Jurado - Comments & Jurisprudence on Obligations and Contracts

8/13/2019 Jurado - Comments & Jurisprudence on Obligations and Contracts

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BOOK IV

OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS

TITLE I OBLIGATIONS

CHAPTER 1

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 1156. An obligation is a juridical necessity to

give, to do or not to do. 1

Concept of Obligations. Evidently, the above de nition ofan obligation is adopted from Sanchez Romans classic de nition ofan obligation as the juridical necessity to comply with a prestation. 2 Manresa, on the other hand, de nes it as a legal relation establishedbetween one person and another, whereby the latter is bound to theful llment of a prestation which the former may demand of him. 3

It must be observed, however, that obligations may be eithercivil or natural. 4 A civil obligation is one which has a binding force inlaw, and which gives to the obligee or creditor the right of enforcing itagainst the obligor or debtor in a court of justice. This is the obligationwhich is de ned in Art. 1156 of the Code. A natural obligation, onthe other hand, is one which cannot be enforced by action, but whichis binding on the party who makes it in conscience and according to

1New provision.24 Sanchez Roman 53.38 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 21.4 Art. 1423, Civil Code.


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the natural law. 5 Thus, when an action has prescribed in accordancewith the statute of limitations, a natural obligation still subsists,although the civil obligation is extinguished. This may be illustratedby the following example: If A has a right of action, evidenced bya promissory note, to collect one thousand pesos from B , and suchpromissory note prescribes after the expiration of ten years fromthe time it accrues, 6 although the latter is no longer bound to paythe obligation in accordance with the statute of limitations, he isstill bound to pay in accordance with equity and natural law. 7 It is,therefore, clear that a civil obligation and a natural obligation maybe distinguished from each other as follows:

(1) A civil obligation is based on positive law, while a naturalobligation is based on equity and natural law; and

(2) The former is enforceable in courts of justice, while thelatter is not. 8

Requisites of Obligations. An obligation has four essentialrequisites. They are:

(1) A juridical or legal tie, which binds the parties to theobligation, and which may arise from either bilateral or unilateralacts of persons;

(2) An active subject known as the obligee or creditor, whocan demand the ful llment of the obligation;

(3) A passive subject known as the obligor or debtor, againstwhom the obligation is juridically demandable; and

(4) The fact, prestation or service which constitutes the object

of the obligation.9

The form in which the obligation is manifested is sometimesadded as a fth requisite. As a general rule, however, it cannot beconsidered as essential. Obligations arising from law, quasi-con-tracts, acts or omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts do notrequire any form whatsoever, yet there can be no question regard-

53 Bouviers Law Dictionary, 2394-2395.6 Art. 1144, Civil Code.7 Agoncillo vs. Javier, 38 Phil. 424; Villaroel vs. Estrada, 71 Phil. 40.8 Art. 1423, Civil Code.9Giorgi, Teoria de las Obligaciones , Vol. 1, p. 13; 3 Castan, 7th Ed., p. 20.

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ing their validity or binding force. It is only in obligations arisingfrom certain contracts that it becomes essential. Thus, in a con-tract involving a donation of personal property whose value exceedsP5,000.00, the law requires that the donation and the acceptanceshall be made in writing; 10 in a contract of sale of a piece of land orany interest therein through an agent, the law requires that theauthority of the latter shall be in writing; 11 in a contract of simpleloan or mutuum , the law requires that any agreement with respectto interest shall be expressly stipulated in writing; 12 in a contract ofantichresis, the law requires that the amount of the principal andof the interest shall be speci ed in writing; 13 in a contract involvinga donation of immovable property, the law requires that the dona-tion shall be made in a public document, while the acceptance shallbe made either in the same deed of donation or in a separate publicdocument; 14 in a contract of partnership where immovable propertyor real rights are contributed to the common fund, the law requiresthat the contract shall be in a public instrument to which an inven-tory of the property or real rights, signed by the partners, must beattached; 15 in a contract of chattel mortgage, the law requires thatthe personal property which is the subject matter of the contractshall be recorded in the Chattel Mortgage Register as a securityfor the performance of an obligation; 16 and in a contract involvingthe sale or transfer of large cattle, the law requires that the sale ortransfer shall be registered. 17 Non-compliance with such formalitieswould have the effect of rendering the contract or agreement void orinexistent.

Classi cation of Obligations. The following is the primaryclassi cation of obligations under the Civil Code:

(1) Pure and conditional (Arts. 1179-1192).

(2) With a period (Arts. 1193-1198).

(3) Alternative and facultative (Arts. 1199-1206).

10 Art. 748, Civil Code.11 Art. 1874, Civil Code.12 Art. 1956, Civil Code.13 Art. 2134, Civil Code.14 Art. 749, Civil Code.15 Arts. 1771, 1773, Civil Code.16 Art. 2140, Civil Code.17Sec. 22, Act No. 1147; Art. 1581, Civil Code.

GENERAL PROVISIONS Art. 1156


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(4) Joint and solidary (Arts. 1207-1222).

(5) Divisible and indivisible (Arts. 1223-1225).(6) With a penal clause (Arts. 1226-1230).

There are, however, other classi cations of a secondary char-acter which can be gathered from scattered provisions of the CivilCode, such as:

(1) Legal, conventional and penal; 18

(2) Real and personal; 19

(3) Determinate and generic; 20

(4) Positive and negative; 21

(5) Unilateral and bilateral; 22

(6) Individual and collective; 23

(7) Accessory and principal. 24

The following, on the other hand, is the classi cation ofobligations according to Sanchez Roman: 25

(1) As to juridical quality:

(a) Natural when the obligation is in accordance withnatural law.

(b) Civil when the obligation is in accordance withpositive law.

(c) Mixed when the obligation is in accordance withboth natural and positive law.

18 Arts. 1158-1162, Civil Code.19 Arts. 1163-1168, Civil Code.20 Arts. 1163-1166, Civil Code.21 Arts. 1167-1168, Civil Code.22 Arts. 1169-1191, Civil Code.23 Arts. 1207, 1223, Civil Code.24 Arts. 1166, 1226, et seq ., Civil Code.258 Sanchez Roman 20-40.

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2. As to parties:

(a) Unilateral and bilateral unilateral, where onlyone party is bound, and bilateral, where both parties are mu-tually or reciprocally bound.

(b) Individual and collective individual, where thereis only one obligor, and collective, where there are several ob-ligors. The latter may be joint, when each obligor is liable onlyfor his proportionate share of the obligation, or solidary, wheneach obligor may be held liable for the entire obligation.

3. As to object: (a) Determinate and generic determinate, when theobject is speci c; generic, when the object is designated by itsclass or genus.

(b) Simple and multiple simple, when there is onlyone undertaking; multiple, when there are several undertak-ings. Multiple obligations may be conjunctive, when all of theundertakings are demandable at the same time, or distribu-

tive, when only one undertaking out of several is demandable.Distributive obligations, on the other hand, may be alterna-tive, when the obligor is allowed to choose one out of severalobligations which may be due and demandable, or facultative,when the obligor is allowed to substitute another obligation forone which is due and demandable.

(c) Positive and negative positive, when the obligoris obliged to give or do something; negative, when the obligormust refrain from giving or doing something.

(d) Real and personal real, when the obligation con-sists in giving something; personal, when the obligation con-sists in doing or not doing something.

(e) Possible and impossible possible, when the ob-ligation is capable of ful llment in nature as well as in law;impossible, when the obligation is not capable of ful llmenteither in nature or in law.

(f) Divisible and indivisible divisible, when the obli-gation is susceptible of partial performance; indivisible, whenthe obligation is not susceptible of partial performance.



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(g) Principal and accessory principal, when it is themain undertaking; accessory, when it is merely an undertakingto guarantee the ful llment of the principal obligation.

4. As to perfection and extinguishment:

(a) Pure when the obligation is not subject to anycondition or term and is immediately demandable.

(b) Conditional when the obligation is subject to acondition which may be suspensive, in which case the happen-ing or ful llment of the condition results in the birth of the

obligation, or resolutory, in which case the happening or ful- llment of the condition results in the extinguishment of theobligation.

(c) With a term or period (a plazo) when the obligationis subject to a term or period which may be suspensive or froma day certain, in which case the obligation is demandable onlyupon the expiration of the term, or resolutory or to a day certain,in which case the obligation terminates upon the expiration ofthe term.

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

1. Law;

2. Contracts;

3. Quasi-contracts;

4. Acts or omissions punished by law; and

5. Quasi-delicts. 26

Sources of Obligations. In Roman law, the sources ofobligations are: (1) contractu; (2) quasi-contractu; (3) male cio; and (4) quasi-male cio. 27 These sources are preserved in the CivilCode with the addition of law or lege. 28 The addition of lege as anindependent source of obligations, however, has been criticized astheoretically erroneous. Thus, according to the Supreme Court:

26 Art. 1089, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form.278 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 35.28 Art. 1157, Civil Code.

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This enumeration of the sources of obligations supposes thatthe quasi-contractual obligation and the obligation imposed bylaw are of different types. The learned Italian jurist, Jorge Giorgi,criticizes this assumption and says that the classi cation embodiedin the Code is theoretically erroneous. His conclusion is that oneor the other of these categories should have been suppressed andmerged in the other. (Giorgi, Teoria de las Obligaciones, Spanish

Ed., Vol. 5, Arts. 5, 7, 9) The validity of the criticism is, we think,self-evident and it is of interest to note that the common law makesno distinction between the two sources of liability. The obligationswhich in the Code are indicated as quasi-contracts, as well as thosearising ex lege, are in the common law system merged into thecategory of obligations imposed by law, and all are denominatedimplied contracts. 29

Art. 1158. Obligations derived from law are not pre-sumed. Only those expressly determined in this Code or inspecial laws are demandable, and shall be regulated by theprecepts of the law which establishes them; and as to what

has not been foreseen, by the provisions of this Book.30

Obligations Arising from Law. Unlike other obligations,those derived from law can never be presumed. Consequently, onlythose expressly determined in the Civil Code or in special laws aredemandable. These obligations shall be regulated by the preceptsof the law which establishes them, and as to what has not beenforeseen, by the provisions of Book IV of the Civil Code. 31

How can we determine whether an obligation arises from

law or from some other source, such as a contract, quasi-contract,criminal offense or quasi-delict? It must be noted that in the birth orgeneration of an obligation, there is always a concurrence betweenthe law which establishes or recognizes it and an act or conditionupon which the obligation is based or predicated. According toManresa, when the law establishes the obligation and the act orcondition upon which it is based is nothing more than a factor fordetermining the moment when it becomes demandable, then the law

29Leung Ben vs. OBrien, 38 Phil. 182.30 Art. 1090, Spanish Civil Code.31 Art. 1158, Civil Code.



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itself is the source of the obligation; however, when the law merelyrecognizes or acknowledges the existence of an obligation generatedby an act which may constitute a contract, quasi-contract, criminaloffense or quasi-delict and its only purpose is to regulate suchobligation, then the act itself is the source of the obligation and notthe law. 32 Thus, if A loses a certain amount to B in a game of chance,according to Art. 2014 of the Civil Code, the former may recover hisloss from the latter, with legal interest from the time he paid theamount lost. It is evident that in this particular case the source ofthe obligation of B to refund to A the amount which he had won fromthe latter is not a contract, quasi-contract, criminal offense or quasi-delict, but the law itself. 33 The same can also be said with regard tothe obligation of the spouses to support each other, 34 the obligationsof employers under the Labor Code, 35 the obligations of the owners ofthe dominant and servient estates in legal easements, 36 and othersscattered in the Civil Code and in special laws.

Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have theforce of law between the contracting parties and should be

complied with in good faith.37

Obligations Arising from Contracts. A contract is ameeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds himself,with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service. 38

As a rule, contracts are perfected by mere consent, and from thatmoment the parties are bound not only to the ful llment of whathas been expressly stipulated but also to all of the consequenceswhich according to their nature may be in keeping with good faith,usage and law. 39 These contracts are commonly called consensualcontracts. Once the contract is perfected, the valid contract has theforce of law binding the parties to comply therewith in good faith,where neither one may renege therefrom without the consent of theother. (Tiu Peck vs. CA 221 SCRA 618 [1993]) There are certain

328 Manresa, 5th Ed., Bk. 1, p. 48.33Leung Ben vs. OBrien, 38 Phil. 182.34 Art. 291, Civil Code; Pelayo vs. Lauron, 12 Phil. 453.35Bautista vs. Borromeo, 35 SCRA 119.36 Arts. 634, 687, Civil Code.37 Art. 1091, Spanish Civil Code, in modi ed form.38 Art. 1305, Civil Code.39 Art. 1315, Civil Code.

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contracts, however, called real contracts, such as deposit, pledgeand commodatum, which are not perfected until the delivery of theobject of the obligation. 40 Whether the contract is consensual or real,the rule is that from the moment it is perfected, obligations whichmay be either reciprocal or unilateral arise. Reciprocal obligationsare those where the parties are mutually or reciprocally obliged todo or to give something; unilateral obligations, on the other hand,are those where only one of the parties, the obligor, is obliged to door to give something.

Unlike other kinds of obligations, those arising from contracts

are governed primarily by the agreement of the contracting parties.This is clearly deducible not only from the nature of contracts, butalso from Art. 1169 of the Code which declares that such obligationshave the force of law between the contracting parties and shouldbe complied with in good faith. Compliance in good faith meansperformance in accordance with the stipulations, clauses, termsand conditions of the contract. Consequently, the Code recognizesthe right of such contracting parties to establish such stipulations,clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, providedthey are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order orpublic policy. 41 Good faith must, therefore, be observed to preventone party from taking unfair advantage over the other party. Inthe case of Royal Lines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 608(1986) , it was ruled that evasion by a party of legitimate obligationsafter receiving the bene ts under the contract would constituteunjust enrichment on his part. However, in default of an agreement,the rules found in the Civil Code regulating such obligations areapplicable. 42

Art. 1160. Obligations derived from quasi-contractsshall be subject to the provisions of Chapter 1, Title XVII, ofthis Book. 43

Obligations Arising from Quasi-Contracts. Quasi-contracts are those juridical relations arising from lawful, voluntary

40 Art. 1316, Civil Code.41 Art. 1306, Civil Code.42 Art. 1305, et seq ., Civil Code.43New provision.



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and unilateral acts, by virtue of which the parties become boundto each other, based on the principle that no one shall be unjustlyenriched or bene ted at the expense of another. 44 The most importantof these juridical relations which are recognized and regulatedby the Civil Code are negotiorum gestio 45 and solutio indebiti. 46

Negotiorum gestio is the juridical relation which arises whenever aperson voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of thebusiness or property of another without any power or authority fromthe latter. 47 In this type of quasi-contract, once the gestor or of ciousmanager has assumed the agency or management of the business orproperty, he shall be obliged to continue such agency or managementuntil the termination of the affair and its incidents, 48 exercising suchrights and complying with such obligations as provided for in theCode. 49 Solutio indebiti, on the other hand, is the juridical relationwhich arises whenever a person unduly delivers a thing throughmistake to another who has no right to demand it. 50 In this type ofquasi-contract, once the delivery has been made, the person to whomthe delivery is unduly made shall have the obligation to return theproperty delivered or the money paid. 51

The Civil Code provides other instances of quasi-contract.Examples are those found in Articles 2159, 2164 to 2175.

In the case of Perez vs. Palomar, 2 Phil. 682 , it was signi cantlynoted that in a quasi contract where no express consent is given bythe other party, the consent needed in a contract is provided by lawthrough presumption (presumptive consent). Presumptive consentgives rise to multiple juridical relations resulting in obligations fordelivery of the thing and rendering of service.

Art. 1161. Civil obligations arising from offenses shallbe governed by the penal laws, subject to the provisions of

Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2,

44 Art. 2142, Civil Code.45 Art. 2144, Civil Code.46 Art. 2154, Civil Code.47 Art. 2144, Civil Code.48 Ibid.49 Arts. 2144-2152, Civil Code.50 Art. 2154, Civil Code.51 Ibid.

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Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII ofthis Book, regulating damages. 52

Obligations Arising from Criminal Offenses. As a rule,every person liable for a felony is also civilly liable. 53 This principleis based on the fact that, generally, a crime has a dual aspect thecriminal aspect and the civil aspect. Although these two aspects areseparate and distinct from each other in the sense that one affectsthe social order and the other, private rights, so that the purpose ofthe rst is to punish or correct the offender, while the purpose of thesecond is to repair the damages suffered by the aggrieved party, it

is evident that the basis of the civil liability is the criminal liabilityitself.

Please note, however, that there are offenses and special crimeswithout civil liability. Examples are crimes of treason, rebellion,illegal possession of rearm and gambling. But a person who is notcriminally liable may still be civilly liable.

Idem; Enforcement of civil liability. In general andprior to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000, the followingrules are observed in the enforcement or prosecution of civil liabilityarising from criminal offenses:

(1) Institution of criminal and civil actions. When acriminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civilliability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted withthe criminal action, unless the offended party (i) expressly waivesthe civil action, or (ii) reserves his right to institute it separately, or(iii) institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

(2) Independent civil action. In the cases provided in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from thecriminal action, may be brought by the injured party during thependency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved. Suchcivil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

52 Art. 1092, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form.53 Art. 100, Revised Penal Code. This rule, however, is subject to the rules stated

in Arts. 101, 102 and 103, Revised Penal Code.



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(3) Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all casesnot included in the preceding rules, the following rules are observed:

(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the sameoffense may be instituted separately, but after the criminalaction has been commenced, the civil action cannot be instituteduntil nal judgment has been rendered in the criminal action;

(b) If the civil action has been led ahead of the criminalaction, and the criminal action is subsequently commenced, thecivil action shall be suspended in whatever stage before nal

judgment it may be found, until nal judgment in criminalaction has been rendered. However, if no nal judgmenthas been rendered by the trial court in the civil action, thesame may be consolidated with the criminal action uponapplication with the court trying the criminal action. If theapplication is granted, the evidence prevented and admittedin the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproducedin the criminal action, without prejudice to the admission ofadditional evidence that any party may wish to present. In caseof consolidation, both the criminal and the civil action shall betried and decided jointly; (c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry withit extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from adeclaration in a nal judgment that the fact from which the civilmight arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled tothe civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in themanner provided by law against the person who may be liablefor restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for thedamage suffered.

Pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule III of the Revised Rules of CriminalProcedure 2000, however, it is stated that except for civil actionsprovided for in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, thecivil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until nal

judgment has been rendered in the criminal action. The actioncontemplated, as pointed out by Justice Oscar Herrera in hisTreatise on Criminal Procedure, is a civil action arising from a crimeif reserved or led separately and a criminal case is led if it has to

be suspended to await nal judgment in the criminal action. The rule clari es that, During the pendency of the criminalaction, the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot

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be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspendedshall not run. Otherwise stated, the period of prescription of thecivil actions under Section 3 of the aforementioned rules shall not besuspended because they can be instituted separately. This refers tocivil actions arising from the offense charged which have not beenreserved or civil actions that have been led ahead of the criminalaction but have been suspended. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise

on Historical Development and Highlights of Amendment of Rules on Criminal Procedure, February 2001).

(4) Judgment in civil action not a bar. A nal judgment

rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant from civil liabilityis no bar to a criminal action.

(5) Suspension by reason of prejudicial question. A petitionfor suspension of the criminal action based upon the pendency ofa prejudicial question in a civil action may be led in the of ce ofthe scal (prosecutor) or the court conducting the preliminaryinvestigation. When the criminal action has been led in court fortrial, the petition to suspend shall be led in the same criminalaction at any time before the prosecution rests.

Section 7 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000provides for the elements of a prejudicial question. They are: (a) thepreviously instituted civil action which involves an issue similar orintimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminalaction, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether ornot the criminal action may proceed.

Section 7 limits a prejudicial question to a previously insti-tuted civil action in order to minimize possible abuses by the sub-sequent ling of a civil action as an after thought for the purpose ofsuspending the criminal action. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise

on Criminal Procedure, February 2001)

At a glance, therefore, the following are the salient changesbrought about by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000,as more speci cally discussed hereunder by Justice Herrera in hisTreatise on Criminal Procedure:

a. The rule changes the 1985 rule as amended in 1988.Under the 1985 Rule, the action for recovery of civil liabilityarising from crime including the civil liability under Articles32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising



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from the same act or omission are deemed impliedly institutedwith the criminal action unless the offended party waives thecivil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, orinstitutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Under the present rule, only the civil liability arising fromthe offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminalunless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves hisright to institute it separately, or institutes the civil actionprior to the criminal action.

b. Under the former rule, a waiver of any of three civilactions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the res-ervation of the right to le any of said civil actions separatelywaives the others. This is no longer provided for. The reserva-tion and waiver refers only to the civil action for the recoveryof civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does notinclude recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the sameact or omission which may be prosecuted separately even with-out a reservation.

c. The rulings in Shafer vs. Judge, RTC of OlongapoCity, 167 SCRA 376, allowing a third-party complaint, and theruling in Javier vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA

376, as well as Cabaero vs. Cantos allowing a counterclaim areno longer in force. Under the 2000 Rules, these pleadings areno longer allowed. Any claim which could have been the subjectthereof may be litigated in a separate civil action.

d. The rule also incorporated Circular 57-97 on the ling of actions for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22mandating the inclusion of the corresponding civil action forwhich the ling fee shall be paid based on the amount of thecheck involved. In other cases, no ling fees shall be requiredfor actual damages.

Idem; Id. Effect of acquittal. If the accused in acriminal action is acquitted of the offense charged, can a civil actionfor damages based on the same act or omission still be instituted?

This question requires a quali ed answer. If the acquittal of theaccused is based on the ground that his guilt has not been provedbeyond reasonable doubt, a civil action to recover damages based

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on the same act or omission may still be instituted. 54 In such case,mere preponderance of evidence shall be suf cient in order thatthe plaintiff will be able to recover from the defendant. 55 On theother hand, if the acquittal is based on the ground that he did notcommit the offense charged, or what amounts to the same thing, ifthe acquittal proceeds from a declaration in a nal judgment thatthe fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, thesubsequent institution of a civil action to recover damages is, as ageneral rule, no longer possible. 56

Idem; id. Effect of independent civil actions. As arule, the civil action to recover damages from the person criminallyliable is not independent from the criminal action. This is true evenwhere it has, to a certain extent, been separated by the injuredparty from the criminal proceedings either by reserving his right to le a separate civil action or by commencing the action to recoverdamages ahead of the criminal action. In the rst, the right to le acivil action shall depend upon the result of the criminal action, whilein the second, once the criminal action is instituted, the action torecover damages shall be suspended. 57 There are, however, certainexceptional cases or instances under the Civil Code where the civilaction to recover damages is entirely separate and independent fromthe criminal action, although the act or omission which is the basisthereof may be a criminal offense. They are: rst, where the civilaction is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omissioncomplained of as a criminal offense or felony; 58 and second , where thelaw grants to the injured party the right to institute a civil actionwhich is entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. 59 As

a matter of fact, we can even go to the extent of saying that thesecases or instances also constitute the exceptions to the rule that ifthe accused in the criminal action is acquitted on the ground that hedid not commit the offense charged, the subsequent institution of acivil action is no longer possible.

54 Art. 29, Civil Code.55 Ibid.56Sec. 3(c), Rule 111, New Rules of Court.57Sec. 3(b), Rule 111, New Rules of Court.58 Arts. 31, 177, Civil Code.59 Arts. 32, 33, 34, Civil Code.



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With regard to the rst, it must be noted that where the civilaction is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omissioncomplained of as a criminal offense or felony, such action mayproceed independently of the criminal action and regardless of theresult of the latter. 60 It is evident that in such case the basis of thecivil action may be an obligation arising from the law, contract,quasi-contract, or quasi-delict. Thus, a postmaster, who has beencharged criminally for malversation of government funds underhis custody, may still be made a defendant in a civil case for therecovery of the funds, not on the ground of malversation, but onthe ground that under Sec. 633 of the Revised Administrative Code,he can be held accountable therefor. 61 The basis of the civil actionin such case is not the obligation arising from the criminal offenseof malversation, but the obligation arising from the law. Similarly,if a passenger in a certain bus institutes a civil action to recoverdamages from the operator of the bus line for injuries sustained inan accident, such action is separate and distinct from the criminalprosecution of the driver for criminal negligence and may, therefore,be continued regardless of the result of the latter. Consequently,

he can still recover damages even if the driver is acquitted in thecriminal action, because it is clear that the action in such case isbased on culpa contractual and not on the act or omission of thedriver complained of as felony. 62 The same principle is also applicableif the offense charged constitutes what is known as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under the Civil Code. 63 In such case, the injured partycan always institute a civil action to recover damages independentlyof the criminal action and regardless of the result of the latter. Thisis so even granting that the accused is acquitted in the criminal

action either on the ground of reasonable doubt or on the groundthat he did not commit the offense charged. The reason for this isthat the basis of the civil action is no longer the criminal liability ofthe defendant, but a quasi-delict or tort. 64

60 Art. 31, Civil Code.61Tolentino vs. Carlos, 39 Off. Gaz., No. 6, p. 121.62San Pedro Bus Line vs. Navarro, 94 Phil. 840; Bernaldes vs. Bohol Land Trans.

Co., 7 SCRA 276.63 Art. 2176, et seq. , Civil Code.64 Art. 2177, Civil Code; Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607; Dyogi vs.

Yatco, 100 Phil. 1095; Calo vs. Peggy, 103 Phil. 1112; Stanvac vs. Tan, 107 Phil. 109.

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With regard to the second, it must be observed that there are ve exceptional cases or instances, in addition to that which is statedin Art. 31 of the New Civil Code, where the law itself expresslygrants to the injured party the right to institute a civil action whichis entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action. Theyare: (1) interferences by public of cers or employees or by privateindividuals with civil rights and liberties, 65 (2) defamation, 66 (3)fraud, 67 (4) physical injuries, 68 and (5) refusal or neglect of a city ormunicipal police of cer to render aid or protection in case of dangerto life or property. 69 In all of these cases or instances, although theact or omission may constitute a criminal offense in accordancewith our penal laws, the injured party may institute a civil actionto recover damages which is entirely separate and distinct from thecriminal action. Once the action is instituted, then it may proceedindependently of the criminal action, and shall require only apreponderance of evidence. 70

Idem; id.; id. Effect of failure to make reservation. Section 2 of Rule 111 of the New Rules of Court states: In the casesprovided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of

the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate anddistinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injuredparty during the pendency of the criminal case, provided that theright is reserved as required in the preceding section . The insertionin the foregoing provision of the phrase provided the right is reservedas required in the preceding section, resulted in a debate amongacademicians which lasted for more than twenty years.

Finally, interpreting the above provision, the Supreme Court,in Garcia vs. Florido, 71 declared:

As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent actcausing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crimeor create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual.

65 Art. 32, Civil Code.66 Art. 33, Civil Code.67 Ibid.68 Ibid.69 Art. 34, Civil Code.70 Arts. 32, 33, 34, Civil Code.7152 SCRA 420. This case was also cited and quoted in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91

SCRA 113.



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The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter isa distinct and independent negligence, having always had its

own foundation and individuality. Some legal writers are of theview that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action basedupon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminalproceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the resultof the latter. Hence, the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 withreference to Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contraryto the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articleswere drafted and are intended to constitute as exceptions tothe general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111.The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an

unauthorized amendment of substantive law. x x x

Again, in Abellana vs. Marabe, 72 the Supreme Court declared:

The restrictive interpretation x x x does not only resultin its emasculation but also gives rise to a serious constitutionaldoubt. Article 33 is quite clear: In case of x x x physical injuries,a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from thecriminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civilaction shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,and shall require only preponderance of evidence. That is asubstantive right not to be frittered away by a constructionthat would render it nugatory, if through oversight, theoffended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery fordamages in a civil suit. x x x The grant of power to this Courtboth in the present Constitution and under the 1935 Charterdoes not extend to any diminution, increase or modi cation ofsubstantive right. It is a well-settled doctrine that a court is toavoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner aswould give rise to a constitutional doubt. x x x The law as aninstrument of social control will fail in its function if through aningenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm,particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment toa litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an allegedright.

Thus, in Elcano vs. Hill, 73 where the rst defendant hadbeen previously charged with the criminal offense of homicide andsubsequently acquitted on the ground that his act is not criminal,

7257 SCRA 106.7377 SCRA 98.

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because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with a mistake, the SupremeCourt held, despite the fact that the plaintiffs (who are the parentsof the alleged victim) failed to make a reservation of their rightto institute the civil action separately, that such acquittal of thedefendant in the criminal case has not extinguished his liabilityfor quasi-delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code; hence, thatacquittal is not a bar to the civil action against him. The sameruling was applied in Mendoza vs. Arrieta. 74 In effect, the proceduralrequirement provided for in Section 2 of Rule 111 of the New Rulesof Court is not mandatory.

Removal of Reservation Requirement For IndependentCivil Actions

Accordingly, Section 2 of the New Rules of Court was likewiseamended to read as:

SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of theCivil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action maybe brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently

of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance ofevidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recoverdamages twice for the same act or omission charged in thecriminal action. (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 2000).

Under the former rule, the foregoing actions may only beallowed if there is a reservation, or were led ahead of the criminalaction. (Justice Oscar M. Herrera, Treatise on Criminal Procedure,

February 2001).

Art. 1162. Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shallbe governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of theBook, and by special laws. 75

Obligations Arising from Quasi-Delicts. As it is usedin this part of the Civil Code, the term quasi-delicts 76 refers to allof those obligations which do not arise from law, contracts, quasi-

7491 SCRA 113.75 Art. 1093, Spanish Civil Code, in amended form.76In Spanish law, cuasi-delitos is sometimes known as culpa aquiliana or

culpa extra-contractual.



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contracts, or criminal offenses. 77 Thus, using Art. 2176 of the CivilCode and decided cases as bases or anchors, it may be de ned as thefault or negligence of a person, who, by his act or omission, connectedor unconnected with, but independent from, any contractual relation,causes damage to another person. It is, therefore, the equivalent ofthe term tort in Anglo-American law. 78

Idem; Persons liable. Obligations arising from quasi-delicts are demandable not only from the person directly responsiblefor the damage incurred, 79 but also against the following:

(1) The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, themother, with respect to damages caused by the minor children wholive in their company;

(2) Guardians, with respect to damages caused by the minorsor incapacitated persons who are under their authority and who livein their company;

(3) The owners and managers of an establishment orenterprise, with respect to damages caused by their employees in

the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or onthe occasion of their functions;

(4) Employers with respect to damages caused by theiremployees and household helpers acting within the scope of theirassigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in anybusiness or industry;

(5) The State, when it acts through a special agent; but notwhen the damage has been caused by the of cial to whom the task

done properly pertains; and(6) Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and

trades, with respect to damages caused by their pupils and studentsor apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. 80

It must be noted, however, that the responsibility of the abovepersons or entities shall cease if they can prove that they have

77Report of the Code Commission, p. 161.78See Elcano and Elcano vs. Hill and Hill, 77 SCRA 98.79 Art. 2176, Civil Code.80 Art. 2180, Civil Code.

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observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to preventdamage. 81

Idem; Requisites of liability. In actions based on quasi-delicts, before the person injured can recover damages from thedefendant, it is necessary that he must be able to prove the followingfacts:

(1) The fault or negligence of the defendant;

(2) The damage suffered or incurred by the plaintiff; and

(3) The relation of cause and effect between the fault ornegligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by theplaintiff. 82

Idem; Quasi-delicts and crimes. Quasi-delicts and crimi-nal offenses are sometimes dif cult to distinguish from each other.However, they may be distinguished from each other in the follow-ing ways:

(1) Crimes affect the public interest, while quasi-delicts areonly of private concern;

(2) The Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act,while the Civil Code, by means of indemni cation, merely repairsthe damages incurred;

(3) Generally, there are two liabilities in crime: criminal andcivil. In quasi-delict, there is only civil liability; and

(4) Crimes are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because theformer are punished only if there is a law clearly covering them,

while the latter include all acts in which any kind of fault ornegligence intervenes. 83

Idem; Scope of quasi-delicts. In Elcano vs. Hill (G.R. No.L-24303, May 26, 1977), the Supreme Court held that quasi-delictsinclude acts which are criminal in character or in violation of thepenal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Using the exact languageof the Court, it is more congruent with the spirit of law, equityand justice, and more in harmony with modern progress, to hold, as

81 Ibid.82Taylor vs. Manila Electric Co., 16 Phil. 8.83Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario, 73 Phil. 607.



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we do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to fault or negligence,covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal incharacter, whether intentional or voluntary or negligent.

The above pronouncement of the Supreme Court isstartling. It expands the coverage of quasi-delicts beyond whatwas originally contemplated by the lawmaker.

Under the general plan of our law on obligations, the scopeof obligations arising from the law, contracts, quasi-contracts,and acts or omissions punished by law is well-de ned. Theirboundaries are clearly delineated and drawn with precision. It

is only with respect to obligations arising from quasi-delicts thatthere is a problem and this is natural because of the very natureof such obligations. Under our system of liabilities, quasi-delictsmust necessarily be a sort of dumping ground or garbage canfor all kinds of actionable wrongs not falling within the purviewof the four sources of obligations. As we look at it, the originalplan envisaged by the lawmaker is as follows:

The coverage of quasi-delicts which do not overlap withcrimes under the Revised Penal Code and special laws (andwhich we can very well call the general rule) are: rst, negligentacts or omissions not punishable as criminal offenses; second, intentional quasi-delicts or torts, such as those regulated by

Arts. 19, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28 and 1314 of the Civil Code; andthird, the so-called strict liability torts where there is neithernegligence nor intent to cause damage or injury, such as in thecase contemplated in Art. 23 of the Civil Code or in the case ofactionable nuisances under Arts. 694 and 705 of the Civil Code.

The coverage of quasi-delicts which overlap with actsor omissions punishable under the Revised Penal Code (andwhich we can very well call the exceptions) are: rst , criminalnegligence; and second , acts or omissions punishable as crimesunder the Revised Penal Code but the Civil Code expresslydeclares that the civil action arising therefrom is separate andindependent from the criminal action. (Arts. 31, 32, 33 and 34 ofthe Civil Code)

We believe that the above arrangement was deliberatelyplanned. Thus, according to the Code Commission in its Report:The Commission also thought of the possibility of adopting

the word tort from Anglo-American law. But tort under thatsystem is much broader than the Spanish-Philippine conceptof obligations arising from non-contractual negligence. Tort in

Anglo-American jurisprudence includes not only negligence, but

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also intentional criminal acts, such as assault and battery, falseimprisonment and deceit. In the general plan of the Philippine

legal system, intentional and malicious acts are governed bythe Penal Code, although certain exceptions are made in theProject. (Report, pp. 161-162)

Idem; Character of remedy. In Padua vs. Robles ,84 in hisconcurring opinion, Justice Barredo declared: It is by now beyondall cavil, as to dispense with the citation of jurisprudence, that anegligent act, such as that committed in this case, gives rise to atleast two separate and independent liabilities, namely (1) the civil

liability arising from crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liabilityarising from civil negligence or the so-called culpa aquiliana.These two concepts of faults are so distinct from each other thatexoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the other.

Adjectively and substantively, they can be prosecuted separatelyand independently of each other, although Article 2177 of the CivilCode precludes recovery of damages twice for the same negligentact or omission, which means that should there be varying amountsawarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect,only the bigger amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff had alreadybeen ordered paid an amount in one case and in the other case theamount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the second caseonly to the excess over the one xed in the rst case, but if he hadalready been paid a bigger amount in the rst case, he may notrecover anymore in the second case.

The above opinion was con rmed in Elcano vs. Hill. 85 Thus,according to the Supreme Court: Consequently, a separate civil

action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not heis criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided thatthe offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged criminally,to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in sucheventuality only to the bigger award of the two assuming that theawards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction ofthe civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refersexclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the RevisedPenal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered

8466 SCRA 485.8577 SCRA 98.



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as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even bya declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged hasnot happened or has not been committed by the accused.

However, in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 86 a more recent case, there wasa return to the old doctrine of selection of remedies. In this case, theSupreme Court categorically held that since the offended or injuredparty had chosen the remedy of proceeding under the Revised PenalCode by allowing the civil action to be impliedly instituted in thecriminal action, and since the court had expressly declared that thefact from which the civil liability did not exist, therefore, the civil

action for damages subsequently commenced by said injured partyagainst the defendant has already been extinguished in consonancewith Sec. 3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. And even if plaintiffscause of action against defendant is not ex-delicto , the end resultwould be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the criminalcase that defendants acquittal was not based upon reasonabledoubt.

Thus, the problem is still very much with us. The debate rageson.

Barredo vs. Garcia and Almario73 Phil. 607

This case come up from the Court of Appeals which heldthe petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages forthe death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of PedroFontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936,on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal,there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the MalateTaxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided byPedro Dimapilis. The carretela was overturned, and one of itspassengers, 16-year-old Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries fromwhich he died two days later. A criminal action was led againstFontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he wasconvicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of oneyear and one day to two years of prision correccional. The courtin the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring aseparate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals af rmed

8691 SCRA 113.

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the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. SeverinoGarcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March

7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance ofManila against Faustino Barredo as the sole proprietor of theMalate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8,1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damagesin favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from thedate of the complaint. This decision was modi ed by the Court of

Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interestfrom the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed thatFontanillas negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he wasdriving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to

Barredos responsibility, the Court of Appeals found: * * * It is admitted that defendant is Fontanillas employer.There is no proof that he exercised the diligence of a good fatherof a family to prevent the damage. (See p. 22, appellants brief.)In fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla whohad been caught several times for violation of the AutomobileLaw and speeding (Exhibit A) violations which appeared inthe records of the Bureau of Public Works available to the publicand to himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs underthe provisions of Article 1903 of the Civil Code.

The main theory of the defense is that the liability ofFausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence,his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civilaction against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable,Barredo cannot be held responsible in this case. The petitionersbrief states on page 10:

* * * The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is beingsued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father

of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanillato prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words,the Court of Appeals insists on applying in this case Article1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found inChapter 11, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makessaid article inapplicable to a civil liability arising from a crimeas in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 ofBook lV of the Civil Code, in precise words of Article 1903 of theCivil Code itself, is applicable only to those (obligations) arisingfrom wrongful or negligent acts or omissions not punishable by

law. The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressedthus:



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* * * We cannot agree to the defendants contention.The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is

not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor(the crime of Pedro Fontanilla), but an obligation imposed in

Article .1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in theselection or supervision of his servant or employee.

Speaking through Justice Bocobo, the Supreme Court held:

The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffsmay bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo,thus making him primarily and directly responsible under

Article 1903 ( now Art. 2180, New Civil Code) of the Civil Code asan employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains thatFontanillas negligence being punishable by the Penal Code,his (defendants) liability as an employer is only subsidiary,according to said Penal Code, but Fontanilla has not been suedin a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. Todecide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle that has,in the minds of many, confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos , or crimes under the Penal Code and fault ornegligence under Articles 1902-1910 (now Arts. 2176 to 2194,New Civil Code) of the Civil Code.

Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict orculpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the CivilCode, with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that isentirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. Upon thisprinciple, and on the wording and spirit of Article 1903 of theCivil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employersmay be safely anchored.

x x x It will thus be seen that while the terms of Article.1902of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driversnegligence in the instant case, nevertheless Article 1093 limits

cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions not punishable by law. Butinasmuch as Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishesnot only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence,the fault or negligence under Article 1902 of the Civil Code hasapparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makesthe confusion worse confounded. However, a closer studyshows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligentacts does not destroy the distinction between the civil liabilityarising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos

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or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causingdamages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under Articles 1902-1910of the Civil Code.

x x x

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separateindividuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the CivilCode. Speci cally they show that there is a distinction betweencivil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by thePenal Code) and responsibility for fault of negligence under

Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the samenegligent act may produce either a civil liability arising froma crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility forfault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the CivilCode. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited renderit inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case thedefendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under

Article 1903 of the Civil Code.

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked

should ordinarily be suf cient to dispose of this case. Butinasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been littleunderstood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicatetheir foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in Article 366 punishesnot only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to holdthat Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault ornegligence not punished by law according to the literal importof Article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpaaquiliana would have very little scope and application in actuallife. Death or injury to persons and damage to property throughany degree of negligence even the slightest would have tobe indemni ed only through the principle of civil liability arisingfrom a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remainfor cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana ? We are loath to impute tothe lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurdand anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spiritthat giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the lawto smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancientorigin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or

cuasi-delito , which is conserved and made enduring in Articles1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.



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Secondly, to nd the accused guilty in a criminal case,proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in

a civil case, preponderance of evidence is suf cient to makethe defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases ofcriminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonabledoubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. Insuch cases, the defendant can and should be made responsiblein a civil action under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civilwrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make de-

fendants liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver andexhaust his (the latters) property rst, would be tantamountto compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersomemethod of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy un-der our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, whichis based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defen-dant under Article. 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the lawis more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because theprocedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productiveof delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that profes-

sional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usuallydo not have suf cient means with which to pay damages. Why,then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go throughthis roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure?In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten andfacilitate the pathways of right and justice.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primaryand direct responsibility of employers and their presumednegligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmenand employees should be carefully chosen and supervised inorder to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employerswho principally reap the pro ts resulting from the services ofthese servants and employees. It is but right that they shouldguarantee the latters careful conduct for the personal andpatrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, theyshould reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness,others for their poor selection and all for their negligence. Andaccording to Manresa, It is much more equitable and just thatsuch responsibility should fall upon the principal or directorwho could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and notupon the injured person who could not exercise such selectionand who used such employee because of his con dence in theprincipal or director. (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also

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base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principleof representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos

says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before thirdpersons the employer and employee vienen a ser como una sola

personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quienle emplea y utiliza (become as one personality by the mergingof the person of the employee in that of him who employs andutilizes him.) All these observations acquire a peculiar forceand signi cance when it comes to motor accidents, and there isneed of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of ownersof motor vehicles.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions ofboth the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, whichhas given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheresalready discussed, and for lack of understanding of the characterand ef cacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grownup a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of thecivil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that thereis another remedy, which is by invoking Articles 1902-1910 ofthe Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed byour laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless andnugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on

culpa aquiliana or extra-contractual.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby af rmed, with costs against thedefendant-petitioner.

Elcano vs. Hill77 SCRA 98

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of FirstInstance of Quezon City dismissing the complaint of plaintiffsfor recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,married at the time of occurrence, and his father, defendantMarvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, of whichwhen criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquittedon the ground that his act was not criminal, because of lack ofintent to kill, coupled with a mistake. According to the SupremeCourt, speaking through Justice Barredo:

As We view the foregoing background of this case, the twodecisive issues presented for Our resolution are:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the



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acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action forcivil liability was not reserved?

2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of theCivil Code be applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding theundisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of,Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistencefrom his father, was already legally married?

The rst issue presents no more problem than the needfor a reiteration and further clari cation of the dual character,criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligationwhich was rmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs.Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on thebasis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the natureof culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito andmere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of theSupreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, andearlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act canresult in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but alsounder the Civil Code.

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon

a reading of x x x Garcia that the concurrence of the PenalCode and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate onlyacts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts deeperre ection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncementstherein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually extends tofault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein tothe Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919,

supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligentact. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force hereat the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations which

are derived from acts or omissions, in which fault or negligence,not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of ChapterII, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts. ) And it isprecisely the underlined quali cation, not punishable by law,that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an undesirableconstruction or interpretation of the letter of the law thatkilleth, rather than the spirit that giveth life hence, the rulingthat (W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smotherand render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin andsuch full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito,

which is conserved and made enduring in Articles 1902 to 1910of the Spanish Civil Code. And so, because Justice Bocobo wasChairman of the Code Commission that drafted the originaltext of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code,

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which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses theterm, not punishable by law, thereby making it clear that the

concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are criminal incharacter or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary ornegligent. Thus, the corresponding provision to said Article 1093in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says, Obligationsderived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisionsof Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book (on quasi-delicts ), and byspecial laws. More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 ofthe new code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence

under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinctfrom the civil liability arising from negligence under thePenal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damagestwice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Code Commission: The foregoing provi-sion (Article 2177) though at rst sight startling, is not so novelor extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminaland civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminallaw, while the latter is a culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict, of an-cient origin, having always had its own foundation and indi-viduality separate from criminal negligence. Such distinctionbetween criminal negligence and culpa extra-contractual or cu-asi-delito has been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Courtof Spain and outstanding Spanish jurists. Therefore, under theproposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminalnegligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not bea bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arisingfrom criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery.

(Report of the Code Commission, p. 162.) Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally

refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of JusticeBocobo about construction that upholds the spirit that givethlife rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent ofthe lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. Andconsidering that the preliminary chapter on human relations ofthe new Civil Code de nitely establishes the separability andindependence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal incharacter (under Articles .29 to 32) from the civil responsibilityarising from crime xed by Article 100 of the Revised PenalCode, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and3(c), Rule III, contemplate also the same separability, it is more



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congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and morein harmony with modern progress, to borrow the felicitous

relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Paci c Co. , 7Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refersto fault or negligence, covers not only acts not punishable bylaw but also acts criminal in character, whether intentionaland voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil actionlies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he iscriminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, providedthat the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually chargedalso criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and wouldbe entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of thetwo, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In otherwords, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) ofSection 3, Rule III, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liabilityfor the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as acrime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminalcase that the criminal act charged has not happened or has notbeen committed, by the accused. Brie y stated, We here hold, inreiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntaryand negligent acts which may be punishable by law.

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill inthe criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant actionagainst him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect ofReginalds emancipation by marriage on the possible civilliability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinionthat the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already freefrom responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated uponemancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under

Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of theminor (child), it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really fullor absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntaryconcession shall terminate parental authority over the childsperson. It shall enable the minor to administer his property asthough he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate

or encumber real property without the consent of his father ormother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only withthe assistance of his father, mother or guardian.

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Now, under Article 2180, The obligation imposed by Article2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions,

but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Thefather and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, areresponsible for the damages caused by the minor children wholive in their company. In the instant case, it is not controvertedthat Reginald, although married, was living with his father andgetting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence inquestion. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient toand dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, thereason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with theiroffending child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation ofthe parent to supervise their minor children in order to preventthem from causing damage to third persons. On the other hand,the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minoremancipated by marriage may not nevertheless, sue or be suedwithout the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipationdoes not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or doany act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, id. , Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone elseinvites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of aminor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see toit that the child, while still a minor, does not give cause to anylitigation, in the same manner that the parents are answerablefor the borrowing of money and alienation or encumbering ofreal property which cannot be done by their minor married childwithout their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra .)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 appliesto Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage ofReginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is

now of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill hasbecome merely subsidiary to that of his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed andthe trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with theforegoing opinion. Costs against appellees.

Mendoza vs. Arrieta91 SCRA 113

The records show that a three-way vehicular accidentoccurred involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven byEdgardo Mendoza, a private jeep owned and driven by RodolfoSalazar and a sand-and-gravel truck owned by Felipino Timbol



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and driven by Freddie Montoya. As a consequence of the mishap,two separate criminal actions for damage to property through

reckless imprudence were instituted. The rst was institutedby Mendoza against Salazar, while the second was institutedby Salazar against Montoya. There was no reservation madeby both complainants of their right to institute a civil actionseparately. After hearing the two cases jointly, the courtrendered judgment acquitting Salazar on the ground that his

jeep was bumped from behind by the truck causing it to collidewith the Mercedes Benz. Montoya, on the other hand, wasconvicted on the ground that his guilt was established beyondreasonable doubt. He was ordered to pay to Salazar the amount

of P972.50 for actual damages to the latters jeep. After thetermination of the criminal cases, Mendoza led a civil case.against both Salazar and Timbol, either in the alternative orin solidum, for indemni cation for damages. Upon motions ofboth defendants, the respondent court dismissed the case. Theplaintiff, as a consequence, went up to the Supreme Court bymeans of a petition for certiorari seeking a review of the ordersof dismissal. Speaking through Justice Herrera, the SupremeCourt held:

We shall rst discuss the validity of the Order, datedSeptember 12, 1970, dismissing petitioners Complaint againsttruck-owner Timbol.

In dismissing the complaint against the truck-owner,respondent Judge sustained Timbols allegations that the civilsuit is barred by the prior joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos.SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation to le a separatecivil case was made by petitioner and where the latter activelyparticipated in the trial and tried to prove damages against

jeep-driver Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not

state a cause of action against truck-owner Timbol inasmuchas petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver Salazar as the onesolely responsible for the damage suffered by his car.

Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment toconstitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisitesmust concur: (1) it must be a nal judgment; (2) it must havebeen rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subjectmatter and over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on themerits; and (4) there must be, between the rst and secondactions, identity of parties, identity of subject matter and

identity of cause of action.It is conceded that the rst three requisites of res judicata

are present. However, we agree with petitioner that there is

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no identity of cause of action between Criminal Case No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803. Obvious is the fact that in said

criminal case truck-driver Montoya was not prosecuted fordamage to petitioners car but for damage to the jeep. Neitherwas truck-owner Timbol a party in said case. In fact as thetrial Court had put it the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannotrecover any damages from the accused Freddie Montoya, he(Mendoza) being a complainant only against Rodolfo Salazarin Criminal Case No. SM-228. And more importantly, in thecriminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of thecivil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is

based on quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article2176 of the Civil Code. As held in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al.:

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate theseparate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquilianaunder the Civil Code. Speci cally they show that there isa distinction between civil liability arising from criminalnegligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibilityfor fault or negligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 ofthe Civil Code, and that the same negligent act mayproduce either a civil liability arising from a crime underthe Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault ornegligence under Articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.Still more concretely, the authorities above cited renderit inescapable to conclude that the employer, in this casethe defendant-petitioner, is primarily and directly liableunder Article 1903 of the Civil Code.

The petitioners cause of action against Timbol in the Civilcase is based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in thecomplaint, to wit: that while petitioner was driving his car along

MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned anddriven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his (petitioners) lane andcollided with his car; that the sudden swerving of Salazars jeepwas caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of FreddieMontoya, Timbols employee, who was then driving a gravel-and-sand truck in the same direction as Salazars jeep; and that as aconsequence of the collision, petitioners car suffered extensivedamage amounting to P12,248.20 and that he likewise incurredactual and moral damages, litigation expenses and attorneysfees. Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action

must consist of, namely: (1) plaintiffs primary right, i.e. , thathe is the owner of a Mercedes Benz; and (2) defendants delictor wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiffs primaryright, i.e., the negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner



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Salazar or of Timbols employee, Montoya, in driving the truck,causing Salazars jeep to swerve and collide with petitioners

car, were alleged in the Complaint.Consequently, petitioners cause of action being based on

quasi-delict , respondent Judge committed reversible error whenhe dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said casemay proceed independently of the criminal proceedings andregardless of the result of the latter.

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obliga-tion not arising from the act or omission complained of asa felony, such civil action may proceed independently of

the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result ofthe latter.

But it is truck-owner Timbols submission (as well asthat of jeep-owner-driver Salazar) that petitioners failure tomake a reservation in the criminal action of his right to le anindependent civil action bars the institution of such separatecivil action, invoking Section 2, Rule 111, Rules of Court, whichsays:

Section 2. Independent civil action. In the cases

provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of theCivil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil actionentirely separate and distinct from the criminal actionmay be brought by the injured party during the pendencyof the criminal case, provided the right is reserved asrequired in the preceding section, Such civil action shallproceed independently of the criminal prosecution, andshall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs. Florido , said:

As we have stated at the outset, the same negligentact causing damages may produce a civil liability arisingfrom crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa

extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminallaw, while the latter is a distinct and independentnegligence, having always had its own foundation andindividuality. Some legal writers are of the view that inaccordance with Article 31, the civil action based upon

quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal

proceeding from criminal negligence and regardless ofthe result of the latter. Hence, the proviso in Section 2of Rule 111 with reference to x x x Articles 32, 33 and34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit

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of the said articles, for these articles were drafted x x xand are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general

rule stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111. Theproviso, which is procedural may also be regarded as anunauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32,33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for thereservation required in the proviso. x x x

In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio Barredo further observed that inasmuch as Articles2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code create a civil liability distinctand different from the civil action arising from the offense of

negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no reservation,therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 ofRule 111 is inoperative, it being substantive in character andis not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate;and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot standbecause of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment ofthe legislature superseding the Rules of 1940.

We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-ownerTimbol is concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by thefact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal action, hisright to le an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.

The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who wasacquitted in Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents a differentpicture altogether.

At the outset it should be clari ed that inasmuch as civilliability co-exists with criminal responsibility in negligencecases, the offended party has the option between an action forenforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for recoveryof damages based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2177 of theCivil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based on

culpa criminal under Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Courtis deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action,unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application bythe offended party.

The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yieldsthe conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause ofaction against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and

not on culpa aquiliana, as evidenced by his active participationand intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit againstsaid Salazar. The latters civil liability continued to be involvedin the criminal action until its termination. Such being the case,


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Jurado - Comments & Jurisprudence on Obligations and Contracts