Digested Cons Ti Cases

Digested Constitutional Law II Cases -Atty. Joan Largo

U.S. vs GOMEZ, G.R. NO. L-9651, August 4, 1915 (31 Phil 218)

Facts:In this case, defendant was found guilty by the trial court with the crime of practicing medicine without a license, in violation of Section 8, Act 30 of the Philippine Commission which provides: “The Board of Medical Examiners may refuse to issue any of the following certificates provided for therein to an individual convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving immoral or dishonorable conduct. In case of such refusal, the reason therefore shall be stated to the applicant in writing. The Board may also revoke any such certificate for like cause, or for unprofessional conduct, after due notice to the person holding the certificate, and a hearing, subject to an appeal to the Board of Health for the Philippine Islands, the decision of which shall be final.” Defendant contends that the court erred in declaring the aforementioned provision are no in conflict with the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in which he relies on paragraph 1, section 5 thereof which states: “That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.”

Held:Defendant’s contention is not meritorious because the Board of Medical Examiners where given such a responsibility through the exercise of the State’s police power. The state has general power to enact such laws, in relation to persons, and property within its borders, as may promote public health, public morals, public safety, and the general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants. This power of the state is generally denominated in its police power. It has been held that the state cannot be deprived of its right to exercise this power. The police power and the right to exercise it constitute the very foundation, or at least one of the cornerstones of the state. For the state to deprive itself or permit it to be deprived of the right to enact laws to promote general prosperity and welfare of its inhabitants, and promote public health, public morals, and public safety, would be to destroy the very purpose and objects of the state. No legislature can bargain away the public health, public safety, or the public morals. The people themselves cannot do it, much less their servants. Governments are organized with a view to preservation of these things. They cannot deprive themselves of the power to provide for them. (Stone vs. Mississippi) In order to enforce the police power of the state, it may, under certain conditions become necessary to deprive its citizens of property and of a right providing for the continuance of property, when the property or the exercise of the right may tend to destroy the public health, the public morals, the public safety, and the general welfare and prosperity of its inhabitants . (Slaughter House Cases) Upon police power of the state depends the security of social order, the life and health of the citizens, the comfort of an existence in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property. It extends to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons and the protection of all property within the state. Persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.

Compiled by: Argon Dulosa, Kyle, Valmoria, Nicey MonteclaroLLB 407 2010


BINAY vs DOMINGO, G.R. NO. 92389, September 11, 1991 (201 SCRA 508)

Facts:The Burial Assistance Program (Resolution No. 60 – assisting those who only earn less than P2,000/month of burial assistance in the amount of P500.00) made by Makati Mayor Jejomar Binay, in the exercise of the police power granted to him by the municipal charter, was referred to the Commission on Audit after the municipal secretary certified the disbursement of four hundred thousand pesos for its implementation was disallowed by said commission of such disbursements because there cannot be seen any perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of its inhabitants. Hence, this petition revolving around the pivotal issue on whether or not Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

Held:Resolution No. 60 of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause. The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, “Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas” (use your property so as not to impair others) and “Salus populi est suprema lex” (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

AGUSTIN vs EDU, G.R. NO. L-49112, February 2, 1979 (88 SCRA 195)

Facts:The letter of instruction providing for an early warning device for motor vehicles is being assailed in the case at bar as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due process. Petitioner contends that they are "infected with arbitrariness because it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because [they] will‐ make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." ‐ 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's."

Held:Petitioner’s contention is erroneous because the Letter of Instruction was issued in the exercise of the police power which is “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty.” In the leading case of Calalang v. Williams, Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of restraints



and burdens in order for the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.’ This doctrine was later reiterated again in Primicias v. Fugoso which referred police power as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The concept was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society.’ Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What are critical or urgent changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”

ICHONG vs. HERNANDEZ, G.R. NO. L-7995, May 31, 1957 (101 Phil 1155)

Facts:This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and far reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions‐ of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?

Held:It has been said the police power is so far reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to‐ limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co extensive with self protection and survival,‐ ‐ and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as we‐ cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the



limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause. Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

THE UNITED STATES vs LUIS TORIBIO, G.R. NO. L-5060, January 26, 1910 (15 Phil 85)

Facts:Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. Evidence sustained in the trial court found that appellant slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered. Appellant contends that he applied for a permit to slaughter the animal but was not given one because the carabao was not found to be “unfit for agricultural work” which resulted to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a place other than the municipal slaughterhouse. Appellant then assails the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be slaughtered.

Held:The extent and limits of what is known as the police power have been a fruitful subject of discussion in the appellate courts of nearly every State in the Union. It is universally conceded to include everything essential to the public safely, health, and morals, and to justify the destruction or abatement, by summary proceedings, of whatever may be regarded as a public nuisance. Under this power it has been held that the State may order the destruction of a house falling to decay or otherwise endangering the lives of passers by; the demolition of such as are in the path of a ‐conflagration; the slaughter of diseased cattle; the destruction of decayed or unwholesome food; the prohibition of wooden buildings in cities; the regulation of railways and other means of public conveyance, and of interments in burial grounds; the restriction of objectionable trades to certain localities; the compulsary vaccination of children; the confinement of the insane or those afficted with contagious deceases; the restraint of vagrants, beggars, and habitual drunkards; the suppression of



obscene publications and houses of ill fame; and the prohibition of gambling houses and places where intoxicating liquors are sold. Beyond this, however, the State may interfere wherever the public interests demand it, and in this particular a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U. S., 27; Kidd vs. Pearson, 128 U. S., 1.) To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the supervision of the court.From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class;" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.Chief Justice Redfield, in Thorpe vs. Rutland & Burlington R. R. Co. (27 Vt., 140), said (p. 149) that by this "general police power of the State, persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State; of the perfect right in the legislature to do which no question ever was, or, upon acknowledge and general principles, ever can be made, so far as natural persons are concerned."

CHURCHILL vs. RAFFERTY, G.R. NO. L-10572, December 21, 1915 ( 32 Phil 580)

Facts:The case arises from the fact that defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, would like to destroy or remove any sign, signboard, or billboard, the property of the plaintiffs, for the sole reason that such sign, signboard, or billboard is, or may be offensive to the sight. The plaintiffs allege otherwise. Was there valid exercise of police power in this case?

Held:Yes. There can be no doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamentals principles which lie at the foundation of all republican forms of government. An Act of the Legislature which is obviously and undoubtedly foreign to any of the purposes of the police power and interferes with the ordinary enjoyment of property would, without doubt, be held to be invalid. But where the Act is reasonably within a proper consideration of and care for the public health, safety, or comfort, it should not be disturbed by the courts."The power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not



repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.""The police power of the State, so far, has not received a full and complete definition. It may be said, however, to be the right of the State, or state functionary, to prescribe regulations for the good order, peace, health, protection, comfort, convenience and morals of the community, which do not ... violate any of the provisions of the organic law.""It [the police power] has for its object the improvement of social and economic conditioned affecting the community at large and collectively with a view to bring about "he greatest good of the greatest number."Courts have consistently and wisely declined to set any fixed limitations upon subjects calling for the exercise of this power. It is elastic and is exercised from time to time as varying social conditions demand correction.""It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare.""It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and sources of this police power than to mark its boundaries, or to prescribe limits to its exercise."

TELEBAP vs. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 132922, April 21, 1998 (289 SCRA 337)

Facts:TELEBAP and GMA Network together filed a petition to challenge the validity of Comelec Time due to the fact that said provisions: (1) have taken properties without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) it denied the radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the Comelec to regulate the operation of media communication or information during election period.

Held:Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. 9 A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires."

Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case was brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, §11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 11

Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast stations give free air time. Even in the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and



attention to public affairs to further the system of free expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be required to give free air time to candidates in an election.

In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.

Diosdado Guzman vs National University

Facts:Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula, students of respondent

National University, have come to this Court to seek relief from what they describe as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them to enrol." In their petition "for extraordinary legal and equitable remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction" dated August 7, 1984, they alleged that they were denied due to the fact that they were active participation in peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.

The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners’ failure to enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and human rights. That as regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to his activities in leading boycotts of classes. That Guzman “is facing criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent University. The petitioners have “failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic standing.”

Held:Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and memorandum is the fact

that they had never conducted proceedings of any sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes therein" 3 or perpetrated acts of "vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander, noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University authority." 4 Parenthetically, the pendency of a civil case for damages and a criminal case for malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more, furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-enrollment. Also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.

There are withal minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and these are, that



(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;(2) they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.

THE PETITION WAS GRANTED AND THE RESPONDENTS ARE DIRECTED TO ALLOW THE PETITIONERS TO RE-ENROLL WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:The case was about the constitutionality of EO 626-A which prohibits interprovincial

movement of carabaos.The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January

13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.

Held:The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently

resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in



the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted, however there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.

EO 626-A was declared unconstitutional.

Tanada vs Tuvera

Facts:Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of

presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

Issue: WON publication is needed for laws that were to become effective immediately.

Held:It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with

altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law is effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them



directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as a whole.We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Halili vs Public Service Commission

Facts:

A petition for certiorari was filed seeking for the revocation and annulment of an order by respondent Public Service Commission dated July 3, 1952 which changed part of the route of the bus service established by the respondent CAM Transit Co., Inc., between Balara and City Hall, Manila. Petitioner herein is the holder of various certificates of public convenience to operate auto-truck services between Balara and various points in the City of Manila and its suburbs.On July 2, 1952, CAM Transit Co., Inc. filed a petition with the respondent Commission alleging that the route authorized in its City Hall(Manila)-Balara line is entirely different from that supported by the evidence presented in the hearing, and praying that the certificate be amended. On the following day, July 3, and without previous notice to the petitioner or a previous hearing thereon, ordered the modification of the line in accordance with the petition.

Issue:WON the order of the amendment of the route, without notice to the petitioner and other interested parties, or hearing in which the latter may be given opportunity to be present, was lawfully and validly issued by the Commission.WON petitioner’s right to due process was violated.

Held:

The order by the Commission of amending the route was not validly issued and petitioner’s right to due process was violated.



In the first place, the power to issue provisional permits is expressly authorized. In the second place, the change ordered is not provisional merely, like that granted in a provisional permit, but final and permanent in character. In the third place, even if the Commission is not bound by the rules in judicial proceedings, it must bow its head to he constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived of a right without due process of law. The "due process of law" clause of the Constitution binds not only the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, but also each and everyone of its branches, agencies, etc. (16 C.J.S., 1149.)"Due process of law, or, in the mean accord with the procedure outlines in the law, or, in the absence of express procedure, under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction for the particular class of cases to which the one in question belongs," (16 C.J.S., 1141.) In the case at bar, the Public Service Act does not include the amendment made in the disputed order among those may be ordered without notice or hearing in accordance with Section 17 of the Act. Is the amendment, without notice or hearing, permitted by the well settled maxims of law? We declare it is not, because due process of law guarantees notice and opportunity to be heard to persons who would be affected by the order or act contemplated.

In a General sense it means the right to be heard before some tribunal having jurisdiction to determine the question in dispute.

By "due process of law" is meant orderly proceeding adopted to the nature of the case, before a tribunal having jurisdiction, which proceeds upon notice, with an opportunity to bee heard, with full power to grant relief.

Some legal procedure in which the person proceeded against, if he is to be concluded thereby, shall have an opportunity to defend himself.

A course of proceeding according to these rules and principles which have been established in our system of jurisprudence for the protection and enforcement of private rights.

Serrano vs National Labor Relations Commission

Facts:

A petition was filed seeking a review of a resolution made by the National Labor relations commission which reversed the decision rendered by theLaborArbiter and dismissed petitioner's complaint for illegal dismissal and denied his motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner was hired by private respondent Isetann Department Store. Sometime in 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, said respondent decided to phase out its entire security section and engage the



services of an independent security agency. A memorandum was subsequently wrote to petitioner informing him of his termination immediately (date of effectivity of termination was exactly the same as the date the memorandum was made).

Issue: WON there was a violation of petitioner's right to due process when respondent-employer failed to give the required 1 month notice provided in the Labor Code.

Held:

"It is now settled that where the dismissal of one employee is in fact for a just and valid cause and is so proven to be but he is not accorded his right to due process, i.e., he was not furnished the twin requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard, the dismissal shall be upheld but the employer must be sanctioned for non-compliance with the requirements of, or for failure to observe, due process."There are three reasons why, on the other hand, violation by the employer of the notice requirement cannot be considered a denial of due process resulting in the nullity of the employee's dismissal or layoff.The first is that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution is a limitation on governmental powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power, such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code. This is plain from the text of Art. III, §1 of the Constitution, viz.: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. . . ." The reason is simple: Only the State has authority to take the life, liberty, or property of the individual. The purpose of the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the exercise of this power is consistent with what are considered civilized methods.The second reason is that notice and hearing are required under the Due Process Clause before the power of organized society are brought to bear upon the individual. This is obviously not the case of termination of employment under Art. 283. Here the employee is not faced with an aspect of the adversary system. The purpose for requiring a 30-day written notice before an employee is laid off is not to afford him an opportunity to be heard on any charge against him, for there is none. The purpose rather is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and the DOLE an opportunity to determine whether economic causes do exist justifying the termination of his employment.The third reason why the notice requirement under Art. 283 can not be considered a requirement of the Due Process Clause is that the employer cannot really be expected to be entirely an impartial judge of his own cause. This is also the case in termination of employment for a just cause under Art. 282.We hold, therefore, that, with respect to Art. 283 of the Labor Code, the employer's failure to comply with the notice requirement does not constitute a denial of due process but a mere failure to observe a procedure for the termination of employment which makes the termination of employment merely



ineffectual. Indeed, under the Labor Code, only the absence of a just cause for the termination of employment can make the dismissal of an employee illegal.

Lao Gi v Court of Appeals

Facts:

Herein petitioner faces a charge for deportation when a judgment was rendered cancelling his citizenship (obtained from a prior judgment) on the ground that it was founded on fraud and misrepresentation. Petitioners were required to register as aliens but refused. They filed a motion for reconsideration of the of the order directing them to register as aliens and to oppose the motion for their arrest but was denied by Acting Commissioner Nituda. Petitioners filed for certiorari in the CFI of Manila which was dismissed fo lack of legal basis. Petition for certiorari was also dismissed on appeal in the CA and a motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, the present petition.

Issue:WON petitioners are entitled to the right to due process even if they are aliens.

Held:

The power to deport an alien is an act of the State. It is an act by or under the authority of the sovereign power. 1 It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public good and domestic tranquility of the people.

Although a deportation proceeding does not partake of the nature of a criminal action, however, considering that it is a harsh and extraordinary administrative proceeding affecting the freedom and liberty of a person, the constitutional right of such person to due process should not be denied. Thus, the provisions of the Rules of Court of the Philippines particularly on criminal procedure are applicable to deportation proceedings.

Under Section 37(c) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 as amended, it is provided:

c) No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Immigration.Hence, the charge against an alien must specify the acts or omissions complained of which must be stated in ordinary and concise language to enable a person of common understanding to know on what ground he is intended to be deported and enable the CID to pronounce a proper judgment.



Petition is hereby granted and the questioned order of the respondent commission on immigration and deportation is hereby set aside.

Villegas vs Ho

Facts:

A petition for certiorari is filed to review the decision rendered by the CFI of Manila wherein Ordinance 6537, which prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business without first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of fifty pesos xxx, was declared null and void for it is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are thus deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

Issue:WON respondent judge committed a serious and patent error of law in ruling that ordinance 6537 violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

Held:

No, respondent judge did not commit the errors assigned. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

International School Alliance of Educators vs Quisumbing

Facts:

Petitioners are employees (teachers) of respondent's school who are receiving less than their counterparts hired abroad and now cry discrimination. The school contends that a foreign-hire would necessarily uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take the risk of devaiting from a promising career path - all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator,



but this time in a foreign land and such person does not enjoy security of tenure as well so the compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in terms of attracting competent pruofessionals in the field of international education. The school's classification between foreign-hires and local-hires was in the point-of-hire so foreigners hired locally are being classified as local-hires. Petitioner claims that such classification is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination. On the other hand, the Acting Secretary of Labor upheld the point-of hire classification for the distinction in salary rates. He also stated that The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.

Hence the present petition.

Issue:WON the Acting secretary erred in upholding the reasonableness of the classification made by respondent-school.

Held:

Yes. That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution 8 in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code 19 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," 25 "to afford labor full protection." 26 The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.27 These relations are not merely contractual but are so



impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. 28 Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.


Documents

Digested Cons Ti Cases