Election Cases Digested

7/29/2019 Election Cases Digested

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Carren Paulet V. Cuyos Election Law Tuesday (5:30-6:30)

MACALINTAL VS COMELEC

Facts:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar,seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)1suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of thiscase in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petitionas a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

Issues:

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanentresidents in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to thePhilippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?

B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for nationaloffices and party list representatives including the President and the Vice-President violate the constitutional mandateunder Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shallbe proclaimed as winners by Congress?

C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189,exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commissionon Elections shall promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A ofthe Constitution?

Held:

In resolving the issues, the application of the rules in Statutory Construction must be applied

1. All laws are presumed to be constitutional2. The constitution must be construed as a whole3. In case of doubt in the interpretation of the provision of the constitution, such meaning must be deduced from thediscussions of the members of the constitutional commission.

A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of thePhilippines?

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the absentee voting process, to wit:

SEC. 4. Coverage.All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen(18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representativeswhich does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the assailedlaw which enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:

SEC. 5. Disqualifications.The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:

a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have pledged allegiance to a foreigncountry;c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of an offense punishable byimprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including those who have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty asdefined under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having been removed by plenary pardon oramnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote under this subsection shall automatically acquire theright to vote upon expiration of five (5) years after service of sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission maytake cognizance of final judgments issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of reciprocity and subject tothe formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court on execution of judgments;


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d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, uponregistration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physicalpermanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under thisAct. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shallbe cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanentresident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by competent authority in thePhilippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine embassies, consulates or foreign service establishments concerned,unless such competent authority subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane orincompetent.

As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent residentwho is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent residence in another country impliesrenunciation of ones residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanentresident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandonedhis domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of thePhilippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress mustestablish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical

residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congressto establish a system for absentee voting.

B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in contravention of Section 4, Article VII ofthe Constitution?

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote for president, vice-president, senatorsand party-list representatives.

Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:

SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.

18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of the

election will not be affected by the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered toorder the proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in aparticular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been renderedimpossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, in which events, factors andcircumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)

SEC. 4

The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of eachprovince or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of thecertificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open allthe certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and theCongress, upon determination of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the

votes.

The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have an equaland highest number of votes, one of them shall forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members ofboth Houses of the Congress, voting separately.

The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

Such provision gives the Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning candidates for president andvice-president.


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It was held that this provision must be harmonized with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution andshould be taken to mean that COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and party-list representatives but notthe President and Vice-President.41

The phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarilyincludes the proclamation of the winning candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency clashes with paragraph 4,Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that the returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the board of canvassers to Congress.

Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly statedby petitioner, to encroach "on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and thepower to proclaim the winners for the said positions." The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of theland should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes andthe proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in thehands of Congress.

C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution?

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the

Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

SEC. 17. Voting by Mail.

17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not more than three (3) countries,subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries thatsatisfy the following conditions:

a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent occasion for fraud;

b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would preclude multiple or proxy voting;

c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies, consulates and other foreign serviceestablishments concerned are adequate and well-secured.

Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval of the Joint CongressionalOversight Committee .

Such provision is unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the independenceof constitutional commissions.

The phrase, "subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight Committee" in the first sentence of Section 17.1which empowers the Commission to authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004elections; and the phrase, "only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee" found inthe second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as they require review and approval of voting by mail inany country after the 2004 elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove thecountries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC pursuant to the conditions provided

for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189.48 Otherwise, Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandateand intrude into the independence of the COMELEC.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A. No. 9189 are declared VOID forbeing UNCONSTITUTIONAL:


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BANAT VS COMELEC

Facts:

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the Commission on

Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party listrepresentatives provided by the Constitution.

However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of COMELECsnational board of canvassers to declare

the petition moot and academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the

winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said

resolution of the COMELEC.

Issues:

(1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution mandatory or

is it merely a ceiling?

(2) Is the 2% threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

(3) Does the Constitution prohibit major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can

major political parties participate in the party-list elections?

Held:

(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list

representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of

the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list

representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of

Representatives.

(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two

percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is

unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the

maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of

the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling

that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We therefore strike

down the two percent thresholdonly in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause

of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percentthreshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec

5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the -broadest possible representation of party, sectoral

or group interests in the House of Representatives.

(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list

system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in

party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in

Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.


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ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by itssecretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO, petitioner,

vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 147589 June 26, 2001

Facts:

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by sectoralparties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, "[v]verifications were made as to the status andcapacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the last party w[as] heard.With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural requirements, review of thesepetitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a decision and as a result the two (2)divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual resolution on political parties. These numerouspetitions and processes observed in the disposition of these petition[s] hinder the early release of the OmnibusResolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only on 10 February 2001."

Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated December 22,2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their intention to participate inthe party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose registrations were denied also filedMotions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to participate in the party-list elections. Stillother registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the deadline.

The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and organizations, butdenied those of several others in Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, saying thus:

"We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation schemewill encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directlyparticipate in this electoral window.

"It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election ofrepresentatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations orcoalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.

"However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep thenumber of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those whosubstantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations orevidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions."

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [someof herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties and that said certified list be accordinglyamended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and

that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. 4 On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed aPetition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents. 5

The Comelec heard the case but due to various delays, Ang Bagong Bayani got dissatisfied and filed a Petition 9 beforethis Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec Omnibus Resolution No.3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001, 10 the Court directed respondents to comment on the Petition within anon-extendible period of five days from notice. 11


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On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition, 12 docketed as GR No. 147613, alsochallenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. The two cases were thereafter consolidated.

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that "the inclusion of political parties in the party-listsystem is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution." 27 For its part, Petitioner Bayan Muna objectsto the participation of "major political parties." 28 On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General, like the

impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow political parties to participate in theparty-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all "registered national, regional and sectoralparties or organizations." 29

1.Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

2.Whether or not only the 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and organizations can be represented underparty-list system.

3.Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785." 16

Held:

1.Yes, the political parties may participate in the party-list elections.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely onthe ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the Houseof Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties ororganizations."

Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under theparty-list system.

"Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registeredunder the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.

"Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented inthe voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However,they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law." 30

Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system, in order togive a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district elections to win a seat inCongress. 34

For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoralparties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party ora sectoral party or a coalition of parties." More to the point, the law defines "political party" as "an organized group ofcitizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, asthe most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders andmembers as candidates for public office."

Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-listsystem:"For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of partyrepresentation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitledto participate in the party-list system.

2.Yes, only the marginalized groups can be represented in the party-list system.


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The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those whohave less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent,the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized andunderrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x x, to become members of the House of Representatives." Wherethe language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms. 37

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are enumerated in Section5 of RA 7941, which states:

"SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposesof the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petitionverified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional orsectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws,platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as theCOMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenouscultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."

While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent ofthe law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system.

3.Yes, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion.

When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the Constitution orthe law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. 49 Indeed, the functionof all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. 50

Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that they qualifyunder the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to participate in and beelected under the party-list system.

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after summaryevidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list elections comply

with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the following guidelines, culledfrom the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groupsidentified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its constitution, articles of incorporation,bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized andunderrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented.And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in theparty-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging tomarginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of Representatives." In other words, whilethey are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political parties, they must show, however, that they

represent the interests of the marginalized and underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and othersimilarly situated political parties admitted as much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the groundsfor disqualification as follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;


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(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whetherdirectly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votescast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."59

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 ofRA 7941 reads as follows:

"SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he isa natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one(1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party ororganization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at leasttwenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of ageon the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall beallowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so alsomust its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong tomarginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fullyrepresented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwiseis to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented.

Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must likewise be able tocontribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. SenatorJose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that "the nominee of a party, national or regional, is notgoing to represent a particular district x x x."61


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TECSON VS COMELEC

GR 151434 March 3, 2004

Facts:

On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate ofcandidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino(KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-borncitizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel hiscertificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy byclaiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; hismother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of LorenzoPou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not havetransmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based theallegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certainPaulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe,married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 forlack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was deniedon 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELECbefore the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolutionthat would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated withGR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC andasserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had originaland exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Issue:

Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the office of the President of thePhilippines.

Held:

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless heis a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the dayof the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term"natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having toperform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJappeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiringcitizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jussanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector ofCustoms (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by

birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate ofFPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certaintyfrom the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born tothem on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) Thefather of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificateof Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submittedin evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of theevidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still


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would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a materialmisrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the OmnibusElection Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ampleopportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has beenmaterial misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but alsodeliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed.


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MO YA LIM Yao vs. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATIONGR L-21289 October 4, 1971

Facts:On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant,

for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961.On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, thatsaid Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period ofstay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeatedextensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contractedmarriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplatedaction of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation,after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Courtof First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau YuenYeung appealed.

Issue:

Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

Held:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,

becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not is qualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the

same law. Likewise ,an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine

citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any

of the disqualifications under said Section 4.Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization

proceedings, Section 15is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as

Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be

considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same

privilege. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever

the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as

res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was

declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto

Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.


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JO SE B. AZ NA R vs. CO MMISSION ON EL EC TI ONS and EMILIO MA RI O RE NN EROSMEA

G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990

Facts:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate ofcandidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988local elections.2)

On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B . Aznar i n his capacity a s its incum bent ProvincialChairman filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on theground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.3)

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the thenImmigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that privaterespondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448and Immigrant Certifica te of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila o n March 27 and 28,1958, respectively. (Annex "B-1").4)

During the hearing a t the COMELEC Private respondent, mai ntained tha t he is a Filipinocitizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late PresidentSergio Osmea, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issuedon March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out ofthe country for more than six months and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 19 65.5)

The re aft er , on Ju ne 11 , 19 88, COM EL EC (F ir st Di vi si on ) di sm is se d th e pe ti ti on fordisqualification for not having been timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that privaterespondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, the petition for Certiorari.

Issue:

Wh et he r or no t re sp ond en t Os me na is no lon ger a Fi li pi no ci ti ze n by ac qui ri ng du al-

citizenship?

Held:

SC dismissed petition for certiorari upholding COMELEC s decision. The petitioner failed topresent direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the mode spr ovi ded f or und er C. A. No . 6 3. the se ar e: (1 ) b y naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by expressrenunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws ofa foreign country. From the evide nce, it is clear that private res pondent Osmea did not lose hisPhilippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losingPhilippine citizenship. In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oathof al le gi an ce of the Un it ed St at es . He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and hascontinuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the present, both as a voter

and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenshipcannot be presumed. Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American,the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still aFilipino. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he isnot still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is noexpress renunciatio n here of Philippine cit izenship; truth to tell, there is eve n no impliedrenunciation of said citizenship. When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippinecitizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied"


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BENGSON III vs. CRUZ AND HRET

G.R. No. 142849 May 7, 2001

Facts:

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April27, 1960, of Filipino parents. On November 5, 1985, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps andtook an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation underRepublic Act No. 2630. He was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. He won overpetitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.

Petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal(HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since heis not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaringCruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan. The HRET likewise denied petitioner'smotion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still beconsidered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Held::

The petition is without merit.

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided bylaw. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may bereacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of thearmed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of theUnited States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity.

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who losthis citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. If he was originally a natural-borncitizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of theUnited States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the CivilRegistry respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which heacquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, orreturn to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.


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FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 87193 June 23, 1989

Facts:

Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect and assume office in due time. The League of

Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground

that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States. Frivaldo admitted the allegation but

pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that his naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of

survival against the unrelenting prosecution by the Martial Law Dictators agent abroad.

Issue:

Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election.

Held:

No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among otherqualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section

1, of the Constitution.

Even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of

automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had earlier renounced.

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment

or election or assumption of office but duringthe officers entire tenure.

Frivaldo declared not a citizen of the Philippines and therefore disqualified from serving as a Governor of the Province

of Sorsogon.


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CO vs. HRET

G.R. No. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

Facts:

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr . is a natural bor n Fi lipino citizen and a resident

of Laoang, Norther n Samar for voting purpose s. The congressio nal election for the second di strict of

NorthernSamar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second

legislative district are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed

election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a

resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

Issue:

Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Phi lippines from China

and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong

Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court an

application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen .In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina

named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and

voted there during those elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of

Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural born citizens.

Besides, private respondent did more than merely exercise his r ight of suffrage. He has established

his life here in the Philippines. On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in

order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or

in that of a friend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a

property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residencerequirements


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Tabasa vs CA

G.R. No. 125793 August 29, 2006

Facts:

In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen of the

United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds

citizenship by virtue of naturalization), petitioner also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner theorizes that he could

be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship

by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.

Issue:

Is Jeovanie Tabasa a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of

political or economic necessity under RA 8171?

Held:

He does not. The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women

who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children

who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the

privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account

of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. Petitioner overlooks the fact

that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on

account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. The privilege under

RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation.


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Mercado vs. Manzano

G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999

Facts:

Manzano and Mercado are vice-mayoral candidates Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. Manzano got thehighest number votes while Mercado bagged the second place. However, Manzanos proclamation was suspended inview of a pending petition for disqualification on the ground that he is an American citizen.

In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration andalleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was bornin the United States (San Francisco, CA) on Sept. 14, 1955 and is considered an American citizen under US laws (jussoli). But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

The Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition and cancelled Manzanos certificate of candidacyon the ground that he is a dual citizen. Under the Local Government Code (sec. 40), dual citizens are disqualified fromrunning for any position.

The COMELEC en banc reversed the divisions ruling. In its resolution, it said that Manzano was both a US

citizen and a Filipino citizen. It further ruled that although he was registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau ofImmigration and was using an American passport, this did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he didnot renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US. Moreover, the COMELEC foundthat when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a Philippine voter and voted as such, whicheffectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had US citizenship.

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issues:

Whether or not Manzano was no longer a US citizen Whether or not Manzano is qualified to run for and hold elective office

Held:

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of theconcurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national bythe said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheresto the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto andwithout any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenshipclause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dualcitizenship:

1.

Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country suchchildren are citizens of that country;

3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by theiract or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also acitizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.


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Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by somepositive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of anindividuals volition.

LGC prohibits Dual Allegiance not Dual Citizenship

The phrase dual citizenship in the LGC must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently,persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship,it would suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate theirstatus as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflictinglaws of different states.

By Electing Philippine Citizenship, the Candidate forswear Allegiance to the Other Country

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country ofwhich they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view ofthe foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of nomoment.

The COMELEC en bancs ruling was that Manzanos act of registering himself as a voter was an effectiverenunciation of his American citizenship. This ruling is in line with the US Immigration and Nationality Act wherein it isprovided that a person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose hisnationality by: (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determinethe sovereignty over foreign territory. But this provision was declared unconstitutional by the US Supreme Court.Nevertheless, our SC held that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondentelected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not apermanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippinesand bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as faras the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he mayhave said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the factthat he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part inpast elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfil his undertaking made under oath. Should hebetray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation inappropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner onthe ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport anddeclared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be takenagainst anyone who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some actconstituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.


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JACOT VS DAL

G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the positionof Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed tomake a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became anaturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under RepublicAct No. 9225.

Issue:

Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor?Held:

No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as

candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for thosewho have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts,considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship.

Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC

G.R. No, 86564 August 1, 1989

Facts:

Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in 1976.In 1980, the marriage was declared void for being bigamous. Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using anAustralian passport, and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status fromimmigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation denied his

application for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship.According to the records of the Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still an Australiancitizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as anaturalized Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16 years who isgranted Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation of allother allegiance. Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from holding public office onthe grounds of alienage, and asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be annulled.

Issues:

1. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship?

2. Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen?

3. Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines?

4. If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections, replace him?

Held:


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1. Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warrantowas filed on time. Lardizabal did not immediately pay the

filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does not

require the payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the filing

fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-day period. Furthermore, the Court held that such technicalities

should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues, such as the one being decided in this case.

2. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the Constitution: (1)

naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to

support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3

methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation.

- Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. The Constitution

explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national interest.

- The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest him of Filipino citizenship is

irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, his

Filipino citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian citizenship, when his

marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy.

- The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The earlier

contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is even alleged to have been politically motivated.

The latter can be reversed because the doctrine ofres judicatadoes not apply to questions of citizenship.

3. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he was elected.

4. Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor because he has

not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office.

Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo.

CAASI vs. COMELEC

[191 SCRA 229, 1990]

Facts:

Private respondent Merito Miguel was elected as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan during the local

elections of January 18, 1988. His disqualification, however, was sought by herein petitioner, Mateo Caasi, on the ground

that under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code private respondent was not qualified because he is a green card

holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America, not of Bolinao.

Issues:

1. Whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States.

2. Whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the

local elections on January 18, 1988.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that Miguels application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S.

and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the

U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his


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application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his

green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local election on January 18,

1988, the Courts conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null

and void.

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR. vs HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO,and MA.VICTORIA L. LOCSIN

G.R. No. 150605 December 10, 2002

Facts:

Codilla, then sitting as Mayor of Ormoc City, and Locsin, the incumbent Representative of the 4th legislativedistrict of Leyte, were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. A petition fordisqualification was filed against Codilla for violating Sec. 68(a) of the Omnibus Election Code, alleging that he used theequipment and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to theresidents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the disqualification case was still pending so Codillas nameremained in the list of candidates and was voted for. In fact, he garnered the highest number of votes. However, hisproclamation as winner was suspended by order of the Comelec. After hearing of his disqualification case, he was foundguilty and ordered disqualified.

Codillas votes being considered stray, Locsin was thus proclaimed as the duly elected Representative andsubsequently took her oath of office. Codilla then filed a timely Motion for Reconsideration with the Comelec and alsosought the annulment of Locsins proclamation.

Issues:

Whether or not Comelec has jurisdiction to annul the proclamation of a Representative Whether or not it is a ministerial duty of the House to recognize Codilla as the legally elected Representative

Held:

First. The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filedby the petitioner.

xxxSince the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending hisproclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity ofthe said Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has notattained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as thebasis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of

Leyte.

Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant case.

xxx

(a)The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by theCOMELEC en banc.

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC


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Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was stillwithin the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdictionover the matter.

In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and acandidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members ofthe House of Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the

very COMELEC pronouncements themselves. This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions ordecisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.

(b)The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.

xxxA petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic ofthePhilippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic ofthePhilippines is in question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for havingobtained the highest number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evidentthat respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the

petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her premature assumption to office asRepresentative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for therespondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.

Ministerial duty of the House to administer the oath of office of a winning but nevertheless unproclaimed candidate

Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for mandamuswhen any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the lawspecifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use andenjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy inthe ordinary course of law. For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petitionfor mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, andthat the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is onewhich an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of alegal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall beperformed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the samerequires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the Houseof Representatives representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of thepublic respondents. The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondentLocsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered theproclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of itsSecond Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not been

challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled bythe COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that itsDecision be obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos andconfusion.


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Adormeo vs COMELEC

GR 147927 February 4, 2002

Facts:

Petitioner and private respondent incumbent mayor were the only candidates who filed their COC for mayorof Lucena City in the May 2001 elections.

Private respondent was elected mayor in May 1992, where he served the full term. Again, he was re-elected inMay 1995, where he again served the full term. In the election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recallelection of May 2000, he again won and served only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to the latter in the1998 election.

Petitioner filed a petition to cancel COC and/or disqualification of the respondent in the ground that the latter

was elected and had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms contending that serving the unexpired term of office isconsidered as 1 term.

Private respondent maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not consecutive. He lost his bid for asecond re-election in 1998 and during Tagaraos incumbency, he was a private citizen, thus he had not been a mayor for3 consecutive terms.

Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that the term of office of elective officials, exceptbarangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruptionin the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) provides that no local elective official shall serve for

more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall notbe considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned

was elected.

Issue:

WON private respondent had already served 3 consecutive term for mayor of Lucena City.

Held:

No. Private respondent was not elected for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen.The continuity of his term as mayor was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.

Neither can respondents victory in the recall election be deemed a voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not.Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts toan interruption of continuity of service (Lonzanidavs COMELEC).

Hence, being elected in a recall election interrupts the 3 consecutive term limit.

Note: Recalla petition designed to remove an official from office by reason of lack of confidence. It is initiated only in the middle of the year.


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Socrates vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 154512 November 12, 2002

Facts:

Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution dated August14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02-010 (RC) whichgave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.Socrates alleges that the COMELECgravely abused its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution. Socrates cites the following circumstances as legal infirmities attending theconvening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1) not all members of the PRA were notified of the meeting to adopttthe resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was palpably and legally efficient; (3) the members of the PRA were themselves seeking anew electoral mandate from their respective constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution was exercised with grave abuse of authority;and (5) the PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated his and the publics constitutional right to information.G.R. No. 154683Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673dated August 21, 2002 insofar as itfixed the recall election on September 7,2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign period. He prayed that the COMELEC beenjoined from holding the recall election on September 7, 2002 and that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least an additional 15days to campaign. In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court en banc enjoined the COMELEC from implementing ResolutionNo. 5673 insofar as it fixed the date of the recall election on September 7, 2002. The Court directed the COMELEC to give the

candidates an additional fifteen 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign. Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, theCOMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5708giving the candidates an additional 15 days from September 7, 2002 within which tocampaign. Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall election to September 24, 2002.

G.R. Nos. 155083-84Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELECs resolutions dated September 20, 2002 andSeptember 23, 2002 in SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. They likewiseprayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of the winning candidate in the recall election.Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding Hagedorns qualification to run for mayor in therecall election despite the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive term for elective local officials.

In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any winning candidate in therecall election until further orders from the Court. Petitioners were required to post a P20,000 bond. On September 27, 2002, Socratesfiled a motion for leave to file an attached petition for intervention seeking the same reliefs as those sought by Adovo, Giloand Ollave. Inthe meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates Socrates and

Sandoval obtained17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively .Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC fromproclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him to assume office to give effect to the will of the electorate. On October 1, 2002,the Court granted Socrates motion for leave to file a petition for intervention.

Issues:

1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution andscheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.

2. In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa on September 24,2002.

In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in fixing a campaign period of only 10days has become moot. OurResolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5708 granted anadditional 15 days for the

campaign period as prayed for by petitioner.

Held:

First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution. Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse ofdiscretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective service of notice toother PRA members. The COMELEC, however, found that on various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents for the Recallof incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant toSection 70 of the Local Government Code. Copies of the said notice are in Volumes I and II entitled Notices to PRA. Likewise, Proof ofService for each of the said notices were attached to the Petition and marked as Annex G of Volumes II and III of the Petition.


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Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay Hall. Notices of the convening of the Puerto PrincesaPRA were also sent to the following: [a list of 25 names of provincial elective officials, print and broadcast media practitioners, PNPofficials, COMELEC city, regional and national officials, and DILG officials].This Court is bound by the findings of fact of theCOMELEC on matters within the competence and expertise of the COMELEC, unless the findings are patently erroneous.

Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution and inscheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.

Second Issue: Hagedorns qualification to run for mayor

In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because:

1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001;

2. Hagedorns continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 duringwhich time he was a private citizen;

3. Hagedorns recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make afourth consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and

4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders

Aldovino, Jr. vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009

Facts:

The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: forthe 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term ofoffice, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. ThisCourt, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finishedhis term.

Issue:

Is thepreventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes ofthe three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA7160, or the Local Government Code)?

Ruling:

General requisites for the application of the three term limit

1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and

2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms

Construction of the three term limit

Although the election requisite was not actually present, the Court still gave full effect to the three-term limitationbecause of the constitutional intent to strictly limit elective officials to service for three terms. By so ruling, the Courtsignalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitationrule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.


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Construction of the word interruption

The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less thanthe involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, howevershort, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strictintent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three

consecutive terms, using voluntary renunciation as an example and standard of what does not constitute aninterruption.

Nature of preventive suspension

Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of hisoffice and does not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is aconsequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.

Ruling of the Court in the case at bar

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered

an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot

simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from

exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspendedofficials continuity in office is theabsence of a permanent replacementand thelack of the authority to appoint onesince

no vacancy exists.

Borjavs COMELEC [295 SCRA 157; GR 133495, September 3, 1998]

Facts:

Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term endingJune 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, CesarBorja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative tothe May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcosdisqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30,1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared privaterespondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration,majority overturned the original decision.

Issue:

WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?

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Election Cases Digested