1

i ! 1 1

(

o •

OCKHAM'S LOGIC, SOM! ASPECTS OP THE THEORt OP OtUVBRSALS AND ESSENTIAL PREDICATION.

Simona MASSOBRIO

A theais submitted to the Paculty of Graduate Studies and Research

in Partial Pulfillment of the requir .. ents for the degree of Master of Arts .

Depart.ent of Philosophy McGill uni~ersity Montreal, Canada

June 198 .. . '"

9 < .. 4'." if'~j" J,,, **,4 j , , ,\ ts

- '

'94 •

.' 1

-~~ .. - .......... _ ................ _ ... """L ___ "~""' _____ """_._""' ___ "' .. ~n_~~ __ ~~ ... "" .. ... _ .... _ ....... __ .. _~_,J,. _ ........ _ ............ -..--.,..- ............... _ .. _ ... ,. , .....

\

Cl., '1

,04 4! lA.

ABS'1'RA~

Sorne aspects of Ockham's "metaphysical and logical

systems are examined: Most irnportantly the relationship

between nominalism and essentialism. It is claimed that in

Ockham's philosophy in general, but in his logical system in

particular, nominalism plays a central role. Also it is

maintained that, generally speaking, a theory of essentialism

ta not compatible with nominalism. In order to ascertain

whether they are also incompatible in Ockham's mind, after

taking into account other aspects of Ockham's philosophy, an

analysis i8 performed of Ockh~m's logical system and

particularly his modal logic with special emphasis on the mode

of necessity. With the help of ~odern discussions of modal

logic and essentialism, a series of arguments are developed

a~ainst the compatibility of Ockham's no~nalrsm with

essentialism. Ockham's essentialism is shown to be based not

on a notion of real essences, but on the ,notion of nominal

essence in order for such a notion to be expressed by Ockham,

he must make use of essentialist language, but he leaves it

eompletely devoid of ontological content •

1

'. a

i

i l,

, 1. 1

1 l • , ~

f r t l l t t l' , !

!

1 J

l ' 1

J 1

j î

-

.... ~ ____ .~ ...... .... ck .. __ ... ___ .... ___ ~ .... _________ ......... __ ... ~"M" _ _ ..... _ .... ~ .... ~_~_ .. _ ~ _~ ...... _ ..... __ ..... -.. ___ ... __ ... __ .................... "*' ............ <Ié ..... ~" '

Cl

~

(,

a

RESUME

Dans cet essai on examine quelques aspects du systtme

aetaphysique et du systlme logique de Guillaume d'Occam: plus

part!culiérement on examine si le nominalisme et

l'essentielisme peuvent se trouver dans la même thf!orie

philosophique. On veut affirmer que dans la philosophie

d'Occam, en general, et dans sa logique en particulier, le

nominalisme est le noyau central. On veut aussi affirmer que,

pqur la plus part des cas, le nominalisme et l'essentielisme ""

ne sont pas compatibles. Pour pouvoir dl!cider si la co-

ex istance de ces deux thtDr iés phi losophiques t!t:a i t possible

dans le systtme d'Occam, Oil a voulu analyser sa logique, tout 1 \

en consid~rant aussi d',autres aspects de sa philosophie: en 1

faisant cela on a donn~ le plus de relevance ~ la logique -;~

modale et :t la notion de necessitl!. Avec l'lide des d~ats

modernes sur les relations 9ui existent entre l'essentielisme 1

et la logique modale, on donne une serie d'ârguments pour 1

d lm 0 n t r e r qu' i 1 n' y a pas des po s s i b i 1 i t ès der èc 0 n cil i e rIe

nominalçisme d'Occam avec l'essentiel isme. On montre que

l'essentielisme d'Occam, est basè, non pas sur une notion

d'essence r~lle, mais sur une notion d'essence nominale:

Occam, puor pouvoir exprimer ce type de notion, utilise un

langage qui est propre de l'essenbielisme, mais qu'il rends au

même temps complètement 'v ide de contenu onto log ique et de

signification.

2

~ 1

, j

.,

t ! -/ J f 1 ! 1

1 1 .,

~~b'" ... '- ....... : _ ~ .. __ ... __ .... _.1" ...... ~ __ ...... ~ ____ .... __ ........... ~ .Jo"

Cl

s~ 'i4

PREFACE

! 1 have decided to write tnis essay because in studying

-Ockham's philosophy in general :land his logic in particular it

seemed less and less plausible to me that he could be a 'ç,

nominalist and at the same time use essentialist language.

This feeling 1 had became stronger as 1 started looking into

the debate which is taking place between modern logicians over

the status of essentialism with respect to modal logic and

philosophy of language. Especially Ouine's reaction to the

idea that quantified modal logic could entail essentialism

convinced me that it would be interesting to see whether a

four teen th cen tury nom i na Il st cou Id cons id er h imse 1 f an L

essentialist. 1 suspected that Ockham's essentialism would

turn out to be based, not on the existence of real essence,

but on linguistic p"rcactice and convenience.

During the period in which 1 started getting interested

in this topic and while 1 was writing this essay many people

helped me callecting material and ideas. In particular 1

should l,ike to thank Anthony Lariviere and Professor Bracken

for very interesting discussions, Professor Klibanski,

Professor Shea and P-rofessor Decar ie for suggesting very

helpful sources to me. 1 owe very special thanks to Professor

John Trentman, my supervisor, for aIl his very helpful advise,

suggestions and encouragement.

3

1

, j'

1-···_··_-~-------_·~---"----:-··_--~--~····· .. · .... ~--I-·~--... , .-_ .... -... :-_._.~._._ ..

.. 1

1

/

1

, \ . 1

! 1

, . TABLE OP CONTENTS

ABSTRACT • • • • • • 1> • • • • • • • • • • • ... RESUME •• . . . . . . . . • • • • • . . . . PREFACE • • • • • . . . . . . . . . . • • • •

TABLE OF CONTENTS • • • • • . . • • • . . .. .

INTRODUCTION

, • CHAPTER 1 SUPPOSITIO ~' S·lG.lt~ÇAT1!~

Introduction

Section 1 - Significatio

Section II - Suppositio

• • •

• • •

. . • •

Seètion III - Quant'ificalion and Suppoaitio ~ j ... Il'

, CHAPTER II MODAL LOGIC !!!Q ESSENTI1LISH

1 . 1

\troduetlon

!ction 1 - Modal' L~ie 1 -rD ,. Section II - Modal Syllogisms' ,

1 1

Section III - Essentialism ana Modality

CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY

4 \

- • -=&$4 d§.pt $ pa

• • • • 1

fi • • .' 2

• • • • , .

• • • •

3 .

4'

16

20

26

33

56

60

69

77

91

104

J

-1

1

~~~--.,...: .... ~-::::._ ...... _-_. ---~._ .. _ ...... ,. .. J '

. .. ~.., .. _____ ....... ___ ............. , ............... _ ..... _ ........ _._._.,,_._. ___ ... -1 .......... ..,.", .............. ...--

t !

1

J

.1

1 , ) -' 0

1

.

,

1 ntrl:oducti on.

Ockh .. , we are told, does not admit universal essences, wlHch would guarantee unit y and order amongst the confusing multitude of indivi­dua~. Furthermore, his conceptua-1 ilÎm has forced him to sever the bond between the order of thought and the order of rea1ity so that each order is left in hopeless isolation. l

.

Broadly speaking the purpose of this thesis ls to ana-

lyze sorne of the connections between some metaphysical

problems and the 10gical framework in which they are discussed

within Ockham's philosophical system. More specifica11y my

~nterest 1 ies in studying some aspects of the problem of

essentialism in Ockham's philosophy: 1 would 1ike to see what

kind of essenttial ism he wou1d be 1 ike1y to subscribe to,

whether or not Any kind of essentialism is compatible with

other aspects of his phi10sophy and especially with his 109i-

cal system, and whether, in fact, the fom of essentiel ism to

which he does subscribe, since he certain1y subscribes to

some, is in effect to have ariy real influence on his

philosophical system at àll or whether it is only a nec.ssity

brought in by the Aristotelian tradition to which he belongs.

For the task of analyzing these issues, this introduction will

s~ve the purpose of looking briefly at some of the Qntoloqi­

ca Àabels which have been put on Ockham's philos6phy by

~"

1

----_ ... _ ..,.... ;wp~~ .,

\ ,

i

1 1

1 t f f ! )

!

... ~~_ .... _ ... ~ .... - ...... -_ ..... ---_ ..... _ ...... _ .... --_ ... ~ '- -.. .... - -. --

1 t D ... : lAS!

various Medieval ists and at the impl ications these labels have',.)

for the in terpretation of hi s system. l t will al 50 serve the

purpose of trying to find out which of them seem to be, in

fact, mOre appropriate for characterizing Ockham's main

theses.

Once that has been done 1 will dedicate the first

chapter to an ana 1 ysi s of Oc kham' s t heor"ie S 0 f re fer ence and

.eaning because they provide the link, it seems to me, between

'hia logic and his ontology. Furthermore, they provide a clear

background for an understanding of some of his most important . logical and metaphysical beliefs, and they seem to point

unquestionably to the appropriateness of at least one of the

labels which are most usually conne~ed with Ockham's philoso-

phy: Nominalism. ,lIn the first chapter 1 will also include a

ihort discussion of Ockham's theory· of 'suppositio' as com­

pared to modern quantification theory because such a discus­

siop brings out quite clearly how the different motivations

behind apparently quite similar logical systems can determine

what are in fact basic differences of interpretation,

d'ifferences which are, it se ... to me, often underestimated by

a atrong desire to show how Medieval philosophy is close to

.odern logical .yat .... , 1

The second chapter 1 want to dedicate to looking at

OCkh .. •• modal 109ic and lItost apecifie.lly to its connection

to the problem of .s .. ntiali.. This will be done .specially

by anal yzing hi. d i.cussion of necessi ty and necesaary

ayllogia •• as weIl as by looking at his analysia ()f modal

aentences taken in the sense of composition and in the aenae

2

-~ - -""- _._-------

1 l

•

r

·f

1 1

, i

(

,1,0\ ..

~'

... 41; .. "' ..........

of division. This ~alysis should help in determining whether

Ockham's modal logic entails any form of essentialism and if

any wh i ch one. Combining the concl usions reached in the

introduction, those arrived at in the discussions of 'signifi-

catio' and 'suppositio' in the tirst chapter and modal ity in

the second chapter, 1 hope to be able to show that some

interesting implications can be safely asserted to follow from

this study as far as Ockham's brand of es~entialism is

concerned.

At tirst sight, it Seems to me, in tact, that Ockham's

nominalism would not allow him to be an Aristotelian essentia-

list because that would seern to irnply a belief that universals

are real things 'extra an imam' , and that through the notion of

essence they are what constitute scientific knowledge. As

will become apparent later, for Ockharn all- this would be

highly unacceptable. At the same time it is very unlikely

that Ockham could be an 'ind i v idua ting' essen tial ist hold ing

the bel ief that essences are real things in iodividuals be-

cause that would render his notion of universals, oatural

aigns and especially the theoretical network behind his theory "

oi signification and his theory of knowledge much less

understandabl e and would leave i t at the sarne time wi th very

little explanatory power. For Ockham, in fact, the essence of

a univeraal, its reason to exist, so to speak, ia found in the

notion of pred icabil i ty. The coocept 8eems to belong to the

individuels only through the logical property a universal bas

of belonging to it. infe.riors via predication, (!tl.E..!!!

3

i ,i ii

"

, .

o

.. -

~~). The only type of essen~ialism left for Ockham to

sdbscribe to seems to be a theory of nominal essenc~s of the

Lockean type which seems to be compatible with aIl his other ?

theses, but which effectively does not seem to be'of very much

use. Whether these essences should be individu~l or universal

is not clear to me and since they appear to be equated with

the ind'ividual and with its existence and since the two

things seem to be two different names for the thing itself, it

is not clear to me what the role of universals would be in

this part ~f the schema. Ockham's theory of universals is

based on the notion of a concept, which is what will give him

the lab~l of conceptualist, but it cannot be forgotten, as

will be evident from later discussions a1so, that great

emphasis is put by Ockham on the grammatical and the verbal

elernents. This wi Il make him hold the v iew);hat cO,ncèpts and

words are inseparable. Universals are, therefqre, basically

meanings, which signify naturally their 'inferiora'

,

Nonetheless he sometimes extends the name 'universals' to the words designating these concepts. The reason that he gives is that whatever is signified by the concept is siCjnified concomitantly bM t h~ wo rd sas we 1 l, a nd vic e versa. ". \

The universal, however, is one singu1ar thing ab~Q_and becômes

universal by signifying many things, it is one in virtue of )

the fact that it is a single intention of the soul and since

through predication' it belongs, as We have seen~ to its infe-

riors, it has to have a role in essential predication., In the .J

hope of solving or at l-east clarifyiQg some of these puzzles 1

--~--~~-~t.~.U.#"*p~~j~~,_.G~ •• ~~;.$~i4-"~;;------~.'---------~;.~~~~~!~,!S~t~.~,---i.C_~(------------~----__ ~,': _____ ~ ___ __ JI ,,;"'

'1

!

J

J , ,f"

think it will be usef'ul to analyze more closely the relation-

ship of such nominal essences to natural signs and the possi-

bility that a connection to natural signs mlght be able to

make nominal essences a little more than Just conventional

utilities.

AlI of these remarks are only tentative and intuitive

and the following analysis of Ockham's 'idealism',

'nominalism', 'realism', 'realistic conceptualism', and

'scepticism' should start carifying them and putting them into

sharper perspective and closer relationship to sorne of his

other philosophical theses mentioned above (theory of univer-

saIs, theory of knowledge, theory of signification and theory

of supposi t ion). In his article "the realistic conceptualism

of William Ockham" professor Boehner starts out with an attack

on the notion that Ockham could be called a conceptualist if

suc h a 1 ab e 1 i s t 0 h a v e a n y i m pli c a t ion s 0 f • ide a 1 i sm': he

cites Father Bittle's definition of conceptual ism which holds

that the major point of the theory

i s the contention that the content of our universal ideas is not rea­lized in any form whatever in the individual sense-abjects; there is no foundation in the things themsel ves which would justi fy the intellect in forming universal ideas. Our universal ideas ale thus purely subjective products of the mind without a correlative in nature; in other words there ls nothing in the individuals in na­ture which is genuinely represented by these un i versa 1 ideas. Thi s, of cOurse, gives to the 9.fliversals only a strictly intra-mental significance; as 'univer/als' they have no objective value.

5 .. q "1 J ~----~·r,~J:~"~.~.8~."-~44~",,?-·AÀ~$~--------~------~~--~~---,~.----~----------------------~---------.-----

1

\

\

(~

Now, it seems to me, that goin9 on to assert that Ockham is, , in this sense, a conceptualist is a clear mlstake. It is true

that for Ockham universals only have intra-aental existence,

but this does not mean that they have intra7_ental signi fican­

ce only. It seems to me that the problem of the connection

between real i ty and universals as being dubious does not even

arise in Ockham's philosophy. The origin of universals is

causal and they are traced back to ex ternal objects or better

ta the effect that these external abjects have on the soule

In Ockham the fact that the substratum of aIl knowledge is

furnished by the extramental world by means of natural causa-

tion is accepted as basic. His notions of 'Notitia Intuitiva'

and of 'Noti tia Abstracti va' allow for a process in which the

intellect first apprehends a singular thing, then forms the

singular conceptual sign which refers to that singular thing

and secondly forms conceptual signs which are more general and

which refer simul taneously to many singular things. The

universal, therefore, seems to be a natural sign, whos"E!

connection to the external world is not in doubt and whose

existence does not have any justification if not the one given

i t by the connection it has wi th the particulars to which i t

refers. From these considerations and trom further points

which will come up in the discussion of Ockham's theory of

'significatio' and ot 'suppositio' it seems quite clear to me

that if Ockham i8 a conceptualist at aIl, he certainly ia not

a conceptual ist in the sense of the term which implie.

Idealisme In addition, it seems quite obvioU8 that on thi.

view just as universals would have very little connection with

• 6

"

6-------~'·~._.H~qa~.~h~4~_~M_._.~ __ ----________ ----------__ --____ ~~ __ --__ --------------_____________ . __ ~ __

, 1

1 ,S

1

t . " ,

l C~I

:j 1

reality, so also there would be very little use for a notion

of essence in as much as either its connection with existence

and t:eality or its connection with universals would be to say

the least dubious: this would contradict Ockham's own view

qui te c learly;

Sed mag i s propr ie loquendo debet dic;, quod universale exprimit vel expl icat naturam substantiae, hoc est nat uram quae est substan t ia.

Unde omnes auctoritates quae Bonant, universalia esse de essen­tia substantiarum esse in substantiis vel esse partes substantiarum, debent sic intell i­gi, quod auctores non inten dunt, nisi quod talia universalia declarant, exprimunt, explicant, i'!'portant lt significant substan­t1as rerum.

As far as label ing Ockham a conceptual ist in thè sense of the

term in which it means that univer8als are only in the mind

and thère is no sense in which universals are eltra ani __ , it

seens to me that such a view i8 quite consistent with Ockham's

bel iefs. On this v iew, in fact, for the uni versal s there is a

foundation of resemblance in the indiv idual things that they

signify, and such a foundation consti tutes the justification

for the forming in the mind of such un i versa 1 8.

iWl P1*C4P uU,," $ m A.

Our universal Weas are by no means purely subjective products of the mind without a correlative in na­ture; in other word8, there is soaething in nature, namely the individual essence or nature, not 80111ething or some nature different from the individuals, whiph i8 genuinel y represented by these universal ideas •••• -However only the content, not the uni versa 1 i­ty-. cor responds to real i ty~ and finally,.only the content grasped

7

• 4

, 1

l t i 1

1 ,

1 r

-

by the ,intellect, not the pecu­liar status of universals as psychic realities, corresponds to reality. The character 6f univer­salit y and spirituality applies only to universal concepts and by no mea~ to ex tr a-men ta 1 sen se­objects.

According to Boehner, however, Ockham's conceptualism has to

be qualified as realistic because in the sense in which this

means that there i5 a correspondence or resemblance between

real ity and the concept, Ockham is also a realist. In fact,

it seems to me, that wi tÎ10ut such a quaI ification even calI ing

Ockham a conceptualist might constitute a distortion of his

views.

As far as the label of Real i st6 i s concerned, there are

also important qualifications and distinctions which need to

be made. Ockham's realism' can be best understood with

reference to the subord ination of the sign to the thing which

is characteristic of his system, and in relationship to his

nominalism. Ockham's nominalism is characterized mainly,

through his theory of supposition, 9Y the possibility of \ )

analyzing aIl general terms into combinations of singular

terms. At the same time it is clear that the sign par

ezcellance in Ockham has to be a non-complex conceptual term

whieh signifies directly a particular, it has to be a proper

name. The relationship between the term whieh signifies and

that which is signified by i t can be reduced, or better, ia

reduced to a simple relationship of substitution. Now, it is

quite clear from these and other aspects of Ockham's theory

that he i. not a realist in the Platonie sense: in other vord.

8

{ 1

1

..... ~~.... ..... ... .... l;."., _ ... - _.,~ ... _." .... -.h, ... "" ~ ~ -. ~ __ il

he is not a realist with respect to univel'sals in that they

are never uninstantiated in particulars, and they are not real

things ex isting outside the soul, eventhough accord ing to the

'Intellectio' theory which he adopted in his later worka they

are real acciden ts of the mind; 16ey have 'esse subiect,i vum' in

the same way in which a colour would be said to have it.

There are, however, two senses of real ism both of which can

easily be attributed to ock~~!,m and quite weIl describe

Ockham's thought: these are Ontological Realism and Epistemic

Real i sm.

Ontological Real ism is the doctr ine which asserts the

independence of being from simply being known by a subject.

Epistemic Realism is the doctrine according to which knowledge

is by essence in conformity with reality. As far as Ontologi-

cal Realism is concerned, it is quite clear that the whole

theory of naturai signification supports it, and the fact

that, as mentioned before, in Ockham's system thought always

presupposes the precedence of that which is signified, that

is, the precedence of the thing over the sign, points quite

obviously to t~e fact that for Ockham such independence of '"

Eeal i ty from Knowl edge was not a source of doubt. The connec­

tion ot this to Ockham's nominalism ls also quite clear: the

8ign is a name, and if i t is a name, 1 t must be the name of'

aOllle particul ar, or in any case, i t must be possible to trace

it back to a particular because there is no, reality but the

one which is made up of particulars •. This fragmentation into

particulars, however, will not be able to cause Ockham's

reality to be à random collection of them because, by the

9

1

f f

! '1/

l

(î

thesis of realism, that is, by their independence from

knowledge, these individuals can be kept in a naturai order,

which would" not otherwise be there. It shouid also be remar-

ked that Ontologicai Realism is the theory which is usually

taken in opposi tion to Ideal ism and the short di scussion of i t

just given should help to make it clearer why Ockham can not

plausibly be called an Idealist.

About the existence of Epistemic Realism in Ockham's

philosophy panaccio writes that:

La correspondence entre les signes naturels et l'olganization objec­tive des choses individuelles sug91!re d~jh que le rhlisme onto­logique d'Occam va de pair avec une thlor i e de l' adl!qua t ion de la con­na i ssance au r&!el. Le terme de , t h èo rie', ~ v rai d ire, est mal choisi, puisque, encore une fois, il s'agit lâdavantage d'un prltsupposè implicite que d'une af­firmation thl!tique d~fendue pour el 1 e-mame. 7

AS Panacc io po ints out 1 ater, the theoretical pr,Obtem tha t

Ockham faces i s not 50 much to f ind out whether or not there

is such a correlation between knowledge and rea1 ity, but to

show how such a correspondence, which is presupposed, cornes

about. To the contemporary mind the distinction

individual/real and universal/sign introduces sceptic,ism by .

causing an unbridgeable gap' between thought and real i ty. In

Ockham's mind the effort has to be made in the reconstruction,

Dot in the re-establ ishment, of the 1 ink between the

particular and the concept. An outl ine of th'e way in which

th! •. 1 s done in hi B log ical system wi Il be 9 i ven in the

10

\

---~ _____ ------------------------------ ----__ 4'>

-, .. w ........ '- ..... ~,~ __ ..... _ .. __ ......... _ ............ ...r.. .. _ ...... " .... ~ .. _ ..... ___ ..... "' .. ~ ...

1 J

! l

t , if.

f

1 J

l!

. ~ , j 1

i -1 1

} 1 i {

l )

1

Cl

} c \

following chapter. Panaceio also points out that:

En vltritlt, le couple individuel/ universel ne coincide pas vraiment avec le couple res/signum, car s'il est vrai que le langage seul peut acckier a l'universel, c'est nban­mo i ns touj our parce qu' i 1 est par t de la dœignation individuelle im­med iate. La sol ution de continui tl! entre 1 a chose et 1 e concept passe par l'existance dans le discours mIme de signes individuels qui, nous l'avons vu, occupent dans la logique occ~miste une place toute pl i v il eg i èe •

This link plovided by language between universal and

individual works two ways; the universal acquires the capacity

to be linked thr:ough langusge because it derives its meaning

from another link with the individual sign: a link through

which the capacity to signify which a universal concept has i8 ,

t r a c ed bac k t 0 a se rie 5 0 f i nd i v id ua 1 sig nif i ca t ion s ( se e

'descensus' to particulars in the theory of supposition in the

nex t chapter). In this way particulars, ins'tead of bei'ng

inaccessible for knowledge, became the internaI foundation of

knowledge's own coherence and functioning. If, on the other

hand, the process is looked at when going the other way, trom

the thing to the universal; if we look, that ls, at the

process of universalization, we still find Ockham, not proving l

r

that sucll a process takes place, but showing in detail exactly

how it takes place. The l ink between universal and particular

in Ockham's phi losophy, in my opinion, to a ve"ry great extent,

is made possible by the existence of mental language: the

idea, that i5, that this l ink between the order of thinga in

reality and the conceptual order, ia natural. This idea 81ao

Il

1 L ________ , ............... ,......, .. _1 .......,." ......... _____ ~ ________________ ,

l

....-- .. ~.,;; ... --~ .. ,,--_ ....... _- --- ................. -... _ .......... -............... - "-"'-"_._"

(

"see.a to allow for Ockhall'a .asentialia. to have any kind of

purpoa ••

Nominal es .. ncea can only conatitute a useful concept if

they can provide an objective criterion of cate<jorization of a

certain type of individuals under one particular universal

concept. 1 f there were no theory of natural 8 igni f ication in

Ockham's phi losophy then the process of abstraction from par­

ticulars to universals would have to be completely arbitrary,

because the use 0 f names would sol el y be based on the conven-

tionality of lan9uage. If Ockham were a modern nominalist,

vith no concept of mental language backing his theories, he

could not even plausibly hold on to a theory of nominal 1>

.ssences, because there would be no role for them to play in

his theory. They would, in fact, be inconsistent with the

test of his philosophy. Even at that, Ockham's nominalism,

even though it allow8 for nominal essences to make sense in

his framework, seems to me to leave very little use for any

kind of real essential iam. His concept of essence only seems

to play a nominal, a very weak, role in his theory of

res.mblance and in the re'st of Ockham's philosophy. This

abridgement between the particulars in reality and natural

language is, in effect, sti 11 accompl i shed through

conventional language, in sorne sense. Hovever, the task

rema ins of examin ing exacti y to wha t extent t hese consider a-

tions correspond 1;:..,2" the actual aims, implications and , ,

mot i va tions of Ockham' s system.

1 t seems qu i te cl ear , in Any case, f rom the above

discussions, from which prespective the analysia of essentia-

12

q:; Pin

.. ~-.. - ~ .. lM. " .. _ ...... _ ...... _ .... ;jt,- -&.. -a,.,. ................. _ ....... "', _ .... _ ... _ ..... _ ~ ... ~, ~ • ~ .. ...., '""" "J _ ... ~ ..... 'tt.. .. __ ~ ... ...,. ~ _____ >0.... ........... _ ... ~ .. __ ... _ ........ '" ~ _ .

\ i .

1 1 ! • 1 1 i • , ,

i ,

! ,

Ci

l ( 1

l 1 Î

. 1 ia should ~ undertaken vi th r •• pect to OCkham'. theor 1 •• 1

it has been conel uded that the label of idea li st wou ld

diree tly eontr ad let the indub i tab 1 e and strong conneet i on

which Ockham presupposes to exist between the realm of thought

and the realm of particulars; it would directly contradict, in

other words, his,ontological realism. It also seems

implausible to calI Ockham a seeptie, in as much as that would

be in evident opposition to the other aspect of his realism,

the epistemic side. The assumption of an essential conformity

between knowledge and reality, in fact, undercuts completely

the whole problematic raised by radical empiricism, and the

issues of sceptieism just do not arise.

, As was said before, the task was not to prove that there

edated such a conformity but to show how such a conformity

worked. It was also concluded that the label of coneeptua-

11am could be attaehed to Ockham' s phil osophy wi th regard to

his views on universals, but this could be done only if his

conceptualism was taken in conjunction with thè two types of

teal ism which treat of the relationship between knowledge of

tealityand reality itself. It also became obvious that

Ockham was not a realist with respect to universals. His

position with respect to theories of meaning and theories of

reference has been ascertained to be based on nominalisme

Ockham's nominalisin, however, has not been examined very clo-

sely dur Ing the course of these discussions. The nex t chapter

will be dedicated to unpacking exactly the meaning thaie the

térm nominal ism has within Ockham's system by lookin9 a~ his

13

~-_.----~ __ ~~._~,_ •• t_; _. ____________________________________________ __

J

f

1

.lll1ll •• IIIILIIIiI' ... _I ......... _._ ... t ....... _ .... , ........ _ .... ___ I_. _______ ._._._ ...... _._.I_ ............ -....~ ................. ~~ ............. AII .. 1'1 ................ P •• " 111 :fIfiIlf!,t:d ~

th.ory of • aignlflcatio' and hi. tbeory of '.uppo.l tic'.

"

/ , ~

\ ;

!

l 14

1 --.F------__ ~~.~~4P .. ~_§~$$~._(.~4.C~----------------------.---.... ~~----------~--------------------~---_________ .

~._ ........ _ .... __ *'t ................... _ ..... _ ......... _____ ................... ~,.".,,_ ~ .... "' ...... ~_" •• ,, _____ , _ .... .- ..... ~ ..... _ ............ ___ ~k ___ ' ____ .... ___ ...... ,._

1 \

fO }

J t

J

1

o

NOTES

1 P. Bo.hner, Collected Article. on .Ockb ••• (St. 80n".­venture N.Y.: The Pranc"i.can In.titute, A5S), p.l73.

2 S.C. Torney, Ockham, Studies and Se lections. (L.Sall ..... I1Unois: The Open Court Publ Ishin9 ë'ëmpany, 193il), p.20.

3 P. Boehner, Collected Articles .2.!! Ockham, p. 157. - . 4 W. Ockham, Summa Logicae, part !.L!.! ! ID. Boehner,

P. ed •• (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institut., 1957), p.S4.

5 P. Boehner, Collected Articles .2.!! Ockham, p.163.

6 For a more detailed discussion of tbe connections between OCkham's 1091c and the labels of ontolOCJical R •• liat and Epi stem lc Real i st Cf. C. Panacc io, Si9n iUca tion .!!! aomination: la Log11ue de Guilla\'I.IBe D'Occam. Ph.O .. Th •• i., OnlversitL deMontdïl, lna.

7 C. panaccio, signific.tion et Nomination: 1. Lo,iqu. ~ Gui llaume D'Occam, p.625-26. - -

8 Ibid., p.626-27.

15

. .

==--.----~~~~~~., ~._,------------------~---------------------------------------------

1

-, •

."'(1 J .........

o

,--'

Cbllpter 1

8uppoaltio ~ Si9nifie.tio

Introduction:

ln "thi. chapter 1 would 1 ik. to • __ in. ac.. of the

Most important a.pects of Ockham'. theories of suppositio

and lignifieatio. 1 have chosen ta discuss these two parts

of his logie in the same chaptel' because, as ve will see

later, they are very di fficul t to sepera te; moreover, i t se_8

to me that looking at them a'. two cœpletely separate en ti-

tiea ean be the cause of ser ioul mi.understand ings in at least

three are~. of study: (1)· the study of d ifferenees and

aimilatities between modern theorie. of reference and meaning,

(partieuiarly'quantification theory) and Ockham's theories of

.ignifieatio and suppoaitio, (2) the study of the relationship

of OCkham's logic to medieval 10C)ieal syst .. s whieh preceded

it, and (3) the atudy of the lignifieance and illportance of

Ockham'. system it.elf. point (1) will bediscua •• d in sOlle

datail at the end of thi. chapter, and pointa (2) and (3) will

becaae e1earer. 1 hope, during the course of the e_position of

Octham's theories of referenee and m.aDing. 1 will .tart by

looking at OckhaJl's th.ory of signification in it •• lf;

s.condly, 1 will try to see exact.ly how it is related to hi.

tbeory of 8uppoai tion, wilich 1 then propose to ex_ine in SOla. ,

detail; a •• last point 1 .. ant to diacu.a .a.. att_pt. whicb

16

--------~.'_I_ .. aN. __ •• __ ~1_4 ____________________ ~------------------------------_____________ __

... -"" "'i' .. .. ~ ..... _ .. .. '"- '"' • ... .,. .. .... • .. .. _ ... "'" .......... ., MO. ...... _ ...... _ •••

'have been made at equating Ockham's concept of personal

supposi tion to modern quantification theory.

Before doing this, however, 1 want to look briefly at

the devéloplllent of the concept of natural supposi tion in some

aed iev al theor ies befo re Oc kham because the fact tha t he

eliminates this, type of supposition by subsuming it under his

th.ory of signification i8 very important in understanding

OckhUl'S own motivations in general. In medieval logic,

thought was considered to be 1 ~n­guistically constrained by its very nature; though~ and language ,were taken to be related both ta each 0 ther and to real i ty in their elementa and in their structure. In the final analysis, language, thought, and rea~ ity were consi­dered to be of the same log ical coherence. Language wa s taken to be not only an instrument of

tthought, expression and communica­tion but a1so in itaelf an iapor tant source of in for,ma t ion regard lng the na ture 0 f rea 1 i ty. In Med levaI thought, log ico-seman­tic and met,aphysieal points of v iev are, as a result of their perceived i n ter d e Pl' n den ce, en tir e 1 y interwoven.

., , 1 have menti oned before that reference and mean Ing a~e

tvo concepts that cannot be di vorced in med levaI theor les 'and

thi., 1 think, is partly due to the tact that in medieval

Ipgic the theory of the prop~rties of terms is alwaya seen

through an undel!lying theory of signification, and what is

called the 'contex:tual apptoach' ia always mitigated by the

'fund_ental significance' of a word. Medieval logicians were

a.are of and used the 'cont,xtual approach' in the theory of

aUlfoai tio, but they coabined it .oat of the tille vi tb a

11

W.";iIJ!! '.3" $Qi

'-

J

theory of significatio:

thi&' doctrine may be best expressed this way: a word's actual meaning (its meaning on a particular occa­sion 0 f Hs use) ul t ima tel y is, or can be, reduced to, its fundamental 'significance' (sign1-, ficatio), which as a word's natural

, proper ty consti tutes i ts essence or fOIm (essentia, forma) in v irtue of which it is the root of every actual meaning of the worV _____

In the l3 th century supposi tio natura lis had one of the

roles which was absorbed in Ockham' s' theory by the concept of

significatio. In fact natural supposition ( also called abso­

lute or habituaI) was taken to be the natural capacity of a <;

wo rd t 0 st and for something which partakes in the

un i ver sa 1 na ture (or essence) which i s sig n ified b.v the word;

natwral supposi tion is not con textual: ace iden..tal supposi tion,

on the other hand, was the term's being taken for something

because of i ts being combined wi th sorne other, term in ei ther a

'" sentence or a proposi tion: acc identa 1 supposi tion will become

for Ockham the onl y k ind of supposi t ion. l3 th centur y log i­

cians i ntrod uced na tut a 1 supposi ti on bec ause they thought

there should be a distinction made between a word's having

signification, that is, representing sorne universai nature, ,

and tha t word' s abi 1 i ty to stand for ind i v idual s par tak ing in

that na ture. In the 14th century log icians in general becamè

more and more geared towards the 'conte,xtual approach' to

language and the ir theories of supposition should be

considered as an attempt to determine the truth-va~luehs of

pr-opositions; this explains the fact that they were mostly

characterized by conseguentiaei the proposition, in fact

') 18

, v *9/ibi&OO 42 ; & Xi Aa .4

1 i

1

1 1 1 1

1

.' 1 1

'1

..

( became the only context in which a term could have

supposi t ion. SinCÉ~ natural supposition was a non-contextual

" type of supposition it was dropped by most of. them, and

certainly by Ockham, he says:

Dicto de signi ficatione terminorum restat dicere de suppositione, quae est propr ieta~ ,co,nveniens ,tt;rmin~, sed numquarn nls1 ln propoSl tlone.

For those who, like Buridan and vincent Ferrer, kept the

concept of naturai supposition it acquired a completely

different rneaning and lt became contextual: lt became,

The supposition a terrn has when the proposition in which it occurs as a subject terrn causes its being taken for aIl i ts signi ficates regard IfsS of the tense of the proposition.

Of the nominalists BuridanS was the only one who reintroducèd

natural supposition and he did it in order to avoid grounding

the truth of the demonstrative propositions of natural science

on abstract enti ties. In his mind natural supposition occurs

when a term is considered to stand for aIl the concrete

suPéosita of that terrn in an omnitemporal manner. Ockharn as a ~

nominal ist had the same need of avoiding grounding the truths

of science on abstract entities, but, as we will see, his

method (descent to particulars) does not require the use of

natural supposition at aIl. Since Ockham does not need or

want, as it may be expected, the division associated with the

concept of natural supposition as defined by l3 th century

logicians either, he drops it altogether and in fact this type

of supposition i5 not ·even mentioned in his tract on supposi-

tion in the Summa Logicae. AlI the discus~ion of what he

19

,"54 l"U", tA 4 q .. el O)i lA

i ,

" 1 .

J 7i

·1

considered the natural capacity of a word to signify is

undertaken by Ockham in his theory of aignificatio, which is

what l now turn to.

Section l - Significatio:

Ockham divides language into three categories: spoken

language, written language, and mental language. Hental

language has priority over spoken and written language and is

the subJect matter of logic, supposedly because lt keeps the

aIl important 1 inks between language and the external world.

Mental language ln Ockham's later developed theory is simply a

collection of mental acts and not surprisingly these mental

aets are natural slgns of things in ~ùch a way that the rela-

tlonship of natural signification obtains directly between the

mental act and the thing. This notion of language is taken by

Ockham from Aristotle for whan mental language is a sign for

things and spoken and written language are signs fqr mental

language. Ockham, however, modified this theory to a great

extent because for him spoken and written language do not

signify mental language, but the three levels of language

equally signify things; spoken and written language,

nevertheless, depend on the mental language's intention in as

much as they are an expression of it.

Since spoken and written language express mental

language, their relationship is so close that lIental language

ia said to have a grammatical structure ( one lDay venture to

20-

= SPi", " .... cp [ Git,e Ph w hl UI

..

calI it universal grammar); this grammar primarily, and not

the grammar of spoken and written language is what a logician

.studies because it is the essential determining factor in the

assignment of truth-values to propositions. This, as will

appear ObVIOUS, leads Ockham to the conclusion that, for

example, there is no need for synonyms and for the distinction

between abstract and common nouns in mental language (which

se em s tom e t 0 b e ver y i m po r tan t for hi s the 0 r y 0 f

universals) •

Asit might be expected, to the tripartite division

of language corresponds a division of terms into three

categories also: (1) Mental terms, (2) Spoken terms, and (3)

Wr i t ten te rms. Obviously Ockham thinks that mental terms do

not belong to any particular natural, i.e. conventional

language, and that they naturally possess signification; on

the other hand, spoken terms, even though they are not 'signs'

of mental terms, are applied in order to signify the same

thing as the mental content. He says that:

1 ta quod conceptus pr imo natural i­ter aliquid significat, et secunda­rio v 0 x sig nif i ca t i 1 1 ud idem, i n tantum quod voce institutà ad signi ficandum al iquod siggi ficatum per conceptus mentis, ••••

'l'he relationship of a written term to a spoken term followa

the same kind of paradigme This natural signification which

the mental term possesses, according to Ockham, comes to it

through experience, and it is that element within his theory

of language which provides a non-arbitrary foundation on which

the conventional languages are based, and allows for

21

-44 .. _Y"" et 4JP JI QL i4 ;4 'Ji

o

meaningful communication; mental words, in tact, have the salle

meaning for everybody. The basic difference among the types

of terms in OCkham can be listed in two major points:

(1) a mental content signifies naturally, spoken and wri tten

terms only signify by convention.

(2) it is possible to change the designation of a spoken or

written term at will, but the same is not possible for a

conceptual terme

Ockham's view on mental terms was derived more directly

fram Scotus than from Aristotle:

Scotus' doctrine here is based upoh a neat and economical theory of signification, according to which aIl signification is a matter" of one-to-one relation beiween lan­guage unit and external object, a theory which was to have a strong following after Scotus. It is basic in Ockham's thought and was also accepted by Scotists like Richard of Campsall, who wrote

7a g ainst

Ockhamist innovations. • ••

The idea of language representing reality, as we have

seen before, is very important in medieval theories, and it Is

one of the main features of Medieval logical systems, that

they should keep that connection.

Ockham maintained that a term can be a sign in two

different ways. In the first way a sign means anything which

makes us know something else; this type of sign, however, will

not make us know something for the first tilDe but will only ,

actualize the knowledge of something which we know habitua11y,

in this sense the vord i8 a natural signe In the second vay a

sign means aOlDething which' makes ua know aoaething e1ae

22

et t.'waq:;;ua $ I .. J 4= .... iS ... )

o

lUAle; .,.*41#

(syncategorematic words are of this kind because they have no

specifie signification), and in this sense a word ia not a

sign of anything. Ockham al so tal ks about there being three

meanings for the word term:

(1) A term 18 anything which can be one of the extremes or

the copul a of a ca tegor ical proposi tion, (Ockham po ints

out that in this sense even a proposition can be

cons idered a term).

(2) All non-composi te expressions are terms.

(3) This is the Most precise meaning and it appliE;!s to all

the terms which in their significative acception will be

either the subjects or the predicates of a proposition.

(A11 syncategorematic terms wi 11 be excl uded if taken in

suppositio personalis; if taken in suppositio materialis

or in suppositio simplex, on the other hand, syncategora­

matie terms may be included, as in "and' is a

conjunction' because 'and' in this case can be the

extreme of a proposi tion).

Terms are syncategorematic or categorematic. Categorema­

tic terms have a specifie and fixed signification, as for

exampl e 'man' because i t sig nif ie s a 11 men or 'br ightness'

because it signifies all instances of brightness.

Syncategorematic terms, on the ot~er hand, cannot stand by

themselves because they do not have any specifie signification

and therefore can only serve as modifiers of categorematic

terms. The synca tegorema tic term 'some' does not have any

specifie signification when taken by itself, but if taken in

conjunction with a categorematic term like 'man' it modifies

23

" • qi •

~" .. ' •• 1 .. Ill.

o

1

!

1 }

o

"#401 t

i t, and the whole expre •• ion 'some man' acquires ~he signifi­

cation of standing for some but not aIl members of the class

designated by the term 'man'. Ockham adds that the situation

may be diffeIent for some adverbs because they sometimes

signify the same things that categorematic words do, but since

they do so in a different mode of signification, 1 don't think

that Ockham's remark was meant to give such adverbs any

special status with respect to other syncategorematic terms.

A further subdivision applicable to terms is the one

that Ockham draws between absolute and connotative terms.

Absolute terms signify primarily aIl the things wh1ch they

signify: i.e. they don't signify one thing primarily and

another thing secondarily. He adds at this point that:

TaI ia, quantum ad quid nominis, possunt al iquo modo pl uribus ora­tionibus non easdem res secundum suas partes significantibus expl i-car i; et ideo nu Il a earum est ) proprie adefinitio expr imens quid ,_. nominis. ,

A connotative term, on the other hand, signifies one thing

primarily and another secondarily. These terllts have

definitions which express the meaning of the name, and they

are characterized by the fact that they have one expression in

the nominati ve case and some other in an obI ique case. For

example Ockham says that,

Hoc autem nomen 'intelligibile' est nomen connotativum et significat intellectum taro in recto quam in obliquo, quia definitio sua est ita: 'Intelligibile est aliqu~d apprehensib ile ab in tell ectu' ; •••

A division between terms of first and second imposition ls

24

1 ; , 1 , ~ 1

1

, ....... ..- .......... .,.il, .ob _ .............. __ ... *"- ... .- ....... ___ .... _ _ _ .. _ ..... _ _ ... __ ...... _ ..-" ~ __ _ ~ _ ~

()

4,$

also drawn; thi8 division only applies to ter •• made by

convention. The basic distinction is that name. of first

imposition refer primarily to mental terms and to things which

are neither signs nor go with signs and names of second impo-

sition to conventional signs: there are, however, many

subdivisions. A term of second imposition can have a,strict

and broad characterization: in the broad sense names of second,

imposi tion signify conventional uses whether or not they May

have a counterpart in the mental; in the strict sense it only

signifies the conventional usage and cannot refer to mental

terms. Names of first imposition are also taken in two sen-

ses: broad and strict. In the broad sense they include aIl

names of second imposition; in the strict sense only names

~hich are categorematic and which are not of second imposition

can be considered names of first imposition. Names of first

imposition taken in the strict sense can be of first or second --intention: those of first intention signify things which are

neither signs nor go with signs, such as 'Socrates', 'Plato'

and 'man': those of second intention are those which signify

mental concepts speci fically or conventional signs, for

example species or genus.

A last distinction is made by Ockham between equivocal

and univocal terms, and it too applies only to conventional

language. (AS we have seen, this division would not make sense

within Ockham's conception of what a mental language i8.)

Equivocity is characterized by the fact that the equivocal

termes significata are not subsumed under one mental concept,

25

,

t i

l 1

f , ,

1 ,

~_~"".!II.J .""""'fU.",,",,,,,,, 4 ......... -.tL ...... __ "._._. _._. ___ ""_' __ t J_'_'_d ___ v'.~_. _________ ""'''-' _ ..... , " ..... , .............. _*** ... ,...,.ça "$4!J1 IIJ ....... ~ .... _ .. ,.

•

but under 3any different ones. A term may be equivocal by

chance; in which case a vord is subordinated to many concepts

but to one independently from the tact that it is subordinated

to the otheri the same proper name when applied to Many men

would have this status. A term May also be intentionally

equivocal, and this occurs when a name is first applied to one

thing, and then because of this first appl ication it is

appl ied ta something el se through, for exampl e, resembl ance •

A univocal term, on the other hand, is a term which stands for

all the things subordinated ta one and the same concept.

Ockham' s discussion of s igni fica tian is very important

for a correct understanding of his ,theory of supposition and,

in a more indirect way, of his ontological committments (theo-

ry of universals/essentialism). As it will be shown later his

brand of nominalism can only be properly understood with

~elation especially to his definition of t concept as a

natural sign taken, of course, in conjunctioJ wi th his theory

of SU:Position. Ockham's theory of SUP~sition will be

outlined in the next section.

Section II - Suppositio: 1

A theory of signification is tied in to a theory of

supposition because terms whose meaning had been explained in

the theory of signification come ta supposit for things in a

theory of supposi tion. A theory of supposition properly

speaking is a theory of reference. In it an extreme (subject

or pred icate) of a proposi tion refers to or '.supposi ts for'

26

. - ~., .. _ .. ."....,. ....... ..,..-._ .. -----------------------------------~~---------- --

'4 'l:Wtaj' •• "cu1 lç:;tl .... if ................... .,._ .... Jill .......... _ ....... ________ .... _._ ".

o everything of which it 'ia truly predicated. In the b8CJinning

of the development of the theories of the propertiea of terms,

the central property was not supposition, but it waa

.!.2l!!!!.!.!.i.2; t~e appellative noun came about as a de.vice fOE

bringing aIl t~e things denoted by it undèr one and the a •• e

name: \ ,

Thus the word 'man' signifies the species (un~versal nature) man indeterminately; not as this or that man, and it may appellate a man who actually exists!Oas weIl as one who does not existe

Later on suppositio became more and more important and in

Ockham's theory one particular kind of suppositio, suppositio 1

personalis, had a central role.

According to Ockham suppositio, as we have seen, is a

property that a term acquires only when used in a proposition,

and also appellatio is a subclass of suppositio which has no

independent place in the analysis of the properties of terms.

Suppositio, broadly speaking, means taking the position of

someth!ng else, or standing for something else:

Prom

Ita quod, quando terminus stat in propositione pro aliquo, ita quod utitur il10 termine pro a1iquo, de quo sive de pronomine demonstrante ~psum i11e terminus vel rectus illius termini, si sit obliquus, verificatur, supponit pro il10; et hoc saltem verum est, quando termi­nus f~pponens si9nifica~~ve accipi­tur.

this passage i t seems gu i te clear

tha.t reference in general in Ockham's theory is closely tied

in with something's being either true or false. Generally

27

~,,,,,,,,,,---,,,,,,,~,, \-. -------;:0---

1 t i 1 t t ~ 1 , 1 t ,

·1

1 !

/

"" __ Irot!!If • ..., __ n __ .... _,_. __ ..... _---.. ..... __ ... ______ ...-_ ..... _

~

vhen a term ia the aubject of a propoai{~on t'he thing it

.uppoaits for ia that about whieh the proposition sa ys that

the verb ia predicated.

In Ockham'. aupposi tion theory both the subjeet and the .'

predicate have supposition, and this ia in perfect keeping -

vith his underlying motivation of redueing common terms to

.tana;ng for nothing over and above individuals. The first

general rule whieh Ockham gives is that

••• nUlllquam terminus in al iqua pro­positione, saltem quando significa­tive accipitur, supponit pro aliqî~' nisi de quo predicatur vere.

~here are three major divisions of suppositio:

1) SUPPOSITIO PERSONALIS

2) SUPPOSITIO MATERIALIS

3) SUPPOSITIO SIMPLEX

1) Simple Supposition is had wb.n a term atanda for a men­

tal content but it ia not taken aignificatively. 'Ma~ ia a

.peeies· ia an example. Man here ia not taken signifieati-

vely beeause in order to be so taken it would have to

aignify real things and not mental contents because they

are not what terms properly signify.

2) In Material Supposition al~o the term does not stand for

thoae things which it signifies; it stands for spoken or

.written signa, as for example, "Man' is a noun', in which

'man, does stand for itself (that is the written word),

but not tor individual men, and therefore it does not

signify itself.

3) Personal Supposition will now be diacussed 'in detail.

28

~----------~~~---------------------------------------------------------------- --- --

..... 1II!1It .... 'il' ' ................... _ .......... ,. ... ~ ............. __ ........... _ ~ _111...~_ ... _ ................... _ .. _. .. ~ .. l .... _,. .. ~ ____ .. _ 4 ....... -. ... -t ...... " ... _~<A- ......... 4-'*'-..".. .......... """"'''1'''1.'1''

o

After talking about tbese other types of supposition

Ockham says that in any proposition whate-ver in which it may

appear a term can have personal supposition unless it is

otherwise stipulated. For what concerns material and simple

supposition, however, this is not true. In fact a term

can have material or simple supposition only if the proposi-

tion in which it is used relates to a mental content or to a

spoken or writ.ten sign. From this it is clear that the same

sentence taken with different suppositions can change truth

value, therefore meanings, must be carefully distinguished:

Et sic est haec distinguenda: "homo' predicatur de pluribus'; quia si 'homo' habeat suppositionem p ers 0 n a 1 em , sic est fa l sa, qui a tune denotatur, quod aliqua res significata per hunc terminum 'homo' pr aed ica tur de pl ur ibus; si habeat supposi tionem simpl icem vel materialem, sive pro voce sive pro scripto, est vera, quia tam inten-tic communis quam vox quam illud quod scz:.ibitur praedicatur de pluribus. 1) ,

JI

Turning now to personal supposition proper, Ockham'.

definition of it runs as follows:

Supposi tio Personal is un i versa liter est illa, quando terminus supponit pro suo significato, sive illud significatum sit res extra animam, sive sit vox, sive intentio animae, ai ve si t scr iptum, si ve quandocum­que imaginabile, ita quod, quando­cumque subjectum vel praedicatum propositionis supponit pro suo aignificato, ita quod significative ténetur~ \~mper est suppositio personalls.

Ockham divides personal supposition into two majo~~Eegorie.:

discrete and common supposi tion. Discrete supposi tion appl~ • ........ _~...,-- \".

29

~-------~~~-.~.--------------------------------------------------------------------_.. ---.

~~ ___ t< ........ ~ ___________ L _______ , ____ · ___ ~ ___ 8

- ~~ .... - --... -- - - -- - '- -- ......... .:. ~ ~ , ~- _ ......... - ~ ----_ ..... -

...

to proper names and to demonatrative pronouna taken

signifieativelYi it makes propositions singular; proper names 4

are taken signifieatively by Ockham. Common supposition

appl ies ta 9 enera 1 terms, and i t i s div ided into two further

subclasses, confused and determinate supposition. Oeterminate

supposition occurs when it is possible to make a logical

descent ta the singular parts by a disjunetive proposition,

and he gives the fol1owing example: "Homo eurrit, igitur iate

homo currit, vel ille' et sic de singularis.15 The major

property of this kind of supposition is that the truth of orrly

one of the singular disjoints is suffleient to make the origi-

nal proposition true; in other ~ords from the truth of any of

the disjoints it i5 possible to infer the original proposi-

tion. Confu$ed personal supposition also appl ies to general

t~r:ms, and it is in turn divided into merély confusec;l suppo-

sition and contusad distributive supposition. Merely confused

supposi tian has the form 'Every man i8 an animal', but the

descerit to the sing~lars éan only be made through a

disjunctive ~edicate, and again the original proposition can ~

be inferred from any singular. 'Every man is an animaIt

according to Ockham can val idly become: 'Every man is an

animal, therefore every man is either this animal, or th~t

animal, or ••• •• Confused distributive supposition, on the

other hand, while being of the same form, 'Every man ia an

animal', has supposition on the su~ject, and the descent to

the singulars ls made through a conjunctive proposition of the

form: 'Every lIlan is an animal, ther.efore this man ia an

30

...

,

i 1

1 i \

..

! - 1

1

1 1 !

o

o •

animal, and that man ia an animal, and ••• ·, but it is not

possible to infer the original proposition from anyone of the

singulars or from the conjunction of them. Ockham also has a

distinction between mobile confused distributi~é supposition

and immobile confused distributive supposition concerning the

account of sentences of the form, 'AlI except one ••• •• For

instance in a sentence of the forro 'Every man except Socrates

is running' we have mobile confused distributive supposition,

and we are allowed to roake the logical descent to individuals

(except Socra tes) in a copula ti ve proposi tion such as: 'Every

man except Socrates i5 running, therefore Plato is running

(and sa forth for aIl men different from Socrates).'

s~tences of the form 'Every man is running' which we have

just analyzed are those whose subject has a form of

supposition which Ockham calls immobile confused distributive

supposition.

As we have seen before, Ockham's main preoccupation is

to make sure that aIl signification be a matter of reference

ta individuals. This seems ta be the main reason for his

almost exclusive interest in personal supposition of the

common type. , The main motivation for treating it 50

exclusively was to prove that general terms als0 refer to

individuals. Professor Kneale comments on this fact in the

following way:

1.

By denying that a general term signifies anything which may· be common to various individual-s, he commi ts h imsel f to the mi staken view that a general term is merely a subsf/tute for a list of p~oper names. .

31

, ----1

1 f

)

It seems to me, however, that Ockham wouid much rather admit

to this kind of mistake than to the view that a general term

signifies something which is common to various individuals,

because that something wouid then have to have sorne kind of

reality within Ockham's system and that would certainly be a

case of multiplying entities beyond necessity in Ockham's

eyes. Contrary to Ockham, William of Shyreswood and Peter of

Spain, both realists, thought that a general term always

signifies a form and, because of this, it can only refer.E.!2

~ significato in the case of simple supposition. William of . Shyreswood, even though in hls thought supposition was gaining

importance, treated ~.!.!atio as the central notion; an

appellative noun when used in a proposition could either stand

for a universal nature or for itself. william of Shyreswood,

howev'er, had sUbdivided suppositio communis in the way which

was later adopted by Ockham; there remained nonetheless major

differences in their interpretation with respect to the

descent to singulars:

In the w~rk of William of Shyreswood the phrase 'descendere ad supposi ta' i s used to descr ibe an argument such as 'Every man is running; so Socrates i8 running', where it t's assumed,'of course, that Socrates is a man. 7

As is obvious from the previous remarks, even though this

formulation may seem similar to Ockham's, it does not have the

same kind of purpose or ontologicai outco~e. For Peter of

Spain supposition is more central, he, however, thinks that a

term can have naturai supposition both in a proposition and

outside a proposi tion. Peter of Spain' s naturai supposi tion

32

"1

----~----~'~'_aJ~;;'wp" .... - ........ _~iW-.-;.~PA __ ------____________________ ~.,~,~~ _______________________________ ~ __ ~-~

(

'(

+

has nothing to do wi th Ockham's personai supposi tion; in fact,

Peter of Spain holds that when a spoken sound has

signification in such a way as to become a terrn, it signifies

a universal nature or essence as its significate and it

acquîres a capacity to supposit for aIl actual (and possible)

indlviduals which belong to thlS un1versal nature,-and this is

what he means by natural supposition. 1 went lnto this short

survey of sorne of the opposing realist Vlews to stress the

fact that aIl medieval logîcians, even though 111 different

ways, were concerned with ]ustifylng their ontolog1cal views

through the lr log ical theor ies. The most impo rtan t po ln t in

Ockham's mlnd lS, as we have seen, the necessity of showing

that a general term can be reduced to a list of individuals,

because this wi 11 have as a consequence, among others, the

fact tha t the truth val ue 0 f demonstr a t ive proposi tions about

natural science can aiso be grounded in what he considers the

only reality: individuals or particulars. Knowledge can then

be of particulars (pr irnary substances in Aristotel ian term ).

with this in mind, 1 would like to look now at sorne attempts

to show that Ockham's system is equivalent to modern

quantification theory because 1 think it will bring out more

shar;:>ly Ockham's own concerns and motivations.

Section III - Quanti fication and Supposi tion;

Efforts have been made by modern logicians towards th~

development of a form of translation of medieval logical

systems into modern notation, notation which would be faithful

33

....

i , i

1

1

' .

(

(

•

to the medieval's interpretation of their own systems and

which would not completely change their systems to adapt them

to modern ones. These translations would also have to remain

faithful to the medieval's metaphysical concerns. 1 will

start by looklng at Boehner's view on the matter. He holds

that, even though there are sorne matters in which the

discrepancy IS obvious, nevertheless systems like those of

Peter of SpaIn, William of Ockham, Walter Burleigh and Albert

of Saxony are by and large translatable into modern systems of

the Frege/Russell type. For my purposes i t is sufficient ta

look at Ockham's system. Boehner's book, ~edie~~.! Logic,

produced Crltlclsms of the type given by Professor Matthews in

his paper "Ockham's supposition theory and modern logic",

WhlCh looks at what the importance is of the difticulties

out lIn ed b y Boe h n e ras we lIa s t 0 0 the r pro b lem s. 1 n

examIning hlS paper 1 plan to bring out the preoccupation with

the tact that, even though modern logic may, in tact, in

general l ines, be able to translate Ockham's system, it can

only do it at the price of changing the interpretations which

Ockham himself seems to have given ta his own system.

Professo r Tren tman remarks tha t

A logic differs from an uninter­preted câlculus in that, at least according to Many logical theorists (including the medieval logicians und e r d i sc u s s ion), a log ici a always developed with a vie", to an interpretation. 1 t must be deve-loped wi th a v iew to expressing what 'iïr truly be said about the world.

1 t seems ta me tba t this statement we Il expesaes Matthe"s' and

34

F*4:::;e4 :;C;:W;" 4

(

o

others' general criticisms of Boehner's approach to the

examination of medieval logical systems. 1 plan to dedicate a

second part of the discussion to looking at Professor Henry's

e ffor t to tr ansla te Ockham's system into a system which

is not of the Frege/Russell type: Lekniewski's ontology.

Professor Henry's contention IS that Lemiewski's ontology is

able to translate medieval logic into modern notation without

changing its interpretation, in a way in which other systems

cannot do 1 t. 1 will examine Henry's contention in some

detail, and also in relation to Professor Trentman's

criticism of it. According ta Geach, Le91iewski's ontoloqy

i s one of the la test d ev elopments in the 'Hi s tory of the

corruptions of logic'. Of the two - name theory of predica-

tion, he says:

ln our own time the two nallle theory has bee-n given a new 1ease of 1 i fe by Pol ish logieians, notably by Stanislaw Lemi-ewski. Great 109i­cal subtlety hàs sometimes been shown in developing the theory. It would be unjust to calI this subtlety fut~le, but 1 do call it ID i sd irected. l

This view , it seems to me, matches weIl professor Trentllan's )

criticism of Henry's effort. He, against Henry, holds that,

in fact, Le!lniewski's ontology weIl translates aIl of the

Medieval logical systems which adopted and were based on the

two - name theory of pred ication, but he holds that i t cannot

in any way hand1e the translation of the Thomist type of

logie. Finally 1 would like to see what the ilDport of aIl

these discussion. ac:tuilly is vith respect to the problell of

35

,

1

1 1 i

how many of Ockham's intuitions can be handled and kept by a

complete formaI i zation of his system.

In turning now to the examination of Boehner's book

Medieval Logic it is worth noting as a prel iminary remark,

that the book is dedicated to the examination of scholastic

logic and to its relevance to and translatability into modern

quantification theory and ax iomatic systems. The main purpose

of the book as i t is expressed by Boehner is:

to show that a carefui analysis of such terms (synca tegorematic words) is a sure sign of a deeper consciousness of the formality of logic. 20

It seems to me, therefore, that it is in orQer to show

the awareness of the scholastics to the formaI character of

logic that Boehner embarks on the enterprise of showing the

translatabi I i ty of the scholastics' tneo-ry -of supposi tion and

of their theolY of consequences into ~odern sys'tems, and not

pl imar ily to show canplete agreement both of pUlpOseS and of

intuition between medieval and modern logicians. In his

examination of the relevance and importance of scholastic

logic Boehner points out that,

Lacking an adequate symbol i8lll, the Scholastics fai 1 ed to expre •• suf­ficiently the distinction between the constants and the variables of logical discourse21

While this 6eems to point to a defect in the logical analy.i.

of the medievals, Boehner then goes on to say that this defi­

cie~cy is not as big as it May appear at first sight because,

he thinks, it can be replaced by the sharp distinction that

the medievals had betveen categorelllatic worda an~ syncategore-

36

(- ,

f

o

of

matie words; furthermore, the distinction whieh they made

between the formal and the material elements of discourse,

mirrors qui te well the modern d istïnction; in fact, the formal

elements of logical diseourse are the constants while the

material elements are the variables. The analysis made by

Boehner is of great importance also because it i8 one of the

basic points of departure for the d isageement between him, on

the one side, and Professors Matthews and Kneale, on the

other. 1 will discuss this point when examining Professor

Matthews' opinion on this subject.

Given the analogy between constants and variables, and

synea tegorema tic and ca tegorema tic words, Boehner goes on to

discuss the similarities between sorne medieval theories of

supposition and modern quantification theory; in doing this he

points, however, to a very basic difference between modern and

mcklieval logic. He thinks that the major source of difference

between them i8 the fact that Medieval logicians dedicated

th_sel ves to the anal ysis of rdinary language, latin; while

modern logicians use, as t e basis for their analysis, an

artificial and simplified language. Having made this remark

he adds that:

lCeepi ng thi s impo r tan t di f ferenee between the two logies in mind, we ahall not be so prone to overlook the basic similaE'~~y beneath the apparent di "erai ty.

, After thea. introduetory remarks Boehner goe. on to dlacu ••

two particular cases: a particular, affiraative, categorieal

proposition about a state of affairs, and a univer •• l, affh;-

37

~. scoa; '4' a; iQU_ • l ,'; ..,.SJ - p_ 4

\ j

( ,

,.

/

\ maUve, categorical proposition about a fact. About the first

case he says that this type of proposition 18 analyzed by

Ockham in exactly the sarne way as by mOdern logicians. Taking

for example: 'Some man i s morta l', which i s an example of wha t

Ockham called determinate personal supposi tion; he says that

both for Ockham and for modern logicians,

the proposition is true, if there i s at lea8t one subject (or indi­vidual), about which it is true ta say: this is a man .and this is mortal. 23

Ockhamls analysis of this type of proposition, as discussed

shortly in section' II, is that ~t is equivalent ta a

disjunction, each member of which consists of a singular

proposition containing the subject in its singularized form;

therefore it becomes 'some man is mortal (-) this man is

mortal, or that man is mOItaI, or that man i8 mortal ••• • •

Boehner then 90e8 on to say that this Bame proposition would

be expressed in modern logical notation in exactly the same

way: (Ex) [Man(ie) • Mortal(x») <-) {(Man(xI)". Mortal (xl») v

(Man(x2) • Mortal(x2») v ••• xn}. In the case of a universal

affirDla ti ve categor ical proposi tion about a fact the matter is

different and more problematic; modern logic, for the /'

int'erpretation of a sentence like 'EverY)B,arr i8 mortal l ,

transforms i t into a condi tional proposJ. tian in the following

way: (x) (Man(x) -) Mortal(x»). The problem with the analysis

of thi8 type of proposition i8 t6at O~kham, even thou9h he

mi9ht have known of the possibil ity of transforming it into a

conditional, wanted to keep the possibility open to infer fram

it a sentence like: 'Some man is mortal', and this obviously

38

1

, li. f ... ' •• e ....... "'4 ..... _.".P, ........ ... t4I"'f ........................... ____ ... _ .... ___ ........... _ ...................... ., ................... ~ .... IIt .. #Ifo : frj II! .,. ........ ~ ..... _

o

/

,

cannat be dODe if the proposition becomes eonditiona~. He

insisted, the-=efore, on keeping the sentence's existential

import, which it loses in the modern analY8is. Ockham, there­

fo.re, analyzed the proposition in the following vay: 'Every

man is mortal (-) this man is mortal, and that man i8 mortal,

and that fan is mortal ••• ', and sa forth for every man.

Boehner, however, argues that there is a possibility of

finding a translation of this kind of analysis in modern logie

and the possibility lies in 'simply sinqularizing the

individual variable.,24

Apc ord i ng to Boehner, howev er, the rea l prob l em in the /

trans·la·tion of medieval theories of supposition into modern

logical notation is given by the s~pposition of the predicate;

there is no counterpart of it present in modern logic. The

fact that Ockham accepted the following eqivalence: 'Every man

ls mortal; therefore, every man is this mortal or that mortal

or that mortal ••• ·, shovs that he did not interpret the

universal affirmative proposition the same vay modern logic

does. At t~e end of, the examination of Ockham's theoEy

Boehner stre.ses again that,

A proposi tion in ord inary 1 anguage is usually composed of several predicates. If the general struc­ture of ordinary propositions is to be reta ined, a compl icated inter­pretation is nece~si tated. As far as ve can determ~~e, this consti­tutes insurmountaolè difficulties for the symbol i za tion (}of sueh pro­posi tions in the language of modern logic. A Scholastic universal, affirmative proposition contains much more than a universal, affir­mative proposition in modern logie,

39

* = t4' _., Q:,.

1

1 i

, 1

(

for it contains existential import. 25

-rrom this quota two -things come out, once more, and quite

First of aIl Boehner attributes most of the problems

arising in the translation of medieval logic into modern

notation to the differenee of the languages used, ordinary

language as opposed to an artifieial 1anguage26 , and not to a

real differenee in intuition or to a real difference in the

interpretation of the logie of a language. Secondly, it seem.

to me, he considers the only [eal difference of interpretation

and intuitions to reside in the medievals' failure to

eliminate existential import from the universel, affirmative

proposi ti on.

1 would like now to take a look ai: Matthews' paper,

"Oekham's supposition theory and modern logic", because it

8eems to me to be a reaction, not to Boehner' s attempt to show

the importance of scholastie logie, but to Boehner's optimism f

in examining the differenees and similarities between modern

and Medieval logic. Matthews takes Ockham's theory as the

paradigm for his analysi s. In The Q.!velopment ~ Logic,

Professor Kneale, in talking about Ockham's theory of

supposition remarks that:

Although it is worth notice that Ockham here treats universal propo­sitions as indefinitely large conj unctions, and ex i stent ial pro­positions as indefinitely large disjunctions, we should not let this novelty blind us to the fact that his real concern is not to expl ain quanti fiers, but rather to show how general terms may be said to stand for individuals.27

40

-..----------,~-~#~Ç~$~~;-,--*----------------------------------------------------------~------------- .-

1 1 ,

1 1 J

l . )

1 1

1

1 i

_ ......................... ___ .. ""' ...................... '- ___ ........ ___ .......... ., .... &... _ _ ... _ ....... t.- .. ~ •

- . 1 would like to suggeat that tt ta thia kind of 9.eneral

point, (wh ich cannot be emphast zed enough) among other thi nga,

which Matthewa has in mind in writing his paper. He does not

onl y argue that there'-l. are di screpancies ln the deta 1 l s of the

theory which make it difficul t to find an exact translation,

he al so wants to argue that there are basic di fferences in the

presupposi tions and starti ng po i nts of the theor ies which

cannot be accounted for by Boehner's analysis, and, therefore,

by the translations. He starts out by making it clear, in

tact, that although there are merits to the notion that there

are similarities between medieval logic and quantification

theory; one should not think, las Boehner's analysis may show,

that the ma in difference between them resides in the different

interpretations of universa1 propositions.

Matthews then starts a detailed analysis of Boehner's

c1aim of simllarity between the two 109ics, by examining the

fact that Boehner says on p.29 of his book that a particular,

affirmative, categorieal proposition is hand1ed the sarne way

by supposition theory and quantification theory. Matthews

maintains that Boehner has made a double mistake: both in

thinking that sentence (1) 'Some man is an animal', la

considered by Ockham to be equivalent to sentence (2) 'This

man ls an animal or that man is an animal or that man ••• ', and

also in thinklnq that sentence (7) '(Ex) (Px" Gx)' la

consldered by modern 109icians to be equiva1ent to sentence

, ... - He thinks in fact that

Ockham says that (1) implies (2) and that, (2) impl les (1), but

he did not put the two toqether to make an equivalence:

~------'" ~

1 \

.................... ......, ....... -_ ....... _---- ... _------*'-_ ..... _-_ ...... _---- -...-..- .. ~~ .. _ ..

()

. ,

furthermore moat modern logicians woù1d say that although (..8)

implies (7), the converse is not the case. 1 do not think,

however, that this criticism attacks the core of Boehner's

claim, and a1though Matthews' criticist!l is, in fact, correct,

it does not yet contribute to the argument that modern logic

and supposition theory differ in basic intuitions and general

Interpretations of their respective systems. The second point

on which Matthews criticizes Boehner, consists in the fact

that Boehner had remarked that there was no p~rallel in modern

109ic to the predicate - term supposition in propositions of

type A. Matthews remarks that this difficulty applies also to

propositions of type 1 and that, therefore, Boehner's remark

that proposi tions of thi s type were interpreted in the same

way by modern and Medieval 10gician8 in unglounded. This

criticism seems to prov ide a more ser ious threat to Boehner' s

claims and a more basic drawback to the wh~le enterprise

because i t appl ies to aIl proposi tions alÎ'"tar as the pred icate

- term's supposi tional descent is concerned. The probl em i s

no longer restricted to universa1, categorical, affirmative

proposi tions. At the end of his analysis of thi. point

Matthew. says that:

JIN .GU *=1

So far, then we have found two reasons fpr denying that the 1 pro po s i t ion 1-8 i n ter pre te d b Y .odern logicians in the same way it was interpreted by Ockham. First a single quantifier is normally all that is used in modern log ic for an 1 proposition; but in order to parallel the ~wo suppositional descents we should need two quanti­fiers. Second, and even more impo­r tan t , the m od e r n par aIl el t 0

42

f'

, ; ,

t

i 1

•

_.. .. _ ... ~ . ~. i • ............ ~ ~ ~ -. _ ,,_ •• ~.... .~ ........... ... ... " .... _ .... _ _ _ _.. _

supposi tional desce~i invol ves a wastage of disjuncts.

The way in which modern logic would parallEil the supposi tional

descent is the fol,lowing: (lOa) 'Xl i8 a man and xl is

identical with something which ls an animal, or x2 i5 a man

and x2 is identical with something which is an animal, or ••• ·;

since only one of the disjuncts need he true for (10a) to be

true, aIl the disjuncts about x's which are not men can be

disregarded, hut this produces what Matthews calls 'an

enormous wastage of di sj uncts.'

This introduces a very strong doubt as to the

possibility of translating any of the types of propositions

from med ievai supposi tion theory to modern quanti ficational

theory_ The reason for this is the fact that in Ockham's

theory the quantified elements are 90ing to be subject and

predicate terms, in modern quantificational theory, on the

other hand, variables are quantified. Matthews says very

rightly, and 1 would say, in agreement with Kneale's

previously quoted remark, that:

Q

To eliminate a quantification by expantion we shou1d' have to go trom,' (Ex) fixe to the di sj unct 10n 'fixl v {lx2 v ••• • "and from '(x) ~Xl to the conjunction '~xl • ~x2 • ••••• So one reason that there can be no fai thful render ing of suppe­sitional'oeacent in modern matheaa­tieal'logic ia this: sinee it ia variables that are quantified in modern 10gic, any de.cent to singulars achieved by the el iroin.­tion of quantifiers would have to he a descent to aIl x's, that is, to aIl the individuels withln the uni verse of discourse. Regar­dles8 of whether a proposition ia universal or particu1ar# thera

43 \

... -----.. """I!"!!, ;a'ftII$II1'III4RIi!'I',411'1OJ2illlllli4'"S4""A""I'I;;:IIIJII!Pi--------------------------- - ,---

1

1 f

, î

__ + ".. .. _ -.. ~ ..... "- __ ................. _ -. .... '"_ "'_ w __ ....... _____ ....- .. ~ _ ... ~ .... _

o

could be no descent by el imination of quantifiers to, say, men and nothing else, ~, there is i~ suppo­si tion theory.

It seems to me that this criticism is quite conclusive,

because it points to a most basic difference with.respect, not

as Boehner wouid have l iked, to the deta il s of one particui ar

type of proposition, but with respect to the translation of

all types of propositions and to the interpretations of the

two sys tems.

1 would like to point out that if Bo.hner's task wa.

almply, as he says at times, to give relevance to the great

devel opmen t and importance of schol astic log ic, and if in

order to dO that he tried to point out some informaI

aimilarities between medieval logic and modern logici then the

eriticisms contained in Matthews' paper are, to some extent,

besides the point. But if, on the other hand, his main task

was t'O show major points of agreement in the actual

accomplishments and intuitions of the two theories, then

Matthews' paper retains great importance and impact in so far

as it shows that such an enterprise ia very problematic if not

altogether impossible.

Given the fact that Matthews' critici'm seems to be

quite conclusive evidence againat the possibility of

transI ati ng med iev al aupposi tian theory into quantifi.cation

theory of a system of the Freeje/Ru.a.ll type, 1 would li ke now

to turn to the exemination of the po •• ibil i ty of tranal ating

aed ieval theor i •• into .nother modern ayat_: Lellnieva.l'.

/ ontology.

•

44

tl"qpa '. ( p » 4 Ji

., 1

..... '-"',.. ... • .. L'" .... _ ........ .. ... .. ................... 1... ~~ ... .L. _ -.. .. ~ __ ... __ ..... "'-_~. • .... __

1 ->

(

In h..is book Medieval Logic and Metaphysics Professor

Henry argues that Lellniewski's ontology can hand1e the

translation of all types of medieval log ica1 systems: 1 would

like to examine this claim in relation to Professor Trentman

cri tic i sm 0 fit. In order to do this 1 think it would be

profitable to give a short out1ine of the way in which Henry

presen ts Le lm iews k i' s onto 1 ogy. About Le!miewski' s onto l ogy

Henry says:

This logic i5 anti - forma1ist, in that i ts theorems are interpreted truths, and not mere syntactical­ly permissib1e combinations of uninterpreted marks. It has the capaci ty for the introduction of indefinitely many ,new parts of speech (semantica1 ca tegor ies), and hence can adapt i tsel f to the required degree of exactitude for the purpose of ana1yzing Medieval 1 og i c , •••• l' t em plo Y san in ter­pretation of the quanti fiers which allows dissociation of the latter from its usually necessary entanglement with the notion of existence, and so is in a position to come ta more exact terms with Medieval discourse on this topic.30

Renry begins his exposition of Le!;niewski's ontology by

considering what has to count as a name: he defines name in

the following way:

a name (or noun - 'expression) ia an expresaion sui table to accur aa the arguat:nt of one or other of both of the following proposition -forming functors: 1. There exista exactly one object which ia (a, an) ••• , 2. There exist at least two obj\ecta each of wh ich i a (a, an) •••

Moun - expressions can be simple or compound and ,shared, un-

ahar.d, or fictitious names; they are the basis of

45

, \ ,

(

1

1 1 ! i

J ()

Le!iniewski' s ontology. Henry uses the ontolog ical tabl e32 in

order to explain the functions which these names ean have and

the eombinations whieh they can be used ta forme

On the table 1.1 represents shared oames, 1.2 represents

unshared names, and 1.3 represents fieti tious names: ai 1 the

o the r dia gram son the t a b 1 e r e pre sen t aIl the po s s i b i lit i e s

for other combinations. Henry then gaes i'nto a detailed

exposition and description of the funetors of Le~niewski's

ontology. The most important of them is the functor of ,"""-:

singular inclusion,'a€b' because th~ tonctor t ••• E. •••• is the \ -\ "

only primitIve functor of ontology, the best ch'aracterization

of it in ordinary language, aeeording ta Henry, is given by

the Latin ·est'. Another interesting fuoctor is the functor ~

af strong inclusion 'aCb', every a is b, Fs the ordinary

language rendering of it and the interesting feature of it for

the purposes of translating medieval logic, is tha,t for the

truth of an expression of this form the existence of both a

and b is required, (For a description of aIl the other

functors, part II of Henry's book ~~~l~~~l LoglE ~~~

Metaphysics is very d,etailed and clear). Since up to this

point Le!iniewski's ontology only takes care of the semantica1

category of names, and eould, therefore, ooly produce a proper

tr ansl ation of the rnedieval two - name theory 0 f pred ication,

Henry gives two ontological definitions with which one can

obtain a verb from a name and viceversa:

15 [afl :a E: trm{Cf}.<->. ae.a. f(8). Here a name 1 iRe expression 'trm {ct}' is formed f~om the verb (pre­~lcate) '~'; thus if 'ft ls

46

• , ,

-

( Li kewi se:

'leads' then , leader' • ~3

'trm {'fl'is

16 ( ab) : ~ [ (b] ] (a). < - >. a ~b. Th us if 'b' is the name 'deputy', then ' [lb]]' lS the verb 'deputlzes'. Th usa s s um i ng n ame a nd ver b (0 r predicate) as basIc semantlcal ca­tegories, it is possIble to build up an lndefinitely large number of new parts of speech of i ne r e a sin g c om pIe x i t Y b Y m e anS 0 f definitlons introduclng such many Ilnk functors. 34

Thus if thlS move can be taken to be legitlmate, and both

names and verbs can be taken as baSIC semantlcal categorIes of

ontology, Henry WIll not only be able to translate two - name

theories of predIcatIon of the Ockhamist type, but he will

also be able to take care of the translatIon ofThomlst, or

an t l - Oc kham I st med 1 ev a l log ics. With Henry's eXpOSItIon It

is certainly possible to get rid of most of the problems

caused by the attempts of translating Ockham's theory of

supposition lnto modern logic, lncludlng the very important

one pointed out by Matthews that where modern lOglc quantifies

over varlables Ockham quantIfIes over terms. However, as

Professor Trentman pOlnted out, sinee the only primitive term

of the original axioms of ontology is 'E.', which has as

arguments two names, this theory can only be considered an

appropriate tool for translating the two - name theory of

pred ieation. Prof-essor Tren tman says:

Ockham regards the copula as 'the verb join ing the pred icate vi th the subjeet' (copul a aute. vocatur verbWD eopulans praedicatUlll cu. aubieeto. 8 1, c.33). He regards the predicate and subject as being

.7

--~------~~~.~>~.~i=~' ____ ------------------------__ -'--_____ ~----____ -----------------------------------

(

(

allke names of the same semantic category, and ln a weIl -formed proposition he thinks the copula joins a subJect with a predicate to form a proposition ln which the two names (if the proposition is ~§ue) each name the same lndivldual.

Since Le~llewski's ontology 15, qUlte elearly, a modern

ver s ion 0 t the t w 0 - na met he 0 r y 0 f P r ed 1 e a t ion, i t e an

eertalnly take eare of the translatIon of Oekham's theory.

The prImitIve functor 'E' 15 ln tact a copula, 'est' )Oinlng

two names. According to Professar Trentman, however, ontology

d oes no t seem to be ab 1 e to accoun t equa Il y we Il fa r those

14 th century loglclans who rejected the two - name theory of

predication, for example V. Ferrer and W. Burleigh: Professor

Trentman argues that 5lnee,

50 far as the doctrines of predica­tIon of these fourteenth cent ury logician are concerned ••• subject and predicate do not belong to the same semantic category, the­refore, Ferrer wi Il not allow that pred icate can have the property of supposi tion, 36

the doctrine of at least these Medieval logieians could not be

translated by using Leliniewski's ontology and what would be

needed wauld be a farm llke 'g(A)' as analyzed ln a Fregean

system. In answer ta this obJection, Henry, taking this point

to be simply a syntaetie remark, eounteracts by saying that

the two definltions given above, which per.it to obtain a na.e

from a verb and v lee versa, would be enough to lDake i t

possible to translate these other kinds of Medieval 109ics

al so. This because, by virtue of these tvo formulas, tbe

verb and the name, as 1 quoted before, vould becc.e two basic

48

.:;:, c; c.

1

1 }

1

1

1 1

1

(

(

semantic categories of ontology,

and hence a '(1 (A)' form cor respon­ding to every 'twî - name' fom of the type of 'a~b', 7

would be given. The point, however, made by Professor

Trentman was not only a syntactic point. His point, if 1

understand it correctly, would seem to be more directed to a

problem of interpretation; in one of his papers he maintains

that there are three ways of talking about a formal system:

(I) One can ta 1 k about a fo rma 1 system strictly syntactically, as though its elements were meanin-9 1 es s m a r k sor cou n ter sin a 9 am e , and refuse to consider any question about interpretation and ontolo­gy •••• (11) One can say about a formaI system tha t i t can be inter­pre t ed i n var i 0 u s wa ys t 0 Y i e 1 d various sets of ontological commi tments. The system i tsel f, accord ing to thi s v iew, i s neutral with respect to ontological questions... • (III) One can say about a formaI system that its structure on interpretation reflects the true (and only true) ontol ogy. It~ may i ndeed be designed with a viev to an interpretation capable of expressing those and only those distinctions th1i cOllllllit one to the trtie ontology.

Professor Trentaan's ~ontention is that lif one is perfoming

a type - 1 activity, in givlng the two definition.:

(1) (afJ :a~trlll{f} .<->.a&.ao,a, and

(2){ab):€-((b)) (a) <->at.bi then the move saay weIl be legiti •• te

and 1 t lIIay alao be possible to interpret syat ... of tbe type

of Sur 1eigh and Ferrer vi th Lemiew.ki's ontology. So a1.0 he

.. intains that if one is perfocaing a type - II activity, thi.

type of saove i •• qually legiti •• te. But he •• int.i". tbat

~ ___ '~=_,"I~' ___ 4 ___ • ______ --____________ ·_9 ____ --------------______ ~ __ __

(

with respect to medievai Iogicai systems it is type - III

activity which shouid be taken into account in order to be

fa i thful to the authors' moti vations. In fact, he sa ys that:

In any case, although there are questions that might be raised about the extent to which we can speak of their having to do with formaI systems at aIl, it is clear that the medievai logicians did not limit their study to a type - 1 acti v i ty; in fact (and Henry wouid agree) the point of view of these logicians was most Jgike that des­cribed above in III.

Furthermore, it is also maintained by Professor Trentman, and

surprisingly argued for in various places by Professor

Henry, that Le!miewski's ontology is aiso a system well

described by type - III activity. Henry says that the

theorems of ontology are true not simply in the sense in which

propositions are true in logic, but in the sense in which

propositions are true in science. And Professor Trent •• n

quotes:

if, hovever, we take into account the contents of ontolo9Y then it wou là be more appropr ia te to àe.cribe it a. a theory of wbat there is. Just as astronomy tell. us something about heavenly bodies, the theses of ontology tell u. something about things or objl~t. if one prefers, or individuais.

50 if the point of view of the meàievals, na.ely type - III

activity, were not enough by itself to dete~ine the fact tbat

people like Burleigh and Ferrer had interpreted .y.t ....

inea.patible vith Le~iev.ki·s ontology; certainly Henry'. own

contention about the fact that Lell'liewski's ontology is it.elf

an interpreteà sy.t .. , would be. Furtbe~ore, in the opinions

50

Cf _cç:b a*4.

, f

f !

. î ~

of people Trentma~, Geach and Kearna, and possibly in

Lehniewski's own opinion, Le!ln-i-e-wskPs ontology is a type -

III activity, and it i8 a nominali8t system.

To conclude 1 would like to summarize the general point

of the above criticism in the following way: if Henry is going

to maintain that ontology is an interpreted system, in which

names are the basic semantic category, then the introduction

of verbs or predicates cannot constitute another semantic

category. On this account he would have to give up the claim

that ontology can interpret and translate correctly non -

nominalist Medieval theories. If, on the other hand, Henry is

g01ng to maintain the claim that ontology can translate such

authors correctly, then he would have to give up the claim

that it is an interpreted system. 1 do not see how he could

solve the problem without accepting one of these two alterna-

tives, and 1 also think that, given the fact that Lellniewski'.

ontology 5eems to be quite clearly an interpreted sys,tem, and

interpreted to fuI f~11 the needs of Lemiewski's nominal ism,

Henry would have to give up the claim that with Lellniewaki's

ont 0 1 og Y he ca n t r ans 1 a te, and m 0 s t 0 f aIl, i n ter pre t

correctly, those authors who clearly reject the two - na ••

tbeory of predication.

More important ta our larger discussion, however, is the

fact that, as has been shawn, Ockha.'. theory of supposition

can properly be handled by Lellniewski's ontology but not by

sy.t ... of the Prege/Russell type. Thi., in tutn, shows quit •

clearly that Ockh .. •• syat .. also ia an interpreted .y.t .. and

51

f •

, r

1

j

1

- ..... If\< ... ". • _ ... _ .. ____ ......... _ ... _ ~ ~ ~.~ "'''' ....... _ .......... _~ ___ ....... ____ "'7 ... - ~- ~ -. _..- ....... ~ -, - -- -~ .... - -... . ...... ~ ... - -. ..... _ ... ~ -... - .......... _ ..... ....,.. -- ................... -

( l

•

it is a version of the two - name theory of predication. In

order to understand Ockham's metaphysical concerna, thereforé,

one has to keep clearly in mind that which i8 entailed by his

logical system: namely a classical form of nominalisme In the

next chapter 1 will look at Ockham's modal logic to s.e

whether it can help in finding Ockham's nominali .. compatible

with some form of es.entialism.

L.

52

o ...

.....

SU El

..

1 L. M. O. Rijk, "Tbe Origin. of the Theory of the Properti •• of T.t .... in!h! Ca.bridie Hi.torx of Later Medieval PbilO.O~hY, N. Kretzœann, A. Kenny, , 3. Pinborg ;a •• (cambrIdge: Cambr dge university Press, 1982), p.16l.

2 Ibid., p.162.

3 Oekham, Oekham's Philosophieal writinrs, P. Boehner ed. (New York: Thomas NeliOiï, Sons, Ltd., 1957 , p.6".

" L. M. De Rijk, "The Development of Suppositio Natura­lis in Medieval LogieR

, Vivarium 11. 1973, p.77.

S For more details on Buridan's discussion and on the general topie Cf. De Rijk, "The Development of Supposi tio .....

6 Oekham, Philosophie.l writinga, p."8.

1 V. Perrer, Tractatus de Suppoaitionibu8, J.A. Trenat.n ad. (Stuttgaard: Frommann-HolZbooq, 1977), p.22.

a Ockham, Philosophieal Kr i ting., p. 53.' 1

9 Ibid., p.S5.

10 L.M. De Rijk, "Theory of,the Properties of T.r •• •• p.165.

11 Oekham, Philosophieal Writings, p.6 ••

12 Ibid., p.65.

13 Ibi'd., p.70.

14 Ibid., pp.6S-ti6.

lS Ibid., p.71.

16 w. , M. Kn_a1e,"!!. D."SipDt .If fe.le. (O.focd: .,... Clarendon Pre •• , 1962), pp.ft1- •

'17 Ibid., p.268.

18 J.A. Trent.an. ·Letnl •• aki t s"onto109Y and .0 •• lIedieval Logicians, Motr. b!!!! Journal.!!! l'or •• 1 LOlie VII, 1966, p.363. .

. 19 P.T. Geach, Lille Matter.. ,Berk.l.y a~ LO. ADg.l ••• Univer.ityof Californ a fr •••• 1'72}, p.52.

53

.. &iLW fi 4P~4

p-

, < 1 , ~

G

o·

• 20 P. Boehner, Medieval Logic, (Manchester: Manchester

University press, 1966), p.19.

21 Ibid., p.24.

22 Ibid., p.29.

23 Ibid., pp.29-30.

24 Ibid., p.3l.

25 Ibid., p.44.

26 This cannot be the major probl .. becauae, in case it ___ ~ ware, i t would suffice to CCDpare Scholastic v iaw8 to modern

\- 'ordinary language' philosophers. When Strawson taik. about an analysis of ordinary language he criticizes Russell's view that un i versa 1 proposi tions should becane cond i tional s (wi th no existential import) in the following way: in ordinary language when we say that (1) "AlI crows are black" and when va say that (2) "Some crow ( in partieular Stanley) is black", we, in both cases, are making an existential claim: we both think that (1) has existential impart, and that (2) follows or can follow from (1). Strawson in this respect Is in full agreement with aIl the medievals; they thought that universal propositions have existential impart and that if there are no croW8, then, neither (1) nor (2) can be true.

27 w. , M. Kneale,The Development of Logie, p.268.

28 G.B. Matthews, "Oekham's Supposi tion Theory and Modern Logic", Philosoehical Revlew 73, 1964, p.95.

/

29 Ibid., pp.95-96.

30 D. P. Henry, Medieval ~ and Metaphysics (London: Hutchiaon University Llbrary, 1972), p.j.

31 Ibid., p.17.

32 Ibid., p.42.

33 Ibid ••

34 Ibid ••

3S J. 'l'rentaen, "r.tnle.ki' a on toI ogy" ,

36 Ibid., p.362.

37 D. P. Henry, "Leiniewaki's Ontology a Logiciens", Motre 2!!! Journal ~ por .. l Losie p.324.

Some Mec! iev.'1 n.3, 1969,

_ ....... _~J

• J .K ........ 4 ,<

, 1 {

f

1 i 1

1

1 Î ) 1 . 1

()

. ,

38 J. Trent.an, ·On Interpretation, L.tnie ... ki'. Ontology, and the Study of Modern Logic·, !!.!!!. 1., Ap76, pp.~1'7-18.

39 Ibid., p.218.

.0 C. Lejewaki, "On Lellnievaki'. Ont'o1ogy·, •• tio 1-2, 1957-60, p.1S3.

\ J

55

r

1 1 , , ,

1

1 j

f

\

~ ~ ....... ~-- _ ... ~,,-------_ .......... -_ ..... -- ... ..-...- ..... -.. ------ --,.. ..... - ~.(. I~'_ iii. ~~ ......... ~tt\i .... I\.,.!Htb'*~~#P

•

•

Chapter Il

MOdal '09ie ~ Z •• entieli.-

Introduction:

But. as Oekham seeks to ahow. those who refer the distinctions between genera. species, differentiae, and pro pe r t i es, t 0 r e a 1 l Y dis tic t things co-existing in the indivi­dual s denoted by thein;" automatical­ly destroy the distinction between essential and accidenta1 predica­tion, and between necessary and contingent propositions. As has been stated before, OckhalD's logical naminaliam is the sine ~ua non of his metaphysical realism.,

As was said before, Ockham wanted to reject Art.totle'a

conception of universals as real things outafde the aind,

because such a view, according to him, would produce a contra­

diction. A univeraal, if it existed out_ide the mind .s an\

entity, would have to be an individual. He also wanted to

Eejeet the Scotist viaw that theEe was a formaI distinction

between the common n.ture and the individual ity, on the

gEound. th.t such a di.tinction ~ouid not be purely mental but

had to be real; for thi. reason the Scotist view would be

bound to encounter the •••• proble •• encount.rad by other .

r •• list theories of universals. Ockh •• 's unfavourable

opinions on the notion of universale !n ~ is related to the

fact that he a1so he1d the view that the other part of the

•• taphysic. of •••• nc ••• tb. part E.lat.d to divine id ••••

56

.., ................ __ ...... _ .. ~ _ ... _ .... _ .... _4'" ... _ ............. ~ _. ___ .... ~" __ ... ____ ...... ~~ ... _.. ~ ~

(> should not really be part of Christian systems, because he

thought that these essences or eternal ideas would limit the

power of God in creation. They were, according to him,

brought into Christian philosophy out of respect for the Greek

philosophy which had bel ieved in them. One part of the

metaphysics of essences, therefore, had to be rejected on

theological grounds, and the other part, the one concerning

the uni'y~.!~ in~, had to be modified. As Moody points

out, Ockham wants to reject realism with respect to universals

through the elaboration of his logical system and, as we have

seen before, he seems to want to retain a notion of essence

which is, however, completely different from the ones which

different forms of realism would uphold. In the previous

chapter it has been established, through an examination of his

theories of meaning and of reference, what the relationship

i8, according to Ockham's nominalism, between thought and

reality and how the one to one correspondence between the two

realms makes it possible for him to maintain the link which,

if lost, would lead him to scepticisme According to Ockham,

Many indivi8uals are subsumed under a common concept

(universal) through a notion of resemblance or similarity;

there is no reason for a part of the universal to be ~ the

various individuals, in order that they May a11 be referred to

by using the same concept. Essences are not universal.

Accprding to Moody's quoted passage the distinction between

accidental predication and essential predication and between

necessary and contingent pr.oposi tions, i8 only kept, in

Ockham's view, if one rejects the theory of universa!! ~

57

--------~.+~;i~ ..... t .. ~A--.------------------------------~-------~-- ~----

~. For a closer analysis of Ockham's views on essential and

accidentaI predication, in order to substantiate or reject

Mo od y. sel a i m ab 0 ut i t, and i n 0 rd e r t 0 se e wh eth e r, i n fa ct,

Ockham can only hold on to nominal essences, 1 want to examine

Ockham' s moda 1 log ie.

Before doing that, however, 1 want to look briefly at

the context in which the distinction between ~ re and de

dicto modalities arose.

In prior Analytics i,9 Aristotle makes an interesting observation: 'It happens sometimes that the conclusion is necessary when only one premiss is necessary; not, however, either premiss taken at random, but the major premiss.' Here Aristotle means to sanction such inferences as (1) Every human being i8 necessari­

ly rational (2) Every animal in this room is a

human being Therefore () Every animal in this room is

necessarily rational On the other hand he means to reject inferences of the following sort:· ' (4) Every rational creature is in

Australia (5) Every human being ia necessari­

ly a rational creature Therefore (6) Every human being ia necessari-

ly in Australia Aristotle would probably accept as sound the Inference of () from (1) and (2). But if so, then (3) is not to be read as ()') It iB necessa;rily true that

every animal in this room i. rational;

for (3') is clearly false. Instead (3) aust be construed, if Aristotle is correct, as the claim that e.ch ani.al in thi. room has a certain

.property - the property of being

58

(

(

rational - Decessarily or e •• entia­lly. That is to say, (3) must be taken as an expression of modality de re rather than modality de d icto. 2

The passage from Aristotle quoted by Plantinga has been

said by sorne to have been one of Aristotle's ways to draw a

distinction between what is called modality de re and modality

de dicto. The distinction between the two is held to provide

a means of distinguishing between what i5 said about proposi-

tions and what i8 said about properties attributed to res.

During the course of the Middle Ages this distinction is

always kept and used for a variety of purposes; one of the

most promlnent ways in which it is used is the solution of the

problem of God's foreknowledge of human action and its

rel ationship to human fr.eedom. It is not clear whether

Aristotle had meant to draw the distinction or not, but there

is evidence that for a period of time between Aristotle and ., the e~rly Middle-Ages the passages which seem to imply the

distinction were held to have been a mistake on Aristotle's

part. When Abelard wrote his cammentary on De Interpretatione

he wrote about the distinction and said that there were two

senses in which modal sentences should be analysed: the

expositio .E!! compositionem and the expositio per divisionem

(de sensu and de !.! or rebus).

A genuinely modal statement, he thinks, is one which involves moda­li ty secundum exposi tionem de rebus. ••• For although Nullum hominem possibil'e est esse album can be taken to be a true singular affirmative statement with the meaning 'It is possible that no man should be wQite', it can also be

59

/

(

taken to be a faise universai nega­tive statement with the meaning 'No man can be white'; and according to Abelard it is not really a modal statement unless taken in the second sense, when the modal word belongs in effect to the predicate and may therefore be said to express a mode or manner in which the subject is characterized. 3

Whether or not Abel ard was the one who establ ished the

distinction, the distinctIon is subsequently found in william

of Shyreswood, in Peter of Spain and in many other medieval

logiclans.

Section l - Modal Logic:

Will iam of Ockham, like most other medieval logicians,

accepted the distinction. The treatment of modal propositions

in medleval logic is undertaken as a part of the theory of

supposition - the theory of amplia~~on. The theory of amplia-

tion treats of cases in which terms are taken to stand for

things ln future, past and modal propositions.

The theory of ampliation played a key role in the fourteenth century nominalist effort to reconcile the Aristotelian dictum that science was always of the necessary with the nominalist view that (excepting Godl) only contingent individual substances ,!nd qualities exist or cou Id ex i st •

. (. As 1S quite clear from the above discussion, this is cer'tainly

true of Ockham whose main philosophical preoccupation was

maintaining that aIl that exists is individual and that,

therefore, aIl knowledge has to be of individuais.

60

. ,.e _Q* ; 4 -

(

According to Ockham aIl terms WhlCh can be predicated

truly of a whole proposItIon are to be considered modes and

are, therefore, capable of making such a propositlon modal.

ASlde from those WhlCh are accepted as modes by most,

'necessary', 'posslble', 'ImpossIble' and 'contIngent', there-

fore, Ockham considered 'true', 'false', 'wrltten', 'spoken',

'belleved', 'known' and 'thought' to be modes as weIl. He,

however, dedicates more time to the diScussIon of the first

four and concedes the fact that the status of the second set

o f ter ms loi hic h he con 5 Ide r 5 t 0 b e m ad a lis con t r 0 ver t ed •

'Contlngent' IS deflned as that whlCh 15 'nelther necessary

nor ImpOSSIble' and 'ImpossIble' IS defined as that WhlCh 1S

'not posslble'. These two modes are, therefore, derlvatlve and

defined ln terms of 'necessary' and 'pOSSIble'. Just as he

does wlth past-tense and future-tense prOpOSItIons, SO aiso ln

deallng wlth modal propOSItIons Ockham uses the strategy of

expl1catlng them in terms of the modal status of the non-modal

propOSItIons correspondlng ta them. ThIS, however, should not

be taken ta mean that Ockham IS at aIl Incllned to talk about

a new categary of belngs (the category of non-eXIstent beings)

or a ne loi 0 n toI og y. It 15 possIble to analyse modal propOSl-

tl0ns ln terms of non-modal proposltlons, but not in such

terms as to Imply talk about non-ex1stents.

Ockham does Insist that Iole cannot even talk about Im~osslblila and mere intelilg Ibl11a.

Accordlng to Ockham forms l ike 'It 15 necessary that P' and

'It lS possible that p' are ambiguous and they should be

distlnguished. He taiks first about modal sentences taken in

61

C hl

(

the sense of eomposi tlon:

Proposltio modails pnmo modo dicta semper est distinguenda seeundum e om po S 1 t ion em et d 1 vis i 0 nem • 1 n sensu eomposltlonis semper denota­tur, quad talls modus verlficatur de proposit10ne illius dieti, Sleut per 1 stam 'Omnem hom Inem esse animal est neeessarlum', denotatur, quad 1 ste modus' neeessar ium' verl­ficetur de ista proposit1one: 'Omnls homo est anImal', CUIUS

dlctum est hoc quod dieitur,'Omnem homlnem esse animal', quia dietum proposltlonls dicitur, quando tenlllni propositloni accipiuntur in accusatlvo casu et verbum in lnflnltlvo modo. 6

.. .

The sense of compositlon, therefore, applles the mode to the

whole propOSItIon, and the dlctum ln Latin takes the form of

the accusatIve case and the verb ln the inf1nitive and ln

Engllsh the farm 'It 15 nece5sary that The deflnition

of modal sentences taken ln the sense of division runs as

follows:

About

Sed sensus divisionis talls propo­si t ion i s semper aequipo Il et propo­sitioni acceptae euro modo sine tail die t 0, sic u t i s ta: ' Om n em h om i n em esse animal est necessarium', in sensu d1visionis aequipollet isti: 'Ornnis homo de necessitate vei necessario est animal'. Sirniliter ista in sensu div isionis: 'Sortem esse animal est seitum', aequipol­let i s t i : ' Sor t e m sc 1 ~u r e s 5 e animal'. Et sic de aliis.

pro p 0 s 1 t 1 0 n s s!~ necessar 1 0 ---------- in the sense of

composi tion Ockham sa ys that when they are universal they can

be necessary even though the singulars are contingent or

false; the same can bel said of a universal impossible proposi-

tion. He al 50 adds that none of these propositions are really

62

·----------_____ ~_.i~;~~ ________________________________________________________________ -- ---_

i t ,

(

a;

unlversal, but they are partlcular, because in aIl of them a

slngular prOposition is presupposed. The m od e , t ha t i s ,

applles to a SI ngu l ar, to onl y one propos 1 tian. As for the

requHements for asslgnlng truth values to such proposItions,

Ockham says that for determlnlng the necesslty of a proposi-

tian de necessarlo, for example, It lS not sufflclent for it

to be called necessary that It always be true, but lt lS

required that lt be true now, If It IS ln eXistence now, and

that lt cannot be possible for lt to be false. He gives the

example of the propositIon ~ est: thls proposition is

necessary, not because lt 15 always true, because If It did

not eXlst lt would not be true, but because when It does exist

it cannot be false. The same 1 s to be sa Id 1 f i nstead of

talklng about the proposition eX1stlng, we were to talk about

the proposition being uttered and the moment of utterance of

the proposition; unless, of course, the terms were stipulated

to have a different meaning. Impossib l e, contingent and pos-

slble propositions are taken care of in the same way, whereas

for the other modes the requiu.ments are more campI icated, but

a di scuss Ion 0 f them 1 S no t necessary for present purposes.

Ockham, then, moves on to a discussion of modal proposi-

tions in the sense of division, and he says that about modal

proposi t ions WI th a d ictum, which correspond who 11 y to those

propositions taken with a dictum in the sense of divis~on, it

should be observed that,

tales non convertuntul' CUlll pl'imis, homo potest una illarulII es •• vera al ia existente falsa et econverao. Sicut aecundum viam Aristoteli.

63

j

f

f

haec est vera in sensu composi tio­nis: 'Omnem hominem esse animal est necessa ri um,; et tamen haec est falsa: 'omn~s homo de necessitate est animal'.

A modal proposition with a dlctum in the sense of division i8,

therefore, equ i va 1 en t to a moda 1 proposl t ion wi thou t a d ictum,

and the determlnation of l ts truth value becomes more compl i-

ca ted. As we have seen, ln fact, the modal term in these

cases does not have as its scope the whole proposition, it

determines only the predieate. For the truth of sueh proposi-

" tlons, It 15 required that the predicate be true of that which

the subJeet stands for. The requlrement, the-fefore, is that

the mode expressed by sueh a proposi tion be trul y pred lcable

of a propOSl t ion de 'inesse ln which the predicate is

predicated of the demonstrative pronoun. He explains by using

as an example the proposition 'Omne verum de necessitate est

ver um'. When taken ln the sense of div ision thi s proposi tion

is analysed in a way which is very similar to the way in which

universal non-modal propositions were seen to be analysed in

the theory of supposi tion (Cf. descensus to par t leul ar s in

the prev ious chapter). He says that the requirement is that

the predicate verum be predicateà of anythir19 for which the

subJect verum stands: he then adds that

puta quod quaelibet talis ait neces.aria: 'Hoc est verum', 'Illud est verum', demostra to quocumque, pro quo subiec tum suppon i t. Et quia non quael ibet ta lis est vera, idea haec est s impl ic i ter fa l sa: 'Olllne ~erum de necessi tate est verum'.

Regardless of the result of the analysis, it i8 intereating to

64

1 1

j

1 ! , ,

-L------__ ;_=-.== __ .~4~J----------------------------------------------------------- ---------. ~

(

(

1

notice that this sort of des~ensus to particulars again

shows Ockham's preoccupation with grounding his theory of

knowledge on particulars and also, as cornes out in other

examples, on existing individuals.

Again using the distinction between modal sentences

taken in the sense of division and taken in the sense of

composition, while talking about modal propositions taken in

the sense of division, Ockham says that a necessary proposi-

tion can be true and yet not be necessary, but contingent. He

explains by saYlng that if we take the proposition 'Creans

necessario est Deo', we want to say that this is necessary,

'Hoc est Deus', once that for ..;hich creans stands in that

necessary proposition( is demonstrated, but the proposition is

true and not necessary, because if it is posited that God

ceases to create, then, the proposition is false: it id,

therefore, in this sense, contingent and not necessary.

It is also to be noted that these modal propositions

when they are universal, are necessary, contingent, impossible

etc., onl y if the ir singul ar saI so are necessary, contingent,

and impossible. It i8 posslble, however, in some rare cases

that there be a universal modal proposition deilllpossibili,

with possible singulers;

Sicut patet in iate: 'Utru.que istorum necessariun est veru.', deatostratis iatis: 'Sortes fuit in A', 'Sortes non fuit in AI. Haec universal is est taposeibilis, et ta.en qual ibet singularis eet pos.ibi lis; nall haec est pos.ibili.: Uaec .st neces.ario vera: ·Sort •• fuit in A'· .. t siailiter ali • •• t PO •• ibil1s.10

6S

~------__ ,~ .... _. __ ••• _14"* ________________________ --------__________________ __

. t , 1

f • (

-

•

1 1 f

(

Ockham, therefore, maps modal proposi tions in the sense

of ccmposi tion ante thei r non-modal equi valent and those taken

in the sense of division onto non-modal propositions which are

not their exact counterpart, but which have as the subject a

demonstrative pronoun, or a proper name. Ockham also divides

necessary and possible proposi tions into two further catego-

ries: primary and derived. Those which are primary are those

in which the modal term is not negated and those which are

derived are those in which it is. Freddosoll characterizes the

division in something like the following way: the primary forro

is necessarily --' has as a derived form ' i8 not possi-

bly not --'; for '-- i5 necessarily not --' the derived form

i5 '-- i5 not p05sibly __ 1. , for '-- i s po S 5 i b 1 Y - -' the d e-

rived form is ' is not necessarily not --ii and for '-- is

possibly not --' the der i ved form i s '-- i s not necessar i-

ly --'. As Freddoso also points out it i5 interesting "to note

that Ockham's account of the truth conditions for a singular

affirmative de necessario proposition like 'Socrates is

necessarily a man' requires the necessity of the non-modal

'Socrates i5 a man'. It is, in other words, equivalent to the

proposition taken in the sense of canposition .'It is necessary

that Socrates is a man' and this proposition i8 false. It

follows that the proposition 'Socrates is necessarily a man'

ia also false. Freddoso says that

this result appears to place in doubt Ockham's commi tment to an e.sential ist account of substance, i.e. to the thesia that a substance ia chaIacterized necessaIily (or ••• entially) in certain ways and only contingently (or accidentally)

66

==-------.......... ""." ....... .--------------------------------------------------------------------------~

1 1

in other ways.l2

Tbese propositions, in fact, can only tutn out to be true for

a necessary being. Ockham, however, wants to accept

propositions of the form: '50crates is-a man and Socrates is

necessarily not a non-man' and 'Socrates i8 a man and it is

n ec e s s a r y t ha tif Soc rat e sis a b e i n g, Soc rat e s i 8 a man', a s

necessary. Since these propositions are taken to be

equivalent to propositions like 'Socrates is necesarily a

man', Ockham, Freddoso says, seems to accept essential i sm, but

reject the equivalence. 1 think this point requires more

discussion because 1 f12spect that the solution is not quite as

simple as it might seem at a fi'rst glance: in other words

there has to be a reason for the fact that Ockham does not

accept the equivalence. 1 want to leave it fOr now, however,

because 1 think the discussion of it will became more

illuminating and more understandable at the end of this

chapter: 1 will come back to it, therefore, in the conclusion.

Betore 1 leave this section 1 want to give lF'reddoso's

outline for the truth cond i tion$ 9 i ven by Ockham for un i versaI

and particular .5!! necessario and de possibili modal proposi­

tions w'i thout a dictum:

(P4l) A present-tense de necessar io A-proposi tion, 'Every A ia

necessarily B', is true if and only if (i) there is

something for which 'A' supposits and (ii) 'This i. s'

is necessary no matter wbich of the supposita of 'A' is

indicated by 'this'.

' •• 2) A present-tense de "necessar io E-propoaition, 'Ev.ry A i.

nec ••• ariIy not B' is tru. if and only if (i) th.rlt ,.

67

· ........ - ~

l

Ct

nothing for which 'A' auppoaits or (ii) 'This ia not B'

is necessary, no matter which of the supposita of 'A' is

indicated by 'this'.

(P43) A present-tense de necessar io r-proposi tion, 'Sorne A is

necessarily B' is true if and only if (i) there is

80mething for which 'A' supposits and (ii) in at least

one instance in which 'this' indicates something for

which 'A' supposits, 'This is B' is necessary.

(P44) A presen t- tense de necessar io 0- proposi t ion, 'Sorne A is

necessarily not B', i5 true if and only if either (i)

there is nothing for which 'A' supposits or (ii) in at

least one instance in which 'this' indicates something

for which 'A' supposits, 'This is not B' i5 necessary.

(P4S) A present-tense de possibi li A-proposi tion, 'Every A is

possibly B', where A iB taken to supposit only for what

is actually A, is true if and only if (i) there is

something for which 'A' supposits and (ii) 'This is B'

is possible, no matter which of the supposita of 'A' is

ind icated by • this' •

(P46) A present- tense de possibi 1 i E-proposi tion, 'Every A is

possibly B', where 'A' ia taken to 8upposi,t only for

what is actually A, ia true if and only if either (i)

there is nothing for which 'A' supposits or (H) 'This ,

is not ,B' i8 possible, no matter which of the 8uppoaita

of 'A' is indicated by 'thi.·.

(P47) A present-tense de posBibili I-propoaition, 'So •• A ts

poaaibly BI, wh.re 'A' is taken to suppps,it only for

68

\

.j

j

___ .. _ ......... ".... ................ _ ..................................... -. ....... .4

what i8 actually A, i8 true if and only if (i) there i8

Bomething for which 'A' supposits and (ii) in at least

one instance in which 'thi s' ind icates something fOI

which 'A' supposi ts, 'this i sB' i s possible.

(P48) A present-tense de possibil i O-proposition, 'Some A is

possibly not B' 1 where 'A' is taken to supposi t only fOI

what i5 actually A, is true if and only if either (i)

there i5 nothing for which 'A' supposits or (ii) in at

least one instance in which 'this' indicates something

for which 'A' supposits, 'This is not B' i9 possible.

Some attention should be given to the tact that Ockham admits

• that A, in modal propositions de possibili, could also be

taken to supposit for what can be or is p05sibly A: a

discussion of this problem, howeveI, would take us too far

from the discussion at hand and would involve an analysis of

Ockham's account of unactualized possible beings. Let it

suffice to say that from a good part of Ockham's arguments and \

trom explicit statements, the existence of unactualized possi-

ble beings seems to be quite readi1y rejected. 1 think that

at this po int some attention should be 9 i ven to Ockham's modal

.yl109i8llls.

Section Il - Modal .y~logi_.:

In examin i09 Ockh .. •• theory of .o4al .y1109i _s 1 vi Il

give special attention to tho_e involving nece'Ssary

propositions because, a8 it is obvlous, they are thO •• which

are .o.t important for the purp\lse of dac id Ing que.tions of

69

(

,

essential properties and esaential predication.

To explore Ockham's logic of modal sentences in the divided sense is to explore his modal syll og istic. Although one can gain valuable insight into Ockham's theory of m od a lit i es in the c om po s i tes e n se from an examination of his proposi­tional logic and of his theory of consequentiae, the deduc ti ve theory of modality in the di.vided sense is almost enijrely confined to syll og i stic.

Ockham starts out by explaining the valid modes of the first

figure in which each proposition starts with 'It is necessary

that', those, that is, in which aIl the premisses are taken in

the sense of composition, and he says:

Et tenet talis discursus per istam regul am: praemi ssae in syll ogismo reg u 1 a tope r die ide om ni v e 1 de n~llo sunt necessaria" igitur conclusio est necessaria.

When aIl the premisses are taken in the sense of division or

its equivalent, the situation is not as simple; the direct

conclusion always followa, but not always when it i8 indirect.

In such propositions it i8 meant that whatever i8 said of the

subject is also said of the predicate, and since these

inferences are val id by the ~ de omni or de .!!.'!!.!~, Ockham

say. that the following is val id 'Omnis homo de nesessitate

est animal, Sortes de nese •• itate est homo, igitur Sortes de

necessitate est animal'. But an indirect conclusion doea not

follov, in fact thia vould not follov: 'Aminal de nece.ai tata

•• t Sortes'. becauae ,'conclu.ionis aine omn! variation.

praet:er transposi tion.. terlDinoruaa non sequi t:ur.,l5

If the pr_i •••• are t:aken in the s.nse of diviilion and

10

, !

1 l 1

1 1

(

(

- ; ee4E4

the conclusion in the sense of composition, on the other hand,

the ar9ument ia never valide If thema)or premiss i8 taken in

the sense of composition and the minor premiss in the sense of

division the conclusion can only follow in the sense of

division and not in the sense of composition. 1 f, 0 n the

other hand, the major premiss i5 taken in the sense of

division and the other ln the sense of composition, the

conclusion follows in the sense of divisIon, but it also

follows in the sense of composl tion. From these two ru 1 es i t

seems to follow that it is both true that a maJor premiss in

the sense of division entails a conclusion in the sense of

composition, and that a maJor premiss in the sense of

composition entails a conclusion in the sense of divlsion.

From this,in turn, it seems quite obvious that Ockham, at

least in some places, seems to accept the thesis that the de

re and the de dicto versions of a sentence are equivalent.

For what concerns modal propositions de necessario in the

second figure, Ockham goes through the sarne divisions and he

says about the first case that:

Quando omnes propositiones de necessario in secunda figura sumuntur in sensu composi tionis vel aequi val entes eis, semper sequi tUI concl us iode necessar io sumpta in sensu compositionis vel aequivalen­tes eis, quando scil icet syl109is­mus ex illis de inease tenet per istam re9ulam: si praemissae sint nec~ssariae, conclusio erit

lgec.a­

sarla, quae semper vera est.

Theae syllogisms can be converted into syllogisme in the first

figure. If aIl the pr ... iss.s are takan in the a.ns. of

71

4=7=

•

divIsion, the syllogisms are not always valld, in tact in some

cases the conclusion may be false, while the premisses are

true. If the major premiss 15 a negatlve universal

propositIon then the syllogism 15 not valld, nor can such

syllogisms be reduced to the first fIgure, because the de

necessario proposition does not convert into a de necessario,

when it 15 taken in the sense of division. If, on the other

hand, the major premiss is taken ln the sense of composition

and the minor premiss is taken in the sense of diVIsion, the

conclUSIon follows in the sense of divislon, because the

converse of the major premlSs 1S vaild ln the first fIgure.

If the maJor premiss is taken in the sense of dIvision and the

minor premlSS in the sense of composition, the argument is not

val Id if the conclusion lS taken in the sense of composition

because the premisses' are possible and the conclusion

impossible. The conclusion in the sense of dIVISIon follows

because the converse of the major premiss is vaild in the

first figure.

In the thlrd figure the arguments are valid bath If aIl

the premisses are taken in the sense of division, and if aIl

the premi sses ar e taken in the sen se of canposi t ion:

quando omnes premissae sumuntur in sensu compositionis, tenet syllogismus sicut ex suis de ines­se, quia arguitur per istam regu­lam: si praemissae sunt necessar iae, conc 1 usio er i t neces­sa ria. S i au t em om n es s um a nt uri n sensu Hvisionis, omnis discursu5 valet.

The realon why this is 50, i5 that in the first figure a major

premiss de nece,sario in the sense of division and a minor ( /-

72

(

(

- me;: N

premiss de inesse entail a conclusion de necessario in the

sense of divlsion, and since whatever follows from the

consequent follows from the antecedent, from those premisses

de necessario which are canverted into premlsses de lnesse

follows the same conclUSlon ln the thlrd flgure. If the maJor

premiss is taken ln the sense of composltlon and the minor

premiss ln the sense of divlsion,the conclusion does not

follow in the sense of division, nor does It follow in the

sense of composltion. If thé maJor premiss IS in the sense of

dlvislon and the mlnor premiss in the sense of composition,

the concluslon in the sense of divlslon always follows, but lt

does not follow in the sense of composition.

Quod enim ln sensu dlVlsionis sequatur, patet, quia minor conver­titur in illam de inesse, ex qua et maiore sequltur conclusio de neces­sario in sensu divisionls non in sensu composlt1onis, sicut lnferius ostendetur .18

After talking about the syllogism de necessario, Ockham

procedes to dl scuss a Il the other forms of unm lXed syll og i sms,

but am not g01ng to outl ine them here because for the

purposes of this dl scussio~, an examination of the necessary

sylloglsms lS sufficient. l will, however, talk briefly about

mixed syllogisms. In discussing mixed syllogisms, Ockham

starts out wi th an exposi tion o f the m i x ed s y 1 1 09 i sm s d e

~~~!!s~io and de l~!~~~ in the first figure. In thij-

category, Ockham says that from a major premiss 2.! necessario

taken in the sense of division and a minor premiss de ines~

thele always follow a conclusion ~ neces.Jario taken in the

73

..

l t

l i

Î

-

•

(

- -

sense of divisIon, not in the sense of composition. These

inferences are true according to the rules of dici de omni and

dlCI de nullo. According to the dicl de omni, ln fact, the

following Inference i5 sald by Ockham ta be val id: 'Omnls homo

de necessltate est anImal, homo albus est homo, 19itur homo

al bus den ec es s i ta tee s tan i mal. 1 1 t 1 S al so to be no ted t ha t

ln this 5ylloglsm, It doe5 not matter whether the mlnor

premlSS lS de IneS5e simpllclter or de Ine§5e ~ nunc. 1 f the

conclUSIon 15 taken ln the sense of compositIon, on the other

hand, the argument 1S never valld; trom this 1 t also cornes out

that ln thlS syllogisrn an IndIrect conclUSIon cannot follow.

1 f the ma J 0 r p r em 1 S SIS ta ken 1 n the sen seo f corn po s i t ion, the

sylloglsm 15 only valld if the minor premiss is de lnesse

but not if lt is de inesse ut nunc:

explanation for thlS lS

quod illa minor est de Inesse slmpl ici ter, in qua non potest praedicatum competere subiecto in u no t em po r e et n eg a ri in al i 0, i ta quod sertt~er vere praedicatur vel numquam.

the

If the maJor premiss lS de inesse and the minor de necessario ,~

in the sense of division the argument i5 not val id, and 50

also lt 15 not valid If the minor premiss 16 de necessario in

the sense of compositIon; however, in thlS case if the major

premiss is de inesse slmpllciter the sylloglsm is valid and

this obviously because the predicate in this type of de inesse 1

proposition cannot be predicated of the subject at sorne time

and not at another, but has to be predicated of the subject

always or never. It is clear therefore that this type of

74

,

! f

j

1 1

1 .1 ï j ...

(

(

QU • '*

S y l l og 1 sm 15 val Id If the maJor premlss 15 de Inesse

~..!.lclter, whether the mlnor premlS5 15 taken ln the sense

of corn po s 1 t Ion 0 r 1 n the sen seo f d 1 VIS Ion. 1 n t he second

fIgure for the sylloglsm to be val Id, If the de necessarlO

pro po S 1 t Ion 1 s ta ken 1 n the sen seo f c om po SI t Ion, 1 t 1 S

requlred that the de IneS5e propositlon be de 1 nesse

slmpllcl ter. 1 f the pro po 5 1 t 1 0 n d e nec e 55 a rio 1 5 t a ken 1 n t he

5ense of dlvlslon, the sylloglsm IS not valld, nor can It be

reduced to the fltst fIgure, because a proposition de

necessarlo 15 not converted lnto another de necessarlO, but

becomes de ~~~~~~, and, obvlously, from two de Inesse

propositions no conclusIon de necessarlO can follow. In the

thlrd flgure,lf elther of the premisses 15 de necessarlO ln

the sense of compOSition, the sylloglsm 15 generally not

valld. However, If the mlnor premls5 15 de Inesse

51mpllclter, the argument 15 valld becau5e It can be converted

to the flr5t fIgure. If the premlss de necessarlO 15 ta ken ln

the 5 e n seo f div i s Ion, 1 fit 1 s the ma J 0 r p rem 1 s S , the de

necessarlo conclUSIon always follows ln the sense of diVISIon,

but If It lS the mlnor premiss, then the syllogism lS not

valld.

In the mixed syll og isms between de possibi Il and de

necessario in the first figure, when both are taken in the

sense of composition and the major preml55 15 de necessario,

and the minor de possibili, the conclusion de possibili

follows both ln the sense of diVIsion and ln the sense of

cy-omposition. When the proposition de necessario is taken in

the sense of composi tion and the proposi tion de possibi 1 i in

75

i 1 f l •

-

·'" ,.

•

(

,$ • t

the sense of dIvIsIon, the concluslon follows de posslblll ln

the sense of dIvIsIon. In the case ln WhiCh the proposItIon

de necessar10 15 ln the sense of dIvIsIon ana the de possIblll

ln the sense of compositlon, the conclusIon lS de posslblll ln

the sense of composltlon. In the case, on the other hand, ln

whlch both of the premIsses are taken ln the sense of

dlVISlon, If the maJor premlSs 15 de necessarlO, t~e sylloglsm

15 notvalld; If the minor prem15s lS de necessarlO, It 15

valld. In tne second fIgure, ln ,,11 cases ln WhlCh the

sylloqlsm 15 valld the concluslon lS always de posslbilli and

the same lS true of thlS type of mixed syllogism ln the third

fIgure.

In the mlxed sylloglsms between de necessarlO and de

contingenti proposltlons, when the arguments are valld the

conclUSIon lS never necessary, but It can be de contlngenti,

de Inesse, or de possibiii. 1 n th i s type 0 f ml x ed 5 yI log i sm

ln the second fIgure, when the argument 15 valld, the

conclUSIon 15 always elther de posslbill or de inesse, never

de cont1ngentl or de necessario. In the third figure, the

conclUSIon of valid syllogisms is either de posslbili or de

contingenti.

In the mixed syllogism between de necessario and de

l~E~~~lÈlll propositions there is no need for further

discussion because these have been discussed before and sinee

quaelibet propositio de impossibili aequ i val et al iqu i proposi tioni dé necessario, ad sciendum quando mixtio neeessarii et impossibilis valet et quando non, oportet seire aequipollentiam propositionis de

16

1 :

lm po s S 1 b 1 l ~ e t pro pO s 1 t 1 0 n 1 S d e necessar1o. 0

1 thlnk that th1s short outl1ne of Ockham's account of

necessary sylloglsmS should sufflce for the purposes of thls

dlScuSSlon, and what 1 propose to do now 15 ta look at sorne of

the concluslons WhlCh can be drawn from what has been sald up

ta now. ln arder to do thlS 1 th1nk It WIll also be useful to

look shortly at McDermott's and Normore's2l account of the

analoqles between LeWIS' S5 and medleval modal loglC and then

analyze ln more detall sorne modern dISCUSSIons of essentlallsm

as related to modal lOglC and the de re/de dicto distlnctlon

ln order to see what klnds of essentiaiism would be Implied by

varlous ways of looking at modal Involvement, modal operators

and at the meaning of the dIstInctIon between de ~ and de

dlctO modallties.

Section III - Essentialism and modality:

Sima Knuuttila says in his article "Modal Logic" that

something very similar to quantification into modal eontexts

seemed to be usual in fourteenth century formulations of modal

logic, and both Moody and McDermott maintain that there are

fourteenth century modal logies which are isomorphic to C.I.

Lewis' S5. McDermott examines, among other things, Pseudo-

Scotus' modal logic in eomparison with Lewis' S5 in her

article "Notes on the Assertoric and Modal Propositional Logie

of the Pseud o-Seotus". In this article she goes through a

detailed translation of Pseudo-Seotus· latin formulation into

\,

\

17

~~~.----____ .~*_._CW_%~ ______ ---------_____________________________________________ ------ ....... - ------....

l ,"

modern notatlon. She gives a notatlonal formulatIon of the

rules expressed in medleval times by the square of OppositIon

for modall tles. Instead of the formul ation she uses 1 wIll

use L and JIll to express stronger and weaker modall tles because

1 t WI 1 1 tur n out to be more conven len t fo r l ater dl scuss Ions,

and for LewIs' slgn of strIct lmpilcation 1 will use the

followlng sign -»:

1. Mp = -L -p

2. Lp = -M -p

3. Lp -» p

4 • P - » Mp

) - 5. Mp -» 1 p J

}- 6. p -» Lp

J - 7. Mp

}- 8. -Lp

She adds tha t if these rules are applied to Pse udo-Seot us'

modal logie',they make the system a Basic Modal Logic in the

sense of Lukaslewicz. After doing this she goes on to claim

tha~, although trying ta find complete translatability between

the two systems would distort Pseudo-Seotus' thought, ther'e

are some strong superfieial similarities between S5 and

Pseudo-Scotus' modal log ic. She gives an outline of the

definitions of Pseudo-Seotus and of S5, the rules of

inference: Modus Panens, Substitution and the rule that if 'A'

is true sa is 'It is neeessary that A', aeeepted in both

systems, and the following axioms:

( 1. Lp -) P

2. -Lp -) L -Lp

78 ... "

------..... --.4~ ....... g .. œ~~--------____ --~------------------~----------------------~--------~-----------

~ - ~-- - -~------------"' .. ~ -

1

1 ,

1

1 , 1

(

(\

L

3. L(p -) q) -) (Lp -) Lq)

and a derivatlve of 2.

4. M -p -) LM -p

After thls she goes on to glve th.e complete outllne of

some of the statements accepted by both systems.

In hlS Doctoral DIssertatIon Calvin Normore proposes to

appl y thl s type of compar 1 son to Ockham' s modal log ic because

he thlnks that modal 10glc has been studied by Moody,

McDermott and others with too many assumptions about the

points of agreement between medieval theories and modern mod~l

log 1 cs. He also takes S5 as the system to which the

compar i son will be made. Necessity will be taken as a

primitive notion which will define possibllity, aIl the theses

of propositional calculus will be accepted by the system, and

Modus Ponens and Substitution will be valid rules of

i~ference. The following specifically modal rules and axioms

will then be added:

Nec if A i5 a theorem 50 is LA

Ax ioms: 1. ]- Lp ->p

2. ] - L (p -> q) -> (Lp -> Lq)

3. ] - Lp -) LLp

4. ] - P -) ~Mp

Normore then goes on to note that both Moody an~ McDermott

take axiom 4 to be accepted by medieval theories and adds that

If they are right then anything which can now be done never be­comes impossible and the passage of time makes220 difference in what is necessal'y.

, (

7' • = 3'. a tai_

1 ?

! !

1

1 ! 1 1

1

1

cl

1

(

a zn_l'AAS)

He wants to show how Ockham would accept a good part of the

system but could not have accepted axiom 4. He gives evidence

that Ockham accepted aIl of Lp ) - p, p ) - Hp, Lp ] - Mp and

Lp (-) -H -p and since Ockham's modal logic includes his

theory of formaI consequence holding by the extrinsic middle,

aIl valld sentences of hlS assertoric logic are also valid in

the modal log ic ..... Ockham also accepted that if A is a thesis

80 15 LA.

ThIS glves reason to think that Ockham would have accepted aIl of the principles sU9gested in my outline of 55 except, perhaps, Axioms 3 and 4. These axioms have a rather special status within the theorYi it is their role to express equivalences between first degree modal expressions (in which no modal operator is within the scope of another) and higher degree expressio?s in wh~~h modal opera­tors are Iterated.

It is quite clear that, since Ockham consiaers what is past to

be necessary and since for Ockham, of course, propositions can

change their truth values such that what becomes past changes,

Axiom 4 could not be accepted by Ockham. The purpose of this

short analysis of the translatability of medieval modal

systems into modern modal systems was not to show to which

extent exactly such a translatability could tak~ place, but

partly to show that l imits existed, as ther have been shown to

exist in ,the translatability of propositional logic, and

especially to show th~t there was, in fact, somethlng very

similar to q~fication into modal contexts in medieval

modal systems. As we will see, this fact will turn out to be

useful for the discussion which is to follow.

:r. 80

L

, 1

(

()

NOw 1 want to go back to the main purpose of this

section and look at some modern discussions of essentialism in

their relationship to Ockham's modal loqic. 1 will start out

by looking at sorne of Quine's arguments for the relationship

ho ld ing between essen t ia 1 ism and modal log ic: ln hlS article

"Three grades of Modal Involvement" Quine malntains that there

are three dlfferent degrees to which the idea of necessity can

be accepted in log ica l systems. The first degree corresponds

to an acceptance of de dicto modal ity ooly, in as much as in

it the notion of necessity is, expressed by a semantical

predicate which does not attach to the subJect or predicate of

the sentence but which is attachable to names of statements

only, as, for example, in, Nec '9 > S'. In the second degree

of modal involvement the notion of necessity acquires the

statu5 of a statement operator: the difference here i5 that

'nec' i s not a pred ica te which appl ies to n_es of sta tements,

but it has become a logical operator wh~ch, like the negation

sign, applies to the stateaent itself: Nec (9 > 5). In this

second case instead of being a predicate lis necessary', the

operator 'nec' becomes an adverb 'necessarily'.

Finally the third and gravest deg:L.ee is the expression of neces­sity by a sentence operator. This is an extention of the second degree, and goes beyond it in allowing the attachment of 'nec' not only to statements but a150 to ope n sen te ne es, a-uc-h a 5 • X > 5', preparato.ry. to ul tim~~e attachment of quantlflers: ••••

/ An exampl e' of thi 5 would be (Ex) nec (x > S). The second two

degrees of modal involvement seem to be v'ery close, in

81

....

At. ....** __ ._

- .... .- .~_. __ . ----~--------

(

o

characterization, to the madieval notion of de!.! modal ity.

In his paper Ouine then goes on to argue, throughfthe notions

of opaque and transparent contexts, that only the first degree

of modal Involvement is totally acceptable; this part of the

argument, however, is lrrelevant to the present discussion,

what is interestlng to note, on the other hand, is that

according to QUlne es~alism ln some form or other is

implied by the second two degrees of modal involvement. About

this Quine writes that:

Necessity as a semantical predicate reflects a non-Aristotelian view of necessity: pecessity resides in the way in which we say things, and nat in the things we talk about. Necessity as a statement operatar is capable, we saw, of being reconstued in terms of necessity aB a semantical predicate, but has, neverthel ess, i ts spec ia 1 dangers; it makes for an excessive and idle e l ab 0 rat ion a fla w s 0 fit e rat ed rnodality, and it tempts one to a final plange into quantified moda­l i ty. Th i s l ast compl ic a tes the logic of singular terms; worse, i t l eads us back to the metaphysical jungle of Aristotelian essentia­li sm. 2 5

Quine's argument provides a clear link between essentialisrn

and certain types of modal logie, those types whieh seem to

ha v e som e rel a t io III 5 h i p t 0 d e ~ mod a lit Y • Sin cet he fi r 5 t

degree of modal involvement is only equivalent to ~ dicta

modality, while the other two hav~ or can have a more or les$ 1 •

strong connection with de ~ modality, it'seem~, quite clear

that if it could be shawn th~t Ockham's modal logic has the

first degree of modal involvement only, that would be strong

82

._ i( 4

..

(

ev idence for the fact that he rejects at le8st some kinds of

essentialism and that, in any case, he cannot consistently be

an essentlalist and maintain the type of modal logic he does, • in fact, maintain. In Ockham there 15 no problem of

determining wh~ther sylloglstic conslsts of an ordering of

tenns in lntentlon or ln extenslon because 5ince the syllogism

itselt presupposes the existence of terms, terms have to have

intentionality, especially for the reason that they have a

specific capacity to stand for particular things for which

Borne other terms may also stand. Because of this and also

because of the fact that since modal expressions in' the $ense

of composition attach only to closed sentences, there is no

theory of terms in the composite sense. This leads ta the

consequence that Ockham's modal syllogistic is for the most

part his theory of modallty in the composite sense. This

implies that for the most part Ockham's modal syllogistic is

free from impl ications of essential ism. More importantly,

however, it should be noted that Ockham seems to imply that

the di v ided and composi te senses of singul ar modal sentences

are equivalent and this, even though it

suggests that the logical distinction between modality de dicto and modality de re does not correspond exactly to any purely grammatical differen~ of scope of the modal expression

it does leave sorne doubt as ta Ockham's comœitment to

essentialism because, as Normore points out, the r~lationship

of singular modal sentences to general modal sentences ln the

divided ~:'nse is ont: of entailment: 'AIl A (modally) i. B'

83

...

1 ; '.

; ! t ]

i

(

1

o

* •• , wu --

entail. 'This A (modally) is B' and this in turn entails 'Some

A (modally) is B'. This klnd of process does not hold for

modal sentences taken in the sense of compositIOn. ThIS, 1

think, isdue partly ta the tact that slncemodal sentences in

the composIte sense do not involve talk about thlngs, but they

involve only talk about sentences, Ockham did not teel obllged

ta ground the truth of such sentences ln partlculars. With

modal sentences taken in the sense of dlvision the situation

is different because they do involve talk about thlngs: for

their truth, therefore, Ockham had a need for grounding in the

realm of particulats. The equlvalence between singular modal

sentences taken in the sense of division and in the sense of

composition, and the relationship of entailment which holds

between general an! singular modal sentences taken in the

sense of division, seems to point to thEJ fact that Ockham's

modal logic does have, in effect, 'only the fitst degree of

modal involvement. TheSé considerations will also turn out ta

be useful when discussing Kneale's views on the distinction

between de re and de dicta modalities. As we have seen, for

the case of modal sentences taken in the sense of composition

we are directly dealing with what Quine calls the first degree

of modal involvement, because in such cases it is bath true

that the mode is predicated of the dictum and that Ockham

takes the d ictum ta stand for the correspond ing proposi t ion:

the mode in this case is the semantic predicate which applies f

only to names of sentences. From these considerations it

seems, therefore, quite plausible to assume that there is no

evidence that Ockham accepted, at least one form of

~

84

t 1 ,

(

-

e88entiallSlD, Aristotel ian essentlallsm ln Quine's sense. It

seems to me, however, that this is not the only form of

e88entlallsm WhlCh would be entalled by the thlrd degree of

modal involvement. Wh en you let quantlflers range over modes,

vou may Intend to be talklng about 'specles' and 'secondary

substances', as ln Arlstotelian essentlallsm, but Vou may also

find yourself talklng about IndivIdual substances as in

'individuat1ng' essentialism. It seems to me, therefore, that

aIl forms of real essentlallsm are pretty much precluded by

Oc k h am 1 s l og i cal s ys t em.

Before drawing flnal conclusIons, however, 1 want to

l 00 kat K n e ale' s a' r 9 ume n t s reg a rd 1 n 9 the val i dit Y 0 f the

distinction between de re and de dicto modalities. Kneale

holds that,

the fault of the doctrine of moda­lit Y der e i sind eed jus t th i s, that it tries to allow for modal assertions which are not abouf the senses of signs but about their references. And the temPta~ion to adopt it seems to be due p:ri arily to the fact that our modal al k is very often elliptical.27

1

The implication that this kind of aFgument has i8 basically

that aIl the talk about \

de ~ modality is only due to a

profound misunderstanding of how -language works, and that aIl

in,stances of de ~ modal ity cou Id be very easily reduced to

instances of de dicto modality. ,Kneale's idea here a1so

implies that if aIl instances of de re modality, could, in

fact, be translated into instances of de dicto modality, this

would eliminate all need to tâ'lk about real essences; his

85

------~ij~~~ __ ". __ ._U#~.~i .. ~. __ ~--~---*~----------------____________________________ ___ L

1

1

(

l c'

argument is a IlnguistlC one, he malntains that

an obJect does not have a property necessarily in Itself or Just as an obJect; it has It necessarlly or contingently, as the case may be, relatIve to a 5grtaln descrlption of the obJect.

ThIS argument Implles 1. that If we flnd eVldence of the

translatabllity of modal sentences taken ln the dlvlded sense

into modal sentences taken ln the composIte sense in Ockham,

we have one more reason to belleve that his modal lOglC does

not entall real essences and 2. that an ellmlnation of real

essences ln favour of nomInal essences ln Ockham's system can

be reasonably poslted. Essences, ln fact, would depend on

descriptions. The role which descrlptlons play ln Kneale's

argument, of course, ln Ockham would be played by concepts

(universals), because a concept, ln sorne sense, describes a

set of indiv Idual things which resemble each other in sorne way

or another. As we have seen before, ln dlscusslng the

relatlonshlp of Ockham's modal logic to Quine's arguments,

there is sorne evidence that translatabillty is possible.

Ockham's modal syllogistic lS mostly concerned with modal

pro po s i t ion s ta ken i n the sen seo f c om po s i t ion; t h i s f a c t

reflects a certain disinterest on Ockham's part in d.e re

modality; this, however, does not imply that the two are

equivalent. In Ockham, however, as we have seen, there is

equivalence between a singular modal sentence in the sense of

division and a singular modal sentence in the sense of

composition. The subject of aIl these sentences has to be a

pxopex name or a demonstxati ve pronoun. This observation ia

86

-

1

Impo r tan t because 1 n the case 0 f gener a l terms the two senses

do not seern, at flrst slght, to be equlvalent.

pOints out:

1 t 1 S po s S 1 b let ha t 's 0 me men are white', lS true If and only If, 'sorne men are white' could be true or, ta use Lelbnlz's metaphor of possible worlds,lf and only If, 'Soltle men are whIte' lS true ln sorne possible world (situations) S. But for 's om e men are wh 1 te' t 0 b e true ln S it lS necessary and suf­fic i e Cl t t ha t som e 0 f the men w hic h exist Ul S (which would eXlst were S actuaT) -be among the--Whi te things existing ln S. On the other hand, , s om e men are w h 1 tel ta ken 1 n the divided sense lS true 1ff: ( l) Som e 0 f the men wh i cha c tua l 1 Y exist now would be white were sorne possibre-world S actual1zed, (2) Sorne of the men WhlCh would exist were S actual would exist and be whi te were sorne si tuat10n s' (perhal?s Identical with S) actual. 2"Y

As Normore

Th 1 S d 1 f fer en cel n fun c t ion, ho we ver, a sim po r tan tas 1 t

i sin the dIS C U S S Ion 0 f ex 1 ste n t i a 1 1 m po r t, se em s tom e t 0

have very little ta do with the question of real essences. It

seems more and more ObVIOUS that the dist1ct1on between de re

and de dicto modal ities and the ambiguity that Ockham finds

in modal propositions w i th a d 1 ct um is more due to

considerations of existential import than to considerations of

essential ism. To corroborate this observation cornes the fact,

which we have considered before, that in inferences !rivolving

modal sentences in the div ided sense Ockham thought that the

following relation holds between general and singular

sentences:

AIl A (modally) ia B

&7

"~-------~.ou~._~P~'--__________________________________ ~ _________________________ ------......

-

entalls

ThIS A (modally) is B

and thlS entalls

Sorne A (modally) 15 B

It seems to me, therefore, that It IS not a concern wlth

essentlallsm whlCh Leads Ockham to draw the distinctIon

between modal sentences ln the composi te sense and modal

sentences in the divïl:161d sense, but a concern with

temparal/eXlstentlal consIderatIons. It seems ta be guite

reasonable to conclude, therefore, that Ockham's logic do~s

not entall any notion of real essences. In the concluding

chapter l want to see what the reiationship 15, between the

outcome of this chapter, the assurnptlans WhlCh l started with

and some other consIderatIons made a10ng the way.

"

. "

88

..... _01 " ..... __ .... ; ... .,... _ . ...,.----,.1.,.., ------------"""!'-------!--------;-------....... -----"

.~

("

..

NOTES

l i:.A. Moody, The Log ic of Wi Il iam of Ockham, (New York: Shed and Ward Inc., mS), p.20'9.----

2 A. Plantinga, "De re et de dicto", Nous 3, 1969, pp. 2 3 S - 236.

3 W. Kneale, "Modal ity de re and de dicto" in Logic Methodo1.2,3.ï and Philosophy of Science, Nagel, E. Suppes, P. Tarski, A., (Standford: Standford University Press, 1962), p. 624.

4- c'Jl~,NOrmore, The Logic of ;!:..!!!!.! ~ ~odailli in the later Midd~-Ages: the contributIon of William of OCkh'iiii'"; P~ D"1Ssërtation, university of Toronto, '"""ï'97'6:-P.57.

5 Ibid., p.SS.

6 W. Ockham, Summa Logicae, part lL II! III, P. Boehner ed., (St. Bonaventure N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1957), p.246.

7 Ibid., p.246.

8 Ibid., p.248.

9 1 b id. -, P • 249 •

10 Ibid., p.2S!.

Il For a more detailed discussion Cf. W. Ockham, Ockham's Theory of Propositions: part II of the Summa Logicae, TransI ated byA.J. Freddoso & H.-SchÜÛÏman, (London: University of Notre Dame Press, 198.0) p.47 ff.

12 Ibid., p.48.

13 c. Normore, The Log i c 0 f !.!!!!! .!lli! MO~Y. p.181.

14 W. Ockham, Summa Logicae, p. 3 76.

15 Ibid. , p.377.

16 Ibid. , p.379 ..

17 Ibid. , p.380-38l.

18 Ibid. , p.382.

89

• 4*Eï#'.= (Sl!''';.;'

19 Ibid., p.403.

20 Ibid., p.444.

21 The short discussion which 1 give on this topic is not directly relevant to the issue of essentialism, but it is given in analogy to the discussion of supposition theory ând quantification theory, to emphasize, once more, the danger of trying to find too rnany points of agreement between modern l ogic and medieval logic. On the other hand, it is included because it is needed for the purpose of showing the extent of the development of medieval modal logic. It is also needed in relation to the discussion of quantification into modal contexts.

22 C. Normore, ~ Logic of Time" and Modality, p.194.

23 Ibid., p.197.

24 W.V.O. Quine, The ways of paradox ~ other essaya, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard Univers1ty Press, 1966), p.159.

25 Ibid., p.116.

26 C. Normore, .1'1!! Logic of !.!!!!.! and Modality, p.118.

21 W. Kneale, -Modality de re and de dicto·, pp.632-633.

28 A. Planting8, The Nature.2! Necessity, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974), p:ï9.

29 C. Normore, !!!! Logic ~ !!!! ..!!!!! MOdality, p.llS •

..

14 iU:;,.). "Ji"; ;u

" i

r.

( l

C, •

Conclusion

One of the main reasons for the medieval unconditional

acceptance of essentialism, in sorne form or another, is the

fact that medieval metaphysical systems generally rejected the

possibi 1 i ty of wha tare now calI ed bare particular s. For .thi s

rea son, even the more nominal isticall y or iented systems have

been held to accept essential ism. It is, therefore,

reasonable to assume that Ockham's motivations for using

essentia 1 ist language are similar. The doctrine of

essentialism in genersl holds that an object has some

properties accidentally and some others essentially. It

maintains, as stated by Planting8, that in the casé ln which P

is a property 50 also is 'having P essentially'. There ia,

however, not onl y one fOnD of essential iam, as was suggested

in the introduction. One of the views held about

essential i sm, and one which in Many people'. opinion. renders

it devoid of meanin9, ia that it is •• rely a que.tion of

language usage:

In fact, the que .• tion of e._nce i. one as to the u •• of word.. v. apply the .aa. nu., on different: occasion., to ao.ewbat different: occurrenc.s, wbich we regard •• aanif.stat:iona of a aing1. ethiDCJe or ·person·.' In fact hove"er thia i. on1y • "erbal con".D.>i.nc ••••• 'b. queation 1. _ •• ly I1Dg.iatlcl a ward •• y have an •••• nc •• but • thi., caDDOt. ~h. conc.ption of ' •• It.teac.- 111le tbat of • •••• ac.·

'1

- &

1 i

o

• i

ia a transference to metllphysica of what la Q.nly a linguistic conven ience. 1

This statement of what Many ca11 anti-essentialism, it seems

tome, is well applicable to Ockham's views, at least'for what

can be deduced from the study which we made of hi s log ical

system. In Ockham, as we have seen, there is a notion of

natural signification which can probably prevent nominal

essences from being completely a question of convention and

totally arbitrary. We will come back to this later.

Professor Hatcus draws a distinction, which 1 sketched

in the introduct'ion, between at least two types of 'real'

essentialism, what she calla 'individuating essentialisme, on

the one hand, and 'Aristotel ian essentialisme on the other.

About this she says that

For Aristotel ian essential iaID, lin esaential property ia a property that an object must have. It an.wer. the question 'what is it?' in • strong sens.; if it ce.sed to have that property it would ce ••• to exi.t. It ia a property 8uch tut, if anything ha. i\ at aIl, it b •• it n.c ••• arily. The latter condition ia what di.tinguiahe. Ari.tot.lian .... atiali .. from wbat 1 ea\l 'individuating1

••• entia-11_.

And l "ould go on to say a. a furtber quaI ifie.tioa tUt .at .e.. to .. to be .n extr_ely iaportant di fferenc. Mt .. eD

th. two type. of •••• nti.li .. i. that "bat ,. b.re b.lng

c.ll'.cl 'lnd 1 v icluatinCJ' •••• nti.ll_ .•• k.. a cl. i. about

.... ac •• of particular., i.e. it tri •• to taik about: personal

lcl.ntity and •••• nti.1 predicatioa ia partiealar., wb.re ••

bi.tot.lian e._aUali. _ •• no .cb cl ..... it oa17 t.llea

'2 #4 Q 4 ,~ _§Sl.f1'IiiEf!" ,,@jlL4 *' ~ ;,i dl 4 id ,\ ,

1 ) 1

_.~ ... _ * __ ....... _ .... ~ ~_ .... __ ......... ~ ...... _w ____ ......... ~ . ~ _ ~ ~ ~ _ ~ ~ + _, ....... ______ • __ ..... __ ...... ___ ... ,., .. _ ..... ~~ .... ~ .............. ,..,._ '* ............ _

about what it means for a certain individual to be part of a

certain 'species'. From the briefly sketched discussion of

this problem in the introduction it has corné out quite clearly

that for Ockham both Aristotelian essentialism and

individuating.essentialism would be, even if for slightly

different reasons, highly unacceptable. This is a consequence

of his rejection of Aristotle's views on universals, on the

one hand, and of his nominalism, on the other.

To summarize very briefly, it should be said that Ockham

"rejected what we take to be Aristotle's conception of

universals for the following reasons: according to Ockham

Aristotle thought of universals as real things existinq

outside the mind, this, as we have seen" produces a

contrad iction at, the outset in Ockham' s eyes, because i t

implies that a universal, if it has to have such an extra-,

mental existence, ia an individual. This fact, in turn,

causes another inconsistency, beceu.e, sinee Ari8totle

believlP univer.aIs to be .!.!!- idividual8, it made it possible

for one individuel existing thing to exi8t in many other

indiv idual thing8. Aceording to Oekata thi •• a. unre •• onable,

and, when eonstueting his own theory of univer.al., he

conceived of th .. a. concept. which through a notion of

re_blance could repr ... nt •• riou. individual.. Thi. notion

of univer •• la, ho.ever, doe. not l •• ve any plac. fot •••• ne •••

8inc. univer.el. ere conc.pt., that i., •• ntal ter •• , the)'

caanot: be iD incUvidu.l •• nd 'give tb_ •••• ne... On tbe otb.r -•• nel, iD th. cOD.truction of Oc:tb •• •• th.ory of re._blanc.,.

93

.'

.... if .. '" '1" .......... ~_ ........................... .-..-____. ......... _____ ..... __ .................... _-. ___ ........ _ ....... _ ............................................ tI' .. ~ "",'r ... r .. ~.f! •• $211;'" MG! f.' •• F tatl.'IIlWIt"' fI'IiI

o

,

\

through which many i,ndividuals are 8ubsumed under, or

'participate in' the same concept, there ia no mention that i t

i8 because of essential properties of individuals that this

process can take place; it is simply because of resemblance

th a t i t ta ke s pl ac e. Th i a in tu r n ta ke sus t~o i nd i v id ua ti n9

o essentialism; in fact, if the Iink between individuais and

universals is produced by the notion of resemblance (thi.

resembl ance, as we will see, i s not produced by proper tiea in

individuals, but it i8 a product of the 'experience' of comin9

to know an individual~, there i8 no reason to believe thàt

there should be any pl ace in thia theory for e •• ences of

individuals, otherwiae it i8 they who would have had aIl the

more plausibility in being the connecting elelllent.. It

beeames quite clear, therefore, how the acceptanee of

'indiv iduating' eaaentiai i.m would undermine the whole of

Ockham' 8 epi stemol og ie network by render ing eup.rU uou. the

whole framework which he enviaag •• a. producing the nec •••• ry

connections bet.,.en the r.ality of individuel. and hi. notion

of univera.la. 'Individuating' .... ntleli. would also render

1 auperfluous OCkh .. 's theory of ,natural .ignification, and even '--

hi. theory of .upposition, whlch 1. clo.ely tied in to natural

.ignilication. The l'ejectlon of the .. type. of •••• nti.li_

i. al.o corroborated by hi. lO9ieal ay.t... As we have .e.n,

t.be conn.ection between .s.entiali •• and ~ !! Dlodal ity ha.

_ad. it po •• ible to ahow bow Ockh .. '. view. on e.senUal ia at

ta. pur.ly .. taphysical 1 eval, are reflected in his l agical

.ysta_ Very intu! tively i t ..... to •• tbat the relationship

bet.en .... ntiali_ .nd g !! aod.llty can be cbaracteriaect

§Aq a • .. _Ac

'\

i \ • ,

t }

(>

. ' -, .. _ .... _ ..... ___ .......... ~ .. "11. ___ "" __ "_ '- ........ -;; ____ ....... _$..-_ ..... ~ ........ ~.., ... _ ......... ___ ....... __ ......... .- ..... _ ..... _ ....... __ ...... ~ ..................... ~.-...-. ............ __

in ~he following vay: if ve a110w for a distinction in the

metaphysical realm between the properties that are the /

essential properties of an abject and those that are -the

"ace idental properties of that object, we al so have to have a

vay to talk aQout that distinction. This way of ..

distinguishing the two types of properties, in other words,

ought to be reflacted in 'theories of language and in 10g1c •.

It seems tome that de!,! modality is preci'sely a reflection

of thi.- distinction in the way in which we talk about things.

2.!! !! modality a110w8 us to ta1k about real necessity and

contingency in things, wt:aereas .st! dicto mdtJa1 ity a llows us to . -'

taik about nec:essity an~ contingency in sentènee-s. It could ,

be argued at this point tbat in Oekham this distinc~ion is

reflected, in his theory of language, in the distinction whic~

he dtava betv::\n .aturai (~, mental) language and conyenUo.al

(or WEi t ten and spotenl l_a~uage. Men tal 1 an9uage may be la ieS

to corre.pond to!!! .!! modal ity and conventional language May

be .'id to correspond to ~ (Heto modalfty. It 18, however.,

qui te cl.ar that in OCkh .. , eventhoQgh thl. distinction do ••

•• ist, it do •• not produce the required di.tinction between

r_àl •••• nce. and:nolDinal e ••• nce8. Universals, that i8 to ,

•• Y, concept. and a. a consequence mental terms, are not

tbinga in the external worId, and in some 8ense, al though they

have,_ different power of lignification., th.y are not very-v' ~

diff.rent fro. conventional terms. 1 want to say that, once

aore, thi. lingui.tic distinction doea not reflect a

di.tinetton at th'-'etapbYlièal levei bat •• en e •• ence. and

" 95

~------.. ~~ .... ----------------~~~--~----------

" ..

l l.

()

o

1

1 ,1.

ac·cidents. It, again, can only point t~ nominal essences.

The same pattern'i as we have seen, is found in discussiRg \1

Ockham's 109ic, ahd modal 10gic in particular. As we have

seen Quine specif~'\I!S three levels of modal invo1vement and

maintains that" where the first level does not entail any ,

commitment to e.sseritialism, the other two do, this because,

among other things, they ha~e sorne relationship to de re r __

modal ity. It has been shown that Ockham's modal logic seems

to point to the fact that, especia1ly throu9h his modal

syl10gistic which is mostly devoted to modal propositions

taken in the cc:xnposité' sense, his modal 1091c in general ends -

up only deal ing wi th the first level of modal invol Veulent. He

have seen, in fact, that even the type of modal sentences

which seem to have a div ided sense can be reducecS to modal

sentences in the compoai te sense. ~._ ..

In the di scu.sion of Kaeale's viewa' on ea .. ntiali_, we

bave al so come to tl1e concl ua ion tha t even for tho •• modal

sen tences in the div ided .ense wh ich could not be reduc.d to

., modal sentences in th. composi t~ sen •• , sucb a reduction could

not be perfor.ad, not for the purpo •• of safegarcHng the

distinction it.el f as valu~ble, but for the purpos. of keeping

temporal and existentiel qua 1 !fications and specifications for

.entenee.. Ockham, therefore, .e ... a only to have a notion of

Ilodal'ity in which the mode is a aemantic predicat. which

appl iel to names of sentences or at lIlost a logical operator'.

which applies to the sentence iteelf; it never ia a ·.en~.nc.

operator: •

1(n.ale argues that in the diatinction betveeD de r. and --"

1

1

, . 'Id' • _ ......... __ ~ .... __ " ....................... IUO ~ ................. ~ ____ \10.0._11. ....... _.»;' ....... ';.,.. ... __ .'" ...... ~_ .. 1' .... - .... ~ ____ ......... _ ............. ~_..dO .............. ~to ..... """'" ......... ....,·~ ......... ~~ .!l!,~ .. - ~f

-0

•

.

S! d ieto modal-1 t iets a mista ke i s be1ng fQ(lde, and 1 t i s the

mistake of letting modal sentences range ~ter the things we

talk abou't, and over t)le way in whieh we Jtalk about them,

instead of only latting them range ovar the latter, that is,

Over the senses of signs. He, we saw, maintains that this is<

only due to a 1 inguistie confusion and that if we could show

that the distinction betweeno. 2.! !!! and de dicto modalities is

a misconception, we would a1so be pble ta show that essences

apply, not to things, but to the senses of words, that is to­

aay, to 1 a nguage. Thi s impl ies .,t ha t< if a log ies1' t heory can

,be shown to be free from the distinction, for aIl ,:;

_ ontologieally relevant purposes, that will' also mean that in

that tlieory, either essences do not appear at aIl 01;, if they ,

do, they are only applicable' ta' the linguistic realm. As has

'alr.ady been aaid, Ockhamts theory i., in all relevant y

. respecta, not inf1uenced by such a di.tinc.tion. It a180 aeem.

qui te el.ar that his theori'., al though free from notions of

re.l •••• nce., employ ••• entialiat language, it aeem.,

the~.tre, plau.ible to bel ieve that OCkh.".'. p,hilosophy fall.

Into ~ aeconcl category, the one ln vhicb e ••• nc •• exl.t, ·but

are on', ,applicable to the 1 ingui.tic re"-. Thi. conclLJaion

.e._ to ,be in perfect agr~_.nt vith hl. nœin.U .... , with his

the<ory o<f knowledge anà vith his th.ory of signifie'ation in

particular. In .odern no.in.listie theôrie., for the mo.t

part, .it ia not po •• ible to have compatibility vith any kind

of •••• ntiali •• ' not even vith a theory of nominal ea.ence ••

This i. in part due ta the-fact tbat for th •• language is not

'7

,­,

, 1 ~ t i l 1

1 1

1

G divided into two parts, mental language and conventional

lànguage; it i8 only.conventional. This makes it obvious that

words, l ike thhlgs, cannot have an essence. From this if

follows quite clearly, that the only reason for which Ockham

can allow himself to use essentialist language is that he has

a place to ground it.

Real essences as far as 1 have been aM-é""to show, have

no pl ace in Ockham's system, but nominal essences can be

grounded in mental l'angu8ge. This i S .possible because, as we

have se~n, mental language is natural; it provides a link to

the natural order of things through the notion of similarity,

which, roughly speaking, is a functional similarity of

resembling processes of experiences. This is one of the

reasons why, intuitive cpgnit.ion

ia held t6 be the basis of concept formation because it is needed to guara'tee concepts of essential natures of things, concepts that are req uired

3for knowledge in the

str ict sense. "

This i s not so because there iia any exper i.ental ev id.nce to

the exi stence of the psychic act but becauae sucn a p.ycbic t

act is needed to provide a reflection of the natural order.

B •• enc.s are, therefore, just concept~" 'and a. far a. 1 cati

••• , have no other type of real grounding_ Kir".n'. atat._nt

of Locke's id •• of 'nClllinal' e •• enc. reflec:t. reaaonably weil,

.1thoQgh vi th diff~rent language, .y ovn perc~ion of vhat

oalcb_'. e, •• ntiali_ aaount. to, 1 wIll', ther.fore, quote lt

e.ten.i •• ly.

Locke argo.4 that ' •••• nc •• , or abstract id... (wbicb ar8 th.

98 ..

• , , ..

f i

1

, . ~~~ ... _ <il' .- ~,..,._.". .......... <il. __ ,.... ",. .... ___ ~ ... *' .... ~ 4Ir .: ..... _ ..... ~ ...... __ ,,_ ....... ~ ___ .... .:. ... _ .. ol..,. ....... ,. 4. • .1< .. "" ,J., '1- ........ ...&. ..a. .... _ ..... "'.. ..,. ... ~.lI-~... ... ,

measures of names, and the bounda­ries 0 f spec ies) are the workm'an­ship 'of the understanding' (Essay concerning Human ~Understand,ing, 3.3.14). Likenesses and unlikenes­ses exist in nature (3.3.13); but i t ia human beings who decide which of tne likenesses that they recognize are to be ~sed in Borting things into species', àrd especially in 'the Borting of them under

'-'~ames'. The sorts that men admit are just those to which general names are attached, and • the essence of each genus, or sort, cornes to be nothing but that abstract idea, which' the genetsl or sortal ••• name s,tands for' (3.3.15). Locke therefore propo8ed that such essences shou1d be termed 'nominal'. Aside from its connex ion wi th abstract ideas, this doctine of nominal essences amouqts to a doctrine of ana1yticity. It is primar11y the species man, not the individual Ifta'n Ge'orge, whicb baa a nominal essence; a,nd the esaence of that .peeie. ~ .. , in .ffeet the conjunction 01\ the log!' cally neees.ary condit.ion. for being a man. In a derivative way particular being. al.o bave neDinal e ••• nce. (3.3.16), relative to their fla.'i fieation under general naRtes.

Sefore cone 1 ud ing there are a fev aore con.ider aUon.

that' need to be made. Pir.t l "ant to go back tCJ rreddo.o· •

• tat ... nt tbat Oc::khM doe. not really reject an ••• entiali.t

account of sub.tance but, OD tbe other band, reject. the

equivalence b.t_en .entence. 1 ike ~Soc:irat:tt. i. '\nee .... rily •

• an' and aentence. like 'Socr.t •• ta a •• n and Soer.te. i.

nec •••• Etly nO,t;' non ••• o' or like ·Socrat •• is ••• n and it

ts nec •••• ry that tf Socrat •• is • beiDCJ, Socrate. i •• man'.

ft'edcJOIIO tbinlts tbat the fact tbat OCkb_ rej.cta .. ùteftcea

lite 'Socrat •• i. n.c •••• rily a •• 11" bec.m •• tbey are

~, ,.... , , ~

.r

~ -=-- - .-~:. .r:' ..

99

__ ~ .... T ... "" .. l'~,"-) ;--~,"'l. r-"r_ .. ~:t,~

.t ~;~#';

•

f \

1

,'~~<'''''''t~iIiI#L/I't'If'oOoolt.,.~~_~,_. _________ • __ ._~ _ .. -4, .•••

1

, .

';'

..

equivalent to the faise sentence taken in the sense of

composition lIt is necessary that Socrates ia a man', might

imply a essential ism on Ockham's part. He then

goes on ham accepts the sentence 'Socrates i8 a

man and non-man' wh ich i s al so

equivalent to the sentence 'Socrates is necessarily a man'.

We have seen before that the reason why this latter sentenc~

i s rejected i s that i t has the implica tion that Socrates ia a

necessary being: the only being for which such a sentence

could be true is God. The reason why the sentence 'Soc~ates

is a lJ'an and Socrates is necessarily not a non-man' i5

acceptable to Ockham seems to be that it has no such

iIllpl ication. In fact, i t would be equi valent ta 'Socrates is a

man and it is necessary that Socrates is not a non-man' which

ia also true. It ls, therefore quite right to say that OCkham

rejecta the equivalenee but not essentialisme It is also

quite right to say, however, that oc~haJII does not reject

e.sentialie in a fO-rm in which it is quite contentless. In

fa~t, i t' seenia to IDe that what you are predicati~g of socrat ••

in 'Socra ~ea i a a .an and Socra te. i. necessar i 1 Y not a non­

.an' cannot be an e ••• ntial property in the sense of Ieal

•• sence, becauae •• abood i. not sClllethil1Cj which has' extern.l

or ind.pendent exi.tenc., it i. only a concept.

1 vant to a.y, to conclude, thl!lt the ra.ulta of thi. ' .

•••• y can ba .WIII.r i zed a. fol ~ ova: ve have .aen that oc:k'b ••

1. Dot an Ide.lilt bec.ua. that voulcJ involve a Cjap batween

tbe t •• 1. of tbougbt and the r .. l vor1d wbic:h ia not allowcJ,

100

, ,

.,

1

1 ~ , i

j

1

1 j

1 l

, i

(

()

1._ •. , •.•. ~ • ~ ". .............. - .... &. .. ~ .....

by Ockham's theory of knowledge and theory of signification. . ,

The same reasons can be given as a proof against the fact that

Ockham might by sorne be considereà a sceptic; the str kt one-

to- one correspondence wh ich he sees between rea li ty and ,

thought" in Ockham's eyes does not even need proof, it ia

basic to his philosophical system; the connexion between

thought' and reality is never doubted. The label of

Conceptualism can be app,lied to Ockham'-s theory of universals

once it is cleared of any ideal ist overtones, because Ockharn

did consider universals to be 'concepts'. Ockham rej ected

both Platonic and Aristotel ian real ism with respect to

universals, but he was both an Ontologieal realist and an

Epistemic real ist, because he both bel ieved that knowledge is

essentially in conformity with real ity and that being is

"1 ind epend ent from bei ng known by a sub j ect. 1 t ha s' a l so been

said that the central aspect of Ockham's philosophy is his

nominal ism, which determines and daninat~s 'all other aspects of

his philosophy. Once nominalism is seeq' to be the central

concept in Ockham's philosophy, it becomes qui--te clear that

whatever his notion of essence is, it has

to be based on na~es. We have concluded tRat a11 doctrines of

rea 1 essen tial i sm ha ve 'to be 'rejected because of the above'

considerations and especially because of the analysis of his

modal logiC. If Ockham should turn out, in fact, to have real

essences, as opposed to nominal essences, l ,t.,.~~.nk that that

would have to come out of some other asp~cts of his

philosophy, aspects which we have not <:onsidered. It would ,

seelll tome, however, that this would be verydifficult to

101

•

, "".' \ '.

1 f,

1 1 1 i 1

( establ ish. For now let us conclude, in any case, that for

Oc k h am e s sen t i a 1 p r ed i c a t ion i sam a t ter 0 f p r ed i ca tin 9 0 n e

term of another by means of the verb "is'. Ockham says:

Furthermore, it is known that according to the Philosopher in-the fourth book of the Metaphysics, 'is' is appl ied both to what is incidentalléJy and to what is intrinsically. This distinction does not mean that sorne being exists Intrinsically and another exists incidentally. Arlstotle is rather pointing out the different ways·of predicating one term of another by means of the verb 'is'. This is sufficiently clear from the examples used by the philosopher. He says: 'we say that the musician is incidentally just, and also that the musician is incidentally a man, and we say that the musician is incidentally building.' From this it is clear that he is speaking only about the diverse modes of predicating one term to another. 5

102 ,

.l..'

( •

NOTES

1 D. W i99 ins, "'l'he De Re 1 Must 1: a note on the Log ica 1 Form of Essentia1ist C1aims" in 'l'ruth ~ !!eaning, Evans, G. McDowell, J. Ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), p.286.

2 R.B. Marcus, "Essential Attribution", 'l'he Journal of Philosophy, LXVIII, 1971, p.190.

3 T.K. Scott, "Oekham on Evidence, Necessity and Intuition", Journa! ~ the History of Philosophy, 7, 1969, p.48.

4 C. Kirwan, "How strong are the objections to essence", proceedings Aristotelian Society, 71, 1970/71, p.46.

5 W. Ockham, Philosophieal Nritin~s, Boehner, P. ed., (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons LTO., 19~7 , p.91.

"

1~3 ,

; : , ~ v ••• ' ()' 4 a $

•

r

c: BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adams, M. M.. ·Ockh •• •• Noain.l iD and Onre.l Entiti •• •• Philo.ophical aeview 86, 1977.

---------------. ·OCkh .. 's theory of n.tural .ignification·. Moniat 61, 1978.

Armstrong, A.H. ed.. Tbe C .. bridqe History of Latar Greek ~ Early Mediev~ philoaophy. Ca.6ridge:Ca.6ridge University Press, 1967.

sird, o.. "Tbe formali.lng of Topica in Medieval Logic·. Notre ~ Journal ~ Formal Logic l, 1960.

---------. ·Topic and Consequence in Ockhu's Loglc". Notre 2!!! Journal ~ For.al Logic 2, 1961.

Boehner, P.. Co1lected article. on Ockham. St.8onaventure N.Y.: T~Pranciacan Inatltute, 1958.

-----------. Med ieva 1 Log lc: .!:!! out 1 ine .2! .!!.! develop_nt from 1250c.- 1400. Manche.ter: Manche. ter uni ver .i ty Prëi"., 1966. -

Boh, 1.. "Tbe 'conditionatim' clause: one of the probl ... of exiatential import in th history of 10gic·. Motre ~ Journal of Foraal L i 18, 1977.

Bur le igh, W.. 2.! Pur i tate Art!. C ice. Tractetu. LODlior. Boebner, P. ed.. St.Bonaventure Il.!.: The rr.nc .can Insti tute, 1955.

Call1p, J.L.. "Plantinga on De Dicto and De Re;". !!!!.! S, 1911.

Copleston, P .. ! History .!!! PhilO.O,bl , vol.III, part 1, Ockha. ~ the Sr.Culat!v. "l.t cs. ..staister, Md.:

.ew.an Pres., 953.

De Rijk, L.".. ·On Anc~ent and Medieval S •• antica and Metaphysic.". Vivariua 15, 1977.

-----------------. "The developtent of suppo.itio Il.turali. in Medieval logic". Vi .,ari .. 11, 1913.

rerrer, v •• Tractatu. d. SlI~.itiODibu •• rra.aann - Rol~oOg,l'.

Geach, P.,... .efereace.!!! Gaoerality: .!!! ••• iaatioD .!!! .!!!!

lot·

4 J( .w:;: ~ u .... w GAP' 0 4 .IIi? 24 t ,. Q ~ .... J •• q4iP .. ,+ 3#\416 i -

1.

, l 1

Medieval and ModerD theorie •• Ünl ver.rty iiëa.-; Illd.

Itha"ca: Cornell

------------. Log le Mat ter •• California Preas, 1972.

Berkeley: Univeraity of

Henry, D.P .. !!edie..!.!.! LOgiS .!.ru! Metapbyaie •• Hutehlnson Oniversity Llbrary, l§'~.

London:

------------. "LalKliew.ki·. ontology and .oa •• ecUeval 1ogicians". Notre ~ Journal of ror_al Logic 10, 1969.

Jol i vet, J.. "Compar iaon dea Thk»rie. du langage chez Abttlard etc he z 1 es no. i n a 1 i a te a du X 1 Ve a i è cie" • i n Proceedinga ~ !!!! international conference Louvain .. y 10 =.!!L!!1.!. Buytaert, I.M. ed.. Leuven: Leuven Univer.ity Prea., 1974.

Kirwan, C.. "How atrong are the objections to ea.ence". proceadin,a Aristotelian Society, 71, 1970/71.

Kneale, w.. "Modality de re and de dieto". ~ethodology ~ pbiloaophy ~ Science. Suppea, P. Taraky, A.. Standford: university pre.8, 1962.

in Log ic, Nagel, E.

Stand for,d

------------- and I(neale, M.. The Developaent of Logis:_ Oxford: The Clarendon Pr • ....,- iii"2:--

Kr.ta.ann, N. Kenny, A. Pinborg, J. ed.. The Ca.bridge Hiatory of Later Medieval PhilosophIe C .. brldge: C ... bridge univeraity Pr~ •• , 1982~

I[r ipke, S.A.. "aaiog and Hec •• ai ty. Ca.br idge: Harvard Univeraity Pr •• a,~72.

~ ,

Lejew.ki, C •• "On LelKliewa~i·. ontology". aatio 1 - 2, 1957 -60.

LOCke, J •• !g Essay ConceroiD9 Hwaan Uadertataodinl' Midditcb, P.H. ad.. Oxford: ~~Clarendon Pre.s, 117 •

Marcu., R.B.. "I •• enti.l Attr idutioD". P,hilo.ophy LXVIII, 1971.

.!.!'!.! J 0 Il r n a ~ .!.!

Matthew., G.8.. ·Ockh •• •• suppoai tiOD theory and _oct.rn logic". Pbilosophieal aevi .. 73, 19'4.

--------------. "Suppo.itio and Quantification in OCkh •• •• Mou. 7, 1973. -

Meoer_ott Senape, A.C.. ·.ote. on th. a ••• rtoric and 1104.1 propoa1 t10na-l Log le of the ... taClo &cota.·. Jop!!t!l

105

CS L t .F Ç4 p, ;1; Ut 3 u;oa , u i •

t 1

i 1

1 t 1 f

.. "II!IlII!!""' ............ """"' .... P_4 ....... _.",,_ ........... ' ............. _ .. _, __ ._ ... _ .. __ .. _ ............. ___ ............. _ ... ~ ....... _ ... ___ ,..,.. ..... .,.. ..... _,... _ ...... ......-...... .......... '*"~ ~ ........................ _.....r.. ........... __ *" ..... _ ~ ...... ..

~ 1!!.! Yiatory !! Pbl1oaopby 10, 1972.

Moody, B.A.. !ruth and Con •• auence in Me41.va1 LOQic. Materd .. : lIorth-=-Hollana 'u6ilahlog 'ë'aiapany,-lj!J:

-----------. -The Medieval Contribution to LOCJic·. Stud!_ General. 19, 1966.

{'

-----------. The Logic of WiILl .. of Oçkh ... New York: Shed and wiidlnc., lUS. -

-----------. Studi •• in Medieval Philoaophy, Science and LOrie, Coll.cte~papers 1933 - 1969. onlverslty-ot Ca lfornia Pres., 1975.

lIor.ore, C.. The Logic of Ti •• and MOdalitl in the later Middle -ASe.: tSecoii'trIbût'I'On 01 "il iiii or-ock6 ... fb.D. DiiHrtation; onlv.r.lty ofToro~to, 19li.

1

Oeka .. , N.. Tractatu. de Pra~tination. et de prae.cienti. D.i et ae !'uturr. contlngentI6u •• aoehner, P. ed .. it.'àooavëiÏture N.Y.: .. hi l'rancl.can In.titute, 19.5.

----------. PhilO.orhical Writings. Boehaer, P. ed .. don: Thoaa. Me son and Sona L'lb., 1951.

Lon-

----------. Ockh •• •• Tbeorl of Ter •• : paèdt ! ~ !!! Su .. a Logicae. Translate .nd Introduc by Lou,x, M. l .. Motre Daae: Onlver.ity of Notre o..e Pra •• , 197 ••

----------. 8u_a LOilc.,., evt Lll ' !!!.. Boehner, P. ed .. St. Bonaventure, Il.Y.: '1' e !'rancrscan In.ti tut., 1951.

----------. Oekha.'. !boery .!!! ProRo.i tioD.: lar t li .!! ~ Su ••• LOlica.. Tran.lated by !'re4 0.0 A. J •• 8chuuœan H.. London: Oniver.ity of Motre D .. e Pre •• , 1980.

Panacclo C.. §ilnifieation et lIo.ination: la LOiifue d. Guill_u •• d'Ocea.. Ph. D. '1'6 •• 1., üiïiver. t' de

_ '~" iiODtrlal, 1971.

Parret, ft. ad.. Hiaory of Liniuiatic Tbougbt and Cont!!porary lingutatics. aarrln: Valter de Gruyter~g'6.

Plantin9_, A.. 'l'b. Il.ture of •• ce.aity. Oxford: Clarendon pr ... , 19""- -_

-o. ra et de dicto-. lou. 3, 1969. -..... _-~- ......... -..... --. 79, 1970.

-World and · •••• ac.·. Pbi!o'ORbica1 •• vi ••

Pr lor, A.... -'b •• o •• ib1y 'rue and tbe ,o •• U,l.-. Mi"

106

. "

........ _. _ ... _ ... ~ .. ~ ___ ....... _..........-___ .. _._. _____ .. _._ .. _* .. ~ ................ _ Mi. - ............. .." ............ ..--.• r4~ .......... ~J __ ... __ ... ____ ....... -... ____ ....

1 !

, 1 -

1

LXXVIII. lf6'.

Ouine, N.V.O.. l'rOll Il Liftcal Point of VI.". Harper .ndiOW Pub .h.i., l,Cl. - -

• •• York:

---------------. ~ ~ Objtst. ca.bridg., Ma ... chu •• tt.: Harvard Univer.ity pre •• , 1960.

!

---------------. rbe Way. of Paradox and /other •••• ~;. C .. bridge, Ma •• acbuaetta:,Harvara Univer.Ity 'r....66.

Read, s.. "Tbe objective being of Ockba.'. fict.". Philoaoph~cal Quarterly 21, 1911.

Saw, R.L.. "Wi Il iam of Ockhall on T.r •• , Propo.i tion. and M.aning". Proceeding. ~ ~ Ari.tot.lian Society 42, (1941 - 42).

Scott, T.K •• "Ockhalll on Evidenc., "ec ••• ity and Intuition". Journal of ~ Hi.tory of Philo.ophy 1, 1969.

Torney, S.C.. OCkhall, Studie. and Selection.. LaSalle, Illinoi8: The Open Court pubIT.hlng Coapany, 1938.

Tr.ntman, J.A.. "On Interpretation, L ..... ie".ki·. Ontology, and the atudy of Medi.val Log ic". Journal .2.! .1!l!. History ~ Philo_opby XIV, 1976.

---------------. "Ockham on Mental tI. ~ 19, 1910.

---------------. "Sxtraordinary Language and Medieval Logic·. Dialogue 7, 1968.

---------------. "Lellnie".k i t. Ontology and aOIl. MecS lev al L09ici~ns". Notre e!!! Journal ~ por.al Loqie 1, 1966.

Wiggin., D.. "The De Re ·Mu.t'; a note on tbe Logical porm of Z.sentialist Claim.- in TrQth and M •• ning. Ivana, G. MeDo"ell, J. ad.. Oxford: Tbe Clarëndon Pres., 1916.

Nippel, J.F. Wol ter, ~.8. eds.. MecUev.!! !1!!!O.OPht: fro. St.Augustine to N lchola. ol W,!-« Ne" 'fork: T • Pr •• pre.s, 19&0. - ,- _

107

J