oeconomica de Conrad de Megenberg retrouvée,” 595.


occasional references in that treatise and later works suggest that hewrote questions or groups of questions in natural philosophy while atParis, specifically on problems in physics. In his treatise against Burleyhe cited his treatise on rarifaction and condensation, while in his Quaes-

tiones de sphaera he referred his readers to his quaestiones in physics, and inhis Ökonomica to his Disputationes in naturalibus speculationibus.50 These may,in fact, all refer to the same work or sections of it, which probably orig-inated as disputed questions. Whether any of this material has survivedor is recoverable will be considered toward the end of the next section.

Student in Theology

Before turning to Conrad’s role in the crisis over Ockhamism at Paris,it is important to determine whether there was a third stage in hisacademic career, namely, as a student and bachelor of theology, thatcoincided with all or part of his regency in arts, and if so, how farhe progressed in that faculty. In the standard biographical accountof Conrad’s academic career, it is reported that he read the Sentences

before leaving Paris in 1342.51 According to that information, Conraddid not attain the doctorate in theology, but he would have beenbaccalarius formatus in sacra pagina and would in the period from 1334to 1342, given the length of the theological program, have been astudent in the theological faculty as well as regent master in arts. Theimplications of this are considerable. He would have been attendinglectures in the theological faculty when Pastor de Serrescuderio, Peter

50 Tractatus contra Burley, Vienna, Dominikanerkloster, Ms. 401/130, fol. 91va, citedfrom Krüger, Ökonomica I, pp. xviii–xix: “Quapropter dico, quod motus est per se adquantitatem in augmentacione in quantum mutacio…, sicut credo me demonstrassein tractatu meo de rarificatione et condensacione, ubi multum clare et diffuse locutussum de motu ad quantitatem.” Quaestiones in Ioannis de Sacrobosco sphaeram, Clm 14687,fol. 74ra, cited from Krüger, “Krise der Zeit als Ursache der Pest? Der Traktat dermortalitate in Alamannia des Konrad von Megenberg,” in Festschrift für Hermann Heimpelzum 70. Geburtstag, vol. II (Gottingen, 1972), p. 849, n. 55: “sed ego non sum istiusopinionis, et habet de hoc videri alibi, scilicet in questionibus physicis.” Ökonomica I, tr.2, c. 6, p. 76: “Unde quedam colerice iuvencule minutos musculos habentes et torridecorpore … non concipiunt, quousque pungens calor sopitur in ipsis et cum incipiuntaliqualiter incarnari. Quorum omnium disputaciones in naturalibus speculacionibusreliqui.”

51 Ibach, Leben, pp. 42–43, esp. n. 148; T. Kaeppeli, “L’Oeconomica de Conrad deMegenberg retrouvée,” 593–594; S. Krüger, “Einleitung,” in Konrad von Megenberg,Ökonomica I, p. xvi.


of Aquila, Bernard of Arezzo, Nicholas of Autrecourt, and Thomas ofStrasbourg read the Sentences. More importantly, his viewpoint in thecrisis over Ockhamism would have been shaped by theological as wellas philosophical considerations. And his having come close to attainingthe Parisian doctorate and having to abandon his studies for financialreasons might well have had an embittering effect on his psychology.

The evidence behind the theological career of Conrad is not exten-sive, but it is persuasive. For many years it rested solely on the remarkof Trithemius that Conrad while at Paris wrote on the four books ofthe Sentences, the three books of his Ökonomica, and drafted his Monas-

ticon.52 Ibach rejected the placement of the last two items, since theywere written in Vienna and Regensburg, not Paris, but he acceptedthe accuracy of the information on the Sentences commentary.53 A betterwitness, however, came to light several decades ago. In Conrad’s Trac-

tatus contra Burley, identified and discussed by Kaeppeli in 1950, Conradspecifically refers to his first question on the fourth book of the Sentences.This means that Conrad’s questions on the Sentences predate his treatiseagainst Burley and were written before he left Paris in the spring of1342.

When did Conrad write his commentary on the Sentences? In view ofthe length of the Paris theological program, Conrad must have begunhis studies in theology at least a year before his regency in arts in orderto have been eligible to lecture on the Bible in 1340, and on the Sentences

in 1342.54 This would place Conrad’s lectures on the Sentences and, along

52 J. Trithemius, Annales Hirsaugienses (S. Gallen, 1690), II, p. 187: “Conradus … quiscripsit apud Parisios docens super sententias, libb. IV, opus Oeconomicon libb. III, AdDucem Austriae aliud, quod praenotavit Monasticon lib. I et alia quae non vidi.”

53 Similarly inaccurate is Trithemius, De scriptoribus ecclesiasticis, p. 157: “se deinde aduniversitatem Parisiensem contulit, ubi philosophiam et sacras literas publice per octen-nium scholaribus lectitans, doctoratus infulam consequutus est.” There is no evidencethat Conrad attained the doctorate, and to pursue degrees in arts and theology up tothe level of master in the first and a formed bachelor in the second in an eight-yearperiod is impossible. Perhaps Trithemius inferred studies in “sacra littera” from Conrad’sreference in Ökonomica III, 1, 21, to the doctorate. But Conrad considered “doctoratus”an appropriate label for the arts magisterium. He used it to describe what he attainedwhen he incepted in arts (“receperam processu lauream doctoratus et octennuus sedisgubernator dilectus universitatis filius honorabar”), and it is the way he describes theobligation of the arts bachelor to dispute in the schools of various arts masters; Ökonom-ica III, 1, 4, p. 27: “qui arguendo et respondendo scolas doctorum perambulat; nondumtamen lauream accepit milicie doctoralis, sed nichilominus vicinus est ad magisteriigradum.”

54 CUP II, p. 692, #1188. This legislation dates to the second quarter of the four-teenth century and specifies seven years of theological study for seculars before pro-


with it, his Tractatus contra Burley, at the very end of his time in Paris. Thepeculiar thing is that Conrad never refers to himself as a bachelor intheology, and that title is never accorded to him when he is mentionedin papal documents, as was customary.55

The answer to this puzzle may lie in the procedures that governedthe composition of Sentences commentaries by the second quarter of thefourteenth century. It had become customary for bachelors to composea draft or working copy of their sentential questions during the yearbefore the candidate orally delivered them as a bachelor of theology.This year, known as annus expectationis, followed his year as biblical cur-sor and preceded his year as sententiarius.56 Thus the oral lectures (lectura

lecta) as sententiarius was the second stage in the writing process, whichwas followed by one or more stages of editing (lectura annotata) beforea definitive text (lectura recollecta, lectura edita, or ordinatio) for publicationwas achieved. If financial need or other circumstances interrupted thenormal sequence, it would be possible for a draft text to have been real-ized without one’s actually having completed or even having begun theofficial, pro forma, lectures on the Sentences.

Whether this happened in Conrad’s case we do not know. We doknow that he wrote questions on the Sentences but was never accordedthe title of bachelor of theology. We also know that his preparation forbiblical and sentential lectures would have coincided with his last twoyears in Paris and with the crisis over Ockham’s thought. If, as will beargued below, Conrad played a central part in the campaign against

ceeding to lectures on the Bible and the Sentences. Those in religious orders by the 1330swere only required to have studied six years initially—a reduction officially granted tothe seculars in 1366 but which may already have been practiced by 1340.

55 For example, in May 1341 he was referred to as “magister artium” (Benoit XII,Lettres communes, ed. J.M. Vidal, vol. II (Paris, 1905), 304), and had he read the Sentencesin or before the academic year 1340–1341, his title would have been “baccalauriustheologiae” or some equivalent. When, in a letter of 19 April 1363, Urban V mentionedConrad in connection with a disputed appointment to the position of cathedral priorin Regensburg, Conrad was described only as a canon of Regensburg, a master in arts,and a priest; cf. Urban V, Lettres communes, ed. M.-H. Laurent, M. and A.-M. Hayez,et al., vol.II (Paris, 1964–1972), p. 247, #6680. See also Urban V, Lettres communes, IX(Rome, 1983), p. 444, #27363.

56 For a description of the annus expectationis, see Z. Kaluza, “Nicolas d’Autrecourt.Ami de la vérité,” in HLF, 42 (1995), pp. 54–56. During the year of expectationdisputations could be held in arts as well as in theology. [The hypothesis of a “year ofexpectation” between cursor and sententiarius has been questioned; see Courtenay, “TheCourse of Studies in the Faculty of Theology at Paris in the Fourteenth Century,” in “AdIngenii Acuitionem” Studies in Honour of Alfonso Maierù, ed. S. Caroti, R. Imbach, Z. Kaluza,G. Stabile, and L. Sturlese (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2006), 67–92.]


Ockhamism, the references in the 1340 statute concerning the implica-tions of those “errors” for the interpretation of scripture or propositionsabout God may reflect the theological sensitivity of someone engagedin precisely those tasks. We also know that Conrad remained activelyteaching in the arts faculty until he left Paris for good in March 1342.57

His retention of his classroom in the Rue du Fouarre and his Tractatus

contra Burley witness to his continuing commitment to philosophy.58

While no Sentences commentary has yet been identified for Conrad,it should be noted that the style and content of questions added toMichael de Massa’s commentary on book II of the Sentences foundin Vat. lat. 1087 anticipate in a remarkable way the viewpoint andlanguage of Conrad.59 The manuscript was in the possession of ThomasParentucelli de Sarzana (later Pope Nicholas V) in the early fifteenthcentury, through whom it came into the Vatican library. The work wascopied from an exemplar that blended, according to the plan of theauthor or editor, a text on the early distinctions of Book II, identifiedas his “opus ordinarium,” with questions on topics in physics identifiedas “additiones” or as “quaestiones extraordinariae.”60 The numerous cross-references among the additional questions, and between those and the

57 Ibach, Leben, p. 4.58 AUP I, col. 54. Nicholas of Autrecourt is another example of a secular master who

continued to teach in the arts faculty while completing his degree in theology.59 For a discussion of that text, see D. Trapp, “Notes on some Manuscripts of the

Augustinian Michael de Massa (d. 1337),” Augustinianum, 5 (1965), 58–133; W.J. Courte-nay, The ‘Quaestiones in Sententias’ of Michael de Massa, OESA: A Redating, Augustiniana, 45(1995), 191–207 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 13].

60 Some questions relating to cosmology are raised in the sections that belong to theauthor’s opus ordinarium; e.g. Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 124rb: “Utrum caelum sit compositumex anima et corpore tamquam ex principiis essentialiter intrinsecis ita quod vere sitanimatum formaliter et vivum”; ibid., fol. 128ra: “Utrum ultima sphaera sit aliquo modoin loco.” Some of the questions added later (additiones), which may have derived fromanother academic context, are directly and almost exclusively concerned with physics;e.g. Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 68va (“quaestio extraordinaria”): “Utrum duratio rei permanentissit realiter idem quod ipsa res permanens”; ibid., fol. 70rb (“quaestio extraordinaria”):“Utrum duratio successiva, quae est ipsum tempus, sit realiter idem quod motus cuiusest passio”; ibid., fol. 71ra: “Utrum motus sit res per se unius tantum praedicamenti”;ibid., fol. 74ra: “Utrum generaliter loquendo tempus sit realiter idem quod motus, vel sitrealitas addita ipsi motui”; ibid.: “Utrum tempus quod est passio primi motus sit aliquarealitas addita primo motui”; ibid. fol. 82ra: “Utrum tempus acceptum formaliter sitpassio inexistens alicui motui”; ibid., fol. 83va: “Utrum forma temporis sive ipsummettempus quantum ad suum formale sit passio inexistens formaliter cuilibet motui”;ibid., fol. 85ra: “Utrum tempus habeat suum esse completum circumscripto omni opereintellectus nostri”; ibid., fol. 89ra: “Utrum aliquod instans maneat idem realiter in tototempore”; ten questions de continuo, ibid., fols. 130v–169v; sixteen questions de veritate


questions in the “opus ordinarium” make it certain that the text, as editedin its present form, is the work of one and the same person. Andalthough the cross-references from the Vatican manuscript to the textof Michael de Massa’s commentary on Book I of the Sentences are not asnumerous nor as convincing, they suggest that both works belong to thesame author.61

Moreover, some of the “additional” questions were not written ini-tially for a Sentences commentary but originated in a different academicsetting, probably from disputations. They differ in style from the otherquestions; they are sometimes prefaced by wording used to describegroupings of disputed questions;62 the topics are more narrowly focused;and there are frequent references to an opponent (tu/tibi) instead of themore general aliqui.63 The issues debated in these questions concernproblems in physics, especially the ontological status of motion andtime. And the opponent or opponents in these questions were adherentsof an Ockhamist physics. In some questions the sources of the debateare limited to Aristotle and the Commentator (Averroes) without citingany Patristic or scholastic author, and without any application to a the-ological issue. In others, such as the questions on quantity, theologicalissues and scholastic sources are introduced.

Assuming these questions were authored by Michael de Massa, thefact that they were incorporated into his Sentences commentary by aneditor after Michael’s death suggests that they would have been writ-ten not long before his death in May 1337. In any event, the additionalquestions show that a student contemporary with Conrad in the theo-logical faculty was deeply concerned over issues that coincide remark-ably with the issues Megenberg claimed to have treated in his ques-tions or disputations on problems in physics. For example, the anti-

primi principii et motione voluntatis, ibid., fols, 175–205r; and four questions de specie, ibid.,fols. 205r–221v.

61 One manuscript of the commentary on Book I (Bologna, Bibl. Univ., Ms. 2214) isin the hand of the scribe of Vat. lat. 1087 and was also in the possession of Sarzana.

62 Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 68va: “Duodecima 〈Undecima〉 quaestio extraordinaria circamateriam creationis fuit ista: Utrum duratio rei permanentis sit realiter idem quod ipsares permanens.”

63 For example, ibid., fol. 70va: “per quascumque connotationes et per quascumquefiguras gramaticales tu conaris salvare quod una res sit quandoque motus et quan-doque quies, et ego per easdem salvabo tibi quod eadem res sit quandoque albedo etquandoque nigredo.… Si autem dicas quod sic… . Preterea, quia tu fugis ad propo-sitiones gramaticales.…” Ibid., fol. 70vb: “Qua ratione tu dicis quod motus localis estidem realiter cum ipso mobili.… Et si dicas quod… .”


Ockhamist arguments on the ontological status of points and lines towhich Conrad refers his readers in his Quaestiones on De sphaera can befound in question 3 (de puncto et linea) of the “additional questions” onthe continuum, Vat. lat. 1087, fols. 136vb–140vb. Similarly, the issues andviews to which he refers his readers in his Tractatus contra Burley can befound in the question on the generation and corruption of matter inVat. lat. 1087, fols. 169va–175rb. And finally, a more extended discussionof Ockhamist theories on motion discussed briefly in Ökonomica III, tr. 1,c. 1 can be found in Vat. lat. 1087, fols. 70rb–74ra. While one cannot dis-miss categorically the possibility that the scribe who assembled Massa’s“additional” questions on book II of the Sentences did not inadvertentlyinclude questions from another author found in quires in the possessionof Michael, or that Michael himself “borrowed” sections from ques-tions on natural philosophy by a prominent secular contemporary, orthat Vat. lat. 1087 is not itself a “reworked” Sentences commentary, alectura secundum alium, in which a later author (Conrad?) redelivered anearlier commentary and added some questions of his own, the weightof evidence points in the direction of Massa’s authorship. Still, the occa-sional similarities in style and attitude between Vat. lat. 1087 and Con-rad’s works is remarkable, as can be seen in the last section cited above,where the language and vehemence with which Ockham’s position isattacked are evocative of Conrad’s critique:

Duodecima quaestio extraordinaria circa materiam creationis erat ista:Utrum duratio successiva, quae est ipsum tempus, sit realiter idem quodmotus cuius est passio.… Et quia de realitate motus est unus errorquorundam modernorum qui circa totam Physicam tam quantum adprincipia quam etiam quantum ad conclusiones ipsius conati sunt inno-vare errores antiquorum philosophorum quos Aristoteles frequentissimereprobat, licet per quasdam fugas grammaticales huiusmodi errores sus-tineant, quae modicum valent, sicut alias apparebit. Ideo statim pro nuncde errore istorum circa realitatem motus expedio me valde breviter, gra-tia cuius moveo istam quaestionem:

Utrum motus sit realiter ipsummet mobile quod movetur. Et videturquod sic, quid frustra ponitur pluralitas realitatum sine necessitate. …Respondeo, sicut dixi, hic est unus errorum quorundam modernorumqui secundum rei veritatem conantur diffundere inter vera dicta phys-icae multa semina falsitatum, et in omnibus tamquam verbosi habentrecursum ad verba gramaticalia sophistice utendo eis. Nec forte meliormodus esset nisi nauseare super dictis eorum et dicere: “Contra verbososnoli contendere verbis,” quia secundum veritatem errores ipsorum nonsunt cum magna diligentia pertractandi. Et ideo expediamus nos de illoerrore quem asserunt circa realitatem motus; dicunt enim quod motus


non est distinctus a mobili sed est realiter ipsummet mobile. Et quodita sit probant quia corpus celeste est quoddam mobile a quo non dis-tinguitur realiter suus motus; ergo, pari ratione, dicendum est de omnimobili et de motu quo quandoque movetur…. Sed iste error est con-tra Aristotelem et Commentatorem…. Nunc autem loquendo physice etad rem, et non recurrendo ad subiectum et praedicatum propositioniset ad suppositum et ad appositum propositionis gramaticaliter; sed dicoloquendo ad rem: constat quod si motus esset realiter idem quod mobile,ergo realiter motus moveatur, quia realitas quae est motus movetur perte, sed hoc est contra sententiam Aristotelis.… Constat quod Commen-tator accipit ibi subiectum reale, cui vicissim possunt inesse contraria,puta motus et quies, et non accipit ibi subiectum propositionis gramat-icaliter; ergo secundum eum motus est quaedam res inexistens mobilisicut suo per se subiecto ex natura rei.… Qua ratione mobile est idemrealiter cum motu quo movetur per te, pari ratione inest idem realitercum quiete qua quiescit cessante motu. Sed hoc posito sequitur …, etita redibit error Parmenidis et Mellissi, quem reprobat Aristoteles primoPhysicorum.64

Sed constat quod movens non causat mobile nec locum; ergo aliquamrealitatem ponam ab utroque distinctam. Alias plus dicetur contra erro-rem istorum quando tractabo generalem abusionem quam ponunt, vide-licet quod in eodem supposito numquam concurrunt nisi duae distinc-tae realitates, scilicet substantia et qualitas… . Sic ergo error istorumtamquam abusio dicatur. Et accedamus ad inquisitionem magis utilemde realitate ipsius motus. Nec oportet philosophum volentem proficere,confundere realitates eorum et confugere ad proprietates grammaticalesut habeatur fuga de non explicando realitates eorum et difficultates phys-icas circa ipsas. Immo quantum possumus investigare, 〈tantum〉 debe-mus explicare de quidditatibus rerum. Moveamus ergo aliquas quaes-tiones circa realitatem motus more Aristotelis et Commentatoris et alio-rum philosophorum, praetermittendo insanias modernorum innovan-tium grossitive antiquorum.65

And from a later question:

64 Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 70rb–70va. For an extensive discussion of the views of Parmenidesand Mellissus, see Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 131ra. The image of nausea was later applied to theOckhamist interpretation of point, line, and figure (Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 140rb): “disputarecum ipsis est quaedam nausea.…” Conrad of Megenberg used the same expressionin discussing Ockham’s understanding of relation, quantity, and motion; ÖkonomicaIII, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 7: “Et deficientes quidem clerici nausigraphi dici poterint, eo quodnauseam praetendant in scripturis rerum aut naturae distinctae ascriptarum. Diciturenim nausigraphus a ‘nausea’ et ‘graphos,’ quod est scriptura.”

65 Ibid., fol. 71ra. Ibid., fol. 84v: “Respondeo sine argumentis quod sustineri potest tamsecundum intentionem Aristotelis quam etiam Commentatoris quam etiam secundumapparentiam rationis quod sic.” Ibid., fol. 143r: “magis volo praeponderare in hac partesententiam Aristotelis et Commentatoris quam suam.”


Sed secundum istos contra quos arguo, tempus et primus motus suntidem identice, nec differunt nisi conceptibiliter … dixerunt aliqui quodtempus est ipsummet caelum, et in sententiam istorum incidunt Okanis-tae.66

Massa’s questions reveal an overriding concern, shared by Conrad,with the scientific and philosophical implications of Ockham’s physicson the eve of the statute of 1339 and the arts faculty oath based on it.The statements in the above passage, ad mentem, although not ad linguam

Conradi, thus lead us back to a central concern of Conrad in his lastthree years in Paris: the crisis over the Occamistae and Ockham’s physics.

The Crisis over the Occamistae

The later years of Conrad’s tenure as regent master in arts at Pariscoincided with a controversy in that faculty over the content and meth-ods of analysis found in the writings of William of Ockham. Con-rad’s opposition to Ockham in his post-Parisian writings is well known,including passages in his Ökonomica (c. 1354) and in his commentary onJohn of Sacrobosco’s Sphaera (1347), as well as his Tractatus contra Ock-

ham (1354). In light of the intensive scholarly attention that has beendevoted to the statutes of the arts faculty over the Ockhamist crisis of1339–1341 and the shifting interpretations of that evidence, a fresh lookat Conrad’s role in those events is in order.67

66 Ibid., fol. 88va. Ibid., fol. 135va: “Sed arguitur ulterius pro opinione Okam primosic: quantitas successiva quae est motus vel tempus non est res distincta a mobili cuiusest subiective. Patet consequentia quia magis videtur differre successivum et permanensquam permanens et permanens, ceteris aliis habentibus se uniformiter, … Praeterea,arguo sic: relatio realiter non est res addita fundamento; igitur nec accidens quod estquantitas est res addita fundamento.… Praeterea, actio et passio et quaecumque entiarespectiva non dicunt res additas entibus absolutis; ergo nec quantitas est res additasubstantiae corporali, quamvis tamen constituat diversum praedicamentum. … Ad istatria simul respondeo.…”

67 Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists,” 53–96; Courtenay, “The Recep-tion of Ockham’s Thought at the University of Paris,” in Z. Kaluza and P. Vignaux(eds.), Preuve et raisons à l’Université de Paris: Logique, ontologie et théologie au XIVe siècle (Paris,1984), pp. 43–64; Courtenay, “Force of Words and Figures of Speech: The Crisisover Virtus sermonis in the Fourteenth Century,” Franciscan Studies, 44 (1984), 107–128;Z. Kaluza, “Le Statut du 25 septembre 1339 et l’Ordonnance du 2 septembre 1276,”in O. Pluta (ed.), Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert: In memoriam Konstanty Michal-ski (1879–1947) (Amsterdam, 1988), pp. 343–351; J.M.M.H. Thijssen, “Once Again theOckhamist Statutes of 1339 and 1340: Some new perspectives,” Vivarium, 28 (1990),136–167; Courtenay, “The Registers of the University of Paris and the Statutes against


First, although the post-Parisian writings of Conrad show a firmopposition to Ockham’s natural philosophy, that topic is not touchedon in his Planctus, nor is there any mention of Ockham or the Occamistae

in that work. What does come out strongly in the Planctus is a hatredof the mendicants and a diatribe against those in the arts faculty whomisused grammar and logic, perhaps a veiled reference to those he latercriticizes in his Ökonomica for rejecting, as literally false, propositionscontaining figures of speech.68 This latter issue was undoubtedly relatedto the propositions that were condemned by the arts faculty in lateDecember 1340 in a statute that bears the rubric: “de reprobationequorumdam errorum Ockanicorum,”69 but in Conrad’s Planctus theseviews are not discussed directly. In any event, the content of the Planctus,which was written and revised between the fall of 1337 and September1338, may all date before the crisis over Ockham’s teaching surfaced atParis.

Secondly, while Conrad apparently returned from Avignon to Parisearly in 1338, he went to Germany in the summer of 1338 and does notappear at all in the records of the nation for the 1338–1339 academicyear. While the records between January and December 1338 are lost,the failure of Conrad’s name to appear in the extant records for thefirst half of 1339—the season of examinations and promotions in whichthe names of sponsoring regents are most likely to be included—makesit likely that he was not in Paris during that year. In fact, the first firmevidence for his resumption of his regency is in December 1339, fromwhich we may infer his presence during the first term of the 1339–1340academic year. Thus, if the crisis over the use of Ockham’s teachings

the Scientia Occamica,” Vivarium, 29 (1991), 13–49; Kaluza, “Les sciences et leurs lan-gages. Note sur le statut du 29 Décembre 1340 et le prétendu statut perdu contre Ock-ham,” in L. Bianchi (ed.), Filosofia e teologia nel Trecento: Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi(Louvain-la-Neuve, 1994), pp. 197–258; Kaluza, “La crise des années 1474–1482,” inM.J.F.M. Hoenen, J.H.J. Schneider, and G. Wieland (eds.), Philosophy and Learning. Uni-versities in the Middle Ages (Leiden, 1994), pp. 293–327; Courtenay, “Was There an Ock-hamist School?” in Philosophy and Learning, pp. 263–292. Also relevant to these issues:Courtenay, “The Preservation and Dissemination of Academic Condemnations at theUniversity of Paris in the Middle Ages,” in Philosophies morales et politiques au Moyen Age.Acts of the Ninth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, Ottawa 1992 (Ottawa, 1995),vol. III, pp. 1659–1667.

68 Planctus ecclesiae, ed. R. Scholz, MGH, SsM II, 1 (Leipzig, 1941), p. 32: “Cespitatin vanis iam lingua, monetat inanis; Floribus est nuda, rudis et vox, rustica cruda;Iam paralogismat homo quilibet atque sophismat; Ethyca marcescunt, magis et brutaliacrescunt.” Compare Ökonomica III, tr. 1, ch. 12.

69 CUP II, pp. 505–507, #1042.


and writings began in the summer of 1339 or during the previousacademic year, it is unlikely Conrad was involved at that stage. It islikely, however, that Conrad had returned to teaching by the end ofSeptember 1339 when the arts faculty statute against the dogmatizing ofOckham was promulgated and inscribed into the Book of the Nation.70

Whether Conrad played any role in the drafting and promulgation ofthat statute cannot be ascertained. But if his later views are any guide,he would have strongly supported the action taken. His absence fromParis in the months before September 1339, however, probably meanshe was not among the initiators of that legislation.

We can assume that Conrad’s role in the campaign against theOccamistae in 1340 and 1341 was more direct.71 He was proctor ofthe English-German nation when the statute of December 29, 1340was passed, and as proctor during the preceding week he may havehad a hand in drafting the final wording. If, as now seems likely,the actual sealing of the statute occurred several weeks later, possiblydue to debate over inclusion of the final article, the promulgation andenforcement of that statute would not have occurred during Conrad’sterm as proctor.72 That may explain his statement in the proctor’s bookthat during his term in office nothing that was done was brought tocompletion.73

If the later writings of Conrad are any guide, the teachings of theOccamistae that he considered the most pernicious were not the proce-dures for determining the truth or falsity of propositions, but Ockham’sreinterpretation of the Aristotelian categories and its implications fornatural philosophy. Propositional analysis and the effect on figures of

70 The fact that Conrad’s name does not appear in the proctor’s register untilDecember proves little, since hardly any names of regent masters are listed in thatregister between August and December 1339.

71 This was also the conclusion of Bernd Michael, Johannes Buridan: Studien zu seinemLeben, seinen Werken und zur Rezeption seiner Theorien im Europa des späten Mittelalters, Teil 1(Berlin, 1985), pp. 191–192. Also suggested in Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockham, Ock-hamists,” 72–75.

72 For scholarly discussion of the two-statute theory vs. a delay in promulgation, seeabove, note 67. If a delay took place, it was probably because of the inclusion of the lastarticle or clause, which unlike the other articles, was perhaps taken from the teaching ofNicholas of Autrecourt. Inasmuch as that was one of the articles whose orthodoxy wasbeing judged at Avignon, some arts masters may have felt it presumptive and possiblyoffensive to Benedict XII to condemn it at Paris before the Avignon commission hadcompleted its deliberations.

73 AUP I, col. 44: “In cujus tempore nichil est factum, quod perfecte ad actumduceretur.”


speech when one allowed only the strictest literal meaning (de virtute

sermonis) was certainly one of Conrad’s later concerns. In his Ökonom-

ica he criticized the wretches (miseri) who rejected as meaningless suchsentences as “aqua transit in fluviis” or “venti volant” because theyattribute an action to a subject that it does not in reality have, sincewater does not have feet, nor do winds have wings.74 Conrad, echoingthe language of the statute of December 1340, noted the implications ofthis fallacy for scriptural exegesis.75 But nowhere in Conrad’s discussiondid he attribute those views to the Occamistae. That label he employedonly when criticizing Ockham’s natural philosophy. The first text inwhich Conrad attacked Ockhamist physics—unless certain questionsin Vat. lat. 1087 were authored or influenced by Conrad—was in hiscommentary on John of Sacrobosco’s Sphaera, which Conrad completedin 1347 while teaching at St. Stephan’s school in Vienna. He rejectedOckham’s teaching that points and lines were not res distinctae inter se et a

corpore.76 The critique was expanded in his Ökonomica, written at Regens-burg between 1348 and 1352. There Conrad rejected the opinion ofOckham and his followers that the categories of relation (relatio), place(situs), habit (habitus), where (ubi), and when (quando) were indistinguish-

74 Ökonomica III, tr. 1, ch. 12, p. 47: “surguntque miseri quidam, qui se numquamdignos noverunt discipulos et quod penitus nesciunt docere presumunt atque, quodcondolendo refero, tales nobilibus ingeniis pocius seductores quam doctores preficiunt.Gramaticam indignis molestant derisibus affirmantes quod nulla partium oracionisconstructio est transitiva. … Quapropter aqua non transit in fluviis secundum eos,neque venti volant, quoniam alas non habent. Nec poterit dici quod una pars oracionisregat aliam secundum modorum significandi proporciones, quia intellectus humanusomnes partes orationis regit et dirigit. Proprietates enim partium oracionis nichil sunt,ut dicunt.”

75 Ibid.: “Rethoricam eloquenciam adeo sua cecitate postergant, ut nec flores ver-borum nec colores sentenciarum capiant, sed flores in pratis crescere et colores variospictores componere et pulchre variare ad instar nature affirmant. Qualiter hii dul-ciloquia sacrarum interpretentur scripturarum quevis racio disposita noscit, nec estdubium hereses ex hiis innumeras pullulare. Scriptura etenim sacra non semel uterumvirginalem virgam vocat et filium dei inde conceptum florem appellat. Et si de virtutesermonis iste oraciones false sunt, sequitur rethoricam in pulcherrimis speciebus tran-sumpcionis nullam ad oraciones habere virtutem, et sic rethorica quasi evanuit tota.”

76 München, Bayr. Staatsbibliothek, Clm 14687, fol. 74ra, as quoted by Sabine Krü-ger, “Krise der Zeit als Ursache der Pest? Der Traktat de mortalitate in Alamanniades Konrad von Megenberg,” in Festschrift für Hermann Heimpel zum 70. Geburtstag, vol. II(Göttingen, 1972), pp. 839–883, at 849, n. 55: “Sed hic est advertendum, quod secun-dum illos, qui negant puncta habere esse reale preter animam et similiter lineas, sicutfacit frater Wilhalmus et sui, illi dicerent, quod secunda descripcio spere eciam com-peteret sibi secundum esse suum ymaginativum et conceptibile, sed ego non sum istiusopinionis, et habet de hoc videri alibi, scilicet in questionibus physis.”


able from absolute, permanent things, who identified quantity as simplya description of substance as extended, and who affirmed that motion(motus) was indistinguishable from permanent things.77

The arts faculty statute of September 1339 was vague about whatsubject matter they proscribed when they forbade Ockham’s doctrina.78

But the writings of Conrad and, even more explicitly, the sententialand physical questions in Vat. lat. 1087 make clear that the principaldoctrine proscribed was Ockham’s interpretation of the categories andits implications for science. This is spelled out in the inception oathsfor the arts faculty, revised in the summer or fall of 1341, in which,parallel to numerous passages in Vat. lat. 1087, the contrast is madebetween Ockhamist scientia and the teaching of Aristotle, Averroes, andthe ancient commentators.79 Whether this language simply expands onthe implicit meaning of the 1339 statute or derives from an additionalpiece of anti-Ockhamist legislation, the battle over Ockham’s physicswas central to the events of 1339–1341. When, in September 1341,the English-German nation required an anti-Ockhamist loyalty oathof all members of the nation, students and masters alike, that theydid not belong to and would inform on anyone who belonged to thesecta occamica, Conrad’s name appears among the masters signing thatlegislation, and he was probably among its principal sponsors.80

It is ironic that Conrad’s departure from Paris coincided with thereturn of Gregory of Rimini to Paris (1342) as the Augustinian sen-

tentiarius for the following academic year, 1343–1344.81 Rimini was the

77 Ökonomica III, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 7: “Aut certe dici potest, quod clerus deficiens in statuscolastico est hic, qui naturas plurium abnegat rerum, quemadmodum frater Wilhelmusde Occham Anglicus atque sui sequaces, qui tam relaciones quam situs, habitus, ubi,quando, asserunt preter animam res indistinctas a rebus absolutis atque quantitatemeandem cum substancia rem affirmant. Motus eciam in quibus actiones rerum etpassiones firmantur dicunt res indistinctas a permanentibus rebus.”

78 CUP II, pp. 485–486, #1023.79 CUP II, p. 680: “Item jurabitis quod statuta facta per facultatem artium con-

tra scientiam Okamicam observabitis, neque dictam scientiam et consimiles sustinebitisquoquomodo, sed scientiam Aristotelis et sui Commentatoris Averrois et aliorum com-mentatorum antiquorum et expositorum dicti Aristotelis, nisi in casibus qui sunt contrafidem.”

80 AUP I, cols. 52–53: “… nullus decetero admitteretur ad aliquos actus legitimos indicta nacione, nisi prius juraret quod revelaret, si sciret aliquos de secta Occanica adinvicem conspirasse de secta vel opinionibus erroneis fovendis, vel etiam conjuratos essevel conventicula habere occulta, aliter nisi jure diceret si sciret, ex tunc penam perjuriiincurreret.”

81 V. Marcolino, “Einleitung,” in Gregory of Rimini, Lectura super primum et secundumsententiarum, ed. D. Trapp and V. Marcolino, vol. I (Berlin, 1981), pp. xi–xiii.


first theologian at Paris to defend publicly Ockham’s natural philoso-phy, as did Hugolino of Orvieto at the end of the decade.82 Whatevereffect Conrad had at Paris in subsequent years came from a distance,either through his writings or, since he was in Avignon in 1346 whenClement VI drafted his letter to the University of Paris, as an encourag-ing voice on the wording of that papal admonition.83 But eventually theanti-Ockhamist legislation in the arts faculty—at least as regards Ock-ham’s natural philosophy—failed. Sometime between 1355 and 1365the prohibition of Ockham’s scientia was removed from the oaths in thearts faculty and all mention of those statutes, as they applied to Ock-ham, was likewise removed from the oaths.84 How Conrad would havereacted to the collapse of an effort to which he had devoted so muchpolitical energy can only be imagined. It would probably have beenfurther evidence, in his eyes, of a world gone wrong.

82 W.J. Courtenay, “The Role of English Thought in the Transformation of Uni-versity Education in the Late Middle Ages,” in J.M. Kittelson and P.J. Transue (eds.),Rebirth, Reform and Resilience: Universities in Transition, 1300–1700 (Columbus, 1984), pp.103–162, at 126–131.

83 CUP II, pp. 587–590, #1125.84 Courtenay, “The Registers of the University of Paris,” at 40–42.

chapter fifteen

THE CATEGORIES, MICHAEL DE MASSA,AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY AT PARIS, 1335–1340*

Much of the recent debate over the introduction of Ockham’s thoughtinto Paris and the crises of the years 1339 and 1340 that led to theso-called anti-Nominalist statute of December 1340 has centered onhermeneutics, semantics, and the logic of propositions.1 Much of theevidence, however, suggests that a major issue separating the two sidesin the debate over Ockham was Ockham’s understanding of the cate-gories and its implications for his natural philosophy.2 These may seem,on the surface, two very different spheres of conflict: hermeneuticalprinciples of language and logic on the one hand, and ontology andnatural philosophy on the other. And yet in the eyes of some partic-ipants the issues raised in those two spheres were intimately related.After briefly sketching the stages in the conflict over the categories atParis in the 1330s and 1340s, I will analyze the arguments of Michael

* Originally presented at the thirteenth European Symposium on Medieval Logicand Semantics (Avignon, 6–10 June 2000) and published in La tradition médiévale descatégories (XIIe–XVe siècles), ed. J. Biard and I. Rosier-Catach (Louvain-la-Neuve andParis, 2003), pp. 243–260.

1 Z. Kaluza, “Les sciences et leurs langages. Note sur le Statut du 29 Decembre1340 et le preténdu statut perdu contre Ockham,” in L. Bianchi (ed.) Filosofia e teologianel Trecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi, Textes et études du Moyen Age 1 (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1994), pp. 197–258; H. Thijssen, “Once Again the Ockhamist Statutes of 1339and 1340: Some New Perspectives,” Vivarium, 27 (1990), 136–167; Idem, “The SemanticArticles of Autrecourt’s Condemnation. New Proposals for an Interpretation of Articles1, 30, 35, 57, and 58,” AHDLMA, 57 (1990), 155–175; Idem, “The Crisis over OckhamistHermeneutic and its Semantic Background: the methodological significance of thecensure of December 29, 1340,” in C. Marmo (ed.), Vestigia, Imagines, Verba: Semioticsand Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIth–XIVth Century) (Bologna, 1997), pp. 371–392.This discussion has centered on supposition theory and whether true propositions arelimited to those that are true only according to the strict, literal meaning of their terms,de virtute sermonis, or whether one should consider common usage, authorial intention,and figures of speech.

2 W.J. Courtenay and K.H. Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-Ger-man Nation at Paris, 1339–1341,” History of Universities, 2 (1982), 53–96; Courtenay, “TheDebate over Ockham’s Physical Theories at Paris,” in S. Caroti and P. Souffrin (eds.),La Nouvelle Physique du XIVe siècle (Firenze, 1997), pp. 45–63 [both reprinted in this volumeas chapters 9 and 12].

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de Massa, who is the earliest witness to that debate, and then reexplorethe connections on this issue between natural philosophy and the logicof propositions. The text of Massa’s question on motion is provided atthe end of the article.

As is well known, there were a number of attempts in the late thir-teenth and early fourteenth centuries to distinguish within the Aris-totelian categories those that had real existence and those that weresimply descriptive of existing things (res permanentes) in various states. Informulating those views, the issue was not to reject the teaching of Aris-totle on the categories but rather to interpret Aristotle along the linesof a reduced ontology. Those who proceeded in this manner not onlyfelt they were bringing the interpretation of the Aristotelian texts in linewith the true nature of things, of external reality, but were thus correctlyinterpreting Aristotle’s true meaning. Others, probably the majority ofthose treating these matters in that period, preferred a broader ontol-ogy that, for them, better explained the physical world and correctlyinterpreted Aristotle’s meaning and that of his Commentator, Averroes.

The controversial nature of a reduced ontology can be seen in theopposition to Peter Olivi’s reduction of “real” categories to three: sub-stance, quality, and action.3 Olivi’s principal aim was to undermine sub-servient acceptance of Aristotle’s opinions rather than to identify Aris-totle’s true meaning through a reinterpretation of the categories. WithWilliam of Ockham, who is known to have maintained that only thecategories of substance and quality or, more precisely, individual sub-stances and qualities are real, the case is different. Rather than tryingto maintain, as did Olivi, that Aristotle was not the final word on suchmatters, Ockham preferred to bring the interpretation of Aristotle intoline with what he (Ockham) believed. Within the context of the freeratmosphere of classroom debates, as distinct from the hostile contextof his trial at Avignon, Ockham was willing to defend his position as apossible, even probable, interpretation of Aristotle’s true meaning.

Discussions of to what the categories refer, whether res or mentalconcepts, or better, how and in what ways the categories relate to realthings, can be and usually are conducted within the context of logic.

3 Epistola ad R., in Olivi, Quodlibeta (Venice, 1509), fol. 52(64)v: “Quod quando nihilaliud est quam tempus, et universaliter quod predicamenta non different re, sed ratione,preter substantiam, qualitatem et actionem,” cited from D. Burr, The Persecution of PeterOlivi, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, new ser. 66/5 (Philadelphia,1976), p. 55. See also Olivi’s Tractatus de quantitate (Venice, 1509), and Book II of hiscommentary of the Sentences, ed. B. Jansen, 3 vols. (Quaracchi, 1921–1926).

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But it is also the case that other issues outside or peripheral to logicinfluenced discussions of the categories in the thirteenth and fourteenthcenturies, and probably in the twelfth century as well.

One of these, theology, is strikingly important. To take one example,the issue of the real status of quantity was fiercely debated in thecontext of Eucharistic transubstantiation. Aquinas had argued that thequantum of bread and wine must remain without the substance of breadand wine, for otherwise there would be nothing in which the remainingaccidents of bread and wine could inhere since they could not inherein the substance of the body of Christ. For Olivi and Ockham themiracle of transubstantiation did not need a remaining quantum, andconsequently the mechanics of transubstantiation did not require thatquantity be anything other than a description that a substance wasextended in space, or having part separate from part. Discussions ofrelation in the context of the Trinity are another example.

The other sphere of knowledge or discourse that shaped interpre-tations of the categories was natural philosophy, one facet of whichI will be treating here. Depending on one’s view of the principles ofnature, or how the universe operates, the real status of quantity, rela-tion, action, passion, place, position, time, and motion came under dis-cussion, and it was often the way in which the categories were under-stood with regard to nature that drove the intensity of debate.

The reinterpretation of Aristotle’s categories and its implications forthe understanding of the principles of nature (and not simply categoriesas objects of thought) gathered new force at Paris in the 1330s withthe introduction first of Ockham’s Summa logicae, and then graduallywith the circulation of some of his other writings.4 There is a strongpossibility that the Ockhamist work known as the Tractatus de successivis

was assembled at Paris in this period.5 In any event, it was at Paris thata controversy over the opinions of the Occamistae developed, and it isto the natural-philosophy side of that issue and the first witness to thatdebate that I now turn, namely the Questions on the Sentences of Michaelde Massa.

4 W.J. Courtenay, “The Reception of Ockham’s Thought at the University of Paris,”in Z. Kaluza and P. Vignaux (eds), Preuve et raisons à l’Université de Paris: Logique, ontologie etthéologie au XIVe siècle (Paris, 1984), pp. 43–64 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 8].

5 The Tractatus de Successivis attributed to William Ockham, ed. Ph. Boehner (St. Bonaven-ture, N.Y., 1944).

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Michael de Massa and the Occamistae

Michael de Massa belonged to the mendicant order of the AugustinianHermits, and his baccalaureate in theology at Paris, which began withhis Parisian lectures on the Sentences, has recently been redated to theearly 1330s.6 Massa died at Paris in 1337, still a “formed bachelor” intheology and awaiting his opportunity to be licensed and incept as adoctor of theology. He was buried in the Augustinian convent at Pariswith the dubious honor of having his writings buried with him. Thismay explain why, apart from his questions on Book One of the Sentences,so few manuscripts of the rest of his writings have survived. Thereis only one manuscript with questions on Book Two of the Sentences,anonymous but attributed to Massa by Damasus Trapp.7

It is this manuscript Vat. lat. 1087 that concerns us. Imbedded inthat work were questions on time and motion that are identified asquaestiones extraordinariae or additiones. That description suggests that theywere questions added to the text after Massa’s sentential year at Paris,questions that were generated from debates during his time as a formedbachelor, or questions that derived from a different academic exercise,such as questions on Aristotle’s Categories or Physics. Their form andtone, however, suggest a debate context: quaestiones disputatae.

In his twelfth quaestio extraordinaria, after having dealt with dura-tion and the aevum in the previous question, Massa raised the issueof whether motion was identical with the moved thing, or whethermotion, and correspondingly time, have any reality apart from things.It is here that he introduces what he calls the error of certain con-temporaries (moderni) who undermine both the principles and conclu-sions of physics by reviving the opinions of ancient philosophers whoseviews were rejected by Aristotle.8 From the standpoint of physics, therevived theory, according to Massa, is that of the Eleatics, specificallyParmenides and Melissus, who are reputed to have held a static viewof the universe in which change, motion, and time are misperceptions

6 W.J. Courtenay, “The Quaestiones in Sententias of Michael de Massa, OESA: ARedating,” Augustiniana, 45 (1995), 191–207 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 13].

7 Vat. lat. 1087. On the manuscripts see D. Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the14th Century,” Augustiniana, 6 (1956), 146–274, at 163–175; Trapp, “Notes on someManuscripts of the Augustinian Michael de Massa (d. 1337),” Augustinianum, 5 (1965),58–133.

8 Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 70rb (below, p. 339).

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of reality.9 The heavens do not move, and what appears to be motionis only a static reality viewed at different moments. Put another way,motion is not something separate from the heavens but is identical withit; motus is the caelum, and motus, or motion, is identical with the mobile,or moved thing.

Whether those who were arguing for a reduced ontology in therealm of nature, an ontology described here by Massa as one thataccorded reality only to substances and qualities, were actually revert-ing to the position of the Eleatics and arguing for a static universe ornot, Massa’s opponents supported their position in natural philosophythrough grammatical arguments, through what Massa called a “flightto grammar”. By this Massa meant that his opponents approachedquestions of time and motion not as factors in physical nature but asthose words and related terms were used in propositions. What dowords like ‘moving,’ ‘moved’ or ‘motion’ stand for when used in aproposition? Is there a reality to which ‘motion’, as a term in a proposi-tion, corresponds, or is it, like one interpretation of abstract concepts oruniversals, such as ‘man’, simply a short-hand way of describing manyexisting individuals, in this case, an individual substance at successivemoments and in successive individual places?

To approach questions about time and motion from the standpointof grammar and propositional logic is not, in itself, anti-Aristotelian,as Massa seems to suggest. Aristotle’s Praedicamenta is a work in logic,and the categories were discussed there as categories of thought intowhich certain words that differed grammatically were placed. Voces, orexpressions, which are spoken incomplexa, or terms, belong to differentcategories inasmuch as they are nouns (‘man’, ‘horse’), or adjectives ofquantity, quality, or relation (‘two cubits long’, ‘white’, ‘greater’, ‘less’),or adverbs of time and place (‘yesterday’, ‘in the agora’).10 Expressionsconcerned with motion and change are intimately linked to several cat-egories: time, place, relation, position, action, and passion or affection.And it is not surprising that chapters four and following of Aristotle’sPraedicamenta naturally lend themselves to a grammatical and termin-ist approach. Only when used in propositions do terms become sub-ject to truth or falsehood, and the nature of the real status of abstract

9 Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 70va (below, p. 342).10 Aristoteles latinus: Categoriae vel Praedicamenta, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Bruges–Paris,

1961), pp. 86–87.

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terms and universals depends inevitably on the theory of suppositionbeing applied.

To return to Massa’s description of the position he is opposing, itapproaches questions of motion from the standpoint of propositionallogic. Thus, according to them, when Aristotle says that the mobile isthe subject of motion, that statement ought not to be understood tomean that motion is a reality added to the mobile as its subject, but thatthe mobile is the subject of a proposition in which motus is predicatedof it. Thus the proposition “mobile movetur” is true in the sense that amobile existing in one place and occurring in another place is said to bemoved locally. The same is true when something white becomes black.In neither case is ‘motion’ or ‘change’ something that is added to themoved or changed object.11

Massa holds the opposite view. His beginning point for any discus-sion of motion and the related issues of time and place is the physicaloperation of nature. As such his determinative text is Aristotle’s Physica,not his Praedicamenta. His opponents approach motion from the stand-point of the Praedicamenta and propositional logic, and interpret the dis-cussion of motion in Aristotle’s Physica as well as Averroes’s commen-tary on it from the standpoint of logic and language. For Massa, theyare intentionally avoiding discussing the matter physice or ad rem and arefleeing to grammar, where they can employ, as he puts it, sophisticalargumentation.12

But even in the context of propositions and the Praedicamenta, theirposition is absurd in Massa’s view. Contradictory propositions cannotbe true at the same time. If motion were identical with that which ismoved, then the true proposition, “mobile movetur”, and the false propo-sition, “motus movetur”, would be simultaneously true, which is absurd.13

Throughout his question Massa seems to have a particular group ofopponents in mind, sometimes referring to their position in the plural,sometimes in the singular as if it were one opponent. If reducing realcategories to substance and quality, and identifying motion with thething moved, were not sufficient clues, Massa directly attributes theseviews in another question to the Occamistae.14

11 Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 70rb (below, pp. 340–341).12 Ibid., fol. 70va (below, p. 341); and earlier, fol. 70rb (below, p. 340).13 Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 70va–70vb (below, pp. 342–343).14 Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 88va: “Sed secundum istos contra quos arguo, tempus et primus

motus sunt idem idemptitate, nec different nisi conceptibiliter” Ibid.: “Avicenna nume-

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Apart from the strong disagreement regarding time and motionbetween Massa and the Occamistae, there are some other factors worthnoting. First, Massa is writing as a bachelor of theology who, by reasonof his religious order, never studied in or took a degree in the facultyof arts. He is approaching these issues as a theologian. This is reflectedin an example he gives toward the end of his question on motion. Theexception to the rule that motion is a reality added to that which ismoved is the body of Christ, which acquires a new ubi in the sacramentof the altar without losing or moving from the ubi it has in heaven,and without motion as a separate reality being added to it.15 Whileopposition to the teachings of the Occamistae at Paris as far as statutesare concerned erupts in the faculty of arts in 1339 and 1340, these issueswere already under debate in the faculty of theology in the mid-1330s.

Second, as one moves through the language of Massa’s questions,one has the sense that he is debating a particular adversary or adver-saries, presumably fellow bachelors of theology in the early to mid1330s. Some of these may have been secular theologians who, as didNicholas of Autrecourt, continued to teach in the arts faculty whilecompleting the degree in theology. By saying this I am not placingAutrecourt among the Occamistae but only pointing out a context thatcould and frequently did bring mendicant theologians, with no directconnection to the arts faculty, into debate with theologians who simul-taneously taught in the arts faculty and may have incorporated intotheir theological debates issues that might appear primarily philosoph-ical.16 Thus, both at the level of classroom teaching and debates, theconcerns of the faculties of arts and theology mixed.

Third, by the early to mid 1330s, given the testimony of this manu-script and Massa’s death in 1337, there were those at Paris who adopteda reduced, Ockhamist ontology and apparently adopted as well itsimplications for natural philosophy. It was clearly the latter—the impli-cations for natural philosophy—that most troubled Michael de Massa.

rat secundo Physicae suae quod fuerunt sex opiniones antiquorum de tempore […]set sexto dixerunt aliqui quod tempus est ipsummet caelum, et in sententiam istorumincidunt Okanistae.”

15 Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 71ra (below, pp. 345–346).16 Although the issues differ, one should recall that in the years immediately before

Autrecourt’s summons to Avignon in 1340, Autrecourt himself was a bachelor and thenlicentiate in theology, and that one of his main opponents was a fellow bachelor of the-ology, Bernard of Arezzo, O.F.M. On Bernard, see Z. Kaluza, “Nicolas d’Autrécourt”,HLF, 42.1 (Paris, 1995), pp. 56–64.

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But if that is the case, why does the so-called anti-Ockhamist statute ofthe arts faculty in December 1340 appear to restrict itself to errors inhermeneutics and the understanding of propositions? Is there any com-mon ground between the issues that concerned Massa and the issuesthat concerned those who drafted the statute against the Occamistae?

Ockham’s Doctrina and the Teaching of Aristotle and Averroes

If one sets aside for a moment the arts faculty statute of December 1340and compares the language of the earlier statute of September 1339with the text of these quaestiones extraordinariae of Michael de Massa, itappears that the fundamental issue of debate in the mid-to-late 1330sat Paris was Ockham’s reductionist ontology and its implications fornatural philosophy. The statute of September 1339, the one that pro-hibits the use of Ockham in public or private teaching, refers not tomethods of argumentation or to hermeneutics but to Ockham’s doct-

rina, which better describes a body of teaching. Similarly, when anti-Ockhamist statutes are mentioned in the oaths introduced in the 1340sfor incepting bachelors in the arts faculty, it is still Ockham’s doctrina

or scientia that is to be avoided. While I am willing to concede thatthe famous statute of December 1340 may have been directed againstthe argumentational practices of Occamistae at Paris, I remain convincedthat the two anti-Ockhamist statutes to which the oaths refer do notinclude that of December 1340 and may even have been drafted andimplemented in the 1339–1340 academic year rather than later. Thoseoaths refer specifically to two statutes, one of which is undoubtedly thatof September 1339 because of verbatim parallels. The other refers to astatute against Ockham’s scientia, so described but not further defined,which is contrasted in the oath and presumably in the statute itself tothe teaching, the scientia, of Aristotle and the Commentator. That con-trast resonates throughout these later questions of Michael de Massa,where they invariably refer to the debate over the status of quantity,relation, place, time, and motion. The same is true in the later writingsof Conrad of Megenberg, one of the leading masters in the arts fac-ulty at this time who stood in opposition to Ockham’s ontology. Despitethe fact that no statute survives that specifically forbids the teaching ofOckham’s natural philosophy and requires instead the adoption of thatof Aristotle, his Commentator, and other ancient commentators andexpositors, the language of that oath points to the former existence of

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such a statute, one of several known to have once existed but which arenot included in the surviving versions of the books of the nations or theBook of the Rector. Sometime between 1355 and 1365 the oath againstOckham’s scientia was deleted from the list of items to which bachelorshad to swear before proceeding to the licence and inception in the artsfaculty.17 The removal from the list of oaths of any mention of Ockhammay have made the text of a statute against Ockham’s scientia also lessin need of preservation, since it was no longer applicable.

The Anti-Ockhamist Statute of December 1340

Michael of Massa, like his secular counterpart, Conrad of Megen-berg, was convinced that questions regarding motion and time shouldbe approached from the standpoint of physics and ad rem. Aristotle’sPhysics, Averroes’s commentary on that text, and the commentaries ofAlbert, Thomas, Giles of Rome, and other late thirteenth-century inter-preters were the foundation for that discussion. Those to whom Massaand Megenberg were opposed were equally convinced that motion andtime, and the other categories, save substance and quality, should beapproached by way of propositions. For them Aristotle’s Praedicamenta

was the fundamental text, as interpreted by more recent commenta-tors, especially perhaps Ockham. Consequently, Aristotle’s discussionof motion and time in his Physics should be read in light of their discus-sion in Praedicamenta, which should in turn be read in light of theoriesof supposition and connotation. What to Massa appeared as a failureto answer the difficult questions in physics by recourse to grammati-cal flights of fancy was, from the other side, a serious attempt to cometo terms with the ontological status of abstract terms and the relationof existing individuals to universals and categories through which theywere defined.

There is no question that the arts faculty statute of December 1340was concerned with the hermeneutics of propositions as applied toauthoritative texts. While the only text referred to in the statute was

17 W.J. Courtenay, “The Registers of the University of Paris and the Statutes againstthe Scientia Occamica,” Vivarium, 29 (1991), 13–49 [reprinted in this volume as Chap-ter 11]. For examples of arts faculty statutes that are not preserved in the books of thenations or the Book of the Rector, see Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists,and the English-German Nation,” 63 and 86, n. 33.

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the Bible, whose authority would be undermined by a strictly literalapproach to the meaning of statements in Scripture, it is likely thatthe interpretation of Aristotelian texts was also a matter of concern,since those were the principal authoritative texts in the arts curriculum.The first article of the 1340 statute makes clear that the arts masterswere concerned with the interpretation of “famous propositions” thatoccurred in the texts on which arts masters lectured. What happens,for example, if the proposition “omnis quod movetur ab alio movetur” issubjected to an analysis that allows as true only a literal interpretationof the proposition, de virtute sermonis? If the famous proposition justcited is understood to mean that motion is something added to themoved object, and if one believes motion is connotative rather thandenoting something real, then the proposition would, for them, be falseon grammatical grounds regardless of what Aristotle intended in therealm of physics.

Many of the articles in the 1340 statute concern debate techniquesabout what is allowable or inadmissible in interpreting texts and re-sponding to opponents. Limiting the meaning of words in a propo-sition to their literal meaning without regard to authorial intent orcommon usage distorts the meaning of the author. Although the exam-ples of authoritative propositions to which Massa refers do not imme-diately appear subject to this, Conrad of Megenberg attributes to hisopponents some traditional examples of true propositions whose literalmeaning is false. “Rivers run” and “winds fly” are true propositions inthe way they are normally understood, yet they are false if one assumesthe verb ‘run’ implies legs, which rivers lack, and if one assumes theverb ‘fly’ implies wings, which winds do not have.18 These are ratherpuerile tricks of debate that permit one person to escape concedingan opponent’s argument by denying the truth of the other’s statementbecause of its absurdity, de virtute sermonis. One could avoid the intendedmeaning of most statements by restricting propositional truth to strictliteral meaning, a technique that could well be described as a flightfrom reality to grammar. And if statements, such as “everything thatmoves is moved by another”, could be construed as false dependingon what words like ‘moves’ and ‘is moved’ actually mean, or to whatthey refer, then there may be a sense in which the hermeneutical rulesunder discussion in the statute of December 1340 have relevance to the

18 Megenberg, Economica III, tr. 1, ch. 12, in L. Thorndike (ed.), University Records andLife in the Middle Ages (New York, 1971), p. 431.

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grammatical arguments in the realm of physical nature that Massa andMegenberg attributed to the Occamistae.

While the arts faculty statute of December 1340 is not concernedwith questions of natural philosophy or the ontological status of motion,time, relation, place, or quantity, both the statute and Massa’s discus-sion of the Ockhamist view of motion do relate to one another on thelevel of supposition of terms in propositions. This grammatical dimen-sion to both branches of the Ockhamist crisis at Paris—branches that indifferent ways concern the categories—is a topic still in need of furtherexamination.

In the following edition of Michael de Massa’s question on motion,which occurs in a unique and at times corrupt manuscript, the wordsin [ ] brackets appear in the manuscript but should probably be elim-inated, while words in 〈〉 brackets are editorial insertions. Words inparentheses provide the manuscript reading of the immediately preced-ing word or words.19

Utrum motus sit realiter ipsummet mobile quod movetur(Vat. lat. 1087, fols. 70rb–71ra)

Duodecima quaestio extraordinaria circa materiam creationis erat ista:Utrum duratio successiva quae est ipsum tempus sit realiter idem quodmotus cuius est passio. Et quia quaestio ista est difficillima tam rationerealitatis temporis quam etiam ratione realitatis motus, ideo quaestio-nem istam multum articulare oportet et primo quantum ad realitatemmotus, secundo quo ad realitatem temporis. Et quia de realitate motusest unus error quorundam modernorum, qui circa totam physicamtam quantum ad principia quam etiam quantum ad conclusiones ipsiusconati sunt innovare errores antiquorum philosophorum, quos Aristo-teles frequentissime reprobat, licet per quasdam fugas grammaticaleshuius[modi] errores sustineant, quae modicum valent, sicut alias appa-rebit, ideo statim pro nunc de errore istorum circa realitatem motusexpedio me valde breviter, gratia cuius moveo istam quaestionem.

Utrum motus sit realiter ipsummet mobile quod movetur. Et videturquod sic, quia frustra ponitur pluralitas realitatum sine necessitate;

19 I am grateful to Prof. Stefano Caroti for giving the text a second reading andhelping with several difficult sections.

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patet primo Physicorum. Sed ponendo quod motus sit realiter idemquod mobile salvantur omnia quae dicuntur de mobili et de motu;frustra ergo poneretur quod essent plures realitates. Probo minorem,nam dicendo quod motus non sit aliud nisi ipsummet mobile ut indiversis locis, ita quod nunc mobile dicatur moveri vel esse motumquando prius est in uno loco, quem connotat in tali situ, et postmodumsit in alio loco, quem connotat in alio situ, absque hoc quod motus sitquaedam realitas addita ipsi mobili, quare etc.

In contrarium est quia quidditates diversorum praedicamentorumrealium sunt diverse realiter, et per consequens sunt diverse realita-tes. Patet, quia praedicamenta realia sunt ex natura rei primo perse diversa, sicut Aristoteles dicit, secundo Posteriorum. Et accipio hicpraedicamenta pro rebus quae quidditative sunt in praedicamentis; sedmotus et mobile sunt quidditates diversorum praedicamentorum rea-lium, patet per Aristotelem tertio Physicorum, quare etc.

Respondeo sicut dixi: hic est unus errorum quorundam moderno-rum qui secundum rei veritatem conantur diffundere inter vera dictaphysicae multa semina falsitatum, et in omnibus tamquam verbosihabent recursum ad verba grammaticalia sophistice utendo eis. Necforte melior modus esset nisi nauseare super dictis eorum et dicerecontra verbosos “noli contendere verbis” (IITim. 2:14), quia secundumveritatem errores ipsorum non sunt cum magna diligentia pertractandi.Et ideo expediamus nos de illo errore quem asserunt circa realitatemmotus; dicunt enim quod motus non est distinctus a mobili, sed est rea-liter ipsummet mobile.

Et quod ita sit probant, quia corpus caeleste est quoddam mobilea quo non distinguitur realiter suus motus; ergo pari ratione dicen-dum est de omni mobili et de motu quo quandoque movetur. Patetconsequentia, sed antecedens proba[n]t, quoniam alias cotidie in caelogeneraretur et corrumperetur aliqua nova res et cotidie fieret deperdi-tio et acquisitio alicuius realitatis in caelo formaliter entis, quod videturabsurdum. Et si quandoque inveniatur, quod Aristoteles dicat mobileesse subiectum motus, hoc debet intelligi non quidem quasi motus sitquaedam realitas addita cuius mobile est subiectum, sed debet intelligiquod videlicet mobile est subiectum propositionis verae in qua ‘mobile’subicitur et ‘motus’ praedicatur. Nam ista propositio est vera: mobilemovetur. Et veritas eius stat in hoc, quia idem mobile existens in unoloco, puta hic, si fiat in alio loco, puta ibi, tunc ex hoc ipso diciturmoveri localiter. Et pari ratione dum est sub una forma, puta sub albe-dine, et fiat sub nigredine, dicitur ex hoc ipso moveri, non quod motus

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sit quaedam res addita mobili praeter ipsummet terminum sub quo fitmobile, et ita de aliis.

Sed iste error est contra Aristotelem et Commentatorem. Patet, di-cunt enim, tertio Physicorum, quod mobile et motus eius habent sesicut subiectum et actus eius. Nam motus est actus mobilis secundumquod mobile. Nunc autem constat quod illud quod subicitur motui,tamquam et entelechiae, subicitur sibi tamquam realitati distinctae, etnon solum est subiectum propositionis, sed ex natura rei est id quodsubicitur et id cui subicitur.

Praeterea, Aristoteles, quinto Physicorum, dicit quod motus non estmotus neque per modum subiecti neque per modum termini. Et hocprobat multipliciter ibi, et una de suis probationibus ad probandumpartem, videlicet quod non per modum subiecti, /70va/ 〈est〉 quiasubiectum motus movetur; ergo si motus esset subiectum motus seque-retur quod motus moveretur, quod est impossibile, ut ipse dicit. Nuncautem loquendo physice et ad rem, et non recurrendo ad subiectumet praedicatum propositionis et ad suppositum et ad appositum pro-positionis grammaticaliter. Sed dico, loquendo ad rem, constat quod simotus esset realiter idem quod mobile, ergo realiter motus moveretur,quia realitas quae est motus movetur parte; set hoc est contra senten-tiam Aristotelis.

Praeterea, Commentator in commento XI declarat quia quod estsubiectum motus natum est quiescere; ergo et si motus esset subiec-tum motus, ergo motus posset subesse quieti, quod est impossibile,quia motus est contrarius quieti, et unum contrariorum non suscipitreliquum. Constat quod Commentator accipit ibi subiectum reale cuivicissim possunt inesse contraria, puta motus et quies, et non accipit ibisubiectum propositionis grammaticaliter; ergo secundum eum motusest quaedam res inexistens mobili, sicut suo per se subiecto ex naturarei. Potest ex dicto Commentatoris formari ratio, quia illa non suntidem realiter sive eadem realitas quorum unum contrariatur alicui (ms:aliquid) realiter et ex natura rei, et tamen alteri non contrariatur. Patetex considerationibus Aristotelis, tertio Thopicorum. Sed quies vere etrealiter et non solum grammaticaliter contrariatur motui, et tamen noncontrariatur mobili, ergo motus et mobile non sunt eadem realitas.

Praeterea, qua ratione mobile est idem realiter cum motu quo move-tur parte, pari ratione inest idem realiter cum quiete qua quiescit ces-sante motu. Set hoc posito sequitur primo, quod idem ens limitatumerit idem realiter cum duobus contrariis, et pari ratione posset poniidem realiter quibuscumque entibus disparatis inexistentibus sibi for-

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maliter, et ita redibit error Parmenidis et Mellissi, quem reprobat Ari-stoteles primo Physicorum, quia secundum hoc omnia quae sunt ineodem supposito, scilicet substantia, quantitas, et qualescumque qua-litates contrariae vel disparatae 〈et〉 universaliter omnia quae sunt ineodem supposito erunt eaedem (ms: eadem) res, et per quascumqueconnotationes et per quascumque figuras grammaticales tu conaris sal-vare quod una res sit quandoque motus et quandoque quies, et ego pereasdem salvabo tibi quod eadem res sit quandoque albedo et quando-que nigredo, sit quandoque qualitas sit quandoque substantia, et sic dealiis, quod est absurdum. Tamen verum est quod isti tantum exorbitantquod nullum absurdissimum habent pro inconvenienti.

Item, sequitur secundo quod motor movens mobile [nihil realiter]quantum potest movere nihil causaret in ipso mobili, quia ex quo motusest eadem res cum ipso mobili constat quod motor non causat reali-ter ipsum mobile, immo praesupponit ipsum, ergo pari ratione motormovendo realiter mobile non causabit realitatem motus, et ita per hocquod movet realiter nihil penitus causabit, et ita in vanum moveret etfrustra fatigaretur frequenter motor conando movere mobile, cum pertalem conatum nihil realiter causaret, quod est absurdum. Sequereturtertio vel quod mobile dum movetur realiter nichil acquireret in re, etper consequens frustra movebitur, quod est absurdum.

Praeterea, capio virtutem primi principii, et ita oportet quod istinegant quasi omnia illa quae statim de proximo eliciuntur ex primoprincipio, quod est: idem simul esse et non esse impossibile est. Immo,si quis bene attenderet, negant quandoque ipsam veritatem primi prin-cipii evidenter. Et ideo oportet nos sustinere primum principium sicutfaciebat Aristoteles, quarto Metaphysice. Et arguo sic: impossibile estquod idem simul sit et non sit, et accipio ‘esse’ et ‘non esse’ de secundoadiacente, ut omnis fuga connotationum tollatur. Patet per primumprincipium. Sed quando mobile quiescit, tunc ista est vera: mobileest, prout ly ‘est’ praedicatur secundo adiacens. Patet, quia, dato quodtunc motus sit vel est, tunc 〈est〉 motus alicuius mobilis vel non; patetper extrema contradictionis. Si non, ergo est motus sine mobile (ms:mobili), quod est impossible, et cum hoc haberetur propositum, quiasecundum hoc motus non esset realiter ipsum mobile. Si autem dicasquod sic, ergo [erit mobile] erit motus 〈alicuius〉 mobilis et mobile nonmovebitur, quod est contradictio.

Praeterea, quia tu fugis ad propositiones grammaticales, confirmorationem sic: impossibile 〈est〉 quod propositiones contradictoriae velcontrariae verificentur pro eodem tempore de una realitate uniformiter

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se habente. Patet, quia ab eo quod res est vel non est, dicitur oratio (ms:omnino) vera vel falsa; patet in Praedicamentis. Sed ista propositio veraest: mobile, puta caelum, movetur, et pro illo eodem tempore ista estfalsa (ms: fallacia): motus caeli movetur.

Item ista est vera: caelum movetur, et ista est falsa: caelum quiescit;ergo [res importata per ‘caelum’ et] res importata /70vb/ per motumcaeli et (ms: sit) res importata per quietem caeli non est eadem realitasnec est eadem res uniformiter habens se penes realitates intrinsecas.

Praeterea, quatuor sunt regulae Aristotelis ad convincendum plurali-tatem et distinctionem in rebus, quarum prima est: si de aliquibus plu-ribus nominaliter nullo modo altero ipsorum variato in re, set unifor-miter stante, verificantur contradictoria praedicata pro eodem instanti,quia veritas propositionum dependet ex veritate rerum.

Secunda regula est: separabilitas eorum in re sive ambobus manen-tibus, sicut est de sillabis unius nominis vel dictionis, septimo Metaphy-sice, sive altero corumpto ipsorum et altero manente, sicut est de mate-ria et privatione, ac etiam de materia et de forma, primo Physicorum.

Tertia est, quam ponit septimo Metaphysice, capitulo de partibus dif-finitionis contra parabolam Socratis junioris, videlicet quando sunt ali-qua inseparabilia tamen sunt vere proportionalia duobus aliis, quorumunum est ab alio separabile, quomodo convinci potest circulus distin-guatur a quantitate et a substantia caeli, licet non sint in re separabilia.

Quarta regula est quando contradictoria insint simul quia non pos-sunt eidem simul inesse; patet tertio Thopicorum et 10 Metaphysice. Etsi quis negaret regulas istas licitum est sibi dicere quod Deus et lapis,et Deus et chimera, idem sint realiter, et omnia quaecumque absurdavelis.

Nunc autem per primam regulam patet propositum nostrum, quianullo modo variato intrinsice corpore caelesti posset motus eius nonesse, et esset verum dicere motus caeli non est sicut erit post generaleiudicium, ergo realitas motus non est realitas mobilis.

Item, nunc de facto manifeste cetera uniformiter moveri non estverum dicere quod caelum quiescat, ergo quies non est eadem res cumrealitate caeli, alias sicut est caelum, ita esset in rerum natura quieseius, sed qua ratione quies caeli non est realiter caelum, ergo nec motuseius est realiter caelum mobile.

Item, per secundam regulam patet propositum, quia manet mobilenon manens (ms: manet) motus realiter, ergo non sunt idem realiter.

Item, per tertiam regulam patet quod adhuc magis habetur proposi-tum.

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Patet etiam per quartam regulam, ut arguatur sic: illa non sunt idemrealiter quorum unum quandoque intenditur et pro tunc alterum velminuitur vel saltem indivisibiliter sine intensione; patet per primumprincipium. Et eodem modo patet si esset econtra. Sed motus quando-que intenditur [pro] quando mobile non intenditur, posset enim caelummoveri velocius, sicut patet sexto Physicorum, et tamen caelum in suarealitate non intenderetur per intensionem motus.

Item, potest quandoque contingere quod intendatur motus cuiu-scumque generis sit ille motus, et tamen pro tunc potest per aliammotum minui mobile subiectum motui. Et quandoque econtra, quiapotest minui motus quando pro tunc non minuitur mobile et quando-que pro tunc per quemdam alium motum potest intendi mobile, et ideoneuter illorum motuum potest esse idem realiter cum ipso mobili.

Praeterea, qua ratione tu dicis quod motus localis est idem reali-ter cum ipso mobili, habeas dicere quod motus alterationis sit realiterquod ipsum alterabile. Et si dicas quod alteratio sit idem realiter quodipsammet forma acquisita per alterationem, licet hoc sit contra Aristo-telem, quinto Physicorum, ubi probat expresse contrarium; tamen hocconcesso, haberes dicere uniformiter quod motus localis sit realiter nonquidem mobile set sit ipsum ‘ubi’ quod per motum acquiritur, et Ari-stotelesmet de omnibus motibus in ordine ad suos terminos loquituruniformiter, tertio Physicorum. Sed dicendo quod alteratio sit realiterres alterabilis cum alteratio secundum Aristotelem et Commentatorem,tertio Physicorum, commento quarto, uno modo secundum verioremopinionem, sit ipsamet forma imperfecta intendens ad complementumet ex hoc ipso sit in genere in quo est forma, puta dealbatio, in generein quo est albedo ac etiam in eadem specie, ergo subiectum alterabilequod dealbatur est ipsamet forma albedinis sub esse incompleto, et itaforma quae per motum acquirit erit subiectum motus, quod est incon-veniens.

Item subiectum alterabile idem realiter est in specie albedinis et idemrealiter cum [albedine] nigredine [albedine] quando dealbatur, similitererit in specie nigredinis et idem realiter cum albedine (ms: nigredine)quando denigratur, quae omnia sunt absurda. Sic enim dicam tibi quodeadem res quae est albedo est ipsa dulcedo in lacte quando dulcedo est,et est etiam ipsamet amaritudo quando sublata dulcedine a lacte est ibiamaritudo, et ita de omnibus absurdissimis mundi.

Praeterea, agens reale applicatum applicatione reali circa passumdispositum reale causat aliquando effectum realem in ipso; sed movensmobile motu locali, puta movens caelum, est huiusmodi; ergo causat in

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ipso aliquem effectum et hoc /71ra/ positivum realem. Sed talis effectusnec est ipsum mobile nec locus, sed est ipsum ‘ubi’; ergo ‘ubi’ est aliquarealitas positiva praeter mobile et praeter locum, et per consequensmotus localis est aliqua realitas inherens mobili praeter locum.

Confirmatur, quia videmus quod agentia intentionalia sicut sol etcolor et lumen causant aliquem effectum positivum in passo etiam amagna distantia. Dicere ergo quod movens non causet aliquem effec-tum positivum in mobili est valde irrationabile. Sed constat quod mo-vens non causat mobile nec locum, ergo aliquam realitatem positi-vam ab utroque distinctam. Alias plus dicetur contra errorem istorumquando tractabo generalem abusionem quam ponunt, videlicet quodin eodem supposito nunquam concurrunt nisi duae distinctae realitates,scilicet substantia et qualitas; omnia autem entia, quaecumque sint illa,coincidunt in idem realiter cum altera istarum. Sed ad praesens istasufficiant.

Respondeo ad motivum ipsorum, quando dicunt: mobile quod estcaelum est idem realiter cum suo motu, etc. Nego antecedens. Adprobationem dico quod illud quod habent ipsi pro inconvenienti nonest inconveniens, sed neccessarium. Patet quod caelum cotidie recipiatet deperdat novam realitatem fluxibilem, videlicet novum ‘ubi’ fluensacquisitum semper per novum motum localem, alias motor movendocaelum nihil reale causaret in ipso. Insuper nos videmus, nisi velimusnegare sensum et totam scientiam astronomiae, quod luna cotidie reci-pit novum lumen a sole ex aliqua sui parte, et cotidie deperdit lumenreceptum ex alia parte. Nec est inconveniens quod caelum subiciaturcotidie talibus novis realitatibus, dummodo non sint peregrinae impres-siones abicientes per modum contrarii aliquid de dispositionibus, cumquaelibet substantia corporis caelestis habet neccesariam colligantiam.Et ideo motuum ipsorum in ista materia, sicut et in omnibus aliis con-similibus, frivolum est et penitus puerile.

Ad argumentum principale quod est de motivis ipsorum, concedomaiorem, sed nego minorem. Et ad probationem dico quod non sufficitsolum mobile, immo est necessaria realitas motus per quem acquiriturmobili alius terminus, nec acquirit mobile aliud ‘ubi’ distans a primo‘ubi’ nisi per prius superveniat mobili quaedam realitas sibi addita,quae est ipsamet translatio acquisitiva termini ad quem vadit, natura-liter dico loquendo. Et dato quod per divinam virtutem corpus mobileexistens in uno ‘ubi’ acquireret aliud ‘ubi’ non dimittendo primum, itaquod non superveniret mobili realitas motus per quem dimitteret pri-mum ‘ubi’ et acquireret aliud, sed stante primo ubi acquireret aliud

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‘ubi’, sicut est de corpore Christi in caelo et in sacramento altaris, velsicut esset de quocumque alio corpore dummodo existens in plus acqui-reret aliud ‘ubi’, tunc tale mobile ita acquireret aliud novum ‘ubi’, quodtamen non moveretur, sicut non movetur corpus Christi existens incaelo quando acquirit aliud ‘ubi’ in sacramento. Et ex hoc patet quodmotus est alia realitas a mobili et a termino quod acquiritur mobili peripsum motum. Sic ergo error istorum tamquam abusio dicatur.

Et accedamus ad inquisitionem magis utilem de realitate ipsius mo-tus. Nec oportet Philosophum volentem proficere confundere realitateseorum et confugere ad proprietates grammaticales, ut habeatur fugade non explicando realitates eorum et difficultates physicas circa ipsas.Immo quantum possumus investigare, tantum (ms: possumus) debe-mus explicite de quiditatibus rerum. Moveamus ergo aliquas quaestio-nes circa realitatem motus more Aristotelis et Commentatoris et alio-rum philosophorum praetermittendo insanias modernorum innovan-tium grossitive antiquorum.

part four

AFTERMATH

chapter sixteen

OCKHAMISM AMONG THE AUGUSTINIANS:THE CASE OF ADAM WODEHAM*

We have come a long way from the days when most Moderni wereautomatically assumed to be disciples of Ockham and when Gregoryof Rimini could without hesitation be termed the standard-bearer ofthe Nominalists. As a result of the pioneering efforts of the last gen-eration we are now becoming aware of the complexity of fourteenth-century thought and the inappropriateness of our traditional labels. Infact, one of the few lines of intellectual continuity that has remainedin fourteenth-century studies has been among the Augustinian Her-mits, whose major representatives shared certain theological presuppo-sitions and whose high regard for historical sources was one of the pos-itive contributions of late medieval scholasticism. Despite differencesamong Augustinians on individual points of philosophy and theology,John Hiltalingen of Basel felt the theologians of his order representeda school.1 Exactly in what sense that was true, what common charac-teristics distinguish the Augustinian Hermits from other late medievalgroups, has been a question addressed by a number of scholars, chiefamong them Adolar Zumkeller and Damasus Trapp.

Both these scholars have recognized the necessity of understandingthe thought of individual members of the Augustinian order before weare in a position to search for the common tenets of an AugustinianSchool. The second, broader question, however, has remained in dis-cussion, and the exact, critical research of Zumkeller and Trapp hasbegun to reveal common assumptions and approaches among someAustin Friars. One common approach has been a certain degree ofanti-Ockhamism among the Augustinians. Certainly the strong com-mitment in Gregory of Rimini and Hugolino of Orvieto to Augustine’s

* Originally published in Scientia Augustiniana. Studien über Augustinus, den Augustinismusund den Augustinerorden. Festschrift für P. Dr. theol. Dr. phil. Adolar Zumkeller OSA zum 60.Geburtstag, ed. Cornelius Petrus Mayer and Willigis Eckermann (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1975), pp. 267–275.

1 See D. Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century,” Augustiniana, 7 (1956),248.

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view of grace and justification contrasts sharply with the semi-Pelagiansoteriology of Ockham, Holcot, or Wodeham. Trapp has gone fur-ther to differentiate in fourteenth-century thought between the logico-critical approach, dependent in large measure on Ockham, and thehistorico-critical approach evident among the Augustinian theologians.Trapp realized that these two approaches were positive contributionsand could at times be closely related, but in general, particularly after1340, there did seem to be a difference in attitude, in approach, per-haps even in the degree of orthodoxy between the normally conserva-tive, constructive Augustinians and the sometimes radical “modernists”.Both groups were moderni, but the radical “modernists” owed moreto Ockham, Holcot, and Wodeham than they did to Giles of Rome,Thomas of Strasbourg, or Gregory of Rimini.

The question of Augustinianism vs. Ockhamism has to some degreebeen derived from Reformation historiography, in particular what Mar-tin Luther owed, either positively or negatively, to the theological tra-ditions of his own order, the Augustinian Hermits, or to the theolog-ical traditions of his university training, dependent on the thought ofGabriel Biel who, in turn, was heavily dependent on Ockham. Inas-much as Luther’s teacher and friend, John Staupitz, was both an AustinFriar and a pupil of Biel’s immediate followers, these two traditions arehard to separate satisfactorily. There has, however, been a tendencyto place most theologians of the Augustinian order at the oppositeextreme from the supposed radical minds of the fourteenth century.

The question I would like to pose is whether we are accurate in view-ing fourteenth-century Augustinians as the committed opponents ofradical nominalism or radical Ockhamism. Was there indeed a majorsplit in the fourteenth century between the disciples of Ockham, partic-ularly the so-called radical wings of Oxford and Paris, and the disciplesof Giles of Rome, between the Nominalists and the Augustinians?

We are far from being able to answer these questions, especially sincethe evaluation of Ockham and those influenced by him has been under-going rapid modification in recent decades. Although the connectionbetween Ockham and such thinkers as Holcot and Wodeham seemssecure, we do not know all the details of that connection, nor do weknow the exact relationship between the Ockhamists at Oxford and thedevelopment of Parisian philosophy and theology in the decade 1340–1350. In light of the more favorable evaluation of Ockham in recentyears, he may not be the best figure to choose in assessing the attitudeof the Augustinian Hermits to radical nominalism. Although it has yet

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to be established that Adam Wodeham deserves that description, hemay provide us with a better test case. He has generally been placedamong the major representatives of radical nominalism at Oxford, histheology is supposed to be semi-Pelagian, and he was perhaps themajor voice of Ockham’s thought at Oxford in the fourth decade ofthe fourteenth century. In theory, the Augustinians should have hadlittle use for Wodeham; in fact, they should have considered him amajor enemy. If they did not, we are led either to view Wodeham asless of a radical mind or to view the polarization of Ockhamism vs.Augustinianism as a less than satisfactory description of the currents offourteenth-century thought.

Gregory of Rimini

The Oxford lectures of Wodeham on the Sentences as well as his ear-lier lectures at Norwich and London were available in some form inEngland by 1334.2 While there is no evidence that the Norwich lectureswere known on the Continent, manuscripts of the London lectures aswell as the Oxford lectures in one or more redactions crossed the Chan-nel before 1342. From then on Wodeham became a familiar figure inthe texts and margins of Sentences commentaries, not the least in thoseof the Austin Friars.

Rimini seems to have been the first author on the Continent to referto the writings of Adam Wodeham. He was familiar with Wodeham’sbachelor lectures at Oxford, his London lectures, and even his mag-isterial lectures at Oxford. He also seems to have been familiar withWodeham’s treatise on the continuum. The only work of Wodehamwith which Rimini shows no familiarity is the Norwich lectures.

While Rimini was aware of the close association of the thought ofWodeham and Ockham, he considered Wodeham an important voicein his own right and dealt with him accordingly. Thus we usually findthe name of Wodeham appearing on the margins of Rimini indepen-dent of Ockham citations.3

2 The dating and arrangement of the redactions of the Sentences commentary ofAdam Wodeham are provided in Courtenay, Adam Wodeham. An Introduction to his Life andWritings, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, 21 (Leiden, 1978).

3 Wodeham appears in association with Ockham five times and independent ofOckham thirteen times. Surprisingly, Wodeham is linked occasionally with those towhom he was generally opposed, for example, Walter Chatton and Richard Fitzralph.For a list of Rimini’s citations of Wodeham see Trapp, “Augustinian Theology,” 205.

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One major question is whether Rimini ever favored Wodeham’sopinions or whether he was consistently opposed to them. The leadingissue on which Rimini strongly rejected Wodeham’s view (and alsothe issue on which Wodeham and Ockham were closely linked) wasthe issue of grace and justification. There Rimini was convinced thatOckham’s and Wodeham’s position amounted to Pelagianism.4 On anumber of other issues Rimini seems only to have been moderatelyopposed to Wodeham’s positions.5 Indeed, Rimini sometimes borrowedarguments from Wodeham to flesh out one side of a debate withoutattacking or approving Wodeham’s arguments.6

Less frequently Rimini acknowledged the value of Wodeham’s argu-ments. Sometimes he felt Wodeham’s position, although subtle, wasinsufficient to solve the question—or, although good, was not totallypersuasive.7 There are also several occasions in which Rimini feltWodeham’s arguments were good and used them to support his ownposition.8

In general Rimini’s attitude toward Wodeham is slightly on the neg-ative side, although not as much as one might expect. The number oftimes Wodeham is credited with a valid, convincing argument is almostequal to the number of times Rimini strongly rejected his opinions. Itshould also be kept in mind that Rimini did not usually cite in the mar-gins or text those with whom he agreed, so that most of the marginaliatend to be of a negative variety. In sum, although Rimini felt certain

4 Cf. Gregory of Rimini, Super primum et secundum sententiarum (Venice, 1522; reprint,St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955), II 92 G–H; II 97 E–F; II 97 O–P; I 36 G–H; II 55 P.[Lectura super primum et secundum sententiarum, Spätmittelalter und Reformation, Texte undUntersuchungen 6, ed. D. Trapp and V. Marcolino, 6 vols. (Berlin–New York, 1979–1984), VI, pp. 18–19, 60–63, 65–66; I, pp. 305–306; V, pp. 86–88.]

5 Cf. Ibid., I 3 M; I 13 J–K; II 36 P–Q; II 66 D. [Lectura I, pp. 25, 107; IV, pp. 306–307; V, p. 175.]

6 Cf. Ibid., I 29 O–Q; I 31 C; I 102 G; I 102 O [Lectura I, pp. 247–248, 258; VII,pp. 346–347, 349.

7 Ibid., I 25 L [Lectura I, p. 212]: “Ista opinio, quamvis [satis] subtiles imaginationeshabeat nec forte bene possit contra protervum impugnari, non tamen apparet mihivera, nec propter eius motiva videtur mihi discedendum esse a via communi.” Cf. I 29O–Q and I 30 G–L [Lectura I, pp. 247–248, 251–255], where Rimini feels Wodeham’scritique of Durand of St. Pourçain insufficient; II 56 J [Lectura V, p. 92]: “Et quamvisuterque horum modorum sit possibilis de potentia Dei, ut utrumque ponit quidamsolemnis doctor, neutrum alteri praeeligens, mihi tamen plus placet modus secundus.”

8 Cf. Ibid., II 34 B [Lectura IV, pp. 284–285]; II 66 B [Lectura V, p. 175]; II 80 C–D [Lectura V, p. 294]; II 88 B–C [Lectura V, p. 362]: “Quamvis autem prima istarumduarum opinionum mihi valde probabilis videatur, haec tamen secunda [i.e. opinioAdae] plus placet.”


positions of Wodeham were detrimental to the faith—principally thoseon justification—Wodeham remained a theologian of stature whosesupport was sometimes sought by Rimini.

Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo

Vargas was far less concerned with Wodeham than Rimini had been.In his commentary on the first book of the Sentences Vargas refers toWodeham only four times.9 If we are to judge by his quotations, he wasfamiliar only with Wodeham’s bachelor lectures at Oxford, and possiblyonly the first book. Since Vargas does not quote the same passages fromWodeham that appeared in Rimini or, when he does, does not followRimini’s text, it would appear that Vargas was directly familiar withWodeham’s work.

As with Rimini, so Vargas considers Wodeham separate from Ock-ham. Out of the four references only once does Wodeham’s nameappear in close association with Ockham.10 Although Vargas does notappear to have been strongly antagonistic to Wodeham’s thought, heis usually critical of Wodeham’s conclusions. Only once does he nameWodeham in support of his argument.11

Hugolino of Orvieto

Of all the Austin Friars in the fourteenth century, one of the most con-servative, anti-Pelagian was Hugolino. In light of Hugolino’s positionon the question of universals and his dependence on Gregory of Rim-ini, Zumkeller conceded that Hugolino was influenced by nominalismbut that he was not an extreme nominalist, i. e., not an Ockhamist.12 IfTrapp’s attempt to sever the connection between Rimini and Ockham,or between Rimini and nominalism, proves successful, then the onlysignificant tie between Hugolino and Ockhamism will also have beensevered.

9 Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo, In primum sententiarum (Venice, 1490; reprint NewYork, 1952), cols. 183, 236, 301, and 481.

10 Ibid., cols. 236–237.11 Ibid., col. 481.12 A. Zumkeller, Hugolin von Orvieto und seine theologische Erkenntnislehre (Würzburg, 1941),

pp. 257–261.

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In light of recent research, therefore, one would expect to find thatthe generally negative evaluation of Wodeham, evidenced in the pagesof Rimini and Vargas, increased in the Sentences commentary of Hugo-lino. Such, however, seems not to be the case. It is true that he quotesOckham only once in the first book13 and refers to Wodeham somefour times,14 treating both authors in a negative way. But in the sec-tion where he gives the greatest attention to Wodeham he is equallycritical of Gregory of Rimini, his teacher.15 One has the feeling that toHugolino Wodeham is an authority whose opinions may be rejected,not an enemy against whom his work is directed.

John Hiltalingen of Basel

Until now we have been relying on those places where Wodeham ismentioned by name, either in the text or in the margins of Augustinianauthors. This presents an overly negative view of the Augustinian atti-tude toward Wodeham, since as was stated above, earlier authors areusually cited only when their thought is being criticized. What of thosetimes when there is unacknowledged agreement?

With John of Basel we are shown not only his own attitude towardWodeham but gain some insight into the relationship between Wode-ham and previous Augustinians. Although Hiltalingen borrowed someof his references to Wodeham from others, he also appears to haveread Wodeham firsthand, inasmuch as he cites sections in Wodeham’sworks not quoted by earlier authors. Moreover, Hiltalingen was awareof Wodeham’s association with Ockham, but like Rimini Hiltalingenconsidered Wodeham a voice of authority in his own right.

Hiltalingen made abundant use of Wodeham, often favoring hisopinions.16 He quoted Wodeham some 27 times on a wide variety of

13 Hugolino of Orvieto, In primum sententiarum, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3 (Rome, Angelica4, fols. 35rb, 35va; Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat. 15840, fol. 23ra) [Commentarius in quattuor librossententiarum, ed. W. Eckermann, 4 vols (Würzburg, 1980–), I, pp. 167–171].

14 Ibid., dist. 1, q. 1, a. 4 (Angelica 4, fols. 36rb, 37ra; Bibl. Nat. lat. 15840, fols. 23vb,24va) [Commentarius, I, pp. 171–182]; Ibid., dist. 1, q. 2, a. 2 (Angelica 4, fol. 40va; Bibl.Nat. lat. 15840, fol. 27va) [Commentarius, I, pp. 200–208]; Ibid., dist. 1, q. 5. a. 4 (Angelica4, fol. 51va; Bibl. Nat. lat. 15840, fol. 37va) [Commentarius, I, pp. 294–296].

15 Ibid., dist. 1, q. 1, a. 4 (Bibl. Nat. lat. 15840, fols. 23vb–24va) [Commentarius, I, pp. 171–182].

16 John Hiltalingen of Basel, Lectura; München, Staatsbibl. Clm 26711, fols. 42va–42vb,44va, 45ra (twice), 45rb, 46va–46vb, 59rb.


topics.17 He pointed to places where Hugolino and Vargas sided withWodeham against Rimini.18 At other times Hiltalingen noted points onwhich Wodeham and Rimini were in agreement.19 If we are to judge byHiltalingen’s commentary, a fellow Augustinian, Bonsemblans, whoseSentences commentary, if extant, has yet to be identified, made evengreater use of Wodeham. Hiltalingen, who was frequently critical ofBonsemblans, noted at times the latter’s dependence on or agreementwith Wodeham.20

Wodeham and the Augustinians as Viewed by Others

Hiltalingen was not alone in noting that some of his fellow Augustinianswere in agreement with Wodeham on certain issues. An academic con-temporary of Hugolino, Peter Ceffons, pointed out at least one issue onwhich Rimini sided with Wodeham.21 Moreover, toward the end of thecentury the Carmelite, John Brammart, noted further correspondence.While he frequently linked the names of Ockham and Wodeham,22 healso on occasion linked Hugolino or Rimini with Wodeham.23

If there was a school animosity between the Augustinians and thedisciples of Ockham in the fourteenth century, one does not have theimpression that those writing in the second half of that century wereaware of it. Instead, it would seem that Wodeham was treated as oneof several fourteenth-century authorities whose opinions were consid-ered alongside and occasionally grouped with those of writers fromthe Augustinian order. This failure on the part of late fourteenth-century theologians to recognize some fundamental division between

17 Cf. Trapp, “Augustinian Theology,” 245. Many of these quotations are examinedin my Adam Wodeham.

18 Clm 26711, fol. 44va: “De isto dubio Adam, libro primo, dist. 1, q. 2, tenetquod non, et concordat cum eo Hugolinus, libro primo, dist. 1, art. primo secundaequaestionis. Et hoc loquendo de nota experimentali oppositum tenet Gregorius, libroprimo, dist. prima, q. 2, art. primo. … Et tenet [Alphonsus Vargas] cum Hugonem etAdam, et solvit rationes oppositae positionis pulchre et diffuse…”

19 Clm 26711, fols. 98rb, 135ra.20 Clm 26711, fols. 98ra, 135va. [Principial questions from Bonsemblante’s time as

sententiarius have survived: Munich, Staatsbibl., Clm 26711, fols. 397r–406v; Vatican, Vat.lat. 981, fols. 91r–105v].

21 Peter Ceffons, In primum sententiarum, q. 21; Troyes 62, fol. 48ra.22 John Brammart, Lectura; Wilhering 87, fols. 34ra, 36va, 38rb, 49va, 52vb.23 Ibid., Wilhering 87, fol. 126va; Florence, Bibl. Naz. II. II. 281, fol. 72r.

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the Augustinians and the Ockhamists can be seen in the Sentences com-mentary of Marsilius of Inghen, a noted Ockhamist, at least in logic.Marsilius frequently acknowledged his intellectual debt to the Augus-tinian Thomas of Strasbourg and the Cistercian James of Eltville, andTrapp has already demonstrated the symbiotic relationship betweenAugustinian and Cistercian theologians.24 Marsilius noted that hisknowledge of Wodeham, for whom he had great respect, was passed onto him through Eltville.25 Once more, therefore, the name of Wodehamappears linked with authors considered to represent the conservativetradition among the moderni.

Wodeham and the Spanish Augustinians

The Augustinian interest in Wodeham was not restricted to the textsand margins of Augustinian Sentences commentaries. The history of thetransmission of the Wodeham text points to a strong interest in thework of Wodeham on the part of the Augustinians. The subject index toWodeham found frequently in manuscripts of Henry Totting of Oyta’sabbreviation of Wodeham’s Oxford lectures was compiled by a SpanishAugustinian, Master Peter Garini, on behalf of his confrere, Appari-cius of Burgos.26 In all probability this index was done at Paris, sinceGarini felt obliged to identify Burgos as “of the Spains”, probably todistinguish it from Bourges. Both Spanish manuscripts of Oyta’s abbre-viation contain Garini’s index, and it was probably through SpanishAugustinians studying at Paris in the fifteenth century that Wodehamwas carried southward into Spain.

At the beginning of the sixteenth century the publication of Oyta’sabbreviation in Paris was indebted to this Spanish interest in Wode-ham. When John Major acquired a text of Oyta’s abbreviation to pub-

24 Trapp, “Augustinian Theology,” 251–253.25 Marsilius of Inghen, Quaestiones super quattuor libros sententiarum (Strassburg, 1501;

reprint, Frankfurt, 1966), fol. 475v.26 Barcelona, Cathedral 38, fol. 183r: “Tabula super opus Adae composita per rev.

magistrum Petrum Garini ordinis Eremitarum Sancti Augustini.” Cf. V. Doucet, Com-mentaires sur les sentences. Supplément au répertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmueller (Firenze, 1954),p. 8. In his introduction to his tabula Garini gives the circumstances behind its com-position (Pamplona, Cathedral 1, fol. 180r): “Quamquam obligatus rogationibus …praedilecti in Christo et religione sacra heremitarum sancti Augustini confratris etsocii Apparicii de Burgis Hyspaniarum abbreviatum opus Adae super Sententias… peralphabetum tabulare praesumpsi…”


lish, he did not use a copy from Paris (assuming one was accessible tohim) but rather borrowed a copy from Peter Menenes, a student fromPortugal.27 Thus the printed edition of Oyta’s abbreviation was basedon the Spanish tradition and followed the form that that work hadtaken through the labors of those from south of the Pyrennees.

It is of course true that the Augustinians of the fifteenth and sixteenthcenturies took a strong interest in the editing and dissemination ofscholastic texts, both of their own order and of others. The fact thatthe Augustinians took an interest in Wodeham may have been dueto this general interest in editing rather than a particular fondnessfor the thought of Wodeham. It should be noted, however, that thedisciples of Ockham were not excluded in this editing process. Indeed,they seem to have been considered of major significance. In additionto the improvement of the form of Oyta’s abbreviation of Wodeham,one might also note in this regard that the revision of the early printededition of Robert Holcot, Ockham’s other major English disciple, wasundertaken by the Augustinian Hermit, Augustinus von Regensburg.

Concluding Remarks

In light of the extensive familiarity with Wodeham that one findsamong the Augustinians, their respect for him as an authority, andthe respect on the part of some for his thought, it may be well notto overstress the dichotomy between the Ockhamist and Augustiniantraditions in the fourteenth century. The Augustinians were certainlyaware of the ties, indeed the close relationship, between Wodeham andOckham, and yet they did not hesitate to incorporate Wodeham intothe structure of their scholastic arguments. Beyond cautioning us not topolarize the Augustinians and Ockhamists in the fourteenth century,the case of Wodeham among the Augustinians suggests that Wode-ham may not have been as radical or the Augustinian theologians asopposed to the thought of Ockham and his disciples as we generallyhave concluded.

27 From John Major’s introduction to the 1512 edition of Oyta’s abbreviation ofWodeham’s Sentences commentary: “… sed illustris viri et eruditi Petri Menenes Lusi-tani in theosophia (!) bacchalarii exemplar procuravimus mediocriter castigatum quodimitari pro maiori parte elaboravimus curantes ut tabula alphabetica ad folia et colum-nas adderetur.”

chapter seventeen

THEOLOGIA ANGLICANA MODERNORUM

AT COLOGNE IN THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY*

The intellectual history of Cologne in the fourteenth and fifteenth cen-turies has largely been studied from the standpoint of Thomism, Alber-tism, and the dominance of the via antiqua. Two of the leading historiansof fourteenth-century Cologne, Gabriel Löhr and Martin Grabmann,concentrated their attention on the Dominicans and the strength ofThomism at Cologne in the post-Eckhart period.1 And although theearliest statutes for the University of Cologne (1398) permitted the useof terminist textbooks, such as the commentaries of John Buridan, thevia antiqua supposedly gained the upper hand by 1415 and opposedattempts by the Electors in 1425 to impose the writings of the lead-ing authors of the via moderna: William of Ockham, John Buridan, andMarsilius of Inghen.2 Cologne therefore, like the university of Louvain,was thought to have been dominated by the via antiqua almost from its

* Originally published in Die Kölner Universität im Mittelalter (Miscellanea Mediaevalia,20), ed. Albert Zimmermann (Berlin–New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1989), pp. 245–254.

1 G.M. Löhr, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Kölner Dominikanerklosters im Mittelalter (Quellenund Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens in Deutschland, 15–17), vol. I:Darstellung (Leipzig, 1920); vol. II: Quellen (Leipzig, 1922); Löhr, Die theologischen Disputa-tionen und Promotionen an der Universität Köln im ausgehenden 15. Jahrhundert (Leipzig, 1926);M. Grabmann, “Einzelgestalten aus der mittelalterlichen Dominikaner- und Thomis-tenschule,” in Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, vol. II (Munich, 1936), pp. 512–613; Löhr, DieKölner Dominikanerschule vom 14. bis zum 16. Jahrhundert (Freiburg i. B., 1946; Köln, 1948);Grabmann, “Der Sentenzenkommentar des Magister Henricus de Cervo und die Köl-ner Dominikanertheologie des 14. Jahrhunderts,” in Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, vol. III(Munich, 1956), pp. 352–369. See also F. Ehrle, Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candiades Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V, (Münster i. W., 1925), pp. 146–157, 281–290.

2 For the Latin text of the university’s response of 1425 see Ehrle, Der Senten-zenkommentar, pp. 282–285. See also F. Benary, “Via antiqua und via moderna auf dendeutschen Hochschulen des Mittelalters mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Univer-sität Erfurt,” in Zur Geschichte der Stadt und der Universität Erfurt am Ausgang des Mittelalters(Gotha, 1919); G. Ritter, Studien zur Spätscholastik, vol. II: Via antiqua und via moderna aufden deutschen Universitäten des XV. Jahrhunderts (Heidelberg, 1922); N.W. Gilbert, “Ockham,Wyclif, and the ‘via moderna’,” in: Antiqui und Moderni (Miscellanea Mediaevalia, 9),ed. A. Zimmermann (Berlin, 1974), pp. 85–125; A.L. Gabriel, “ ‘Via antiqua’ and ‘viamoderna’ and the Migration of Paris Students and Masters to the German Universitiesin the Fifteenth Century,” in Antiqui und Moderni, pp. 439–483.

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very founding in contrast to Erfurt and Heidelberg, where the via mod-

erna presumably reigned supreme.Several decades ago when working on Gabriel Biel I came upon

some information that ran counter to conventional wisdom. Biel, whohad taken his arts education at Heidelberg and had probably begunthe study of theology at Erfurt, acquired his copy of the Sentences com-mentary of Ockham not at those universities—the supposed centers ofthe via moderna in Germany—but at Cologne, where he matriculated in1453 in order to complete his theological degree.3 Moreover, EggelingBecker von Braunschweig, whose “nominalistic” commentary on thecanon of the mass was later redelivered and made famous by his friendand associate Biel, also received the most important part of his theolog-ical education at Cologne in the 1450s.4

Are these biographical details simply isolated exceptions to the hege-mony of the via antiqua or were the textbooks and approaches of thevia moderna a more important undercurrent at Cologne than has gener-ally been recognized? And to the degree that texts of authors associatedwith the via moderna were available at Cologne in the middle of the fif-teenth century, was this simply a continuation of interests introduced byGerman students from Paris and Heidelberg in the late fourteenth cen-tury, a subsequent effect of the interchange of texts and learning pro-duced through student migrations in the fifteenth century, or is there alonger and more direct history to the presence of these texts at Colognebefore the founding of the university?

Before approaching these questions, several observations need to bemade on the relation of the two viae and the curricular concerns ofthe various faculties at Cologne. Statements relating to curriculum inthe early statutes of Cologne as well as the Wegestreit documents of 1415and 1425 all concern the study of logic and natural philosophy withinthe arts faculty. The use within the theological faculty of works byOckham, Buridan, Marsilius, or other “modern” authors may not have

3 On Biel’s education see H.A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology (Cam-bridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 10–12; W.J. Courtenay, “The Eucharistic Theology of GabrielBiel,” doc. diss., Harvard University, 1967. For Biel’s entrance into Cologne see H.Keussen, Die Matrikel der Universität Köln, vol. I: 1389 bis 1559 (Bonn, 1892), p. 561. Biel’scopy of Ockham’s Ordinatio is Giessen, Univ. Bibl. 773, discussed in Ockham, Opera The-ologica II, ed. S. Brown and G. Gál (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1970), pp. 8*–13*. See alsomy Adam Wodeham (Leiden, 1978), p. 134.

4 A. Franz, Die Messe im deutschen Mittelalter (Freiburg i. B., 1902); Courtenay, “Eucha-ristic Theology”.

theologia anglicana modernorum at cologne 361

been such a major issue. It was in the theological faculty that Biel andBecker were enrolled. Moreover, students from the mendicant ordersdid not take the arts degree and were not under the jurisdiction ofthe arts faculty, although lectures on logic and natural philosophy werepresumably held in mendicant convents. Thus the conflict between thevia moderna and the via antiqua, to the degree it was limited to the artsfaculty, concerned mendicants and those in the higher faculties onlyindirectly if at all. Finally, even though the texts of the via moderna

included both English and Parisian authors, it is important for anunderstanding of the fourteenth-century background to differentiatebetween realist versions of terminism (as found in Peter of Spain andWalter Burley) and so-called nominalist versions, and among the latterbetween English authors, such as Ockham, and Parisian authors suchas Buridan and Marsilius. It will be the contention of the followingremarks that the newer English works in theology, which incorporatedproblems and approaches of English logic and mathematical physicsinto theology, came into Cologne in the second and third quarters ofthe fourteenth century, and that these works probably entered throughthe mendicant orders, including the Dominicans, and through Germanstudents who attended Oxford or other studia in England. The extent ofthe effect of these texts upon the intellectual life of Cologne before thefounding of the university is harder to assess but needs to be examinedas well.

The Cologne Abbreviation of Wodeham’s Lectura

The first item in our list of texts representing the other side of Cologne’sintellectual life is an abbreviation or Extractio of the Lectura Oxoniensis

of Adam Wodeham, Ockham’s closest but often independent discipleand fellow Franciscan. Several abbreviations were made of Wodeham’sOxford Sentences commentary in the course of the fourteenth century.The earliest such abbreviation is one that was compiled at Cologneand survives in two manuscripts.5 The Cologne provenance is based ona passage in book III, q. 3 in which Wodeham mentioned the nameof the then reigning pope, John XXII (d. 1334). Later redactions andabbreviations of Wodeham’s Lectura updated that passage to correspond

5 Hannover, Stadtbibl., Hs. 1, fols. 1r–47v, 69v–75r, 76v; Naples, Bibl. Naz.,Cod.VII.C.53, fols. 1r–109v. See Adam Wodeham, pp. 215–222.


to the pope at the time of the later version: in the case of Wodeham’sown post-1334 redaction, Benedict XII, and in the case of HenryTotting of Oyta’s abbreviation, Gregory XI. In both manuscripts ofthe abbreviation under discussion here, one of which was copied insouthern Italy later in the fourteenth century, the name of the thenreigning pope was replaced with the name of the then reigning countfrom the region in which the redaction was made: “Comes Adolphusde Monte”. The county of Mons (or Berg), on whose western edgeCologne was situated, was absorbed into a larger territorial duchy in1380, and the only Count Adolf von Berg in the period was Adolf IX,count of Berg from 1308 to 1348. As I argued in my Adam Wodeham, thatevidence places this particular redaction at Cologne between 1334 (thedate for the completion of Wodeham’s Oxford lectures) and 1348 (thedate of Adolf ’s death).6

The Cologne abbreviation is not simply a scribal redaction preparedat Cologne for use elsewhere, although that in itself would be of con-siderable interest. The structure and additions to the text suggest thatit was composed as a separate series of lectures, presumably given atCologne, which were based on—in fact were primarily a rereadingof—Wodeham’s lectura. The practice of reading lectures on the Sen-

tences “secundum alium” was frequently employed in the second half of thefourteenth century and invariably meant that the second “author” heldthe original author in very high esteem. In this case we have an earlyinstance of the practice. The Cologne redactor was probably lecturingin one of the schools or convents of that city to an audience of theo-logical students. A Franciscan seems the most likely candidate, but thelater case of Oyta proves that secular theologians were also attracted toWodeham’s work.

We also do not know the means by which Wodeham’s Lectura reachedCologne. Wodeham may have passed through Cologne on his wayto Basel in 1339.7 There were also German students at Oxford whomight have brought such newer texts back to Germany with them.The respect in which continental authors held English texts on logic,natural philosophy, and theology, particularly in the decades after 1340,is probably sufficient reason for this text appearing at Cologne at suchan early date.

6 Adam Wodeham, pp. 133–135.7 Analecta Franciscana, 2 (1887), 177; A.G. Little, The Grey Friars in Oxford (Oxford,

1892), p. 173.


The Presence of English Texts at Cologne

In addition to the Cologne redaction of Wodeham’s Sentences commen-tary a number of other works by fourteenth-century English authorsfound their way into the scholarly community at Cologne. One piece ofevidence is found in a manuscript from the Historisches Stadtarchivin Cologne, GB 2° 175. The manuscript is a collection of variousphilosophical and theological works and groups of questions, manyof them from fourteenth-century Sentences commentaries. Much of themanuscript has the appearance of a student notebook. It was acquiredby a religious community in Cologne, and portions of it may have beencopied there. On fols. 146v–147v, in a script dating from the third quar-ter of the fourteenth century, occurs a question on distinction 40 ofbook I of the Sentences: “Utrum aeternaliter praedestinatus possit dampnari”.On fol. 146vb (and in a copy of the identical text on fol. 147ra) the oth-erwise unidentified author responds according to one doctor, Ockham,whom he claims to have seen, perhaps in Munich or, if he was a Fran-ciscan, at one of the provincial chapters.8 The contact would have hadto have occurred before Ockham’s death in 1347, although this com-mentary could have been written somewhat later but certainly before1360. The argument our author adopts concerned propositions de pos-

sibili in sensu diviso sive in sensu composito. Since we only have one shortand incomplete question from this author, it is impossible to know howfrequently he followed or adopted the arguments and conclusions ofOckham. But his assumption that his personal acquaintance with Ock-ham would be of importance to his readers and help substantiate hisargument is a remarkable witness to the celebrity status of Ockham inGermany and the influence of his ideas at mid-century.

Another manuscript in the same collection, GB 4° 186, contains onfols. 1r–130r the Sentences commentary, Sex articuli, and De stellis of RobertHolcot, O.P. The manuscript was copied around 1375 by Henricus deDalen and belonged to the Carmelite convent at Cologne. Althoughthe intellectual or ideological relationship of Holcot and Ockham hasincorrectly been seen as very close, there is little question that Holcot

8 Köln, Historisches Stadtarchiv, GB 2° 175, fols. 146vb and 147ra: “Respondeo se-cundum unum doctorem quem ego vidi, scilicet Ockham, qui dicit quod propositio depossibili in sensu diviso non habet generaliter poni(?) in esse, licet nisi tantum in sensucompositionis.” See Ockham, Summa logicae III, 1, c. 23–25 (Opera philosophica, I), ed.G. Gál et al. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1974), pp. 419–427. The manuscript also containson fols. 79r–94r the opening section of the Sentences commentary of James of Spinalo.


was among the more critically speculative English theologians in thefourteenth century, and the questions in his Sentences commentary makefull use of the terminist logic of his day.

Our third item is the first half of a manuscript from the VaticanPalatine collection, Vatican Pal. lat. 329, which was originally partof the Elector’s library at Heidelberg. In a partially erased colophon,the words “anno 77” appear, on the basis of which, along with thefact that the manuscript contained works of authors thought to befifteenth century, the Vatican cataloguer dated the manuscript to 1477.9

All the works contained in the manuscript are now known to havebeen composed in the 1335–1365 period, and the handwriting of thismanuscript copy, which has some English characteristics, is almostcertainly late fourteenth century.10 Thus a date of 1377 can be assignedto the manuscript, and the remaining part of the colophon indicatesthat it was copied by a friar in Cologne.11

The first half of this manuscript contains several works of interest.One of these (fols. 94r–140v) is the Sentences commentary of ThomasBuckingham, an important “modern” English author who composedthat work around 1335.12 Buckingham was, alongside Ockham, Fitz-ralph, Wodeham, and Bradwardine, one of the recent English scholas-tics most frequently cited by continental authors in the period after1340. As was true of Fitzralph and Bradwardine, his name was par-ticularly linked to problems of divine volition, human freedom, andfuture contingents. The importance of the Buckingham section to theearly possessors of the manuscript is reflected in the fact that theentire manuscript is erroneously labeled as Buckingham’s work. Themanuscript also contains the only copy of the Sentences commentaryof Hermann Hetzstede, a Dominican who probably read at Magde-burg or Erfurt (or even possibly Cologne) sometime in the 1360s, andone of the few extant copies of the Sentences commentary of HeinrichHager, another Dominican who read at Cologne in the 1360s.13 Neither

9 Vatican, Pal. lat. 329, fol. 145v: “Expliciunt tituli istius libri. Iste liber fuit scriptusin Colonia per me fratrem … anno 77.”

10 The scribal hand in the manuscript has strong English characteristics, e. g. theforked “re” combination, the 6-form of the “s” used at the beginning and end of words,and the angular suspension mark for an “er” contraction.

11 See above, note 9, and Vatican, Pal. lat 329, fol. 146v: In Colonia anno …12 On Buckingham see J.A. Robson, Wyclif and the Oxford Schools (Cambridge, 1961);

Courtenay, Adam Wodeham; B.R. De la Torre, Thomas Buckingham and the Contingency ofFutures (Notre Dame, 1987).

13 On Hermann Hetzstede (Hettstede or Hettstedt) see T. Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis


Hetzstede’s nor Hager’s commentary shows any particular influence offourteenth-century authors, English or continental, whose names even-tually become linked to the via moderna.14 Thus their inclusion here inthe company of Buckingham only shows the range of interests of thescribe or of those for whom the volume was being prepared.

There is nothing unusual about Buckingham’s Sentences commentaryappearing in a continental manuscript in 1377. His name and commen-tary were known at Paris as early as 1343.15 What is remarkable hereis that this text was copied at Cologne in all probability by and for theDominicans. The manuscript’s bias in the direction of recent Domini-

Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, vol. II (Rome, 1975), p. 224. Hetzstede was lector at the Erfurtconvent, M.Th., prior of the Saxon Province from 1374 to 1376, and Inquisitor haereticaepravitatis in 1374–1375. He died at Avignon in 1376 and was buried in the choir ofthe Dominican convent. Heinrich Hager is discussed in Kaeppeli, Scriptores, II, p. 196.Hager was closely associated with the Dominican convent at Würzburg. He was lectorthere in 1359 and prior in 1372 and 1374. His Cologne lectures should probably beplaced in the early 1360s. For further discussion see J. Koch, Durand de S. Porciano O. P.(Munich, 1927), p. 251; Löhr, Die Kölner Dominikanerschule vom 14. his zum 16. Jahrhundert,p. 47. Manuscript copies of all four books of his commentary were once extant, butsince the loss of the Münster collection in World War II, only copies of books III–IVremain.

14 Although the commentaries of both Hetzstede and Hager have had only cursoryexamination, it would appear that Thomas was the favored and most frequently citedauthority for Hetzstede. The role of Thomas for Hager is less certain. At various timeshe referred his readers to the arguments and conclusions of an otherwise unidentified“Gerardus”. The Carmelite theologian Gerard of Bologna comes most readily to mind,but the question titles cited by Hager do not correspond with those of the Sentencescommentary or Quodlibets of that Gerard. The same is true for the Dominican Gerardof Büren.

15 Buckingham was cited in Gregory of Rimini’s commentary on the first two booksof the Sentences, read at Paris in 1342–1344. See the introduction and notes in Rimini,Lectura super primum et secundum sententiarum, ed. D. Trapp, V. Marcolino, et al. (Berlin,1979–1984). Buckingham was also a major source for John of Mirecourt, who read theSentences at Paris in 1345. On Mirecourt’s use of Buckingham and other English sourcessee Courtenay, “John of Mirecourt and Gregory of Rimini on Whether God can Undothe Past,” RTAM, 39 (1972) 224–256; 40 (1973) 147–174; J.-F. Genest, “La bibliothèqueanglaise de Jean de Mirecourt: subtilitas ou plagiat?” in Die Philosophie im 14. und 15.Jahrhundert. In memoriam Konstanty Michalski (1879–1947), ed. O. Pluta (Amsterdam, 1988).For the transmission of the newer English logic, natural philosophy, and theology tocontinental studia see Courtenay, “The Role of English Thought in the Transformationof University Education in the Late Middle Ages,” in Rebirth, Reform and Resilience:Universities in Transition, 1300–1700, ed. J.A. Kittelson and P.J. Transue (Columbus, 1984),pp. 103–162; “The Early Stages in the Introduction of Oxford Logic into Italy,” inEnglish Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries, ed. A. Maierù (Naples, 1982), pp. 13–32;“The Reception of Ockham’s Thought at the University of Paris,” in Preuve et raisons àl’Université de Paris: Logique, ontologie et théologie au XlVe siècle, ed. Z. Kaluza and P. Vignaux(Paris, 1984), pp. 43–64 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 8].


can authors certainly points in that direction. And since the manuscriptwas copied at Cologne, the exemplars from which it was copied werealso extant there by 1377.

A final piece of evidence comes from an Eichstätt manuscript, copiedby the Dominican theologian Heinrich Tröglein while he was residentat a number of Dominican studia in the 1380s and early 1390s, includ-ing Regensburg and Cologne.16 The manuscript is a notebook of ques-tions, per modum notabilium, drawn from various authors including fourDominicans (Durand of St. Pourçain, Gerard de Büren, Rycholf de ViaLapidea, and Heinrich Hager), two Augustinians (Angelus de Anconaand Facinus de Ast), and others. Among the texts Tröglein copied atCologne and preserved in this manuscript are two questions taken fromthe Sentences commentary of Robert of Halifax, an English Franciscanauthor active in the late 1330s and one of the more popular Englishmoderni.17 The questions Tröglein assembled were not ones he thoughtsuspect and useful as counterarguments to be answered, but ratherwere ones he felt important and helpful, “bonae et utiles” as he expressedit at one point.18 Again, the presence in Germany in the second half ofthe fourteenth century of a copy of all or some of Halifax’s commentaryis not particularly remarkable. What is of interest is that it was copiedat Cologne by a Dominican theologian with extensive experience in theDominican studia of central and southern Germany.

Channels of Transmission

We will never be able to chart precisely the means by which these“modern” English theological texts reached Cologne. The presenceof Ockham in Germany made some impact on the author of oursecond text, but the position he cites was almost certainly derived fromOckham’s written works, most notably his Summa logicae. But Ockham’spresence in Germany was for political, not academic reasons. Colognewas rarely a chosen place of study or teaching for students or mastersfrom the British Isles. Duns Scotus had been sent there to teach by

16 Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben III, pp. 366–368.17 Eichstätt, Universitätsbibl. 471, fol. 195v: “Explicit dicta diversorum doctorum

supra libros sententiarum … 1590 … Colonie.” Also fol. 35v. On Halifax see Courtenay,“Some Notes on Robert of Halifax, O.F.M.,” FS, 33 (1973), 135–142.

18 Eichstatt 471, fol. 121vb.


his order, but sent from Paris as a Parisian master, not as a theologianfrom England or Scotland. We cannot, however, discount the role ofother English scholastics who may have passed through Cologne whileon business in German-speaking lands, such as Wodeham’s presence inBasel in 1339 and John of Rodington’s visit to Basel in 1340.19

An equal if not more important avenue for the transmission of thenewer English texts were the German students who chose or were sentto England for study. Many prominent German Carmelites were for atime connected with their studium generale at London.20 There was also agrowing number of German students at Oxford beginning in the 1340s.One arts student by the name of Sifridus wrote a series of determinationes

on Metaphysics at Oxford in 1343, and in that same year a Franciscanfrom Cologne by the name of Hermann was resident at the Oxfordconvent and associated with John Lathbury.21 The Augustinian friarJohn Klenkok read the Sentences at Oxford in 1354 before returningto Germany; in 1370 the Oxford sententiarius for the Augustinians wasGyso of Cologne, while that of the Oxford Dominicans was HeinrichAlberti.22 Heinrich von Sachsen was in that same year also resident atBlackfriars Oxford.23 The list could be extended and in any case wouldnever reflect the full extent of German participation in English studia.Presumably the views and texts acquired in England would be broughthome to German studia by these scholars upon their return.

19 Analecta Franciscana, 2 (1887), 177; 3 (1897), 638.20 F. Lickteig, The German Carmelites at the Medieval Universities, doc. diss., Catholic

University of America, 1977, pp. 430–436.21 BRUO I, p. 470; A.G. Little, The Grey Friars in Oxford, pp. 235–236. The relationship

of Hermann of Cologne and John Lathbury O.F.M. may be a clue to another mystery.One portion of Vatican, Vat. lat. 829 that seems concerned with Franciscan authorsand some Dominicans, namely fols. 56v–148v, begins (fol. 57r) with some questionsunder the title “De distinctione et respectibus lat” and on the opposite page (fol. 56v) abovesome miscellaneous notes occurs: pro I lat and Hermannus doctor. Is it possible to read theformer as pro I〈oanne〉 Lat〈hbiri〉? On Lathbury, see B. Smalley, English Friars and Antiquity(Oxford, 1960), pp. 221–239. The latter section of Vat. lat. 829, fols. 149r–227v wasoriginally a separate manuscript and contains some lesser known English Dominicanauthors from the second quarter of the fourteenth century. It is presently under studyby Hester Gelber.

22 BRUO, pp. 17, 469–470. On Klenkok see D. Trapp, “Notes on John Klenkok,OSA, (d. 1374),” Augustinianum, 4 (1964) 358–404.

23 BRUO, p. 1621.


Conclusions

How extensive an influence these and other English texts had at Co-logne is a quite different question and difficult to answer. Most of theprominent English moderni were Franciscans or secular theologians, andfew works produced at the Franciscan studium at Cologne or by sec-ular theologians studying at Cologne in the fourteenth century havesurvived. The Dominican and Augustinian authors are far better rep-resented, but those whose works have been studied do not show anyextensive use of the newer linguistic and logical methods, nor do theyadopt the solutions proposed by the English moderni. This is certainlytrue for the Thomistic mid-century Dominican Heinrich de Cervo,24

and may well be true for Gerard de Büren and Rycholf de Via Lapi-dea, who have received almost no study to date. Rycholf was activeat Cologne in the 1360s and Gerard, who probably commented onthe Sentences between 1350 and 1389 (when Tröglein copied his com-mentary), may have lectured at Cologne as well. The same is true forour two other German Dominicans of the 1360s, Hetzstede and Hager,both of whom essentially escaped the notice of Grabmann and Löhr.25

Dominican interest in “modern” English theologians was not unusu-al. Almost all German manuscripts of the English Franciscan, Robertof Halifax, belonged to Dominican convents.26 The interaction betweenGerman Dominicans and these English texts stimulated oppositionmore often perhaps than emulation.27 Yet the positive collecting in-

24 Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, III, pp. 352–369.25 The commentaries of Hetzstede and Hager have not received the attention they

deserve, although there are grounds for believing that Hager was almost as influentialas Heinrich Cervo on whom Grabmann lavished so much attention. Judgment mustbe reserved until a thorough study has been made, but it is likely that Hetzstede’scommentary leans in a Thomistic direction. Thomas is the only scholastic author ofthe previous century mentioned by name, and he is referred to as “the holy doctor”. Asimilar impression is derived from the folia of Hager’s commentary, which appears verytraditional and frequently uses Thomas in support of his position. The only modernauthor cited by Hager is the otherwise unidentified Gerard, and his dependence on thisauthor is so extensive that at many points he directs his readers to the text of Gerard ascontaining what he would himself say on particular questions.

26 Eichstätt, Universitätsbibl. ms 471 comes from the Eichstätt Dominican convent;Frankfurt a. M., Univ. Bibl., Barth. 75 from the Frankfurt Dominican convent; andsimilarly Vienna, Dominikaner Konvent ms 108. I have not as yet determined theprovenance of Magdeburg, Stadtbibl. Fol. 140.

27 John de Hurwin of Constance, for example, was familiar with William Heytes-bury’s Insolubilia and in 1360 at Cologne, in the second year of his lectorate, wrote arefutation on one of Heytesbury’s questions.


stincts of Tröglein were no doubt shared by other Dominicans, and onecan assume that the Franciscans were even more open to the newerEnglish theology.

Cologne in the fourteenth century was much more of a marketplace for the academic exchange of ideas than has been realized. Anassessment of the extent of that influence must await a more extensivestudy of the surviving philosophical and theological texts of that periodof Cologne’s intellectual history.

chapter eighteen

WAS THERE AN OCKHAMIST SCHOOL?*

In the autumn of 1921 Gerhard Ritter published the first volume ofhis trilogy on late scholasticism: Marsilius von Inghen und die okkamistis-

che Schule in Deutschland.1 At the time Ritter conceived his project andfor many years thereafter, there was no doubt about the existence andimportance of the reality expressed in the second half of his title. SinceLouis XI’s prohibition of the doctrina of the doctores renovatores at Paris in1474, a group of names in late scholasticism—names no doubt suppliedby the Realist opponents of the Nominalists—have been linked in a tra-dition that was traced back to Ockham.2 Within this tradition, variouslyunderstood in later historiography by the supposedly interchangeablelabels of Nominalistae, Terministae, Occamistae, or via moderna, were placedOckham, Adam Wodeham, John Buridan, Gregory of Rimini, Johnof Mirecourt, Marsilius of Inghen, Albert of Saxony, John Dorp, andPierre d’Ailly.3 To that list the subsequent apologia by the Nominalistsadded the name of Jean Gerson.4

* Presented at a symposium in Tübingen in 1991 and published in Philosophy andLearning. Universities in the Middle Ages, ed. M.J.F.M. Hoenen, J.H.J. Schneider, andG. Wieland (Leiden–New York–Köln: E.J. Brill, 1995), pp. 263–292.

1 G. Ritter, Marsilius von Inghen und die okkamistische Schule in Deutschland (Heidelberg,1921). The other volumes in his Studien zur Spätscholastik were Via Antiqua und Via Modernaauf den deutschen Universitäten des XV. Jahrhunderts (Heidelberg, 1922) and Neue Quellenstückezur Theologie des Johann von Wesel (Heidelberg, 1926–1927).

2 Printed many times, the standard edition of the text is found in F. Ehrle, DerSentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia des Pisaner Papstes Alexanders V, FzS, Beiheft 9 (Münsteri.W., 1925), pp. 313–314.

3 Ibid.: “(…) quam sit quorundam aliorum Doctorum Renovatorum doctrina, utputa Guillelmi Okam, Monachi Cisterciensis [= John of Mirecourt], de Arimino [=Gregory of Rimini], Buridani, Petri de Alliaco, Marsilii, Adam, Dorp, Alberti deSaxonia, suorumque similium, quam nonnulli, ut dictum est, eiusdem UniversitatisStudentes, quos Nominales, seu Terministas vocant, imitari non verentur.”

4 Ehrle, Sentenzenkommentar, p. 322: “Reales autem haec omnia negligunt et contem-nunt dicentes: ‘Nos imus ad res, de terminis non curamus’. Contra quos magisterJohannes de Guersonno: ‘Dum vos ad res itis, terminis neglectis, in totam rei caditisignorantiam’.” Ibid., p. 324: “…suscitavit Deus Doctores catholicos: Petrum de Allyaco,Johannem de Gersonno, et alios quamplures doctissimos viros Nominales ….”

The inclusion of Gerson by the 1474 Nominalistae was probably based on their desire

372 chapter eighteen

It should be noted, as Neal Ward Gilbert already pointed out, thatthe names in this list in Louis’s 1474 Edict were not labeled “Nom-inalists” but “renovating doctors” whose doctrine had inspired latefifteenth-century Nominalistae or Terministae at Paris.5 Those listed werenot described as members of a school but as authoritative sources fora school. Moreover, some of those named, such as Ockham, Buridan,Marsilius of Inghen, Albert of Saxony, and John Dorp, were knownfor their works in logic and their Aristotelian commentaries, althoughOckham and Marsilius had also written important theological works.Others, such as Wodeham, Mirecourt, Rimini, and d’Ailly were the-ologians who applied principles of Terminist logic to theological prob-lems. Finally, while only two of those named were English authors, theothers—all Parisian scholars, three of whom belonged to the English-German Nation—could be viewed as English-influenced.6

to claim the mantle of one of the most respected and influential Parisian figures—a ploymade plausible by Gerson’s personal association with d’Ailly and by Gerson’s opposi-tion to the realist Formalizantes. That association led most historians until recently toview Gerson as one of the most important late medieval Nominalists and to attempt todocument that throughout his work. Only in the last two decades has there emergeda more balanced picture of Gerson, who after his chancellorship reformed univer-sity teaching by opposing English influence and the techniques of analysis and argu-mentation found in Ockham, Buridan, Rimini, Mirecourt, Marsilius and others. Seeespecially S. Ozment, “The University and the Church. Patterns of Reform in JeanGerson,” Medievalia and Humanistica, n.s., 1 (1970), 111–126; “Mysticism, Nominalism,and Dissent,” in Pursuit of Holiness, ed. C. Trinkaus and H.A. Oberman (Leiden, 1974),pp. 67–92; W. Hübener, “Der theologisch-philosophische Konservatismus des Jean Ger-son,” in Antiqui und Moderni, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 9 (Berlin, 1974), pp. 171–200;Z. Kaluza, “Le chancelier Gerson et Jérome de Prague,” AHDLMA, 51 (1984), 81–126; Les Querelles doctrinales à Paris. Nominalistes et realistes aux confins du XIVe et du XVe siècles(Bergamo, 1988); M.S. Burrows, “Jean Gerson after Constance: ‘Via Media et Regia’ asa Revision of the Ockhamist Covenant,” Church History, 59 (1990), 467–481.

5 N.W. Gilbert, “Ockham, Wyclif, and the ‘Via Moderna’,” in Antiqui und Moderni,pp. 85–125, at 94. For the text, see above, note 3.

6 N.W. Gilbert, “Richard de Bury and the “Quires of Yesterday’s Sophisms,” inPhilosophy and Humanism. Renaissance: Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, ed. E.P. Ma-hony (New York, 1976), pp. 229–257; J. Murdoch, “Subtilitates Anglicanae in Fourteenth-Century Paris: John of Mirecourt and Peter Ceffons,” in Machaut’s World: Science andArt in the Fourteenth Century, ed. M.P. Cosman and B. Chandler (New York, 1978),pp. 51–86; W.J. Courtenay, “The Role of English Thought in the Transformationof University Education in the Late Middle Ages,” in Rebirth, Reform, and Resilience:Universities in Transition, 1300–1700, ed. J.M. Kittelson and P. Transue (Columbus, Ohio,1984), pp. 103–162; G. Ouy, Un commentateur des “Sentences” au XIVe siècle, Jean de Mirecourt,Thèse, École des Chartes, 1946; summarized in École Nationale des Chartes. Positions desThèses soutenues par les élèves de la promotion de 1946 pour obtenir le diplôme d’archiviste paléographe(Paris, 1946), 117–122.

was there an ockhamist school? 373

The list was essentially an expansion on a basic grouping that hadoriginated earlier in the century. Jean de Maisonneuve, in his treatise onuniversals written between 1406 and 1418, had criticized the approachto logic and metaphysics found in Ockham, Buridan, and Marsilius.7

That association was echoed in the 1427 statute at Louvain, under theinfluence of the Realists, which prohibited the doctrine of Buridan,Marsilius, Ockham, and their followers.8 The opposing group acceptedmuch of that pedigree, as is reflected in the decree of the Electors atCologne in 1425 that the university/arts faculty should adopt “as amode of teaching and lecturing” the works and approach of Buridan,Marsilius, and their followers.9 And in the Nominalist response of 1474they traced their origins back to Ockham, whom they included withinthe Nominalist group.10

When, where, and why the list of “modern” authors was expandedto include theologians are interesting questions. The proscribed list ofrenovating doctors in the 1474 Edict applies just as much to the fac-ulty of theology as it does to arts. This goes well beyond the languageused earlier in the century and may have resulted from the fact that theLouvain controversy on future contingents between Peter de Rivo andHenry de Zomeren, which led to the Parisian realist manifesto of 1471and from there to the Edict of 1474, was as much a theological con-troversy as a philosophical one.11 But the cross-disciplinary implicationsof Gerson’s attack on the corrupting influence of English sophistical

7 “… sed sunt Epicuri litterales sequentes condemnatam Parisius Occanicum dis-coliam cum collegiis, scilicet, Buridani et Marsilii, qui Occam Anglicus fuit emula-tor paternarum traditionum et non insecutor Aristotelis et aliorum antiquorum (…).”A.G. Weiler, “Un traité de Jean de Nova Domo sur les Universaux,” Vivarium, 6 (1968),108–154, at 137; Gilbert, “Ockham, Wyclif,” pp. 96–97; Zénon Kaluza, “Le ‘De uni-versali reali’ de Jean de Maisonneuve et les epicuri litterales,” Freiburger Zeitschrift fürPhilosophie und Theologie, 33 (1986), 469–516; Kaluza, Querelles. For the dating of Maison-neuve’s De universali reali see Kaluza, Querelles, p. 91.

8 Ehrle, Sentenzenkommentar, p. 159: “Nullus magister debeat recipi aut admitti adregentiam, nisi iuret, se nunquam doctrinare Buridanum, Marsilium, Ockam, auteorum sequaces.”

9 Ehrle, Sentenzenkommentar, p. 282: “… Magistri moderniores, ut Buridanus, Marcil-ius, et eorum College sive sequaces (…).”

10 More precisely, Ockham was not described as the first Nominalist or as founderof a school, but as the first Nominalist to be attacked. Ehrle, Sentenzenkommentar, p. 323:“Item inter Nominales primus, qui legitur fuisse condemnatus fuit Guillelmus Okam,quem Johannes XXII persecutus est ….”

11 La Querelle des futurs contingents (Louvain 1465–1475), ed. L. Baudry (Paris, 1950);Ehrle, Sentenzenkommentar, pp. 116–140, 157–162, 297–321.


techniques of analysis and disputation at the beginning of the fifteenthcentury certainly played a part.12

The distinction between these fourteenth-century sources and theirlate fifteenth-century proponents, i.e., between the doctores renovatores andthe Nominalistae, was eventually lost, and the list became an incom-plete membership list of the Nominalist or Ockhamist “school”.13 Thegroundwork for that shift was laid in the Nominalist defense of 1474. Inorder to portray themselves as the true defenders of the faith againstthe “heretical realists,” they constructed a “history” of previous con-frontations and persecutions leading up to the one in which they werepresently engaged. Apart from Ockham, d’Ailly, and Gerson, no adher-ents of their sect were claimed by name, but their account did attributeto the Nominalists at least a century and a half of existence as a group.After that it was a simple step to use the list of Nominalist sourcesand the lingering memory of Roscelinus and Abelard to create a moredetailed history of the Nominalist sect. From Johannes Turmair (Aventi-nus) in the early sixteenth century well into the later part of this century,Ockham and Nominalists were linked as restoring-founder and follow-ers in a school that spanned the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.14

Few modern historians have taken the history of the Nominalists,as developed in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, asaccurate. Yet some such school was thought to have existed in thefourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and it was conceded that Ockhamplayed a central role, either as founder or as principal and identifyingfigure. The problem was how to proceed to uncover a more accurateunderstanding of the development of the Ockhamist or Nominalisttradition.

12 Kaluza, Querelles; see also Kaluza, “La crise des années 1474–1482: l’interdictiondu Nominalisme par Louis XI,” in Philosophy and Learning, pp. 293–327.

13 It would be interesting to trace when, in the historiography, Robert Holcot,Nicolaus of Autrecourt, and others became attached to the school of Nominalism inlate scholasticism.

14 For Turmair’s account see his Annales ducum Boiariae, VI, c. 3, in Sämtliche Werke, ed.S. Riezler, vol. 3 (Munich, 1884), pp. 200–202. For the historiography on Nominalismsee my “In Search of Nominalism: Two Centuries of Historical Debate,” in Gli studi difilosofia medievale fra otto e novecento, ed. A. Maierù (Rome, 1991), pp. 233–251 [reprinted inthis volume as Chapter 1].


Methodological Considerations

Four different approaches to this problem are possible, and most havebeen tried, either singly or in combination with others. The first is totake the list of authoritative sources for the late medieval Nominalistae asa membership list of the Nominalist or Ockhamist tradition, and thenproceed to find out what the named individuals have in common witheach other and with Ockham. That was primarily the path chosen byRitter in his work on Marsilius, by Ehrle in his work on Peter of Candiaand the late medieval school traditions, by Albert Lang in his work onthe Parisian abbreviator of Wodeham, Heinrich Totting of Oyta, andby many other scholars in this century.15

Despite the long history of doing business that way, this approachwas based, as has already been suggested, on the confusion betweenNominalism or Ockhamism and a list of authoritative sources usedby late fifteenth-century Nominalists. The list was not a descriptionof a school. Moreover, this historiographical approach assumed at theoutset one of the things to be proven, namely that these figures were infact Nominalists or Ockhamists. Thus it should not be surprising thateveryone on the list who has been studied in detail, obviously with theexception of Ockham, has proved to have departed from Ockham andfrom each other, often on several major issues.

A second approach is similar but starts at the other end. It first seeksto identify the principal and distinctive elements in Ockham’s thought,and then to assess subsequent late medieval authors as to whether andto what degree they defended or incorporated those elements. Thosewho accepted all or most of those elements became the Ockhamistschool, whether or not they saw themselves as such. Correspondingly,those who do not accept what are considered to be major elements ofOckham’s “system” were placed outside the Ockhamist tradition, nomatter how close the historical association.

If pursued carefully and systematically, this second approach is excel-lent for determining the degree and type of influence Ockham’s writ-ings or particular features of his thought exercised in late medievalEurope.16 As a method of identifying an Ockhamist school in late

15 A. Lang, Heinrich Totting von Oyta (Münster i.W., 1937). For Ritter and Ehrle, seeabove, notes 1 & 2.

16 A good example of this second approach is K.H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in theAge of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics 1250–1345 (Leiden, 1988).


medieval universities, it is far less satisfactory. This is so for several rea-sons. First, we cannot assume that the elements we identify as centralto Ockham’s thought are the ones late medieval authors would havethought of as distinctly Ockhamist. Second, being influenced by Ock-ham does not make one a conscious member of an Ockhamist school.Third, those who thought of themselves as Ockhamists or who wereso designated by others need not have been “true Ockhamists” in oursense of that term. What is ultimately important is not so much what we

think Ockham stood for or what we think was the core of his thought,but what they thought of as Ockhamist, which could be a very differentand narrower group of views. A good example of the problem is thescholarly literature on the arts faculty statute of Dec. 29, 1340, whichuntil recently has almost universally tested the accuracy of its anti-Ockhamist rubric by comparing its articles to Ockham’s thought.17 Butthe “Ockhamist” (quorundam errorum Ockanicorum) of the rubric applies, ifcorrect, to opinions of contemporary Ockhamists, which may or maynot have much to do with Ockham. The question of whether later Ock-hamists were faithful to Ockham is a separate question from whetherthey saw themselves as followers of Ockham, just as the faithfulness ofThomists or Scotists to their respective doctors should not be the crite-rion for whether they are appropriately labeled. Subsequent “followers”must be studied on their own terms apart from the question of whetherthey are true to the thought of their doctor.18

Anyone using this method, which to be thorough must trace a small group of issues andpositions through many post-Ockham authors, has to be careful not to confuse the partwith the whole and make the conclusions too sweeping. Only when numerous issueshave been thoroughly searched will we be in a position to broaden our conclusions.

Another way to get at the question of influence is through the provenance andhistory of extant manuscripts as well as book lists from late medieval libraries. Bothtypes of sources can give us useful information on the dissemination of Ockham’swritings and their reception. But again, this procedure speaks only to knowledge ofOckham, not to the existence and meaning of an Ockhamist school.

17 E.A. Moody, “Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt: The Parisian Stat-utes of 1339 and 1340,” FS, 7 (1947), 113–146; R. Paqué, Das Pariser Nominalistenstatut. ZurEntstehung des Realitätsbegriffs der neuzeitlichen Naturwissenschaft (Berlin, 1970); T.K. Scott, Jr.,“Nicholas of Autrecourt, Buridan, and Ockhamism,” JHP, 9 (1971), 15–41; J.M.M.H.Thijssen, “Once again the Ockhamist Statutes of 1339 and 1340: Some new perspec-tives,” Vivarium, 28 (1990), 136–167.

18 In fact, later representatives of a “school” tradition are not only important fortracing the effect of an author’s thought (Wirkungsgeschichte), the changing balanceof issues, and changing interpretation; they are often the clues by which we candetermine when and how positions and labels take on new character and meaning.The truth of this is demonstrated in M.J.F.M. Hoenen, “Albertistae, thomistae und


These first two approaches have often gone together. Membershipin the Nominalist or Ockhamist school in the late Middle Ages con-sisted in those named in the core list that emerged in the fifteenthcentury, expanded to include like-minded authors. The teaching con-tent of the school was derived from Ockham himself, but usually incombination with those “followers” already so identified. Yet every so-called Ockhamist who has been studied has proved to be somewhatindependent, rejecting Ockham’s arguments and conclusions on issuesconsidered of major importance to his thought. In this regard, the con-clusions reached by Ritter in his study of Marsilius of Inghen have beenconfirmed by studies of other “Ockhamists,” even including Ockham’sclosest associate, Adam Wodeham.19 And whatever core presupposi-tions are identified, whether they are epistemology, or the distinctionof absolute and ordained power, or covenantal causality, or Ockham’stheory of supposition and universals, or linguistic reductionism, theseseem to have also been the property of late medieval authors that onewould have great difficulty in placing within an Ockhamist tradition.

Thus it has recently seemed advisable to set aside the traditional pic-ture, with its clearly identified names and ideas, and to look first andfor a time exclusively at those who identify themselves as belonging tothe school or party of Ockham, or at the meaning attached to mentionof the Occamistae and doctrina Occamica in the texts of the period. Thefirst part of this approach, i.e., the way of self-identification, is basedon the testimony of “insiders”. It examines the thought—at least on theissues where they declare their Ockhamism—of those who view them-selves to be members of an Ockham school or who view themselves aswithin that tradition. What they thought on those issues reveals thelate medieval Ockhamist tradition, whether or not those points canbe found in Ockham or were central to his thought. One of the bestfigures to use in this regard, as Heiko Oberman realized, is GabrielBiel.20 The second part of this approach, i.e., deciphering the meaningof Occamistae and scientia Occamica, while based on the negative testimony

nominales: Die philosophisch-historischen Hintergründe der Intellektlehre des WesselGansfort († 1489),” Wessel Gansfort (1419–1489) and Northern Humanism, ed. F. Akkerman,G.C. Huisman, and A.J. Vanderjagt, Brill Studies in Intellectual History, 40 (Leiden1993), pp. 71–96; and “The Thomistic Principle of Individuation in 15th CenturyThomistic and Albertistic Sources,” Medioevo, 18 (1992), 327–357.

19 Tachau, Vision and Certitude, pp. 275–312.20 H.A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval

Nominalism (Cambridge, Mass., 1963).


of opponents, does reveal what contemporary “outsiders” understoodOckhamism to be. If that contemporary, negative information can besupported or confirmed by the testimony of those so identified, then wemay be closer to knowing what Ockhamism meant in that period.

These last two approaches, linked as they are here, may not producethe same results. As can be seen in the differences between the accountsof the Reales and Nominalistae of 1474, the tenets of a “school” do notappear the same way to insiders and outsiders. More importantly, wemust take seriously the possibility that being an Ockhamist at Parisin 1339 meant something very different than being an Ockhamist atTübingen in 1485. To be an Ockhamist might and probably did meandifferent things at different times. It is highly unlikely that there was acontinuous stream that we can call Ockhamism from 1330 to 1530.

Each chapter must be studied on its own terms. For reasons of space,the following remarks are limited to two universities.

Oxford, 1324–1400

Belief in the existence of an Ockhamist school at Oxford in the four-teenth century rested largely on three pieces of evidence: the close asso-ciation of Ockham and his student, Adam Wodeham, who edited someof Ockham’s writings and who was active at Oxford a decade later;the supposed Ockhamism of Robert Holcot; and John Wyclif ’s oppo-sition to contemporary “sign doctors”, who were presumed to be theOckhamists at Oxford during his student days.

The first author to be removed from the list of English Ockhamistswas Holcot. Holcot never described himself as an Ockhamist, nordid any contemporary so describe him. Moreover, Holcot was openlycritical of Ockham in the areas of epistemology, where he retainedsensible and intelligible species, in his understanding of the object ofknowledge, and in his view of sin and grace.21 Despite E.A. Moody’sattempt to show that Chatton, not Ockham, was the target of Holcot’squodlibet on the object of knowledge, and despite Heinrich Schepers’s

21 H.G. Gelber, Exploring the Boundaries of Reason. Three Questions on the Nature of God byRobert Holcot, OP (Toronto, 1983); Tachau, Vision and Certitude, pp. 244–255; E.A. Moody,“A Quodlibetal Question of Robert Holkot, O.P. on the Problem of the Objects ofKnowledge and of Belief,” Speculum, 39 (1964), 53–74; W.J. Courtenay, Adam Wodeham(Leiden, 1978), pp. 95–106.


attempt to show that Holcot defended Ockhamist positions againstCrathorn, the weight of evidence provides little ground for viewingHolcot as an Ockhamist.22

More surprisingly, Adam Wodeham has recently been shown tohave been more independent of Ockham than previously supposed,perhaps enough to place him outside an Ockhamist camp. This isthe case with his definition of intuitive cognition, his view of species,his understanding of the object of knowledge, and Wodeham’s ownclaim that he developed his view of quantity and divisibility beforeOckham adopted similar positions.23 Although independent and highlycreative in his own right, and not one to defend positions simplybecause they were taught by Ockham, Wodeham is as close as wecan come to an Ockhamist at Oxford in this period. That he failsto conform to traditional definitions is evidence that we have beenasking the wrong questions about Wodeham and about Ockhamism.On the basis of what we now know about Oxford in the generationafter Ockham, there is no evidence that anything like an Ockhamistschool ever developed there.24

What then is one to make of Wyclif ’s “sign doctors,” long consid-ered a code word for Ockhamists. Masters in the arts and theologicalprogram at Oxford during Wyclif ’s student years seem to have beenrealists, not nominalists. One thinks, for example, of Nicholas Aston,Ralph Strode, and Richard Brinkley.25 Unless or until some new textsand names appear, we would have to conclude that Wyclif ’s sign doc-tors were little more than a rhetorical device, a backdrop against whichhe highlighted his own positions.

22 Moody, “Quodlibetal Question”; H. Schepers, “Holkot contra dicta Crathorn,”PJ, 77 (1970), 320–354; 79 (1972), 106–136; see also H.A. Oberman, “Facientibus quodin se est Deus non denegat gratiam. Robert Holcot, O.P., and the Beginning of Luther’sTheology,” HTR, 55 (1962), 317–342.

23 Tachau, Vision and Certitude, pp. 275–312; G. Gál, “Adam Wodeham’s Question onthe ‘Complexe Significabile’ as the Immediate Object of Scientific Knowledge,” FS, 37(1977), 66–102; Courtenay, Adam Wodeham, p. 64.

24 W.J. Courtenay, “The Reception of Ockham’s Thought in Fourteenth-CenturyEngland,” in From Ockham to Wyclif, ed. A. Hudson and M. Wilks (Oxford, 1987), pp. 89–107 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 7]. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England (Princeton, 1987), pp. 171–218.

25 Z. Kaluza, “L’oeuvre théologique de Nicolas Aston,” AHDLMA, 45 (1978), 45–82;G. Gál and R. Wood, “Richard Brinkley and his ‘Summa logicae’,” FS, 40 (1980), 59–101; Kaluza, “L’oeuvre théologique de Richard Brinkley, O.F.M.,” AHDLMA, 56 (1989),169–264; M.J. Fitzgerald, Richard Brinkley’s Theory of Sentential Reference (Leiden, 1987).


Paris, 1339–1346

At Paris the situation appears quite different. In fact, the only four-teenth-century references to the Occamistae occur in Parisian or Parisian-related documents. Therefore the events of 1339 to 1346 are of crucialimportance to the history of Ockhamism in late medieval universities.Despite almost a century of research and entire books devoted to thissmall group of documents, there is still much to be learned.26 Since theaccount presented below brings together evidence and arguments onlyintroduced in the last decade, a brief look at the tidal currents of recentresearch is necessary.

The Hypothesis of a Lost Statute

In an article jointly authored with Katherine Tachau in 1982 we putforward the hypothesis that the rubric attached to the arts facultystatute of December 29, 1340, “de reprobatione quorundam errorum Ockan-

icorum,” was mistakenly attached to that document when it was laterinscribed into a university register, and that the statute for which thatwas the appropriate rubric was lost between the date of its supposedapproval (early 1341) and the compilation of the register.27 The hypoth-esis was an attempt at a solution to a discrepancy in the dates assignedto what had previously been thought to be one and the same statute.The colophon of the statute in question was dated at Paris on Decem-ber 29, 1340 under the seals of the rector of the university and the proc-tors of the four nations.28 Yet there was also a reference in the proctor’s

26 Ehrle, Sentenzenkommentar, pp. 114–116; Moody, “Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholasof Autrecourt”; Paqué, Das Pariser Nominalistenstatut; Scott, “Nicholas of Autrecourt”;Gilbert, “Ockham, Wyclif, and the ‘via moderna’”; W.J. Courtenay and K.H. Tachau,“Ockham, Ockhamists, and the English-German Nation at Paris, 1339–1341,” Historyof Universities, 2 (1982), 53–96 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 9]; Courtenay,“The Reception of Ockham’s Thought at the University of Paris,” in Preuve et raisons àl’Université de Paris. Logique, ontologie et théologie au XIVe siècle, ed. Z. Kaluza and P. Vignaux(Paris, 1984), 43–64 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 8]; Thijssen, “Once Againthe Ockhamist Statutes”; Courtenay, “The Registers of the University of Paris andthe Statutes against the Scientia Occamica,” Vivarium, 29 (1991), 13–49 [reprinted in thisvolume as Chapter 11]; and Kaluza, “Les sciences et leurs langages. Note sur le statutdu 29 décembre 1340 et le prétendu statut perdu contre Ockham,” Filosofia e teologia nelTrecento. Studi in ricordo di Eugenio Randi (Turnhout, 1994), pp. 197–258.

27 Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists”. The statute is printed in CUPII, pp. 505–507, #1042.

28 Ibid., 507: “Datum Parisius sub sigillis quatuor nationum, videlicet Gallicorum,


book of the English-German nation stating that an arts faculty statute“contra novas opiniones quorundam, qui vocantur Occhanistae” was sealed in thehouse of the proctor and published in sermone at the Dominican conventbetween Jan. 13 and Febr. 10, 1341.29 The editors of the Chartularium Uni-

versitatis Parisiensis and the Liber procuratorum, Heinrich Denifle and ÉmileChâtelain assumed that the proctor, Henry de Unna, was referring tothe statute of December 29, 1340, and they did not offer any expla-nation as to why a statute dated and sealed in December 1340 couldalso be sealed a month later. Moreover, the inception oaths in the artsfaculty mention that there were two statutes contra scientiam Occamicam.30

If one of those was the statute passed on Sept. 25, 1339, whose firstclause or statute proscribed “dogmatizing” Ockham and whose sec-ond clause was an unrelated disciplinary statute, then the other statutecontra scientiam Occamicam was probably the one to which the rubric de

reprobatione errorum Ockanicorum belonged. But the oath, which usuallyfollowed the language of the statute, proscribed the scientia Occamica andprescribed the scientia Aristotelis and of the Commentator Averroes andother ancient commentators, none of which seemed to describe thecontent of the December statute.31 Finally, the Nominalist defense of1474, which referred to two statutes against Ockham, the first of whichwas the prohibition on using his works, described the second as havingfour articles, not six as has the statute of December 1340.32 The dis-crepancy in date of sealing in the 1340 statute and the 1341 reference,

Picardorum, Normannorum et Anglicorum, unacum signeto rectoris Universitatis Pari-siensis, anno Domini MCCCXL, die veneris post Nativitatem Domini.”

29 Liber procuratorum nationis Anglicanae in AUP I, cols. 44–45: “Item tempore procu-racionis ejusdem [Henricus de Unna, Jan. 13 – Febr. 10, 1341] sigillatum fuit statutumfacultatis contra novas opiniones quorundam, qui vocantur Occhaniste, in domo dictiprocuratoris, et puplicatum fuit idem statutum coram Universitate apud Predicatoresin sermone.”

30 CUP II, p. 680: “Item jurabitis quod statuta facta per facultatem artium contrascientiam Okamicam observabitis (…). Item observabitis statutum contentum in alteropredictorum duorum statutorum de scientia Okamica, scilicet (…).”

31 Ibid.: “… neque dictam scientiam [Occamicam] et consimilis sustenebitis quoquo-modo, sed scientiam Aristotelis et sui Commentatoris Averrois et aliorum commentato-rum antiquorum et expositorum dicti Aristotelis, nisi in casibus qui sunt contra fidem.”

32 C. Du Plessis d’Argentré, Collectio judiciorum de novis erroribus, vol. I, pt. 2 (Paris,1724), p. 286; also in Ehrle, Sentenzenkommentar, pp. 323–324: “Sed Facultas Artiumimportunitate victa fecit statutum in quo cavetur dictam doctrinam non esse dogmati-zandum, quia nondum erat approbata et examinata. Et postmodum instituit juramen-tum quo juraverunt omnes dictam doctrinam non dogmatizare in casibus in quibus estcontra fidem. Et expresse habetur in libro Rectoris. Et in eodem libro notantur quatuor


compounded by the differences in language and structure between the1340 statute and the descriptions given in the oaths and the Nominalistdefense, called for some explanation. The hypothesis proposed in 1982seemed the more plausible solution at that time. Others shared thatview.33

In 1990 Hans Thijssen proposed a different solution based on hisunderstanding of notarial practice.34 According to Thijssen, the cre-ation of official documents went through three stages separated in time:general approval, according to which the document was dated; sealing,which was done sequentially and separately by each nation; and pro-mulgation, indicated by the word ‘actum’. He hypothesized that sincethe text of the statute of December 1340, with its colophon of date,place, and reference to the seals of the proctors and rector, lacked theword actum, it was a draft copy kept by the rector until the official copywas prepared and sealed a month later. He concluded that there wasno lost statute and that the rubric attached to the 1340 document iscorrect.

The possibility introduced by Thijssen, attractive in its simplicity,was plausible if his understanding of university notarial practice wascorrect. The problem, however, was that the preparation and preser-vation of university documents had received no separate study. Whenexplored, the situation looked very different than anticipated.35 Theuniversity had no chancery in the fourteenth century beyond the uni-versity notary, who attended meetings of the university and arts facultyand prepared their documents. Each nation had its own scribe for suchpurposes. Moreover, documents were kept as original diplomas in thechests of the nation and faculty (usually without rubric) and were notregularly copied into a register. The extant registers of the nations (theLibri nationum)—in contrast to the registers of the proctors (Libri procura-

torum, which were regularly maintained but which rarely included offi-cial documents)—were products of a standardized revision that tookplace during the 1355 to 1368 period. There is no evidence that theregister of the rector (the Liber rectoris) was revised or updated between

articuli in quibus asserebat dictum Okam errasse (…).” On the accuracy of this descrip-tion, see note 38 below.

33 For example, see J.M.M.H. Thijssen, “Buridan on the Unity of a Science. Anotherchapter in Ockhamism?,” in Ockham and Ockhamists (Nijmegen, 1987), pp. 93–105, at 102;J. Biard, Logique et théorie du signe au XIVe siècle (Paris, 1989), pp. 163–165.

34 Thijssen, “Once again the Ockhamist Statutes”.35 Courtenay, “Registers of the University of Paris”.


c. 1310 and c. 1400, at which point the statute of 1339 was included butnot that of 1340. All these registers at one time or another omitteddocuments, including statutes; on occasion an incorrect rubric wasattached to a document and copied again without correction; and weknow of statutes passed that were never copied into any register. But thecrucial finding was that most statutes of the arts faculty in the thirteenthand fourteenth centuries as well as those of the university carry onlythe date or a datum clause in their colophon, and less frequently actum

or actum et datum. This applies not only to their form when eventuallyinscribed into the books of the nations and of the rector, a procedurethat surely would have used the final, official language of the statute,but also to their form as original diplomas, some of which have survivedwith seals attached and only have datum in the colophon. The non-standardization of this part of a notarial colophon, which could useactum, datum, or both to indicate the place and date of official action,has long been noted by French diplomatics specialists.36

The wording of the colophon of the 1340 statute, then, is the wordingused in its final official form as eventually recorded in the books of thenations. While the sealing of documents usually took place at or soonafter the meeting at which action was taken, the above study of uni-versity diplomatics did find one document, to be discussed below, thatreveals that there could, on occasion, be a delay between the approvalof a statute and its sealing and promulgation.37 If one hypothesizes thatsimilar circumstances could have occurred in the case of the 1340/41statute, then the scenario proposed by Thijssen is possible, althougharrived at through different evidence.

Because of that, I suggested that there is no longer sufficient reasonfor categorically denying that the statute of December 1340 is identicalwith the statute sealed and promulgated a month later. The statementsmade in the Nominalist defense are too unreliable to contradict thatconclusion.38 The only matter I found unresolved was the discrepancy

36 A. Giry, Manuel de diplomatique (Paris, 1894), pp. 578, 581–582, 585–589; A. deBoüard, Manuel de diplomatique française et pontificale (Paris, 1929), pp. 295–296.

37 Statute of 1253, CUP I, 242–244 (#219). More detail on the stages and timingof document preparation and publication is given in Courtenay, “Registers of theUniversity of Paris,” 33–37 [above, pp. 249–253].

38 The best treatment of the context of the Nominalist defense or manifesto of 1474can be found in Kaluza, “La crise des années”. When treating that document in his“Les sciences et leurs langages,” however, Kaluza attributes far more intentional distor-tion and fabrication to the Nominalist account than I think is warranted consideringthe period in which it was written. Kaluza has done an excellent job in revealing the


between the description of the main statute contra scientiam Ockhamicam

in the arts faculty inception oaths and the content of the 1340 statute.Because of that I concluded in 1991 that until this last problem wasresolved, we could not entirely eliminate the possibility of a lost statute.The consequence was to continue to entertain the possibility that therewere three statutes involved: one against Parisian Ockhamists, i.e. thestatute of December 1340, and two directed in some sense againstOckham, one in Sept. 1339 and a later one now lost.

Zénon Kaluza, turning to this problem after many years of study onthe texts related to the disputes between the realists and nominalistsin the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and on the eve of publish-ing his long-awaited study of Nicholas of Autrecourt, has gone furtherin resolving some of the puzzles with the documents of this Parisiancrisis over Ockham and Ockhamism.39 Although I do not accept hisunderstanding of university procedures and efficiency in the prepara-tion and preservation of documents and still believe that neither hispicture nor mine fully and adequately explains all the evidence, I doaccept most of his conclusions regarding the identity and significance

well-crafted, rhetorical structure of the Nominalist use of “evidence” aimed at theiraudience: the king and his advisers. But words like “perfidie,” “fourberies,” “men-songes” and others show the same insensitivity to medieval perspectives as does ourmodern notion of plagiarism when applied to the medieval understanding of author-ship.

Any document that pleads a case shapes evidence to support the argument. Some“distortions” in the Nominalist treatise are probably no more than the inaccurateunderstanding, in an age that lacked historical accounts or instruction about the past,of events that occurred a century and a half earlier. This is probably the basis for thefusion of events that occurred during the pontificates of John XXII and Benedict XII.On the other hand, they were aware that the statute against dogmatizing Ockhamwas in the Liber rectoris, which they may or may not have had direct access to. In anycase, their statement that the same register contained a second statute against Ockham,which is false, is either an intentional misrepretation or, more likely, a confused beliefthat they could not or did not verify. Since they were wrong about the register in whichthe second statute is recorded, they are no doubt wrong about the number of articlesin that statute, which they did not have before their eyes in any form. The importantpoint is that we cannot take any otherwise unsupported statements in the Nominalistdefense as historically credible.

39 Kaluza, “Les sciences et leurs langages”. His earlier contributions include Querel-les; “Le chancelier Gerson”; “Le ‘De Universali reali’ ”; “Le Statut du 25 septembre1339 et l’ordonnance du 2 septembre 1276,” in Die Philosophie im 14. und 15. Jahrhundert. Inmemoriam Konstanty Michalski (1879–1947) (Amsterdam, 1988), pp. 343–351; and “La crisedes années 1474–1482”. His study of Nicholas of Autrecourt subsequently appeared inHLF, 42.1 (Paris, 1995).


of the documents under discussion. The following picture reflects mypresent understanding, aided considerably by his most recent exposi-tions to which the reader is directed.

The Statutes of September 25, 1339

A crisis over the implications of some aspects of Ockham’s philosoph-ical teaching at Paris apparently came to a head sometime during theacademic year 1338–1339. The arts faculty took action at the beginningof the next fall term. On September 25, 1339, they passed two statutes,the first of which mandated that no works of Ockham be used in teach-ing or disputations, privately or publicly, since they had not yet beenproperly examined and approved.

Since, therefore, we have sworn to observe a certain ordinance whichwas issued by our predecessors, who were not unreasonably concernedas to the books to be read publicly or privately among us; and becausewe ought not to read certain books not admitted by them or custom-arily read elsewhere; and since in these times some have presumed todogmatize the doctrine of William called Ockham, publicly and secretlyby holding small meetings on this subject in private places—despite thefact that this doctrine has not been admitted by those in authority, hasnot been customarily read elsewhere, and has been examined neither byus nor by others to whom this might pertain, for which reason it doesnot appear to be free from suspicion—; hence we, mindful of our well-being, and considering the oath which we made to observe the above-mentioned ordinance, decree that henceforth no one shall presume todogmatize the said doctrine by listening to it or lecturing on it publiclyor in private, or by holding small meetings for disputing said doctrine,or by citing it in lecture or in disputations. If anyone should presume,however, to act against the above or any part thereof, him we suspendfor a year, during which time he may not obtain any office or degreeamong us, nor exercise in any way any office or degree already held.Moreover, if anyone should obstinately fail to observe the above statute,we will forever place him under the aforesaid penalty.40

40 CUP II, pp. 485–486 (#1023). The translated section corresponds to the followingtext: “Cum igitur a predecessoribus nostris non irrationabiliter motis circa libros apudnos legendos publice vel occulte certa precesserit ordinatio per nos jurata observari,et quod aliquos libros per ipsos non admissos vel alias consuetos legere non debemus,et istis temporibus nonnulli doctrinam Guillermi dicti Okam (quamvis per ipsos ordi-nantes admissa non fuerit vel alias consueta, neque per nos seu alios ad quos pertineatexaminata, propter quod non videtur suspicione carere), dogmatizare presumpserintpublice et occulte super hoc in locis privatis conventicula faciendo: hinc est quodnos nostre salutis memores, considerantes juramentum quod fecimus de dicta ordi-


As Zénon Kaluza has pointed out, one of the precedents used forthis legislation was a 1276 university ordinance that prohibited privateteaching on texts, except those in grammar and logic. The latter wereexempted, since they could not endanger the faith.41 But the arts mas-ters of 1339 went beyond the provisions of the earlier legislation, indi-cating in Kaluza’s view a stronger level of concern and anti-Ockhamistpressure than a simple delay on a decision to allow use of Ockham’sworks. The 1339 statute excluded Ockham’s works from disputationsas well as lectures, public as well as private, presumably those in logicas well as on other subjects, made citing and even listening as egre-gious as teaching, and reasserted the right of the masters or ecclesias-tical authority to judge what works were appropriate. Kaluza acceptedthe hypothesis, suggested in the Nominalist defense of 1474 (albeit onerroneous grounds) and explored further by Courtenay and Tachau,that the arts masters were responding in part to papal pressure.42

Kaluza’s article advanced our knowledge of the legislative contextand meaning of this statute. Yet the ordinance of 1276 is not the onlypiece of university legislation that lies behind the text of the 1339statute. The right of the faculty and university to determine whichbooks were permissible texts for lectures and study was grounded inthe 1215 letter of Robert Curson, preserved in university registers as thefirst statute of the university, as well as the oaths sworn by those being

natione observanda, statuimus quod nullus decetero predictam doctrinam dogmatizarepresumat audiendo vel legendo publice vel occulte, necnon conventicula super dictadoctrina disputanda faciendo vel ipsum in lectura vel disputationibus allegando. Si quistamen contra premissa vel aliquod premissorum attemptare presumpserit, ipsum perannum privamus, et quod per dictum annum obtinere honorem seu gradum inter nosnon valeat nec obtenti actus aliqualiter exercere. Si qui autem contra predicta inventipertinaces fuerint, in predictis penis volumus perpetue subjacere.”

41 CUP I, pp. 538–539, #468, Engl. transl. in L. Thorndike, University Records and Lifein the Middle Ages (New York, 1971), pp. 102–103; Kaluza, “Le Statut du 25 septembre1339”. It should be noted that the 1276 statute was a statute of the university, not thearts faculty. But it was recorded in both the book of the Rector and the books of thenations, and bachelors in the arts faculty swore to uphold the statutes of the universityalong with those of the faculty and nation. Conrad of Megenberg would probablynot have agreed that lectures in grammar and logic could not be dangerous to thefaith. Private lectures in other areas of philosophy required special permission, suchas the arts faculty granted to Suno Karoli in November 1340 for lectures on John ofSacrobosco’s De sphaera; AUP I, col. 44.

42 See Kaluza, “Le Statut,” 343–344, 349–351; Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockham,Ockhamists,” 75–79; Courtenay, “Reception of Ockham’s Thought at the University ofParis,” pp. 47–50.


examined for determination and eventual licensing.43 More importantly,the language used in the 1339 statute evokes the more famous sequelto the ordinance of 1276, namely Étienne Tempier’s preface to thecondemnation of 219 articles in 1277.44

1277: “…qui dictos errores vel aliquem ex illis dogmatizaverint, aut def-fendere seu sustinere presumpserint ….”45

1339: “et istis temporibus nonnulli doctrinam Guillermi dicti Okam (…)dogmatizare presumpserint publice et occulte super hoc in locis privatisconventicula faciendo ….”46

It is Tempier’s preface that reaffirms the right of ecclesiastical author-ity to judge which books or texts should or should not be read—anauthority and procedure described in the 1339 statute as shared withuniversity masters (“examined neither by us nor by others to whom thismight pertain”).47

The appeal to the language of 1276 and 1277, one of the definingmoments in the history of the university, reveals that the arts mastersin the autumn of 1339 believed (or at least wished to be perceived asbelieving) that more was at stake than a simple suspension of judgmentuntil Ockham’s works could be studied. E.A. Moody was right thatOckham was not directly condemned, but wrong in his belief that thestatute was innocuous as far as it concerned Ockham.48 Suspicion of

43 CUP I, pp. 78–80, #20; CUP II, p. 678.44 It should be noted, however, that Tempier’s condemnation of 219 articles in 1277

was never recorded in any register of the university, faculties, or nations. Its contentswere known within the university community probably through oral communicationand through theological texts. The text of the articles was copied into various theolog-ical works that were available in several Parisian libraries, most notably the Sorbonne.See Courtenay, ‘The Preservation and Dissemination of Academic Condemnations atthe University of Paris in the Middle Ages,’ Moral and Political Philosophies in the Mid-dle Ages. Proceedings of the Ninth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy, Ottawa, 1992,ed. C. Bazán, E. Andújar, L. Sbrocchi (New York–Ottawa–Toronto, 1995), vol. III,pp. 1659–1667.

45 CUP I, p. 543, #473.46 CUP II, p. 485, #1023.47 CUP I, p. 543. The role of ecclesiastical authority in approving the use of Aristo-

tle’s works in natural philosophy can be seen in Gregory IX’s letter in CUP I, p. 143,#87. In Tempier’s preface (CUP I, p. 543) the university’s role in judging works andopinions is reflected in the words “tam doctorum sacre scripture quam aliorum pru-dentium virorum communicato consilio,” and later specific titles are forbidden alongwith unspecified works in necromancy and divination, “per eandem sententiam nos-tram condempnamus, in omnes, qui dictos rotulos, libros, quaternos dogmatizaverint,aut audierint ….”

48 Moody, “Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt”.


Ockham’s doctrina was specifically stated, and the language used evokeda parallel between Ockham’s works and those condemned in 1277.Moreover, the arts faculty considered this piece of legislation to be astatute specifically concerned with Ockhamist scientia. This is clear fromthe oath instituted within a few years of the statute, which describes it asone of two statutes “de scientia Okamica”.49 No matter how one interpretsor where one places the arts faculty statute of December 29, 1340 (theso-called “Nominalistenstatut”), the arts faculty in the early autumn of1339 was concerned about one particular aspect of Ockham’s thoughtdesignated by the term doctrina in the statute and by scientia in the oath.In light of the evidence presented in the 1982 article, the crucial issueappears to have been Ockham’s interpretation of the categories and itsimplications for logic and physics.50

As was noted a decade ago, the statute against dogmatizing Ockhamwas promulgated in the midst of a controversy between Benedict XIIand the university in which the pope threatened and eventually sus-pended all privileges granted to Paris.51 It was politically in the uni-versity’s best interest to take action against Ockham, who had longopposed and written against Benedict and his predecessor, John XXII.Yet this statute was not simply a response to outside pressure. It wasprimarily a reaction to an internal crisis over the influence of Ockham’sthought on young scholars at Paris.

Against whom was the 1339 statute directed? It has long been viewedas a prohibition applicable to the university at large, but such is notthe case. As was pointed out a decade ago, it applied only to the artsfaculty.52 No comparable statute for the theological faculty or the entireuniversity was ever undertaken. Moreover, while the statute undoubt-edly obliged all members of the arts faculty, the type of sanction im-posed for disobedience makes clear that those who drafted the doc-ument did not think the problem lay with the masters in the faculty.The “offenders” were bachelors and other students in arts, those who

49 CUP II, p. 680. This text will be examined in detail below.50 Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists,” 71–75. It has now been proven

possible that Michael de Massa’s reference to the Okanistae on these same issues dates tothe 1330s, not 1326 as previously believed. See Courtenay, ‘The Debate over Ockham’sPhysical Theories at Paris,’ in La Nouvelle Physique du XIVe siècle, ed. S. Caroti andP. Souffrin (Firenze, 1997), pp. 45–63 [reprinted in this volume as Chapter 12].

51 Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists,” 75–79.52 Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists,” 55–58.


were at the level of determination, licensing, or about to incept.53 Theonly person at that stage of career known to have used Ockham inhis bachelor lectures is Nicholas Drukken of Denmark, who must havedetermined in the spring of 1338 or 1339 but who was not licensed untilApril 1340.54 But there may well have been other reasons for Drukken’sdelayed promotion, and the number of those interested in using Ock-ham’s writings and particularly his physical theories was greater. In anycase, Nicholas of Autrecourt, who was then an advanced student in thetheological faculty, was not among them, or at least did not belong tothose at the academic level at which the statute was targeted.

The Statute of December 29, 1340

As was stated above in the section on recent research, there are nolonger sufficient grounds for maintaining the view that the statute ofDecember 29, 1340, could not be identical with the statute sealed inthe lodgings of the proctor of the English-German nation a monthlater. That is so not because of firm proof that they are identical butbecause there is no longer firm proof that they are not. The text ofthe colophon of the Dec. 1340 statute, with its reference to the sealsof the nations and the rector, is the official, final text, and the absenceof the word actum, as noted above and established in the 1991 article,is irrelevant.55 What is relevant is that despite extensive evidence thatthe sealing of documents took place at or soon after the meeting wherefinal action was taken, there is one known instance in which a period of

53 The sanction for the first section of the statute, i.e., the portion related to “dog-matizing” Ockham, is a year’s suspension “during which time [the offender] may notobtain any office or degree among us, nor exercise in any way any office or degreealready held.” This level of sanction, as the second paragraph of the statute indicates, isone applied to bachelors and scholars. CUP II, p. 485: “Si quis autem bachellarius autscolaris contra premissa aliquid attemptaverit, penis in precedenti statuto positis modoet forma quibus supra omnino volumus subjacere. Si quis autem magister (…).”

54 AUP I, col. 38. Normally a bachelor would receive the license late in the springin which he determined, or in the following autumn. The delay in Nicholas’s case wasnot financial, since his burse was “nihil.” We will probably never know whether hislicensing, which occurred two-thirds of an academic year after the September statute,was delayed because of his previous use of Ockham. In any event, he went on to adistinguished career in the faculty. On Nicholas’s “Ockhamism” see Courtenay andTachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists,” 65–66.

55 For the evidence on this point see Courtenay, “Registers of the University ofParis,” 37–40 [above, pp. 253–256].


time elapsed between official approval (marked in that case by the termactum!) and official sealing.56 That earlier instance, offering a possibleparallel situation, occurred in 1253.57

The purpose of the statute of 1253 was to enforce the oath of alle-giance to the university by all masters and bachelors in all facultiesbecause of the failure of the Dominican and Franciscan regents tosupport the university in its case against three watchmen who killeda student and severely injured and tortured two others and a servantin violation of university privileges. The main text of the statute wasapproved in April 1253 and was presumably promulgated at that time,but its sealing was delayed until justice had been achieved. The univer-sity was eventually able to get the brother of the king, Alfonse, who wasregent while Louis IX was in the Holy Land, to arrest and try the threewatchmen, sentencing two of them to be dragged by horses throughthe streets of Paris and hanged, and the third exiled. Presumably therector and others wanted that object lesson to be part of the officialdocument, which was sealed five months later on Sept. 2.58

The circumstances surrounding the two statutes are not, of course,parallel. In 1253 sealing was delayed until royal action took place. Nocomparable situation existed in 1340–1341. Secondly, the 1253 docu-ment was officially dated according to its sealing, while the 1340 doc-ument, if one believes it to be identical with the document sealed amonth later, was dated according to its approval (Dec. 29, 1340), not itssealing (late January 1341). Thirdly, the colophon of the 1253 documentmentions and explains the discrepancy between the dates of approvaland sealing, while the colophon of the 1340 document—if similar cir-cumstances occurred—is completely silent on that subject. Perhaps the

56 For procedures on sealing see Courtenay, “Registers of the University of Paris,”33–37 [above, pp. 249–253].

57 CUP I, pp. 242–244, #219, which has survived as an original diploma (Paris, Univ.Archiv., carton 4, A.22.b), was included in both copies of the thirteenth-century Liberrectoris (Vat. Regin. lat. 406, fol. 55v; Paris, B.N., nouv. acq. lat. 936, fol. 58v), wasincluded in the Libri nationum (Paris, B.N., nouv. acq. lat. 535, fol. 75r; Paris, B.N., nouv.acq. lat. 2060, fol. 70r), and was retained in the later Liber rectoris (London, Brit. Lib.,Addit. 17304, fol. 90v).

58 Ibid., p. 243: “Hanc autem ordinationem seu statutum a nobis approbatum eteditum sigilli nostri munimine fecimus roborari. Actum est hoc statutum anno predicto[1253] mense April. Sed propter additionem clausule de emenda facta per memoratumcomitem posterius, que nondum exhibita erat quando editum est hoc statutum, sigillataest carta ista iiii non. Septembris, anno predicto.”


time span between approval and sealing was too brief to be mentionedor to warrant changing the date of the document to accord with thedate of sealing.

If we assume the sealing of the document was delayed, what cir-cumstances might explain this? Kaluza, who believes there was nothingunusual in a month between approval and sealing, has hypothesizedthat the arts faculty had to wait for an open Sunday in the calendarof the Dominicans before the statute could be promulgated.59 Even ifone accepted this conjecture, there is no reason why sealing would haveto wait until just days before promulgation. If a delay occurred, it ismore likely to have been a result of additions or changes in the text thatprolonged the process.

One possibility might be the wording of the fifth article, whichconcerns the objects of knowledge, while the other articles concerndistinguishing terms in propositions—a difference already noted byKaluza. John Buridan, who may have had a role in the drafting of thisstatute, as Kaluza has argued, shared with Ockham the view that theimmediate object of scientific knowledge is a proposition, not the thingitself. Buridan, however, articulated more than did Ockham the viewthat, as Thijssen has expressed it, “the ultimate purpose of knowingpropositions is knowing the referents of these propositions, the res”.60

Considering the delicate nature of an article on which realist andnominalist sensitivities ran high, the precise wording may not have beenworked out by the time of the late December meeting.

A second possibility might be the inclusion of the sixth article, whichgave a specific example of the problems created by a failure to ade-quately distinguish terms in propositions. Whether or not this examplewas taken from a disputation of Nicholas of Autrecourt, it parallels astatement censured in Autrecourt’s condemnation in 1346.61 Autrecourthad been summoned to Avignon in November 1340, and a similarly-worded article would have been part of the dossier under review.62

59 Kaluza, “Le Statut du 29 Decembre 1340”.60 Thijssen, “Buridan on the Unity of Science,” 94–95.61 CUP II, pp. 578, 583, #1042. For arguments on the meaning of the sixth article,

and whether or not it was taken from Autrecourt’s writings, see Tachau, Vision andCertitude, pp. 354–357; J.M.M.H. Thijssen, “The ‘Semantic’ Articles of Autrecourt’sCondemnation. New Proposals for an Interpretation of the Articles 1, 30, 31, 35, 57,and 58,” AHDLMA, 57 (1990), 155–175, at 170–171; Kaluza, “Le Statut du 29 Decembre1340,” n. 63.

62 CUP II, p. 505, #1041.


There may have been some additional discussion as to whether theParisian arts faculty should prejudge the case by passing judgment ona statement closely worded to one under review at Avignon before thepapal court had come to a decision.

Whatever explanation might be proposed for a time difference be-tween approval and promulgation of one and the same statute, I aminclined to believe that revisions or additions in the wording of part ofthe text—as happened in 1253 for far different reasons—is a more likelycause of the delay in sealing.63

If the statute approved in December 1340 is the same statute sealedand promulgated a month later, then the rubric and the subsequentdescription, “de reprobatione quorundam errorum Ockanicorum” in the firstcase and “contra novas opiniones quorundam, qui vocantur Occhanistae” inthe second, can and probably should be taken as equivalent. While“Ockhamist errors” (errores Ockhanici) can be read as referring eitherto Ockham or Ockhamists, or both, the 1341 description identifies thetarget of the statute as Parisian Ockhamists. Moreover, as the researchon the articles of 1277 has shown, an initial list of suspect articlescan receive last-minute additions from other sources. We are safe inassuming that a majority of articles in the 1340 statute, most probablythe first four, were considered Ockhamist. The pedigree of the last twomay be somewhat less certain. The important point is that the target ofthe statute is the Ockhamists at Paris and only indirectly Ockham.

The Oaths against Ockham’s ‘Scientia’ and the Ockhamists

At some point during or toward the end of this crisis the arts facultyand the English-German nation instituted oaths as a way of ensur-ing compliance or policing the problem. But when were these oathsdrafted, on what statutes were they based, and was their aim identicalor at least similar?

63 Kaluza, “Le Statut du 29 Decembre 1340,” explained the description in theNominalist defense of 1474 of the second statute against Ockham’s scientia as containingfour articles, not six as in the 1340 statute, to be a result of their having before theireyes an early draft of that statute. But before one further multiplies draft copies of the1340 statute (Kaluza’s view of the text as entered in the registers or as known to theNominalists of 1474), by using this hypothesis of a period of fine-tuning after approval,no such explanations are needed. The published text of the 1340 statute is its finalform, and as will be shown below, this is one of the clearest cases in which the fifteenth-century Nominalists could not or did not bother to check their facts.


The only oath that can be precisely dated is that imposed on themembers of the English-German nation on October 19, 1341, whichrequired its members to reveal any knowledge they might have ofpersons belonging to or in any way supporting the secta Ockamica.64 Inlight of its date and the stated purpose, one may conclude that thestatute sealed at the beginning of 1341 had not fully achieved its aimand that the problem of eradicating the Ockhamist sect still occupiedthe arts faculty, or at least the English-German nation.

At some point during this period the arts faculty also institutedan anti-Ockhamist oath drawn from one of the two statutes againstOckhamist scientia.

Moreover, you shall swear that you shall observe the statutes made bythe faculty of arts against the scientia Okamica, nor sustain in any waywhatsoever the said scientia and similar ones, but [sustain instead] thescientia Aristotelis and of his Commentator Averroes, and of the otherancient commentators and expositors of the said Aristotle, except inthose cases that are against the faith.

Moreover, you shall observe the statute contained in the other of theaforesaid two statutes concerning the scientia Okamica, namely that nomaster, bachelor or scholar should argue without the license of themaster holding the disputations, which license he is not permitted torequest orally but only in writing with proper reverence.65

When these arts faculty oaths were introduced is difficult to determine.They obviously were imposed after two anti-Ockhamist statutes werepromulgated. The initial terminus post quem, therefore, is Sept. 25, 1339,since the second item refers to the second clause or statute in thelegislation of that day.

64 AUP I, cols. 52–53: “Item in eadem congregatione ordinatum fuit, quod nullusde cetero admitteretur ad aliquos actus legitimos in dicta nacione, nisi prius juraretquod revelaret, si sciret aliquos de secta Occanica ad invicem conspirasse de secta velopinionibus erroneis fovendis, vel etiam conjuratos esse vel conventicula habere occulta,aliter nisi jure diceret si sciret, ex tunc penam perjurii incurreret. Et hanc ordinacionemvoluerunt equivalere statuto.”

65 CUP II, p. 680: Item jurabitis quod statuta facta per facultatem artium contrascientiam Okamicam observabitis, neque dictam scientiam et consimiles sustinebitisquoquomodo, sed scientiam Aristotelis et sui Commentatoris Averrois et aliorum com-mentatorum antiquorum in expositorum dicti Aristotelis, nisi in casibus qui sunt contrafidem.

Item observabitis statutum contentum in altero predictorum duorum statutorum descientia Okamica, scilicet quod nullus magister, baccalarius aut scolaris sine licentiamagistri disputationes tenentis arguat: quam licentiam sibi non liceat petere verbaliter,sed tantummodo signative reverenter.


Furthermore, since it is manifestly clear to us that in the disputationswhich take place in the rue de Fouarre, such abuse has developed, thatbachelors and others present at these disputations dare to argue ontheir own authority, showing little reverence toward the masters who aredisputing, and making such a tumult that the truth of the conclusionbeing debated cannot be arrived at, so that the said disputations are notin any way fruitful for the listening scholars; we therefore decree that nomaster, bachelor, or scholar argue without the permission and license of the masterholding the disputations, which license he is not permitted to request orally but onlyin writing with proper reverence. If any bachelor or scholar should act againstthe aforesaid, we wish him to be subjected in every respect to the samepenalties as in the previous statute [i.e., the first clause or statute of Sept.25, 1339]. If any master should presume to argue in disputations, unlesshe becomes quiet when required to do so by the master holding thedisputations, we decree that he is to be punished by being deprived ofthree lectures.66

Whether there needs to be a later terminus post quem depends on whichstatute one thinks the first item (contra scientiam Ockamicam) refers to.

A solid terminus ante quem is harder to arrive at. Both oaths appearin this form in the Book of the French Nation, which was compiledsometime between 1355 and 1366.67 Du Boulay conjectured that theywere introduced around July 1341, since on June 30 the French nationrevised the oaths sworn by bachelors being licensed at Notre Dameor Ste. Geneviève.68 Dating the revision of licensing oaths, however,does not help us date the revision of inception oaths, whose new formincludes an oath based on a statute of 1355.69 But a post-1355 list of

66 CUP II, p. 485, #1023: Insuper cum nobis liqueat manifeste quod in disputation-ibus que fiunt in vico Straminum talis abusus inolevit quod bachellarii et alii in dis-putationibus dictis existentes propria auctoritate arguere presumunt minus reverenterse habentes ad magistros, qui disputant, tumultum faciendo adeo et in tantum quodhaberi non potest conclusionis disputande veritas, nec dicte disputaciones in aliquosunt scholaribus audientibus fructuose: statuimus quod nullus magister, bachellarius autscolaris, sine permissu et licentia magistri disputationes tenentis arguat, quam licen-tiam sibi non liceat petere verbaliter, sed tantummodo signative reverenter. Si quisautem bachellarius aut scolaris contra premissa aliquid attemptaverit, penis in prece-denti statuto positis modo et forma quibus supra omnino volumus subjacere. Si quisautem magister in disputationibus arguere presumat, nisi requisitus a magistro disputa-tiones tenente taceat, ipsum privatione trium lectionum decrevimus puniendum.

67 Courtenay, “Registers of the University of Paris,” 28 [above, p. 244].68 C.E. Du Boulay, Historia Universitatis Parisiensis (Paris, 1665–1673), IV, p. 273.69 CUP II, p. 680: “vos jurabitis statutum de modo legendi sine penna,” which

quotes directly from the corresponding statute in CUP III, pp. 39–40, #1229, approvedin December 1355.


inception oaths does not preclude an earlier introduction of particularoaths, so we are still left with a range from late 1339 to c. 1360.

Kaluza dated the anti-Ockhamist oaths to late autumn 1341 on theassumption that the October 1341 oath for the English-German nationwas a draft version of the second of the arts faculty oaths contra scien-

tiam Ockamicam (first in their documentary order among the inceptionoaths).70 According to Kaluza, what began as an oath to reveal theidentity of Ockhamists turned into an oath against Ockhamist scientia

after negotiations with the other nations.That hypothesis is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, both the

statute of 1340/41 and the oath of the English-German nation almosta year later are directed against the Ockhamists, their errors and theneed to identify and control them. By late 1340, then, the area of con-cern became increasingly focused on the activities and teachings of theParisian Ockhamists and no longer directly on their use of Ockham’swritings and views. The arts faculty oaths, however, were directedagainst Ockham’s scientia and say nothing directly about Ockhamists.Secondly, oaths result from and were based on statutes. The oath of theEnglish-German nation was the result of an ordination or statute. Oneof the oaths against Ockhamist scientia was taken from the statutory leg-islation of Sept. 25, 1339. If the principal arts faculty oath, the one thatproscribes Ockham’s scientia and prescribes Aristotle’s scientia, resultedfrom a multi-stage legislative process in the autumn of 1341, where isthe eventual statute of late 1341 that created that oath?

A better but still unsatisfactory solution is to divide the crisis intotwo stages. The first stage during the academic years 1338–1339 and1339–1340 concerned the use or acceptance by some Parisian scholarsof Ockham’s doctrina or scientia, probably referring to Ockham’s treat-ment of the categories and its implications for other areas of philoso-phy, which was not to be taught in any form. The second stage dur-ing the academic year 1340–1341 and into 1341–1342 concerned theOckhamists and their teaching. Admittedly, on some level and on sev-eral issues Ockham and the Parisian Ockhamists are related, and theconcern with the conventicula occulta is mentioned in the statute of Sept.

70 It is curious that in rejecting the hypothesis of one lost statute, Kaluza has replacedthat with the hypothesis of one lost final version of the December 1340 statute, and threedraft documents: the draft version of the arts faculty statute of December 1340; an evenearlier draft of the December 1340 statute with four articles available to the Nominalistsin 1474; and the English-German nation’s oath of October 1341, which was supposedlyan early version of the oath against Ockhamist scientia.


1339 and the English-German ordinance of October 1341. But the doc-uments in chronological sequence do reflect a shift in the targetedconcern, from textual source (Ockham) to contemporary practitioners(Ockhamists). If that analysis is correct, the arts faculty oaths wouldbetter fit in the period between the autumn of 1339 and the autumnof 1340, when the focus was still on Ockham’s doctrina, before the famousstatute of 1340/41. Viewed from that perspective, the oath to teach Aris-totle’s scientia as interpreted by Averroes and the older commentatorsinstead of Ockham’s scientia may simply have been an elaboration ofthe first clause or statute of Sept. 25, 1339 not to dogmatize Ockham orteach his doctrina.

This interpretation—in fact any interpretation—must be shown tobe compatible with the phrase “statutum contentum in altero predictorum

duorum statutorum de scientia Okamica”. It has always been recognized that“the statute contained in” referred to the second clause or statute ofSept. 25, 1339, which was disciplinary in nature. More recently, “theother” of the two statutes was understood to refer to the entire statuteof 1339 (both clauses or statutes taken together), identified or labeled byits first clause or statute on not dogmatizing Ockham.71 The companionstatute de scientia Okamica in that interpretation was thought to be thestatute of 1340 or 1341, which may be identical, as argued above. But ifthe two statutes referred to in the oaths are simply the first and secondstatutes of Sept. 25, 1339, it means that the second, disciplinary statuteof Sept. 25, 1339, was also understood as “contra scientiam Okamicam”.

This conclusion—so simple in many ways—does not adequatelyexplain all the evidence. It requires us to believe that the disciplinarycrisis of the arts faculty in 1339 that resulted in the second statuteof Sept. 25 and other legislation—a crisis paralleled in the law andmedical faculties—stemmed in some way from Ockham’s scientia, atleast as regards the arts faculty. Secondly, it does not explain why theoath reads: “statutum contentum in altero predictorum duorum statutorum de

scientia Okamica” instead of the more direct “statutum alterum de scientia

Okamica” If for those reasons one rejects the view that the oaths simplyrefer to the two statutes of Sept. 25, 1339, and if, as I still believe, thecontent of the December 1340 statute could not or would not havebeen described as a statute to teach Aristotle’s scientia as interpreted

71 Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockham, Ockhamists,” 55–57; Kaluza, ‘Les sciences etleurs langages’.


by Averroes and the older commentators, then we are still missing onestatute on which the oath concerning Ockham’s scientia was based.72

The contrast of Aristotle’s scientia and Ockham’s scientia needs furtherexamination. No such language appears in the statute of Sept. 25, 1339or in that of Dec. 29, 1340. And both the rubric that was eventuallyattached to the 1340 statute (de reprobatione quorundam errorum Ockanicorum)and the words used to describe the statute sealed early in 1341 (contra

novas opiniones quorundam, qui vocantur Occhaniste) talk about Ockhamisterrors or opinions of those called Ockhamists, not about the scientia

Okamica. But the contrast between the scientia of Ockham and the scientia

of Aristotle, Averroes, and other commentators does appear in othertexts of the period.73

Inception oath (CUP II, p. 680): “statuta facta per facultatem artium con-tra scientiam Okamicam observabitis, neque dictam scientiam et consi-miles sustinebitis quoquomodo, sed scientiam Aristotelis et sui Commen-tatoris Averrois et aliorum commentatorum antiquorum in expositorumdicti Aristotelis, nisi in casibus qui sunt contra fidem.”

Sentences commentary in Vat. lat. 1087, fol. 71ra (Michael of Massa?):“Moveamus ergo aliquas quaestiones circa realitatem motus more Aris-totelis et Commentatoris et aliorum philosophorum, praetermittendoinsanias modernorum innovantium grossitive antiquorum.”

Conrad of Megenberg, Planctus ecclesiae in Germaniam, (written at Paris in1337), ed. R. Scholz, M.G.H., SsM II, 1 (Leipzig, 1941), p. 76: “SummusAristotelis et Averrois edocuere ….”

Clement VI’s letter to the University in 1346 (CUP II, p. 588): “Namnonnulli magistri et scolares artium et philosophie scientiis insudantesibidem, dimissis et contemptis Philosophi et aliorum magistrorum etexpositorum antiquorum textibus, quos sequi deberent in quantum fideicatholice non obviant, ac veris expositionibus et scripturis, quibus fulcituripsa scientia (…).”

72 This is why my 1991 article concluded that the possibility of a lost statute hasnot been entirely eliminated, which still seems true despite Kaluza’s two recent arti-cles. One question that has not been asked is why these oaths were placed among theinception oaths as distinct from those for determination or licensing. The inceptionoaths were the ones in which adherence to the content of individual statutes was articu-lated. Oaths sworn at determination and licensing concerned preparatory requirementsand future obligations. But inasmuch as the secta Occamica was perceived primarily as aproblem among bachelors in 1339, the inception oaths would bind them or make themliable for perjury.

73 Further instances of this language should be sought.


The 1474 Edict of Louix XI identifies the “other commentators” or“ancient expositors” as Albert, Thomas, Giles, and others.74 The Aris-totelian commentaries of these authors came into use at Paris in thelate thirteenth century. None of them appear in the list of exemplars inthe taxatio of c. 1275, but the taxatio of 1304, even allowing for its proba-ble Dominican bias, has an extensive list of Aristotelian exemplars of allthree of these authors.75 It is highly probable that these were the vehi-cles through which Aristotle was understood up to the time Buridan’sand eventually Marsilius of Inghen’s commentaries began to compete.There is not room here to discuss Kaluza’s thesis that Buridan wasbehind the statute of December 1340 or that Parisian nominalism (=Buridan) was or at least was perceived as being markedly different fromEnglish nominalism (= Ockham). Whatever findings that importantissue eventually reveals, the transition from the late thirteenth-centurycommentators to Buridan’s commentaries cannot have been smooth.

The text listed above immediately after the oath comes from acommentary on Book II of the Sentences that Damasus Trapp attributedto Michael de Massa, OESA, who was thought by Trapp to haveread at Paris in 1326–1327.76 Whoever’s work it is, it shows signs ofsubsequent revision as the bachelor’s text was made into an ordinatio

text. If the work is indeed by Michael, the text in its present formwould date after 1327, possibly sometime in the 1330s but before 1337,when Michael died. In light of the fact that a few folios later in themanuscript, in the questions on time, the Occamistae are mentioned, Iam inclined to date the work closer to the events that precipitated thelegislation against the Ockhamists at Paris.

Two things about this text are important. First, the statement ofadherence to “Aristotle, the Commentator, and other philosophers” aswell as the reference to the Occamistae occur in the context of a dis-

74 Ehrle, Sentenzenkommentar, p. 313: “Visum est eis rursum doctrinam Aristotelis etCommentatoris Averrois, Alberti Magni, Sancti Thome de Aquino, Egidii de Roma,Alexandri de Halis, Scoti, Bonaventure aliorumque Doctorum Realium ….”

75 Compare CUP I, pp. 644–650, #530 at 644–645, and CUP II, pp. 107–112, #642at 110–111. On these lists see R. and M. Rouse, “The Book Trade at the Universityof Paris, ca. 1250 – ca. 1350,” in L.J. Bataillon, B.G. Guyot, and R. Rouse (eds.), Laproduction du livre universitaire au Moyen Age: exemplar et pecia (Paris, 1988), pp. 41–114.

76 D. Trapp, “Augustinian Theology of the 14th century,” Augustiniana, 6 (1956), 163–175; “Notes on some Manuscripts of the Augustinian Michael de Massa († 1337),”Augustinianum, 5 (1965), 58–133; A. Zumkeller, “Die Augustinerschule des Mittelalters:Vertreter und philosophisch-theologische Lehre,” Analecta Augustiniana, 27 (1964), 209–210; Courtenay, ‘The Debate Over Ockham’s Physical Theories’.


cussion over the nature of motion and time, issues on which Ock-ham’s interpretation of the categories and its implications for physicsimpinged. Second, the discussion occurs in a Sentences commentary andreveals that these aspects of Ockham’s teaching were of concern to the-ologians, who may have encouraged the arts masters to take action.

The letter of Clement VI also reflects theological concerns. Butthe intriguing feature of this text is its close parallel with the text ofthe oath. In light of the wide time span in which we initially placethe oath, 1339 – c. 1360, it is theoretically possible that the oath wasinstituted after the university received Clement’s letter and used thepope’s language as an apt statement of the principal aim of that portionof the statute. It is more likely, however, that Clement was paraphrasingthe oath, possibly as provided by Conrad of Megenberg, who was inAvignon in the summer of 1346 when the papal letter was prepared.77

How long did the oath to oppose Ockham’s scientia remain in effect?As described elsewhere, the anti-Ockhamist wording appears amongthe inception oaths in the Book of the French Nation, which wascopied in or after 1355 but before 1368.78 However, in the list of oathsas recorded in the Liber procuratorum of the English-German nationbetween 1365 and 1368 as well as the Book of the English Nation copiedat the same time, the oath referring to the scientia Occamica does notappear. This was not a scribal error, since the following oath, whichderives from a disciplinary statute that was appended to the statuteagainst dogmatizing Ockham, was edited to remove any mention ofstatutes against Ockhamist scientia.

Earlier form: “Item, observabitis statutum contentum in altero predicto-rum duorum statuorum de scientia Okanica, scilicet quod nullus magis-ter, baccalarius aut scolaris (…).”

Later form: “Item, observabitis statutum quod nullus magister, baccalar-ius aut scolaris (…).”

The implication of these changes is that at some point between 1355and 1368 the ban on Ockham and his scientia was lifted and Ockham’swritings and views could be openly discussed and used in the arts

77 Clement, as Pierre Roger, had been resident in Paris until 1339, when his eleva-tion to cardinal (December, 1338) transferred his principal residence to Avignon. Butas provisor of the Sorbonne and frequent correspondent with John XXII and Bene-dict XII on university matters, he would have been fully informed about developmentsbefore September 1339.

78 Courtenay, “The Registers of the University of Paris,” 40–44 [above, pp. 256–260].


faculty. Precisely when this occurred cannot yet be determined, but itseems likely to have been done by the time Marsilius of Inghen becamemaster of arts in 1362.

Despite the fact that some theologians, such as Pierre Roger (ClementVI) and Michael de Massa, opposed the Occamistae, collective concernover Ockham’s writings and thought—at least to the point of attempt-ing their prohibition and suppression—continued to be limited to thearts faculty. Theologians at Paris in the early 1340s studied some ofOckham’s philosophical and theological writings and cited his opin-ions, rejecting some and adopting others.79 Even in the arts faculty theprincipal concern appears not to have been with Ockham’s thought ingeneral but Ockham’s interpretation of the Aristotelian categories andits implication for physics and logic. Specific references to the views ofthe Occamistae as well as the oath that requires the use of Aristotle andthe traditional commentaries in place of Ockham’s scientia, make thisclear.80

The Ockhamist Tradition at Paris after 1360

Space and the present incomplete state of research does not allow anyextensive examination of the history of Ockhamism at Paris between1360 and the events of 1474. It is evident that the term “Ockhamist”had already acquired a different meaning by the time Peter of Candiabegan reading the Sentences at Paris in 1378. Several times Candia refersto “Ockham and his followers,” also called Ockamistae or filii Ockham.81

Occasionally Candia names some of those he so labels: Adam, referringto Adam Wodeham; Monachus or Monachus Albus, referring to Johnof Mirecourt; and Gregory, referring to Gregory of Rimini. Candia’s

79 Gregory of Rimini, who read the Sentences at Paris in 1342–1344 and who acceptedand defended most of Ockham’s natural philosophy, although he opposed Ockham inthe areas of epistemology and grace, had no difficulty in completing his degree andproceeding with a distinguished career in his order. The same applies to HugolinoMalebranche of Orvieto in 1349.

80 For the views of the Occamistae see, for example, the comments of Michael ofMassa and Conrad of Megenberg cited in Courtenay and Tachau, “Ockham, Ock-hamists,” 72–75 [above, pp. 196–199]; Courtenay, “The Reception of Ockham’sThought at the University of Paris,” 50–55 [above, pp. 132–136]. For the text of theoath: CUP II, p. 680.

81 Ehrle, Sentenzenkommentar, pp. 60–62.


Ockhamist tradition is as much theological as philosophical, perhapsmore so. And on the theological side Candia is identifying precisely theauthors who are listed among the “renovating doctors” in the royaledict of 1474. The broadening of the meaning of “Ockhamist” hadalready begun at Paris by Candia’s generation, and thus some of thegroundwork for the way in which this tradition was understood in thefifteenth century was already laid.

Considerable progress has been made in recent years in under-standing the development of schools in the fifteenth century, includingthe Nominalist tradition and with it, the Ockhamist tradition.82 Muchremains to be done on the basis of the discoveries of recent research,particularly in three areas that have not received sufficient attention oflate. First, the late fourteenth century from Candia to Gerson; second,a new look at the events of 1474, which Kaluza has addressed in thisvolume, especially the need to identify the Nominalist group; and third,a new examination of the meaning the label “Ockhamist” had for fig-ures like Gabriel Biel and Martin Luther.

82 Kaluza, “Querelles”; Hoenen, “Albertistae, thomistae und nominales.”

LIST OF MANUSCRIPTS CITED

Numbers following the shelf marks are page numbers in this volume.

Bamberg, Staatsbibliothek, Patr. 126 53n, 60n

Barcelona, Biblioteca del Cabildo de la Catedral, ms 38 356n

Bergamo, Biblioteca Civica, ms A.3.21 272n, 285n

Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria, ms lat. 2214 272n, 273, 285n, 286, 287,288, 289, 291, 292n, 294, 295, 296, 300n, 319n

Bologna, Collegio di Spagna, ms lat. 40 272n, 285n, 294, 295, 300n

Bruges, Bibliothèque de la Ville, ms lat. 237 55n

Cambridge, Gonville & Caius College, ms lat. 281 121n, 123n, 124n

Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, ms lat. 103 244, 245

Chartres, Bibliothèque de la Ville, ms lat. 595 (formerly 662) 231, 232, 241,260n

Chicago, University Library (Regenstein), ms 22 292n

Cologne (Köln), Historisches Stadtarchiv,GB 2° 175 363GB 4° 186 363

Cracow, see Krákow

Eichstätt, Universitätsbibliothek, ms 471 366, 368n

Erfurt, Universitäts- und Forschungsbibliothek (formerly WissenschaftlicheBibliothek der Stadt)CA 4° 259 192nCA 8° 67 130n, 192n, 269n,CA 8° 74 178n–179n, 179n–180n

Erlangen, Universitätsbibliothek, ms lat. 353 62n

Florence (Firenze), Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale,ms conv. sopp. A.III.508 121n, 122nms conv. sopp. C.VIII.794 272n, 285nms II.II.281 355n

Frankfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Barth. 75 368n

Gießen, Universitätsbibliothek, ms 773 360n

404 list of manuscripts cited

Hannover, Stadtbibliothek, Hs. 1 361n

Kraków, Biblioteka Jagiellonska, ms lat. 1391 162n

Leipzig, Universitätsbibliotek, ms lat. 529 290n

London, British Library, ms Addit. 17304 145n, 232n, 234n, 236n, 238, 239,240, 241, 247, 253n, 257, 258n, 390n

London, Westminster Abbey, ms 13 113n, 115n

Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, ms lat. 65 290n

Magdeburg, Stadtbibliothek, ms Fol. 140 368n

Munich (München), Bayerische Staatsbibliothek,Clm 4643 5nClm 14508 55n, 56n, 63n, 71n, 74n, 80nClm 14687 147n, 197n, 198n, 276n, 314n, 315n, 325nClm 26711 354n, 355nClm 29520/2 64n, 83n

Munich (München), Universitätsbibliothek, F. 52 130n

Naples (Napoli), Biblioteca Nazionale,ms lat. VII.C.1 272n, 285nms lat. VII.C.6 293, 294nms lat. VII.C.14 54n, 59nms lat. VII.C.53 361n

Oxford, All Souls College, ms 86 269n

Oxford, Bodleian Library,Canon. misc. 226 183nCanon. misc. 276 272n, 285nLaud lat. 67 51n

Oxford, Corpus Christi College, ms 283 243n, 244, 245

Padua (Padova), Biblioteca Universitaria, ms 2229 292n, 293n

Pamplona, Biblioteca del Cabildo de la Catedral, ms 1 356n

Paris, Archives Nationales,M 68, n. 2 256nM 68, n. 6 256nM 68, n. 26 256nM 68, n. 27 256n

Paris, Archives de l’Université (Sorbonne),carton 1, A.1.h 256ncarton 3, A.7.b 256ncarton 3, A.7.c 256ncarton 4, A.19.i 256ncarton 4, A.22.b 390n

list of manuscripts cited 405

carton 5, B.1.g 256ncarton 6, B.1.c 256ncarton 6, C.5.a 256ncarton 7, D.12.b 256ncarton 7, D.12.d 256ncarton 7, D.13.a 256ncarton 7, D.15.a 256ncarton 7, D.18.ss 256nReg. 2 145n, 172n, 232Reg. 3 174n, 257, 258n, 260nReg. 100 171n, 172n, 209n, 229n, 231, 232, 241, 242n, 243, 247n, 257,

260

Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, ms lat. 910 83n

Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine,ms lat. 178 79nms lat. 758 54n, 56n, 58n, 59n, 63nms lat. 894 130nms lat. 915 122n

Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale,ms lat. 3197A 199nms lat. 6441 193n, 196n, 271nms lat. 9950 242nms lat. 14526 55nms lat. 14556 55nms lat. 15747 61nms lat. 15840 354nms lat. 15880 271nms lat. 15887 121nms lat. 16621 179nms nouv. acq. lat. 535 231, 234n, 235n, 241, 243n, 246n, 247n, 253n, 258n,

260n, 390nms nouv. acq. lat. 936 (formerly Cheltenham, Phillips 876) 236, 237, 238,

239, 245, 247, 390nms nouv. acq. lat. 1470 42nms nouv. acq. lat. 2060 145n, 231, 241, 253n, 258n, 260n, 390n

Paris, Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève, ms lat. 1655 231, 232n, 242n

Paris, Bibliothèque de l’Université (Sorbonne), ms lat. 193 122n, 124n

Pavia, Biblioteca Universitaria, ms 226 272n, 285n

Rome, Archivum Generale Augustinianum, Dd 1: Registrum GeneralatusMatthaei Asculani 193n

Rome, Biblioteca Angelica, ms 4 354n

406 list of manuscripts cited

Seville (Sevilla), Biblioteca Colombina,ms lat. 7-7-13 183nms lat. 7-7-32 147n, 198n

Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale,ms lat. 62 189n, 355nms lat. 718 130n

Vatican City, Archivio Segreto Vaticano,Regist. Supplic. Innocent. VI, an. 2 260nRegist. Vat. Benedict. XII, an. 4 166n–167n

Vatican City, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana,Pal. lat. 329 364Pal. lat. 1252 147n, 198n, 277nRegin. lat. 406 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 245, 390nVat. lat. 829 367nVat. lat. 901 131nVat. lat. 955 97n, 110n, 120n, 121n, 122n, 124nVat. lat. 981 355nVat. lat. 1084 272n, 285nVat. lat. 1087 132n, 133n, 186n, 196n, 197n, 271, 272–274, 282n, 286–289,

294, 298–301, 318, 319n, 320–322, 325, 326, 332, 333n, 334n, 335n, 339–346, 397

Vat. lat. 1110 110nVat. lat. 4296 56n, 61n, 71nVat. lat. 4304 56n, 61n, 71nVat. lat. 7678 52n, 64n, 79n, 85, 86nVat. lat. 10754 54n, 61n

Vienna (Wien), Dominikanerkonvent,ms 108 368nms 160/130 193nms 401/130 314n, 315n

Vienna (Wien), Österreichische Nationalbibliothek,Pal. lat. 2459 84nPal. lat. 5460 119n

Wilhering, Cistercienserstift, ms 87 355n

Worcester, Cathedral, ms F 3 114n

INDEX OF ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL NAMES

Adam of Lincoln, 93Adam of Petit Pont [Parvipontanus],

86Adam Wodeham, O.F.M., 14, 16,

43n, 97, 98, 102, 103, 105, 107,110, 112, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120–124, 125, 135, 139, 140, 185n, 188,296, 349–357, 361–364, 367, 371,372, 375, 377, 378, 379, 400

Adolphus de Monte, count of Berg,362

Alain of Villa Colis, 173, 209, 265Alberic of Paris, 35, 49, 50, 51, 64,

75, 76, 77, 78, 82, 87Alberic of Reims, 50, 82nAlbert II, Duke of Austria, 198, 313Albert the Great, O.P., 52n, 54n,

79n, 80, 281, 337, 398Albert of Saxony, 105, 227n, 371, 372Alcuin, 211nAlexander IV, pope, 237Alexander of Aphrodisias, 280Alexander of Hales, O.F.M., 9, 398nAlexander Langeley, O.F.M., 124,

142Alexander Necquam, 86Alexander of S. Elpidio, O.E.S.A.,

289, 291, 292, 293, 294n, 300Alfonse, brother of King Louis XI of

France, 390Alfonsus Vargas of Toledo,

O.E.S.A., xv, 184, 185n, 285n,289, 291, 353, 354, 355

Andàlo di Negro, 137nAndrea de Biglia, O.E.S.A., 272n,

285nAndreas Freouati of Småland, 192nAndrew of Sweden, 144n, 177Angelus de Ancona, O.E.S.A., 366Angelus Dobelin, O.E.S.A., 224, 225

Anselm of Bec, St., 31–37, 46, 65,66, 67, 68, 73

Anthonius Sicti de Vercellis, 250nAntony Bek, later chancellor of Lin-

coln and bishop of Norwich, 96Apparicius of Burgos, O.E.S.A., 356Aristotle, xiii, xv, 27, 28, 32n, 36, 45,

46n, 47n, 49, 60, 64, 65n, 67, 75,80n, 83, 86n, 98, 132, 144, 145,146, 147n, 151, 174, 178, 187, 188,194, 195, 196, 210, 215, 258, 259,265, 271, 273n, 275, 276n, 280,281, 300, 319, 320, 321, 326, 330,331, 332, 333, 334, 336, 337, 338,339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 346,381, 387n, 393, 395, 396, 397,398, 400

Arnold de Verdala, papal chaplainand legate, 312

Arnulf of Laon, 46Aubertus de Maconvilla, 250nAugustine, St., 9, 23–30, 41, 42n, 49,

56, 66n, 70, 71n, 73, 75, 147n, 187,188, 212n, 213, 214, 349

Augustinus von Regensburg,O.E.S.A., 357

Averroes, xiii, xiv, 144, 145, 146,147n, 151, 174, 194, 195, 196, 258,259, 265, 280, 281, 319, 321, 326,330, 334, 336, 337, 341, 344, 346,381, 393, 396, 397, 398n

Avicenna, 334n

Baldwin, archdeacon of Exeter, 51Bandinus, 62Bede, 211nBenedict XII, pope, 97n, 102, 136,

137, 138, 147, 166n, 201, 202, 203,204, 205, 206, 272n, 283, 313,324n, 362, 384n, 388, 399n

408 index of ancient and medieval names

Bernard of Arezzo, O.F.M., xv, 316,335n

Bernard of Chartres, 42, 65, 66, 67Bertaud of St. Denis, 297nBerthold of Constance, 180nBerthold Swavus, 314Boethius, 31, 32n, 33, 36, 37, 45,

46n, 49, 83, 130n, 192nBonagratia of Bergamo, O.F.M., 102Bonamicus (of Bologna), 250Bonaventure, O.F.M., St., 52n, 53,

54n, 55n, 59n, 86, 215, 221, 398nBonsemblans Baduarius,O.E.S.A., 355Burchard of Constance, 180n, 314

Cassiodorus, 213n, 214nChristianus, master from French

nation, 309, 310Christianus de Elst, 310Christianus Ghys [Ghis] of St.

Omer, 310Cicero, 27, 28n, 211, 212Clement VI, pope (Pierre Roger),

151, 152, 191, 205, 206, 280, 297n,327, 397, 399

Conrad of Megenberg [MontePuellarum], xiv, xv, 137n, 143–153, 173n, 176, 177, 193, 196n, 197,198, 199, 204, 205, 222, 223, 225,226, 262, 264, 268, 269n, 271,272, 274, 275n, 276, 277, 278, 282,284, 303–327, 336, 337, 338, 339,386n, 397, 399, 400n

David II, king of Scotland, 182Diomedes, 213Dominique Grenier, O.P., lector at

the Sacred Palace and bishopelect of Pamiers, 100

Donatus, 65, 213n, 214Duns Scotus; see John Duns ScotusDurand of St. Pourçain, O.P., 101,

132, 133, 186n, 189, 202, 289, 290,296n, 352n, 366

Dyonisius de Mutina [Modena],O.E.S.A., 295

Dyonisius Thrax, 211

Edward III, king of England, 113Eggeling Becker von Braunschweig,

360, 361Eghno, 314Elias de Corson, 182nElias of Nabinali, O.F.M., 100Eric of Auxerre, 6, 40Étienne Chaumont, 271nÉtienne Marcel, 261Étienne Tempier, bishop of Paris,

387Euclid, 194

Facinus de Ast, O.E.S.A., 366Francis of Marchia, O.F.M., 100,

102, 111, 129, 136, 269n, 290Francis of Meyronnes, O.F.M., 100,

111, 130–131Francis of Treviso, O.P., xv, 188, 189,

190, 191, 193Fulk of Beauvais, bishop, 46n

Gabriel Biel, 14, 15, 350, 360, 361,377, 401

Garinus de Pruvino, 252nGarlandus Compotista, 37Garnerus, 51nGaufridus dictus Ligator, 250nGaufridus de Plesseio, 250nGeoffrey Lemaresch, 182nGerard of Bologna, O.Carm., 186n,

365nGerard de Büren, O.P., 365n, 366,

368Gerard of Marten, 144n, 177Gerard Odonis (Guiral Ot), O.F.M.,

100, 136, 193, 290, 296nGerard of Siena, O.E.S.A., 289, 292,

293, 297Gerardus [Last Name Unknown],

referred to in commentary ofThomas Hager, 365n, 368n

Giles of Rome, O.E.S.A., 91, 96, 98,101, 105, 211n, 281, 283, 290n,337, 350, 398

Godfrey of Fontaines, 291, 293Godfrey of Poitiers, 52n, 61n, 62n

index of ancient and medieval names 409

Godfrey of St. Victor, 48, 51, 52Gregory IX, pope, 237, 387nGregory XI, pope, 362Gregory of Lucca, O.E.S.A., bishop

of Belluno-Feltre, 101Gregory of Rimini, O.E.S.A., xv, 14,

15, 17, 43n, 104, 123, 140n, 142n,143, 145, 150, 184, 185, 186, 187,188, 189, 190, 191, 193, 206, 207,285n, 289, 295, 297, 301, 326,349, 350, 351–353, 354, 355, 365n,371, 372, 400

Grimerius Bonifacii, 310nGuillaume d’Estouteville, cardinal,

239n, 243nGuillaume de Chanac, bishop of

Paris, 166nGuiral Ot; see Gerard OdonisGyso of Cologne, O.E.S.A., 367

Heinrich Alberti, O.P., 367Heinrich de Cervo, O.P., 368Heinrich Hager, O.P., 364, 365, 366,

368Heinrich von Nürnberg, 314nHeinrich von Sachsen, O.P., 367Heinrich Tröglein, O.P., 366, 368,

369Henry of Constance, 314Henry of Dalen, 363Henry of England, O.Cist., 205nHenry of Friemar, O.E.S.A., 294nHenry of Ghent, 91, 95, 96, 98,

114n, 291, 292, 293Henry of Harclay, 95, 114, 115, 120,

129n, 130n, 134Henry of Langenstein, 303Henry of Sutton, O.F.M., guardian

of Franciscan convent in London,93

Henry Totting of Oyta, 105, 303,356, 357, 362, 375

Henry of Unna, 142n, 173, 175, 176,180, 181, 198, 251n, 264, 265, 381

Henry of Zomeren, 373Herman of Tournai, 45Hermann, O.F.M., Franciscan from

Cologne resident at Oxfordconvent, 367

Hermann Hetzstede, O.P., 364, 365,368

Herveus de Insula, 250n, 261n, 265Horace, 219Hrabanus Maurus, 6, 40Hugh of Douglas, 144n, 177Hugh Lawton, 225nHugh of St. Cher, O.P., 62nHugo Sapientis, 164nHugolino (Malbranche) of Orvieto,

O.E.S.A., xv, 104, 273n, 300n,327, 349, 353–354, 355, 400n

Innocent IV, pope, 237, 238Innocent VI, pope, 239Isidore, 211n, 212n, 213, 214n

Jacob Fortis, 194nJacques de Dijon, O.Cist., 202nJacques Fournier, O.Cist. (see also

Benedict XII), 201–204James of Eltville, O.Cist., 356James of Épinal (de Spinallo),

O.F.M., xv, 363nJames of Pamiers (de Appamiis),

O.E.S.A., 289, 290, 291, 296n,301

James of Viterbo, O.E.S.A., 290nJean Gerson, 14, 17, 371, 372n, 373,

374, 401Jean de Maisonneuve, 18, 373Jerome, 41Johannes Arneri of Sweden, 314Johannes de Marliano, O.E.S.A.,

272n, 285nJohannes de Piscibus, papal chap-

lain, 311John; see also Johannes, JeanJohn, master of Robert of Paris,

Roscelin of Compiègne, andArnulf of Laon, 46

John, monk, 46nJohn XXII, pope, 98n, 102, 200,

201, 202, 203, 239, 290n, 297n,298, 361, 373n, 384n, 388, 399n


John Baconthorpe, O.Carm., 134John Brammart, O.Carm., 355John of Bruxelles, 307John of Burgos, O.E.S.A., 296John Buridan, xiv, xv, 13, 14, 17,

105, 134, 136, 140, 142, 149n, 158,173n, 268, 269–270, 278, 279, 281,283–284, 359, 360, 361, 371, 372,373, 391, 398

John Crombe, O.F.M., 94John Dorp, 371, 372John Dumbleton, 107, 116, 125, 151John Duns Scotus, O.F.M., 2, 91, 94,

95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 111, 112, 114,115, 116, 122, 123, 131, 133, 134,135, 190n, 287n, 291, 294n, 366,398n

John Grafton, 118, 119John Hiltalingen of Basel, O.E.S.A.,

349, 354–355John of Holland, 227nJohn de Hurwin of Constance,

368nJohn of Jandun, 146John Kinhard, 144n, 177, 180n, 182John Klenkok, O.E.S.A., 367John Lathbury, O.F.M., 367John Lutterell, 100, 101, 110, 111, 112,

113, 114, 115, 229, 265, 279John Major, 356, 357nJohn of Mirecourt, O.Cist., xv, 14,

17, 127, 142, 143, 157, 158n, 191,308, 365n, 371, 372, 400

John de Misna, 180nJohn Nicholai, 130, 191, 192, 269John Paignote, O.E.S.A., 101John Rathe of Scotland, xv, 180, 182,

183, 184, 185, 188, 189, 190, 191,193, 198, 309n

John of Reading, O.F.M., 17, 96–97,98, 99, 100, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114,115, 120, 129n, 134, 188n

John of Rodington, O.F.M., 102, 112,113, 116, 134, 135, 367

John of Sacrobosco, 137n, 147,197, 198, 276, 314, 322, 325,386n

John of Salisbury, 7, 35n, 41, 42n,44n, 47, 49, 50, 51, 64, 65n, 66,67, 75

John Scotus Eriugena, 6, 40John Staupitz, O.E.S.A., 350John Swavus, 314John of Trier, 314John of Vimarcio [Vémars], 309,

310, 311John Went, O.F.M., 124John of Wessel [Wesalia], 184nJohn of Wittenberg, 314John Wyclif, 103, 104, 107, 108, 126,

224, 227n, 378, 379

Louis IX, king of France, 390Louis XI, king of France, 199, 371,

372, 374n, 398Louis of Bavaria, emperor of Ger-

many, 102, 146, 147, 312Louis of Beaumont, bishop of

Durham, 113Luke of Ely, 114

Mainerius, 51nMarguerite Porete, 202Marsilius of Inghen, 7, 14, 17, 105,

227n, 303, 356, 359, 360, 361,371, 372, 373, 375, 377, 398,400

Marsilius of Padua, 102, 103, 146Martin Luther, 350, 401Martinus, master, 53n, 55nMartinus Anglicus, 227nMatthew of Sweden, 163n, 178nMeister Eckhart, O.P., 202Melissus, 275, 276n, 321, 332, 342Michael of Cesena, O.F.M., minister

general, 100, 102, 202Michael of Massa, O.E.S.A., xiv, xv,

111, 132, 133, 136, 186, 189, 196,197, 198, 269n, 271, 272–274, 275,276, 277, 280, 282, 284, 285–301,318, 319, 320, 322, 329–346, 388n,397, 398, 400

Michael de Montecalerio, xv, 270nMonachus Niger, O.S.B., 140, 142


Nicholas IV, pope, 238Nicholas Albergati, cardinal protec-

tor of Augustinians, 286nNicholas de Anesiaco, O.P., 250nNicholas Aston, 104, 125, 142, 379Nicholas of Autrecourt, xv, 13, 14,

16, 127n, 138, 143, 157, 158, 159,166, 167, 191, 205, 206, 221, 316,318n, 324n, 335, 374n, 384, 389,391

Nicholas of Cosfeld, 144n, 177Nicholas Drukken de Dacia, 144n,

177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184,194, 198, 389

Nicholas Gossek of Poland, 313Nicholas Trevet, O.P., 96Nicole Oresme, xv, 184nNorman de Lesseley, 180n

Odo, future bishop of Cambrai, 45Otto of Freising, 46, 47, 48n, 76

Parmenides, 275, 276n, 321, 332, 342Parvipontanus; see Adam of Petit

PontPastor de Serrescuderio, O.F.M.,

100, 315Paul of Perugia, O.Carm., xvPaul of Venice, 227nPeter; see also Petrus, PierrePeter Abelard, 1, 2, 4, 5n, 7, 9, 11,

13, 18, 19, 35, 39, 41, 44, 45, 46n,47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53n, 61n, 62,66n, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74n, 75–79, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 214,374

Peter of Aquila, O.F.M., 135, 280n,315–316

Peter Auriol [Aureoli], O.F.M., 94,98, 111, 115, 120, 124, 133, 186n,189n, 190n, 286n, 296

Peter of Candia, 8, 227n, 375, 400,401

Peter the Cantor, 52n, 62n, 78n,79n

Peter of Capua, 52n, 55n, 56n, 61n,63n, 71n, 74, 80n

Peter Lombard, 24, 25, 35, 53, 54n,55, 56, 58, 59n, 60, 61n, 64, 68,70, 79

Peter of John Olivi, 114, 122, 129n,130n, 132, 143, 186n, 202, 330, 331

Peter of Poitiers, 53, 61nPeter de Rivo, 373Peter of Spain (Hispanus), 361Petrus de Croso, 181, 182nPetrus Garini, O.E.S.A., 356Petrus Menenes, 357Petrus Nigri, 4nPhilip Augustus, king of France, 238Philip of Grève, 54nPhilip the Scot, 309nPierre d’Ailly, 14, 15, 105, 127, 189n,

371, 372, 374Pierre Ceffons, O.Cist., xv, 127,

189n, 355Pierre Roger (see also Clement VI),

205, 297n, 400Plato, 132Porphyry, 45, 47n, 98Praepositinus, 52n, 54n, 55n, 62nPriscian, 31, 32, 34n, 47n, 51n, 65,

214n

Quintillian, 213

Radulphus Benedicti, 250, 256nRaimbert of Lille, 45Ralph Strode, 104, 125, 379Ratramnus of Corbie, 40nRaymund Béguin, O.P., patriarch of

Jerusalem, 100Richard Billingham, 227nRichard Brinkley, O.F.M., 104, 125,

224, 379Richard de Bury, 113, 152Richard Campsall, 95, 96, 99, 114,

115, 120, 134, 139, 215, 216Richard of Conington, O.F.M., 95,

96, 115, 134Richard Drayton, 113, 115Richard Fitzralph, 107, 112, 113, 116,

120, 122, 123n, 134, 135, 351n,364


Richard Kilvington, 116, 135, 140,184n

Richard of Lincoln, O.Cist., 205Richard of Portirstona, 180n, 184,

191, 193, 194Richard the Scot, 144n, 177Richard Swineshead, 125Robert Cowton, O.F.M., 96, 114,

115, 134Robert Curson, 386Robert de Ffyf (de Cupir), 178nRobert Graystanes, O.S.B., 113–116Robert Grosseteste, 305Robert of Halifax, O.F.M., 116, 124,

125n, 135, 140, 188n, 366, 368Robert Holcot, O.P., 14, 17, 43n,

57n, 107, 112, 116, 117–120, 135,139, 140, 188, 225, 350, 357, 363,374n, 378, 379

Robert of Kykeley [Kigheley], 95,114

Robert of Melun, 49, 51, 71Robert of Paris, 46Robert Semere, 183nRobert of Walsingham, O.Carm.,

114, 115Robert Winchelsey, archbishop of

Canterbury, 93Roger Bacon, 135, 217Roger Marston, O.F.M., 94Roger Rosetus, O.F.M., 124, 125n,

188nRoger Swyneshead, 227nRoland of Cremona, O.P., 52nRoscelin [Roscelinus], 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7,

9, 35, 37n, 41, 44, 46, 47, 67, 68,374

Rosetus; see RogerRycholf de Via Lapidea, 366, 368

Scaurus, 213Sifridus, 367Simon de Brie, 311Simon of Faversham, 215nSimon of Mepham, future arch-

bishop of Canterbury, 96Simon Quinimo, 250n, 261

Simon of Tournai, 56n, 61nSimon de Weuchy, 164nSimplicius, 280Stephen; see also ÉtienneStephen Kettelbergh, 101Stephen of Langres, 136, 204, 252nStephen Langton, 59n, 62nSuno of Sweden, 178n, 308, 313Suno Karoli of Sweden, 178n, 313,

314, 386nSurrey, 114

Themistius, 280Thomas Aquinas, O.P., St., 2, 39,

52n, 54n, 79, 86, 91, 96, 101, 105,113, 129n, 133, 215, 221, 280, 281,291, 294, 295, 331, 337, 365n,368n, 398

Thomas de Bailly, chancellor atParis, 98n

Thomas Bradwardine, 104, 107, 116,135, 140, 269n, 364

Thomas Buckingham, 107, 116, 125,135, 140, 364, 365

Thomas de Caliga Rubea of Trier,313

Thomas de Fabiano, O.E.S.A., 290nThomas de Kinnemund, 180nThomas Parentucelli de Sarzana,

future Pope Nicholas V, 286n, 318Thomas of Strasbourg, O.E.S.A.,

287n, 292, 316, 350, 356Thomas de Vio Cajetan, O.P., 4nThomas Waleys, O.P., 202, 205Thomas de Wedale, 183n, 184nThomas Wilton, 134

Udo, master, 53n, 60nUlger of Angers, 214Ulrich of Augsburg, 178n, 180n, 308,

309, 312Ulrich of Saxony, 314Urban II, pope, 46Urban V, pope, 243n, 317n

Valetus, 51nVarro, 211, 212


Walter Burley, 111, 112, 115, 125, 129,130, 132, 134, 135, 139, 140, 141,142, 145n, 153, 179, 184n, 191, 192,193, 195, 196n, 217, 218, 269, 270,280n, 281, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318,320, 361

Walter Chatton, O.F.M., 17, 43n,98, 99, 110, 111, 112, 113, 117, 119,120, 121, 122, 123, 130n, 134, 188n,190n, 296, 300n, 351n, 378

Walter Map, 48n, 78Walter Wardlaw, 178n, 180n, 182,

183, 184, 198Werner Wolfram, 144n, 177, 180nWilliam; see also GuillaumeWilliam of Alnwick, O.F.M., 94, 97,

98, 114, 115, 134, 135William of Auxerre, 25, 52n, 53n,

54n, 56n, 63n, 74nWilliam of Brenueth, 184n

William Buser, 227nWilliam of Champeaux, 4William of Conches, 48, 49, 73, 74William Crathorn, O.P., 43n, 107,

118, 119, 135, 188, 379William of Cremona, O.E.S.A., 291,

293, 294, 297William Grenlaw (de Viridi Monte),

182nWilliam Heytesbury, 107, 116, 125,

135, 140, 151, 368nWilliam Melton, archbishop of York,

113William of Nottingham, O.F.M., 96William of Ockham, O.F.M., passimWilliam of Rubione, O.F.M., 100William of Soissons, 86William Sutton, 125

Zeno, 80n

INDEX OF MODERN NAMES

Adams, M.M., 171nAkkerman, F., 105n, 377nAlmagno, R.S., 111nAndújar, E., 267n, 387nArnauld, A., 3nArnold, K., 146n, 198n, 222nAshworth, J., 227nAventinus, see Turmair

Balic, C., 95nBaluze, É., 2nBarach, K.S., 6, 40nBarbet, J., 205nBarth, T., 13nBataillon, L., 280n, 398nBaudry, L., 13, 110n, 112n, 373nBaumgartner, M., 40, 41nBazán, C., 267n, 387nBeckmann, J.P., 18nBenary, F., 7, 359nBender, J., 125nBergmann, G., 4nBianchi, L., 267n, 323n, 329nBiard, J., 278n, 279, 282, 329n, 382nBirch, T.B., 110nBoehner, P., xiii, 11n, 12, 13, 14, 17n,

108, 112n, 120n, 130n, 131n, 133n,141n, 158n, 166, 170, 171n, 180n,186n, 187n, 190n, 192n, 195n,209, 210, 217n, 220, 221, 269n,270n, 271n, 331n

Borchert, E., 11Borgnet, A., 80nBouquet, M., 46nBoyer, B., 70n, 214nBraakhuis, H.A.G., 80n, 85Brampton, C.K., 92n, 101n, 110n,

133n, 195nBriek, M., 203nBriquet, C.M., 172n, 243n

Brooke, C.L.N., 48n, 50nBrown, M.A., 139nBrown, S.F., 95n, 98n, 99n, 110n,

111n, 112n, 120n, 129n, 130n, 131n,171n, 180n, 186n, 192n, 195n,217n, 270n, 300n, 360n

Brucker, J.J., 3nBuck, A., 17nBuhle, J.G., 3n, 4nBurger, C., 18nBurr, D., 330nBurrows, M.S., 18n, 372nBusa, R., 53nBusse, M., 4nBuytaert, E.M., 12, 18n, 48n, 76n,

158n

Canivez, J.M., 305nCaramuel y Lobkowitz, J., 4n, 6Caroti, S., 105n, 267n, 317n, 329n,

339n, 388nCarré, M.H., 4n, 11, 44nCatto, J.I., 125n, 305nChandler, B., 139n, 372nChâtelain, É., 230, 231, 232, 233n,

236, 242n, 243n, 256n, 257, 381Chenu, M.-D., 9, 10, 18, 23, 24, 39,

40, 41, 42, 43, 52, 53, 55n, 56,62n, 63n, 66

Colish, M., 19n, 29n, 50n, 66nCondillac, E.B. de, 6Condorcet, M. de, 6Corsten, W., 201nCosman, M.P., 139n, 372nCousin, V., 4, 5, 6, 40n, 44nCova, L., 95n

Dal Pra, M., 83nDavis, L.D., 158nDe Boüard, A., 255, 383n

416 index of modern names

De Gérando, J., 3n, 6De la Torre, B.R., 364nDe Libera, A., 19n, 35n, 39n, 82nDe Pommerol, M.-H., 232nDe Rémusat, Charles, 4n, 5nDe Rijk, L.M., 18n, 35n, 44, 50n,

52n, 75n, 76n, 84, 85n, 86n, 138n,139n, 171n, 214n, 217n

De Wulf, M., 6, 8, 9, 11, 40, 41nDenifle, H., 157, 172, 209, 230, 231,

236, 242n, 243n, 257, 381Desharnais, R.P., 15nDi Benedetto, V., 211nDolnikowski, E.W., 104nDoucet, V., 95n, 293, 294, 356nDrossbach, G., 312nDu Boulay, C.E., 2, 3, 6, 44n, 145n,

172n, 174n, 235n, 241n, 242n,256n, 257, 394

Du Cange, C., 2, 3, 6, 44Dugauquier, J.-A., 62nDumont, S., 280nDu Plessis d’Argentré, C., 127n,

175n, 200n, 381n

Ebbesen, S., 18n, 63n, 83n, 179n,211n, 215n, 219n

Eckermann, W., 16n, 224n, 225n,273n, 300n, 349n, 354n

Ehrle, F., 1n, 8, 9, 45n, 128n, 359n,371n, 373n, 375, 380n, 381n, 398n,400n

Elie, H., 43nEmden, A.B., 97n, 110n, 113n, 114n,

183nEtzkorn, G.J., 96n, 99n, 104n, 110n,

111n, 300nEvans, G.R., 28n

Fabricius, J.A., 304nFaes de Mottoni, B., 95nFeckes, C., 8, 9Fehling, Detlev, 211nFerruolo, S., 50nFitzgerald, M.J., 379nFitzpatrick, N., 110nFlash, K., 9n, 128n, 158n

Fontaine, J., 213nFournier, P., 201nFrank, W.A., 99n, 300nFranz, A., 360nFredborg, K.M. (Margarita), 18n,

63nFriedberg, E., 93nFrotz, A., 201nFuchs, O., 12nFumagalli, M.T. Beonio-Brocchieri,

48n, 76n

Gabriel, A.L., 127n, 200n, 359nGál, G., 17n, 95n, 97n, 98n, 99n,

110n, 111n, 112n, 114n, 120n,123n, 129n, 130n, 134n, 180n,185n, 186n, 192n, 195n, 217n,224n, 270n, 296n, 360n, 363n,379n

Geach, P.T., 171nGelber, H.G., 16n, 17n, 118, 119n,

122n, 123n, 225n, 367n, 378nGenest, J.-F., 104n, 307n, 365nGeyer, B., 6n, 40, 41n, 44n, 47n, 77n,

80nGhisalberti, A., 187nGiacon, C., 171nGilbert, N.W., 127n, 128n, 199n,

359n, 372, 373n, 380nGilson, É., 9n, 11, 12Giry, A., 255, 383nGlorieux, P., 17n, 182n, 201n, 202n,

293n, 294nGössmann, E., 17nGrabmann, M., 50n, 80n, 85, 359,

366n, 368Gracia, J.J.E., 40nGraham, R., 93nGreen-Pedersen, N.J., 18n, 64n, 83n,

179nGrimaldo, C., 188n, 189n, 193nGrzondziel, H., 8, 9, 10Guyot, B.G., 280n, 398n

Harkins, C.L., 111nHauréau, B., 4n, 5, 6, 40nHeinze, M., 5n

index of modern names 417

Henry, D.P., 31, 34n, 37n, 65n,171n

Hermelink, H., 7Hertz, M., 32nHochstetter, E., 10, 11, 12, 13nHoenen, M.J.F.M., 105n, 267n,

323n, 371n, 376n, 401nHoffmann, F., 15n, 101n, 110n, 117Honnefelder, L., 18nHübener, W., 17n, 18n, 372nHubien, H., 166nHudson, A., 96n, 107n, 379nHuisman, G.C., 105n, 377nHume, D., 3n, 8Hunt, R., 51n, 75n

Ibach, H., 145n, 151n, 222n, 304n,312n, 314n, 315n, 316, 318n

Imbach, R., 1n, 317nInciarte, F., 131n, 170nIserloh, E., 11, 12Iwakuma, Y., 18n, 64n, 83n, 84n

Jacobi, K., 81nJaffé, P., 46nJames, F.A., 96nJansen, B., 330nJolivet, J., 18, 19n, 35n, 39n, 48n,

82nJunghans, H., 13n

Kaeppeli, T., 146n, 188n, 202n,203n, 222n, 304n, 314n, 315n,316, 364n, 365n

Kaluza, Z., xiv, 16n, 18, 19n, 35n,39n, 80n, 82n, 105n, 125n, 127n,222n, 267n, 268n, 271n, 283n,317n, 322n, 323n, 329n, 331n,335n, 365n, 372n, 373n, 374n,379n, 380n, 383n, 384, 386,391, 392n, 395, 396n, 397n, 398,401

Kaulich, W., 5nKenny, A., 139nKeussen, H., 360nKibre, P., 249n, 252nKilcullen, J., 103n

King, E.B., 23n, 57nKingsford, C.L., 92n, 93nKintzinger, M., 312nKittelson, J.M., 139n, 185n, 327n,

365n, 372nKnowles, D., 13n, 113Knudsen, C., 171nKnysh, G., 100nKoch, J., 110n, 131n, 133n, 201n,

202n, 203n, 365nKopp, K., 219n, 223nKretzmann, N., 139n, 216nKrüger, S., 146n, 147n, 151n, 197n,

198n, 199n, 222n, 275n, 276n,277n, 303n, 304, 305n, 307n,312n, 314n, 315n, 325n

Künneth, J.T., 3nKürzinger, J., 185n, 291nKwanten, E., 307n

Landgraf, A.M., 23n, 40, 42, 43, 53,55n, 61n, 63n, 79n, 80n

Lang, A., 11n, 375Lappe, J., 157nLe Roy Ladurie, E., 202nLeff, G., 13n, 15n, 104n, 108n, 116n,

123n, 131nLeland, J., 113LeMoine, F., 211nLerner, R., 202nLeroux, P., 4nLesne, E., 50nLevi, A.H.T., 17nLickteig, F., 367nLindberg, D.C., 132n, 195nLinden, P., 201nLittle, A.G., 114n, 362n, 367nLivesey, S.J., 17nLocke, J., 3, 8Löhr, G.M., 184n, 359, 365n, 368Longpré, E., 97n, 110nLortz, J., 12nLuscombe, D.E., 18, 50n, 51n, 69n

Maier, A., 129, 130n, 131n, 135n,185n, 186n, 201n, 205n, 269n,270, 283n


Maierù, A., 1n, 131n, 140n, 185n,365n, 374n

Malebranche, N., 3, 8Marcolino, V., 145n, 184n, 193n,

285n, 295n, 297n, 326n, 352n,365n

Marenbon, J., 40nMarkowski, M., 198nMarmo, C., 329n,Martin, C.J., 82, 86Martin, R.M., 71nMärtl, C., 312nMatthews, G.B., 171nMaurer, A.A., 13nMayer, C.P., 349nMcGrade, A.S., 103n, 124n, 146n,

199n, 222nMcKeon, R., 36n, 49n, 70n, 214nMcNamara, J.F., 15nMeiners, C., 3Menges, M.C., 12nMichael, B., 149n, 270n, 324nMichalski, C. [or K.], 8, 9, 128n,

142n, 157n, 158n, 170, 173n,209

Michaud-Quantin, P., 48nMiethke, J., 100n, 103n, 146n, 149n,

199n, 222nMillor, W.J., 50nMinio-Paluello, L., 138n, 333nMohan, G.E., 195nMoody, E.A., xiii, 13, 14, 15n, 16,

43n, 108, 117, 118, 119n, 128n,131n, 158, 162, 166, 170, 171,172, 173n, 195n, 209, 220, 225n,229n, 376n, 378, 379n, 380n,387

Moser, S., 131nMoshin, V., 243nMüller, G., 305nMurdoch, J.E., 122n, 132n, 139n,

142n, 195n, 372nMynors, R.O.B., 48n

Nielsen, L.O., 63nNormore, C., 19, 40n, 62n, 64n, 77n,

78, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87

Nuchelmans, G., 10n, 18, 19n, 23n,32n, 33n, 35n, 36, 37, 41n, 43n,49n, 50n, 54n

Oakley, F., 13n, 15nOberman, H.A., 14, 15, 17n, 18n,

96n, 104n, 117n, 120n, 152n, 360n,372n, 377, 379n

O’Donnell, J.R., 158n, 171nOmont, H., 231, 232, 241nOuy, G., 17n, 142n, 372nOzment, S., 15n, 17n, 372n

Paqué, R., xiii, 16, 128n, 135n, 158,162, 167n, 170, 172, 173n, 177n,209, 220, 229n, 279n, 282n, 376n,380n

Parodi, M., 17n,Pegis, A., 12Pelster, F., 11, 52n, 80n, 85, 95n,

114n, 129n, 289nPelzer, A., 146n, 222nPerini, D.A., 273n, 289n, 296nPerreiah, A.R., 139n, 171nPicavet, F.J., 5n, 6Piccard, G., 243nPinborg, J., 139n, 179n, 211nPluta, O., 267n, 322n, 365nPommerol, M.-H. de; see De Pom-

merolPrantl, C. [or K.], 5, 6, 7, 40nPreti, G., xiiiPrice, R., 131n, 171n

Rashdall, H., 167n, 252nReina, M.E., 135n, 171n, 278nReiners, J., 5n, 7, 11, 40, 41, 43n, 47,

49Ribaillier, J., 25n, 53nRichter, V., 195nRiezler, S., 2n, 44n, 374nRijk, L.M. de; see De RijkRitter, G., 7, 8, 9, 14, 359n, 371, 375,

377Robson, J.A., 108n, 125n, 364nRoensch, F.J., 96nRosier-Catach, I., 329n

index of modern names 419

Ross, W.D., 49nRouse, M., 280n, 398nRouse, R., 280n, 398nRousselot, X., 3, 4nRudavsky, T., 120n, 216n

Sagal, P.T., 171nSalabert, J., 3n, 4nSalter, H.E., 101nSbrocchi, L., 267n, 387nSchabel, C., 290nSchaefer, J.T., 23n, 57nSchepers, H., 15n, 43n, 117, 118, 378,

379nSchmeller, J.A., 5nSchmitt, F.S., 46nSchnaubelt, J.C., 285nSchneider, J.H.J., 267n, 323n, 371nScholz, R., 146n, 222n, 277n, 303n,

323n, 397Schönberger, R., 98nSchrimpf, G., 18nSchum, W., 192nScott, T.K., xiii, 16, 128n, 135n,

158, 170, 171n, 209, 229n, 376n,380n

Sebeok, T.A., 211nShapiro, H., 13n, 131n, 195nSheehan, M.W., 305nSikes, T.G., 44nSirridge, M., 28, 66nSmalley, B., 117, 202n, 203n, 206n,

226n, 367nSouffrin, P., 105n, 267n, 329n, 388nSouthern, R.W., 50n, 305nSpade, P.V., 91n, 127n, 131n, 139n,

171nStabile, G., 317nSteele, R., 217nStegmüller, F., 127nStöckl, A., 5nStump, E., 139nSturlese, L., 317nSwiniarski, J., 131n, 171nSylla, E., 132n, 139n, 195nSynan, E.A., 99n, 111n, 114n, 122n,

170n, 215, 216n

Tachau, K.H., xiii, 16, 104n, 112,118, 119n, 123n, 125n, 130n,132n, 142n, 157n, 185n, 186n,187n, 188n, 189n, 209n, 221n,222n, 229n, 259n, 262n, 263,267, 268n, 271n, 283n, 285n,296n, 313n, 322n, 324n, 329n,337n, 375n, 377n, 378n, 379n,380, 386, 388n, 389n, 391n, 396n,400n

Tennemann, W.G., 3n, 4n, 6Tessier, G., 158nThijssen, J.M.M.H., xiv, 229, 230,

241n, 248n, 251n, 253, 254n, 258,263, 264, 265, 267n, 268n, 270n,279, 281n, 322n, 329n, 376n,380n, 382, 383, 391

Thomas, E.C., 152nThomasius, J., 3nThorndike, L., 137n, 147n, 148n,

175n, 198n, 201n, 223n, 277n,338n, 386n

Thurot, C., 232, 233nTierney, B., 103nTornay, S.G., 10nTraljich, S., 243nTransue, P.J., 327n, 365n, 372nTrapp, [A.]D., 14, 17n, 127n,

128n, 132n, 145n, 184n, 186n,196n, 197n, 224n, 271, 285, 286,287, 288, 289, 290n, 291, 294,295, 296, 297, 299, 301, 318n,326n, 332, 349, 350, 351n, 352n,353, 355n, 356, 365n, 367n,398

Tribbechov, A., 4nTrinkaus, C., 15n, 17n, 372nTrithemius, J., 304n, 316Turmair, J. [Aventinus], 2, 3, 6, 7, 9,

44n, 374Tweedale, M.M., 44n, 50n, 76n,

78n, 116n

Überweg [Ueberweg], F., 5n, 6n,40n, 41n

Uhlfelder, M., 211nUhlig, G., 211n


Van Neste, R., 16nVanderjagt, A.J., 105n, 377nVan der Lecq, R., 270nVernet, A., 307nVidal, J.M., 201n, 317nVignaux, P., 11, 12, 13, 14, 16n, 18,

39, 40, 41, 105n, 127n, 222n, 322n,331n, 365n, 380n

Vives, J.L., 4nVossenkuhl, W., 98n

Wallace, W., 195nWalsh, K., 116nWarichez, J., 61nWatt, D.E.R., 178n, 181n, 182n,

183n, 184n, 191nWebb, C.C.I., 35n, 44nWebering, D., 12nWeiler, A.G., 373nWeinberg, J.R., 11n, 158n

Weisheipl, J.A., 13n, 111n, 125, 131n,132n, 139n, 191n, 193n, 195n,269n, 280n

Wey, J.C., 17n, 99n, 123n, 186nWhite, L., 137nWieland, G., 18n, 267n, 323n, 371nWilks, M., 96n, 107n, 379nWilson, C., 139nWippel, J.F., 19n, 40n, 81n, 293nWood, R., 97n, 104n, 224n, 379n

Xiberta, B.M., 114n

Ypma, E., 273n, 295n

Zimmermann, A., 17n, 127n, 200n,359n

Zumkeller, A., 224n, 349, 353,398n