45
MACAM vs CA CASE: Petitioner Benito Macam, doing business under the name and style Ben-Mac Enterprises , shipped on board the vessel Nen Jiang , owned andoperated by respondent China Ocean Shipping Co., through local agentrespondent Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. (WALLEM), watermelonscovered by a Bill of Lading and fresh mangoes covered by another Bill ofLading. The Bills of Lading contained the following pertinent provision:"One of the Bills of Lading must be surrendered duly endorsed in exchangefor the goods or delivery order." The shipment was bound for Hongkongwith Pakistan Bank (PAKISTAN BANK) as consignee and Great ProspectCompany of Kowloon, Hongkong (GPC) as notify party.Per letter of credit requirement, copies of the bills of lading and commercialinvoices were submitted to petitioner's depository bank, ConsolidatedBanking Corporation (SOLIDBANK), which paid petitioner in advance thetotal value of the shipment.Upon arrival in Hongkong, the

Digested Cases in TLaw

Embed Size (px)

DESCRIPTION

Contains the following cases:MACAM VS. CASHEWARAM VS. PALONG YIU VS. CASWEET LINES VS. TEVEZSEALAND SERVICES INC. VS. IACEVERETT STEAMSHIP VS. CAPANAM VS. RAPADASNOCUM VS. LTBKOREAN AIRLINES VS. CALA MALLORCA VS DE JESUS

Citation preview

MACAM vs CA

MACAM vs CA

CASE:Petitioner Benito Macam, doing business under the name and styleBen-Mac Enterprises, shipped on board the vesselNen Jiang, owned andoperated by respondent China Ocean Shipping Co., through local agentrespondent Wallem Philippines Shipping, Inc. (WALLEM), watermelonscovered by a Bill of Lading and fresh mangoes covered by another Bill ofLading. The Bills of Lading contained the following pertinent provision:"One of the Bills of Lading must be surrendered duly endorsed in exchangefor the goods or delivery order."The shipment was bound for Hongkongwith Pakistan Bank (PAKISTAN BANK) as consignee and Great ProspectCompany of Kowloon, Hongkong (GPC) as notify party.Per letter of credit requirement, copies of the bills of lading and commercialinvoices were submitted to petitioner's depository bank, ConsolidatedBanking Corporation (SOLIDBANK), which paid petitioner in advance thetotal value of the shipment.Upon arrival in Hongkong, the shipment was delivered by respondentWALLEM directly to GPC, not to PAKISTAN BANK, and without the requiredbill of lading having been surrendered.Subsequently, GPC failed to pay PAKISTAN BANK such that the latter, still inpossession of the original bills of lading, refused to pay petitioner throughSOLIDBANK.Since SOLIDBANK already pre-paid petitioner thevalue of theshipment, it demanded payment from respondent WALLEM but was refused.Petitioner was thusallegedly constrained to returnthe amountinvolved to SOLIDBANK, then demanded payment from respondentWALLEM in writing but to no avail.Petitioner filed in the TC against respondent. TC ruled in favor of petitioner.CA reversed.

ISSUE 1: WON respondent is liable to petitioner for misdelivery becauseGPC was not the proper recipientISSUE 2: WON respondents are liable to petitioner for releasing the goodsto GPC without the bills of lading or bank guarantee

HELD 1: NO. Respondent is not liable to petitioner because GPC was aproper recipient. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrierslasts until actual or constructive delivery of the cargoes to the consigneeorto the person who has a right to receive them.PAKISTANBANKwasindicated in the bills of lading as consignee whereas GPC was the notifyparty.However, in the export invoices GPC was clearly named asbuyer/importer.Petitioner also referred toGPC assuch in hisdemandletter to respondent WALLEM and in his complaint before the trial court.This premise drew the Court to conclude that the delivery of the cargoes toGPC as buyer/importer which, conformably with Art. 1736 had, other thanthe consignee, the right to receive the goods.HELD 2: NO. Respondent himself admitted in his testimony during trial thatit was his practice to ask the shipping lines to immediately release shipmentof perishable goods through telephone calls by himself or his people. Heno longer required presentation of a bill of lading nor of a bank guaranteeas acondition to releasing the goods in case he wasalready fully paid.Thus,taking into account that subject shipment consisted of perishable goodsand SOLIDBANK pre-paid the full amount of the value thereof, it is nothard to believe the claim of respondent WALLEM that petitioner indeedrequested the release of the goods toGPC without the bills of lading.Shewarma vs. PAL

FACTS:Plaintiff paid for his ticket for hisflight from Zamboanga to Manila. Hechecked in 3 luggages. Upon arrival in Manila, oneof his luggages which containeda radio and acamera worth P353 was missing. Upon investigation by PAL, itwasfound out that it wasmistagged and was sent to Iligan. Thenext day the lugggagewas returned but the camera and radiowere already missing.Plaintiff now wants PAL to pay for the original amount of the camera andradio but PAL invoked theprovision at the back ofthe ticket. The provision providedthat the company would pay onlyP100 for any lost itemnot initially declared.ISSUE:Whether PAL is liable and to what extent.

HELD:Yes. PAL being acommon carrier is liable. Its contention that theliability limitation to P100 cannot be enforced. Accdg. toSC, there is nothing wrong in limiting the liability but first there must bea contract which is just andreasonable under the circumstances and must fairly be agreed upon (Art.1750).In this case, the print at the back of theticket was so small and there was no signature at the back of the ticket to manifest a fairly agreed contract. Hence, PAL is liable for the wholeamount of the objects although they werenot initially declared.To establishnegligence, SC used Art 1734 and 1735. In these articles, thereis an exclusive list where commoncarriers are exempted from liablility. These are thefollowing:1 flood ,storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster2 act ofthe public enemyin war, whether international or civil3 act or omission of the shipper or owner of goods4 the cahracter ofthe goods or defects in thepacking or in containers5 order or actof competent public authoritiesSince in the case at bar, none of these fall in the categories cited, PAL isconsidered negligent and liable.

G.R. No. L-40597 June 29, 1979 AGUSTINO B. ONG YIU,petitioner,vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE AIR LINES, INC.,respondents.MELENCIO-HERRERA,J .:FACTS:On August 26, 1967, petitioner was a fare paying passenger of respondent Philippine AirLines, Inc. (PAL) from Mactan Cebu, bound for Butuan City. As a passenger, he checked in onepiece of luggage, a blue "maleta" for which he was issued Claim Check. Upon arrival, petitionerclaimed his luggage but it could not be found. According to petitioner, it was only after reactingindignantly to the loss that the matter was attended to by the porter clerk, Maximo Gomez, which,however, the latter denies, At about 3:00 o'clock P.M., PAL Butuan, sent a message to PAL, Cebu,inquiring about the missing luggage,Subsequently, PAL Manila wired PAL Cebu advising that theluggage had been over carried to Manilaand that it would be forwarded to Cebu on the same day.Instructions were also given that the luggage be immediately forwarded to Butuan City on the firstavailable flight. Petitioner was worried about the missing luggage because it contained vitaldocuments needed for trial the next day.Early in the morning of the next day, August 27, 1967, petitioner went to the Bancasi Airport toinquire about his luggage. He did not wait, however, for the morning flight which arrived at 10:00o'clock that morning. This flight carried the missing luggage. The porter clerk, Maximo Gomez,paged petitioner, but the latter had already left. A certain Emilio Dagorro a driver of a "colorum" car,who also used to drive for petitioner, volunteered to take the luggage to petitioner. As MaximoGomez knew Dagorro to be the same driver used by petitioner whenever the latter was in ButuanCity, Gomez took the luggage and placed it on the counter. Dagorro examined the lock, pressed it,and it opened. After calling the attention of Maximo Gomez, the "maleta" was opened, Gomez took alook at its contents, but did not touch them. Dagorro then delivered the "maleta" to petitioner, withthe information that the lock was open. Upon inspection, petitioner found that a folder containingcertain exhibits, transcripts and private documents in Civil Case and Sp. Procs. were missing, asidefrom two gift items for his parents-in-law. Petitioner refused to accept the luggage. Dagorro returnedit to the porter clerk, Maximo Gomez, who sealed it and forwarded the same to PAL Cebu.On September 13, 1967, petitioner filed a Complaint against PAL for damages for breach of contractof transportation. After due trial, the lower Court found PAL to have acted in bad faith and withmalice and declared petitioner entitled to moral damages in the sum of P80,000.00, exemplarydamages of P30,000.00, attorney's fees of P5,000.00, and costs.ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Court committed grave error when it limited PAL'scarriage liability to the amount of P100.00 as stipulated at the back of the ticket.HELD: NO.The respondent Court correctly opined:As a general proposition, theplaintiff's maletahaving been pilfered while in the custody of the defendant, it is presumed that the defendant hadbeen negligent. The liability, however, of PAL for the loss, in accordance with the stipulation writtenon the back of the ticket, Exhibit 12, is limited to P100.00 per baggage,plaintiff not havingdeclared a greater value, and not having called the attention of the defendant on its true valueand paid the tariff therefor. The validity of this stipulation is not questioned by the plaintiff.They are printed in reasonably and fairly big letters, and are easily readable. Moreover,plaintiff had been a frequent passenger of PAL from Cebu to Butuan City and back, and he,being a lawyer and businessman, must be fully aware of these conditions.Sweet Lines, Inc. v. Teves, 83 SCRA 361FACTS: Private respondents Atty. Leovigildo Tandog and Rogelio Tiro, a contractor by professions, bought tickets Nos. 0011736 and011737 for Voyage 90 on December 31, 1971 at the branch office of petitioner, a shipping company transporting inter-islandpassengers and cargoes, at Cagayan de Oro City. Respondents were to board petitioner's vessel, M/S "Sweet Hope" bound forTagbilaran City via the port of Cebu. Upon learning that the vessel was not proceeding to Bohol, since many passengers were boundfor Surigao, private respondents per advice, went to the branch office for proper relocation to M/S "Sweet Town". Because the saidvessel was already filled to capacity, they were forced to agree "to hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers of thePhilippine Coastguard." Private respondents alleged that they were, during the trip," "exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and thedust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits," and that the tickets they bought at Cagayan de Oro City for Tagbilaran were nothonored and they were constrained to pay for other tickets. In view thereof, private respondents sued petitioner for damages and forbreach of contract of carriage in the alleged sum of P10,000.00 before respondents Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental.Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. This motion was premised on the condition printed at theback of the tickets, i.e., Condition No. 14, which reads: It is hereby agreed and understood that any and all actions arising out of theconditions and provisions of this ticket, irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu.

ISSUE:WON the stipulation any action arising out of the conditions and provisions can be filed only in competent court of cebu cityin the ticket valid and enforceable.RULING: There is no question that there was a valid contract of carriage entered into by petitioner and private respondents and thatthe passage tickets, upon which the latter based their complaint, are the best evidence thereof. All the essential elements of a validcontract, i.e., consent, cause or consideration and object, are present.To the same effect and import, and, in recognition of the character of contracts of this kind, the protection of the disadvantaged isexpressly enjoined by the New Civil Code In all contractual property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantageon account of his moral dependence, ignorance indigence, mental weakness, tender age and other handicap, the courts must bevigilant for hisprotection.Considered in the light Of the foregoing norms and in the context Of circumstances Prevailing in the inter-island ship. ping industry in the country today, We find and hold that Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void and unenforceable for the following reasons first, under circumstances obligation in the inter-island ship. ping industry, it is not just and fairto bind passengers to the terms of the conditions printed at the back of the passage tickets, on which Condition No. 14 is Printed in fine letters, and second, Condition No. 14 subverts the public policy on transfer of venue of proceedings of this nature, since the same will prejudice rights and interests of innumerable passengers in different s of the country who, under Condition No. 14, will have to file suits against petitioner only in the City of Cebu.1. It is a matter of public knowledge, of which We can take judicial notice, that there is a dearth of and acute shortage in inter- island vessels plying between the country's several islands, and the facilities they offer leave much to be desired. Thus, even under ordinary circumstances, the piers are congested with passengers and their cargo waiting to be transported. The conditions are even worse at peak and/or the rainy seasons, when Passengers literally scramble to whatever accommodations may be availed of, even through circuitous routes, and/or at the risk of their safety their immediate concern, for the moment, being to be able to board vessels with the hope of reaching their destinations. The schedules are as often as not if not more so delayed or altered. This was precisely the experience of private respondents when they were relocated to M/S "Sweet Town" from M/S "Sweet Hope" and then any to the scorching heat of the sun and the dust coming from the ship's cargo of corn grits, " because even the latter was filed to capacity.Under these circumstances, it is hardly just and proper to expect the passengers to examine their tickets received from crowded/congested counters, more often than not during rush hours, for conditions that may be printed much charge them with having consented to the conditions, so printed, especially if there are a number of such conditions m fine print, as in this case.Again, it should be noted that Condition No. 14 was prepared solely at the ms of the petitioner, respondents had no say in its preparation. Neither did the latter have the opportunity to take the into account prior to the purpose chase of their tickets. For, unlike the small print provisions of contracts the common example of contracts of adherence which are entered into by the insured in his awareness of said conditions, since the insured is afforded the op to and co the same, passengers of inter-island v do not have the same chance, since their alleged adhesion is presumed only from the fact that they purpose chased the tickets.It should also be stressed that slapping companies are franchise holders of certificates of public convenience and therefore, posses a virtual monopoly over the business of transporting passengers between the ports covered by their franchise. This being so, shipping companies, like petitioner, engaged in inter-island shipping, have a virtual monopoly of the business of transporting passengers and may thus dictate their terms of passage, leaving passengers with no choice but to buy their tickets and avail of their vessels and facilities. Finally, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that the bulk of those who board these inter-island vessel come from the low-income groups and are less literate, and who have little or no choice but to avail of petitioner's vessels.Sea-Land Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (April 30, 2001)Doctrine: Laws granting exemption from tax are construedstrictissimi jurisagainst the taxpayerand liberally in favorof the taxing power.Taxation is the rule and exemption isthe exception.Facts:Sea-Land Service Incorporated (SEA-LAND) is a SEC(PH)-registered American internationalshipping company which into a contract with the US Government to transport military householdgoods and effects of U. S. military personnel assigned to the Subic Naval Base. They derivedincome amounting to P58 million and paid taxes amounting to P870 thousand based on theNIRC and theRP-US TaxTreaty. Three years later,it filed aclaim for refundstating that it paidthe aforementioned income tax by mistake and before it was acted upon by the BIRCommissioner, SEA-LAND filed a petition for review with the CTA to judicially pursue therefund and to stop the running of the 2 year prescriptive period. Such petition was denied by theCTA and later by the CA.Issue:Whether or not the income that petitioner derived from services in transporting the householdgoods and effects of U. S. military personnel falls within the tax exemption provided in ArticleXII, paragraph 4 of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.Held:NO.Laws granting exemption from tax are construedstrictissimi jurisagainst the taxpayer andliberally in favor ofthe taxing power.Taxation is the rule and exemptionis theexception.Under Article XII (4) of the RPUS Military Bases Agreement, the Philippine Governmentagreed to exempt from payment of Philippine income tax nationals of the United States, orcorporations organized under the laws of the United States, residents in the United States inrespect of any profit derived under a contract made in the United States with the Government ofthe United States in connection with theconstruction, maintenance, operation and defense ofthe bases.It is obvious that the transport or shipment of household goods and effects of U. S. militarypersonnelisnotincludedinthetermconstruction,maintenance,operationanddefenseofthebases.Neither could the performance of this serviceto the U. S. government be interpreted as directly related to the defense and security ofthe Philippine territories.EVERETT STEAMSHIP CORPORATIONvs.COURT OF APPEALS and HERNANDEZ TRADING CO. INC.G.R. No. 122494.(October 8, 1998)FACTS:Private respondent imported three crates of bus spare parts from its supplier, Maruman Trading, a foreigncorporation based in Inazawa, Aichi, Japan. The crates were shipped from Nagoya, Japan to Manila on boardADELFAEVERETTE, a vesselowned by petitioners principal, Everett Orient Lines.The said crates were covered by a Bill ofLading. One of the crates was discovered missing upon arrival at the port of Manila. RTC conclusively finds defendantliable to the plaintiff subscribing to Article 1750, NCC.The next point of inquiry the Court wants to resolve is the extent ofthe liability of the defendant.As stated, plaintiff contends that defendant should be held liable for the whole value for theloss of the goods in the amount of Y1,552,500.00 because the terms appearing at the back of the bill of lading was sowritten in fine prints and that the same was not signed by plaintiff or shipper thus, they are not bound by theclause statedin paragraph 18 of the bill of lading.On the other hand, defendant merely admitted that it lost the shipment but shall beliable only up to the amount of Y100,000.00. CA affirmed RTCs findings with the additional observation that privaterespondent Maruman cannot be bound by the terms and conditions of the bill of lading because it was not privy to thecontract of carriage.ISSUES:1) Whether the limited liability clause in the bill of lading is valid.YES. Pursuant to the afore-quoted provisions of law, it is required that the stipulation limiting the common carriersliability for loss must be reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has beenfreely and fairly agreed upon. Astipulation in the bill of lading limiting the common carriers liability for loss or destruction of a cargo to a certain sum,unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is sanctioned by law, particularly Articles 1749 and 1750 of the CivilCode which provide:ART. 1749.A stipulation that the common carriers liability is limited to the value of the goods appearing inthe bill of lading,unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value, is binding.ART. 1750.A contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or shipper for the loss, destruction, ordeterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been freely and fairly agreedupon.The trial courts ratiocination that privaterespondent could not have fairly and freely agreed to the limited liabilityclause in the bill of lading because the said conditions were printed in small letters does not make the bill of lading invalid.Readymade contracts, such as the bill of lading in question requires greater vigilance. Article 24 of the Civil Code whichmandates that (i)n all contractual, property orother relations,when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on accountof his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must bevigilant for his protection.The shipper, Maruman Trading, has been extensively engaged in the trading business. Itcannot be said to be ignorant of the business transactions it entered into involving the shipment of its goods to itscustomers.2) Whether or not private respondent, as consignee, who is not a signatory to the bill of lading is bound by thestipulations thereof.YES. Whenprivate respondentformally claimed reimbursement forthe missinggoods frompetitioner andsubsequently filed a case against the latter based on the very same bill of lading, Maruman Trading accepted theprovisions of the contract and thereby made itself a party thereto, or at least has come to court to enforce it. Thus, privaterespondent cannot now reject or disregard the carriers limited liability stipulation in the bill of lading.In other words,private respondent is bound by the whole stipulations in the bill oflading and must respect the same.3) Whether private respondent is allowed to fully recover the full alleged value of its lost cargo.NO.To defeat the carriers limited liability,Clause 18 of the bill of lading requires that the shipper shouldhavedeclared in writing a higher valuationof its goods before receipt thereof by the carrier andinsert the saiddeclaration in the bill of lading, with the extra freight paid.These requirements in the bill of lading were never compliedwith by the shipper, hence, the liability of the carrier under the limited liability clause stands.The commercial Invoice No.MTM-941 does not in itself sufficiently and convincingly show that petitioner has knowledge of the value of the cargo asPAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS INC V. JOSE K. RAPADAS, G.R. NO 60673 (1992)FACTSPrivaterespondentJoseRapadaspurchasedaplaneticketfromPanAmerican Airways bound for Manila from Guam.1.On January 1! 1"#$! while Rapadas was waitin% to check in atthe GuamAirport! he was ordered by Pan American&s hand carry control a%ent tocheck'in his (amsonite attach) case. Rapadas protested* ar%uin% that other co'passen%ers were allowed to handcarry bulkier ba%%a%e+.As such! he went to the end of line hopin% that he would not have to re%isterhis lu%%a%e. ,owever! the same man in char%e of hand carry control orderedhim to re%ister his ba%-.earin% that he would miss his /i%ht! he a%reed to check it in. ,e then %avehis ba% to his brother who happened to be around and who checked it in forhim! without declarin% its contents or thevalue thereof0.ponarrival inManila!Rapadas claimed and was%iven allhis checked'inlu%%a%ewithoutthee2ceptionofthe(amsoniteattach)case.Assuch!Rapadas 3led a claim with petitioner&s Manila4a%%a%e (ervice. ,owever! PanAmerican was unable to locate the lost ba%.$.As such! Pan Am Airways o5ered to settle the lost for 617 representin% theairline&s limit of liability for loss or dama%e to a passen%er&spersonal propertyunder thecontract of carria%e between Rapadas and Pan Am..Rapadas refused and 3led an action for dama%es a%ainst Pan Am. ,e alle%edthat Pan Am sin%led him out in orderin% hislu%%a%e to be checked in and thatthe airlines ne%lected in its duty in handlin% and safekeepin% his lu%%a%e. ,ealle%ed that the value of the lost ba% and its contents was 60+!07-."7! theloss resulted in hisfailure to pay certain monetary obli%ations! failure to remitmoneysentthrou%hhimtorelatives!inabilitytoen8oythefruitsofhisretirement and vacation pay earned from workin% in 9on%a :onstruction :o#.;n its answer! Pan Amacknowled%ed responsibility for the loss of the suitcasebut asserted that the claim was sub8ect to the notice of ba%%a%e liabilitylimitations printed at the back of the plane ticket and posted in itsoarsaw :onvention"E#D@es. 9he :onvention %overns the availment of the liability limitations wherethe ba%%a%e check is combined with or incorporated in the passen%er ticket whichcomplies with the provisions of Article -! par. 1cB. Article 0! par. +B ;n the case atbar! the ba%%a%e check is combined with the passen%er ticket in one document ofcarria%e.9he provisions intheplane ticket su;FF 4;?H ,;M ROM(9;PFA9;O?( 9,ERE;?* :A(E A9 4AR. I 9he ar%uments of the petitioner do notbelie the fact that it was indeed accountable for the loss of the attach) case.>hatthe petitioner is concerned about is whether or not the notice! which it did not fail tostate in the plane ticket and which it deemed to have been read and accepted bythe private respondent will be considered by this :ourt as adeDuate under thecircumstances of this case.As earlier stated! the :ourt 3nds the provisions in theplane ticket sue are not by any means su%%estin% that passen%ers are always bound to thestipulated amounts printed on a ticket! found in a contract of adhesion! or printedelsewherebut referred toin handouts orforms.>esimply reco%nie that thereasons behind stipulations on liability limitations arise from the di