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1.NIPPON EXPRESS (PHILIPPINES) CORP., vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE February 4, 2015

Facts: Under the premise that it is entitled to a refund of the amount of P24,826,667.61, petitioner filed four separate applications for tax credit/refund with the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the Department of Finance (OSSAC-DOF) on September 24, 2001. Receiving no resolution from OSSAC-DOF, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on April 24, 2002 pursuant to Section 112 in relation to Section 229 of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended.

Issue: W/N petitioner was delayed in filing the above action.

Held: Yes. The timeliness in the administrative and judicial claims can be found in Section 112 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended, which reads:

SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. -

x x x x

(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. - In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) hereof.

In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty ay period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.

Section 112(D) of the NIRC of 1997 categorically states that in case of failure on the part of the respondent to act on the application within the 120-day period prescribed by law, petitioner only has 30 days after the expiration of the 120-day period to appeal the unacted claim with the CTA.

Since petitioners judicial claim for the aforementioned quarters for taxable year 2000 was filed before the CTA only on 24 April 2002, which was way beyond the mandatory 120+30 days to seek judicial recourse, such noncompliance with the mandatory period of 30 days is fatal to its refund claim on the ground of prescription. Consequently, the CTA had no jurisdiction over the instant claim of petitioner as the petition was belatedly filed. (My note: You cannot also make an appeal during the 120 day period as it would be an immature filing unless you all under the period 10December 2003 until 6 October 2010. Within this period, BIR Ruling No.DA-489-03 is recognized as an equitable estoppel, during which judicial aims may be filed even before the expiration of the 120-day period granted to the CIR to decide on a claim for a refund.2. Northern Mindanao Power Corp. vs. Commissioner of the Internal Revenue February 18, 2015

Facts: Petitioner filed an administrative claim for a refund on 20 June 2000 for the 3rd and the 4th quarters of taxable year 1999, and on 25 July 2001 for taxable year 2000 in the sum of _6,411,892.84. Thereafter, alleging inaction of respondent on these administrative claims, petitioner filed a Petition6 with the CTA on 28 September 2001.

Issue: W/N the imprinting the word zero-rated is required.

Held: Yes. In addition, the issue of the requirement of imprinting the word zero-rated has already been settled by this Court in a number of cases. In Western Mindanao Power Corporation v. CIR, we ruled:

RR 7-95, which took effect on 1 January 1996, proceeds from the rule-making authority granted to the Secretary of Finance by the NIRC for the efficient enforcement of the same Tax Code and its amendments. In Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines v.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, we ruled that this provision is reasonable and is in accord with the efficient collection of VAT from the covered sales of goods and services. Moreover, we have held in Kepco Philippines Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the subsequent incorporation of Section 4.108-1 of RR 7-95 in Section 113(B) (2) (c) of R.A. 9337 actually confirmed the validity of the imprinting requirement on VAT invoices or official receipts a case falling under the principle of legislative approval of administrative interpretation by reenactment. In fact, this Court has consistently held as fatal the failure to print the word "zero-rated" on the VAT invoices or official receipts in claims for a refund or credit of input VAT on zero-rated sales, even if the claims were made prior to the effectivity of R.A. 9337. Clearly then, the present petition must be denied.

3. DONA ADELA1 EXPORTINTERNATIONAL, INC., vs. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION (TIDCORP), AND THE BANK OFTHE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (BPI), - February 11, 2015

Facts: Petitioner undergoes insolvency proceedings. Parties agreed to a compromise agreement but one of the stipulation stated therein was for the respondents to check the bank account of the petitioner which the latter did not conform as he did not agree the same. Thus, this case.

Issue: W/N waiver of confidentiality provision in the Agreement between TIDCORP and BPI is valid despite petitioner not being a party and signatory to the same.

Held. No. It is basic in law that a compromise agreement, as a contract, is binding only upon the parties to the compromise, and not upon non-parties. This is the doctrine of relativity of contracts.32 The rule is based on Article 1311 (1) of the Civil Code which provides that contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs x x x.33 The sound reason for he exclusion of non-parties to an agreement is the absence of a vinculum or juridical tie which is the efficient cause for the establishment of an bligation.34 Consistent with this principle, a judgment based entirely on a compromise agreement is binding only on the parties to the compromise the court approved, and not upon the parties who did not take part in the compromise agreement and in the proceedings leading to its submission and approval by the court. Otherwise stated, a court judgment made solely on the basis of a compromise agreement binds only the parties to the compromise, and cannot bind a party litigant who did not take part in the compromise agreement.4. Marieta De Castro vs. People of the Philippines February 2, 2015Facts: The petitioner, a bank teller of the BPI Family Savings Bank (BPI Family) at its branch in Malibay, Pasay City, appeals the affirmance of her conviction for four counts of estafa through falsification of a commercial document committed on separate occasions in October and November 1993 by forging the signatures of bank depositors Amparo Matuguina and Milagrosa Cornejo in withdrawal slips, thereby enabling herself to withdraw a total of 1165,000.00 and 112,000.00 from the respective savings accounts of Matuguina and Cornejo.

Issue: W/N petitioners conviction was invalid because her constitutional rights against self-incrimination, to due process and to counsel were denied.

Held: No. Debunking the petitioners challenges, the CA stressed that the rights against self-incrimination and to counsel guaranteed under the Constitution applied only during the custodial interrogation of a suspect. In her case, she was not subjected to any investigation by the police or other law enforcement agents. Instead, she underwent an administrative investigation as an employee of the BPI Family Savings Bank, the investigation being conducted by her superiors. She was not coerced to give evidence against herself, or to admit to any crime, but she simply broke down bank when depositors Matuguina and Cornejo confronted her about her crimes.

5. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CECILIA GRACE L. ROASA, married to GREG AMBROSE ROASA, as herein represented by her Attorneys-in-Fact, BERNARDO M. NICOLAS, .JR. and ALVIN B. ACAYEN February 2, 2015Facts: The instant petition arose from an application for registration of title over a parcel of land filed by herein respondent, represented by her attorneys-in-fact, Bernardo M. Nicolas, Jr. and Alvin B. Acayen. The application was filed on December 15, 2000 with the RTC of Tagaytay City.

Issue: W/N RESPONDENTS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIRED 30-YEAR ADVERSE POSSESSION SINCE THE SUBJECT LAND WAS DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ONLY ON MARCH 15, 1982 PER CENRO CERTIFICATION, AND THE APPLICATION WAS FILED ONLY ON DECEMBER 12, 2000.

Held: Yes. Therefore, what is important in computing the period of possession is that the land has already been declared alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration. Upon satisfaction of this requirement, the computation of the period may include

the period of adverse possession prior to the declaration that land is alienable and disposable. Respondents right to the original registration of title over the subject property is, therefore, dependent on the existence of (a) a declaration that the land is alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration and (b) open and continuous possession in the concept of an owner through itself or through its predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945 or earlier.In the present case, there is no dispute that the subject lot has been declared alienable and disposable on March 15, 1982. This is more than eighteen (18) years before respondent's application for registration, which was filed on December 15, 2000. Moreover, the unchallenged testimonies of two of respondent's witnesses established that the latter and her predecessors-in-interest had been in adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945.

6. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TOMAS DIMACUHA, JR., et. Al. Feb.2,2015

Facts: Appellants Edgar Allen Alvarez (Alvarez) and Rodel Caballero (Caballero), together with the accused who remain at-large, were charged with the crime of murder for the fatal shooting of Nicanor Morfe Agon (Agon).

Issue: W/N the evidence was insufficient to warrant their conviction of the respondents.

Held: No. The elements of the crime of murder are: (1) a person was killed; (2) the

accused killed him or her; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying

circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); and (4)

that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.10 These requisites have been established by the prosecution.

The gunman himself who testified for the prosecution, George Vitan (Vitan), testified that his group Black Shark killed Agon. One of the responding policemen PO2 Arnold Abdon, for his part, testified that he went to the hospital where Agon was taken and the latter was already dead when he arrived. Further, the Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Antonio S. Vertido, testified on the post-mortem examination he conducted upon Agon which showed that the latter sustained six gunshot wounds, two of which were fatal. The element therefore that a person was killed is obtaining in this case.

That appellants killed Agon was established through the prosecution witnesses composed of Vitan and two other self-confessed former members of Black Shark, Arnel Balocon and Romulo Gasta. Their testimonies pointed to appellants as among those who planned and executed the killing of Agon.

The fatal shooting of Agon was attended by treachery, a qualifying circumstance listed under Article 248 and notably, alleged in the Information.