Constitutional Law: Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)TAADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

Publication in the Official Gazette (Enforceability of a Statute)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

Digest 6:VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS

G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xG.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,vs.THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xMAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-interventionx - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xAQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors

Facts: During the hype of Arroyo administration, a new controversy arises. During the 2007 election the conversation of President Arroyo and the herein petitioner Virgilio Garciliano, COMELEC regional director, regarding the desire of the president to have a favourable outcome in terms of his senatoriables. Such conversation was recorded and was played during the house of representative investigation. Because of such turn of events, a petition was filed before the court praying that such playing of the illegally seized communication was in violation of RA 4200 or the anti-wire tapping law. Also such petition for injunction prays that the Senate committee be prevented from further conducting such investigation for the basic reason that there was no proper publication of the senate rules, empowering them to make such investigation of the unlawfully seized documents.

Issue: Whether or not there was proper publication of the rules as to empower the senate to further proceed with their investigation?

Held: No, the Supreme Court mentioned the following:

The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."

Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for the reason that the rules that they will observe was not properly published as provided by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed without observance of the required publication will put a persons life, liberty and property at stake without due process of law. Also, the further assertion of the senate that they already published such rules through their web page, in observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act was only viewed by the court as matter of evidence and still does not conforme with what the constitution propounded.In this regard the high court granted the petition for injunction preventing the senate to conduct such inquiry in aid of legislation.

Gregorio Honasan II petitioner vs.The Panel of Investigating ProsecutorsOf the Department of JusticeG.R.No. 159747April 13,2004

Lessons Applicable: Rule on Interpretative Regulations (persons), Powers of the Ombudsman (consti), concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation (consti)

Law Applicable: Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution, Art. 2 Civil Code

Facts:August 4, 2003: CIDG-PNP/P Director Edguardo Matillano filed an affidavit-complaint with the Department of Justice (DOJ) which contains the following in part:oJuly 27, 2003: crime of coup d etat was committed by military personnel who occupied Oakwood and Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan, IIoOn or about 11 p.m. June 4,2003: A meeting was held and presided by Senator Honasan in a house located in San Juan, Metro ManilaoEarly morning of July 27, 2003: Capt. Gerardo Gambala, in behalf of the military rebels occupying Oakwood, made a public statement aired on national television, stating their withdrawal of support to the chain of command of the AFP and the Government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Willing to risk their lives to achieve the NationalRecoveryAgenda (NRA) of Senator Honasan which they believe is the only program that would solve the ills of society.

Sworn statement of AFP Major Perfecto Ragil stated that:oJune 4, 2003 about 11 pm: Senator Gregorio Gringo Honasan arrived with Capt. Turinga to hold the NRP meeting where they concluded the use of force, violence and armed struggle to achievethe visionof NRP where a junta will be constituted which will run the new government. They had a blood compact and that he only participated due to the threat made by Senator Honasan when he said Kung kaya nating pumatay sa ating mga kalaban, kaya din nating pumatay sa mga kasamahang magtataksil.oJuly 27, 2003: He saw on TV that Lieutenant Antonio Trillanes, Captain Gerardo Gambala, Captain Alejano and some others who were present during the NRP meeting he attended, having a press conference about their occupation of the Oakwood Hotel. He saw that the letter "I" on the arm bands and the banner is the same letter "I" in the banner is the same as their blood compact wound.August 27, 2003: Senator Honasan appeared with counsel at the DOJ to file a a Motion for Clarification questioning DOJ's jurisdiction over the case since the imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office by a group of public officials with Salary Grade 31 which should be handled by the Office of the Ombudsman and the SandiganbayanSenator Honasan then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against the DOJ Panel and its members, CIDG-PNP-P/Director Eduardo Matillano and Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Panel in issuing the aforequoted Order of September 10, 2003 directing him to file his respective counter-affidavits and controverting evidence on the ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation

Issues:1. Whether in regards to Ombudsman-DOJ Circular no. 95-001, the office of the Ombudsman should deputize the prosecutors of the DOJ to conduct the preliminary investigation.2. Whether the Ombudsman-DOJ Joint Circular no. 95-001 is ineffective on the ground that it was not published3. Whether the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation because the petitioner is a public officer with salary grade 31 (Grade 27 or Higher) thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandigan Bayan.

Held: Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack ofmerit

1.No. Ombudsman cases involving criminaloffensesmay be subdivided into two classes, to wit: (1) those cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and (2) those falling under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. The difference between the two, aside from the category of the courts wherein they are filed, is on the authority to investigate as distinguished from the authority to prosecute The power to investigate or conduct a preliminary investigation on any Ombudsman case may be exercised by an investigator or prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman, or by any Provincial or City Prosecutor or their assistance, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman that it is just an internal agreement between the Ombudsman and the DOJ The Constitution, The Ombudsman Act of 1989, Administrative order no. 8 of the office of the Ombudsman. The prevailing jurisprudence and under the Revised Rules onCriminal Procedure, All recognize and uphold the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation on charges filed against publicofficersand employees. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ's authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case13 as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.

2.No.In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640 (1954). The only circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.In the case of Taada V. Tuvera, 146 Scra 453 (1986), The Honorable Court rules that:oInterpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so called letters of instructions issued by the administrative superiors concerning the rules onguidelinesto be followed by their subordinates in performance of their duties. OMB-DOJ Joint Circulars no. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and the office of the Ombudsman, Outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the office of the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. It does not regulate the conduct of persons or the public, in general.

3.No. Whether or not the offense is within exclusive jurisdiction or not will not resolve the present petition so as not to pre-empt the result of the investigation conducted by the DOJ Panel.

Republic vs Claude A. Miller and Jumrus E. MillerG.R. No. 125932. April 21, 1999

Facts:On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to adopt Michael Magno Madayag, a Filipino child, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt.The natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation.On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption.

On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens.

The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not aliens may be allowed to adopt a Filipino childwhen the petition for adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.

Held:

Yes.An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.

The enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. Vested rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.

As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance.

Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effectivity of the Family code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code.

Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to experience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent instincts. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.

Manuel vs People of the PhilippinesEDUARDO P. MANUEL, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondentG.R. No. 165842November 29, 2005

FACTS:This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting the petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first married to Rubylus Gaa on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandaleras knowledge of Manuels first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latters defense being that his declaration of single in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,000.00 for moral damages.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the petitioner but with modification on the RTCs decision. Imprisonment was from 2 years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was affirmed.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis in fact and in law.

RULINGS:1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. The court rules against the petitioner.2. The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages to be just and reasonable.