Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Management Accounting Research:

A Critical Realist Approach

Sven Modell

Manchester Business School, University of Manchester and

School of Accounting, University of Technology Sydney E-mail: sven.modell@uts.edu.au

Abstract

Empirical management accounting research increasingly mix qualitative and quantitative methods and combine theories generally associated with entrenched and arguably incommensurable paradigms. This type of research has received considerable criticism in the wider social sciences for failing to present a convincing case for the use of mixed methods research as a means of validation, pivoting around the possibilities of triangulation. However, little explicit attention has been paid to this critique in the management accounting literature. This paper responds to this critique and advances a modified notion of triangulation based on critical realism. The applicability of this conception of triangulation is then illustrated based on two empirical studies straddling between the functionalist and interpretive paradigms. We discuss how this responds to the aforementioned critique and how it may contribute to the advancement of mixed methods research in management accounting. Acknowledgements: This paper has benefited greatly from my collaboration with Kari Lukka on a related project. Additional comments on earlier versions by Jane Baxter, Christina Boedker, Wai-Fong Chua, David Emsley, Jonas Gerdin, Markus Granlund, Trevor Hopper, Habib Mahama, Jodie Moll, Richard Morris, Bob Scapens and Bernhard Wieder are also appreciated. An earlier version of the paper was presented at a workshop at the University of New South Wales.

1

Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Management Accounting Research:

A Critical Realist Approach 1 Introduction The methodological development in management accounting research over the past decades has been characterized by increasing pluralism. A broad range of ‘alternative’ approaches, challenging the hegemony of the functionalist and quantitatively orientated ‘mainstream’, now assume a relatively entrenched position (Ryan et al., 2002; Baxter and Chua, 2003). A small, but growing body of research seeking to overcome this divide by mixing theories and/or methods generally associated with different paradigms is also emerging (see Hopper and Major, 2007; Modell, 2005). By widening the view of the roles of accounting in organizations, such research has the potential to yield important insights into the substantive phenomena under examination (cf. Gioia and Pitre, 1990; Lewis and Grimes, 1999). However, it may also encounter resistance from scholars defending the idea of paradigm incommensurability (see e.g., Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Jackson and Carter, 1991). The latter position holds that specific theories and methods are often wedded to incompatible philosophical assumptions and cannot be combined in a fruitful and philosophically justifiable manner. Recent advances in the mixed methods literature suggest that the paradigm incommensurability thesis has now lost some of its force (Smaling, 1994; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003) and that researchers involved in such research tend to subscribe to a more pragmatic, but not always philosophically informed, position (Bryman, 2006, 2007). Similar calls for pragmatism are discernible in the management accounting literature, notably in works emphasizing the nature of the substantive research topic rather than strict paradigmatic loyalties as the primary basis for the choice of theories and methods (e.g., Humphrey and Scapens, 1996; Dirsmith, 1998). Moreover, whilst earlier classifications of management accounting research tended to follow existing paradigmatic division lines in the social sciences (see e.g., Hopper and Powell, 1985; Chua, 1986) there is evidence that such distinctions might have been overdrawn when contrasted with actual research practice (Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al., 2007). Nevertheless, recent debates in the management accounting literature underline the difficulties in working towards a pragmatic position, especially when this entails bridging the gap between the interpretive and functionalist paradigms. Animated exchanges have occurred between scholars seeking to resurrect the hegemony of the functionalist ‘mainstream’ (e.g., Zimmerman, 2001) and those defending the need for methodological pluralism (e.g., Hopwood, 2002; Lukka and Mouritsen, 2002). Similarly, several observers have lamented the general lack of communication between functionalist and interpretive management accounting research (Ahrens et al., 2007; Merchant, 2007).1

1 Some attempts to reconcile the epistemological and methodological differences between interpretive and critical accounting research have been made, notably by Laughlin (1995, 2004). However, Laughlin (1995, p. 80) characterized such ‘middle-range’ research as ‘invariably qualitative’. Hence, the rise of critical accounting research has not brought the tensions between qualitative and quantitative methods to the fore to the same extent as the mixing of interpretive and functionalist approaches and it is not discussed in any greater detail in this paper.

2

It is within this broader discourse that we need to locate the growing interest in combining qualitative and quantitative methods in management accounting research. Even though the philosophical tensions involved in such research generated some early debate in the accounting literature (Abdel-Khalik and Ajinkyia, 1983 vs. Tomkins and Groves, 1983a, 1983b) this issue has largely been ignored in more recent discussions of mixed methods research (Birnberg et al, 1990; Abernethy et al., 1999; Lillis and Mundy, 2005; Modell, 2005; Anderson and Widener, 2007). Rather, these advances concentrate on technical and methodological issues, with particular reference to research blending elements of survey and case study methods, but have exclusively done so within the remits of the functionalist paradigm. For example, even though Modell (2005) identified a number of studies straddling between the functionalist and interpretive paradigms, he subjected these to analysis based on criteria associated with the former. He also declined to debate the epistemological ramifications of blending these paradigms. This neglect of the philosophical tensions in mixed methods research straddling between the functionalist and interpretive paradigms is problematic for at least two reasons. The first of this is of a political nature. There is evidence that scholars engaging in mixed methods research and subscribing to a pragmatic position harbour a lingering anxiety with the lack of a clearly articulated philosophical foundation for such research (Bryman, 2006). Without a more thorough understanding of the philosophical premises on which such a ‘pragmatic’ approach can be developed scholars are likely targets for accusations of unreflexive eclecticism (cf. Smith, 1983; Smith and Heshusius, 1986; Blaikie, 1991). Such criticisms may, in turn, serve to de-legitimize mixed methods research to the detriment of the accumulation of scientific knowledge of management accounting practice (Modell, 2007). The second problem is of a more substantive kind and concerns the lack of a unified and philosophically consistent foundation for assessing the validity of research blending theories and methods generally associated with the functionalist and interpretive paradigms. Whilst the prospects of enhanced validity, pivoting around the notion of triangulation, has constituted a key concern as a motivation for as well as a critique of mixed methods research the advancement of such a unified approach has recently been identified as a major unresolved issue in the mixed methods literature (Sale et al., 2002; Sale and Brazil, 2004; Bryman, 2006). In the present paper, we argue that contemporary pragmatist thought, as mobilized in the mixed methods literature, is insufficient for addressing these problems. Instead, we turn to critical realism for developing a unified approach for validating mixed methods research. Whereas critical realism shows many similarities to and has indeed borrowed key concepts from the pragmatist tradition, it constitutes a more cogently articulated philosophical foundation to this end. However, even though important advances based on critical realism have recently been made in the mixed methods literature (Mingers, 2000, 2006; Brown and Brignall, 2007) these do not yet present a coherent framework for addressing the philosophical criticisms levied at the validation procedures typically invoked in this literature.2 2 We also recognize that critical realism has evolved into a much broader program for social research stressing issues of agency, authority, power and emancipation (see e.g., Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 1989; Sayer, 2000; Danermark et al., 2002). Our use of this perspective is limited to provide an ontological and epistemological basis for addressing the notion of validity in mixed methods research.

3

Elaborating on this issue, the purpose of this paper is to explicate how critical realism may be developed as a basis for validating management accounting research mixing qualitative and quantitative methods. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we revisit the dominant means of validation in mixed methods research based on the notion of triangulation and some key criticisms levied at its application in the social sciences. We also elaborate on the limits of contemporary pragmatist thought in addressing these criticisms. In section 3, we outline a critical realist approach to validate mixed methods research and advance a modified conception of triangulation. In section 4, we illustrate how traces of this approach may be found in two empirical studies straddling between the functionalist and interpretive paradigms. In section 5, we conclude the paper by summarizing how our modified notion of triangulation responds to the aforementioned critique and how it may contribute to the advancement of mixed methods research in management accounting. 2 Validation in Mixed Methods Research The Conventional Logic of Triangulation Within the functionalist paradigm, the key motivation for mixed methods research is generally the prospects of enhanced validity through various types of triangulation (Jick, 1979; Brewer and Hunter, 1989; Modell, 2005). The purpose of triangulation, as conventionally conceived in the social sciences, is to enhance the precision of the representation of the same empirical phenomenon by examining it with the aid of different theories, methods, data sources and/or investigators (Bryman, 1988; Denzin, 1978).3 Following one of the leading advocates of this technique (Denzin, 1978), the underlying logic of method triangulation is to use dissimilar methods to maximise the chances of findings reflecting ‘substantive’ similarities and differences in empirical phenomena rather than methodological artefacts. The strengths and weaknesses of different methods should ideally cancel each other out such that research yields more valid, or precise, representations of these phenomena. This logic is compatible with the realist ontology, grounded in the presumed existence of an objective empirical reality independent of human cognition, underpinning the functionalist paradigm (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Morgan and Smircich, 1980). That is, by adopting a strategy of triangulation it is possible to improve the capture of a particular phenomenon, the ‘real’ nature of which is of a singular kind and thus beyond dispute. By crafting research strategies to this end researchers may avoid or reduce the bias associated with any one method such that the law-like regularities making up the world are represented with greater accuracy. This testifies to a positivist epistemology, according to which research instruments are largely independent of the object under examination and the role of the researcher is mainly one of detached adjudicator of whether research findings correspond to ‘real’ phenomena (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Morgan and Smircich, 1980).

3 This paper is primarily concerned with method and theory triangulation. Between-method triangulation, brought about through the mixing of qualitative and quantitative methods, subsumes data triangulation (Denzin, 1978). Researcher triangulation is not discussed in any detail. However, as explicated later in the paper, the more general role of the researcher in the construction of scientific knowledge is of vital concern in addressing the critique of triangulation (see also Wolfram Cox and Hassard, 2005).

4

In actual research practice, this approach is generally manifest in concerns with construct, internal and external validity (Brewer and Hunter, 1989; Birnberg et al., 1990; Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998; Modell, 2005). We briefly explicate how the conventional logic of triangulation has been brought to bear on these issues in research mixing qualitative and quantitative methods and the role of theory in this process. In its simplest form, triangulation of different methods is mainly used for enhancing construct validity, or the extent to which theoretical concepts and their operational definitions adequately capture properties of various empirical phenomena (Jick, 1979). The fundamental triangulation logic here is that embedded in Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) multi-trait/multi-method approach, positing that construct validity is enhanced when correlations between measures presumed to reflect similar properties (traits) of an empirical phenomenon are high relative to correlations between measures presumed to reflect different properties. When translated into analyses of construct validity in mixed qualitative/quantitative research, this triangulation logic typically takes the form of more subjective assessments of convergence based on expert and/or respondent judgements (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). For example, the development or refinement of theoretical concepts based on small-scale, qualitative pilot studies is often combined with statistical techniques such as factor analysis to determine the degree of convergence with quantitative measures of a particular phenomenon (Modell, 2005). Having established a high degree of construct validity triangulation may also be used for enhancing internal validity, or the credibility of causal explanations. However, the views of how this may be accomplished vary somewhat in the literature. Some authors primarily see triangulation as a useful means of internal validation where dissimilar methods produce converging findings (Bryman, 1988; Bryman and Bell, 2003; Hammersley, 1996). Under such circumstances, qualitative data may enrich and substantiate causal explanations suggested by statistical co-variations in the same empirical setting. Other authors have ascribed a somewhat wider role to triangulation beyond mere corroboration, arguing that it may also shed additional light on and explain unexpected or diverging findings (Denzin, 1978; Brewer and Hunter, 1989; Jick, 1979). Qualitative data often play an important role in this respect as they provide rich accounts of alternative causal relationships (Modell, 2005). The use of multiple theoretical perspectives (ie. theory triangulation) may also sensitize researchers to rival or complementary explanations evident in empirical data, but eschewed by the adoption of a particular theoretical perspective (Denzin, 1978; Brewer and Hunter, 1989). Such internal validation efforts may be extended to enhance the external validity of the resultant theory, or the likelihood that it will hold up across a wider range of empirical settings. Following the logic of analytical (or theoretical) generalization (Yin, 1984; Eisenhardt, 1989) the resolution of diverging findings through method and/or theory triangulation may result in important theory refinements preventing subsequent research from replicating faulty or underspecified theoretical models

5

(Modell, 2005).4 External validity is also enhanced where causal patterns or hypotheses emerging from qualitative studies are corroborated by subsequent quantitative research, such as survey-based tests across larger samples, provided that no unresolved construct or internal validity threats prevail (Brewer and Hunter, 1989; Modell, 2005). Philosophical Critique of Triangulation and the Limits of Pragmatism Not surprisingly, objections to this conventional logic of triangulation primarily originate from scholars with a more subjectivist orientation, such as that underpinning the interpretive paradigm (Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003). Consistent with the paradigm incommensurability thesis, Smith (1983) rejected the possibilities of combining qualitative and quantitative methods arguing that these belong to different paradigms rooted in incompatible philosophical assumptions (see also Smith and Heshusius, 1986). The ontology most consistent with the use of qualitative methods is here seen as one of nominalism; that is, one emphasizing the nature of the world as constituted by subjective experiences and conditioned by the inherent ambiguity of language (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Accordingly, scientific knowledge can only be derived from the ‘inside’ by engaging in dialogue with and occupying the frame of reference of researched individuals. This signifies an epistemological position of anti-positivism emphasizing the relativistic nature of scientific knowledge and the inevitable role of the researched as well as the researcher as active participants in the process of knowledge creation (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Blending validity criteria derived from the positivist tradition with such a position arguably leads to a tenuous ‘quasi-foundationalist’ stance simultaneously testifying to a realist ontology and a relativist epistemology (Smith and Deemer, 2000; Sandberg, 2005).5

Concerns such as those raised above have impressed critics of the use of triangulation as a validation technique in the social sciences. This critique can be broadly summarized into two related strands. The first of these concerns the limited probability of any two methods reflecting the ‘same’ empirical phenomenon if strongly subjectivist assumptions are brought to bear on data. If reality is seen as subjectively construed by researched individuals, the meanings attached to empirical phenomena will vary considerably. However, this richness is arguably compromised by the striving to ‘reconcile’ divergences and establish stable constructs inherent in method triangulation (Fielding and Fielding, 1986; Blaikie, 1991). The resulting abstractions easily hide important variations in the meaning of empirical phenomena. This risk is particularly imminent if positivist inclinations force premature closure in concept definitions and operationalization (Blaikie, 1991). Similarly, converging and diverging causal explanations do not necessarily suggest that one of these is more or less valid, but may simply conceal or reflect the legitimate co-existence of competing constructions of such explanations (Fielding and Fielding, 1986). Hence interpreting the meaning of converging and diverging findings stemming from different methods becomes a nearly futile exercise (Blaikie, 1991, 2000).

4 Analytical generalization is based on close iterations between existing and emerging theory and empirical findings in accordance with some replication and/or extension logic rather than statistical inference (Eisenhardt, 1989). See Lukka and Kasanen (1995) for further discussion of the differences between these modes of generalization in accounting research. 5 This does not mean that the issue of validity has been ignored in interpretive research. However, authors subscribing to a strongly subjectivist position suggest that this reflects a lingering influence of positivism and has reinforced the ‘crisis of validity’ (Gergen and Gergen, 2000, p. 1026).

6

The second and corollary strand of criticism concerns the privileging of researchers as detached and neutral adjudicators between subjectively held views of reality. Such a position is alien to genuinely interpretive researchers and arguably not one on which a convincing case for triangulation as a means of validation can be built (Blaikie, 1991). Silverman (1993, p. 158) succinctly articulated this critique by suggesting that: ‘…the major problem with triangulation as a test of validity is that, by counterposing different contexts, it ignores the context-bound and skilful character of social interaction and assumes that members are ‘cultural dopes’, who need a sociologist to dispel their illusions.’ (Emphasis added). The ability of researchers to remain neutral to the phenomenon under examination is also compromised by the theory-ladenness of observations. Elaborating on this topic, Fielding and Fielding (1986) argued that empirical data are only meaningful to researchers in relation to some theoretical perspective. Hence the representations produced by researchers are highly contingent on their choice of theories and should not be conceived of as ‘accurate’ descriptions of an objective empirical reality ‘out there’. Even though increasingly comprehensive representations may be produced through theory triangulation, these can never approximate universally valid, ‘objective’ truths (see also Koro-Ljungberg, 2004; Richardson, 2000). These criticisms of the use of triangulation as a validation technique have occasionally surfaced in the accounting literature. In responding to Abdel-Khalik and Ajinkya’s (1983) claim that triangulation is possible across paradigmatic boundaries, Tomkins and Groves (1983b) argued that this unduly subjects interpretive research to the assumption that meanings are stable and easily enumerated. More recently, Ahrens and Chapman (2006, p. 834) echoed this critique by suggesting that the conventional logic of triangulation is misleading ‘because it suggests that some certainty has been gained in the capture of an objective reality’. However, such rejections of the notion of triangulation seem to rest on the assumption that the only alternative to empirical realism, grounded in a view of the world as an objectively verifiable entity, is to strive to capture ever-changing subjective experiences (see also Willmott, 1983; Armstrong, 2007). This signifies a somewhat stereotyped notion of interpretive research that is not necessarily tenable when contrasted with actual research practice in management accounting (Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al., 2007). As explicated below, it is also at odds with the ontological position discernible in contemporary pragmatist (and, indeed, critical realist) thought underpinning much of the mixed methods movement. Drawing on seminal thinkers within the tradition of American pragmatism (e.g., James, 1907; Peirce, 1960), the philosophical foundations of the current resurgence of interest in mixed methods research were recently outlined by Maxcy (2003). Few pragmatists, he argued, have gone as far as rejecting the possibility of a reality made up of reasonably stable, albeit temporally finite and intrinsically social, relationships. In other words, there is room for an ontological position recognizing that some socially negotiated consensus concerning the nature of the world is indeed possible. Although the subjective experiences of researched individuals as well as researchers form an integral part of the process of constructing such consensus, it is also intricately bound up with a range of social premises. Thus, Maxcy (2003, p. 63) summarized the pragmatist position as follows:

7

‘As a group, pragmatists are convinced that human thought is intrinsically linked to action. Theory was joined with practice. Ideas operate as instruments rather than ideals. Reality is in process, undergoing change at every turn of events. The universe is seen as evolving rather than static. External forces do not determine humans; rather, through intelligence, humans are capable of shaping experience.’ In terms of epistemology, the view of researchers as actively involved in the construction of knowledge is thus affirmed. However, the views of the researcher as either a detached observer of some objective reality ‘out there’ or recorder of purely subjective experiences are equally over-simplified. Rather, theory development is arguably inseparable from the practices and actions of researchers, whose choices are driven by practical, political and cultural premises rather than strictly philosophical considerations. The adequacy, or validity, of specific methods are primarily seen as a matter of what ‘works’ in terms of answering specific research questions in a particular research setting (Maxcy, 2003; Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003). By engaging in dialogue with the researched, researchers may arrive at some inter-subjective understanding representing a shared conception of ‘workability’ without privileging any particular method (Maxcy, 2003). This highly contingent view of what constitutes valid knowledge claims goes some way towards recognizing the importance of subjective meanings and the theory-ladenness of empirical observations without succumbing to methodological purism. However, Maxcy (2003) conceded that the epistemological status of contemporary pragmatist thought is too vague to provide reasonably stable ground rules to assess the validity of mixed methods research. In particular, the precise meaning of the notion of workability as an overriding criterion of adequacy remains unclear. Following the view of scientific knowledge creation as conditioned by cultural and practical premises, Maxcy (2003, p. 83) outlined an inherently relativistic notion of workability as the basis for continuous ‘reconstruction and reappropriation’ of specific theories and research methods. In other words, what ‘works’ in terms of scientific knowledge claims and choice of theories and methods is always open to debate depending on the values shaping research communities and various practical contingencies (see also Greene and Caracelli, 2003). As demonstrated by Bryman (2006, 2007), however, such factors often lead to side-stepping of ontological and epistemological concerns in mixed methods research. Moreover, as a result of the fundamentally practical, action-centred thrust of pragmatist thought, little guidance as to whether and how such a relativist position can be combined with an element of causal explanation is available. Indeed, Maxcy (2003, p. 86) concluded that: ‘Pragmatism is not as interested in explanations of anomalous cause-effect cases as in the ways in which practical intelligence may push toward full and free settlement of chaos and discord.’ Nevertheless, as explicated in the following section, pragmatist thinkers such as Peirce (1960) have contributed to resolve the issue of how causal explanation can be lodged in a firmly theory-laden mode of analysis within a critical realist framework.

8

3 A Critical Realist Framework Ontological and Epistemological Underpinnings Similar to the pragmatist approach outlined above, critical realism rejects the possibility of ‘naïve’, or empirical realism, pivoting around the existence of a singular, objective world. Critical realism partly evolved as a critique of the possibilities of such a position, notably manifest in the transposition of natural science procedures to the social sciences (see e.g., Bhaskar, 1979). More recently, however, it has also been invoked as an alternative to the subjectivist turn in management and organization research (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000; Reed, 2005a). Critical realism may thus be seen as a means of elaborating an intermediate position along the objectivist-subjectivist continuum frequently used to classify social science research (see also Willmott, 1983). To this end, critical realism, as outlined by Bhaskar (1978, 1989), presents a tripartite, ‘stratified’ ontology divided into the domains of real objects and mechanisms, actual events and empirical experiences. Although it accepts the existence of real, intransient objects (or mechanisms) it posits that these are independent of our knowledge of them. The nature of such mechanisms is only partially within the realm of human conception. However, these mechanisms, constituted by human (e.g., social and political structures) as well as non-human factors (e.g., force of gravity), are associated with causal powers that generate actual events (e.g., coercive and competitive pressures, a falling apple). Whilst such events do not follow universally valid causal laws, reflected by the constant conjunction of events, they are structured by underlying intransient mechanisms. This gives rise to tendencies occurring with some regularity which are, in turn, observable through human experience. Underpinning this ontology is the recognition that most social phenomena occur in open systems where causal powers often form a complex interplay (Bhaskar, 1979). The domains of intransient mechanisms and actual events can only be merged if conditions of systems closure are created by researchers, as may be the case in experiments (Tsoukas, 1989). When examining naturally occurring social phenomena, however, the assumption of systems closure needs to be relaxed. Following these ontological premises, critical realism recognizes the difficulties in crafting social science research to produce ‘accurate’ representations of an objective empirical reality (Bhaskar, 1978, 1989; Tsoukas, 1989). In contrast to the pragmatist position outlined by Maxcy (2003), however, critical realism is clearer about the epistemological ramifications of abandoning the view of reality as constituted by readily observable, law-like regularities. Rather than resorting to the position that scientific knowledge claims are always negotiated around the notion of ‘workability’ without much consideration of how causal relationships can be theorized, critical realism has advanced a coherent set of prescriptions to the latter end. Although humans are rarely able to experience more than a subset of the tendencies generated by the complex interactions between causal powers, it is possible to advance contingently stable knowledge claims whilst recognising that these are always indeterminate and potentially fallible (Reed, 2005a; Smith, 2006). The advancement and validation of scientific knowledge claims are thus a matter of clarifying the contingent circumstances under which a particular explanation is likely to hold rather than seeking for constant conjunctions of events (Tsoukas, 1989).

9

The key process by which such clarifications are produced is generally known as abduction (or retroduction).6 Whilst originally introduced by Peirce (1960), abduction has assumed a central position as a means of advancing causal explanations in critical realist analyses (Bhaskar, 1989; Danermark et al., 2002; Contu and Willmott, 2005; Reed, 2005a, 2005b). Abduction differs from the hypothetico-deductive mode of analysis, prevalent in functionalist/positivist research, as well as the strongly inductive approach found in much interpretive research. In contrast to the hypothetico-deductive mode, pivoting around empirical testing of hypotheses derived from existing theories, abduction is about developing theoretical explanations based on emerging empirical observations. However, it does not move directly from empirical observations to theoretical inferences, as is the case in purely inductive research, but relies heavily on existing theory and other cognitive materials as mediators for deriving explanations. Peirce (1960, p.117) described the fundamental logic of abductive reasoning as follows:

A surprising fact, C, is observed. But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to expect that A is true.

In actual research practice, this logic of inquiry often implies assessing the explanatory capacity of multiple theories, postulating the existence of intransient mechanisms (A), in the process of searching for empirical evidence that may shed light on the contingent conditions under which a particular event (C) will occur (Bhaskar, 1989; Reed, 2005a). Researchers move back and forth between empirical observations and theory. However, the object of theorising is not the empirically observable events or tendencies themselves, as would be the case in research subscribing to empirical realism, but rather the underlying mechanisms generating causal powers (Reed, 2005a; Smith, 2006). This is so as critical realists recognize that empirical observations of human experiences are not exact representations of the world of real and intransient objects and mechanisms. Explanation and theorising must thus rely on human ascription of causal powers to particular mechanisms (Tsoukas, 1989). Hence the construction of explanations should entail an element of abstract conceptualisation, with reference to intransient mechanisms, as well as empirical probing into the contingent circumstances of concrete events being activated by such mechanisms. Critical realism recognizes that abductive reasoning is possible even if theories rest on allegedly incommensurable assumptions. To say that theories are incommensurable, or conflicting, implies that they have something to conflict over (Bhaskar, 1989). In a critical realist mode of theorising, this ‘something’ is the intransient mechanisms belonging to the domain of the real. Different theories ascribe different causal powers to such mechanisms, which may overlap, complement or compete with each other. Empirical research plays a pivotal role in delineating the nature of such causal 6 Many critical realist writers do not recognize the origins of the notion of abduction in Peirce’s (1960) work and conflate the term with the notion of retroduction (Contu and Willmott, 2005). For example, even Bhaskar (1989) failed to reference Peirce’s work but traced the notion of retroduction to Hanson (1965) whilst describing an analytical logic nearly identical to that outlined by Peirce (1960). Consistent with the origins of this logic of inquiry, we use the term abduction throughout this paper.

10

powers. However, similar to the pragmatist position outlined in the foregoing, critical realism recognizes that the ultimate choice of theories rests with the researcher operating in a wider social milieu where such theories are constructed (Smith, 2006). The position outlined above reflects a ‘semi-strong’ form of epistemological relativism, recognizing the active role of the researcher in the construction of scientific knowledge and the inherent theory-ladenness of empirical analyses but insisting on the possibilities of detecting regularities, or tendencies, which are indicative of causal relationships. Coupled with critical realism’s recognition of the need for concrete, inter-subjective understandings of the specific circumstances in which humans experience particular events, this provides a starting point for addressing the aforementioned criticisms of mixed methods research. Indeed, even some of the staunchest critics of validation procedures such as triangulation accept that it may have a legitimate role as part of a critical realist framework. For example, Blaikie (1991) concluded that triangulation may be less problematic for critical realists, but remained silent as to how it should be re-conceptualised to this end. We now turn to address this issue. Re-considering the Notion of Triangulation Critical realism does not privilege any substantive theory or research method over the other but is genuinely pluralistic (Bhaskar, 1989; Reed, 2005a; Mingers, 2000, 2006). However, the assumptions embedded in this approach pose some restrictions which are necessary to bear in mind when combining qualitative and quantitative methods. Regarding quantitative methods, it is important to recognise that these are rarely able to delineate more than surface structures generated by the causal powers at work in a particular social setting. Statistical techniques may reveal associations between variables which are suggestive of the tendencies resulting from the interplay of causal powers. However, this is insufficient for producing causal explanations in keeping with critical realism (Mingers, 2000, 2006). For explanations to be valid, researchers need to go beyond such tendencies to specify the contingent conditions under which specific mechanisms and causal powers are likely to generate particular events (Tsoukas, 1989; Easton, 2000). For example, merely observing falling apples is insufficient for inferring under what contingent conditions (e.g., degree of ripeness, weight of the apples) the causal powers associated with the force of gravity are activated. The complex interplay between causal powers in social systems exacerbates the task of deriving explanations from quantitative research and enhances the need for refined theoretical models to this end (Mingers, 2000, 2006). Moreover, the open systems in which most social phenomena occur reduce the likelihood of any tendencies being stable across contexts and time. This severely limits the predictive capacity of statistical techniques (Bhaskar, 1989; Mingers, 2000, 2006). It is rarely possible to model the occurrence of a social phenomenon to capture all possible mechanisms which might generate variations in observable events. For similar reasons, considerable caution is also required in interpreting statistical significance tests. Even though such tests can provide an indication of the probability with which observations reflect non-random patterns in a carefully specified population, they can neither be used for predictive purposes nor be extended to generalize to other settings (Mingers, 2006). Non-random regularities may be indicative of the influence of underlying intransient mechanisms in a particular

11

empirical setting (Mingers, 2000). However, statistical significance tests should not be viewed as substitutes for judgemental assessments of the theoretical significance of a particular model (Mingers, 2006). These limitations have been recognised in functionalist/positivist management accounting research (Lindsay, 1995). However, the prescribed remedy, pivoting around close replications of theoretical models across different contexts, still rests on the assumption that these models will have some predictive capacity (see also Lindsay and Ehrenberg, 1993). As explicated later in this section, critical realists are more sceptical of the possibilities of such replication as a means of generalization. Taken together, these restrictions on the use of quantitative methods invite a theory-laden mode of inquiry and suggest that qualitative methods may fill an important complementary role in the search for the deeper structures explaining observed tendencies. Qualitative probing into the contingent conditions under which causal powers generate particular events is particularly valuable where prior theory suggests a complex interplay between such powers (Tsoukas, 1989; Easton, 2000). As explicated below, this has important ramifications for the notion of triangulation as a validation technique. As far as construct validation is concerned, critical realism offers a way around the critique that triangulation is meaningless as there will be little consensus concerning the constitution of various phenomena. Rather, human experiences will be structured in accordance with some underlying intransient mechanisms and may thus manifest themselves in reasonably stable patterns of meanings. Due to the inherent indeterminacy of any conceptualisation of these mechanisms, however, it is vital for researchers to carefully analyse variations in such meanings. It is entirely legitimate to use statistical techniques such as factor analysis as one step in the process of exploring the properties of these structures (Mingers, 2000, 2006).7 But without additional qualitative data and careful conceptual delineations our understanding of such properties is likely to be relatively superficial. For example, Brown and Brignall (2007) explicated how qualitative probing into the meanings of key quantitative variables enabled them to address issues of comparability between research sites. Whilst working on the assumption that differences in such meanings could be traced to systematic variations in underlying structures they observed considerable caution so that the richness of these variations was not unduly under-represented. Discussions of construct validity in mixed methods research have conceived of such context-specific validation procedures as a matter of making appropriate trade-offs given the purpose of the research; that is, empirical refinement of constructs is subordinate to conceptual consistency across studies if the purpose is close replication rather than generation of novel theoretical insights and vice versa (see Modell, 2005, 2007). From a critical realist perspective, however, such reasoning is misleading. Researchers always need to remain open to the possibility that replication of existing constructs in different contexts might fail, given the indeterminacy and potential fallibility of any conclusions derived from previous analyses (cf. Tsang and Kwan, 1999). Such failures should rather constitute starting points for deeper probing and re-conceptualisation of constructs to better reflect the underlying structures at work in a 7 This observation rests on the premise that factor analyses may be a step towards identifying underlying structures of observed variables capturing various facets of human experience (Mingers, 2000, 2006).

12

particular context. Insights from existing theories may inform such exercises. But in contrast to the occasionally one-sided positivist concerns with conceptual consistency (cf. Lindsay, 1995; Lindsay and Ehrenberg, 1993) and theoretically informed construct specification (cf. Bisbe et al., in press), a critical realist approach should always recognise the potential need to re-think existing constructs based on empirical findings. A similar line of reasoning can be inferred with respect to internal validation. Statistical techniques such as regression and correlation analysis can be used for corroborating and falsifying possible explanations as long as statistical significance tests are not interpreted as indicative of whether theoretical models correspond to an objective reality and no predictive capacities are ascribed to these techniques (Mingers, 2000). However, more valid, or credible, explanations may be derived by combining such techniques with an element of abductive reasoning and additional qualitative data. The mobilization of an abductive mode of reasoning is perhaps most straightforward where quantitative methods produce inconclusive findings diverging from a priori hypotheses or theoretical expectations. Working on the assumption that such findings suggest that the original theoretical model is insufficient for capturing the complex interplay between causal powers in a particular context researchers may engage in qualitative probing into the human experiences of the events under examination. These observations may then be contrasted with alternative theoretical perspectives postulating a different constellation of intransient mechanisms and causal powers until more comprehensive and credible explanations are at hand. Yet, researchers need to be cautious of interpreting any convergence of explanations emerging from the combination of quantitative and qualitative methods as an indication of theoretical closure, since these explanations are based on human ascriptions of causal powers to particular mechanisms and are thus potentially fallible. Whilst this caveat cautions us to the critique of triangulation for suppressing variations in meanings (cf. Fielding and Fielding, 1986; Blaikie, 1991), an abductive mode of reasoning may be invoked for gradually expanding our understanding of what converging findings mean. By compelling researchers to confront empirical data with new questions and theoretical perspectives it may further probing into the workings of intransient mechanisms and contingent conditions. It may be argued that, in practice, these procedures are not too dissimilar to the use of method and theory triangulation as a means of enhancing internal validity described in the foregoing (cf. Brewer and Hunter, 1989; Modell, 2005). However, through its emphasis on abduction, critical realism makes the theory-laden mode of analysis for addressing this issue more explicit. It is important to recall that the reference point for determining the degree of credibility is not whether a particular explanation corresponds to an objective reality, but rather the theory informing the analysis. The ‘truth’ of a particular explanation is an attribute of the theory underpinning that explanation as it refers to particular mechanisms and causal powers (Smith, 2006). This counters the critique of method triangulation for ignoring the theory-ladenness of observations (cf. Fielding and Fielding, 1986). These insights also have important implications for the extent to which the resultant theory will be considered externally valid. Careful delineations of intransient mechanisms and their causal powers will have some external validity, as they may be

13

expected to describe reasonably stable patterns of events (Tsoukas, 1989). However, the indeterminacy and potential fallibility of the resultant theoretical models suggest that successful replication of these is an insufficient condition for conclusive verification (Tsang and Kwan, 1999). Researchers always need to bear in mind that theoretically relevant aspects may have been excluded in such models (Tsang and Kwan, 1999) and that the activation of the mechanisms which they refer to is contingently determined in a particular empirical context (Tsoukas, 1989). Instead, the external validity of a particular model should be specified based on its theoretical content. Inferring a similar line of argument and building on the logic of abductive reasoning, Erzberger and Kelle (2003) proposed that the validity of a particular model may be assessed based on the extent to which it (1) increases the propensity to capture an empirical phenomenon, (2) resolves conceptual problems (e.g., logical incoherence, internal inconsistencies) and (3) increases the adaptability of prior theory to other, well-established theories. Summary The discussion in this section has taken the position that critical realism may be seen as occupying an intermediate position along the objectivist-subjectivist continuum frequently used to classify social science research (cf. Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hopper and Powell, 1985; Gioia and Pitre, 1990). Table 1 contrasts critical realism with the functionalist and interpretive paradigms along this continuum with particular reference to the implications for the use of triangulation as a validation technique. Insert table 1 here! As far as the possibilities of triangulation are concerned, the distinguishing characteristic of critical realism is the approach to theorizing from multiple methods. Functionalists would apply different methods and/or theories with direct reference to empirical phenomena to enhance the accuracy with which these are represented. This is unproblematic under the assumption that these phenomena constitute direct reflections of an objective reality. Conversely, critics informed by a strongly subjectivist, interpretive position reject the possibilities of triangulation as the existence of such realities is seen as an ontological fallacy. Critical realism, on the other hand, accepts that researchers do not have immediate access to objective realities, but that these can still be theorized based on a combination of empirical observation and abstract conceptualisation. This lays the foundation for a modified conception of triangulation pivoting around the combination of different methods and/or theories as a means of conceptualising the structures shaping human experiences. Such conceptualisations refer to intransient mechanisms and the causal powers associated with them, rather than human experiences per se. 4 Empirical Examples Although critical realism has rarely been explicitly invoked in mixed methods research in management accounting (but see Brown and Brignall, 2007) it is possible to identify empirical studies following a line of inquiry largely conforming to that outlined in the foregoing. To illustrate how this may effectively respond to the criticisms of mixed methods research informed by the paradigm incommensurability thesis, we review two studies combining theories and methods typically associated with the functionalist and interpretive paradigms (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983;

14

Hoque and Hopper, 1994, 1997). The two studies differ considerably, however, in their overall research design. The first (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983) stemmed from a failure to corroborate a priori expectations and pivoted around the resolution of diverging findings whilst the second (Hoque and Hopper, 1994, 1997) mainly produced converging explanations. To varying degrees, these studies combine institutional theory (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) with functionalist approaches, such as contingency theory. Institutional theory emerged in opposition to and has been described as incommensurable with such functionalist approaches as it is grounded in a diverging view of organizational rationality (McKinley and Mone, 2003). Meyer and Rowan (1977) clearly subscribed to social constructivist lines of thought in their initial articulation of institutional theory. Drawing on Berger and Luckman (1967), institutions were described in terms of widely shared interpretations of reality supported by taken for granted rules and norms rather than objective performance criteria. Management accounting research informed by institutional theory has generally been classified as firmly located in the interpretive paradigm (Hopper and Powell, 1985; Ryan et al., 2002) and has often been invoked to explain anomalous patterns in the choice of accounting and control systems left unaccounted for by functionalist approaches (see e.g., Alam, 1997; Ansari and Euske, 1987; Covaleski et al., 1985; Modell and Lee, 2001; Major and Hopper, 2007). As such, it has widened the focus from a managerialist, efficiency-centred perspective to emphasize the social and political aspects of accounting. Covaleski and Dirsmith (1983) Covaleski and Dirsmith (1983) set out by testing an existing model of budgetary control (Swieringa and Moncur, 1975) informed by a functionalist perspective in the nursing area of a number of American hospitals. As initial survey findings failed to corroborate this model, the authors regrouped survey items in a search for more meaningful patterns in the use of budgets by different categories of survey respondents. This resulted in the identification of two distinct patterns in the use of budgets; namely as vehicles of internal control and external, political advocacy. This research phase was augmented by open-ended interviews probing the subjective experiences of budgeting of numerous survey respondents. Emerging researcher interpretations were also corroborated in dialogue with nursing managers. Based on these empirical insights and prior research informed by a more interpretive perspective (partly based on institutional theory) a revised theoretical framework was developed. This framework, pivoting around the influence of administrative positions and the formalization of work roles on the two roles of budgeting, was then re-tested through non-parametric correlation analysis across a smaller sub-sample from the original research sites. Survey results largely corroborated the revised model and a set of refined research propositions were subsequently formulated. This example illustrates how the wider causal powers associated budgeting and the contingent conditions under which these are activated may only be captured through deeper empirical probing and re-conceptualisation. Budgets have the inherent power to fill an instrumental role as a means of internal control as well as enabling external, political exchanges. However, in reflecting upon their earlier study, Covaleski and Dirsmith (1990) conceded that their quest for a deeper understanding of budgeting stemmed from a growing realization of the problematic nature of the traditional,

15

functionalist approach only stressing the former role. The authors thus tried to free themselves from a priori theories to develop a more grounded understanding of the lived experiences of interviewees and produce a more multifaceted conceptualisation of budgeting. Even though Covaleski and Dirsmith (1983, 1990) emphasized the emergent empirical insights and especially the use of qualitative methods in this re-conceptualisation of budgeting, an important element of abductive reasoning is also evident in their analysis. First, the delineation of the political advocacy role of budgeting was partly informed by alternative theories emerging at the time of the study (e.g., Wildavsky, 1975; Burchell et al., 1980). Second, in advancing alternative explanations for the use of budgets, the authors drew on prior theories of professional bureaucracies (e.g., Mintzberg, 1979) and the symbolic side of control (e.g., Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Ouchi, 1979) to specify the contingent conditions (ie. administrative positions and the formalization of work roles) under which the two roles of budgeting were activated. These theoretical frameworks were interwoven with empirical observations to refine researcher expectations, which were then corroborated across the smaller sub-sample. The procedures outlined above illustrate how a theory-laden mode of analysis is combined with qualitative and quantitative methods to resolve an emergent construct validity threat and then extended to refine explanations and enhance the internal validity of the resultant model. Existing theories helped the authors interpret and systematize nurse managers’ subjective experiences of budgeting such that the different roles of budgeting were clearly delineated. Whilst Covaleski and Dirsmith (1983) took pains not to under-represent variations in these meanings, they clearly saw these efforts to develop the construct at hand and the subsequent elaboration of causal explanations as a matter of arriving at some inter-subjective understanding of the deeper structures underpinning such meanings. In their retrospective reflection on the study Covaleski and Dirsmith (1990, p. 556) expounded that: ‘… we also had to go beyond merely listening to our subjects, for their understanding is not a privileged view of their own or others’ actions because of the gap that exists between doing and talking. Rather, we had to treat what they said with some skepticism […] and also take responsibility for a creative leap beyond our data in forming interpretations […].’ The successful corroboration of the resultant theoretical model also strengthens the impression that it captured reasonably stable structures pertaining to the two roles of budgeting in the research setting at hand. These procedures also enhanced the theoretical contents of the resultant model. The resolution of conceptual problems inherent in the limitations of the functionalist approach to budgeting increased its adaptability to an alternative framework and resulted in a more comprehensive depiction of the roles of budgeting (cf. Erzberger and Kelle, 2003). The theoretical contribution of the study was also clearly specified in relation to prior research into similar aspects of control (e.g., Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Ouchi, 1979). However, consistent with the critical realist view of theories as indeterminate and potentially fallible, Covaleski and Dirsmith (1983) were cautious in generalizing from their findings but emphasized the need to examine context-specific characteristics of budgeting in similar organizations as a means of producing more conclusive theoretical insights.

16

Hoque and Hopper (1994, 1997) Hoque and Hopper (1994, 1997) examined the influence of economic, political and institutional factors on budgetary control in the state-owned Bangladeshi jute industry. The project started with a relatively open-ended and exploratory study in three jute mills, whereof one was subsequently examined in greater depth (Hoque and Hopper, 1994). This case study was informed by functionalist as well as more interpretive approaches, but primarily aimed at exploration of context-specific factors impinging on budgetary control. Insights from this phase were subsequently integrated into a theoretical framework informed by contingency theory and political-institutional approaches (Hoque and Hopper, 1997). This framework was tested across all mills in the industry, using a context-specific measure of environmental factors and a modified version of an existing measure of budgetary control (Swieringa and Moncur, 1975). Support was found for four out of five research propositions based on non-parametric correlation analysis. Feedback on the survey findings was also sought through interviews with a smaller number of key personnel. Hoque and Hopper (1997) provide some illuminating insights into the epistemological tensions emerging in their study. The authors emphasised the interpretive underpinnings of the study, as reflected by the striving to capture context-specific meanings in shaping research propositions and developing the survey instrument. However, in discussing the notion of triangulation they invoked a rather conventional approach, testifying to positivist concerns with validity without recognising philosophical criticisms such as those raised in the foregoing. Instead, Hoque and Hopper (1997, p. 126) resorted to the statement that triangulation straddling between paradigms ‘is probably philosophically impossible’ and adopted the pragmatic, but rather loosely justified position that: ‘Proof and knowledge is ultimately a social product of convincing relevant experts of the veracity of one’s story […]. … Ultimately, how best to use results from different methodologies resides in the user’s evaluation of whether they reasonably inform the problem under scrutiny.’ (Hoque and Hopper, 1997, p. 126) This suggests that the authors had some pragmatic notion of ‘workability’ in mind as an overriding criterion of adequacy (cf. Maxcy, 2003). However, they did not elaborate on this position and the study may be seen as an attempt to eschew philosophical debate by emancipating methodological choices from their epistemological roots (cf. Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2003; Bryman, 2006). On closer examination, however, it is possible to detect traces of a critical realist approach in the actual research practices involved in the study. In the initial, exploratory phase Hoque and Hopper (1994) used survey evidence as a complement to qualitative data to map out broad patterns in mill managers’ perceptions of budgeting along certain key dimensions (ie. actual vs. desired levels of influence, motivational aspects and the operating and political roles of budgeting). Possible explanations for these patterns were then advanced based on qualitative data, which were subsequently contrasted with the theoretical perspectives invoked to support the argument that the political and institutional environment of jute mills mainly engendered symbolic use of budgets. This testifies to an abductive mode of reasoning in establishing the credibility of such environmental conditions as a contingent explanation for why the power of budgets as a vehicle of political exchanges is

17

activated. Similarly, in elaborating on such explanations in the latter phase of the research Hoque and Hopper (1997, p. 127) motivated the use of contingency theory and quantitative methods by the need to explore the influence of ‘institutional factors such as the state, trade unions and the markets’ more ‘fully and systematically’ than is typically possible in qualitative research in individual organisations. This suggests a view of variations in the perceived use of budgets as being underpinned by at least reasonably stable structures in the industry under examination. Nevertheless, Hoque and Hopper (1994, 1997) paid considerable attention to the context-specific and situated nature of the meanings of both environmental factors and budgeting. They were clearly aware of the perils of using existing constructs derived from contingency theory in the empirical setting at hand and invoked their lack of sensitivity to context-specific meanings as a major reason for the use of a mixed methods approach. They conceded that the design of the survey instrument was guided by a striving to preserve the interpretive underpinnings of the study in the belief that such ‘grounded research is more likely to reveal important and surprising results than more ‘hands off’ survey methods’ (Hoque and Hopper, 1997, p. 140). This was especially manifest in the interweaving of qualitative data and prior theory in the development of the constructs used for capturing political, institutional and economic factors. Consistent with the critical realist approach, Hoque and Hopper (1997) also carefully delineated how context-specific factors impinged on the contents of the resultant theory and their ability to generalize from the study. Whilst the context-specific adjustments of the survey instrument resolved some conceptual problems related to existing contingency theory frameworks, the authors explicated how this reduced the possibilities of comparing findings with prior research in this genre. They also explained how the problematic nature of established notions of effectiveness as a means of determining the level of ‘contingency fit’ in state-owned enterprises dominated by socio-political rather than strictly commercial and functional concerns constrained the possibilities of extending contingency theory. On the other hand, the context-specific adjustments and mobilization of a complementary theoretical framework represent an attempt to increase the adaptability of contingency theory to a previously neglected type of research setting (cf. Erzberger and Kelle, 2003). This illustrates how an abductive mode of reasoning, drawing on multiple theoretical frameworks and enriched by qualitative data, can enhance the validity of the resultant theory through specification of the causal powers and contingent conditions at play in a particular research setting. However, Hoque and Hopper (1994, 1997) also shed light on the potential problems involved in this mode of inquiry as reflected by their failure to resolve some diverging findings. Whilst qualitative data suggested that the pressures exerted by aid agencies fostered symbolic rather than instrumental use of budgets (see Hoque and Hopper, 1994) the proposition developed from this observation and institutional theory was not corroborated when tested across all mills in the industry (see Hoque and Hopper, 1997). The authors partly ascribed this to potential measurement problems (see Hoque and Hopper, 1997). However, they also conceded to not having explored the intricate processes through which aid agencies influence budgeting deeply enough at the earlier research phases (see Hoque and Hopper, 1994). This is an indication of the inherent difficulties in capturing the

18

complex interplay between causal powers and contingent conditions in theoretical models conducive to survey-based testing despite extensive qualitative probing. 5 Concluding Discussion This paper has responded to recent debates in the management accounting literature raising concerns over the lack of communication and integration of insights between the functionalist and interpretive paradigms. More specifically, we have addressed the issue of how theories and methods typically associated with such entrenched and, some would claim, incommensurable paradigms may be combined and used as a means of validation. Echoing criticisms advanced in the wider social sciences, prior discussions of this topic in the management accounting literature (Tomkins and Groves, 1983b; Ahrens and Chapman, 2006) have voiced considerable aversion to the use of conventional validation techniques, such as triangulation, as these rest on philosophical assumptions firmly embedded in the functionalist paradigm. By contrast, we rely on critical realism to advance a modified notion of triangulation which rescues it from being the exclusive preserve of scholars working within the functionalist paradigm and subscribing to empirical realism. This modified notion of triangulation rests on the assumption that human experiences are structured by intransient (or real) mechanisms generating some stability in observed phenomena even though these observations cannot be interpreted as direct reflections of objective realities. Qualitative and quantitative methods may still be combined for producing valid explanations of the tendencies generated by the causal powers embedded in such mechanisms. However, critical realism provides several cautionary notes which should sensitize researchers to the philosophical critique of the conventional logic of triangulation and how it may be addressed. First, although critical realism recognizes that human experiences are contingently stable it emphasizes the need for concrete understandings of the context-specific meanings of social phenomena, which may only be achieved through close empirical investigations. It is only through such probing that researchers may produce in-depth knowledge of the contingent conditions under which the causal powers embedded in intransient mechanisms, such as various accounting techniques, are activated. Indeed, it may be argued that qualitative methods are not only a useful complement to quantitative methods, but constitute a necessary vehicle for enhancing the validity of research explanations, given their superior capacity to engender inter-subjective understandings of how causal powers are activated (cf. Tsoukas, 1989; Easton, 2000; Mingers, 2000). Whilst this is not the same thing as affirming the critique of triangulation for invariably suppressing variations in situated meanings (cf. Blaikie, 1991), it should sensitize researchers to the process whereby human beings ascribe causal powers to various mechanisms. Second, critical realism recognizes the theory-ladenness of empirical observations through its emphasis on abductive reasoning and thus invalidates the view of triangulation as inexorably linked to attempts to enhance the ‘accuracy’ of the representations of objective realities (cf. Fielding and Fielding, 1986; Richardson, 2000; Koro-Ljungberg, 2004). The modified notion of triangulation advanced in this paper does not subscribe to such a view, but takes the theoretical contents of the models informing and emanating from empirical research as its main reference point

19

for assessing the degree of internal and external validity. In combination with the emphasis on close examinations of situated meanings, this mitigates tendencies towards premature theoretical closure and compels researchers to continuously theorize emergent manifestations of the causal powers at work in a particular empirical setting. Finally, underpinning these two premises is a view of researchers as inextricably involved in the construction of scientific knowledge claims. This view contrasts with the somewhat caricatured portrayal of researchers as detached and neutral adjudicators occasionally invoked by critics of triangulation (cf. Blaikie, 1991). Such a conception of the role of researchers would be alien to critical realists, given their emphasis on the wider social milieu in which scientific knowledge claims are shaped (Smith, 2006). However, in contrast to other attempts to re-conceptualise the notion of triangulation, stressing the socially conditioned ‘angle’ taken by researchers in adjudicating between separate positivist and anti-positivist accounts (see Wolfram Cox and Hassard, 2005), critical realism offers a more unified philosophical approach for advancing knowledge claims based on mixed methods research.8 As explicated below, this has certain advantages for overcoming tendencies to conceive of management accounting research as belonging to entrenched and arguably incommensurable paradigms. The empirical examples reviewed in this paper suggest that evidence of a critical realist approach may be found even though the authors tend to espouse other established paradigms (see Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1983) or eschew the philosophical tensions involved in blending paradigms (see Hoque and Hopper, 1997). Both studies entailed careful examinations of situated meanings as a means of advancing theoretically informed explanations of the use of budgeting. However, rather than being forced into an infinite regress of trying to reconcile irreconcilable subjective accounts of reality the authors clearly adopted a view of observed variations in meanings as indicative of at least contingently stable causal relationships in the research settings at hand. By framing their empirical analyses in an essentially abductive mode of reasoning and mobilizing multiple theoretical perspectives they were able to make sense of diverging as well as converging findings although there is also evidence of the difficulties in producing entirely conclusive theories based on this logic (see Hoque and Hopper, 1997). These examples raise the issue of whether there is more widespread discrepancy between espoused paradigms and actual research practices in mixed methods research in management accounting and whether more explicit subscription to critical realism may lessen the confusion stemming from such inconsistencies. Similar observations have recently been made in the information systems literature (Smith, 2006) and inform Reed’s (2005a, 2005b) contention that management and organization studies are currently undergoing a ‘realist turn’ as a reaction to the rise of strongly subjectivist research genres (but see Contu and Willmott [2005] for a critique of this position). If inconsistencies between espoused paradigms and actual research practices are found to be common in the management accounting literature, there is an 8 The approach advocated by Wolfram Cox and Hassard (2005) is closer to dialectic contrasting of research findings at a meta-theoretical level (cf. Lewis and Grimes, 1999; Greene and Caracelli, 2003) than the integrative ethos underpinning theory and method triangulation (see Moran-Ellis et al., 2006; Bryman, 2007).

20

obvious case for breaking the entrenched paradigm mentality still pervading much of the methodological debate in this area.9 Critical realism certainly has the potential to provide a consistent philosophical foundation, bridging the gap between the interpretive and functionalist paradigms, whilst responding to calls for a more ‘pragmatic’ approach to the choice of methods and theories. Critical realism is genuinely pluralistic. It neither privileges any substantive theories or methods per se nor rejects the combination of allegedly incommensurable perspectives. However, it provides more clearly articulated ontological and epistemological premises than those found in other ‘pragmatic’ approaches advanced in the mixed methods literature (see e.g., Smaling, 1994; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998; Greene and Caracelli, 2003; Maxcy, 2003). Whilst critical realism has borrowed key concepts, such as abduction, from the pragmatist tradition without always recognizing their pedigree (Contu and Willmott, 2005) it has incorporated these into a coherent set of philosophical assumptions providing clear guidelines for how valid knowledge claims may be advanced. As demonstrated in this paper, these prescriptions can be reconciled with a modified notion of triangulation between qualitative and quantitative methods even though they pose certain restrictions on the use of the latter. This is a clear improvement on the pragmatist concern with the relatively fluid notion of ‘workability’ as an overriding criterion of adequacy for mixed methods research (cf. Greene and Caracelli, 2003; Maxcy, 2003). For the future, it is important not to interpret this positioning of a critical realist approach to mixed methods research within the ‘pragmatic’ vein as a justification for eclecticism and excessive holism in the process of theorizing. Similar to the conventional notion of triangulation the modified version advanced in this paper strongly emphasizes the integrative and ‘synergistic’ aspects of combining different methods and theories (cf. Modell, 2005; Moran-Ellis et al., 2006). Critical realism may induce a tendency to produce increasingly comprehensive theoretical frameworks in the quest for more valid representations of causal powers and their complex interplay. However, given their indeterminacy and potential fallibility, they can never aspire to ‘grand theories’, neatly ascribing the manifestation of social phenomena to a few broad, unifying conceptual categories (cf. Llewellyn, 2003). Hence there are still good reasons for observing some parsimony in the process of theorizing. Whether critical realism will come to be accepted as a unified basis for mixed methods research in management accounting is partly a political issue. Considerable barriers need to be overcome in this respect. Apart from the general polarization of the methodological debate in the accounting literature, accounting scholars tend to specialize along existing paradigmatic lines at an early stage of their careers (Panozzo, 1997; Modell, 2007). There is certainly no need to add to these obstacles by invoking critical realism as a means of justifying excessively broad and ill-specified theoretical frameworks.

9 See Kakkuri-Knuuttila et al. (2007) for a similar line of argument with respect to interpretive management accounting research.

21

References Abdel-Khalik, A.R. and Ajinkya, B.B. (1983) An evaluation of “the everyday accountant and researching his reality”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 8, 375-384. Abernethy, M.A., Chua, W.F., Luckett, P.F. and Selto, F.S. (1999) ‘Research in managerial accounting: learning from others’ experiences’, Accounting and Finance, 39, 1-27. Ackroyd, S. and Fleetwood, S. (2000) Realism in contemporary organisation and management studies, in Ackroyd, D. and Fleetwood, S. (eds) Realist Perspectives on Management and Organizations, London: Routledge. Ahrens, T., Becker, A., Burns, J., Chapman, C.S., Granlund, M., Habersam, M., Hansen, A. Khalifa, R., Malmi, T., Mennicken, A, Mikes, A., Panozzo, F., Piber, M., Quattrone, P. and Scheytt, T. (2007) The future of interpretive accounting research – a polyphonic debate, Critical Perspectives in Accounting (in press). Ahrens, T. and Chapman, C.S. (2006) Doing qualitative research in management accounting: positioning data to contribute to theory, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31, 819-841. Alam, M. (1997) ‘Budgetary process in uncertain contexts: a study of state-owned enterprises in Bangladesh’, Management Accounting Research, 8, 147-167. Anderson, S.W. and Widener, S.K. (2007) Doing quantitative field research in management accounting, in Chapman, C.S., Hopwood, A.G. and Shields, M.D. (eds) Handbook of Management Accounting Research, Volume 1, Oxford, Elsevier. Ansari, S. and Euske, K.J. (1987) Rational, rationalizing and reifying uses of accounting data in organizations, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 12, 549-570. Archer, M. (1995) Realist Social Theory: The Morphogenetic Approach, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Armstrong, P. (2007) Calling out for more: comments on ‘The future of interpretive accounting research – a polyphonic debate’. Critical Perspectives on Accounting (in press). Atkinson, A.A. and Shaffir, W. (1998) Standards for field research in management accounting, Journal of Management Accounting Research, 10, 42-68. Baxter, J. and Chua, W.F. (2003). Alternative management accounting research – whence and whither. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 28, 97-126. Berger, P.S. and Luckmann, T. (1967) The Social Construction of Society, New York: Doubleday.

22

Bhaskar, R. (1978) A Realist Theory of Science (2nd ed), Hassocks: Harvester Press Bhaskar, R. (1979) The Possibilities of Naturalism. A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences, Harvester Press, Brighton. Bhaskar, R. (1989) Reclaiming Reality. A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy, Verso, London. Birnberg, J.G., Shields, M.D. and Young, S.M. (1990) The case for multiple methods in empirical accounting research (with an illustration from budget setting), Journal of Management Accounting Research, 2, 33-66 Bisbe, J., Batista-Foguet, J-M. and Chenhall, R. (in press) Defining management accounting constructs: a methodological note on the risks of conceptual misspecfication, Accounting, Organizations and Society. Blaikie, N.W.H. (1991) A critique of the use of triangulation in social research, Quality and Quantity, 25, 115-136 Blaikie, N.W.H. (2000) Designing Social Research, Cambridge: Polity Press. Brewer, J. and Hunter, A. (1989) Multimethod Research: A Synthesis of Styles, Thousand Oaks, Sage. Brown, R. and Brignall, S. (2007) Reflections on the use of a dual-methodology research design to evaluate accounting and management practice in UK university central administrative services, Management Accounting Research (in press) Bryman, A. (1988) Quantity and Quality in Social Research, London, Routledge. Bryman, A. (2006) Paradigm peace and the implications for quality, International Journal of Social Research Methodology, 9, 111-126. Bryman, A. (2007) Barriers to integrating quantitative and qualitative research, Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1, 8-22. Bryman, A. and Bell, E. (2003) Business Research Methods, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Burchell, S, Clubb, C., Hopwood, A.G., Hughes, J. and Nahapiet, J Jr. (1980) The roles of accounting in organizations and society, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 5, 5-28. Burrell, G. and Morgan, G. (1979) Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis, Heinemann, London. Campbell, D.T. and Fiske, D.W. (1959) Convergent and discriminant validation by the multitrait-multimethod matrix, Psychological Bulletin, 56, 81-105.

23

Chua, W.F. (1986) Radical developments in accounting thought, Accounting Review, 601-632. Contu, A, and Willmott, H. (2005) You spin me round: the realist turn in organization and management studies, Journal of Management Studies, 42, 1645-1662. Covaleski, M.A. and Dirsmith, M.W. (1983) ‘Budgets as a means of control and loose coupling’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 8, 323-340 Covaleski, M.A. and Dirsmith, M.W. (1990). Dialectical tension, double reflexivity and the everyday accounting researcher: on using qualitative methods, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 15, 543-547. Covaleski, M.A., Dirsmith, M.W. and Jablonsky S.F. (1985) Traditional and emergent theories of budgeting: an empirical analysis, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 4, 277-300. Danermark, B., Ekstrom, M., Jakobsen, L. and Karlsson, J. (2002) Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences, Routledge, London. Denzin, N.K. (1978) The Research Act. A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods (2nd ed), New York, McGraw-Hill. DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W. (1983), “The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism in organizational fields”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 48, pp. 147-160 Dirsmith, M.W. (1998) Accounting and control as solutions to technical problems, political exchanges and forms of social discourse: the impact of substantive domain, Behavioral Research in Accounting, 10 (Supplement), 65-77. Easton, G. (2000) Case research as a method for industrial networks. A realist apologia, in Ackroyd, D. and Fleetwood, S. (eds) Realist Perspectives on Management and Organizations, London: Routledge. Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989) Building theories from case study research, Academy of Management Review, 14, 532-550. Erzberger, C. and Kelle, U. (2003) Making inferences in mixed methods: the rules of integration, in Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie, C. (eds) Handbook of Mixed Methods Research in Social and Behavioral Research, Thousand Oaks: Sage. Fielding, N.G. and Fielding, J.L. (1986) Linking Data: The Articulation of Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Social Research, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage. Gergen, M.M. and Gergen, K.J. (2000) Qualitative inquiry. Tensions and transformations, in Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (eds) Handbook of of Qualitative Research (2nd ed), Thousand Oaks, Sage.

24

Gioia, D.A. and Pitre, E. (1990) ‘Multiparadigm perspectives on theory building’, Academy of Management Review, 15, 584-602. Greene, J.C. and Caracelli, V.J. (2003) Making paradigmatic sense of mixed methods practice, in Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie, C. (eds) Handbook of Mixed Methods Research in Social and Behavioral Research, Thousand Oaks: Sage. Hammersley, M. (1996) ‘The relationship between qualitative and quantitative research: paradigm loyalty versus methodological eclecticism’ in Richardson, J.T.E. (ed) Handbook of Research Methods for Psychology and the Social Sciences, Leicester, BPS Books. Hanson, N.R. (1965) Patterns of Discovery, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Hopper, T. and Major, M. (2007) Extending institutional analysis through theoretical triangulation: regulation and activity-based costing in Portuguese telecommunications, European Accounting Review (in press) Hopper, T. and Powell, A. (1985) ‘Making sense of research into the organizational and social aspects of management accounting: a review of its underlying assumptions’, Journal of Management Studies, 22, 429-465. Hopwood, A. (2002) ‘If only there were simple solutions, but there aren’t’: some reflections on Zimmerman’s critique of empirical management accounting research, European Accounting Review, 11, 777-785. Hoque, Z. and Hopper, T. (1994) ‘Rationality, accounting and politics: a case study of management control in a Bangladeshi jute mill’, Management Accounting Research, 5, 5-30 Hoque, Z. and Hopper, T. (1997) ‘Political and industrial relations turbulence, competition and budgeting in the nationalised jute mills of Bangladesh’, Accounting and Business Research, 27, 125-143 Humphrey, C. and Scapens, R.W. (1996) Theories and case studies of organizational accounting practices: limitation or liberation? Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 9(4), 86-106. Jackson, N. and Carter, P. (1991) In defense of paradigm incommensurability, Organization Studies, 12, 109-127. James, W. (1907) Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old ways of Thinking, New York, Longmans. Jick, T.D. (1979) ‘Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: triangulation in action’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 24, 602-610

25

Kakkuri-Knuuttila, M-L., Lukka, K. and Kuorikoski, J. (2007) Straddling between paradigms: a naturalistic philosophical case study on interpretive research in management accounting, Accounting, Organizations and Society (in press) Koro-Ljungberg, M. (2004) Impossibilities of reconciliation: validity in mixed theory projects, Qualitative Inquiry, 10, 601-621. Laughlin, R. (1995) Empirical research in accounting: alternative approaches and a case for “middle-range” thinking, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 8(1) 63-87. Laughlin, R. (2004) Putting the record straight: a critique of ‘methodology choices and the construction of facts: some implications from the sociology of knowledge’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 15, 261-277. Lewis, M.W. and Grimes, A.J. (1999) Metatriangulation: building theories from multiple paradigms, Academy of Management Review, 24, 672-690. Lillis, A.M. and Mundy, J. (2005) Cross-sectional field studies in management accounting research – closing the gap between surveys and case studies, Journal of Management Accounting Research, 17, 119-141. Lindsay, R.M. (1995) Reconsidering the status of tests of significance: an alternative criterion of adequacy, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 20, 35-53. Lindsay, R.M. and Ehrenberg, A.S.C. (1993) The design of replicated studies, American Statistician, 47, 217-228. Llewellyn, S. (2003) What counts as theory in qualitative management and accounting research? Introducing five levels of theorizing, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 16, 662-708. Lukka, K. and Kasanen, E. (1995) The problem of generalizability: anecdotes and evidence in accounting research, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 8(5), 71-90. Lukka, K. and Mouritsen, J. (2002) Homogeneity or heterogeneity of research in management accounting?, European Accounting Review, 11, 805-811. Maxcy, S.J. (2003) Pragmatic threads in mixed methods research in the social sciences: the search for multiple modes of inquiry an the end of the philosophy of formalism, in Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie, C. (eds) Handbook of Mixed Methods Research in Social and Behavioral Research, Thousand Oaks: Sage. McKinley, W. and Mone, M.A. (2003) Micro and macro perspectives in organization theory. A tale of incommensurability, in Tsoukas, H. and Knudsen, C. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Organization Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

26

Merchant, K.A. (2007) Why interdisciplinary accounting research tends not to impact North American academic accountants, Critical Perspectives on Accounting (in press). Meyer, J.W. and Rowan, B. (1977) Institutionalized organizations: formal structure as myth and ceremony, American Journal of Sociology, 83: 340-363. Mingers, J. (2000) The contribution of critical realism as an underpinning philosophy for OR/MS and systems, Journal of the Operational Research Society, 51, 1256-1270. Mingers, J. (2006) A critique of statistical modelling in management science from a critical realist perspective: its role within multimethodology, Journal of the Operational Research Society, 57, 202-219. Mintzberg, H. (1979) The Structuring of Organizations, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. Modell, S. (2005) Triangulation between case study and survey methods in management accounting research: an assessment of validity implications, Management Accounting Research, 16, 231-254. Modell, S. (2007) Mixed methods research in management accounting: opportunities and obstacles, in Granlund, M. (ed) Title to be announced, Turku: Publications of Turku School of Economics and Business Administration. Modell, S. and Lee, A. (2001) Decentralization and reliance on the controllability principle in the public sector, Financial Accountability and Management, 17, 191-218. Moran-Ellis, J., Alexander, V.D., Cronin, A., Dickinson, M., Fielding, J., Sleney, J. and Thomas, H. (2006) Triangulation and integration: processes, claims and implications, Qualitative Research, 6, 45-59. Morgan, G. and Smircich, L. (1980) The case for qualitative research, Academy of Management Review, 5, 491-500. Ouchi, W.G. (1979) A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control mechanisms, Management Science, 25, 833-848. Panozzo, F. (1997) The making of good academic accountants, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 22, 447-480. Peirce, C.S. (1960) Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, (Vols. V-VI edited by Hartshorne, C. and Weiss, P.) Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Reed, M. (2005a) Reflections on the ‘realist turn’ in organization and management studies, Journal of Management Studies, 42, 1621-1644.

27

Reed, M. (2005b) Doing the loco-motion: response to Contu and Willmott’s commentary on ‘The realist turn in organization and management studies’, Journal of Management Studies, 42, 1663-1673. Richardson, L. (2000) Writing: a method of inquiry, in Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (eds) Handbook of of Qualitative Research (2nd ed), Thousand Oaks, Sage. Ryan, B., Scapens, R.W. and Theobald, M. (2002) Research Method and Methodology in Finance and Accounting, (2nd ed.), Padstow: Thomson. Sale, J.E. and Brazil, K. (2004) A strategy to identify critical appraisal criteria for primary mixed-method studies, Quality and Quantity, 38, 351-365. Sale, J.E., Lohfeld, L.H. and Brazil, K. (2002) Revisiting the quantitative-qualitative debate: implications for mixed methods research, Quality and Quantity, 36, 43-53. Sandberg, J. (2005) How do we justify knowledge produced within interpretive approaches? Organizational Research Methods, 8, 41-68. Sayer, A. (2000) Realism and Social Science, Thousand Oaks: Sage. Silverman, D. (1993) Interpreting Qualitative Data. Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction, Thousand Oaks, Sage. Smaling, A. (1994) The pragmatic dimension: paradigmatic and pragmatic aspects of choosing a qualitative or quantitative method, Quality and Quantity, 28, 233-249. Smith, J.K. (1983) Quantitative versus qualitative research: an attempt to clarify the issue, Educational Researcher, 12, 6-13. Smith, J.K. and Deemer, D.K. (2000) The problem of criteria in the age of relativism, in Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (eds) Handbook of of Qualitative Research (2nd ed), Thousand Oaks, Sage. Smith, J.K. and Heshusius, L. (1986) Closing down the conversation: the end of the quantitative-qualitative debate among educational researchers, Educational Researcher, 15,(4), 4-12. Smith, M.L. (2006) Overcoming theory-practice inconsistencies: critical realism and information systems research, Information and Organization, 16, 191-211 Swieringa, R.J. and Moncur, R.H. (1975) Some Effects of Participative Budgeting on Managerial Behavior, New York: National Association of Accountants. Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie, C. (1998) Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, Thousand Oaks: Sage. Teddlie, C. and Tashakkori, A. (2003) Major issues and controversies in the use of mixed methods in the social and behavioral sciences, in Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie,

28

C. (eds) Handbook of Mixed Methods Research in Social and Behavioral Research, Thousand Oaks: Sage. Tomkins, C. and Groves, R. (1983a) The everyday accountant and researching his reality, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 8, 361-374. Tomkins, C. and Groves, R. (1983b) “The everyday accountant and researching his reality”: further thoughts, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 8, 407-415. Tsang, E,W.K. and Kwan, K-M. (1999) Replication and theory development in organizational science: a critical realist perspective, Academy of Management Review, 24, 759-780. Tsoukas, H. (1989) The validity of idiographic research explanations. Academy of Management Review, 14, 551-561. Wildavsky, A. (1975) Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes, Boston: Little Brown & Co. Willmott, H.C. (1983) Paradigms for accounting research: critical reflections on Tomkins and Grove’s “Everyday accountant and researching his reality”, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 8, 389-405. Wolfram Cox, J. and Hassard, J. (2005) Triangulation in organizational research: a re-presentation, Organization, 12, 109-133. Yin, R.K. (1984) Case Study Research. Design and Methods, Newbury Park, Sage.

29

Objectivism Subjectivism

Functionalism Critical realism Interpretivism

Key ontological assumptions

Reality constituted by objectively observable, law-like regularities.

Real mechanisms structure human experiences of events in a non-deterministic manner.

Reality constituted by subjective meanings.

Key epistemological assumptions

Researchers are detached observers of externally verifiable empirical realities.

Researchers ascribe causal powers to real mechanisms by combining empirical observations and abstract conceptualisation.

Researchers construct knowledge claims based on in-depth understandings of subjective meanings.

Possibilities of triangulation for: Construct validation Internal validation External validation

Yes; by finding converging properties of empirical phenomena. Yes; by detecting converging causal explanations and resolving divergences. Yes; by replicating/extending theoretical models to better capture objective reality.

Yes; by conceptualising the structures shaping human experiences. Yes; through mobilization of abductive reasoning. Yes; through enhancement of the theoretical contents of models.

No; meaningless due to variations in meanings. No; causal explanations will be inherently unstable. No; all interpretations are theory-laden and cannot reflect objective reality.

Table 1. Comparison of critical realism with functionalism and interpretivism.

30