DIGESTED CASES ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

G.R. No. 123263December 16, 1996PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, Branch 32, and ISAH V. RED

FACTS:Private respondent, Isah V. Red, was charged with the crime of libel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thereafter, Red filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged. The Regional Trial Court granted the motion and remanded the case to the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City. The prosecution, citing the provision of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code filed a manifestation and motion to remand praying that the case be returned to the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE:Whether or not the crime of libel falls on the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

HELD:Yes, the crime of libel falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides that:The criminal action and civil action for damages in case of written defamation, as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with theCourt of First Instanceof the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offenseRepublic Act 7691, placing the exclusive and original jurisdiction of offenses punishable by not more than six years of imprisonment under the Municipal Trial Court did superseded Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as there is no manifest legislative purpose to do so or an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist between them.

G.R. No. 115115July 18, 1995CONRAD AND COMPANY, INC. vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FITRITE INC., and VICTORIA BISCUITS CO., INC.

FACTS:Private respondents, FITRITE Inc. and Victoria Biscuits Co., Inc., are engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling and distributing biscuits and cookies bearing the trademark SUNSHINE in the Philippines. Petitioner, CONRAD AND COMPANU, Inc. is engaged in the business of importing, selling and distributing biscuits and cookies in the Philippines.Private respondents were granted the trademark SUNSHINE to be used on biscuits and cookies by the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT). For quite some time, the trademark SUNSHINE has been used by the private respondents in the concept of an owner on its biscuits and cookies.Meanwhile, petitioner was designated as the exclusive importer and dealer of the products of Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. for sale in the Philippines.Private respondents then filed a case before the Regional Trial Court, seeking for remedies against infringement under Sec. 23 of Republic Act No. 166, as amended, as well as of the remedies against unfair competition under Sec. 29 of the same statue.Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss the complaint invoking, among others, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

ISSUE:Whether or not the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is applicable in the case at bar.

HELD:No, the doctrine finds no merit in the case at bar.While an application for the administrative cancellation of a registered trademark falls under the exclusive cognizance of BPTTT, an action, however, for infringement or unfair competition, as well as the remedy for injunction and relief for damages, is explicitly and unquestionably within the competence and jurisdiction of ordinary courts. An application with BPTTT for an administrative cancellation of a registered trade mark cannot per se have the effect of restraining or preventing the courts from the exercise of their lawfully conferred jurisdiction. A contrary rule would unduly expand the doctrine of primary jurisdiction which, simply expressed, would merely behoove regular courts, in controversies involving specialized disputes, to defer to the findings of resolutions of administrative tribunals on certain technical matters.

G.R. No. 169004September 15, 2010PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.SANDIGANBAYAN and ROLANDO PLAZA

FACTS:Private respondent, Rolando Plaza, is a member of the Sanguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu with a salary grade 25. He was charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree No. 1445, or the Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received.Private respondent then questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offense charged. Private respondent contends that he should not fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as he does not belong the salary grade 27 and that his violation is not among those enumerated by law to be cognizable by the Sandiganbayan even if the offender is below salary grade 27.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the Auditing Code of the Philippines committed by a public official below salary grade 27.

HELD:Yes, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of the Auditing Code of the Philippines committed by a public official below salary grade 27.The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The case having been instituted on March 25, 2004 the provisions of Republic Act No. 8249 shall govern.Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by RA No. 8249. Among those enumerated are members if the Sangunuiang Panlungsod. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

G.R. No. L-14595May 31, 1960THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.HONORABLE GREGORIO MONTEJO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Zamboanga City and Basilan City, MAYOR LEROY S. BROWN, DETECTIVE JOAQUIN R. POLLISCO, PATROLMAN GRACIANO LACERNAaliasDODONG, PATROLMAN MOHAMAD HASBI, SPECIAL POLICEMAN DIONISIO DINGLASA, SPECIAL POLICEMAN HADJARATIL, SPECIAL POLICEMAN ALO, and JOHN DOES

FACTS:A sub-police station was established upon the orders of Mayor Leroy S. Brown in sitio Tipo-Tipo, district of Lamitan, City of Basilan. Said sub-station was composed regular and special policemen all armed with pistols and high power guns. It was alleged that criminal complaints were entertained in the said sub-station and that defendant Joaquin R. Pollisco acted as investigating officer and exercised authority to order the apprehension of persons and their detention in the camp, for days or weeks, without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court.On June 4, 1958, Yokan Awalin Tebag was arrested upon orders of Mayor Brown without any warrant or complaint filed in court. Tebag was allegedly maltreated while being taken into the sub-station and was again mauled at the sub-station, said torture resulted to Tebags death.The private respondents were then charged with the crime of murder before the Court of First Instance of the cities of Zamboanga and Basilan.Senator Roseller Lim entered his appearance for the private respondents. The prosecution is questioning said appearance due to the constitutional prohibition for senators and members of the House of Representatives to appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation of his office.

ISSUE:Whether or not the crime charged is committed in relation to the offices of the private respondents.

HELD:Yes, a mere perusal of the amended information therein readily elicits an affirmative answer. It is alleged in said amended information that "Leroy S. Brown,City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policemen and ... special policemen, appointed and provided by him with pistols and high power guns" and then "established a camp ... at Tipo-Tipo," which is under his "command, ... supervision and control," where his codefendants were stationed, entertained criminal complaints and conducted the corresponding investigations, as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain persons without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that, in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his orders, his codefendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag, who died in consequence thereof.It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City.

G.R. Nos. 118013-14October 11, 1995PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Bacolod City, and P/COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES, P/INSP. ADONIS C. ABETO, PO MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, PO JOSE PAHAYUPAN, PO VICENTE CANUDAY, JR., JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA, TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, and EDGAR HILADO

FACTS:Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed in the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City against fourteen persons, five of whom are members of the Philippine National Police. The two cases was consolidated.While the trial was on going, the prosecution file a motion for the transmittal of the case to the Sandiganbayan on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the cases because the offense charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers.

ISSUE:Whether or not the crimes charged falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

HELD:No, the case is no longer cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.Ordinarily, jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court until the case is finally terminated.Hence, the Sandiganbayan or the courts, as the case may be, cannot be divested of jurisdiction over cases filed before them by reason of R.A. No. 7975. They retain their jurisdiction until the end of the litigation.In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases, as the informations were filed not before it but before the Regional Trial Court. Even if we labor under the foregoing assumption that the informations in the subject cases do charge the respondent PNP officers with offenses committed in relation to their office so that jurisdiction thereof would fall under the Sandiganbayan, and assuming further that the informations had already been filed with the said tribunal but hearing thereon has not begun yet, the Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the express provision of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975. That section provides that upon the effectivity of the Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not yet begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. Hence, cases which were previously cognizable by the Sandiganbayan under P.D. No. 1606, as amended, but are already under the jurisdiction of the courts by virtue of the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 7975, shall be referred to the latter courts if hearing thereon has not yet been commenced in the Sandiganbayan.It would, therefore, be a futile exercise to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan because the same would anyway be transferred again to the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 7 of the new law in relation to Section 2 thereof.

G.R. No. L-64548July 7, 1986ROLANDO P. BARTOLOMEvs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYANG.R. No. L-64559July 7, 1986ELINO CORONEL Y SANTOSvs.SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS:Rolando P. Bartolome and Elino Coronel Y Santon were charged with the crime of Falsification of Official document as defined and penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. It was alleged that the two conspired to make it appear on the CS Personal Data Sheet that Bartolome has taken and passed the Career Service Professional Qualifying Examination with a rating of 73.35% and that he was a 4th year AB student at the Far Eastern University.The charges were filed in the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE:Whether or not the offense charged falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

HELD:No, the offense is not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.Under Section 4 of P.D. 1606, which created this special court:Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over:(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act No. 1379; (b) Crime committed by public officers and employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, embraced in Title VI I of the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complexed with other crimes; and (c) Other crimes or offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office. (Emphasis supplied).A careful reading of Republic Act No. 3019 and Republic Act No. 1379 will reveal that nowhere in either statute is falsification of an official document mentioned, even tangentially or by implication.Title VII, Book Two, of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes a wide range of offenses committed by public officers, from knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 to abuses against chastity in Article 245, but falsification of an official document is not included. This is punished in Article 171 under Title IV, Book Two, on Crimes against Public Interest.

G.R. No. 85328July 4, 1990PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,vs.BIENVENIDO LEOPARTE, alias "EMBEN,"

FACTS:Bienvenido Leoparte was charged and convicted with the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape by the Regional Trial Court of Lucena. It was alleged in the information that the accused, Leoparte, pulled the victim, Marinel Idea, while she was on her way home and traversing the railroad tracks. The accused then dragged her to the nearby banana plantation where the accused satisfied his carnal desires against the victims will. Thereafter, the accused brought the victim to his sisters home where he again had carnal knowledge with the victim.The following day, the accused brought the victim to his uncles home and again succeeded to have carnal knowledge with the victim against her will. After two day, the accused the brought the victim to the house of his parents where he again successfully satisfied his lascivious desires against the victim. All the incidents took place with the accused purporting that he and the victim had eloped and were planning to get married.Issues:Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.

Held:Yes, The Regional Trial Court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the case.Article 344 was not enacted for the specific purpose of benefiting the accused. When it is said that the requirement in Article 344 that a complaint of the offended party or her relatives is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the prosecutor proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction on the court to try the case. The court's jurisdiction is vested in it by the Judiciary Law.Such condition has been imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial.The overriding consideration in determining the issue of whether or not the condition precedent prescribed in Article 344 has been complied with is the intent of the aggrieved party to seek judicial redress for the affront committed.In the case at bar, the active cooperation of the offended party in the prosecution of the case, as witness, clearly indicates said intent.

G.R. No. 192565February 28, 2012UNION BANK OF THE, PHILIPPINES AND DESI TOMAS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:Desi Tomas was charged with perjury for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. It was alleged that Tomas stated under oath that the Union Bank of the Philippines has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency aside from that which is filed before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for the collection of sum of money with prayer of writ of replevin filed against Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe.Tomas filed a motion to quash arguing that the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City does not have jurisdiction over the case as, though it was notarized in Makati, the Certificate against Forum Shopping was used or submitted before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City has jurisdiction over the case at bar.

HELD:Yes, the Metropolitan Trial Court has jurisdiction to try and decide the case at bar.Tomas deliberate and intentional assertion of falsehood was allegedly shown when she made the false declarations in the Certificate against Forum Shopping before a notary public in Makati City, despite her knowledge that the material statements she subscribed and swore to were not true. Thus, Makati City is the proper venue and MeTC-Makati City is the proper court to try the perjury case against Tomas, pursuant to Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as all the essential elements constituting the crime of perjury were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Makati City, not Pasay City.

G.R. No. 158763March 31, 2006JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCONvs.VIRGILIO M. TULIAO

FACTS:Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable doubt.Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.

ISSUE:Whether or not the court has lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

HELD:Yes, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to the custody of the law.In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief. Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court. Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.

G.R. No. 113630May 5, 1994DIOSDADO JOSE ALLADO and ROBERTO L. MENDOZAvs.HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME COMMISSION

FACTS:Petitioners, Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, were both implicated as the masterminds of the kidnapping and murder of Eugen Alexander Van Twist. An information for the said crime was filed against the petitioners primarily on the strength of a sworn statement by Escolastico Umbal, who admitted that he was among those who kidnapped and killed the victim upon the orders of the petitioners. Thereafter, respondent judge, Roberto C. Diokno, ordered the arrest of the petitioners and no bail was recommended.Petitioners, contending that their arrests was effected whimsically as there is no probable cause, questioned their arrests.

ISSUE:Whether or not probable cause is present to warrant the order of arrest against the petitioners.

HELD: No, probable cause do not exist to merit the order of arrest against the petitioners. For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations, even if the State invokes its inherent right to prosecute, are insufficient to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for that matter. More importantly, the PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to search the dwellings of Santiago never implicated petitioners. In fact they claimed that according to Umbal, it was Santiago, and not petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair.While there may be bits of evidence against petitioners' co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago, these do not in the least prove petitioners' complicity in the crime charged. Based on the evidence thus far submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For them to stand trial and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately exacts much more to sustain a warrant for their arrest facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.

G.R. No. L-4567 May 30, 1983EMILIANO A. FRANCISCO and HARRY B. BERNARDINOvs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:A complaint for intriguing against honor was filed against petitioners, Francisco and Bernardino on February 6, 1966 before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. The acts constituting the complaint was allegedly perpetrated against Dr. Patrocinio Angeles on December 26, 1965.On May 3, 1966, an information charging the petitioners with the crime of grave oral defamation was filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The information was amended upon the order of the court on October 8, 1966 amending the offense charged to slander.The Court of First Instance of Rizal convicted the petitioners with the offense charged, the Court of Appeals modified the conviction finding the petitioners only guilty of simple slander.On appeal, the petitioners raised the defense of prescription.

ISSUE:Whether or not the crime has prescribed.

HELD:No, the crime has not prescribed.Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him."Interpreting the foregoing provision, this Court inPeople vs. Taycoheld that the complaint or information referred to in Article 91 is that which is filed in the proper court and not thedenunciaor accusation lodged by the offended party in the Fiscal's Office. This is so, according to the court, because under this rule it is so provided that the period shall commence to run again when the proceedings initiated by the filing of the complaint or information terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, adding that the proceedings in the Office of the Fiscal cannot end there in the acquittal or conviction of the accused.

G.R. No. 125066July 8, 1998ISABELITA REODICA vs.COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:A complaint charging petitioner, Isabelita Reodica, with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and slight physical injuries was filed before the Fiscals office on October 20, 1987.On January 13, 1988, an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati charging the petitioner for the abovementioned offense. The Regional Trial Court found the victim guilty as charged, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.On appeal, the petitioner raised the defense of prescription.

ISSUE:Whether or not prescription has set in.

HELD:We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, the prosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information.However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or information directly with said courts.It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law.Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings inFranciscoandCuaresmaapply.Thus, the prescriptive period for thequasioffenses in question was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case.We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioners defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.

G.R. No. 152662June 13, 2012PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN

FACTS:Virginia Malolos filed an affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.22 against the respondent, Pangilinan on September 16, 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. On December 5, 1997, a civil case was commenced by Pangilinan against Malolos for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City.Five days thereafter or on December 10, 1997, Pangilinan filed a Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City. The City Prosecutor approved the petition upon the recommendation of the assistant City Prosecutor on March 2, 1998.Malolos appealed the decision of the City Prosecutor to the Department of Justice. On January 5, 1999, reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of informations on violations of Batas Pambansa Blg.22. Said cases were filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City on November 18, 1999.Pangilinan filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City.She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription.ISSUE:Whether or not prescription has set in.

HELD:No, the action has not prescribed.Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases.Appositely, the law reads:SECTION 1.Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules:(a) xxx; (b) after four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx.SECTION 2.Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law.The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.

G.R. No. 127845March 10, 2000PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.LODRIGO BAYYA

FACTS:Respondent, Lodrigo Bayya was charged and convicted with the crime of incestuous rape as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 before the Regional Trial Court in Ilagan, Isabela. On Appeal, respondent challenged the penalty of death against him on the grounds that the information charging of the offense did not made any mention of Republic Act 7659 and that he was only charged using Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, hence, the penalty should be that which is provided for in the Revised Penal Code and not as provided for in Republic Act 7659. As such, in convicting him under the provisions of Republic Act 7659, a transgression of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.

ISSUE:Whether or not there is a transgression of the respondents right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.

HELD: Yes, the respondent may only be convicted of the charges under the information indicting him and nothing more.In the case under scrutiny, the informationdoes not allege the minority of the victim, Rosie S. Bayya, although the same was proven during the trial as borne by the records. The omission is not merely formal in nature since doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more than what he is indicted for. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot be convicted of any offense, not charged in the Complaint or information on which he is tried or therein necessarily included. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of an offense higher than that charged in the Complaint or information on which he is tried would constitute unauthorized denial of that right.

G.R. No. 169888November 11, 2008RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., City Mayor, Lucena City vs.HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, 4thDivision, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:Criminal and administrative charges were filed against petitioner Ramon Y. Talaga Jr. before the Office of the Ombudsman. It was alleged, that the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor, has unlawfully granted favors to a third party with respect to the operation of bingo games in the city, to the damage and prejudice of the complainants. The administrative complaint was dismissed but the criminal case was retained by the Ombudsman.Three criminal information charging the petitioner of violation of Republic Act No. 3019 was recommended by the Office of the Special Prosecutor. Only one information was sustained by the Sandiganbayan, the criminal information for giving unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang by approving an ordinance granting him a local franchise to operate bingo games in the city. However, said information was reverted back to the Ombudsman for the conduct of further preliminary investigation.Thereafter, an information charging the petitioner and the City Councilors for the aforementioned offense, alleging that the parties conspired to perpetrate the crime. The City Councilors moved for the motion to be quashed as the information does not constitute an offense.

ISSUE:Whether or not there exist a valid information under which the petitioner stands charged.

HELD:Yes, the information is valid.The test in Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to appraise the accused, with reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. Theraison d'etreof the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. Based on the foregoing test, the Information sufficiently apprises petitioner of the charges against him. The Information charged the petitioner of evident bad faith and manifest partiality when as Mayor of Lucena City, petitioner, in conspiracy with the City Council, gave unwarranted benefits to Jose Sy Bang. Moreover, it states the specific act which constituted the giving of unwarranted benefits, namely, granting unto the said Jose Sy Bang a local franchise to operate a bingo business in Lucena City in violation of existing laws. These allegations are clear enough for a layman to understand.

G.R. No. 130492January 31, 2001PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.SALVADOR ARROJADO

FACTS:The accused, Salvador Arrojado, and the victim, Mary Ann Arrojado was living in the same roof along with the victims father. The accused was helping in taking care of the victims father. One day, the accused went to the house of his cousin, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, and reported that the victim has committed suicide. Erlinda along with his husband and father went to the victims house and there they saw the already lifeless body of the victim.Upon examination, it was revealed that the victim suffered multiple stab wounds all over her body, negating the theory of suicide.On hearing, several witnesses testified on the strained relationship between the victim and the accused. The accused was found guilty of murder.

ISSUE:Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, though not alleged in the information, may be appreciated in the case.

HELD:No, an aggravating circumstance to be appreciated must be alleged in the information.The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on December 31, 1993 which increased the penalty for murder fromreclusion temporalmaximum to death toreclusion perpetuato death.In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and in accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant.However, on December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect, requiring that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well settled rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence not having been alleged in the information, the same therefore could not be appreciated to raise accused-appellants sentence to death.

G.R. No. 188106November 25, 2009PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.ANTONIO DALISAY Y DESTRESA

FACTS:Antonio Dalisay was charged and convicted with the crime of rape perpetrated against the 16 years old daughter of his live in partner.It was alleged that even prior to the commission of rape, the accused was already repeatedly molesting the victim by inserting his fingers in her genitalia.An information charging the accused of the crime of rape in relation to Republic Act 7610 was then instituted before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused for the crime of qualified rape. The Court of Appeals only found the accused guilty of the crime of simple rape.

ISSUE:Whether or not the special qualifying circumstance of minority, though not alleged in the information, may be appreciated in the case at bar.

HELD:No, the special qualifying circumstance of minority may not be appreciated as it is not alleged in the information charging the accused of the crime.While it has been proven that appellant was the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim and the child was a minor at the time of the incident, the Court cannot convict appellant of qualified rape because the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were not sufficiently alleged in the information. To recall, the information here erroneously alleged that appellant was the stepfather of the victim. Proven during the trial, however, was that appellant was not married to the victims mother, but was only the common-law spouse of the latter. Following settled jurisprudence, appellant is liable only of simple rape punishable byreclusion perpetua.

G.R. No. 103102March 6, 1992CLAUDIO J. TEEHANKEE, JR.vs.HON. JOB B. MADAYAG and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:Petitioner, Tehankee, Jr. was charged with the crime of frustrated murder for the act of shooting Maureen Navarro Hultman on the head, which would have caused her death if not for the timely medical intervention.Trial ensued. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died. The prosecution then filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an amended information. The amended information was filed, however, the petitioner refused to be arraigned on the said amended information for lack of preliminary investigation.

ISSUE:Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admitted.

HELD:Yes, the amendment is legal and valid.Amendments are allowed after arraignment and during the trial but only as to matters of form and provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. An objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is allowed even during the trial of the case. It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite preliminary investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

G.R. No. 165751April 12, 2005DATU GUIMID P. MATALAMvs.THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:An information charging the petitioner of violation of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 as amended was filed before the Sandiganbayan. Said violation was for his alleged refusal to pay the back wages ordered by the Civil Service Commission. After reinvestigation, an amended information was filed by the public prosecutor, Matalam, objected to the filing of the amended information and filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the amended information charges an entirely new cause of action, that is, the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal dismissal from the service of the complaining witnesses. Also, the petitioner assails that admitting said information without a preliminary investigation would amount to a violation of his right to due process.

ISSUE:Whether or not the amendment to the information is substantial as to warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation.

HELD:Yes, the amendment was indeed substantial.The recital of facts constituting the offense charged was definitely altered. In the original information, the prohibited act allegedly committed by petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of the private complainants, while in the amended information, it is the illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants. However, it cannot be denied that the alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary claims is related to, and arose from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants.If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the amended charge, his right will definitely be prejudiced because he will be denied his right to present evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the element of evident bad faith and manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be denied due process.A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to due process.

G.R. No. 182677August 3, 2010JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTEvs.HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS

FACTS:Petitioner, Leviste, was originally charged with the crime of homicide for the death Rafael de las Alas before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.After re-examination and re-investigation of the records of the case, the prosecution amended the information to reflect that the petitioner is already charged with the crime of murder and no longer for homicide.

ISSUE:Whether or not the amendment of the information is substantial as to warrant the conduct of a new preliminary investigation.

HELD:Yes, the amendment was substantial. However, there is no need for a new preliminary investigation as the conduct of re-investigation is of the same nature.The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact that what was conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation does not invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early as the first motion.

G.R. No. 121211April 30, 2003PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.RONETO DEGAMO alias Roy

FACTS:Accused, Degamo, was charged and convicted for the crime for rape before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City. The Trial Court imposed upon the accused the supreme penalty of death as the Trial Court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and night time.Also, the penalty of death was imposed due to the qualifying circumstance of that by reason of the incident of rape, the victim has become insane. However, said circumstance was only presented on the amended information submitted after the accused has already been arraigned.

ISSUE:Whether or not the amendment to include the circumstance that the victim has become insane by reason of the incident of rape is substantial.

HELD:No, the amendment is not substantial.The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substanceTested against the foregoing guidelines, the subject amendment is clearly not one of substance as it falls under all of the formal amendments enumerated in theTeehankeecase. The insertion of the phrase that the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape in the Information merely raised the penalty that may be imposed in case of conviction and does not charge another offense different from that charged in the original Information. Whatever defense appellant may have raised under the original information for rape committed with a deadly weapon equally applies to rape committed with a deadly weapon where the victim has become insane by reason or on occasion of the rape. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant. Therefore, the trial court correctly allowed the amendment.

G.R. No. 171271August 31, 2006PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.ELBERTO TUBONGBANUA y PAHILANGA

FACTS:Accused, Tubongbanua, was charged and convicted with the crime of murder for the death of Atty. Evelyn Sua-Kho by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.The conviction was based on the amended information which included the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and with insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of her rank, age or sex.The Court of Appeals did not appreciate the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to rank, sex and age of the victim because these circumstances were included as amendments to the information after the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence.

ISSUE:Whether or not the amendment constitutes a substantial one so as to invalidate the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult to rank, sex or age of the victim.

HELD:No, the amendments are not substantial.The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance.Tested against these guidelines, the insertion of the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or disregard of the respect due to rank, age, or sex of the victim is clearly a formal, not a substantial, amendment. These amendments do not have the effect of charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of murder as contained in the original information. They relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction. The amendment did not adversely affect any substantial right of appellant.Besides, appellant never objected to the presentation of evidence to prove the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and insult or in disregard of the respect due to the offended party on account of rank, age or sex.Without any objection by the defense, the defect is deemed waived

G.R. No. 151785December 10, 2007SUSAN FRONDA-BAGGAOvs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:Four separate informations for illegal recruitment were filed against petitioner, Baggao, before the Regional Trial Court of Bangued.The prosecution filed a motion to amend the informations praying that the separate informations for illegal recruitment be amended so that there would only be one information for illegal recruitment in large scale.

ISSUE:Whether or not the amendment is valid.

HELD:Yes, the amendment is valid.Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the offended party.If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.Simply stated,beforethe accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the accused.

G.R. No. 160451February 9, 2007EDUARDO G. RICARZEvs.COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, CALTEX PHILIPPINES, INC., PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK (PCIBANK)

FACTS:Two informations for estafa through falsification of commercial document was filed against petitioner, Ricarze, before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIBank), unknown to the Regional Trial Court of Makati, credited the amount being questioned in the criminal cases of estafa.On pre-trial, the petitioner questioned the appearance of PCIBank. The petitioner averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the private complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced.

ISSUE:Whether or not the substitution of Caltex by PCIBank as private complainant is tantamount to substantial amendment.

HELD:No, there is no substantial amendment.The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. In the case at bar, the substitution of Caltex by PCIB as private complaint is not a substantial amendment. The substitution did not alter the basis of the charge in both Informations, nor did it result in any prejudice to petitioner. The documentary evidence in the form of the forged checks remained the same, and all such evidence was available to petitioner well before the trial. Thus, he cannot claim any surprise by virtue of the substitution.

G.R. No. 80116June 30, 1989IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPILvs.HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING

FACTS:Two complaints for adultery were filed against petitioner, Pilapil, before the City Fiscal of Manila, for allegedly having an affair with a certain William Chia and another man named Jesus Chua while her marriage with Geiling was still subsisting.Pilapil contested said charges stating that Geiling no longer qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree in Germany before filing the criminal charges for adultery.

ISSUE: Whether or not Geiling is an offended spouse with capacity or legal representation to initiate an action for adultery.

HELD:The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. The offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option. This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial.Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. It presupposes, therefore, that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.In view of the valid divorce obtained by Geiling in his country, its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as Geiling is concerned in view of the nationality principle in civil law on the matter of status of persons. Geiling, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

G.R. No. 168785February 5, 2010HERALD BLACK DACASINvs.SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN

FACTS:Herald, an American, and Sharon, Filipino, were married in Manila on April of 1994. In June 1999, Sharon was able to obtain a divorce decree from the Circuit Court of Lake County, Illinois. The Illinois Circuit Court also granted sole custody of their child to Sharon.In 2002, both parties instituted a contract agreeing to a joint custody over their child.In 2004, Herald filed a case against Sharon alleging that Sharon had exercised sole custody over their child.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD:Yes, the Regional Trial Court can take cognizance of the case.The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioners suit but not to enforce the Agreement which is void.Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.

G.R. No. L-38308December 26, 1984MILAGROS DONIO-TEVES and MANUEL MORENOvs.HON. CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., as Presiding Judge, Branch III, Court of First Instance, Negros Oriental, PABLO E. CABAHUG, as City Fiscal of Dumaguete, and JULIAN L. TEVES

FACTS:Milagros Donio-Teves and Manuel Morenoare accused of andcharged with adultery. Thecriminal action was initiated bya letter-complaint thumb marked and sworn to bycomplainant Julian Teves, the husband of petitioner Milagros Donio-Teves. During the preliminary investigation, Julian Teves filed a newletter-complaint attaching his affidavit. Before the scheduled arraignment, Milagros Donio-Teves filed a Motion to Quash challenging thejurisdiction of the Courtof First Instance over the offense charged, the persons of both accused, and the authority of respondent City Fiscal of Dumaguete to filethe information. The motion was denied by the CFI. During thependency of the case, complainant Julian Teves died.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of the complainant in adultery while the case is pending a ground to dismiss the case.

HELD:In adultery and concubinage cases, the death of the offended party is not aground for the extinguishment of the criminal liability, whether partial ortotal, of the offending spouse. The participation of the offended party is essential not for the maintenance of the criminal action but solely for the initiation thereof. The moment the offended party initiates the action, the law will beapplied in full force beyond the control of, and in spiteof the complainant, his death notwithstanding.

G.R. No. 190847April 13, 2011BUREAU OF CUSTOMSvs.PETER SHERMAN, MICHAEL WHELAN, TEODOR B. LINGAN, ATTY. OFELIA B. CAJIGAL and the COURT OF TAX APPEALS

FACTS:A criminal action for violation of the provisions of the Tariff and Custom Code of the Philippines, as amended and Republic Act 7916 was filed against private respondents for alleged non-payment of duties or taxes for the shipment of bet slips and thermal papers.The State Prosecutor found probable cause and filed an information against the private respondents before the Court of Tax Appeals.The Secretary of Department of Justice reversed the determination of probable cause and ordered the withdrawal of the information. Hence, the State Prosecutor withdrew the information.The Bureau of Customs then filed, in its own, a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Tax Appeals.

ISSUE:Whether or not the Bureau of Customs can commence the action without the participation of the State Prosecutor.

HELD:No, the public prosecutor has power of direction and control over prosecution of criminal cases.It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the government whose principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute violators. Thus, all criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction and control of public prosecutors. In the prosecution of special laws, however, the exigencies of public service sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from different government agencies to assist the public prosecutor; but this designation does not detract from the public prosecutor having control and supervision over the case.

G.R. No. 145391.August 26, 2002AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULOvs.MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA

FACTS:The parties in this case were involved in a vehicular accident. As a result, Casupanan filed a civil case against Laroya for Quasi-delict and Laroya filed a criminal case against the former for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property.When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was already in its Preliminary investigation stage. Laroya filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum shopping considering the own going criminal case, which was granted.Casupanan filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently from the criminal case.

ISSUE:Whether or nor an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case?

HELD:Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation.The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code.The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other.Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action.

G.R. No. 174238July 7, 2009ANITA CHENGvs.SPOUSES WILLIAM SY AND TESSIE SY

FACTS:Two cases of estafa was filed by petitioner, Cheng, against the respondents, Spouses Sy, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner then filed two more criminal cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against the respondents based on the same facts contained in the criminal charge of estafa.The criminal charge for estafa was dismissed for failure to prove the elements thereof, however, no pronouncement as to the civil liability was made. The cases for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 are likewise dismissed, no pronouncement as the civil liability was also made.Petitioner then filed a civil action for collection of sum of money with damages based on the same checks that are the subject of the charges of estafa and Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

ISSUE:Whether or not the dismissal of the charges of estafa and Batas Pambansa Blg.22 bars the institution of a civil actions arising from the criminal charges.

HELD:Under the present revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no longer file a separate civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then, the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In view of this special rule governing actions for violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is not applicable.

G.R. No. 175091July 13, 2011P/CHIEF INSPECTOR FERNANDO BILLEDO,SPO3 RODRIGO DOMINGO, PO3 JORGE LOPEZ, FERDINAND CRUZ, andMARIANO CRUZ,vs.WILHELMINA WAGAN, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Branch III,PasayCity, ALBERTO MINA, NILO JAY MINA AND FERDINAND CAASI

FACTS:Private respondents were charged for violating a city ordinance that prohibits the drinking of liquor in public places. Thereafter, the private respondents filed a civil case against the petitioners, criminal complaints were also filed against the petitioners before the City Prosecutor Office and the Office of the Ombudsman for unlawful arrest and violation of Republic Act No. 7348.Both of the criminal actions against the petitioners were dismissed, however, the civil action proceeded with the trial.

ISSUE:Whether or not the civil case is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.

HELD:Yes, the civil case falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.The subject civil case does not fallwithin the purview of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249as the latter part of this provision contemplates only two (2)situations. First, a criminal action has been instituted before theSandiganbayan or theappropriate courts after the requisite preliminary investigation, and the corresponding civil liability must be simultaneously instituted with it. Second, the civil case, filed ahead of the criminal case, isstill pending upon the filing ofthe criminal action, in which case, the civilcase should be transferred to the court trying the criminal case for consolidation and joint determination. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 finds no application in this case. No criminal action has been filed before theSandiganbayan or any appropriate court. Thus, there is no appropriate court to which the subject civil case can be transferred or consolidated as mandated by thesaid provision .It is also illogical to consider the civil case as abandoned simply because the criminal cases against petitioners were dismissed at the preliminary stage. A reading of the latterpart ofSection 4 of R.A. No. 8294 suggests that the civilcase will only be considered abandoned ifthere is a pending criminal case and thecivil case was not transferred to the court trying the criminal case for joint determination. The criminal charges against petitioners might have been dismissed at the preliminary stage for lack of probable cause, but it does notmean that the civil case instituted prior to the filing of the criminalcomplaints is already baseless as the complainants can prove their cause ofaction in the civil case bymere preponderance of evidence.G.R. Nos. 155531-34July 29, 2005MARY ANN RODRIGUEZvs.HON. THELMA A. PONFERRADA, in her OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 104; PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and GLADYS NOCOM

FACTS:Petitioner Rodriguez was charged with estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. On hearing of the criminal charge of estafa, the respondent judge allowed the appearance of a private prosecutor to try the civil aspect of the offense charged. The petitioner opposed said appearance alleging that the private prosecutors appearance is barred as the civil aspect of the case is already deemed instituted in the criminal charge of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

ISSUE:Whether or not private respondent is allowed to collect civil damages in both the estafa and Batas Pambansa Blg.22 cases as to warrant the appearance of a private prosecutor in the case of estafa.

HELD:No. Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to two distinct criminal offenses: Estafa and violation of BP 22. However, the recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of issuing a bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability in the other criminal action. While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies for the offended party, it authorizes recovery in only one.

G.R. No. 175851July 04, 2012EMILIA LIMvs.MINDANAO WINES & LIQUOR GALLERIA, A SINGLE PROPRIETORSHIP BUSINESS OUTFIT OWNED BY EVELYN S. VALDEVIESO

FACTS:Mindanao Wines and Liquor Galleria (Mindanao Wines) delivered several cases of liquors to H & ECommercial owned by Emilia Lim who issued four checks worth P25,000.00 each. Two of these checks bounced for the reasons ACCOUNT CLOSED and DRAWN AGAINSTINSUFFICIENT FUNDS. Mindanao Wines demanded from H & E Commercial the payment oftheir value through two separate letters but the demands went unheeded prompting Mindanao Wines to file beforethe MTCC for violations ofBP 22. Emilia Lim was acquitted but was made to pay civil the twoamounts of checks plus interest and cost of filing fees.

ISSUE:Whether or not the dismissal of the Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 case includes the dismissal of the civil aspect.

HELD:No, Acquittal from a crime does not necessarily meanabsolution from civil liability. Even if the Court treats the subject dismissal as one based oninsufficiency of evidence as Emilia wants to put it, thesame is still tantamount to a dismissal based on reasonable doubt. The MTCC dismissed the criminalcases because one essential element of BP 22was missing, i.e., the fact of the banks dishonor. The evidence was insufficient to prove said element of the crime as no proof of dishonor ofthe checks was presented by the prosecution. This, however, only means that the trial court cannot convict Emilia of the crimesince the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases.Conversely, the lack of such proof of dishonor does not mean that Emilia has no existing debt with Mindanao Wines, a civil aspect which is proven byanother quantum of evidence, a mere preponderance of evidence." Preponderance of evidence is defined as the weight, credit, and value ofthe aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to besynonymous with the term greater weight of the evidence orgreater weight of the credible evidence. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than thatwhich is offered in opposition thereto."

G.R. No. 102007September 2, 1994PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVAFACTS:The accused, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, was charged and convicted with the crime of rape by the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City. Pending appeal, the accused suffered a cardio respiratory arrest resulting to his demise. The Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal and required the Solicitor General to submit his comment with regards to the civil aspect of the case.The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People vs Sendaydiego, opined that the civil liability of the accused still exists despite his death, thus, the case should proceed for the determination of the civil liability.

ISSUE:Whether or not the civil liability of the accused arising from the offense charged is extinguished upon the death of the accused pending appeal.HELD:Yes. The death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes the civil liability arising from the offense charged.In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding.

G.R. No. L-50691December 5, 1994EUSEBIO V. FONACIER, ROGELIO RAMOS, JOSEPH GONZALES and FRANCISCO VILLANUEVAvs.THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN presided by HONORABLE MANUEL PAMARAN, BERNARDO P. FERNANDEZ and ROMEO ESCAREAL, and the TANODBAYAN CHIEF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR JUAN A. SISON and PROSECUTORS RODOLFO AQUINO and MANUEL HERRERA

FACTS: In April 1979, Fonacier, et. al, being public officers, entered into a fixed and pre-arranged contract in the name of the Government requiring their participation and approval with Francisco T. del Moral, a private contractor, for the delivery of Five Thousand Five Hundred and Fifty (5,550) cubic meters of aggregate subbase. No delivery was ever made after payment of Ninety Six Thousand Six Hundred and Three Pesos (P96,603.00) through falsified vouchers supported by falsified, spurious, irregularly prepared and questionable documents and without the requisite delivery receipts and tally sheets approved by the accused public officers.On October 8, 1980, Del Moral died. Counsel for Del Moral filed a motion to dismiss the petition for review on certiorari on the ground that Del Moral died during the pendency of the case. The Solicitor General commented "petitioner's appeal should only be dismissed insofar as his criminal liability is concerned."

ISSUE:Whether or not the death of the accused extinguishes the criminal and civil liability of the accused.

HELD:On 29 January 1981, the Court dismissed the petition only with regard to Del Moral's criminal liability. The death of Del Moral has extinguished the civil liability based on ex delicto. In the recent case of People vs. Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, G.R. 102007, promulgated on 02 September 1994, the Court have ruled, and might now reiterate, that 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law, b) Contracts, c) Quasi-contracts, d) .Delict, e) Quasi-delicts3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, which should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.

G.R. No. 172060September 13, 2010JOSELITO R. PIMENTELvs.MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel yLacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional TrialCourt of Quezon City. On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons toappear before the Regional Trial Court ofAntipolo City for the pre-trial and trialof a civil case (MariaPimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 ofthe Family Code on the ground ofpsychological incapacity. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filedan urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of theexistence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victimis a key element inparricide, the outcome of the civil casewould have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The RTC Quezon City heldthat the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo isnot a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorariwith application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals. However, The Court ofAppeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crimeof frustrated parricide had already been committed.

ISSUE:Whether or not the resolution of the action of annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case of frustrated parricide.

HELD:No, there is no prejudicial question in the case at bar.Section 7, Rule 111 ofthe 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised inthe subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution ofsuch issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. In the case at bar, thecivil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 ofthe 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civilaction was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. The relationship between the offender and the victim isa key element in thecrime of parricide, which punishes any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any ofhis ascendants or descendants, or his spouse. However, the issuein the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminalcase for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and the victim is not determinative ofthe guilt or innocence of the accused. The issue in the civilcase for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to complywith the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed thevictim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would havekilled respondent as aconsequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason ofcauses independent of petitioners will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have noeffect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. Inshort, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminallyliable since at the time ofthe commission of the alleged crime, hewas still married to respondent.

G.R. No. 184861 June 30, 2009DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs.CLEOFE S. JANIOLA and HON. ARTHUR A. FAMINI

FACTS:Petitioner, Dreamwork, instituted a criminal case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against private respondent, Janiola, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pinas. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a criminal information for the said offense before the Metropolitan Trial Court on February 2, 2005.On September 20, 2006, spouses Janiola instituted a civil complaint for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement that they entered into with the petitioner. The checks, subject of the criminal case of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.The private respondent then filed a motion to suspend the trial in the criminal case alleging that the civil case of rescission poses a prejudicial question that needs to be resolved first before a determination on the criminal case may be had.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a prejudicial question in the case at bar.

HELD:No, the action for rescission does not pose a prejudicial question on the criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected.The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.

GR. No. 101236January 30, 1992JULIANA P. YAPvs.MARTIN PARAS and ALFREDO D. BARCELONA, SR., Judge of the 3rd MTC of Glan Malapatan, South Cotabato,

FACTS:Private respondent, Paras, sold his share in the intestate estate of their parents to his sister, Juliana P. Yap. Nineteen years thereafter, Paras sold the same property to Santiago Saya-ang.When Yap learned of the second sale, she filed a complaint for estafa against Paras and Saya-ang with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of General Santos City.On the same date, she filed a complaint for the nullification of the said sale with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City.After investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against Paras with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Glan-Malapatan, South Cotabato, presided by Judge Alfredo D. Barcelona, Sr.On April 17, 1991, before arraignment of the accused, the trial judgemotu proprioissued an order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that the criminal action for estafa is a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of an alleged double sale.

ISSUE:Whether or not there exist a prejudicial question in the case presented.

HELD:No, the criminal action for estafa is not and cannot be a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of double sale.A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the congnizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal.It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.It is the issue in the civil action that is prejudicial to the continuation of the criminal action, not the criminal action that is prejudicial to the civil action.

G.R. No. L-53373June 30, 1987MARIO FL. CRESPOvs.HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL.

FACTS:An information for Estafa was filed by the Fiscal against Crespo in the CriminalCircuit Courtof Lucena. When the case was set for arraignment, Crespo filed a Motion To Defer Arraingment on the ground that there was a pending Petition for Review with the Department of Justice. Said Motion was denied by Judge Mogul. Crespos Motion For Reconsideration also having been denied, he filed a TRO with the CA, which granted the same. Thereafter, the CA granted CresposWritof Injucntion and perpetually restrained Judge Mogul from having Crespo arrainged until the Sec. of Justice finally made his decision and ordered the Fiscal tomovefor dismissal of the case. The Fiscal then filed a Motionattachingthe Secretarys Resolution calling for the dismissal of the case. Judge Mogul denied the Motion and set Crespos arraignment.

ISSUE:Whether or not the trial court may refuse to grant a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders from the Secretary of Justice and still insist on the arraignment of the accused.

HELD:Yes, it is within the power of the trial court to refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal. Once an information is filed incourt, the courts prior permission must be secured if fiscal wants to reinvestigate the case. While it is true that it is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case, the filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.

G.R. No. L-60962July 11, 1986PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.ROLANDO MONTEVERDE y CONE alias "EDUARDO MASCARIAS

FACTS:Rolando Monteverde along with his co-accused Reynaldo Codera Jr. were charged and convicted with the crime of robbery with rape and meted out the ultimate penalty of death.On appeal, Monteverde raised the following issues; 1) a) the medical certificate does not show signs of physical injuries and spermatozoa; (2) said medical certificate and even his co-accused's confession are inadmissible against him, for being hearsay; (3) recidivism cannot be considered against him because it was not alleged in the information; and (4) the lower court's proceedings are void because the amended information does not contain a certification.

ISSUE:Whether or not the accused can still assail the lack of preliminary investigation even after plea and conviction.

HELD:No, a valid plea on arraignment is tantamount to a waiver of the right of the accused to preliminary investigation.While generally, a preliminary investigation is mandatory and a certification that such investigation was held is required, still this rule does not apply if the issue is raised onlyafterconviction. Thus, it has been held that after a plea of not guilty to the information, an accused is deemed to have foregone the right of preliminary investigation and to have abandoned the right to question any irregularity that surrounds it.

G.R. No. L-14732January 28, 1961THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.JOSEFINO G. SELFAISON, NEMESIO DALISAY, DOMINGO URETA and BERNARDO BAUTISTA

FACTS:Appellants Josefino G. Selfaison, Nemesio Dalisay, Domingo Ureta and Bernardo Bautista in company with Arsenio Amacio, Reynaldo Bautista, Domingo Salde and Amrafil Dalisay who were alleged to be still at large were accused in an amended information of the crime of robbery with rape in the Court of First Instance of Capiz. After trial, Josefino G. Selfaison was found guilty and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the complainants, Angelita Sinag and Angelina Maghibon, the amounts of