Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform

G.R. No. 78742

July 14, 1989

Ponente: CRUZ, J.

FACTS

Cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions. They will be subject to one common discussion and resolution.

G.R. No. 79777:

The petitioners are Nicolas Manaay and his wife who own a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and Augustin Hermano, Jr. who owns a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants. They question the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 & 229, and R.A. No. 6657 since their tenants were declared full owners of the mentioned lands.

G.R. No. 79310

Landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental and Planters’ Committee Inc., with 1400 planter-members, submitted a petition seeking to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.

Aug. 27, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters, which claim 20 000 members). It was granted by the court.

Sept. 10, 1987 – A motion for intervention was filed by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland owners. It was granted by the court.

G.R. No. 79744

Sept. 3 1986 – The petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation Land Transfer accusing the then Secretary of DAR of violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation. Certificates of Land Transfer were issued to the private respondents who then refused to pay lease rentals. The petitioner is asking for the recall and cancellation of these certificates.

Dec. 24, 1986 – Petitioner claims his petition was denied without hearing.

Feb. 17, 1987 – A motion for reconsideration was filed which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 & 229 were issued which rendered his motion moot.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the President had the power to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229

2. Whether or not the President had the legislative power for issuing the measures

3. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 conforms to the requirements of a valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution

4. Whether or not Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits required by Article 13, Section 4 of the Constitution

5. Whether or not E.O. No. 229 violates constitutional requirement that a bill should only have one subject, to be expressed in its title

6. Whether or not the writ of mandamus can issue to compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government.

7. Whether this statute is an exercise of police power or the power of eminent domain

8. Whether or not the statutes are valid exercises of police power

9. Whether or not the equal protection clause was violated

10.Whether or not the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution

11.Whether or not there is contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain by divesting the landowner of his property even before actual payment to him in full of just compensation

RULING

1. YES. P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos during Martial Law has been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella. President Aquino is authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 & 229.

2. YES. The said measures were issued before July 27, 1987, when the Congress was formally convened and took over legislative power.

3. NO. Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure for that is not its principal purpose and therefore is not required to conform to the requirements.

4. NO. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law.

5. NO. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of its

contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred from the title.

6. NO. The rule is that mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.

7. It is an exercise of the power of eminent domain because there is payment of just compensation unlike in the exercise of police power wherein confiscation of property is not compensable.

8. YES. A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.

9. NO. The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.

10.NO. It is declared that although money is the traditional mode of payment, other modes of payment shall be permitted as compensation. The court accepts the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, they find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.(Court: We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after

the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.)

11.NO. The CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner.

DISPOSITIVE

WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.

2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.

3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.

4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.

5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

Roxas & Co. Inc. v CA

Facts:

Petitioner Roxas & Co. is a domestic corporation and is the registered owner of three haciendas, namely, Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway, all located in the Municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas. On May 6, 1988, petitioner filed with respondent DAR a voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to the provisions of E.O. No. 229. Haciendas Palico and Banilad were later

placed under compulsory acquisition by respondent DAR in accordance with the CARL. Petitioner tried to withdraw the VOS of Hacienda Caylaway but the sane was denied. Thereafter, petitioner sought the conversion of the three haciendas from agricultural to other use but the petition was likewise denied.

Issue:

Whether or not process of land acquisition under CARL should observe due process

Held:

For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The taking contemplated in Agrarian Reform is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favour of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The CARL was not intended to take away property without due process of law. The exercise of the power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private property.

Alita v CA

Facts: Private respondents' predecessors-in-interest acquired the subject parcel of lands through homestead patent under the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 141. Private respondents herein are desirous of personally cultivating these lands, but petitioners refuse to vacate, relying on the provisions of P.D. 27 and P.D. 316. On June 18, 1981, private respondents instituted a complaint for the declaration of P.D. 27 and all other Decrees, Letters of Instructions and General Orders issued in connection therewith as inapplicable to lands obtained through homestead law. The RTC dismissed the complaint but on motion for reconsideration it declared that P.D. 27 is not applicable to homestead lands. On appeal to the CA, the decision of the RTC was sustained.

Issue: Whether or not lands acquired through homestead law are covered by CARP

Held: Petitioners is correct in saying that P.D. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil and transferring to them ownership of the land they till is a sweeping social legislation, a remedial measure promulgated pursuant to the social justice precepts of the Constitution. However, such contention cannot be invoked to defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Philippine Constitution likewise respects the superiority of the homesteaders' rights over the rights of the tenants guaranteed by the Agrarian Reform statute. Provided, that the original homestead grantees or their direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead.

Natalia Realty v. DARGR No. 10330212 August 1993

Facts:

PP 1637 set aside several hectares of land in Antipolo, San Mateo, and Montalban as townsite areas to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis which were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite, where Natalia Realty’s properties were situated. Estate Developers and Investors Corporation (EDIC), the developer of the Natalia properties, was granted approval to develop the said properties into low-cost housing subdivisions. The Natalia properties then became the Antipolo Hills Subdivision.

When the CARL came into effect, the DAR issued a Notice of Coverage on the undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision. Natalia immediately registered its objection to the said Notice and requested the DAR Secretary to cancel the same. However, members of the Samahan ng Magsasaka sa Bundok Antipolo (SAMBA) filed a complaint against Natalia and EDIC before the DAR Regional Adjudicator to restrain them from developing areas under their cultivation. The RA issued a writ of Preliminary Injunction. Natalia and EDIC appealed to the DARAB but the latter merely remanded the case to the RA. Natalia then requested the DAR Secretary to set aside the Notice of Coverage. Neither the DAR Secretary nor the DAR Director concerned took action on the protest letters.

Issues: W/N the Natalia properties were validly converted from agricultural to residential land.

W/N the Natalia properties are covered by the CARL.

Held:

YES. Natalia and EDIC complied with all the requirements of law, even securing prior approval from DAR. As a matter of fact, there was no need for Natalia and EDIC to do so because the Natalia properties were within

the areas set aside for the Lungsod Silangan Reservation. Since PP 1637 created the townsite reservation for the purpose of providing additional housing to the burgeoning population of Metro Manila, it in effect converted for residential use what were erstwhile agricultural lands provided all requisites were met.

NO. The undeveloped portions of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision cannot be considered as “agricultural lands.” These lots were intended for residential use. They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation.

Doctrine:

To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative.

Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners.

Obiter: One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means. There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual’s rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a person invoking a right guaranteed under Art III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would deny him that right.

Luz Farms v. DAR SecretaryGR No. 868894 December 1990

Facts:

In 1988, RA 6657 was approved by the President of the Philippines. It includes the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in its coverage.

In 1989, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform promulgated the IRR of Secs. 11, 13, and 39 of the said law.

Luz Farms, a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business, allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of certain sections of RA 6657, of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under RA 6657, and of the IRR of Section 11. It prays that the aforesaid statutes be declared unconstitutional.

Issue:

W/N the CARL should include the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage.

W/N the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of RA 6657 directing “corporate farms” to execute and implement “production-sharing plans” is unreasonable for being confiscatory and violative of due process, with respect to livestock and poultry raisers.

Separate Opinion: Sarmiento, J.W/N the assailed provisions violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Held:

NO. It was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include the livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the agrarian reform program of the government. The intention of the Committee was to limit the application of the word “agriculture”. Thus, Section II of RA 6657 which includes “private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry, and swine raising” in the definition of “commercial farms” is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State.

YES. As there is no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform, there is no need to call upon them to distribute from 3% of their gross sales and 10% of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation.

NO. Substantial distinctions exist between land directed purely to cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops and land exclusively used for livestock, poultry and swine raising that make real differences:

1. There are no tenants nor landlords in livestock and poultry businesses;

2. Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land;

3. Land is not a primary resource;4. Livestock and poultry production are

industrial activities;Livestock and poultry farmworkers are covered by minimum wage law rather than by tenancy law.

Doctrine: Raising of livestock, poultry, and swine are excluded from the coverage of the CARL.Milestone Farms vs Office of the President

FACTS:

Among the pertinent secondary purposes of Milestone Farms are 1) to engage in the raising of cattle, pigs, and other livestock; 2) to breed, raise, and sell poultry; and 3) to

import cattle, pigs, and other livestock, and animal food necessary for the raising of said cattle, pigs, and other livestock

On June 10, 1988, CARL took effect

In May 1993, petitioner applied for the exemption/exclusion of its 316.0422-hectare property pursuant to the aforementioned ruling of this Court in Luz Farms.

Meanwhile, on December 27, 1993, DAR issued AO No. 9, Series of 1993, setting forth rules and regulations to govern the exclusion of agricultural lands used for livestock, poultry, and swine raising from CARP coverage.

Milestone re-documented its application pursuant to said AO.

DAR’s Land Use Conversion and Exemption Committee (LUCEC) conducted an ocular inspection on petitioner’s property and recommended the exemption of petitioner’s 316.0422-hectare property from the coverage of CARP.

DAR Regional Director Dalugdug adopted LUCEC’s recommendation

The Pinugay Farmers, represented by Balajadia, moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but the same was denied by Director Dalugdug. Hence, they filed an appeal with DAR Secretary

Subsequently, Milestone filed a complaint for Forcible Entry against Balajadia and company before the MCTC.

MCTC ruled in favor of Milestone

RTC reversed the decision of MCTC

CA ruled in favor of Milestone

DAR Secretary Garilao issued an Order exempting from CARP only 240.9776 hectares of the 316.0422 hectares previously exempted by Director Dalugdug, and declaring 75.0646 hectares of the property to be covered by CARP.

Office of the President primarily reinstated the decision of Director Dalugdug but when the farmers filed a motion for reconsideration, Office of the President reinstated the decision of Director Garilao.

CA primarily ruled in favor of Milestone in exempting the entire property from the coverage of CARP. However, six months

earlier, without the knowledge of the CA – as the parties did not inform the appellate court – then DAR Secretary Villa issued DAR conversion order granting petitioner’s application to convert portions of the 316.0422-hectare property from agricultural to residential and golf courses use. The portions converted was with a total area of 153.3049 hectares. With this Conversion Order, the area of the property subject of the controversy was effectively reduced to 162.7373 hectares.

With the CA now made aware of these developments, particularly Secretary Villa’s Conversion Order, CA had to acknowledge that the property subject of the controversy would now be limited to the remaining 162.7373 hectares. CA, in its amended decision, states that the subject landholding from the coverage of CARP is hereby lifted, and the 162.7373 hectare-agricultural portion thereof is hereby declared covered by the CARP.

ISSUE: Whether or not Milestone’s property should be exempted from the coverage of CARP

HELD:

No.

When CA made its decision, DAR AO No. 9 was not yet declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Thus, it could not be said that the CA erred or gravely abused its discretion in respecting the mandate of DAR A.O. No. 9, which was then subsisting and in full force and effect.

As correctly held by respondent OP, the CA correctly held that the subject property is not exempt from the coverage of the CARP, as substantial pieces of evidence show that the said property is not exclusively devoted to livestock, swine, and/or poultry raising.

Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce (OIC)vsDelia T. Sutton, Ella T. Sutton-Soliman and Harry T. SuttonG.R. No.162070

Facts:

This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the Constitution.

The case involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.

On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine.

On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR, the Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land and declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the

coverage of agrarian reform. In view of this, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents' land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL.

On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith. Petitioner ignored such request.

On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O. fixed the following retention limits, viz.: 1:1 animal-land ratio and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.

On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is exempted from the CARL.

On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents' land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of respondents' landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, contending that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Said motion was denied. Respondents filed a notice of appeal with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform. The OP affirmed the impugned order. On appeal to CA, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and declared A.O. No. 9, Series of 1993 as void.

Issue:

Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which prescribes a maximum retention for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional?

Held:

The impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural activity." The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing

facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenance.

Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.

Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law. On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. In the case at bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881 which amended certain provisions of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the terms "agricultural activity" and "commercial farming" by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine-raising. With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.

It is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.

Central Mindanao University vs. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board 215 SCRA 86 (1992)

Facts:

On 16 January 1958, President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 467 reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, now the CMU, a piece of land to be used as its future campus. In 1984, CMU embarked on a project titled "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" wherein parcels of land were leased to its faculty members and employees. Under the terms of the program, CMU will assist faculty members and employee groups through the extension of technical know-how, training and other kinds of assistance. In turn, they paid the CMU a service fee for use of the land. The agreement explicitly provided that there will be no tenancy relationship between the lessees and the CMU.

When the program was terminated, a case was filed by the participants of the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap" for declaration of status as tenants under the CARP. In its resolution, DARAB, ordered, among others, the segregation of 400 hectares of the land for distribution under CARP. The land was subjected to coverage on the basis of DAR's determination that the lands do not meet the condition for exemption, that is, it is not "actually, directly, and exclusively used" for educational purposes.

Issue:

Is the CMU land covered by CARP? Who determines whether lands reserved for public use by presidential proclamation is no longer actually, directly and exclusively used and necessary for the purpose for which they are reserved?

Held:

The land is exempted from CARP. CMU is in the best position to resolve and answer the question of when and what lands are found necessary for its use. The Court also chided the DARAB for resolving this issue of exemption on

the basis of "CMU's present needs." The Court stated that the DARAB decision stating

that for the land to be exempt it must be "presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its present educational program with its present student population and academic faculty" overlooked the very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to come.

DAR v. DECSPetition for review on certiorari to set aside decision of CA which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration-Lot No.2509 and Lot No. 817-D consists of an aggregate area of 189.2462 hectares located at Hacienda Fe, Escalante, Negros Occidental and Brgy. Gen. Luna, Sagay, Negros Occidental, respectively.  On October 21, 1921, these lands were donated by Esteban Jalandoni to respondent DECS. Titles were transferred in the name of respondent DECS.-DECS leased the lands to Anglo Agricultural Corporation for 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1984-1985 to crop year 1993-1994.  The contract of lease was subsequently renewed for another 10 agricultural crop years, commencing from crop year 1995-1996 to crop year 2004-2005.-June 10, 1993: Eugenio Alpar et.al, claim to be permanent and regular farm workers of the subject lands, filed a petition for Compulsory Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Escalante.-After investigation, MARO Jacinto R. Piñosa, sent a “Notice of Coverage” to respondent DECS, stating that the lands are covered by CARP and inviting its representatives for a conference with the farmer beneficiaries. Then, MARO Piñosa submitted his report to OIC-PARO Stephen M. Leonidas, who recommended to the DAR Regional Director the approval of the coverage of the landholdings. -August 7, 1998: DAR Regional Director Andres approved the recommendation and directed Provincial Agrarian Reform Office to facilitate acquisition and distribution of landholdings to qualified beneficiaries.-DECS appealed the case to the Secretary of Agrarian Reform which affirmed the Order of the Regional Director. -Aggrieved DECS filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the decision of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Hence, the instant petition for review.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject properties are exempt from the coverage of Republic Act

No. 6657/ Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998 (CARL)—NO

2. Whether or not the farmers are qualified beneficiaries of CARP--YES

The general policy under CARL is to cover as much lands suitable for agriculture as possible. Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 sets out the coverage of CARP.  The program shall: “… cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.”Following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a)            All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.  No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account, ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;

(b)            All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits as determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;

(c)            All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and

(d)            All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon. 

Section 3(c): “agricultural land- “land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.” “agriculture” or “agricultural activity”- means the cultivation of the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities, and practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done by persons whether natural or juridical.

The records of the case show that the subject properties were formerly private agricultural lands owned by the late Esteban Jalandoni, and were donated to respondent DECS.  From that time until they were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, the lands continued to be agricultural primarily planted to sugarcane, albeit part of the public domain being owned by an agency of the

government. There is no legislative or presidential act, before and after the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, classifying the said lands as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.  Indubitably, the subject lands fall under the classification of lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.-DECS: sought exemption from CARP coverage on the ground that all the income derived from its contract of lease with Anglo Agricultural Corporation were actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.-DAR: the lands subject are not exempt from the CARP coverage because the same are not actually, directly and exclusively used as school sites or campuses, as they are in fact leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation.  Further, to be exempt from the coverage, it is the land   per se , not the income derived that must be actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes.HELD: I. We agree with the petitioner DAR that they are not exempted.

Section 10 of R.A. No. 6657 enumerates the types of lands which are exempted from the coverage of CARP as well as the purposes of their exemption:

c)      Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for national defense, school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, … , shall be exempt from the coverage of this Act. x x x                          x x x                             x x xIn order to be exempt from the coverage: 1) the land must be “actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary;” and 2) the purpose is “for school sites and campuses, including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes.”  

The importance of the phrase “actually, directly, and exclusively used and found to be necessary” cannot be understated. The words of the law are clear and unambiguous.  The “plain meaning rule” or verba legis is applicable. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.

We are not unaware of our ruling in the case of Central Mindanao University v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, wherein we declared the land subject exempt from CARP coverage.  However, DECS’ reliance is misplaced because the factual circumstances are different in the case at bar.

1st, in the CMU case, the land involved was not alienable and disposable land of the public domain because it was reserved by the late President Carlos P. Garcia under Proc. No. 476 for the use of Mindanao Agricultural College (now CMU).  In this case, however, the lands fall under the category of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture. 

2nd, in the CMU case, the land was actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for school sites and campuses.  Although a portion of it was being used by the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) under a “Management and Development Agreement”, the undertaking was that the land shall be used by the Philippine Packing Corporation as part of the CMU research program, with direct participation of faculty and students.  The retention of the land was found to be necessary for the present and future educational needs.  On the other hand, the lands in this case were not actually and exclusively utilized as school sites and campuses. They were leased to Anglo Agricultural Corporation, not for educational but business purposes.  Also, it was the income and not the lands that was directly used for the repairs and renovations of the schools.

II. We disagree with the Court of Appeals’ finding that they were not qualified beneficiaries.The identification of actual and potential beneficiaries under CARP is vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform pursuant to Section 15, R.A. No. 6657:

SECTION 15.           Registration of Beneficiaries. — The DAR in coordination with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) as organized in this Act, shall register all agricultural lessees, tenants and farmworkers who are qualified to be beneficiaries of the CARP. These potential beneficiaries with the assistance of the BARC and the DAR shall provide the following data:

(a)            names and members of their immediate farm household;

(b)            owners or administrators of the lands they work on and the length of tenurial relationship;

(c)            location and area of the land they work;

(d)            crops planted; and(e)            their share in the harvest

or amount of rental paid or wages received.

A copy of the registry or list of all potential CARP beneficiaries in the barangay shall be posted in the barangay hall, school or other public buildings in the barangay where it shall be open to inspection by the public at all reasonable hours.

In the case at bar, the BARC certified that the farmers were potential CARP beneficiaries of the subject properties. Further, on November 23, 1994, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform through the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) issued a Notice of Coverage placing the subject properties under CARP.  Since the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of the CARP, it behooves the courts to exercise great caution in substituting its own determination of the issue, unless there is grave abuse of discretion committed by the administrative agency.  In this case, there was none.

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) is the bastion of social justice of poor landless farmers, the mechanism designed to redistribute to the underprivileged the natural right to toil the earth, and to liberate them from oppressive tenancy.  The objective of the State is that: “landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural development and industrialization.”

The petition is GRANTED.  The decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 64378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision dated August 30, 2000 of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform placing the subject lands under CARP coverage, is REINSTATED.Province of Camarines Sur vs CAMay 17, 1993

FACTS: Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) of Cam Sur passed Res. 129 authorizing the Prov. Gov. To purchase/expropriate property to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-agricultural crops and housing project for the government employees. By virtue of the resolution, Cam Sur filed 2 cases for expropriation against private respondents (San Joaquins).

RTC: denied motion to dismiss on the ground of inadequacy of price of San Joaquins.CA: San Joaquins raised issue of a) declaring the resolution null and void, b) complaint for expropriation de dismissed. CA asked Sol Gen to give comment.SolGen: under the LGC, no need for approval by the OP of the exercise of the SP of the right to eminent domin. However, approval of DAR must first be secured (since this involves appropriation of agricultural lands).

CA: set aside order of RTC (without however disposing of the issues raised. The SC said that the CA assumed that the resolution is valid and the expropriation is for a public use).

Issues: 1) WON the resolution is null and void. Corollary to this issue is WON the expropriation is for a public use.2) WON the exercise of the power of eminent domain in this case is restricted by the CAR Law?3) WON the complaint for expropriation may be dismissed on the ground of inadequacy of the compensation offered?

Held/ratio:1) The expropriation is for a public

purpose, hence the resolution is authorized and valid.

SC explained that there had been a shift from the old to the new concept of “public purpose:. Old concept is that the property must actually be used by the general public. The new concept, on the other hand, means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community.

In this case, the proposed pilot development center would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the CamSur peeps. (How?) invaluable info and tech on agriculture, fishery, and cottage industry, enhance livelihood of farmers and fishermen, etc.

2) No, (citing Ardana vs Reyes, SC here said that the implication of the Ardana case is that) the power of expropriation is superior to the power to distribute lands under the land reform program.

Old LGC does not intimate in the least that LGUs must first secure approval of the Dept of Land Reform for conversion of agri to non-agri use. Likewise, no provision in the CAR Law subjecting expropriation by LGUs to the control of DAR.

Moreover, Sec 65 of CAR Law is not in point because it is applicable only to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program. This is limited only to applications for

reclassification submitted by land owners or tenant beneficiaries.

Statutes conferring power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by implication.

3) Fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation decalred in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded.

It is unconstitutional to fix just compensation in expropriation cases based on the value given either by the owners or the assessor. Rules for determining just compensation are those laid down in Rule 67 ROC, evidence must be submitted to justify what they consider is the just compensation.

12.G.R. No. 149548   December 14, 2010ROXAS & COMPANY, INC., Petitioner, vs.DAMBA-NFSW and the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xG.R. No. 167505DAMAYAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG BUKID SA ASYENDA ROXAS-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (DAMBA-NFSW), Petitioner, vs.SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ROXAS & Co., INC. AND/OR ATTY. MARIANO AMPIL, Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xG.R. No. 167540KATIPUNAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA HACIENDA ROXAS, INC. (KAMAHARI), ET AL.,

Petitioners, vs.SECRETARY OF THE DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM, ROXAS & Co., INC., Respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xG.R. No. 167543DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM, FORMERLY DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR), Petitioner, vs.ROXAS & CO, INC., Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xG.R. No. 167845ROXAS & CO., INC., Petitioner, vs.DAMBA-NFSW, Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xG.R. No. 169163DAMBA-NFSW REPRESENTED BY LAURO V. MARTIN, Petitioner, vs.ROXAS & CO., INC., Respondent.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xG.R. No. 179650DAMBA-NFSW, Petitioner, vs.ROXAS & CO., INC., Respondent.

FACTS:

This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed on January 13, 2010 by Roxas & Co., Inc. (Roxas & Co.) and the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed on January 29, 2010 by Damayan ng Manggagawang Bukid sa Asyenda Roxas-National Federation of Sugar Workers (DAMBA-NFSW) and Katipunan ng mga Magbubukid sa Hacienda Roxas, Inc. (KAMAHARI), et al., which both assail the Court’s December 4, 2009 Decision in these consolidated cases.

ISSUE:

Whether the subject lands are exempt from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) coverage?

HELD:

Roxas & Co. cannot have it both ways. It must either zealously argue its legal position if it believes it to be meritorious or altogether abandon it if it has reservations. Its Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Resolution of its earlier Motion for Reconsideration effectively coaxes the Court to wait for the outcome of its TIEZA application and ultimately delay the final resolution of these consolidated cases.

On Roxas & Co.’s Motion for Reconsideration, no substantial arguments were raised to warrant a reconsideration of the Decision. The Motion contains merely an amplification of the main arguments and factual matters already submitted to and pronounced without merit by the Court in its Decision. In the Court’s considered view, nothing more is left to be discussed, clarified or done in these cases since all the main issues raised have been passed upon and definitely resolved.

Roxas & Co. raises the fringe issue that DAR Memorandum Circular No. 7 (Series of 2004) has no force and effect since the said DAR Memorandum Circular was not published and filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register.

The contention fails. It should be stressed that there is no need for the publication and filing of the said DAR Memorandum Circular with the ONAR as it is merely an administrative interpretation.

Roxas & Co. is merely nitpicking on the issue. Since the DAR had initially issued CLOAs to the farmer-beneficiaries of the nine parcels of land in Hacienda Palico, the assailed Decision merely reiterated the original designation of the affected individuals as farmer-beneficiaries who should be entitled to disturbance compensation before the cancellation of their respective CLOAs is effected. This is in pursuance of the directive of DAR Administrative Order No. 6 (Series of 1994) which mandates the payment of disturbance compensation before Roxas & Co.’s application for exemption may be completely granted.

Since subject landholding has been validly determined to be CARP-exempt, therefore, the previous issuance of the CLOA of oppositors-movants is erroneous. Hence, similar to the situation of the above-quoted Supreme Court Decision, oppositors-movants only hold the property in trust for the rightful owners of the land and are not the owners of subject landholding who should be notified of the exemption application of applicant Roxas & Company, Incorporated.1avvphi1

Finally, this Office finds no substantial basis to reverse the assailed Orders since there is substantial compliance by the applicant with the requirements for the issuance of exemption clearance under DAR AO 6 (1994).

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Roxas & Co., Inc. and the Motion for Partial Reconsideration filed by DAMBA-NFSW and KAMAHARI are DENIED for lack of merit.

12. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINESV HON. ELI G. C. NATIVIDAD et al.G.R. No. 127198, May 16, 2005

Caguiat, et al. (Los) filed a petition before the SAC for the determination of just compensation for their AGRICULTURAL LANDS in Arayat, Pampanga

The SAC ordered the DAR and LBP to pay the Los P30.00 per square meter as just compensation

LBP’S ARGUMENT:

*For purposes of agrarian reform the property was acquired on 21 October 1972, the effectivity date of PD 27, therefore just compensation should be based on the value of the property as of that time NOT at the time of possession in 1993

SUPREME COURT RULING:

.The seizure of the landholding DID NOT take place upon the date of effectivity of PD 27 but would take effect on the payment of just compensation (OP v. CA)

The agrarian reform process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid the Los has yet to be settled

Considering the passage of RA 6657 before the completion of this process, the just compensation determined and the process concluded under RA 6657

RA 6657 is the applicable law with PD 27 and EO 228 having only suppletory effect (Paris v. Alfeche)

It would be inequitable to determine just compensation based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR’s failure to determine the just compensation for a consideration length of time

Just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator

13. Estribillo v DAR

Facts: Private respondent Hacienda Maria Inc. requested that 527.8308 hectares of its landholdings be placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Receiving compensation therefor, HMI allowed petitioners and other occupants to cultivate the landholdings so that the same may be covered under Agrarian Reform Program. In 1982, a final survey over the entire area was conducted and approved. From 1984 to 1988, the corresponding TCTs and EPs covering the entire 527.8308 hectares were issued to petitioners, among other persons. In December 1997, HMI filed with RARAD petitions seeking the declaration of erroneous coverage under Presidential Decree No. 27 of 277.5008 hectares of its former landholdings. HMI claimed that said area was not devoted to either rice or corn, that the area was untenanted, and that no compensation was paid therefor. RARAD rendered a decision declaring as void the TCTs and EPs awarded to petitioners because the land covered was not devoted to rice and corn, and neither was there any established tenancy relations between HMI and petitioners. Petitioners appealed to the DARAB which affirmed the RARAD Decision. On appeal to the CA, the same was dismissed. Petitioners contended that the EPs became indefeasible after the expiration of one year from their registration.

Issue: Whether or not EPs have become indefeasible one year after their issuance

Held: After complying with the procedure in Section 105 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree where the DAR is required to issue the corresponding certificate of title after granting an EP to tenant-farmers who have complied with Presidential Decree No. 27, the TCTs issued to petitioners pursuant to their EPs acquire the same protection accorded to other TCTs. The certificate of title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the issuance of the order for the issuance of the patent. Lands covered by such title may no longer be the subject matter of a cadastral proceeding, nor can it be decreed to another person.

Facts:

Andrea Millenes allowed Bienvenido Abajon to construct a house on a portion of her landholding, paying a monthly rental of P2.00. Millenes likewise allowed Abajon to plant a portion of the land, agreeing that the produce thereof would be shared by both on a 50-50 basis.

When Millenes sold her land to the spouses Arturo and Yolanda Caballes, the spouses told Abajon that they intended to build a poultry close to his house and persuaded him to transfer his dwelling to another portion of the landholding. Abajon refused to leave, even after confrontation before the Barangay Captain of the locality.

Subsequently, Yolanda filed a criminal case against Abajon for malicious mischief for harvesting bananas and jackfruit from their property without her knowledge. All the planting on the property however, had been done by Abajon. The trial court ordered the referral of the case to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform for a preliminary determination of the relationship between the parties. The Ministry ruled that a tenancy relationship existed between the parties, and, as such, the case is not proper for hearing.

On appeal, the DAR (the new MAR) reversed the findings and declared that the case was proper for trial as the land involved was residential. The new minister of the DAR, however, set aside the said order and declared that the criminal case was not proper for trial, as there was an existing tenancy relationship between the parties.

Issue: W/N Abajon is an agricultural tenant.

Held:

NO. To invest Abajon with the status of a tenant is preposterous. He only occupied a miniscule portion (60m2) of a 500m2 lot, which cannot by any stretch of imagination be considered as an economic family-sized farm. Planting camote, bananas, and corn on such a size of land cannot produce an

income sufficient to provide a modest standard of living to meet the farm family’s basic needs. Thus, the order sought to be reviewed is patently contrary to the declared policy of RA 3844. Moreover, there exists no tenancy relationship between the parties because Abajon’s status is more of a caretaker who was allowed by the owner out of benevolence or compassion to live in the premises and to have a garden of some sort. Agricultural production as the primary purpose being absent in the arrangement, it is clear that Abajon was never a tenant of Millenes.

Doctrine:

Essential requisites of a tenancy relationship:(1) The parties are the landowner and the

tenant;(2) The subject is agricultural land;(3) There is consent;(4) The purpose is agricultural production;(5) There is personal cultivation; and(6) There is sharing of harvests.

Unless a person has established his status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing laws.

Tenancy status arises only if an occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural production.

Obiter:If justice can be meted out now, why wait for it to drop gently from heaven?

Gelos vs Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 86186.

May 8, 1992

Topic: Definition of Agricultural Tenancy

Facts:

The Private Respondent owned the subject land of 25,000 square meters in Laguna. The

Landowner then entered in to a contract with the petitioner and employed him to be laborer on the land with the wage of 5.00 peso a day.

The Petitioner first went the Court of Agrarian Relation and then went to Ministry of Agrarian reform and asked the court to fix the agricultural lease rental of the land and his request was granted.

The private respondent then filed a complaint of illegal detainer against the petitioner that was that was dismissed by the Ministry of Agrarian reform for the existence of Tenancy relations between the parties. The Private respondents appealed to the office of the President alleging that there was no tenancy relation between the parties.

The RTC rendered dismissed the complaint and assailed that there was a tenancy relation between the parties.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Is there a Tenancy relation between the parties?

Held:

No, it was clear that the petitioner were not intended to be tenant but a mere employee of the private respondent as showed in the contract. The petitioner was paid for specific kind of work. The court stressed many cases that:

"tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the farmer is installed, and as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary to law, are even more important."

It should also be considered that a tenant is defined under Section 5(a) R.A 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or

possessed by another, with the latter's consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.

Therefore the court laid down the requisites for the tenancy relationship to exist:

1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant;

2) The subject is agricultural land;

3) There is consent;

4) The purpose is agricultural production;

5) There is personal cultivation; and

6) There is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.

Absence of this clearly does not qualify someone to be a tenant. It is clear that it is not a tenancy relationship that exists between the parties, what they have is employee-employer relationship.

Gabriel v. Pangilinan

Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan claiming she is the owner of a 169,507 sqm fishpond in barrio Sta. Ursula, Pampanga. An oral contract of lease with a yearly rental was entered between them. Defendant was notified that the contract would be terminated, but upon request was extended for another year.

Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint claiming that the trial court had no jurisdiction. It should properly pertain to the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the parties. Upon opposition by plaintiff, the motion was denied. The defendant filed his answer that the land was originally verbally leased to him by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as the defendant wanted, subject to the condition that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and that which was already a fishpond be improved at his expense, which would be reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease. Plaintiff also assured him that he could continue leasing as long as he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it personally.

Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining which Court shall take cognizance of the case.

It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting fingerlings, repairing dikes and such, personally with the aid of helpers since he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over who said that she helps her father in administering the leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar who is residing near the fishpond, defendant’s other children are all professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in Manila. None of these has been seen working on the fishpond.

Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the members of his immediate farm household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the

tenancy relationship between the parties has been extinguished (Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.

Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code. No tenancy relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199. Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and decide this case.

Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this Court.

ISSUES:

1. Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant as that of a civil lease and not a leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.

2. The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction, the cue being that of an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.

HELD:

Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.

The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to exist:

1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;

2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate farm household;3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of

labor available from members of his immediate farm household;4. land belongs to another; and5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both

There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to "agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. The mere fact that a person works an agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of Sec 4 of Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are complied with.

The court doesn’t want to decide on the second requisite since it wasn’t raised. For the third requisite, the tenancy agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond personally because he became ill and incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's immediate farm household work the land. Only the members of the family of the tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm household".

Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land. A person, in order to be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm household cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.

We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the relationship between the appellee Trinidad Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its

Civil Case No. 1823, appealed from, is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.