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7/24/2019 Elites Studies, The Case of the Mexican Presidency
1/24
7/24/2019 Elites Studies, The Case of the Mexican Presidency
2/24
J.
Lat.
Amer. Stud.
5, 2,
247-269
Printed in Great
Britain
Elite Studies : the Case of the
Mexican
Presidency
by
JOHN
G. CONKLIN
Introduction:
Elite Studies of Latin America
Many
studies
of
Latin
American
elites are
compilations
of
biographical
sketches.l
These
increase
understanding
of
various
personalities,
but
tend
to
be
unsystematic
and unrelated.
Frequently,
no
attempt
is
made
to draw the
data
together
into
meaningful
generalizations
about
elite
background,
recruit-
ment,
behavior,
and
the
like.
Many
other studies that take
a
group
approach
also
concern
elites but often
this is not
explicitly
recognized
by
the
author.
Much
of
the
literature
on
the
Latin
American
military
falls into this
category.2
Merle
Kling
has
written a
study
of
a
particular
elite
group.3
He
examined
the
origin,
membership, leadership,
objectives,
and
political
influence of a con-
servative
Mexican business
group.
In
i967,
a
study
of
group
elites
edited
by
Lipset
and Solari
was
published.4
This
book
includes
chapters
on business
elites,
political
leaders,
military
leaders,
religious
elites,
cultural
elites,
labor
and
peasant
leaders,
and
student
and
education
elites.
In
some of
the
selections,
particularly
those
concerning military
and
educational
leaders,
the authors
employ quantitative
methods.
In
addition
to
the work edited
by Lipset
and
Solari,
there
are
perhaps
seven
or
eight explicitly
elite
analyses concerning
Latin
America.
There
are short
social
background
articles of
governmental
elites in
Argentina,
Peru,
and
Mexico.5 In
the
Peruvian and
Mexican
cases,
the
authors
found
that
educated
1
For
examples,
see
Robert
J.
Alexander,
Prophets
of
the
Revolution
(New
York,
Macmillan,
i962),
and Harold E.
Davis,
Makers
of
Democracy
in
Latin
America
(New
York,
H.
W.
Wilson
Co.,
I945).
2
For
example,
John J. Johnson,
The
Military
and
Society
in
Latin
America
(Stanford,
Stanford
University
Press,
I964).
3
Merle
Kling,
A
Mexican
Interest
Group
n
Action
(Englewood
Cliffs,
Prentice-Hall,
196I).
4
Seymour
Martin
Lipset
and Aldo
Solari
(eds.),
Elites in
Latin
America
(New
York,
Oxford
University
Press,
I967).
5
Kalman
Silvert,
'
Political
Leadership
and
Institutional
Weakness
in
Argentina
',
in
The
Conflict
Society
(New
York,
American
Universities Field
Staff,
i966);
Arnold
Payne,
'
Peru:
Latin
America's Silent
Revolution
',
Inter-American
Economic
Affairs,
xx
(Winter
I966),
pp.
69-78;
James
D.
Cochrane,
'Mexico's New
Cientificos :
the
Diaz
Ordaz
Cabinet',
Current
History,
xxI
(Summer
I967),
pp.
6I-72.
247
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248
John
G.
Conklin
middle
class
individuals
were
now
occupying
high
government
positions.
Silvert's
positional
analysis
of
the
Per6n
era
showed
that
no dramatic
turn-
over had occurred,and he concluded from this that Peronism was not a
truly
revolutionaryphenomenon.
Jamaican
Leaders
by
Wendell Bell
is
undoubtedly
one
of
the
outstanding
studies of
elites in
a
single
Latin
American
country.6
While
the
focus is
on social
backgrounds
and
attitudes,
Bell
places
his
findings
within
the
context
of
Jamaican
politics.
His
familiarity
with
the
Jamaican
system,
combined with
the
quantitative
methods,
results
in
a
balanced,
infor-
mative
book
which is
methodologically
explicit.
Daniel
Goldrich,
in
his
study
of
Panamanian
and Costa Rican
elite
youth,
surveys
the
attitudes of
16
to
i8
year
olds
towards their
respective
systems.7
His
study
is
particularly
interest-
ing
because
he
polled
each
country
twice at
two-year
intervals.8
Goldrich used
quantitative
methods,
but
his
sampling
and
administering procedures
were
very
different
from
those
employed
by
Bell.9
He selected
his
sample
simply
by
going
to
educational
institutions attended
by
the sons of
elites.
Surveys
were
administered
directly
in controlled
situations
and the
response
was
over
go
per
cent. On
the
whole,
Goldrich
exercised
greater
care
in
accumulating
his
data.
The
Venezuelan
project
directed
by
Frank Bonilla
is
a
benchmark in the
study of national elites. In Volume II of Politics of Change in Venezuela,
Bonilla
notes:
To
our
best
knowledge
the VENELITE
research has
managed
to collect
more
informationabout
more of
.the
very
top people
in
an
actively operative
national
power
system
han
has
ever
been
obtained
before.10
The
VENELITE
team
used
the
positional,
reputational,
and
decision-partici-
pation
methods in
selecting
their
sample.
They
categorized
elites into three
groups-economic,
political,
and
cultural.
The
interview
data were
organ-
ized
along
five
lines-social
characteristics,
biography-career
ines,
power-role
activities,
personal qualities,
and socio-metricdata.
The
purpose
of the
study
was
to
inquire
into 'the
potential
capacity
of
leadership
to
help bring
about
the
new
Venezuela
prefigured
in
their
state-
6
Wendell
Bell,
Jamaican
Leaders:
Political
Attitudes
in
a
New
Nation
(Berkeley,
Univ.
of
California
Press,
1964).
Two
other
works
on
West Indian
leaders are Charles
Moskos,
The
Sociology
of
Political
Independence
(Cambridge,
Mass., Schenkmann,
I967),
and
Ivar
Oxaal,
Black
Intellectuals
Come
to
Power
:
The Rise
of
Creole
Nationalism
in Trinidad
and
Tobago
(Cambridge,
Mass.,
Schenkmann,
1968).
7
Daniel
Goldrich,
Sons
of
the
Establishment:
Elite Youth
in Panama
and Costa
Rica
(Chicago,
Rand
McNally
&
Co.,
1966).
8
Since
Goldrich
wrote his
book
the
survey
has
again
been
repeated
in Panama:
Douglas
A.
Brown,
The
Political
Orientations
of
Panamanian
Students: A
Republication (unpublished
thesis,
Chapel
Hill,
Univ.
of
North
Carolina,
i967).
9
For Bell's
sampling
and
administering
techniques,
see
pp.
7
and
8
of
Jamaican
Leaders.
l0
Frank
Bonilla,
The Failure
of
Elites
(Cambridge,
Mass.,
MIT
Press,
1970),
p.
14.
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Elite
Studies:
the Case
of
the
Mexican
Presidency
249
ments to
us
and
in
key
documents such
as
national
plans
'.
The
title
of
the
project's
second
volume,
The Failure
of
Elites,
indicates
the
basic
finding
of
the VENELITEesearchgroup.
From the
point
of view of the
social
sciences,
this
project
has
larger
method-
ological
implications.
It
applies
'
scientific'
research
techniques
to
socially
and
politically
volatile
questions.
Moreover,
the current Venezuelan
elite,
whose
responses
made the
study
possible,
can
hardly
view the
project's
conclusion
as
'friendly'.
Indeed,
Bonilla writes
that
the domestic elite
within the
'
national
armies,
national
parties,
national
bourgeoisies
all have fallen
short
of
the
immediate
challenge
'.1
Only
the
cultural
elite,
led
by
the
university
community,
seems
to understand
adequately
the
programs
needed for
the
long-
term
development
of Venezuela. Whatever the merits of this conclusion, it
can
be
read
as
a call
for
revolutionary
upheaval.
Where
social
scientists
are,
even
implicitly,
prescribing
such courses
of
action,
the
validity
and
reliability
of
their
methodology
is of crucial
importance.
In other
words,
this book
directly
raises
the
question
of whether
we
are
engaged
in
political
science
or
political
philosophy
and whether
or
not
one can
be divorced from
the other.
Latin
American
Elites
:
the
Chief
Executive
Two key features of Latin American politics are executive predominance
and
military
intervention.l3
While
the
literature
on Latin
America
is,
rela-
tively
speaking,
full of information
on
the
military,
almost
nothing
is
to
be
found
concerning
the
presidency.
Hence,
one
of the
two
most
important
elite
structures
remains
practically
ignored.
Rosendo G6mez's article is
one of
the
few
studies
dealing
specifically
with the
Latin American
presidency.14
How-
ever,
this
article
was written
largely
to
outline a
classificatory
system.
Data
were
not
systematicallygathered
and
they
were
used
to
illustrateeach
classifica-
tion
rather than
to test
or
generate
hypotheses.
There
are
some studies of
the
executive of various countries. Leo Lott's essay is a good traditional descrip-
tion
and
analysis
of
the
formal
and informal
powers
of
the
Venezuelan
presi-
dency.l5
The
power
of the
Peruvian
presidency
is
treated in
a
cursory
article
by
Martin
Needler.l6
Other studies of the
Latin American
presidencies
are in
textbooks.
Alexander
Edelmann's text
has one
of the better
treatments of
the
11
Ibid.,
p.
62.
12
Ibid.,
p.
322.
13
Martin C.
Needler,
'Political
Development
and
Military
Intervention in Latin
America',
American Political
Science
Review,
ix
(September
1966),
p.
6I6.
14
Rosendo
Gomez,
'
Latin American
Executives:
Essence
and
Variations
',
Journal
of
Inter-
AmericanStudies,
III
(JuneI96I), pp. 81-96.
15
Leo
Lott,
'
Executive
Power in
Venezuela
',
American
Political
Science
Review,
i
(June
1956),
pp.
422-4I.
16
Martin
Needler,
'Cabinet
Responsibility
in
a Presidential
System:
The
Case
of Peru
'
Parliamentary
Affairs,
xviii
(Spring,
1965), pp.
I56-6I.
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7/24/2019 Elites Studies, The Case of the Mexican Presidency
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Elite
Studies:
the
Case
of
the Mexican
Presidency
251
TABLE
I
Presidents
of
Mexico
21
May, 1822,
to
I
December, 1970
President
Agustfn
de Iturbide
Guadalupe
Victoria
Vicente
Guerrero
Jose
Marfa
Bocanegra
Pedro Velez
Anastasio
Bustamante
Melchor
Muzquiz
Manuel
G6mez
Pedraza
Valentin G6mez
Farfas
L6pez
de
Santa Anna
Miguel
Barragan
Jose Justo
Corro
Nicolas Bravo
Francisco
Javier
Echeverrfa
Valentfn Canalizo
Jose
Joaqufn
de
Herrera
Mariano Paredes
y
Arrillaga
Jose
Mariano Salas
Pedro
Marfa
Anaya
Manuel
de
la
Pena
y
Pena
Mariano
Arista
Juan
Bautista Ceballos
Manuel
Maria Lombardini
Martin
Carrera
R6mulo
Diaz
de
la
Vega
Juan
Alvarez
Ignacio Comonfort
Fdlix
Zuloaga
Manuel
Robles Pezuela
Miguel
Miramo6n
Jose
Ignacio
Pav6n
Sebastian
Lerdo de
Tejada
Jose
Marla
Iglesias
Benito
Juarez
Porfirio
Diaz
Juan
N. Mendez
Manuel Gonzales
Francisco
Le6n de
la Barra
Francisco I. Madero
Pedro Lascurafn
Victoriano
Huerta
Elite
Type
Time
Means
Age
Occupation
in
Office
to
Office
Yrs
Mths
Days
34
f
m
9-28
v
38
f
m/i
4-
6-io
e
45
f
m/i
8-
7
42
P g/l 5
P
42
P
g/l
8
p
49
f
m/i/p
6-10-2I
e/i/p
42
f
m/i
4-I2
p
42
f m
4-
7
v
52
P
g/p
9-
7
p/e
38
f m
5-
9- 4 v/i
45
f
m/i
I-
1-12
i
51
f
1
i-i6
p
52
f
m/i
4-22
p
44
f
g/b
i8
p
49
f
mn
Io-II
p
56
f m
3-
8-14
p/e
48
f
m 7- i v
49
ff m
4-17
v
52
f
m
3-
3
P
58
p
g/l
6-28
p
48
f
m
I--I--9
e
41
p g/l
I-
2
p
60
f
m/i
2-I3
p
58
f
m
28
p
54
f
m
21 p
65
f
m/i
2-
6
v
43 f 1/m 2- I- 9
v
54
f
m
11-19
p/v
41
f
m
28
p
26
f
mrn
-10-IO-II
v
69
p
g/l
2
p
49
p
g/l/e
4-
3-10
p/e
53
P
g/l/j
2-19
p
51
p
g/1
I4-
5-2I
p/e/v/i
46
f m
26-
5-25
v/e/i
52
f
mn
2-II
p
47
f m
4
i
47
P
g
5-II
p
38
f
h
I-
3-12
v
54
f
1/e
I
p
67
f
m
I-
4-28
v
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Elite Studies:
the Case
of
the
Mexican
Presidency
253
Occupationally,
24
presidents
have been
civilians,
I8
professional
soldiers,
and
I6
military insurgents.22
By dividing
Mexican
history
into three
periods:
the era of Santa Anna (1822-55), the
period
of Juarezand Dfaz
(I855-1910),
and
the
Revolutionary
era
(190o-70),
and
correlating
occupation,
one
finds
TABLE
2
Presidential
Occupations
n
Three Historical
Periods
(Mexico)
Occupations
y
Numberand
Percentage
Era
m
m/i
c
Santa
Anna
9 39%'
7
30.5%
7
30.5%
Juarez/Diaz 8 58% I 7.0% 5 35.0%
Revolutionary
I
5%
8
38.o?%
12
57.0%
Totals
i8
31%
i6
27.0%
24 42.0%
that
all
three
occupational
categories
were about
equally
represented
during
the
initial
period, professional
soldiers
and civilians
(930%)
dominated the
Juarez/Diaz
epoch,
while
military insurgents
and
civilian
(95%)
dominated
the
third
era.
When
the
same factors
(occupation
and
numbers of
presidents)
are correlated with tenure, an interesting pattern emerges.23 Taking the
civilians in
each
historical
unit,
it
is
seen that
although
30.5%
of
the
presidents
during
the
Santa
Anna
period
were
civilians
they
all served
less
than
one
year.
During
the
Juarez//Daz
era
civilians came
to
power
35%
of
the
time,
but
more
significantly,
they
began
to serve
for
more
prolonged
periods.
Finally,
during
the
Revolutionary
era civilians became
the
predominant
group
both
numerically (57%)
and
with
regard
to
tenure.
If
one
assumes
a
positive
relationship
between
office,
tenure and the
actual
exercise of
power,
the
pattern
is
clear. The
history
of the
Mexican
Presidency
has been one of
growing
civilian control of the
position
itself and, hence, of
the
political system.
Given
their
short durations
in
office,
civilians
during
the
Santa
Anna
era
might
well be
considered
puppets
for various
professional
and
insurgent generals.
Political
power,
then,
rested
primarily upon
coercive
instruments. In
the
Juarez/Diaz
period
civilians were
able to exercise
power
and
control for
the
first time. This
suggests
an
increasingly
sophisticated
system
in
that
crude
force
was
no
longer
the sole
requisite
for the effective
22
See
Table
2.
In all of the
tables the letter c will be used
to refer to
civilian,
m to
denote
professional soldier, and m/i to indicate military insurgent. Military insurgent refers to
individuals who
began
their
career as
guerrilla
soldiers or with
irregular
forces rather than
with the
standing army.
Of
course,
irregular
forces were
usually
formed
to
fight
against
the
regular
army.
23
See
Table
3.
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254
John
G.
Conklin
exercise of
presidential power.
In
the final
era,
for
the
first time in
Mexico's
history
there
were
more
civilian than soldier
presidents.
Moreover,
the
tenure
pattern begun during the Juarez/Diaz period became more pronounced as
31%
of
the
presidents
were
civilians
serving
more
than a
single year. (Com-
parable
figures
for
the
first and
second
historical
periods
were
9%
and
2I%
respectively.)
TABLE
3
Presidential
Occupations
and Tenure
(Mexico)
Number
and
Percentage
Less than I to
22
Over
2
Era
*
I Year
Years Years
Santa Anna
m
6
26%
I
4%
2
9%
m/i
4
17%
I
4%
2
9%
c
7
31%
Juarez/Diaz
m
5
37%
I
7%
2
I4%
m/i
I
7%
c
2
14%
I
7%
2
14%
Revolutionary
m I
50
m/i
2
9%
I
5%
5 24%
c
5 24%
2
9%
5
24%
*
Each of
the three
eras
is
treatedas an individual
analytical
unit.
Within
the
civilian
groups
the
majority
of the
Mexican
presidents
have
been
government
officials/public
men,
and/or
lawyers.
3I%
of all Mexican
executives were
governmental
or
public
men and
27%
lawyers.
Among
them
have been a sprinkling of physicians,businessmen,educators,journalists,and
hacendados.
The
occupations
of the Chilean executives are
considerably
different
from
those of
the Mexicans. At least
go%
of the Chilean
presidents
had
extensive
office-holding public
careers
prior
to
achieving
the
presidency,
and
47%
were
lawyers.
However,
the most
significant
difference
between the
occupational
experiences
of the
Mexican and Chilean
presidents
concerns the
incidence
of
military
executives.
In
Mexico,
a
majority
of the
presidents
(58%)
have been
either
professional
or
insurgent
soldiers
whereas
only
20%
of
the
Chilean
executives fall into thesecategories.
These
occupational
differences
in recruitment
patterns
undoubtedly
reflect
the
different
political
traditions of
Mexico and Chile. Chile
has
been
notable
for
its adherence
to the formal
aspects
of
constitutionalism and
particularly
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256
John
G.
Conklin
have
proportionately
fewer
presidents
than
their
populations
would indicate.
The
North,
on
the
other
hand,
is
'over-represented'
having
produced
more
than twice as
many
chief executives as its numbers would 'warrant'.
Table
5
categorizes
presidential
hometowns
by
size.
Cities with
popula-
tions
of
Io,ooo
to
50,000
have
been
the most
productive,
followed
by
towns of
2,500
to
I0,000,
and
the
large
cities
with
populations
of over
50,000.
The
thousands of
villages
and
hamlets
throughout
Mexico have
produced
propor-
tionately
few
presidents.26
TABLE
5
President's
Birthplace by
Size
(Mexico)
Percentage
of
Number
of
Percentage
Population
in
Population
Presidents
of
Presidents
Cities
*
Up
to
2,500
8
14
65
2,500
to
I0,000
I5
26
13
10,000
to
50,000
20
34
8
Over
50,000
15
26
14
*
Percentage
of
cities,
nation is for
I940.
Source for this
column,
Howard
Cline,
The
U.S.
and
Mexico,
p.
436.
This
might
be
explained by
the
differing optimal
levels
of 'life chances'
found in
the
villages,
towns,
and
cities
of
Mexico.
Historically,
the
villages
(up
to
2,500
population)
contained
peasant
populations
and had
very
little
wealth and
almost
no
education
facilities.
For
the
most
part,
village
popula-
tions
have
been
apolitical
and
the few
existing
religious-governmental
offices
have been
filled
by
the
members
of
a
few families
who
undertook these offices
as
a matter of
tradition,
status,
and
duty.
Towns
(2,500
to
Io,ooo),
small
cities
(Io,ooo
to
5o,ooo),
and
cities
(over 50,000) possess greater
wealth and
offer
more in the
way
of educational
opportunities.
Assuming
that
most
political
activism
usually requires
a
minimum
material
and/or
educational
level,
cities,
and even
towns,
are
more
likely
to
provide
them than
are
villages.
The
fecundity
of the
small
city
is
particularly
striking
in Mexican
recruit-
ment
patterns.
In
I940,
there
were
eighty-four
cities
of
this
size with
eight
per
cent
of the
population.27
Yet,
they produced
thirty-six per
cent
of Mexico's
presidents.
This
contrasts
with
the
Chilean case where
most of the
presidents
26
See
Table
5
for
the
percentage
of
the total
population represented
by
each
category.
It
is
interesting
to
compare
this
finding
with that of Donald Matthewsin U.S. Senatorsand Their
World
(New
York,
Random
House,
I960).
He found
the
small and
medium
sized
town
(2,500
to
50,000)
to be
consistently
over-represented
as a senatorial birth
place.
Rural and
metropolitan
areas
were
under-represented, p.
I4-I7.
27
Cline,
The U.S. and
Mexico,
p.
436.
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258
John
G. Conklin
refers to
any
situation
in
which
a
presidential
candidate
uses armed
force
directly
to
achieve
office. This
can take
many
forms,
from
a
bloodless
golpe
to a violent revolution. One can discern violencia by locating evidence of an
armed
action
undertaken to
achieve
immediate
power.
As used here an
election means
a
contest between two
or more
candidates.
For
a
contest
to
exist
more
than
one
candidate must
have
a
'reasonable chance' of
winning.
occupation
m
m/i
c
violencia
9
2
5
number
of
imposicioon
3
9
6
election
3
2
3
Imposiciones
are all
power
turnovers that
fall between violencia
and elections.
Normally
these are
election charades
in which there
is
a
single
candidate
or
only
one
candidate
with
a
chance
for
victory.
Tables
7,
8,
and
9
list
the
presidents
according
to
means to
power. Occupation
and means
to
power
are
outlined below.29
TABLE
7
Presidents
Achieving
Power
by
Way
of
Golpe
(Mexico)
President Age Area
*
Size t Occupation
Iturbide
34
I
C
m
Guerrero
45
2 B
m/i
G6mez Pedraza
42
I
C
m
Santa
Anna
38
I C
m
Paredes
y
Arrillaga
48
I
D
m
Salas
49
I
D
m
Alvarez
65
2 A
m/i
Comonfort
43
I
D
c
Zuloaga
54
4
B
m
Miram6n 26 i D m
Juarez
51
2 A
c
Diaz
46
2 C
m
Madero
38
4
B
c
Huerta
67
3
B
m
Carranza
54 4
A
c
de
la
Huerta
39
4
C c
*
the
numerical
symbols
I
=
Core
2
=
South
t
the letter
symbols
refer
B
=2,500
to
IO,000
A
=
to
2,500
refer
to:
3
=
West
4
=
North
to:
C-=IO,000
to
50,000
D=over
50,000
29
A
similar
analysis
of modes of
attaining
power
and
executive
age
indicates
that
no
relation-
ship
exists.
The same is true
of means for
achieving
power
and
area and size of
birthplace.
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Elite
Studies:
the
Case
of
the
Mexican
Presidency
259
TABLE 8
Presidents
Achieving
Power
by
Way
of
Imposicion (Mexico)
President
Age
Area
Size
Occupation
Bustamante
49
I
B
m/i
Santa Anna
38
I
C
m
Barragan
45
I
B
m/i
Juarez
51
2
A
c
Diaz
46
2
C
m
Gonzales
47
4
B
m
Gutierrez
34
4
A
m/i
Gonzalez
Garza
29 4
C
m/i
Lagos Chazaro 26 I B c
Obregon
40
4
A
m/i
Calles
47
4
B
m/i
Ortiz
Rubio
53
I
C
m/i
Cardenas
40
I B
m/i
Camacho
43
I
C
m/i
Aleman
44
I
B
c
Ruiz
Cortines
60 I
C
c
L6pez
Mateos
48 I
D
c
Dfaz
Ordaz
53
I
B
c
TABLE
9
Presidents
Achieving
Power
by
Way
of
Election
(Mexico)
President
Age
Area
Size
Occupation
Victoria
38
I
A
m/i
Bustamante
49
I
B
m/i
G6mez
Farias
52
3
D
c
Herrera
56
I
C
m
Arista
48
I
D
m
Lerdo 49 I C c
Juarez
51
2 A
c
Diaz
46
2
C
m
In
the
history
of
Mexico,
I6
presidents
have used
violencias
to
gain
the
executive
office,
i8
have used
imposiciones,
and
8
have
come
to
power
through
elections.
Surprisingly,
civilians who
are
often
associated with
the
electoral
process
have
not used
election
any
more
than
have
military
men.
The
most
significant
finding
here is
the
marked
difference in
the
behavior
of
profes-
sional soldiers and military insurgents. By and large, professionals have
relied
upon
violencia to
attain
power (60%)
while
insurgents
have
used
the
imposici6n
most
of
the
time
(69%).
This
may
be
explained
by
the
democratic
ideology
that
often
pervades
insurgent
movements.
Having justified
rebellion
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260
John
G.
Conklin
with
democratic
slogans,
the
insurgent
can
hardly
be blatant
in
replacing
an
authoritarian
government
with one
of
his own.
Hence,
the use
of civilian
provisionalpresidentsuntil an 'election' can be held. We can only speculate,
but it
does not seem
unreasonable o
suggest
that
insurgents
are
more sensitive
to the
art
of mass
manipulation
and the
use of
symbols
than are
professional
soldiers.
Another factor
is the
powerful
position
of individual
civilians
in
insurgent
movements.
Juarez,
Madero,
and Carranza were the
acknowledged
leaders
of
insurgencies
and
with
victory they naturally
assumed
the
presi-
dency.
Soldiers
came
to
power
only
after
these leaders
died.
Table
IO
summarizes the extent to
which
violencias,
imposiciones,
and
elections were
utilized
by
executives
in
three historical time
periods.
This
Table indicates that
during
the
Santa
Anna
period
violencias and
elections
were
the
primary
routes
to
office.
During
the
Juarez/Diaz
time,
the
incidence
of
all three
modes
remained
about constant
although
the
percentage
of
imposi-
ciones
and
violencias
increased
slightly
and elections
declined
somewhat.
In
the
Revolutionary
era the
use of
violencia
declined
markedly
and
elections
disappeared
completely,
and
imposiciones
emerged
as
the
primary
means for
transferring
the executive
office.
Indeed,
we know
that all
violent
turnovers
occurred
early
in
the
Revolutionary period
(I9IO
to
I920),
so
that
the
imposicion has clearlybecome institutionalized.
TABLE IO
Modes
of
Attaining
Office
by
Historical
Period
(Mexico)
Numberand
Percentage
f
Era
Violencias
Imposiciones
Elections
Santa
Anna 6
43%
3
21%
5
36%
Juarez/Diaz
6
50%
3 25%/
3
25%
Revolutionary 4 25%
12
75%
o
Totals
i6
38%
I8
43%
8
Ig%
Mexican
Development
:
An
Elite
Analysis
One
way
of
differentiating
between
elites
is to consider them
as
being
either
multi-functional
or
political/governmental.30
Political/governmental
elites
are
professional
politicians
and
government
workers. Multi-functional
elites
cross
back
and
forth between
various
elite roles.
Two
variables,
career
span
and
career
crossover,
are
used to differentiate
between elite
types.
Political/
30
This
distinction
is
based
largely
upon
Robert
Scott,
'
Political
Elites
and
Political
Moderniza-
tion:
the Crisis
of
Transition
',
Lipser
and
Solari
(eds.),
Elites in Latin
America,
pp.
I20-I.
Scott
distinguishes
between functional
and
political
elites.
Here the terms are
changed
so
that
they
relate
more
directly
to the distinction
being
made.
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Elite
Studies: the Case
of
the
Mexican
Presidency
261
governmental
elites include
anyone
with
15
years
of
political/governmental
experience.
However,
those
individuals
who cross over
between
elite roles
during
the
i5
years
period
are consideredmulti-functionalelites. A
non-politi-
cal/governmental
occupation
is
not taken as
evidence of crossover. Valentin
G6mez
Farias,
for
instance,
was a
physician
and
at
one
time
he
practiced
medicine.
However,
his
medical
career was
obviously
peripheral
to
his
political
career.
Throughout
his
adult life
he was the
acknowledged
leader
of the
Liberal
Party
and for
30
years
he
served in various
government
posts.
Any
president
with
a
non-political
occupation
but with a
career such as this
is
considered
a
political
elite.
The
easiest
political/governmental
elite to
iden-
tify
is
the individual who
has
spent
his
life in
politics
and
government
and
who
has
no
social or
economic resources.
Benito
Juarez,
for
example,
was
a
political/governmental
elite.
His whole life
was
spent
in various
political/
governmental
roles,
and his
power
was
based
solely upon
those
political
roles.
He never
moved into
business,
journalistic,
or
military
roles.
Unhappily,
not
all
presidents
are
so
easily
categorized.
However,
each
president
has
been
coded
and the
results
are in column
2
of Table
i.
It
is
assumed
here that
political
development
occurs when
multi-functional
elites
are
replaced
by
political/governmental
elites.
That
is,
the
greater
the
incidence
role/elite
congruence-political elites filling political roles-the more developed the
system.
Table
ii
indicates that
Mexico
has
been
increasingly
recruiting
poli-
tical elites
to
the
presidency.
When measured
in
terms
of
years
in
office,
the
improving position
of
the
political/governmental
elites becomes
even more
apparent,
so
that,
by
this
scale,
substantial
political
development
has occurred
in
Mexico.
TABLE
I I
Functional and
Political
Elites
(Mexico)
Number
of
Presidents
Years
in
Office
Era f
p
f
p
Santa
Anna
74%
26%
96%
4%
Juarez/Diaz
72%
28%
66%
34/
Revolutionary
62%
38%
55%
45%
Mexico also
evidences
considerable
political
development
when
compared
with four other Latin American
countries.
In
Tables
I2
and
13
the incidence of
political/governmental
elites
filling
the Mexican
executive
since
1940
is
com-
pared with the Argentine, Venezuelan, Colombian, and Paraguayan cases.
Every president
who
served between
I940
and
I965
is
included,
and even if
he
served
only
one
day
in
I940
or
I965
his whole
consecutive
term
is counted.
Forty-three
men
constitute the
survey.
Each has
been
coded
as
a
multi-func-
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17/24
262
John
G.
Conklin
tional
or
political/governmental
elite
(see Appendix
III).
These
Tables show
Mexico
to be
the
most
politically
developed
of
the
five
countries.
Moreover,
the
percentile distance between Mexico and the other countries is
strikingly
wide.
TABLE
12
Levels
of
Political
Development
:
Numbers
of
Presidents
Numberand
Percentage
f
Presidents
Country
Multi-functional
Political
Governmental
Mexico
2
33% 4 67%
Argentina
7
64% 4
36%
Venezuela 6
67%
3
33?
Colombia
7 77%
2
23%
Paraguay
7 88%
I
12%
TABLE
13
Levels
of
Political
Development:
Years
in
Office
Numberand
Percentage
f
Years n
Office
Country
Multi-functional
Political/
Governmental
Mexico
12
33% 24 67%
Argentina 17 61%
II
39%
Venezuela
27 66%
14 34%
Colombia
27
79%i
6 2I
Paraguay 24
84%
5
I6?/
CONCLUSIONS
Substantive
Who
governs?
At the
outset
of
this
paper
this
question
was
posed
as a focal
point for political research.Who governs Mexico? Unfortunately, this paper
addresses
this
question
in
a
very
narrow
sense,
that
is,
from the
perspective
of
the
office of the chief executive.
It
does, however,
tell
us who
fills
the
presi-
dency
and
suggests long-term
recruitment
patterns.
In
Mexico,
the
'typical
president
was
born
in
a
town
or
city,
likely
in
the
Core
of
the
country
or
in
one
of the
Northern
states.
He
probably
completed
secondary
school
and there is
a
good
chance
he is
a
college
graduate
or finished
his
training
as a
military
cadet.
There is a
strong
chance
he is either
a
soldier
or a
politician
with
legal
train-
ing
and in
his forties
or fifties.
The
'typical'
Chilean
president
was born in
the heart of the
country, probably
Santiago, graduatedfrom college, probably
the
law school
at the
University
of
Chile,
had an extensive careeras a
politician
and
in
government
service,
and
assumed
the chief executive in his fifties
or
sixties.
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18/24
Elite
Studies: the Case
of
the Mexican
Presidency
263
A
major
difference
in the
backgrounds
of the Mexican
and
Chilean
execu-
tives is
the
comparatively
arge
number of
military
presidents
in
Mexico.
But
the most
significant
difference lies in the relative
homogeneity
in the back-
grounds
of
the
Chilean
presidents.
Compared
with
the
Chileans,
the
Mexicans
are
a much more
heterogenous
lot. Whether we are
talking
about
age,
occupation,
or
birthplace,
it
is
easier
to
talk
of
a
'typical'
Chilean
than
a
'typical'
Mexican
chief executive.
Over
the
long
haul,
there has
been
a
definite trend
toward
the
'
civilization'
of
the
Mexican
presidency.
Moreover,
the
occupations
of the
civilian
presi-
dents are
increasingly political/governmental. Taking
this as
an indicator
of
political modernization,
Mexico's
political history
has
been
characterizedby
'development,'
and the
country
has
attained
a
degree
of
'
development'
not
yet
achieved
by
some
of her southern
neighbors.
Simultaneously,
there
has
been
a
shift
away
from the
use of violencias and
elections
to
gain
office.
Today
the
imposicion
seems
to have
been
institutionalized.
Method
There
are a number of
practical
advantages
to
the
positional
approach
in
studying
elites.
First,
it
greatly
reduces
the
problem
of
elite
identification,
especially when the
position
represents
the
pinnacle
or
near-pinnacle
of the
political
system.
Here
the
office of the
chief
executive
in
Latin
America
is
used
as
the unit of
analysis,
and
it seems safe
to assume
that
even
the obscure
personalities
who
served
short
provisional
terms are
representative
of
an elite.
This
method
of
identification is
particularly
useful in
large
countries where
the
researcher is concerned
with national
elites. The
problems
encountered
in
identifying
national elites
reputationally
or
decisionally
in
a
country
the
size
of Mexico
are formidable and
time-consuming.
The
accessibility
of
the
'positional tool' enhances
its
utility.
The
investigator
can
identify
and
analyze
elites
without
having
to
operate
in
the
field.
Along
these same
lines,
positional
analysis
lends itself
to
comparative
work. The
observer
can move
cross-nationally,
examining
a
single
position
without
totally
immersing
him-
self
(or
herself)
in the
government
and
politics
of
each
country
or
visiting
every country
personally.
Finally,
a
positional
study
is
relatively
easy
to
design
because ts
parameters
are more
easily
defined.
Not all
data is
equally
suited
for
coding
and
quantification.
Some
of
the
variables
used in
this
study
such as
years
in
office,
age,
and
education,
result
in 'hard' data that is
virtually
irrefutable.However, other variablessuch as
elite
type,
occupation,
and means to
office,
are '
soft'
in
the
sense that
the
data
results
from
the researcher's
judgment
of how an
individual took
office,
his
occupation,
and
his
elite
type.
This
inspective
data is
impressionistic
and,
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19/24
264
John
G.
Conklin
lacking
the
precision
of
hard
data,
is
more
subject
to
error and
criticism.
Sadly,
'hard
data
variables' tend
to
concern
relatively
unimportant
questions,
whereas
'
soft data
variables
tend
to deal
with
matters of
greater significance.
For
instance,
the
average
age
of
the
presidents
of
a
country
is
obviously
less
important
than the
type
of
elite he
represents
or
the means
he
used to
gain
office.
Both
types
of data
can
be criticized when
the
researcher
combines
classes
of
variables
into
aggregates
and
uses
the
aggregates
for
generalizing.
Inevitably,
distortions are
introduced,
particularly
when the
number of
observations
is
limited.
Quantification
is,
however,
a
useful tool for
bringing
a
semblance
of
order to
a
large
number
of
observations.
Unless
various
classes
of
people
are
aggregated the raw data may well 'engulf' the researcherand its significance
might
be lost.
Social
Background
Studies
The
backgrounds
of
politically
powerful people
are useful
for
descriptive
purposes.
But,
what
is
needed are studies that
link
backgrounds
and behavior.
This
paper
includes a behavioral
variable,
means to
office,
and
I
have
attemp-
ted
to
identify
any relationship
that
might
exist
between
background
and how
individuals
achieve
the
presidency.
This is
simply suggestive
of what
might
be done. Another
question
that needs to be researched is the
relationship
between
background
and
policy.
Does
an individual's
class
origins,
education,
or
occupation
affect
his
policy
orientation?
Does
it
matter if an executive is a
military
man or
a civilian?
If
it
does
matter,
what are the
policy
conse-
quences
of
these
occupational
types
? These
are
the sort
of
questions
to
which
we
might
address
ourselves.
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266
John
G.
Conklin
APPENDIX
I
(contd.)
Statesand
Towns
San
Luis
Potosi
Ciudad
(Valle)
de
Maiz
San Luis
Potosi
Sonora
Guaymas
(2)
Hermosillo
Alamos
Siquisiva
Populations
624,748
4,266
61,0I9
262,545
8,658
I0,6I3
6,i8o
76
Tamaulipas
249,253
Matamoros 8,347
Ciudad Victoria
11,25
Veracruz
1,124,368
Jalapa
3)
20,388
Veracruz
(3)
29,164
Tlacotalpan
5,089
Sayula
3,667
Zacatecas
475,863
Zacatecas
32,866
FederalDistrict (io) 468,705
Source:
The
population
for
each
town is
from
the census of
I900.
This
is
the
earliest
census
data available.
Ministerio
de
Fomento,
Censo
General
de la
Republica
Mexicana
(Mexico, I90I-6).
The state
figures
are also from
the
I900
census and are taken from Pan American
Union,
Mexico:
A General
Sketch
(Washington,
Pan
American
Union, I9II), p.
333.
Core
Aguascalientes
Federal
District
Guanajuato
Hidalgo
Mexico
Michoacan
Morelos
Puebla
Queretaro
San
Luis Potosi
Tlaxcala
Veracruz
APPENDIX
I
States
of
Mexico
by Region
South
Campeche
Chiapas
Guerrero
Oaxaca
Quintana
Roo
Tabasco
Yucatan
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22/24
Elite Studies:
the Case
of
the Mexican
Presidency
267
North
Baja
California,
Norte
Baja
California,
Sur
Coahuila
Chihuahua
Durango
Nuevo Leon
Sinaloa
Sonora
Tamaulipas
APPENDIXII
(contd.)
West
Colima
Jalisco
Nayarit
Zacatecas
Source:
Howard
Cline,
The
U.S.
and
Mexico,
pp.
433-4.
APPENDIX
II
Presidents
of
Argentina,
Colombia,
Mexico,
Paraguay
and
Venezuela
(1940-65)
Argentina
Roberto Ortiz
Ramon Castillo
Arturo
Rawson
Pedro
Ramirez
Edelmiro
Farrell
Juan
Per6n
Pedro
Aramburu
Eduardo
Lonardi
Arturo Frondizi
Jose
Marfa
Guido
Arturo Illia
f
p
f
f
f
f
f
f
p
p
p
Colombia
L6pez
Pumarejo
Eduardo
Santos
Lleras
Camargo
Ospina
Perez
Laureano
G6mez
R.
Urdaneta
Rojas
Pinilla
Gabriel Paris
Le6n
Valencia
f
f
f
f
f
p
f
f
p
Mexico
Lazaro
Cardenas
Avila
Camacho
Miguel
Aleman
Ruiz
Cortines
L6pez
Mateos
Diaz
Ordaz
Paraguay
J. Estigarribia
Higinio
Morinigo
Juan
Frutos
J.
Natalicio
Raimundo Rol6n
Molas
L6pez
Federico
Chaves
Alfredo
Stroessner
f
f
p
p
p
p
f
f
f
f
f
f
p
f
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268
lohn
G.
Conklin
Venezuela
L6pez
Contreras
Medina
Angarita
R6mulo
Betancourt
Gallegos
Freire
Delgado
Chalbaud
German Suarez
Perez
Jimenez
W.
Larrazabal
Raul Leoni
APPENDIX
III
(contd.)
f
f
p
f
f
p
f
f
p
APPENDIX
V
Education
of
the
Mexican
Presidents
Agustfn
de Iturbide
Guadalupe
Victoria
Vicente
Guerrero
Jose
Maria
Bocanegra
Pedro
Velez
Anastasio
Bustamante
Melchor
Muzquiz
Manuel
G6mez Pedraza
Valentin
G6mez Farfas
Santa Anna
Miguel Barragan
Jose Justo
Corro
Nicolas
Bravo
Francisco
J.
Echeverria
Valentin Canalizo
J. J.
de
Herrera
Mariano Paredes
Jose
Marfa Salas
Pedro
Marfa
Anaya
M.
de
la Pena
y
Pena
Mariano Arista
Juan
Bautista Ceballos
Manuel
Maria
Lombardini
Martin Carrera
R. Diaz de la Vega
Juan
Alvarez
Ignacio
Comonfort
Felix
Zuloaga
Manuel
Robles Pezuela
Secondary
College
None
College
College
Secondary
Unknown
Primary
College
Military
Cadet
Unknown
College
Unknown
Some
Secondary-Level
Unknown
Unknown
Military
Cadet
Military
Cadet
Some School-Level
Unknown
Some School-Level
Unknown
College
Military
Cadet
College
Some
School-Level
Unknown
Military
Cadet
Military Cadet
Tutorial
College
Unknown
Some School-Level Unknown
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24/24
Elite
Studies:
the Case
of
the
Mexican
Presidency
269
APPENDIX IV
(contd.)
Miguel
Miram6n
JoseIgnacio
Pav6n
S. Lerdo de
Tejada
Jose
Maria
Iglesias
Benito
Juarez
Porfirio Diaz
Juan
N. Mendez
Manuel
Gonzalez
Francisco
L.
de
la Barra
Francisco
I. Madero
Pedro
Lascurain
Victoriano
Huerta
Francisco
Carvajal
Venustiano
Carranza
Eulalio
Gutierrez
Roque
Gonzalez
Garza
Francisco
Lagos
Chazaro
Adolfo de
la Huerta
Alvaro
Obregon
Plutarco Elias
Calles
Emilio Portes Gil
Pascual
Ortiz
Rubio
Abelardo Rodriguez
Lazaro Cardenas
Manuel
Avila
Camacho
Miguel
Aleman
Adolfo Ruiz
Cortines
Adolfo
L6pez
Mateos
Gustavo
Dfaz
Ordaz
Military
Cadet
College
College
College
College
Secondary
Unknown
Some
School-Level
Unknown
Attended
College
Attended
College
College
Military
Cadet
College
Secondary
Some
School-Level
Unknown
Some
School-Level
Unknown
College
Secondary
Some
School-Level
Unknown
Secondary
College
College
Secondary
Primary
Secondary
College
Secondary
College
College