Digested Crim Cases

8/22/2019 Digested Crim Cases

1/10

CRIM LAW REVIEW: DIGESTED CASES PAGE 1

Empoy //jmp

[G.R. No. 127755. April 14, 1999]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plainti ff -appell ee, vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO

FACTS:Accused del Rosario, Marquez, Santos and certain Dodong were charged with special

complex crime of Robbery with Homicide for allegedly having robbed Virginia Bernas, a 66-year old businesswoman in cash and jewelry and on the occasion thereof shot and killed her.

Accused del Rosario pleaded not guilty of the crime, Santos and Dodong remained at large

while Marquez was killed in a police encounter. Only del Rosario was tried and interposed the

defense that he was not all part of the said robbery much more of the killing of the victim.Accused maintained that his participation in the crime was the used of his tricycle in pursuing the

crime and that he only acted under threat and irresistible force as employed upon him by his co-

accused through gun pointing at him. However, accused Del Rosario was still held by the courtguilty of the crime charged.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSEDs PARTICIPATION OF THE CRIME WAS UNDER

THREAT AND IRRESISTABLE FORCE.

RULING:The conviction of del Rosario was set aside. His claim for exemption from criminal liability

under Art. 12, par. 5, Revised Penal Code as he acted under the compulsion of an irresistible

force must be sustained. He was then unarmed and unable to protect himself when he wasprevented at gunpoint by his co-accused from leaving the crime scene during the perpetration of

the robbery and killing, and was only forced to help them escape after the commission of the

crime.

A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the

impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability

because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act doneby me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to

reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not onl y without wil l but against his will. The

duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such natureas to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A

threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave

no opportuni ty for the accused for escape or self -defense in equal combat.

In the instant case, while del Rosario admits that he was at the locus criminis as he was the

driver of the getaway vehicle, he nonetheless rebuts the imputation of guilt against him by

asserting that he had no inkling of the malevolent design of his co-accused to rob and kill since

he was not given any briefing thereof. He was merely hired by Boy Santos to drive to an agreeddestination and he was prevented at gunpoint from leaving the scene of the crime since he was

ordered to help them escape.


2/10


Empoy //jmp

[G.R. No. 129051. July 28, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO MOLINA y

FLORES, accused-appellant.

FACTS:Accused-appellant Molina was treated for injuriessustained when he was mauled without no

apparent reason by several assailants, including Domingo, the victim, whom Molina looked up to

as a father. At least 6 hours after the attack, Molina went to the house of Domingo and thereafterattacked the latter while sleeping, hitting and stabbing him with a stone and a short knife,

resulting in Domingos death.

ISSUE: Whether the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense is present.RULING: The mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense was present. Being

mauled by someone whom the accused respected akin to a father understandably engendered a

strong feeling of vengeance on the latters part.

As to the manner in which Molina killed the victim, the same was undoubtedly attended by

treachery since the accused attacked Domingo while the latter was asleep and unable to defend

himself. There is alevosiawhere the attack was sudden and unexpected, rendering the victimdefenseless and ensuring the accomplishment of the assailants evil purpose without risk to

himself.

It should be emphasized that for dwelling to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance,

there must have been no provocation on the part of the victim. The provocation contemplatedhere is one that is sufficient and immediate to the commission of the crime. In other words, the

invasion of the privacy of the offended partys house must have been the direct and immediate

consequence of the provocation given by the latter as where, for example, the accused and thevictim quarelled in front of the latters house and the accused, in a fit of rage entered the victims

house and proceeded to stab him.[21]

Such is not the situation in the case at bar because the

killing in the victims house occurred at least six hours after the accuseds mauling.

There is, however, the mitigating circumstance of vindication of a grave offense to offset thegeneric aggravating circumstance of dwelling. As the records show, accused-appellant was

treated for injuries he sustained when he was mauled in the afternoon of July 14, 1995 and the

prosecution did not offer anny rebuttal evidence to deny the allegation that Domingo was one of

the men who beat up Molina. Indeed, that accused-appellant was mauled for no apparent reasonby someone who looked up to as a father understandably engendered a strong feeling of

vengeance on his part. Sadly, however, he chose to take the law into his own hands to sate his

thirst for revenge.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/129051.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/129051.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/129051.htm#_edn21http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jul99/129051.htm#_edn21


3/10


Empoy //jmp

[G.R. No. 130010. May 26, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE RABANILLO y

MAGALONG, accused-appellant.

FACTS:Rabanillo & the deceased Morales were drinking w/ their friends. One friend started a water fight

game & Rabanillo joined the fun, accidentally dousing Morales w/ water. Morales reprimandedhim because water got into his ear & they argued which led into a fistfight. They were pacified &ushered to their respective houses. The prosecutions version of the events was given credit by

the court which claimed that after 30 minutes after, while Morales & some friends were having a

conversation in the terrace of the house of Morales, Rabanillo went out his house w/ a 1-metersamurai & hacked Morales who died that same day.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT ACCUSED RABANILLO COUD BE GIVEN THE

BENEFIT OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF PASSION & OBFUSCATION,

DRUNKENNESS, & VOLUNTARY SURRENDER

RULING:A. Forpassion & obfuscation to be mitigating, the same must originate from lawful feelings.

From the version of the facts by the prosecution, clearly the assault was made in a fit of anger.The turmoil & unreason that would naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be

confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended to such a

degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control. The excitement w/c is inherent in all

persons who quarrel & come to blows doesnt constitute obfuscation. Moreover, the actproducing obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the crime by a

considerable length of time, during which the accused might have regained his normal

equanimity. In this case, 30 minutes intervened between the fight and the killing. Having

been actuated more by the spirit of revenge or anger than of a sudden impulse of natural or

uncontrollable fury, passion and obfuscation cannot be appreciated.

B. To be mitigating, the accuseds state of intoxication should be proved or established bysufficient evidence. It should be such an intoxication that would diminish or impair the exercise

of his willpower or the capacity to know the injustice of his act. The accused must then show that

(1) at the time of the commission of the criminal act, he has taken such quantity of alcoholic

drinks as to blur his reason and deprive him of a certain degree of self-control; and (2) such

intoxication is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony. The accused merely

testified that he joined his friends de Guzman and Soriano in a drinking session, but only

for a short time. The fact that he was able to resume his routine work thereafter, belie his

claim that he was heavily drunk at the time he attacked the victim. The regularity of

Rabanillos alcohol intake could even have increased his tolerance for alcohol to such an

extent that he could not easily get drunk.

C. Forvoluntary surrender to be considered, the following requisites must concur:

1. the offender was not actually arrested;

2. he surrendered to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and3. his surrender was voluntary

A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to

submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (a) he acknowledges his guilt or(b) he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and

capture.

In the case, the barangay captain had to go to the house of Rabanillo to take the

latter to the police station. The latter did not present himself voluntarily to the former, who

is a person in authority pursuant to Art. 152 of the RPC, as amended; neither did he ask

the former to fetch him at his house so he could surrender. The fact alone that he did not

resist but went peacefully with the baranggay captain does not mean that he voluntarily

surrendered. Besides, voluntary surrender presupposes repentance.

We agree with the trial court in ruling out treachery. The evidence shows that MORALES

was facing towards the direction where RABANILLO came from.[10]

He must then have caught

sight of the latter, who was approaching him with a samurai in his hands. Considering that a
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn10


4/10


Empoy //jmp

fight between them had just taken place. MORALES knew or must have known that he would

be the target of RABANILLOs attack. Since he was still about 10 meters[11]

away from

RABANILLO, he had an opportunity to escape or avoid the assault. Hence, it cannot be saidthat treachery attended the commission of the crime.

However, we are of one mind with the OSG and RABANILLO that evident premeditation

was wanting in the commission of the crime. For evident premeditation to be considered, thefollowing elements must be established: (1) the time when the offender determined to committhe crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender has clung to his determination; and

(3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination to commit the crime and the execution

thereof of allow the offender time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[12]

The essence ofevident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and

reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent within a span of time sufficient to

arrive a calm judgment.[13]

In the present case, there is no showing as to the time RABANILLO decided to commit thecrime. Even assuming that it was right after he was escorted to his house that he conceived the

idea of killing the victim, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. Only 30minutes[14]

intervened between that time and the time he went out of his house to attack

MORALES. It has been held that the lapse of 30 minutes between the determination to commit acrime and the execution thereof is insufficient for full meditation on the consequences of the

act.[15]

Additionally, as aptly observed by the OSG, the attending circumstances of the killing and

the external acts of the appellant negate the existence of evident premeditation; thus:

When accused-appellant rushed out from his house, it was just 5:30 in the afternoon. (TSN, April11, 1997, p. 10) Following Philippine norm, it would still be daylight or at least there would stillbe sufficient light to easily see people or happenings. The persons who were previously drinking

were just milling around by the road. (TSN, November 7, 1996, p. 21) Accused-appellant did

not even wait until Raul Morales was alone; he came out of his house with the samurai parallel tohis head and directly went straight to the victim at the time when the latter was conversing withtwo of his friends. Also, accused-appellant did not even attempt to disguise his intention by

camouflaging his weapon. He raised it high for all to see. Cool thought and calm judgment,

there was none in this case.[16]

Since the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation are not present inthis case, RABANILLO can be convicted of homicide only.

We do not agree with the trial court on its finding of the aggravating circumstance of abuse

of superior strength. It appreciated such circumstance because RABANILLO had a bulkier and

strong[er] body physique as compared to victims slimmer/thinner body, and despite thereof

he armed himself with a samurai bolo.There is abuse of superior strength if, as expressly provided by law, the assailant take

advantage of his superior strength. It must then be established that not only did the assailant

enjoy superior strength over the victim, but that he took advantage thereof in the commission ofthe crime. That MORALES was slimmer/thinner while Rabanillo was bulkier and strong[er]

was not enough proof that the letter superior strength. There should have been proof that,

indeed, RABANILLOs bulkier physique provided him physical strength to that ofMORALES. It may further be stressed that a man of slimmer/thinner body need not

necessarily be physically weak; he could even be physically stronger than a bulkier

person. Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that RABANILLO was physically

stronger than MORALES, the circumstances in this case fail to convince us that RABANILLO

took advantage of his superior strength.
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn11http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn16http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn15http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn14http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn13http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn12http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130010.htm#_edn11


5/10


Empoy //jmp

G.R. No. 130654 July 28, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,

vs. EDUARDO BASIN JAVIER, accused-appellant

FACTS:Accused Eduardo is husband of victim Florentina. They got married in 1954 and for 47

years of marriage, they had10 children. On June 15, 1996, Consolacion heard her mother sayingYour father is going to kill me. Her sister, Alma is weeping and told her that theirparents arequarrelling. They went tothe house of their brother Manuel and when they came back they saw

their mother dead. And their father has a wounded stomach. He admitted hacking his wife and

stabbed himself afterwards.He was brought to the hospital. SPO1 Racho, desk investigator, said that when they went

to see the crime scene Manuel told him that Eduardo pleaded guilty and surrendered the bolo.

Eduardo said the he havent slept for a month and his mind was completely blank when he killed

his wife. Trial Court rejected his claim of insanity and sentenced him to death for parricide.In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court erred in imposing the death

penalty, considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances of illness of the offender and

passion and obfuscationEduardo does not question the rejection of insanity as his defense but he says he was

suffering from lost of sleep for a prolonged period of time. He also has suspicion that his wife is

having an illicit relationship, aggravated with his illness, goaded him to commit the crime.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ILLNESS

AND PASSION AND OBFUSCATION

RULING: None

A. FOR ILLNESS:For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be appreciated, the law

requires the presence of the following requisites: (1) illness must diminish the exercise of thewill-power of the offender; and (2) such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness

of his acts.

Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent upon him toprove the claimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In this case, however, aside from the

testimony of the accused that his mind went blank when he killed his wife due to loss of sleep,

no medical finding was presented regarding his mental condition at the time of killing. ThisCourt can hardly rely on the bare allegations of accused-appellant, nor on mere presumptions and

conjectures. No clear and convincing evidence was shown that accused-appellant was

suffering an illness which diminished his exercise of will-power at the time of the killing. On

the other hand, it is clear that accused-appellant was aware of the acts he committed. First, heremembered killing his wife in their bedroom with the use of a bolo, where he mangled her neck

twice; he remembered trying to commit suicide, by wounding himself with the same bolo he

used in killing his wife; and he remembered being brought to the hospital. Since he remembered

the vital circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, from the time of the killing up to the

time he was brought to the hospital, it shows that he was in full control of his mental faculties.

This negates his claim that he was suffering from an illness that diminished the exercise of

his will-power. On the basis of the foregoing, we cannot appreciate the mitigating circumstancealleged by accused-appellant.

The defense failed to show medical evidence and since he remembered the vital

circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, from the time of the killing up to the time

he was brought to the hospital, it shows that he was in full control of his mental faculties

B. AS FOR PASSION:In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and to obfuscation, the

following elements should concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient toproduce such condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far

removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the

perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. Elements were not proven; he even said that he

was not jealous of his wife.


6/10


Empoy //jmp

[G.R. Nos. 130665 and 137996-97. April 21, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO BALIAO EMPANTE @PETER,accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Herein accused Empante was found guilty by the trial of three counts of rape against hisdaughter, Elvie Empante, then below 18 years of age. The said offense allegedly transpired in

different series of acts and different dates. They happened during the time Elvies mother and

siblings are out of the conjugal home. Elvies mother was a domestic helper in other places and

would come home only during weekends. Attendant to commission of each of the offensecharged, accused would always warned not to tell her mother about the incident or accused

would kill both of them. Elvie knew her father to be a violent man. He maltreated her mother

and threatened her with a bolo. It was only during the third time of the commission of the offensethat the Elvie opened up her situation because her mother was already transferred to Manila for

work. Elvie feared that, with her mother gone, her father would make a mistress of her. She

went to the house of her grandmother the next morning and told her her story. Her grandmother,

Lourdes Intong, lost no time in taking her to the barangay captain who referred them to thepolice and advised them to take Elvie to the hospital for examination.

Accused was indicted of three charges of rape and pleaded not guilty to all of them duringarraignment. Accused through counsel asked the court to allow him to change his plea from not

guilty to guilty but was denied on the ground that the prosecution had already started

presenting its evidence. But upon his insistence, the Court finally granted such change of plea..

The trial continued and accused admitted having raped his daughter, claiming, however, that hewas drunk at the time. He denied that he used a hunting knife to threaten his daughter and

claimed that he only threatened her verbally. He alleged that he did not have any hunting knife

The trial court found the accused guilty.

ISSUE: WON THE GUILTY PLEA OF THE ACCUSED EMPANTE AS WELL AS THE

DEFENSE OF INTOXICATION MITIGATE HIS LIABILITY

RULING:

A. GUILTY PLEAAccused entered his plea of guilty freely, voluntarily, and with full understanding of

its consequences and should be bound by it. Accused asseverates that his plea of guilty

mitigates his liability. The contention has no merit. To be considered a mitigating

circumstance, a plea of guilty must be made spontaneously by the accused, in open court,

prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. In the cases at bar, accused at firstpleaded not guilty and only confessed his guilt after the prosecutions first witness was nearly

finished with her testimony. Such a belated act of remorse or contrition cannot be considered

spontaneous or timely within the contemplation of the law.

B.INTOXICATIONThe claim of intoxication as a mitigating circumstance cannot be given credence. For even if

accused was intoxicated and he is not a habitual drinker, to be considered mitigating, the

intoxication must be shown to have so impaired his willpower that he did not know what he

was doing or could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. In these cases, not only did

complainant deny that her father was drunk when he raped her, but the fact that accused himself

could recall details of the rape incidents (i.e., time of the day as regards the November 1994incident, the manner he raped his daughter, what his daughter was wearing, how he forced and

threatened her to submit to his desires) is the best proof that he knew what he was doing on those

occasions.


7/10


Empoy //jmp

[G.R. No. 128287. February 2, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plainti ff -appell ee, vs. RIZAL

ESPIRITU yKINAO, accused-appellant.

FACTS: Accused in this case are Espiritu, Alicoy and Malicdan who allegedly killed inconcerted effort victim Sato Sannad who sustained multiple stab wounds resulting to his death.

Accused Espiritu was convicted of murder qualified by treachery by the trial court while his co

accused were acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonabledoubt. The conviction of Espiritu was made based solely of his extra-judicial statement with the

police authorities in the presence of his counsel.

ISSUE: WON THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF THE ACCUSED IS

ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE WHICH ENTITLES HIM FOR MITIGATION OF HIS

PENALTYRULING:

A.ADMISSIBILITYThe court is convinced that the confession of Appellant Espiritu is admissible in evidence,

as it was satisfactorily shown that it was (1) voluntary and (2) made with the assistance of a

competent and independent counsel.

With respect to the first requisite, we find that Espiritu readily admitted killing Sanad when

he was confronted by the relatives of the deceased. Thereafter, without being invited by the

investigating officers, he went to the police station and voluntarily gave his statement to SPO1

Wilfredo P. Cabanayan. Later, appellant affirmed before Prosecutor Romeo Carbonell the fact

that he, with Atty. Mangallay, had gone to the police station to surrender and that the saidcounsel had assisted him when the police started taking his statement. In his confession,

appellant admitted that he and Malicdan killed Sanad, after being hired by Alicoy to do so forthe sum of P20,000. Aside from describing the details of how he and his cohort killed Sanad,

Espiritu, during an ocular inspection, even pointed out the place where the killing had been

committed. These acts of the appellant are clear manifestations that, contrary to his protestations,

no torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means was used against him toforce him to confess.

As a consequence of the confession of the appellant, his conviction becomesinevitable. Such confession is evidence of a high order, since it is supported by the strong

presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crimeunless prompted by truth and his conscience.

B. MITIGATION OF SENTENCE (VOLUNTARY SURRENDER)The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is appreciated when the following

requisites concur: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2) the offender

surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The

foregoing requisites are borne by the records, which show that Espiritu surrendered to the

police even in the absence of a warrant for his arrest. Without being invited by the

investigating officers, he went to the police station and voluntarily gave his statement.


8/10


Empoy //jmp

[G.R. No. 119942. July 8, 1999]

FELIPE E. PEPITO, SINONOR E. PEPITO, and SONNY E. PEPITO, peti tioners, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

Accused Felipe Pepito(the father) and his sons, fellow accused Sinonor and Sonny were allconvicted guilty by the trial court of murder for killing victim Sapa inside the latters house. Allegedly,

prior the killing, the victim was drunk and made trouble in the neighborhood. The accuseds wife EstrellaPepito reported the incident to the barangay captain who in turn accompanied the victim to his house butwent back to Pepitos house and challenged them. He chased accused Felipe, who was then returninghome from the seashore. Felipe ran towards their house. Sapa did not pursue any further.

Meanwhile, Sinonor, who was in the kitchen having breakfast, thought that his father had beenhurt. He grabbed a bolo, rushed out of the house, and went after victim Sapa, eventually catching up with

him on the highway. Sapa hit Sinonor with his indian pana, and struck him with a bolo on the rightarm. Somehow, however, Sinonor was able to grab the right arm of the victim, which was holding the

bolo, and stab him several times. Sapa tried to flee, but Sinonor pursued him until they reached theformers house. Sapa staggered inside their house, fell on the floor of the kitchen, and died. Felipe,

Sonny, and Estrella met Sinonor as he came out, his clothes, hands, and bolo all bloodied.In their conviction, the trial court based its decision on the version of the prosecution witness,

victims spouse saying that all the three accused were the one who attacked the victim inside their housewhile he was sleeping.

ISSUES:

(A) WON THERE WAS CONSPIRACY AMONG THE THREE ACCUSED IN KILLING THEVICTIM.(B) WON THERE ARE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION AND

SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM AS WELL AS PASSION ANDOBFUSCATION ON THE PART OF ACCUSED SINONOR.

RULING:

The Court was convinced of the accused allegations. CA decision as to Felipe & Sonny reversed.

They are acquitted except accused Sinonor who was found guilty of homicide only.

(a) NO CONSPIRACYIt appears that the victims bodyphotographs & witnesses testimony that bolo was in victimss

right hand belying claim that he was asleep when he was attacked & supporting Pepitos claim that victim

died while fighting with accused Sinonor. Victim was found in kitchen & not in living room. This negates

claim that he was asleep & bolsters allegation that accused Sinonor finished him off as he retreated to his

house. The doctor who examined victim couldnt make a categorical statement re certainty of 19

wounds being inflicted by different weapons. The doctor also claims its possible. There are only

suspicions, surmises, & guesses on guilt of accused Felipe & Sonny. They cant be found guilty

simply because of these. Guilt must flow naturally from facts proved & must be consistent w/all of them.

(b) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE

1. Mitigating circumstance ofincomplete defense of relative cant be appreciated in favor of accusedSinonor. Even ifbased on mistaken belief, such can be appreciated only if act done wouldve been lawful

had facts been as accused believed them to be. No more right to attack when unlawful aggression has

ceased. In this case, even if the victim killed Felipe, Sinonor cant still claim this mitigating because

victim already stopped pursuing about meters away from door of Pepitos residence & turned back to go

home. Aggression already ceased to exist.

2. Mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation/threat on part of offended party immediately

preceding act is appreciated. Sufficient provocation exists when there is (a) unjust/improper conduct or

act of offended party capable of exciting, inciting or irritating anyone. It is sufficient when (b) it is

adequate to excite person to commit a wrong w/c must be proportionate in gravity. And it must

immediately precede the act: no interval of time bet provocation by offended party & commission

of crime by provoked. Provocation on victims part, challenging Pepitos, armed with bolo & pana andchasing Felipe. Witnesses testified that Sinonor attacked victim shortly after provocation.

3. Mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation disregarded since sufficient provocation/threat

was already appreciated.*Dwelling as an aggravating circumstance was not appreciated since victim gave provocation. It

should be treated as one if based on same facts.


9/10


Empoy //jmp

[G.R. No. 123071. October 28, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plainti ff -appell ee, vs. JERONICO M. LOBINO aliasHAPON", accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Appellant was convicted for murdering his common-law wife. He contends he would not stabher without any apparent reasons, and that he attacked her because he could no longer stand her

going home late at night and her sarcastic remarks whenever her attention was called to what she

was doing. He contends he should have been credited with the mitigating circumstance of

passion and obfuscation.

ISSUE: WON SHOULD HAVE BEEN CREDITED WITH THE MITIGATING

CIRCUMSTANCE OF PASSION AND OBFUSCATION.

RULING:The Court disagrees. The requisites of passion and obfuscation are:

1. That there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition

of mind;

2. That said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the

commission of the crime by a considerable length of time during which the

perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.

It has been held that there is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to

an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to alegitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. The obfuscation must originate fromlawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or fight should

not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of a person injured or offended tosuch a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control, because the cause of this condition

of mind must necessarily have preceded the commission of the offense.

Here, there is no evidence to support appellants theory that he and the victim quarreled. Julie

Lobino, who lived with her parents, testified that she knew of no quarrel or altercation between

them. None of the prosecution witnesses testified that a quarrel preceded the attack. Appellant

alleges that the victim did not take care of him when he was ill on April 5, 1994, but the said date

was far removed from the time appellant committed the crime on April 28, 1994. Such length oftime would have been sufficient to enable the appellant to recover his equanimity. Victims lack

of concern for a sick husband are not cogent enough to drive anyone to passion or

obfuscation and commit the crime at the spur of the moment. Besides being vague andgeneric, the alleged provocative acts do not even proximately precede the time of the

commission of the crime.


10/10


Empoy //jmp

[G.R. No. 99869. May 26, 1999]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plainti f f -appel lee, vs. ROMEO

BELARO, defendant-appellant.FACTS:

One evening, victims wife was inside her residence, when someone from outside called Ma

and Pa, summoning her attention. Since her husband, the victim was already reclined on thebed momentarily savoring a local drama aired on the radio, Victims wife raced down the stairs

to answer the call. When she opened the front door, she was surprised to see the caller as theirlong-time family acquaintance, appellant Belaro, posing outside the door and armed with the

armalite that he usually carries. Appellant appeared to be drunk. Since the armalites nozzle was

ominously pointed at the door, Myrna felt an onrush of fear and instinctively shut thedoor. Thereafter, she raced towards their bedroom and told her husband about appellant. The

victim descended to see appellant. However, the moment the front door was opened, victims

wife was simply surprised when her deceased husband(victim) tossed to her the child and shoved

her aside. Thereafter, a volley of shots from an M-16 rifle rang through the air. The deceasedwas directly hit as he toppled on the floor. Appellant interposed the defense of alibi. The trial

court convicted Belaro of murder.ISSUE: WON THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF DRUNKENNESS ANDILLITERACY OF THE APPELLANT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED

RULING:The Court affirmed the lower courts decision. The witnesses corroborating appellants alibi

cannot outweigh positive identification by the victims widow of appellant as her husbandsassailant. The court did not agree to the two alternative circumstances of the appellant to mitigate

his liability. Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as

aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and the other

conditions attending its commission. They are the (1)relationship, (2)intoxication, and the(3)degree of instruction and education of the offender . Appellant invokes the last two

circumstances in his favor.The ordinary rule is that intoxication may be considered either as aggravating or as

mitigating, depending upon the circumstances attending the commission of the

crime. Intoxication has the effect of decreasing the penalty, if the intoxication is not habitualor subsequent to the plan to commit the contemplated crime; upon the other hand, whenintoxication is habitual or intentional, it is considered as an aggravating circumstance. The

person pleading intoxication must present proof that he had taken a quantity of alcoholic

beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, sufficient to produce the effect of blurring

his reason; and at the same time, he must prove that not only was intoxication not habitual

but also that his imbibing the alcoholic drink was not intended to fortify his resolve to

commit the crime.

Appellant failed to introduce evidence to support the presence of this mitigatingcircumstance. He cannot be entitled to this mitigating circumstance merely on the declaration ofthe prosecution witness that appellant was drunk.Even if we consider Myrna Pastors testimony

that appellant reeked of alcohol, this does not warrant a conclusion that the degree of intoxication

affected his mental faculties. Appellant also did not prove that such intoxication was nothabitual or intentional. This he failed to do, for the reason that appellants defense was that of

alibi.

Neither can appellants alleged lack of instruction be appreciated in his favor. Illiteracy

alone will not constitute such circumstance; it must be accompanied by lack of sufficient

intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of ones act. In this case, the trial court did

not make any findings as to the degree of instruction of appellant. Moreover, lack of instruction

should be proved directly and positively; it cannot be based on mere deduction orinference. There is no such proof in this case. On the contrary, appellant, being a CAFGU

member, is presumed to have received some degree of instruction and training.

Finally, there is jurisprudence holding that the accuseds lack of instruction cannot be

considered mitigating in homicide or murder. The reason is that one does not have to beeducated or intelligent to be able to know that it is unlawful to take the life of another person

even if it is to redress a wrong committed against him.

Documents

Digested Crim Cases