Civil procedures case digest

Copyright 2012 CD Technologies Asia, Inc. and Accesslaw, Inc. Philippine Law Encyclopedia 2012 1

I. Civil Procedure

Noli Alfonso, et al. vs. Sps. Henry and Liwanag Andres, G.R. No. 139611, October 4, 2002

Mariano L. Gumabon, et al. vs. Aquilino T. Larin, G.R. No. 142523, November 27, 2001

Tung Chin Hui vs. Rufus B. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 137571, September 21, 2000

William P. Chan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 138758, July 6, 2000

Perla S. Zulueta vs. Asia Brewery, G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001

General Provisions — Jurisdiction of Courts

The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over acontroversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by newlegislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to the ruleis where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate asto actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has noretroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of thestatute.

Lourdes E. Bengzon vs. Amado G. Inciong, G.R. No. L-48706, June 29, 1979

Latchme Motoomull, et al. vs. Joffre dela Paz, et al., G.R. No. L-45302, July 24, 1990

PNB vs. Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., G.R. No. 173615, October 16, 2009

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue ofsupervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courtsdecline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.

Renald F. Vilando vs. HRET, et al., G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011

The "moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade thecourts from resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if: (1) there isa grave violation of the Constitution; (2) there is an exceptional character of the situation and theparamount public interest is involved; (3) the constitutional issue raised requires formation ofcontrolling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (4) the case is capable ofrepetition yet evading review.

Rodolfo G. Navarro, et al. vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 180050, April 12, 2011


Courts will decide a question, otherwise moot and academic, if it is "capable of repetition, yetevading review." The question on Limkaichong's citizenship is likely to recur if she would runagain, as she did run, for public office, hence, capable of repetition.

Renald F. Vilando vs. HRET, et al., G.R. Nos. 192147 & 192149, August 23, 2011

It may also be pertinently stressed that "jurisdiction" is different from the "exercise ofjurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decisionrendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants andthe subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arising therefromis but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the exercise of itsjurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect its authority to decide the case,much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.

Bernabe L. Navida, et al. vs. Teodoro A. Dizon, Jr., et al., G.R. Nos. 125078, 125598, 126654,127856 &128398, May 30, 2011

The rule is that the active participation of the party against whom the action was brought, coupledwith his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the court or administrative body where the action ispending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by theresolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court or body'sjurisdiction.

Megan Sugar Corp. vs. RTC of Iloilo, Branch 68, et al., G.R. No. 170352, June 1, 2011, citing Marquezv. Secretary of Labor, 253 Phil. 329, 336 (1989)

The law governing jurisdiction is Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended byRepublic Act No. 7691 . . . Conformably with the provision, because an action for reconveyance orto remove a cloud on one's title involves the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interesttherein, exclusive original jurisdiction over such action pertained to the RTC, unless the assessedvalue of the property did not exceed P20,000.00 (in which instance the MTC having territorialjurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction). Determinative of which regular court hadjurisdiction would be the allegations of the complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and theprincipal relief thereby sought.

Heirs of Sps. Teofilo and Elisa Reterta vs. Sps. Lorenzo and Virginia Mores, G.R. No. 159941, August17, 2011

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversyinvolving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to itsresolution by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretionrequiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determinetechnical and intricate matters of fact.

Rosito Bagunu vs. Sps. Francisco & Rosenda Aggabao, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011

It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies


where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement ofthe claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed withinthe special competence of an administrative agency. In such a case, the court in which the claim issought to be enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to theadministrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly disadvantaged, dismiss thecase without prejudice.

Samar II Electric Coop., Inc., et al. vs. Ananias D. Seludo, Jr., G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012

Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of administrativeremedies. The Court, in a long line of cases, has held that before a party is allowed to seek theintervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he avail himself of all administrative processesafforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can be resorted to by givingthe administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction,then such remedy must be exhausted first before the court's power of judicial review can be sought.The premature resort to the court is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding ofwaiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for lack of cause of action.


The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal reasons.The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedierdisposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for reasons of comity andconvenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has beencompleted and complied with, so as to give the administrative agency concerned every opportunityto correct its error and dispose of the case.


True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies are subjectto certain exceptions, to wit: (a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking thedoctrine; (b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack ofjurisdiction; (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievablyprejudice the complainant; (d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the ruleimpractical and oppressive; (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately haveto be decided by the courts of justice; (f) where judicial intervention is urgent; (g) where theapplication of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable damage; (h) where the controverted actsviolate due process; (i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has beenrendered moot; (j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; (k) where strongpublic interest is involved; and (l) in quo warranto proceedings.


The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular courts'area of competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular courtswould have no power to conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given the public character of


the land, since under C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192, the disposition andmanagement of public lands fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subjectto review by the DENR Secretary.

While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose ofpublic land do not divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted byoccupants or applicants (to protect their respective possessions and occupations), the respondents'complaint-in-intervention does not simply raise the issue of possession — whether de jure or defacto — but likewise raised the issue of ownership as basis to recover possession.

Rosito Bagunu vs. Sps. Francisco & Rosenda Aggabao, G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011

Rule 1, Sec. 2 - In what courts applicable

The Rules of Court apply to all courts, except as otherwise provided by the Supreme Court.Regional Trial Courts are not precluded from conducting hearings on matters on which the partiesneed to be heard, even in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction. c d a s i a

Lamberto Casalla vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 138855, October 29, 2002

Rule 1, Sec. 3 - Cases governed

Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply to allactions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedurehave suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminalproceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering thatRule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reasonto apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.

Concepcion Cuenco Vda. De Manguerra, et al. vs. Raul Risos, et al., G.R. No. 152643, August 28, 2008

An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by thecourt or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite establishedrules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish thestatus or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadingsare required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is grantedgenerally upon an application or motion.

Patricia Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001


The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such adeclaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 RevisedRules of Court, a civil action is defined as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcementor protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding is "aremedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." It is then decisivelyclear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as thepetitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay, et al. vs. Roy S. Del Rosario, et al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999

It is axiomatic that the Rules of Court, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effectof law. More importantly, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, orcertain proceedings taken, are absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and theorderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict compliance with such rules is mandatoryand imperative. Only strong considerations of equity will lead us to allow an exception to theprocedural rule in the interest of substantial justice.

Minda Villamor vs. People of the Phil., G.R. Nos. 172110 & 181804, August 1, 2011

Rule 1, Sec. 4 - In what cases not applicable; suppletory character

It is true that Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules can be applied in a"suppletory character." Suppletory is defined as "supplying deficiencies." It means that theprovisions in the Rules of Court will be made to apply only where there is an insufficiency in theapplicable rule.

GSIS, et al. vs. Dinnah Villaviza, et al., G.R. No. 180291, July 27, 2010

It should be underscored that the nature of an election protest case differs from an ordinary civilaction. Because of this difference, the Rules of Civil Procedure on demurrer to evidence cannotapply to election cases even "by analogy or in a suppletory character," especially because theapplication of said Rules would not be "practicable and convenient."

Gelacio P. Gementiza vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 140884, March 6, 2001

The failure of the extant election laws to reproduce Section 218 of the Election Code of 1971does not mean that execution of judgment pending appeal is no longer available in election cases. Inelection contests involving elective municipal officials, which are cognizable by courts of generaljurisdiction; and those involving elective barangay officials, which are cognizable by courts oflimited jurisdiction, execution of judgment pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rulesof Court are permissible pursuant to Rule 143 of the Rules of Court, which is now Section 4, Rule 1of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.


Roberto D. Ramas, et al. vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 130831, February 10, 1998

Rule 1, Sec. 6 - Construction

Time and again, we have stressed that procedural rules do not exist for the convenience of thelitigants; the rules were established primarily to provide order to, and enhance the efficiency of, ourjudicial system. While procedural rules are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementaryperiods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays, and arenecessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. The timeliness of filing apleading is a jurisdictional caveat that even this Court cannot trifle with. Viewed in this light,procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may haveprejudiced a party's substantive rights; like all rules, they are required to be followed.

Francisco A. Labao vs. Lolito N. Flores, et al., G.R. No. 187984, November 15, 2010

However, there are recognized exceptions to the strict observance of procedural rules, such as:(1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice notcommensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of thedefaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) theexistence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirelyattributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lackof any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will notbe unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence withoutappellant's fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in thename of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exerciseof sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be aneffort on the part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanationfor his/her failure to comply with the rules.


Saint Louis University, Inc. vs. Evangeline C. Cobarrubias, G.R. No. 187104, August 3, 2010

The strict enforcement of the rules of procedure may be relaxed in exceptionally meritoriouscases. Whether a case involves an exceptionally meritorious circumstance can be tested under thefollowing guidelines: Aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant thesuspension of the Rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by theappellate court of the lower court's findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered arethe following: (a) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (b) the merits of the case,(c) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspensionof the rules, (d) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and


(e) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Arsenio Z. Locsin vs. Nissan Lease Phils. Inc., et al., G.R. No. 185567, October 20, 2010, citingSanchez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152766, June 20, 2003

Susan Fronda-Baggao vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 151785, December 10, 2007

Francisco Dee vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133542, January 29, 2004

Systems Factors Corp. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 143789, November 27, 2000

Public Estates Authority vs. Jose F. Caoibes, et al., G.R. No. 132426, August 19, 1999

Marcelino Tan, et al. vs. Jose Renato Lim, et al., G.R. No. 128004, September 29, 1998

Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Helen Bautista Ricafort, et al., G.R. No. 132007, August 5, 1998

While Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides for a liberal construction of the rules inorder to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of everyaction and proceeding, the same can not be used as a vehicle to ignore the Rules at will and atrandom to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and their justresolution.

Aneco Realty and Development Corp. vs. Landex Development Corp., G.R. No. 165952, July 28, 2008

Dee Hwa Liong Electronics Corp., et al. vs. Emelinda Papiona, G.R. No. 173127, October 17, 2007

Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146559, August 13, 2004

Section 6, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that rules shall be liberally construed inorder to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of everyaction and proceeding. Indeed, rules of procedure should be used to promote, not frustrate justice.

Roberto Lastimoso, et al. vs. Jose J. Asayo, G.R. No. 154243, December 4, 2007

Virginia Real vs. Sisenando H. Belo, G.R. No. 146224, January 26, 2007

Teresita B. Mendoza vs. Beth David, G.R. No. 147575, October 22, 2004

Ma. Teresa Vidal vs. Ma. Teresa O. Escueta, G.R. No. 156228, December 10, 2003

The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense and are used only tohelp secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aimwould be defeated. They should be liberally construed so that litigants can have ample opportunityto prove their claims and thus prevent a denial of justice due to technicalities.

Marcelo R. Soriano vs. Sps. Ricardo and Rosalina Galit, G.R. No. 156295, September 23, 2003

As expressed in Alberto vs. Court of Appeals, "(w)hat should guide judicial action is the principlethat a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint ordefense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. . . . (T)he rules ofprocedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict


and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promotesubstantial justice, must always be eschewed."

Rosa Yap Paras, et al. vs. Ismael O. Baldado, G.R. No. 140713, March 8, 2001

Medina Investigation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144074, March 20, 2001

Republic of the Phil. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003

Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice and, therefore, theyshould not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The exception is that, while the Rules areliberally construed, the provisions with respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfectingappeals are strictly applied. As an exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes beenrelaxed on equitable considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course toan appeal perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, butonly when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of equityjurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

Teodora Buenaflor, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 142021, November 29, 2000

Unity Fishing Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145415, February 2, 2001

It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to cases already pending at the time oftheir promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights doesnot preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactiveapplication of procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he isadversely affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a generalrule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.

Anita Cheng vs. Sps. William and Tessie Sy, G.R. No. 174238 July 7, 2009

We have indicated many times in the past that a primary factor in considering technical andprocedural objections is the nature of the issues involved. We have been strict when the issues aresolely confined to the parties' private interests and carry no massive ripple effects directly affectingthe public, but have viewed with liberality the technical and procedural threshold issues raised whengrave public interests are involved. Our liberality has even gone beyond the purely technical andprocedural where Court intervention has become imperative. Thus, we have recognized exceptionsto the threshold issues of ripeness and mootness of the petitions before us, as well as questions onlocus standi. We have also brushed aside procedural technicalities where the issues raised, becauseof the paramount public interest involved and their gravity, novelty or weight as precedents deservethe Court's attention and active intervention.

Liberal Party vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 191771, May 6, 2010

Indeed, we have relaxed the procedural technicalities introduced under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC inorder to serve substantial justice and safeguard strong public interest. . .

It is a well-settled principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the


attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tendto frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. In deciding a case, theappellate court has the discretion whether or not to dismiss the same, which discretion must beexercised soundly and in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, taking into account thecircumstances of the case. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excusea technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather thandispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impressionof speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.

Mid-Islands Power Generation Corp. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 189191, February 29, 2012 citing Tan v.Ballena, G.R. No. 168111, July 4, 2008

We cannot allow a patently wrong judgment to be implemented because of technical lapses. Thisratiocination is in keeping with the policy to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition ofevery action or proceeding.

Mangontawar M. Gubat vs. NAPOCOR, G.R. No. 167415, February 26, 2010

But while we have so ruled, we recognize nonetheless that the right to appeal is an essential partof our system of judicial processes, and courts should proceed with caution in order not to deprive aparty of the right to appeal. We invariably made this recognition due to our overriding concern thatevery party-litigant be given the amplest opportunity to ventilate and secure the resolution of hiscause, free from the constraints of technicalities. This line of rulings is based, no less, on the Rulesof Court which itself calls for a liberal construction of its provisions, with the objective of securingfor the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. In this lineof rulings, we have repeatedly stressed that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. The lawand jurisprudence grant to courts — in the exercise of their discretion along the lines laid down bythis Court — the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatorycharacter, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation speedily and theparties' right to an opportunity to be heard.

Sps. Heber and Charlita Edillo vs. Sps. Norberto and Desideria Dulpina, G.R. No. 188360, January 21,2010

Poverty cannot be used as an excuse to justify petitioners' complacency in allowing months topass by before exerting the required effort to find a replacement lawyer. Poverty is not ajustification for delaying a case. Both parties have a right to a speedy resolution of their case.

Noli Alfonso, et al. vs. Sps. Henry and Liwanag Andres, G.R. No. 166236, July 29, 2010

While the court has the power to relax procedural rules "for persuasive and weighty reasons," thisdoes not mean that "[they] are to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance mayhave prejudiced a party's substantive rights." Just like any other rule, "[procedural rules] arerequired to be followed except for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed."

Jovina Dabon Vda. de Mendez vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 174937, June 13, 2012


Rule 2 - Cause of Action

Conrado Pineda, et al. vs. Pedro T. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 143482, April 13, 2007

Rule 2, Sec. 1 - Ordinary civil actions, basis of

A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three essential elements of acause of action, namely:

(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;

(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and

(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these elements, the complaintbecomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action.Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a cause of action that is a ground for the dismissal of thecomplaint but the fact that the complaint states no cause of action. Failure to state a cause of actionmay be raised at the earliest stages of an action through a motion to dismiss, but lack of cause ofaction may be raised at any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of thestipulations, admissions, or evidence presented.

Dolores Adora Macaslang vs. Sps. Renato and Melba Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 2011

Failure to state a cause of action and lack of cause of action are really different from each other.On the one hand, failure to state a cause of action refers to the insufficiency of the pleading, and is aground for dismissal under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. On the other hand, lack of cause actionrefers to a situation where the evidence does not prove the cause of action alleged in the pleading.

Dolores Adora Macaslang vs. Sps. Renato and Melba Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 2011

Failure to state a cause of action is different from failure to prove a cause of action. The remedyin the first is to move for dismissal of the pleading, while the remedy in the second is to demur tothe evidence, hence reference to Sec. 5 of Rule 10 has been eliminated in this section. Theprocedure would consequently be to require the pleading to state a cause of action, by timelyobjection to its deficiency; or, at the trial, to file a demurrer to evidence, if such motion iswarranted.


Dolores Adora Macaslang vs. Sps. Renato and Melba Zamora, G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 2011, citingRegalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Volume 1, Ninth Revised Ed. (2005), p. 182

Rule 2, Sec. 2 - Cause of action, defined

A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. The essentialelements of a cause of action are: (a) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff; (b) acorrelative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and (c) an act or omission by suchdefendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damage to the plaintifffor which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from the defendant. Althoughthe first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upon the occurrence of the lastelement, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or otherappropriate relief.

Philip Turner, et al. vs. Lorenzo Shipping Corp., G.R. No. 157479, November 24, 2010

DBP vs. Silverio Q. Castillo, et al., G.R. No. 163827, August 17, 2011

With respect to identity of cause of action, a cause of action is defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of theRules of Court as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. This Court haslaid down the test in determining whether or not the causes of action in the first and second casesare identical, to wit: would the same evidence support and establish both the present and formercause of action? If so, the former recovery is a bar; if otherwise, it does not stand in the way of theformer action.

Goodland Co., Inc. vs. Asia United Bank, et al., G.R. Nos. 195546 & 195561, March 14, 2012

Subject to certain qualification, and except as otherwise provided by law, an action commencedbefore the cause of action has accrued is prematurely brought and should be dismissed. The fact thatthe cause of action accrues after the action is commenced and while the case is pending is of nomoment. It is a rule of law to which there is, perhaps no exception, either in law or in equity, that torecover at all there must be some cause of action at the commencement of the suit. There arereasons of public policy why there should be no needless haste in bringing up litigation, and whypeople who are in no default and against whom there is as yet no cause of action should not besummoned before the public tribunals to answer complaints which are groundless. An actionprematurely brought is a groundless suit. Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause ofaction at the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by theacquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and a supplemental complaint or anamendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not permissible.

Philip Turner, et al. vs. Lorenzo Shipping Corp., G.R. No. 157479, November 24, 2010, citing SurigaoMine Exploration Co., Inc. v. Harris, 68 Phil 113 (1939)


Section 2, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines a cause of action as the act oromission by which a party violates a right of another. A cause of action exists if the followingelements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever lawit arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not toviolate such right; and, (3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right ofthe plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which thelatter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.

Pioneer Concrete Phil., Inc., et al. vs. Antonio D. Todaro, G.R. No. 154830, June 8, 2007

Kenneth O. Nadela vs. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 149627, September 18, 2003

Progressive Devt. Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123555, January 22, 1999

Rule 2, Sec. 4 - Splitting a single cause of action; effect of

(Section 4 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court) proscribes a party from dividing a single or indivisiblecause of action into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions based on it.

Ernesto C. Del Rosario, et al. vs. Far East Bank and Trust Company, et al., G.R. No. 150134, October31, 2007

Splitting a single cause of action consists in dividing a single or indivisible cause of action intoseveral parts or claims and instituting two or more actions therein. A single cause of action or entireclaim or demand cannot be split up or divided so as to be made the subject of two or more differentactions.

A single act or omission may be violative of various rights at the same time, such as when the actconstitutes a violation of separate and distinct legal obligations. The violation of each of these rightsis a cause of action in itself. However, if only one right may be violated by several acts oromissions, there would only be one cause of action. Otherwise stated, if two separate and distinctprimary rights are violated by one and the same wrong; or if the single primary right should beviolated by two distinct and separate legal wrongs; or when the two primary rights are each brokenby a separate and distinct wrongs; in either case, two causes of action would result. Causes of actionwhich are distinct and independent, although arising out of the same contract, transaction or state offact may be sued separately, recovery on one being no bar to subsequent actions on the others.

Isidro Perez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157616, July 22, 2005

A claim cannot be divided in such a way that a part of the amount of damages may be recoveredin one case and the rest, in another. The rule was aimed at preventing repeated litigations betweenthe same parties in regard to the same subject of the controversy and to protect the defendant from


unnecessary vexation. Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa.


Bank of America vs. American Realty Corp., G.R. No. 133876, December 29, 1999

If a party-litigant splits his single cause of action, the other action or actions filed may bedismissed by invoking litis pendentia, pursuant to Sec. 1(e), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure. This is in relation to Section 4, Rule 2 which provides for the cause and effect of thispractice.

As a general rule, therefore, the second case filed should be abated under the priority and timerule, for this is a declaration of public policy against multiplicity of suits.

Dasmariñas Village Assn. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127276, December 3, 1998

Rule 2, Sec. 5 - Joinder of causes of action

United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Sps. Samuel and Odette Beluso, G.R. No. 159912, August 17, 2007

Well-settled is the rule that since a cause of action requires, as essential elements, not only a legalright of the plaintiff and a correlative duty of the defendant but also "an act or omission of thedefendant in violation of said legal right," the cause of action does not accrue until the partyobligated refuses, expressly or impliedly, to comply with its duty.

It bears stressing that it is only when the last element occurs that a cause of action arises.Accordingly, a cause of action on a written contract accrues only when an actual breach or violationthereof occurs.

China Banking Corp vs. CA, G.R. No. 153267, June 23, 2005

The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action which are joined accrue infavor of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties isinvolved. The issue of whether respondents' claims shall be lumped together is determined byparagraph (d) of the above provision. This paragraph embodies the "totality rule" as exemplified bySection 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 which states, among others, that "where there are several claims orcauses of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amountof the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whetherthe causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions."

Pantranco vs. Standard Insurance, G.R. No. 140746, March 16, 2005

Multiplicity of suits should be avoided if the filing of a separate and independent action torecover a claim would entail proving exactly the same claim in an existing action. It can not


however, be avoided when the cause of action in the two complaints are distinct and separate fromeach other.

Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81024, February 3, 2000

Manuel Silvestre Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 111715 & 112876, June 8, 2000

Rule 3, Sec. 1 - Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant

Gloria Santos Dueñas vs. Santos Subdivision Homeowners Asso., G.R. No. 149417, June 4, 2004

Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Solidbank Corp., G.R. No. 134049, June 17, 2004

Parties may be either plaintiffs or defendants. The plaintiff in an action is the party complaining,and a proper party plaintiff is essential to confer jurisdiction on the court. In order to maintain anaction in a court of justice, the plaintiff must have an actual legal existence, that is, he, she or itmust be a person in law and possessed of a legal entity as either a natural or an artificial person, andno suit can be lawfully prosecuted save in the name of such a person. 05plpe

The rule is no different as regards party defendants. It is incumbent upon a plaintiff, when heinstitutes a judicial proceeding, to name the proper party defendant to his cause of action. In a suitor proceeding in personam of an adversary character, the court can acquire no jurisdiction for thepurpose of trial or judgment until a party defendant who actually or legally exists and is legallycapable of being sued, is brought before it. It has even been held that the question of the legalpersonality of a party defendant is a question of substance going to the jurisdiction of the court andnot one of procedure.

Sulpicia Ventura vs. Francis J. Militante, et al., G.R. No. 63145, October 5, 1999

There can be no legal duel in court when the one who demands satisfaction from the allegedoffender is not even the offended party.

Stefan Tito Miñoza vs. Cesar Tomas Lopez, et al., G.R. No. 170914, April 13, 2011

Rule 3, Sec. 2 - Parties in interest

Speed Distributing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149351, March 17, 2004

The afore-quoted rule (Section 2, Rule 3) has two requirements: 1) to institute an action, theplaintiff must be the real party in interest; and 2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of thereal party in interest. Necessarily, the purposes of this provision are 1) to prevent the prosecution of


actions by persons without any right or title to or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actualparty entitled to legal relief be the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and4) to discourage litigation and keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy.

Jose Max S. Ortiz vs. San Miguel Corporation, G.R. Nos. 151983-84, July 31, 2008

Sps. Anthony and Percita Oco vs. Victor Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006

The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by thejudgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. The word "interest", as contemplated by the Rules,means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by the judgment, as distinguishedfrom mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Stated differently, the rulerefers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future,contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interestto protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action.

Jose Max Ortiz vs. San Miguel Corp., G.R. Nos. 151983-84, July 31, 2008

The rules of court define a real party-in-interest as "the party who stands to be benefited orinjured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Every action,therefore, can only be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest.

Celestial Nickel Mining Exploration Corp. vs. Macroasia Corp., G.R. Nos. 169080, 172936, 176226 &176319, December 19, 2007

Rule 3, Section 2, of the Rules of Court provides explicitly that every action must be prosecutedand defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.

Eduardo L. Rayo vs. Metropolitan Bank, et al., G.R. No. 165142, December 10, 2007

In Re: Reversion / Recall of Reconstituted Titles in Tarlac Registry of Deeds, G.R. No. 171304, October10, 2007

This provision has two requirements: 1) to institute an action, the plaintiff must be the real partyin interest; and 2) the action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.Necessarily, the purposes of this provision are 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by personswithout any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal reliefbe the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage litigationand keep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy.

Interest within the meaning of the Rules means material interest or an interest in issue to beaffected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about thequestion involved. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of thecourt as the plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case isdismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.

Rural Bankers Association of the Phil. vs. Ma. Rosario Tanghal-Salvana, G.R. No. 175020, October 4,2007


Sps. Anthony and Percita Oco vs. Victor Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006

Real party-in-interest is a concept in civil procedure and is expressly defined in the Rules ofCourt.

Leah M. Nazareno, et al. vs. City of Dumaguete, et al., G.R. No. 168484, July 12, 2007

Joel G. Miranda vs. Antonio C. Carreon, G.R. No. 143540, April 11, 2003

According to Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, a real party-in-interest is the party whostands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of thesuit.

Samahang Magsasasaka ng 53 Hektarya vs. Wilfredo G. Mosquera, et al., G.R. No. 152430, March 22,2007

The established rule is that a real party in interest is one who would be benefited or injured by thejudgment, or one entitled to the avails of the suit. The word "interest," as contemplated by the Rules,means material interest or an interest in issue and to be affected by the judgment, as distinguishedfrom mere interest in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Stated differently, the rulerefers to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future,contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who has no right or interestto protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action.

Mayor Dagadag vs. Tongnawa, G.R. No. 161166-67, February 3, 2005

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by thedecree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or afuture, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a realparty-in-interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present realowner of the right sought to be enforced."

Stefan Tito Miñoza vs. Cesar Tomas Lopez, et al., G.R. No. 170914, April 13, 2011

The party-in-interest applies not only to the plaintiff but also to the defendant. "Interest" withinthe meaning of the rules means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decreeas distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. A realparty in interest is one who has a legal right. Since a contract may be violated only by the partiesthereto as against each other, in an action upon that contract, the real parties-in-interest, either asplaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to the said contract. The action must be brought by theperson who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.

Ma. Teresa Vidal, et al. vs. Ma. Teresa O. Escueta, G.R. No. 156228, December 10, 2003

"Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to beaffected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mereincidental interest. This means that the action must be brought by the person who, by substantive


law, possesses the right sought to be enforced.

Alvin Tan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127210, August 7, 2003

Even as a taxpayer, petitioner does not stand "to be benefited or injured by the judgment of thesuit." Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts doneby the government. It bears stressing that "a taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the actcomplained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds from taxation."

Joel G. Miranda vs. Antonio C. Carreon, et al., G.R. No. 143540, April 11, 2003

To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will sustain a"direct injury" as a result of a government action, or have a "material interest" in the issue affectedby the challenged official act. However, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locusstandi requirements and has accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or withmaterial interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a constitutional issue ofcritical significance is at stake. The rule on locus standi is after all a mere procedural technicality inrelation to which the Court, in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import, haswaived, or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers,voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been personally injuredby the operation of a law or any other government act.

Dennis A. B. Funa vs. Reynaldo A. Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

The Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called "non-traditional suitors" may beextended standing to sue, thusly:

1) For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds orthat the tax measure is unconstitutional;

2) For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of theelection law in question;

3) For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are oftranscendental importance which must be settled early; and

4) For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained ofinfringes their prerogatives as legislators.

Dennis A. B. Funa vs. Reynaldo A. Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012 citing David v.Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. Nos. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400, 171489 & 171424, May 3,2006

Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, a real party in interest is defined as "theparty who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to theavails of the suit." "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an interest inissue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved,or a mere incidental interest. The interest of the party must also be personal and not one based on a


desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and unrelated party. Real interest, on theother hand, means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or afuture, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.

VSC Commercial Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121159, December 16, 2002

A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in thesuit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. And by real interest is meant a present substantialinterest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate orconsequential interest.

Shipside Incorporated vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001

Rule 3, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action "must beprosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest." This means that the action mustbe brought by the person who, by substantive law, possesses the right sought to be enforced and notnecessarily the person who will ultimately benefit from the recovery.

Gilda C. Lim vs. Patricia Lim-Yu, G.R. No. 138343, February 19, 2001

Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Universal International Group of Taiwan, G.R. No. 131680,September 14, 2000

Eliseo Fajardo, Jr. vs. Freedom to Build, G.R. No. 134692, August 1, 2000

Teofista Babiera vs. Presentacion B. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000

Philippine Trust Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124658, December 15, 1999

Any decision rendered against a person who is not a real party in interest in the case cannot beexecuted. Hence, a complaint filed against such a person should be dismissed for failure to state acause of action.

Alfredo N. Aguila vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127347, November 25, 1999

If the suit is not brought in the name of or against the real party in interest, a motion to dismissmay be filed on the ground that the Complaint states no cause of action (Sec. 1(g), Rule 16).

Eduardo Balagtas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109073, October 20, 1999

By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy ora future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.

Emiliano R. "Boy" Caruncho III vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 135996, September 30, 1999

Clearly, a suit filed by a person who is not a party in interest must be dismissed.

Angela C. Tankiko, et al. vs. Justiniano Cezar, et. al., G.R. No. 131277, February 2, 1999

The purposes of this provision are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions by persons without


any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be theone to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage litigation andkeep it within certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy

Allan C. Go vs. Mortimer F. Cordero, G.R. No. 164703, May 4, 2010

A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof that the plaintiff is not the realparty-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.


A taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed, orthat the public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of publicfunds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer,however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of publicfunds derived from taxation. He must also prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing theillegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he will sustain a direct injury because of theenforcement of the questioned statute or contract. In other words, for a taxpayer's suit to prosper,two requisites must be met: (1) public funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a politicalsubdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is violated or some irregularity is committedand (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act. In light of the foregoing, it is apparentthat contrary to the view of the RTC, a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge itsvalidity. As long as taxes are involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by thegovernment.

Manuel N. Mamba, et al. vs. Edgar R. Lara, et al., G.R. No. 165109, December 14, 2009

[L]egal standing in suits is governed by the "real parties-in-interest" rule under Section 2, Rule 3of the Rules of Court. This states that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name ofthe real party-in-interest." And "real party-in-interest" is one who stands to be benefited or injuredby the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. In other words, the plaintiff'sstanding is based on his own right to the relief sought.

Jose L. Atienza, et al. vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 188920, February 16, 2010 citing David v.Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Anent locus standi, "the rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have apersonal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustained, directinjury as a result of its enforcement. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges"such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adversenesswhich sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illuminationof difficult constitutional questions." In public suits, the plaintiff, representing the general public,asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action. The plaintiff may be a personwho is affected no differently from any other person, and could be suing as a "stranger," or as a"citizen" or "taxpayer." Thus, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that publicfunds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that


public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. Of greaterimport than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal woundinflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.

Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and Management, et al., G.R. No.164987, April 24, 2012

In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack theconstitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also

taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised bytaxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure ofpublic moneys.

Lawyers against Monopoly and Poverty vs. Secretary of Budget and Management, et al., G.R. No.164987, April 24, 2012 citing Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331, 342-343 (1960)

Rule 3, Sec. 3 - Representatives as parties

Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring thesuit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lackof advertence to the heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3 and Section2, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan vs. Young, this Court recognized thelegal standing of the heirs to represent the rights and properties of the decedent under administrationpending the appointment of an administrator.

Teodora A. Rioferio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129008, January 13, 2004

For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances recognizedthe heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administratorappointed by the court.

Virginia O. Gochan vs. Richard G. Young, G.R. No. 131889, March 12, 2001

Rule 3, Sec. 6 - Permissive joinder of parties

Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division) and People of the Philippines, G.R. No.148560, November 19, 2001


Rule 3, Sec. 7 - Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties

Ma. Valentina Santana-Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120176, July 20, 2001

Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interestwithout whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined eitheras plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civilaction requires, of course, the joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of allindispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for theexercise of judicial power.

Victoria Regner vs. Cynthia R. Logarta, et al., G.R. No. 168747, October 19, 2007

Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, defines indispensable parties as parties-in-interestwithout whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined eitheras plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civilaction requires the joinder of all necessary parties where possible and the joinder of allindispensable parties under any and all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non for theexercise of judicial power.

Simplicio Galicia, et al. vs. Lourdes Manliquez, et al., G.R. No. 155785, April 13, 2007

Marcelino Arcelona vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102900, October 2, 1997

An indispensable party has been defined as one: [who] must have a direct interest in thelitigation; and if this interest is such that it cannot be separated from that of the parties to the suit, ifthe court cannot render justice between the parties in his absence, if the decree will have aninjurious effect upon his interest, or if the final determination of the controversy in his absence willbe inconsistent with equity and good conscience.

There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded the plaintiffwithout the presence of the other party? and (2) can the case be decided on its merits withoutprejudicing the rights of the other party? There is, however, no fixed formula for determining whois an indispensable party; this can only be determined in the context and by the facts of theparticular suit or litigation.

Speed Distributing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 149351, March 17, 2004

Andrea D. Domingo vs. Herbert Markus Emil Scheer, G.R. No. 154745, January 29, 2004

Drianita Bagaoisan, et al. vs. National Tobacco Administration, G.R. No. 152845, August 5, 2003


A person who is not a party to an action may be impleaded by the defendant either on the basis ofliability to himself or on the ground of direct liability to the plaintiff.


China Banking Corporation vs. Mercedes M. Oliver, G.R. No. 135796, October 3, 2002

It is clear that the presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court withjurisdiction, which is "the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case." Theabsence of indispensable parties renders all subsequent actuations of the court null and void,because of that court's want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to thosepresent. 05plpe

Rebecca T. Cabutihan vs. Landcenter Construction & Development Corp., G.R. No. 146594, June 10,2002

Metropolitan Bank vs. Floro T. Alejo, G.R. No. 141970, September 10, 2001

Rule 3, Section 7 of the Rules of Court defines indispensable parties as those who are parties ininterest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. They are those parties whopossess such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights,so that the courts cannot proceed without their presence. A party is indispensable if his interest inthe subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought is inextricably intertwined with the otherparties' interest.

Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., et al. vs. Catalino U. Villamater, et al., G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010

Rule 3, Sec. 8 - Necessary party


Rule 3, Sec. 9 - Non-joinder of necessary parties to be pleaded

The rule is settled that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissalof an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may beadded by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the actionand/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an indispensable party despite theorder of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff's/petitioner's failureto comply therewith.

Rene B. Pascual vs. Jaime M. Robles, G.R. No. 182645, December 15, 2010

Heirs of Jose B.L. Reyes vs. Justice Demetrio G. Demetria, A.M. No. CA-01-32, January 23, 2002


The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At anystage of a judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion ofa party or on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead anindispensable party despite the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for theplaintiff's failure to comply with the order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to beindispensable.

Pamplona Plantation Co. vs. Tinghel, G.R. No. 159121, February 3, 2005

Rule 3, Sec. 10 - Unwilling co-plaintiff

Ramon Ramos vs. Heirs of Honorio Ramos, Sr., G.R. No. 140848, April 25, 2002

Rule 3, Sec. 11 - Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties

Union Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131729, May 19, 1998

Ma. Linda T. Almendras vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110067, August 3, 1998

Sps. Eligio and Marcelina Mallari vs. Ignacio Arcega, et al., G.R. No. 106615, March 20, 2002


Mabayo Farms vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140058, August 1, 2002

China Banking Corporation vs. Mercedes M. Oliver, G.R. No. 135796, October 3, 2002


Under Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is aground for the dismissal of an action, thus:

The proper remedy is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court,either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of the indispensableparty or give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint in order to include indispensableparties. If the plaintiff ordered to include the indispensable party refuses to comply with the order ofthe court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's ownmotion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include or to amend is theaction dismissed.


Leonis Navigation Co., Inc., et al. vs. Catalino U. Villamater, et al., G.R. No. 179169, March 3, 2010

Misjoinder of parties does not warrant the dismissal of the action.

Littie Sarah a. Agdeppa, et al. vs. Heirs of Ignacio Bonete, G.R. No. 164436, January 15, 2010

Failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. In such acase, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added byorder of the court, on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or

such times as are just. If the petitioner/plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party

despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for thepetitioner's/plaintiff's failure to comply.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Mamindiara P. Mangotara, et al., G.R. Nos. 170375, 170505, 173355-56,173401, 173563-64, 178779 & 178894, July 7, 2010, citing Vda. De Manguerra v. Risos, G.R. No.152643, August 28, 2008

Rule 3, Sec. 12 - Class suit

In order that a class suit may prosper, Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires theconcurrence of three (3) essential elements, namely: (1) that the subject matter of the controversy isone of common or general interest to many persons; (2) that the parties are so numerous that it isimpracticable to bring them all before the court; and (3) that the action be maintained by parties whowill fairly and adequately represent the class.

MVRS Publications vs. Islamic Da'wah Council, G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003

Rule 3, Sec. 16 - Death of party; duty of counsel

Ramon A. Gonzales vs. Phil. Amusement and Gaming Corp., et al., G.R. No. 144891, May 27, 2004

Asuncion Macias, et al. vs. Mariano Lim, et al., G.R. No. 139284, June 4, 2004

City Sheriff, et al. vs. Alfaro Fortunado, et al., G.R. No. 80390, March 27, 1998

Ang Kek Chen vs. Amalia R. Andrade, AM RTJ-99-1504, November 16, 1999

Maria Mercedes Nery, et al. vs. Gabriel Leyson, et al., G.R. No. 139306, August 29, 2000

The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to thelitigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigant is herself or himself


protected as he/she continues to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legalrepresentative of his estate.

Antonio C. Sumaljag vs. Sps. Diosdidit and Menendez M. Literato, et al., G.R. No. 149787, June 18,2008

Failure of a counsel to comply with the Section 16 of Rule 3 is a ground for disciplinary action.

Crisologo C. Domingo vs. Severino Landicho, et al., G.R. No. 170015, August 29, 2007

Rule 3, Section 16 is the rule on substitution in the Rules of Court. This rule allows substitutionby a legal representative. It can be gleaned from the citation of this rule that movant/intervenorseeks to appear before this Tribunal as the legal representative/substitute of the late protestantprescribed by said Section 16. However, in our application of this rule to an election contest, wehave every time ruled that a public office is personal to the public officer and not a propertytransmissible to the heirs upon death. Thus, we consistently rejected substitution by the widow orthe heirs in election contests where the protestant dies during the pendency of the protest.

In Vda. de De Mesa v. Mencias, we recognized substitution upon the death of the protestee butdenied substitution by the widow or heirs since they are not the real parties in interest. Similarly, inthe later case of De la Victoria v. Commission on Elections, we struck down the claim of thesurviving spouse and children of the protestee to the contested office for the same reason. Even inanalogous cases before other electoral tribunals, involving substitution by the widow of a deceasedprotestant, in cases where the widow is not a real party in interest, we denied substitution by thewife or heirs.

Ronald Allan Poe vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, P.E.T. Case No. 002, March 29, 2005

The death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in filing a Notice ofAppeal, petitioner's counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf of the already deceasedclient who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party after his death. The trial court'sdecision had thereby become final and executory, no appeal having been perfected.

Domingo Carabeo vs. Sps. Norberto and Susan Dingco, G.R. No. 190823, April 4, 2011

The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and thedamage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of] affects primarilyand principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, whilein the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the propertyand rights of property affected being incidental.

Domingo Carabeo vs. Sps. Norberto and Susan Dingco, G.R. No. 190823, April 4, 2011, citing Bonilla v.Barcena, G.R. No. L-41715, June 18, 1976


Rule 3, Sec. 19 - Transfer of interest

State Investment House vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106795, November 16, 1999


Section 19 of Rule 3 of Rules of Court uses the word "may" to denote that the substitution ofparties on account of transfer of interest from the original party to another is discretionary.

Intestate Estate of the Late Nimfa Sian vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 168882, January 31, 2007

Rule 3, Sec. 20 - Action on contractual money claims

Vivencio M. Ruiz, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 116909, February 25, 1999

Purita Alipio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134100, September 29, 2000

Natalia Realty vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126462, November 12, 2002

Melencio Gabriel vs. Nelson Bilon, et al., G.R. No. 146989, February 7, 2007

Rule 3, Sec. 21 - Indigent party

Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., et al. vs. Jorge Valdez, G.R. Nos. 150107 & 150108, January28, 2008

Teofilo Martinez vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 132852, May 31, 2000

Rule 3, Sec. 22 - Notice to the Solicitor General

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. La Suerte Cigar, G.R. No. 144942, June 28, 2001

Rule 4 - Venue of Actions


While stipulations regarding venue are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in acontract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules ofCourt in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words.

Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc., et al. vs. Klaus K. Schonfeld. G.R. No. 166920, February 19,2007

Rule 4, Sec. 1 - Venue of real actions

Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue ofvenue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions)shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area wherethe real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall becommenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffsresides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides.

Generosa Almeda Latorre vs. Luis Esteban Latorre, G.R. No. 183926, March 29, 2010

A real action, under Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, is one that affects title to or possessionof real property, or an interest therein. Such actions should be commenced and tried in the propercourt which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, issituated. All other actions are personal and may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or anyof the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Yahya M. Tomawis vs. Rasad G. Balindong, et al. G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010 citing Orbeta v.Orbeta, G.R. No. 166837, November 27, 2006

Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties thereto when thesuit relates to breach of the said contract. But where the exclusivity clause does not make itnecessarily all encompassing, such that even those not related to the enforcement of the contractshould be subject to the exclusive venue, the stipulation designating exclusive venues should bestrictly confined to the specific undertaking or agreement. Otherwise, the basic principles offreedom to contract might work to the great disadvantage of a weak party-suitor who ought to beallowed free access to courts of justice.

Restrictive stipulations are in derogation of the general policy of making it more convenient forthe parties to institute actions arising from or in relation to their agreements. Thus, the restrictionshould be strictly construed as relating solely to the agreement for which the exclusive venuestipulation is embodied. Expanding the scope of such limitation on a contracting party will createunwarranted restrictions which the parties might find unintended or worse, arbitrary and oppressive.


Moreover, since convenience is the raison d'etre of the rules on venue, venue stipulation shouldbe deemed merely permissive, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves theparties' convenience. Contrawise, the rules mandated by the Rules of Court should govern.

SMC vs. Monasterio, G.R. No. 151037, June 30, 2005

By express provision of Section 417 of the LGC, an action for the enforcement of the settlementshould be instituted in the proper municipal or city court. This is regardless of the nature of thecomplaint before the Lupon, and the relief prayed for therein. The venue for such actions isgoverned by Rule 4, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. An action for theenforcement of a settlement is not one of those covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure in civilcases; hence, the rules on regular procedure shall apply, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 5 of theRules of Civil Procedure, as amended.


Real actions, as so opposed to personal actions, are those which affect the title to or possession ofreal property. Where a contrary claim to ownership is made by an adverse party, and where therelief prayed for cannot be granted without the court deciding on the merits the issue of ownershipand title, more specifically so as to who, between the contending parties, would have a better rightto the property, the case can only be but a real action.



Atlantic Erectors vs. Herbal Cove, G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003

Rule 4, Sec. 2 - Venue of personal actions

Sections 1 and 2, Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide an answer to the issue ofvenue. Actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions)shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area wherethe real property is situated. On the other hand, all other actions (personal actions) shall becommenced and tried in the proper courts where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffsresides or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides.

Generosa Almeda Latorre vs. Luis Esteban Latorre, G.R. No. 183926, March 29, 2010

A real action, under Sec. 1, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, is one that affects title to or possessionof real property, or an interest therein. Such actions should be commenced and tried in the propercourt which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is


situated. All other actions are personal and may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or anyof the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides,or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.

Yahya M. Tomawis vs. Rasad G. Balindong, et al. G.R. No. 182434, March 5, 2010 citing Orbeta v.Orbeta, G.R. No. 166837,November 27, 2006

The general rule on the venue of personal actions, as in a case for damages, is embodied inSection 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court… The rule, however, finds no application where the parties,before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue.

Auction in Malinta, Inc. vs. Warren Embes Luyaben, G.R. No. 173979, February 12, 2007

Uniwide Holdings, Inc. vs. Alexander M. Cruz, G.R. No. 171456, August 9, 2007

The choice of venue for personal actions cognizable by the RTC is given to plaintiff but not toplaintiff's caprice because the matter is regulated by the Rules of Court. The rule on venue, likeother procedural rules, is designed to insure a just and orderly administration of justice, or theimpartial and evenhanded determination of every action and proceeding. The option of plaintiff inpersonal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place where defendant resides or may be found,or the place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.

Aniceto Saludo, Jr. vs. American Express Int'l Inc, G.R. No. 159507, April 19, 2006

An action for damages being a personal action, venue is determined pursuant to Rule 4, section 2of the Rules of Court.

Davao Light vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111685, August 20, 2001



Anita Mangila vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 125027, August 12, 2002

Atlantic Erectors vs. Herbal Cove, G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003

Rule 4, Sec. 4 - When Rule not applicable

Section 2 of Rule 4 is, however, qualified by Section 4 of the same rule which allows parties,before the filing of the action, to validly agree in writing on an exclusive venue.

Uniwide Holdings, Inc. vs. Alexander M. Cruz, G.R. No. 171456, August 9, 2007

The Rules of Court provide that parties to an action may agree in writing on the venue on which


an action should be brought. However, a mere stipulation on the venue of an action is not enough topreclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that suchstipulation is exclusive. Thus, absent words that show the parties' intention to restrict the filing of asuit in a particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any venue, as long as jurisdictionalrequirements are followed. Venue stipulations in a contract, while considered valid and enforceable,do not as a rule supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. In theabsence of qualifying or restrictive words, they should be considered merely as an agreement onadditional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.


Rule 5 - Uniform Procedure in Trial Courts

Sps. Michaelangelo and Grace Mesina vs. Humberto D. Meer, G.R. No. 146845, July 2, 2002

Rule 5, Sec. 1 - Uniform procedure


Rule 6, Sec. 5 - Defenses

Reynaldo T. Cometa vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124062, January 21, 1999

Alibi is indeed a good defense and could certainly exculpate a person accused of a crime.However, this is true only if the accused's alibi strictly meets the following requisites:

1. His presence at another place at the time of the commission of the crime; and

2. The physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.

People of the Phil. vs. Cleofe V. Baroquillo, et al., G.R. No. 184960, August 24, 2011

This Court has ruled consistently that alibi is an inherently weak defense and should be rejectedwhen the identity of the accused is sufficiently and positively established by the prosecution.Moreover, for alibi to overcome the prosecution's evidence, the defense must successfully prove theelement of physical impossibility of the accused's presence at the crime scene at the time of the


perpetration of the offense. Physical impossibility in relation to alibi takes into consideration notonly the geographical distance between the scene of the crime and the place where accusedmaintains he was, but more importantly, the accessibility between these points. . . . By physicalimpossibility, we refer to the distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and theplace where he says he was when the crime was committed.

People of the Phil. vs. Cleofe V. Baroquillo, et al., G.R. No. 184960, August 24, 2011, citing People vs.Bihag, Jr. and Hilot, 396 Phil. 289 (2000)

It is well-settled that since alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevailover and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accusedperpetrated the crime.

People of the Phil. vs. Cleofe V. Baroquillo, et al., G.R. No. 184960, August 24, 2011, citing People vs.Bihag, Jr. and Hilot, 396 Phil. 289 (2000)

Jurisprudential rules and precepts guide this Court in assessing the proffered defense. One, alibisand denials are generally disfavored by the courts for being weak. Two, they cannot prevail over thepositive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. Three, for alibi to prosper, theaccused must prove not only that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed, butalso that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time of itscommission. Fourth, alibi assumes significance or strength only when it is amply corroborated bycredible and disinterested witnesses. Fifth, alibi is an issue of fact that hinges on the credibility ofwitnesses, and the assessment made by the trial court — unless patently and clearly inconsistent —must be accepted.

People of the Phil. vs. Juanito Apattad, G.R. No. 193188, August 10, 2011, citing People vs. Estoya,G.R. No. 153538, May 19, 2004

Alibi becomes more unworthy of merit where it is established mainly by the accused himself andhis or her relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms and not by credible persons.

Victor Rondina vs. People of the Phil., G.R. No. 179059, June 13, 2012 citing People v. Alfredo, G.R.No. 188560, December 15, 2010

In light of the positive identification of appellant by the prosecution witnesses and since no illmotive on their part or on that of their families was shown that could have made either of theminstitute the case against the appellant and falsely implicate him in a serious crime he did notcommit, appellant's defense of alibi must necessarily fail. It is settled in this jurisdiction that thedefense of alibi, being inherently weak, cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification ofthe accused as the perpetrator of the crime.

People of the Phil. vs. Francisca Talaro, et al., G.R. No. 175781, March 20, 2012 citing People vs.Molina, G.R. No. 184173, March 13, 2009

It is elementary that the defense of denial is outweighed by a positive identification that iscategorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying onthe matter. Denial, like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and


self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.

People of the Phil. vs. Antonio L. Baldomar, G.R. No. 197043, February 29, 2012

Rule 6, Sec. 6 - Counterclaim

Felipe Yulienco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131692, June 10, 1999

A counterclaim is any claim which a defending party may have against an opposing party. Itpartakes of the nature of a complaint or cause of action against the plaintiff. It is an independentaction, separate and distinct from the original complaint.

Johnny K. Lima, et al. vs. Transway Sales Corp., et al, G.R. No. 106770, October 22, 1999

Rule 6, Sec. 7 - Compulsory counterclaim

A counterclaim is compulsory when its object "arises out of or is necessarily connected with thetransaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does notrequire for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquirejurisdiction".

Premiere Development Bank vs. Alfredo C. Flores, et al., G.R. No. 175339, December 16, 2008

Administrative Circular No. 04-94 does not apply to compulsory counterclaims. The circularapplies to initiatory and similar pleadings. A compulsory counterclaim set up in the answer is not an"initiatory" or similar pleading. The initiatory pleading is the plaintiff's complaint. A respondent hasno choice but to raise a compulsory counterclaim the moment the plaintiff files the complaint.Otherwise, respondent waives the compulsory counterclaim. In short, the compulsory counterclaimis a reaction or response, mandatory upon pain of waiver, to an initiatory pleading which is thecomplaint.

Estherlita Cruz-Agana vs. Aurora Santiago-Lagman, et al., G.R. No. 139018, April 11, 2005

A compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of a separate action but it should instead beasserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence, which gave rise to it. Todetermine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, we have devised the following tests: (1)Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Wouldres judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3)Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendant'scounterclaim? and (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?


Affirmative answers to the above queries indicate the existence of a compulsory counterclaim.

A compulsory counterclaim is auxiliary to the proceeding in the original suit and derives itsjurisdictional support therefrom. A counterclaim presupposes the existence of a claim against theparty filing the counterclaim. Hence, where there is no claim against the counterclaimant, thecounterclaim is improper and it must dismissed, more so where the complaint is dismissed at theinstance of the counterclaimant. In other words, if the dismissal of the main action results in thedismissal of the counterclaim already filed, it stands to reason that the filing of a motion to dismissthe complaint is an implied waiver of the compulsory counterclaim because the grant of the motionultimately results in the dismissal of the counterclaim.

Thus, the filing of a motion to dismiss and the setting up of a compulsory counterclaim areincompatible remedies. In the event that a defending party has a ground for dismissal and acompulsory counterclaim at the same time, he must choose only one remedy. If he decides to file amotion to dismiss, he will lose his compulsory counterclaim. But if he opts to set up his compulsorycounterclaim, he may still plead his ground for dismissal as an affirmative defense in his answer.

Financial Building Corp. vs. Forbes Park Association, G.R. No. 133119, August 17, 2000

A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a defending party mayhave against an opposing party. A counterclaim is compulsory if (a) it arises out of, or is necessarilyconnected with, the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the opposing party'sclaim; (b) it does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the courtcannot acquire jurisdiction; and (c) the court has jurisdiction to entertain the claim. In other words, acompulsory counterclaim cannot be made the subject of a separate action but should be asserted inthe same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence giving rise to it. c d a s i a

Felipe Yulienco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131692, June 10, 1999

Rule 6, Sec. 8 - Cross-claim

The Rules of Court defines a cross-claim as any claim by one party against a co-party arising outof the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of acounterclaim. It may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable tothe cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant. Theanswer then to the cross-claim is meant to join the subsidiary issues between the co-parties inrelation to the opposing party's claim against the cross-claimant.

Needless to state, until the principal issue between the plaintiff and the defendant cross-claimantshall have been heard and determined, it would be premature to decide the cross-claim .

Leticia P. Ligon vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127683, August 7, 1998


China Airlines vs. Daniel Chiok, G.R. No. 152122, July 30, 2003

Rule 6, Sec. 10 - Reply

Under Section 10, Rule 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any new matter alleged by way ofdefense in the answer (or comment as in this case) is deemed controverted should a party fail to filea reply thereto. Except in cases where the answer alleges the defense of usury in which case a replyunder oath is required otherwise the allegation of usury is deemed admitted, or is based on anactionable document in which case a verified reply is necessary otherwise the genuineness and dueexecution of said actionable document is generally deemed admitted, the filing of a reply is merelyoptional as the new matters raised in the answer are deemed controverted even without a reply.

Ramon M. Veluz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139951, November 23, 2000

Rule 6, Sec. 11 - Third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint

A third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against aperson not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity,subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.

Seaoil Petroleum Corp. vs. Autocorp Group, et al., G.R. No. 164326, October 17, 2008

A third-party complaint is actually a complaint independent of, and separate and distinct from theplaintiff's complaint. Were it not for Rule 6, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, such third-partycomplaint would have to be filed independently and separately from the original complaint by thedefendant against the third-party defendant. The purpose is to avoid circuitry of action andunnecessary proliferation of law suits and of disposing expeditiously in one litigation all the mattersarising from one particular set of facts. The trial court is vested with discretion whether or not toallow the defendant to file a third-party complaint. As such, the defendant has no vested right to filea third-party complaint.

Erasmo Tayao vs. Rosa D. Mendoza, et al., G.R. No. 162733, April 12, 2005

Accordingly, the requisites for a third-party action are, firstly, that the party to be impleaded mustnot yet be a party to the action; secondly, that the claim against the third-party defendant mustbelong to the original defendant; thirdly, the claim of the original defendant against the third-partydefendant must be based upon the plaintiff's claim against the original defendant; and, fourthly, thedefendant is attempting to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted against him by


the original plaintiff.

As the foregoing indicates, the claim that the third-party complaint asserts against the third-partydefendant must be predicated on substantive law. Here, the substantive law on which the right ofInland to seek such other relief through its third-party complaint rested were Article 2176 andArticle 2180 of the Civil Code.

Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. Felix Paras, et al., G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012

Paras' cause of action against Inland (breach of contract of carriage) did not need to be the sameas the cause of action of Inland against Philtranco and its driver (tort or quasi-delict) in theimpleader. It is settled that a defendant in a contract action may join as third-party defendants thosewho may be liable to him in tort for the plaintiff's claim against him, or even directly to the plaintiff.Indeed, Prof. Wright, et al., commenting on the provision of the Federal Rules of Procedure of theUnited States from which Section 12, supra, was derived, observed so, to wit:

The third-party claim need not be based on the same theory as the main claim. Forexample, there are cases in which the third-party claim is based on an express indemnitycontract and the original complaint is framed in terms of negligence. Similarly, there need notbe any legal relationship between the third-party defendant and any of the other parties to theaction. Impleader also is proper even though the third party's liability is contingent, andtechnically does not come into existence until the original defendant's liability has beenestablished. In addition, the words 'is or may be liable' in Rule 14(a) make it clear thatimpleader is proper even though the third-party defendant's liability is not automaticallyestablished once the third-party plaintiff's liability to the original plaintiff has beendetermined.

Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. vs. Felix Paras, et al., G.R. No. 161909, April 25, 2012

Rule 7, Sec. 1 - Caption

Rule 7, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states that the names of the parties shall be indicated inthe title of the original complaint or petition.

Linton Commercial Co., Inc., et al. vs. Alex A. Hellera, et al., G.R. No. 163147, October 10, 2007

Rule 7, Sec. 3 - Signature and address

Antonio (Antonino) Samaniego, et al. vs. Vic Alvarez Aguila, et al., G.R. No. 125567, June 27, 2000


[I]n a derivative suit, it is the corporation that is the indispensable party, while the suingstockholder is just a nominal party. Under Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, an indispensableparty is a party-in-interest, without whom no final determination can be had of an action withoutthat party being impleaded. Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversythat a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that the court cannot proceed withouttheir presence. "Interest," within the meaning of this rule, should be material, directly in issue, andto be affected by the decree, as distinguished from a mere incidental interest in the questioninvolved. On the other hand, a nominal or pro forma party is one who is joined as a plaintiff ordefendant, not because such party has any real interest in the subject matter or because any relief isdemanded, but merely because the technical rules of pleadings require the presence of such party onthe record.

Santiago Cua, Jr., et al. vs. Miguel Ocampo Tan, et al., G.R. Nos. 181455-56 & 182008, December 4,2009

With the corporation as the real party-in-interest and the indispensable party, any ruling in one ofthe derivative suits should already bind the corporation as res judicata in the other. Allowing twodifferent minority stockholders to institute separate derivative suits arising from the same factualbackground, alleging the same causes of action, and praying for the same reliefs, is tantamount toallowing the corporation, the real party-in-interest, to file the same suit twice, resulting in theviolation of the rules against a multiplicity of suits and even forum-shopping. It is also in disregardof the separate-corporate-entity principle, because it is to look beyond the corporation and to giverecognition to the different identities of the stockholders instituting the derivative suits.

Santiago Cua, Jr., et al. vs. Miguel Ocampo Tan, et al., G.R. Nos. 181455-56 & 182008, December 4,2009

It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations therein that are controlling. The inclusionof the names of all the parties in the title of a complaint is a formal requirement under Section 3,Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. However, the rules of pleadings require courts to pierce the form andgo into the substance. The non-inclusion of one or some of the names of all the complainants in thetitle of a complaint, is not fatal to the case, provided there is a statement in the body of thecomplaint indicating that such complainant/s was/were made party to such action. This is speciallytrue before the HLURB where the proceedings are summary in nature without regard to legaltechnicalities obtaining in the courts of law and where the pertinent concern is to promote publicinterest and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of everyaction, application or other proceedings.

Sps. William and Rebecca Genato vs. Rita Viola, G.R. No. 169706, February 5, 2010

Rule 7, Sec. 4 - Verification


Loreta Torres vs. Specialized Packaging Dev't. Corp., G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004

A pleading is verified by an affidavit that an affiant has read the pleading and that the allegationstherein are true and correct as to his personal knowledge or based on authentic records. The partydoes not need to sign the verification. A party's representative, lawyer, or any person who personallyknows the truth of the facts alleged in the pleading may sign the verification.

Hutama-RSEA/Supermax Phils., J.V. vs. KCD Builders Corp., G.R. No. 173181, March 3, 2010

A party's failure to sign the certification against forum shopping is different from the party'sfailure to sign personally the verification. The certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed bythe party, and not by counsel. The certification of counsel renders the petition defective.

On the other hand, the requirement on verification of a pleading is a formal and not ajurisdictional requisite. It is intended simply to secure an assurance that what are alleged in thepleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, andthat the pleading is filed in good faith. The party need not sign the verification. A party'srepresentative, lawyer or any person who personally knows the truth of the facts alleged in thepleading may sign the verification.

Vallacar Transit, Inc. vs. Jocelyn Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011, citing Pajuyo v. Court ofAppeals, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004

As a general rule, a pleading need not be verified, unless there is a law or rule specificallyrequiring the same. Examples of pleadings that require verification are: (1) all pleadings filed incivil cases under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure; (2) petition for review from theRegional Trial Court to the Supreme Court raising only questions of law under Rule 41, Section 2;(3) petition for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals underRule 42, Section 1; (4) petition for review from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals underRule 43, Section 5; (5) petition for review before the Supreme Court under Rule 45, Section 1; (6)petition for annulment of judgments or final orders and resolutions under Rule 47, Section 4; (7)complaint for injunction under Rule 58, Section 4; (8) application for preliminary injunction ortemporary restraining order under Rule 58, Section 4; (9) application for appointment of a receiverunder Rule 59, Section 1; (10) application for support pendente lite under Rule 61, Section 1; (11)petition for certiorari against the judgments, final orders or resolutions of constitutionalcommissions under Rule 64, Section 2; (12) petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus underRule 65, Sections 1 to 3; (13) petition for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 1; (14) complaint forexpropriation under Rule 67, Section 1; (15) petition for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Section 4,all from the 1997 Rules of Court; (16) all complaints or petitions involving intra-corporatecontroversies under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies; (17)complaint or petition for rehabilitation and suspension of payment under the Interim Rules onCorporate Rehabilitation; and (18) petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages andannulment of voidable marriages as well as petition for summary proceedings under the FamilyCode.


Vallacar Transit, Inc. vs. Jocelyn Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudentialpronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, orsubmission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submissionof defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission ofdefective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily renderthe pleading fatally defective. The Court may order its submission or correction or act on thepleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may bedispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge toswear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, andwhen matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correctionthereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" orpresence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners ina case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Underreasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitionersshare a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature ofonly one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with theRule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, notby his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unableto sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record tosign on his behalf.

Nellie Vda. de Formoso, et al. vs. PNB, et al., G.R. No. 154704, June 1, 2011, citing Oldarico S.Traveno v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, G.R. No. 164205, September 3,2009

As worded, the Rule dictates that a pleading may be verified under either of the two given modesor under both.

Marcial Aparece vs. J. Marketing Corp., et al., G.R. No. 174224, October 17, 2008

The verification requirement is significant, as it is intended to secure an assurance that the


allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter ofspeculation.

Toyota Motor Phil. Corp. Workers Assn., et al., vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos.158786, 158789 & 158798-99, October 19, 2007

Christine Chua vs. Jorge Torres, G.R. No. 151900, August 30, 2005

Loreta Torres vs. Specialized Packaging Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146923, April 30, 2003


Under Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, a pleading is verified by an affidavit that theaffiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personalknowledge or based on authentic records.

Fernando Go vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 163745, August 24, 2007

LDP Marketing, Inc. vs. Monter, G.R. No. 159653, January 25, 2006

Section 4 of Rule 7 indicates that a pleading may be verified under either of the two given modesor under both. The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be affirmed based on either one'sown personal knowledge or on authentic records, or both, as warranted. The use of the preposition"or" connotes that either source qualifies as a sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state,the concurrence of both sources is more than sufficient.

Hun Hyung Park vs. Eun Won Choi, G.R. No. 165496, February 12, 2007

Franklin P. Bautista vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 136082, May 12, 2000

The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Suchrequirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance of which doesnot necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is simply intended to secure anassurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of theimagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court mayorder the correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is notverified, if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may bedispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.

Sergio I. Carbonilla, et al. vs. Board of Airlines Representatives, G.R. Nos. 193247 & 194276,September 14, 2011

Marilyn Valdecantos vs. People of the Phil., et al., G.R. No. 148852, September 27, 2006

The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of thepetition have been made in good faith, or are true and correct, not merely speculative.Non-compliance with such requirement does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective,hence, the court may order its correction if verification is lacking, or act on the pleading although it


is not verified if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules may bedispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be served.

Erneliza Z. Mamaril vs. CSC, et al., G.R. No. 164929, April 10, 2006

Verification is simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are trueand correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleadingis filed in good faith."

Jesus Dela Rosa, et al. vs. Santiago Carlos, et al., G.R. No. 147549, October 23, 2003


Verification is intended to assure that the allegations in the pleading have been prepared ingood faith or are true and correct, not mere speculations. Generally, lack of verification is merely aformal defect that is neither jurisdictional nor fatal. The court may order the correction of thepleading or act on the unverified pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strictcompliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order to serve the ends of justice.

Antonio I. Rodriguez vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), G.R. No. 153947, December 5,2002

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Sps. Willie and Julie L. Evangelista, et al., G.R. No. 146553,November 27, 2002

City Warden of the Manila City Jail vs. Raymond S. Estrella, et al., G.R. No. 141211, August 31, 2001

Pfizer Inc. et al. vs. Edwin V. Galan, G.R. No. 143389, May 25, 2001

Verification based on the affiant's own knowledge and information is sufficient under thecircumstances. Verification is merely a formal and not a jurisdictional requisite which does notaffect the validity or efficacy of the pleading, or the jurisdiction of the court. Therefore, a defectiveverification, as in the present case, does not render the pleading or the petition invalid and the Courtof Appeals did not err in giving due course to the petition.

Purto J. Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141307, March 28, 2001

Rule 7, Sec. 5 - Certification against forum shopping

Basis for the Requirement of Certification of Non-Forum Shopping

The requirement of the certification of non-forum shopping is rooted in the principle that aparty-litigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this practiceis detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure. However, the Court has relaxed, under justifiablecircumstances, the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that, although it is


obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. Not being jurisdictional, it can be relaxed under the rule ofsubstantial compliance.

South Cotabato Communications Corp., et al. vs. Patricia A. Sto. Tomas, et al., G.R. No. 173326,December 15, 2010

All complaints, petitions, applications, and other initiatory pleadings must be accompanied by acertificate against forum shopping, first prescribed by Administrative Circular No. 04-94, whichtook effect on April 1, 1994, then later on by Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

Vallacar Transit, Inc. vs. Jocelyn Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, May 30, 2011

What is truly important to consider in determining whether forum shopping exists or not is thevexation caused the courts and parties-litigant by a party who asks different courts and/oradministrative agencies to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same orsubstantially the same reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting decisions beingrendered by the different fora upon the same issue.

Phil Pharmawealth, Inc. vs. Pfizer, Inc. et al., G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010

Public Interest Center, Inc., et al. vs. Vicente Q. Roxas, et al., G.R. No. 125509, January 31, 2007

Regarding the certification against forum shopping, the Rules of Court provides that the plaintiffor the principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading therequirements as mandated under Section 5, Rule 7.

Teresa Gabriel, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 149909, October 11, 2007

Failure to comply with the non-forum shopping requirements in Section 5, Rule 7 of the RevisedRules of Court, does not automatically warrant the dismissal of the case with prejudice.

Composite Enterprises, Inc. vs. Emilio M. Caparoso, et al., G.R. No. 159919, August 8, 2007

Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that, should there be any pending action or claimbefore any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, a complete statement of its status should begiven.

Rufa C. Suan vs. Ricardo D. Gonzalez, A.C. No. 6377, March 12, 2007

This circumstance — of being surprised by the discovery of another pending claim with anothercourt or quasi-judicial agency — is the very situation contemplated by letter (c) in the firstparagraph of Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.

Nelson P. Collantes vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 169604, March 6, 2007

Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shoppingshould be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with the requirementshall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal application of the rules is proper wherethe higher interest of justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that while a


petition may have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only bycounsel and not by the party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantialjustice. So it is in the present controversy where the merits of the case and the absence of anintention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered as compelling reasons to temperthe strict application of the rules.

Michael C. Guy vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 163707, September 15, 2006

The requirement that the certification of non-forum shopping should be executed and signed bythe plaintiff or principal means that counsel cannot sign said certification unless clothed withspecial authority to do so. The reason for this is that the plaintiff or principal knows better thananyone else whether a petition has previously been filed involving the same case or substantially thesame issues. Hence, a certification signed by counsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid causefor dismissal of the petition. In the case of natural persons, the Rule requires the parties themselvesto sign the certificate of non-forum shopping. However, in the case of the corporations, the physicalact of signing may be performed, on behalf of the corporate entity, only by specifically authorizedindividuals for the simple reason that corporations, as artificial persons, cannot personally do thetask themselves. It cannot be gainsaid that obedience to the requirements of procedural rules isneeded if we are to expect fair results therefrom. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly berationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction.

Phil. Public School Teachers Ass'n, et al vs. Heirs of Carolina P. Iligan, et al., G.R. No. 171562, July 27,2006

Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause ofaction, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.Thus, it has been held that there is forum-shopping —

(1) whenever as a result of an adverse decision in one forum, a party seeks a favorabledecision (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or

(2) if, after he has filed a petition before the Supreme Court, a party files another before theCourt of Appeals since in such case he deliberately splits appeals "in the hope that even asone case in which a particular remedy is sought is dismissed, another case (offering asimilar remedy) would still be open," or

(3) where a party attempts to obtain a preliminary injunction in another court after failing toobtain the same from the original court.

Executive Secretary, et al. vs. Richard J. Gordon, et al., G.R. No. 134171, November 18, 1998

Forum shopping exists when two or more actions involve the same transactions, essential factsand circumstances, and raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and issues. Still another testof forum shopping is when the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment inone case will amount to res judicata in another — whether in the two or more pending cases, thereis an identity of (a) parties (or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions);


(b) rights or causes of action, and (c) reliefs sought.

Metrobank vs. International Exchange Bank, G.R. Nos. 176008 & 176131, August 10, 2011

The Rules of Civil Procedure generally do not apply to election cases. They apply only byanalogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Election contests aresubject to the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Rule 35 thereof governs election contests involvingelective municipal officials before the Regional Trial Courts. Rule 35 does not require that thepetition contesting the election of any municipal official be accompanied by a certification or anystatement against forum shopping.

Claudius G. Barroso vs. Francisco S. Ampig, et al., G.R. No. 138218, March 17, 2000

Apolinario vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123686, November 16, 1999

Section 5, Rule 7 expressly provides that it is the plaintiff or principal party who shall certifyunder oath that he has not commenced any action involving the same issues in any court, etc.

The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledgeby the party who executed the same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure topersonally sign the certification. Utter disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harkingon the policy of liberal construction.

Efren O. Loquias, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., G.R. No. 139396, August 15, 2000

Allen Leroy Hamilton vs. David Levy, et al., G.R. No. 139283, November 15, 2000

MCIAA vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139495, November 27, 2000

Alexander T. Ty vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112872 & 114672, April 19, 2001

Alfredo Canuto, Jr. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 110914, June 28, 2001

The requirement in Rule 7, § 5 that the certification should be executed by the plaintiff or theprincipal means that counsel cannot sign the certificate against forum-shopping. The reason for thisis that the plaintiff or principal knows better than anyone else whether a petition has previously beenfiled involving the same case or substantially the same issues. Hence, a certification signed bycounsel alone is defective and constitutes a valid cause for dismissal of the petition.

Santiago Eslaban vs. Clarita Vda. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001

Forum shopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in oneforum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal orthe special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two or more actions or proceedingsgrounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorabledisposition. The language of the Supreme Court circular (now the above-quoted Section 5, Rule 7,1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) distinctly suggests that it is primarily intended to cover an initiatorypleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief. The most important factorin determining the existence of forum shopping is the "vexation caused the courts and


parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes or grantthe same or substantially the same reliefs."

Since a party resorts to forum shopping in order to increase his chances of obtaining a favorabledecision or action, it has been held that a party cannot be said to have sought to improve his chancesof obtaining a favorable decision or action where no unfavorable decision has ever been renderedagainst him in any of the cases he has brought before the courts. Forum shopping exists where theelements of litis pendencia are present, and where a final judgment in one case will amount to resjudicata in the other.

Ma. Carminia C. Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139337, August 15, 2001

Request for Consolidation of Civil Case No. R-1692 RTC BR. 45, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro withCivil Case No. 3640, RTC-BR. 49, Cabanatuan City, A.M. No. 00-7-299-RTC, August 31, 2001

Republic vs. Carmel Development, Inc., G.R. No. 142572, February 20, 2002

Spouses Elanio C. Ong vs. Court of Appeals and Emma A. Garamay Ong, G.R. No. 144581, July 5,2002

Antonio I. Rodriguez vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), G.R. No. 153947, December 5,2002

Tomas R. Leonidas vs. Francisco G. Supnet, AM MTJ-02-1433, February 21, 2003

Emilio S. Young vs. John Keng Seng, G.R. No. 143464, March 5, 2003

Agapito Cruz Fiel vs. Kris Security Systems, G.R. No. 155875, April 3, 2003


Prudencio Bantolino, et al. vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., G.R. No. 153660, June 10, 2003,

Top Rate Construction vs. Paxton Development Corp., G.R. No. 151081, September 11, 2003

Jimmy L. Barnes vs. Teresita C. Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 144533, September 23, 2003

Diana M. Barcelona vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130087, September 24, 2003

Sps. Manuel and Rosemarie Wee vs. Rosario D. Galvez, G.R. No. 147394, August 11, 2004

Origin of the Concept of Forum Shopping

The determination of whether there is identity of parties rests on the commonality of the parties'interest, regardless of whether they are indispensable parties or not. The issue of whether theadditional parties are indispensable parties or not acquires real significance only when consideringthe validity of the judgment that will be rendered in the earlier case. This is so, because if theadditional parties are indispensable parties, then no valid judgment can be rendered against them inthe earlier case in which they did not participate, and this will foreclose the application of resjudicata which requires the existence of a final judgment.


Sps. Sofronio and Natividad Santos, et al. vs. Heirs of Dominga Lustre, G.R. No. 151016, August 6,2008

Forum shopping originated as a concept in private international law, where non-resident litigantsare given the option to choose the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons orexcuses, including to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoidovercrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. To combat these less than honorableexcuses, the principle of forum non conveniens was developed whereby a court, in conflicts of lawcases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or availableforum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.

In the Philippines, forum shopping has acquired a connotation encompassing not only a choice ofvenues, as it was originally understood in conflicts of laws, but also to a choice of remedies. As tothe first (choice of venues), the Rules of Court, for example, allow a plaintiff to commence personalactions "where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where theplaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff" (Rule 4, Sec. 2[b]). As toremedies, aggrieved parties, for example, are given a choice of pursuing civil liabilitiesindependently of the criminal, arising from the same set of facts. A passenger of a public utilityvehicle involved in a vehicular accident may sue on culpa contractual, culpa aquiliana or culpacriminal — each remedy being available independently of the others — although he cannot recovermore than once.

"In either of these situations (choice of venue or choice of remedy), the litigant actually shops fora forum of his action. This was the original concept of the term forum shopping. "Eventually,however, instead of actually making a choice of the forum of their actions, litigants, through theencouragement of their lawyers, file their actions in all available courts, or invoke all relevantremedies simultaneously. This practice had not only resulted to (sic) conflicting adjudicationsamong different courts and consequent confusion enimical (sic) to an orderly administration ofjustice. It had created extreme inconvenience to some of the parties to the action.

"Thus, 'forum-shopping' had acquired a different concept — which is unethical professional legalpractice. And this necessitated or had given rise to the formulation of rules and canons discouragingor altogether prohibiting the practice." What therefore started both in conflicts of laws and in ourdomestic law as a legitimate device for solving problems has been abused and misused to assurescheming litigants of dubious reliefs.

Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc., et al. vs. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. 159323, July 31, 2008

First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115849, January 24, 1996

Forum Shopping Construed

Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who "repetitively availed of several judicial remedies indifferent courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactionsand the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either


pending in, or already resolved adversely by some other court . . . to increase his chances ofobtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another."

Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., et al. vs. Jorge Valdez, G.R. No. 150107, January 28, 2008

It is "the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, eithersimultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment."


Mondragon Leisure and Resorts Corp. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, G.R. No. 154187, April 14,2004

T'Boli Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. vs. Nephtali Solilapsi, A.C. No. 4766, December 27, 2002

There is forum shopping when the following elements are present: "(a) identity of parties, or atleast such parties as represent the same interests in both actions[;] (b) identity of rights asserted andrelief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts[;] and (c) the identity of the twopreceding particulars[,] such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless ofwhich party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration; said requisites[are] also constitutive of the requisites for auter action pendant or lis pendens." The essence offorum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause ofaction, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment,through means other than by appeal or certiorari.


Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a finaljudgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Litis pendentiais a Latin term, which literally means "a pending suit" and is variously referred to in some decisionsas lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers tothe situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action,so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy againstmultiplicity of suits. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identityof parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both actions; (2)identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and (3)identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment thatmay be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to resjudicata in the other case.


Rationale for Rule Against Forum Shopping

The rationale against forum shopping is that a party should not be allowed to pursuesimultaneous remedies in two different courts as it constitutes abuse of court processes, which tendsto degrade the administration of justice, wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, and adds to


the congestion of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.


Sps. Manuel and Rosemarie Wee vs. Rosario D. Galvez, G.R. No. 147394, August 11, 2004

George S. Briones vs. Lilia J. Henson-Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 159130, August 22, 2008

Coca-Bottler (Phils.), Inc., et al. vs. Social Security Commission, et al., G.R. No. 159323, July 31, 2008

Tokio Marine Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., et al. vs. Jorge Valdez, G.R. Nos. 150107 & 150108, January28, 2008

A certificate of non-forum shopping is required only in complaints or other initiatory pleadings,and a petition or motion for the issuance of the writ under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, isnot a complaint or an initiatory pleading.

Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. vs. Sps. Elmor and Rosario J. Bance, G.R. No. 167280, April 30, 2008

The certification against forum shopping is required only in a complaint or other initiatorypleading. The ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by the respondent is notan initiatory pleading. Although the private respondent denominated its pleading as a petition, it is,nonetheless, a motion. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its formor the title given by the party executing it, but rather its purpose. The office of a motion is not toinitiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the casein which the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined toincidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question that is collateral to themain object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy. Anapplication for a writ of possession is a mere incident in the registration proceeding. Hence,although it was denominated as a "petition," it was in substance merely a motion.

Metrobank vs. Salvador Abad Santos, et al., G.R. No. 157867, December 15, 2009

The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least, such as representing thesame interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the reliefbeing founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases, such that judgment in one,regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.

Roberto S. Benedicto, et al. vs. Manuel Lacson, et al., G.R. No. 141508, May 5, 2010

The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex anothermore than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory isfounded on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy incourts more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake ofthe stability of the rights and status of persons.


The test to determine identity of causes of action is to ascertain whether the same evidence


necessary to sustain the second cause of action is sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first, evenif the forms or the nature of the two (2) actions are different from each other. If the same facts orevidence would sustain both, the two (2) actions are considered the same within the rule that thejudgment in the former is a bar to the subsequent action; otherwise, it is not. This method has beenconsidered the most accurate test as to whether a former judgment is a bar in subsequentproceedings between the same parties. It has even been designated as infallible.


It is, thus, clear that the counsel is not the proper person to sign the certification against forumshopping. If, for any reason, the principal party cannot sign the petition, the one signing on hisbehalf must have been duly authorized.

Eagle Ridge Golf and Country Club vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 178989, March 18, 2010

[A] certification of non-forum shopping is a certification under oath by the plaintiff or principalparty in the complaint or other initiatory pleading, asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworncertification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, that (a) he has not theretoforecommenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal orquasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pendingtherein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present statusthereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filedor is pending, he shall report that fact within five days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaidcomplaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.

Hutama-RSEA/Supermax Phils., J.V. vs. KCD Builders Corp., G.R. No. 173181, March 3, 2010

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudentialpronouncements already reflected above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, orsubmission of defective, verification and certification against forum shopping:

1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submissionof defective verification, and non-compliance with the requirement on or submission ofdefective certification against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily renderthe pleading fatally defective. The Court may order its submission or correction or act on thepleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may bedispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.

3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge toswear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, andwhen matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction


thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" orpresence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."

5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners ina case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Underreasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitionersshare a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature ofonly one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with theRule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, notby his counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unableto sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record tosign on his behalf.

Nellie Vda. de Formoso, et al. vs. PNB, et al., G.R. No. 154704, June 1, 2011, citing Oldarico S.Traveno v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, G.R. No. 164205, September 3,2009

The lack of certification against forum shopping is not curable by mere amendment of acomplaint, but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice. Indeed, the generalrule is that subsequent compliance with the requirements will not excuse a party's failure to complyin the first instance.

Vivian T. Ramirez, et al. vs. Mar Fishing Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 168208, June 13, 2012 citingPhilippine Public School Teachers Association v. The Heirs of Carolina P. Iligan, 528 Phil. 1197 (2006)

Rule 8, Sec. 1 - In general

Timoteo Baluyot vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122947, July 22, 1999

The Rules of Court require every pleading to "contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain,concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim ordefense".

Edward T. Marcelo, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 156605, August 28, 2007

Rule 8, Sec. 4 - Capacity

Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, a foreign arbitral award should be respected not because


it is favored over domestic laws and procedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 has certainlyerased any conflict of law question.

Tuna Processing, Inc. vs. Philippine Kingford, Inc., G.R. No. 185582, February 29, 2012

Rule 8, Sec. 5 - Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind

Sto. Tomas University Hospital vs. Cesar Antonio Y. Surla, G.R. No. 129718, August 17, 1998

Ernesto R. Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134090, July 2, 1999

Reynaldo T. Cometa vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124062, December 29, 1999

Claro Ponciano, et al. vs. Jose J. Parentela, et al., G.R. No. 133284, May 9, 2000

Felix Uy Chua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121438, October 23, 2000

Sec. 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that in all averments of fraud, thecircumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity. This is to enable the opposingparty to controvert the particular facts allegedly constituting the same.

Jorge Gonzales, et al. vs. Climax Mining Ltd., et al., G.R. Nos. 161957 & 167994, January 22, 2007

Rule 8, Sec. 8 - How to contest such documents

Sps. Efren and Zosima Rigor vs. Consolidated Orix Leasing and Finance Corp., G.R. No. 136423,August 20, 2002


Filipinas Textile Mills vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119800, November 12, 2003

Rule 8, Sec. 10 - Specific denial

Three (3) modes of specific denial are contemplated by the above provision, namely: 1) byspecifying each material allegation of the fact in the complaint, the truth of which the defendantdoes not admit, and whenever practicable, setting forth the substance of the matters which he willrely upon to support his denial; (2) by specifying so much of an averment in the complaint as is true


and material and denying only the remainder; (3) by stating that the defendant is without knowledgeor information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment in the complaint,which has the effect of a denial.

Sps. Napoleon and Evelyn Gaza, et al. vs. Ramon J. Lim, et al., G.R. No. 126863, January 16, 2003

A negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or atleast an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with anadmission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying ormodifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied,it has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.


A denial is not specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A general denial doesnot become specific by the use of the word "specifically." When the matters of whether thedefendant alleges having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief, are plainly andnecessarily within the defendant's knowledge, his alleged ignorance or lack of information will notbe considered as a specific denial.

PNB vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126153, January 14, 2004

Rule 8, Sec. 11 - Allegations not specifically denied deemed admitted

Sps. Napoleon and Evelyn Gaza, et al. vs. Ramon J. Lim, et al., G.R. No. 126863, January 16, 2003


A denial is not made specific simply because it is so qualified by the defendant. A general denialdoes not become specific by the use of the word "specifically." When matters of whether thedefendant alleges having no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly andnecessarily within the defendant's knowledge, an alleged "ignorance or lack of information" will notbe considered as a specific denial. Section 11, Rule 8 of the Rules also provides that materialaverments in the complaint other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages shall bedeemed admitted when not specifically denied. Thus, the answer should be so definite and certain inits allegations that the pleader's adversary should not be left in doubt as to what is admitted, what isdenied, and what is covered by denials of knowledge as sufficient to form a belief.

Wilson Cham vs. Eva Paita-Moya, A.C. No. 7494, June 27, 2008

Agrifina Aquintey vs. Sps. Felicidad and Rico Tibong, G.R. No. 166704, December 20, 2006


Rule 9, Sec. 1 - Defenses and objections not pleaded

The second sentence of this provision does not only supply exceptions to the rule that defensesnot pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, it also allows courtsto dismiss cases motu proprio on any of the enumerated grounds — (1) lack of jurisdiction over thesubject matter; (2) litis pendentia; (3) res judicata; and (4) prescription — provided that the groundfor dismissal is apparent from the pleadings or the evidence on record.

Heirs of Domingo Valientes vs. Reinerio (Abraham) B. Ramas, et al., G.R. No. 157852, December 15,2010

Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 157594,March 9, 2010

Procopio Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004


Spouses Elanio C. Ong vs. Court of Appeals and Emma A. Garamay Ong, G.R. No. 144581, July 5,2002

Elidad C. Kho vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115758, March 19, 2002

Saturnino Salera, Jr., et al. vs. A-1 Investors, Inc., G.R. No. 141238, February 15, 2002


Maria L. Anido vs. Filomeno Negado and The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143990, October17, 2001

Inocencia Yu Dino vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113564, June 20, 2001

Rudolf Lietz Holdings vs. Register of Deeds, G.R. No. 133240, November 15, 2000

Ramona T. Logronio vs. Roberto Taleseo, G.R. No. 134602, August 6, 1999

Citibank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61508, March 17, 1999

It is clear and categorical in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court that failure to raisedefenses and objections in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is deemed a waiver thereof; andbasic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and free from any doubt orambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.

Librada M. Aquino vs. Ernest S. Aure, G.R. No. 153567, February 18, 2008

Failure to raise defenses and objections in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is deemed awaiver thereof; and basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and freefrom any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation.



In every action, indeed, the parties and their counsel are enjoined to present all available defensesand objections in order that the matter in issue can finally be laid to rest in an appropriate contestbefore the court. The rule is a wise and tested one, borne by necessity. Without the rule, there willbe no end to a litigation, because the dissatisfied litigant may simply raise "new" or additional issuesin order to prevent, defeat, or delay the implementation of an already final and executory judgment.The endlessness of litigation can give rise to added costs for the parties, and can surely contribute tothe unwarranted clogging of court dockets. The prospect of a protracted litigation between theparties annuls the very rationale of every litigation to attain justice. Verily, there must be an end tolitigation.

Catalina Balais-Mabanag vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, et al., G.R. No. 153142, March 29, 2010

We have ruled that trial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on the ground ofprescription when the parties' pleadings or other facts on record show it to be indeed time-barred . ..; and it may do so on the basis of a motion to dismiss, or an answer which sets up such ground as anaffirmative defense; or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a motion forreconsideration; or even if the defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof isfound in the pleadings, or where a defendant has been declared in default. What is essential only, torepeat, is that the facts demonstrating the lapse of the prescriptive period, be otherwise sufficientlyand satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments of the plaintiffs complaint, orotherwise established by the evidence.

PNB vs. Merelo B. Aznar, et al., G.R. Nos. 171805 & 172021, May 30, 2011, citing Feliciano v. Canoza,G.R. No. 161746, September 1, 2010

Rule 9, Sec. 3 - Default, declaration of

United Overseas Bank of the Phils. vs. Rosemoor Mining and Development Corp., et al., G.R. No.172651, October 2, 2007

Three requirements must be complied with before the court can declare the defending party indefault: (1) the claiming party must file a motion asking the court to declare the defending party indefault; (2) the defending party must be notified of the motion to declare him in default and (3) theclaiming party must prove that the defending party has failed to answer within the period providedby the Rules of Court.

Sps. Guillerma and Pascual Lumanas vs. Esterlita S. Sabilas, et al., G.R. No. 144568, July 3, 2007

Well settled is the rule that the court should be liberal in setting aside orders of default forjudgment by default is frowned upon, and unless it clearly appears that the reopening of the case isintended for delay, it is best that both parties be given every chance to fight their case fairly and inthe open, without resort to technicality.


Henry Tanchan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113150, March 29, 1999

Francisco Motors Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100812, June 25, 1999

Heirs of Fabela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142546, August 9, 2001

Mariano Joaquin S. Macias vs. Margie Corpus Macias, G.R. No. 149617, September 3, 2003

Sps. Efren and Digna Mason, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 144662, October 13, 2003

Section 3 (b)

Phil. Banking Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127469, January 15, 2004

Section 3 (d)

Rule 9, Section 3 (d) of the Rules of Court defines the extent of the relief that may be awarded ina judgment by default, i.e., only so much as has been alleged and proved.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Vicente A. Hidalgo, et al., G.R. No. 161657, October 4, 2007

Section 3 (e)

Marietta B. Ancheta vs. Rodolfo S. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004

Failure to file an answer is a ground for a declaration that defendant is in default.

Philippine National Bank vs. Sps. Erlando and Norma Rodriguez, G.R. No. 170325, September 26, 2008

Clearly, there are three requirements which must be complied with by the claiming party beforethe court may declare the defending party in default, to wit: (1) the claiming party must file a motionasking the court to declare the defending party in default; (2) the defending party must be notified ofthe motion to declare him in default; (3) the claiming party must prove that the defending party hasfailed to answer within the period provided by the Rule.

Sps. Humberto and Carmencita DeLos Santos vs. Emmanuel C. Carpio, et al., G.R. No. 153696,September 11, 2006

A petition for certiorari to declare the nullity of a judgment by default is also available if the trialcourt improperly declared a party in default, or even if the trial court properly declared a party indefault, if grave abuse of discretion attended such declaration.

The filing of the present petition is clearly not the proper remedy to assail the default judgmentrendered by the trial court. Petitioner still has the available remedy of filing with the Regional TrialCourt a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals from the trial court'sdefault judgment. Note that petitioner admits that she was "properly declared in default." Thus,there is no question of any improvident or improper declaration of default by the trial court, and theremedy of filing a special civil action for certiorari has been effectively foreclosed on petitioner.


Her only recourse then is to file an ordinary appeal with the Court of Appeals under Section 2(a),Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

Instead, she came directly to this Court via petition for review on certiorari, without setting forthsubstantial reasons why the ordinary remedies under the law should be disregarded and the petitionentertained.

Crisologo vs. Globe Telecom, G.R. No. 167631, December 16, 2005

Rule 10, Sec. 1 - Amendments in general

Jovito Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131175, August 28, 2001

The Court has invariably held that amendments are not proper and should be denied when delaywould arise, or when amendments would result in a change of cause of action or theory of the case,or would be inconsistent with the allegations in the original complaint.

Josephine B. Ng, et al. vs. Sps. Marcelo and Maria Fe Soco, G.R. No. 149132, May 9, 2002

Rule 10, Sec. 2 - Amendments as a matter of right

Under the Rules of Court, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any timebefore a responsive pleading is served, or in the case of a reply, at any time within ten (10) daysafter it is served.

NAMAWU vs. Adelina Calderon-Bargas, et al., G.R. No. 157232, December 10, 2007

Under Section 2 of Rule 10, a party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any timebefore a responsive pleading is served, and thereafter, only upon leave of court.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Andres L. Africa, et al., G.R. No. 172315, August 28, 2007

It is clear from Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 10 that once a case has already been set for hearing,regardless of whether a responsive pleading has been served, substantial amendments . . . may onlybe made upon leave of court.

Alicia C. Maranan vs. Manila Banking Corp., G.R. No. 164398, March 30, 2007

Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that a pleading may beamended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. This only means that prior tothe filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the complaint whether a new


cause of action or change in theory is introduced. The reason for this rule is implied in thesubsequent Section 3 of Rule 10. Under this provision, substantial amendment of the complaint isnot allowed without leave of court after an answer has been served, because any material change inthe allegations contained in the complaint could prejudice the rights of the defendant who hasalready set up his defense in the answer.

Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendant's rights have been violated by changes made inthe complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In such an event, the defendant has notpresented any defense that can be altered or affected by the amendment of the complaint inaccordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant still retains the unqualified opportunity toaddress the allegations against him by properly setting up his defense in the answer. Considerableleeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as a matter of right, prior to thefiling of an answer by the defendant.

The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before an answerhas been served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss or any other proceedingcontesting its sufficiency. Were we to conclude otherwise, the right to amend a pleading underSection 2, Rule 10 will be rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all that a defendant has to do toforeclose this remedial right is to challenge the adequacy of the complaint before he files an answer.

Moreover, amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtheranceof justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without regard totechnicalities. This principle is generally recognized to speed up trial and save party litigants fromincurring unnecessary expense, so that a full hearing on the merits of every case may be had andmultiplicity of suits avoided.

Remington Industrial Sales Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133657, May 29, 2002

Rule 10, Sec. 3 - Amendments by leave of court

The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "theamendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This should only be true,however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, theamendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and preventdelay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy andinexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."


Remington Industrial Sales Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133657, May 29, 2002


Amendment of pleadings may now substantially alter the cause of action or defense

Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule insuch manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" wasstricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3,Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause ofaction or defense." This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change oralteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve thehigher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objectiveof the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action andproceeding."

Phil. Ports Authority vs. William Gothong & Aboitiz Inc., G.R. No. 158401, January 28, 2008


Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such mannerthat the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off andnot retained in the new rules. The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is thatunder the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense."This should only be true, however when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause ofaction or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantialjustice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to securea "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding".

Ligaya Biglang-Awa, et al. vs. Philippine Trust Co., G.R. No. 158998, March 28, 2008

Phil. Ports Authority vs. William Gothong & Aboitiz, Inc., G.R. No. 158401, January 28, 2008

Rule 10, Sec. 4 - Formal amendments

The error or defect is merely formal and not substantial and an amendment to cure such defect isexpressly authorized by Sec. 4, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.


Rule 10, Sec. 5 - Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence


Materrco, Inc. vs. First Landlink Asia Development Corp., G.R. No. 175687, November 28, 2007

BPI Family Bank vs. Amado Franco, et al., G.R. No. 123498, November 23, 2007

Lolita R. Ayson vs. Marina Enriquez Vda. De Carpio, G.R. No. 152438, June 17, 2004

Phil. Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corp. vs. Phil. Infrastructures, G.R. No. 120384, January 13,2004

Maunlad Savings and Loan Assn. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114942, November 27, 2000

Bernardo Mercader vs. DBP, G.R. No. 130699, May 12, 2000

Bank of America vs. American Realty Corp., G.R. No. 133876, December 29, 1999

Nicholas Y. Cervantes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125138, March 2, 1999

Cindy & Lynsy Garment vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 108369, January 7, 1998

If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by thepleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if thepresentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby.

Asean Pacific Planners, et al. vs. City of Urdaneta, et al., G.R. No. 162525, September 23, 2008

Indeed, any objection to the admissibility of evidence should be made at the time such evidenceis offered or as soon thereafter as the objection to its admissibility becomes apparent, otherwise theobjection will be considered waived and such evidence will form part of the records of the case ascompetent and admissible evidence. Rule 10, Section 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure allows theamendment of the pleadings in order to make them conform to the evidence in the record.

Jose L. Chua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109840, January 21, 1999

It need not be underlined that jurisdiction over an issue in a case is determined and conferred bythe pleadings filed by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation or, at timesby their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered bythe pleadings, as provided in Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court.

Eugene L. Lim vs. BPI Agricultural Dev't. Bank, G.R. No. 179230, March 9, 2010

Rule 10, Sec. 6 - Supplemental pleadings

The rule is a useful device which enables the court to award complete relief in one action and toavoid the cost of delay and waste of separate action. Thus, a supplemental pleading is meant tosupply deficiencies in aid of the original pleading and not to dispense with or substitute the latter.


Sps. Orlando and Carmelita C. Lambino vs. Presiding Judge, et al., G.R. No. 169551, January 24, 2007

Shoemart, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86956, October 1, 1990

Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 81024 February 3, 2000

The admission of supplemental pleadings, including supplemental complaints, does not arise as amatter of right on the petitioner, but remains in the sound discretion of the court, which is wellwithin its right to deny the admission of the pleading. Section 6, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure, governing supplemental pleadings, is clear that the court only "may" admit thesupplemental pleading, and is thus not obliged to do so.

Far East Bank and Trust Co. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al., G.R. No. 138919, May 2,2006

As its very name denotes, a supplemental pleading only serves to bolster or adds something to theprimary pleading. A supplement exists side by side with the original. It does not replace that whichit supplements. Moreover, a supplemental pleading assumes that the original pleading is to standand that the issues joined with the original pleading remained an issue to be tried in the action. It isbut a continuation of the complaint. Its usual office is to set up new facts which justify, enlarge orchange the kind of relief with respect to the same subject matter as the controversy referred to in theoriginal complaint.

The purpose of the supplemental pleading is to bring into the records new facts which willenlarge or change the kind of relief to which the plaintiff is entitled; hence, any supplemental factswhich further develop the original right of action, or extend to vary the relief, are available by wayof supplemental complaint even though they themselves constitute a right of action.

The parties may file supplemental pleadings only to supply deficiencies in aid of an originalpleading, but not to introduce new and independent causes of action. In Leobrera v. Court ofAppeals, the Court ruled that when the cause of action stated in the supplemental complaint isdifferent from the causes of action mentioned in the original complaint, the court should not admitthe supplemental complaint. However, a broad definition of causes of action should be applied.

Planters Dev't Bank vs. LZK Holdings and Dev't Corp., G.R. No. 153777, April 15, 2005

Supplemental pleadings must be with reasonable notice, and it is discretionary upon the court ortribunal to allow the same or not.

Secondly, a supplemental pleading must state transactions, occurrences or events which tookplace since the time the pleading sought to be supplemented was filed.

Conrado L. De Rama vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001

Intramuros Administration vs. Yvette Contacto, et al., G.R. No. 152576, May 5, 2003

A supplemental pleading states the transactions, occurrences or events which took place since thetime the pleading sought to be supplemented was filed. A supplemental pleading is meant to supply


deficiencies in aid of the original pleading and not to dispense with or substitute the latter. It doesnot supersede the original, but assumes that the original pleading is to stand.

Jose Feliciano Loy, Jr., et al. vs. SMCEU-PTGWO, et al., G.R. No. 164886, November 24, 2009

As a general rule, leave will be granted to a party who desires to file a supplemental pleading thatalleges any material fact which happened or came within the party's knowledge after the originalpleading was filed, such being the office of a supplemental pleading. The application of the rulewould ensure that the entire controversy might be settled in one action, avoid unnecessary repetitionof effort and unwarranted expense of litigants, broaden the scope of the issues in an action owing tothe light thrown on it by facts, events and occurrences which have accrued after the filing of theoriginal pleading, and bring into record the facts enlarging or charging the kind of relief to whichplaintiff is entitled. It is the policy of the law to grant relief as far as possible for wrongs complainedof, growing out of the same transaction and thus put an end to litigation.

Pentacapital Investment Corp. vs. Makilito B. Mahinay, G.R. Nos. 171736 & 181482, July 5, 2010

The supplemental pleading must be based on matters arising subsequent to the filing of theoriginal pleading related to the claim or defense presented therein, and founded on the same causeof action. Supplemental pleadings must state transactions, occurrences or events which took placesince the time the pleading sought to be supplemented was filed.

Pentacapital Investment Corp. vs. Makilito B. Mahinay, G.R. Nos. 171736 & 181482, July 5, 2010

Rule 10, Sec. 8 - Effect of amended pleadings

Under Section 8, Rule 10, Rules of Court, an amended complaint supersedes an original one. Theoriginal complaint is deemed withdrawn and no longer considered part of the record.

Natividad Figuracion, et al. vs. Sps. Cresenciano and Amelita Libi, G.R. No. 155688, November 28,2007

The Philippine American Life & General Insurance Company vs. Breva, G.R. No. 147937, November 11,2004

Vlason Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 3G.R. Nos. 121662-64, July 6, 1999

Wilfredo P. Verzosa vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 119511-13, November 24, 1998

Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court clearly provides that an amended complaint supersedesthe complaint that it amends.

Negros Merchants Enterprises, Inc. vs. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 150918, August 17, 2007


Rule 11, Sec. 8 - Existing counterclaim or cross-claim

Sps. Marcelo and Anita Arenas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126640, November 23, 2000

Rule 11, Sec. 9 - Counterclaim or cross-claim arising after answer


Rule 11, Sec. 11 - Extension of time to plead

Sps. Ampelquio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124243, June 15, 2000

Sps. Payongayong vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144576, May 28, 2004

The Rules of Court provides for discretion on the part of the trial court not only to extend thetime for filing an answer but also to allow an answer to be filed after the reglementary period.

Sps. Guillerma and Pascual Lumanas vs. Esterlita S. Sabilas, et al., G.R. No. 144568, July 3, 2007

Rule 12, Sec. 1 - When applied for; purpose

Jose Baritua, et al. vs. Nimfa Divina Mercader, et al., G.R. No. 136048, January 23, 2001

Rule 13, Sec. 2 - Filing and service, defined

Equitable PCI Bank vs. Rosita Ku, G.R. No. 142950, March 26, 2001

Ginete vs. Sunrise Manning Agency, G.R. No. 142023, June 21, 2001

Sps. Sarraga vs. Banco Filipino, G.R. No. 143783, December 9, 2002

PCI Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114951, July 19, 2003


Phil. Ports Authority vs. Sargasso Construction & Dev't. Corp., G.R. No. 146478, July 30, 2004

Phil. Airlines, Inc. vs. Balubar, Jr., A.M. No. P-04-1767, August 12, 2004

If any party has appeared by counsel, service upon him shall be made upon his counsel unlessservice upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Notice or service made upon a party who isrepresented by counsel is a nullity. Notice to the client and not to his counsel of record is not noticein law. While this rule admits of exceptions, such as when the court or tribunal orders service uponthe party or when the technical defect is waived, none applies in this case.

Heirs of Benjamin Mendoza, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170247, September 17, 2008

Rule 13 Section 2 of the Rules of Court merely defines filing as "the act of presenting thepleading or other paper to the clerk of court." Since the signing of verifications and certificationsagainst forum shopping is not integral to the act of filing, this may not be deemed as necessarilyincluded in an authorization merely to file cases.

Metropolitan Cebu Water District (MCWD) vs. Margarita A. Adala, G.R. No. 168914, July 4, 2007

It is a rule generally accepted that when the service is to be made by registered mail, the serviceis deemed complete and effective upon actual receipt by the addressee as shown by the registryreturn card. Thus, between the registry return card and said written note, the former commands moreweight. Not only is the former considered as the official record of the court, but also as such, it ispresumed to be accurate unless proven otherwise, unlike a written note or record of a party, which isoften self-serving and easily fabricated. Further, this error on the part of the secretary of thepetitioners' former counsel amounts to negligence or incompetence in record-keeping, which is notan excuse for the delay of filing.

Sps. De la Cruz vs. Ramiscal, G.R. No. 137882, February 4, 2005

Rule 13, Sec. 3 - Manner of filing

The date of filing is determinable from two sources: from the post office stamp on the envelopeor from the registry receipt, either of which may suffice to prove the timeliness of the filing of thepleadings. If the date stamped on one is earlier than the other, the former may be accepted as thedate of filing. This presupposes, however, that the envelope or registry receipt and the datesappearing thereon are duly authenticated before the tribunal where they are presented.

GSIS vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 180045, November 17, 2010

Norma Santos vs. Joyce Trinidad A. Hernandez, et al., AM P-02-1556, February 22, 2002


Rule 13, Sec. 4 - Papers required to be filed and served

Teodora and Rodolfo Capacete vs. Venancia Baroro, et al., G.R. No. 154184, July 8, 2003

Marcelina Gacutana-Fraile vs. Angel T. Domingo, et al., G.R. No. 138518, December 15, 2000

Rule 13, Sec. 5 - Modes of service


Rule 13, Sec. 7 - Service by mail

Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Vergara, G.R. No. 154037, April 30, 2003

Rule 13, Sec. 8 - Substituted service

The requirements for substituted service are indispensable because substituted service is inderogation of the usual method of service. It is an extraordinary method since it seeks to bind thedefendant to the consequences of a suit even though notice of such action is served not upon himbut upon another whom the law could only presume would notify him of the pending proceedings.Failure to faithfully, strictly, and fully comply with the statutory requirements of substituted servicerenders such service ineffective.

Abubakar A. Afdal, et al. vs. Romeo Carlos, G.R. No. 173379, December 1, 2010

Luthgarda F. Fernandez vs. Fidel M. Cabrera II, A.C. No. 5623, December 11, 2003

Nancy L. Ty vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, et al., G.R. Nos. 149797-98, February 13,2004

Rule 13, Sec. 9 - Service of judgments, final orders or resolutions


Fidel M. Bañares II, et al. vs. Elizabeth Balising, et al., G.R. No. 132624, March 13, 2000

Section 9 in relation to Section 10

The rule on service by registered mail contemplates two situations: (1) actual service, thecompleteness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail; and (2)constructive service, which is deemed complete upon expiration of five (5) days from the date theaddressee received the first notice from the postmaster.

Philemploy Services and Resources, Inc. vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 152616, March 31, 2006

Umbra M. Tomawis vs. Nora M. Tabao-Caudang, G.R. No. 166547, September 12, 2007

Rule 13, Sec. 10 - Completeness of service

Sps. Jose and Evangeline Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120972, July 19, 1999


Carmelita G. Abrajano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120787, October 13, 2000

Equitable PCI Bank vs. Rosita Ku, G.R. No. 142950, March 26, 2001

Service by registered mail is deemed completed upon actual receipt by the addressee or after five(5) days from the date the addressee received the first notice of the postmaster, whichever date isearlier.

Jerryco C. Rivera vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 157040, February 12, 2008

The rule on service by registered mail contemplates two situations: (1) actual service thecompleteness of which is determined upon receipt by the addressee of the registered mail; and (2)constructive service the completeness of which is determined upon expiration of five days from thedate the addressee received the first notice of the postmaster.

Jose Mel Bernarte vs. PBA, et al., G.R. No. 192084, September 14, 2011

Insofar as constructive service is concerned, there must be conclusive proof that a first notice wasduly sent by the postmaster to the addressee. Not only is it required that notice of the registered mailbe issued but that it should also be delivered to and received by the addressee. Notably, thepresumption that official duty has been regularly performed is not applicable in this situation. It isincumbent upon a party who relies on constructive service to prove that the notice was sent to, andreceived by, the addressee. The best evidence to prove that notice was sent would be a certificationfrom the postmaster, who should certify not only that the notice was issued or sent but also as tohow, when and to whom the delivery and receipt was made. The mailman may also testify that the


notice was actually delivered.


The Postmaster's Certification does not sufficiently prove that the three notices were delivered toand received by respondents; it only indicates that the post office issued the three notices. Simplyput, the issuance of the notices by the post office is not equivalent to delivery to and receipt by theaddressee of the registered mail. Thus, there is no proof of completed constructive service of theLabor Arbiter's decision on respondents.


Rule 13, Sec. 11 - Priorities in modes of service and filing

E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. vs. Herminio I. Benito, et al., G.R. No. 136426, August 6, 1999


Castilex Industrial Corp. vs. Vicente Vasquez, G.R. No. 132266, December 21, 1999

Engrace Niñal vs. Norma Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000

Security Bank and Trust Company vs. Rodolfo M. Cuenca, G.R. No. 138544, October 3, 2000

Marcelina Gacutana-Fraile vs. Angel T. Domingo, et al., G.R. No. 138518, December 15, 2000

Perla S. Zulueta vs. Asia Brewery, G.R. No. 138137, March 8, 2001

Pfizer Inc. et al. vs. Edwin V. Galan, G.R. No. 143389, May 25, 2001

MC Engineering vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 142314, June 28, 2001

Deogracias Musa, et al. vs. Sylvia Amor, G.R. No. 141396, April 9, 2002


Aquilina Estrella, et al. vs. Nila Espiridion, G.R. No. 134460, November 27, 2003

Sps. Payongayong vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144576, May 28, 2004

The rule that a pleading must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filingwas not done personally is mandatory.

Martin Penoso, et al. vs. Macrosman Dona, G.R. No. 154018, April 3, 2007


The requirement under Section 11 is mandatory. Any violation of this Rule may be cause for the


court to consider the paper as not filed.

However, such discretionary power of the court must be exercised properly and reasonably,taking into account the following factors: (1) "the practicability of personal service;" (2) "theimportance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein;" and (3) "the prima faciemerit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11".

The affidavit of service is a substantial compliance with the requirement under Section 11. Itbears stressing that petitioners' procedural lapse in not appending such affidavit to their petition didnot in any way thwart the laudable objective of Section 11 as stated in Solar, i.e., to quell thelawyers' unethical practice of deliberately resorting to delays in the filing and service of pleadings,motions and other papers. Indeed, the evil sought to be prevented by the new rule is absent here.Also, there is absolutely no indication from petitioners' omission that they demonstrated theircontempt for the Rules and our directive in Solar, as claimed by respondents.

Luciano Ello vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141255, June 21, 2005

Personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, theexception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of thecircumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only whenpersonal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then beaccompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable tobegin with.


Charles N. Uy vs. Nelida S. Medina, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1247, October 10, 2000

Roberto Fulgencio, et al., vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 141600, September 12, 2003

Pursuant . . . to Section 11 of Rule 13, service and filing of pleadings and other papers must,whenever practicable, be done personally; and if made through other modes, the partyconcerned must provide a written explanation as to why the service or filing was not donepersonally. . . .

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should expedite actionor resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely, minimize, if not eliminate,delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail, considering the inefficiency of postalservice. Likewise, personal service will do away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting toappear clever, resort to the following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings bymail to catch opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, forinstance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the post officethat the registered parcel containing the pleading of or other paper from the adverse party may beclaimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or, worse, not claiming it at all, therebycausing undue delay in the disposition of such pleading or other papers.


If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective rulesrequiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives the court thediscretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filingwere resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was notdone in the first place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily, consider the practicability ofpersonal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the clause "whenever practicable."

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service

and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, inlight of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory.Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had,which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filingwas not practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shalllikewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, andthe prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. This Courtcannot rule otherwise, lest we allow circumvention of the innovation introduced by the 1997 Rulesin order to obviate delay in the administration of justice.

Marcelino Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 169122, February 2, 2010 citing Solar TeamEntertainment, Inc. v. Judge Ricafort, 355 Phil. 404 (1998)

City of Dumaguete vs. Phil. Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011

Rule 13, Sec. 13 - Proof of service


Ace Navigation Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140364, August 15, 2000

MC Engineering vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 142314, June 28, 2001

Lutgarda Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123340, August 29, 2002

Betty T. Chua vs. Absolute Mngt. Corp., et al., G.R. No. 144881, October 16, 2003

Republic of the Phil. vs. Josefina B. Vda. De Neri, G.R. No. 139588, March 4, 2004

Rule 13, Sec. 14 - Notice of lis pendens


As provided in Section 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendensmay be cancelled on two grounds: (1) when the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the titleof the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party whocaused it to be recorded.

Heirs of Jose Sy Bang, et al. vs. Rolando Sy, et al., G.R. Nos. 114217 & 150797, October 13, 2009

The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the subject matter of thelitigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment in order to prevent thefinal judgment from being defeated by successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fideor not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgatesubsequently.

Heirs of Jose Sy Bang, et al. vs. Rolando Sy, et al., G.R. Nos. 114217 & 150797, October 13, 2009

Rule 14, Sec. 1 - Clerk to issue summons

Producers Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125468, October 9, 2000

Noel G. Wabe vs. Luisita P. Bionson, AM P-03-1760, December 30, 2003

Rule 14, Sec. 3 - By whom served

Giselle G. Talion vs. Esteban P. Ayupan, A.M. No. P-01-1529, January 23, 2002

Rule 14, Sec. 4 - Return

Harry Ang Ping vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126947, July 15, 1999

Joel R. Umandap vs. Jose L. Sabio, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 140244, August 29, 2000

Christopher V. Aguilar vs. Rolando C. How, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-03-1783, July 31, 2003


Rule 14, Sec. 5 - Issuance of alias summons

Sps. Madrigal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129955, November 26, 1999

Christopher V. Aguilar vs. Rolando C. How, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-03-1783, July 31, 2003

Rule 14, Sec. 6 - Service in person on defendant

Sps. Madrigal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129955, November 26, 1999


Maria Victoria Cano-Gutierrez vs. Herminio A. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 138584, October 2, 2000


Federico S. Sandoval II vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 149380, July 3, 2002

Regalado P. Samartino vs. Leonor B. Raon, G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002

Cipriano M. Lazaro vs. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas (Bulacan), Inc., et al., G.R. No. 139895,August 15, 2003

Henry S. Oaminal vs. Pablito M. Castillo, et al., G.R. No. 152776, October 8, 2003

Sps. Patrick and Rafaela Jose vs. Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon, G.R. No. 147369, October 23, 2003

A resident defendant who does not voluntarily appear in court, such as petitioner in this case,must be personally served with summons as provided under Sec. 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

Ma. Theresa Chaves Biaco vs. Phil. Countryside Rural Bank, G.R. No. 161417, February 8, 2007

Section 6 in relation to Section 7

Personal service of summons is preferred over substituted service. Only if the former cannot bemade promptly may the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service ofsummons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b)specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served upon aperson of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of theoffice or regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the pertinent factsproving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or in the officer's return. The failure tocomply faithfully, strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted servicerenders the service of summons ineffective.


Air Materiel Wing Savings, et al. vs. Luvin S. Manay, et al., G.R. No. 175338, October 9, 2007

In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot bepersonally served, substituted service, as provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, isessential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of a defendant who does notvoluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court.


[P]ersonal service of summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when the saidsummons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to substitutedservice.

Constantino A. Pascual vs. Lourdes S. Pascual, G.R. No. 171916, December 4, 2009

Rule 14, Sec. 7 - Substituted service


Maria Victoria Cano-Gutierrez vs. Herminio A. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 138584, October 2, 2000


United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Roberto V. Ongpin, G.R. No. 146593, October 26, 2001

Federico S. Sandoval II vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 149380, July 3, 2002


Cipriano M. Lazaro vs. Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas (Bulacan), Inc., et al., G.R. No. 139895,August 15, 2003

Henry S. Oaminal vs. Pablito M. Castillo, et al., G.R. No. 152776, October 8, 2003

Fortunato Gomez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127692, March 10, 2004

As a rule, summons should be personally served on the defendant. It is only when summonscannot be served personally within a reasonable period of time that substituted service may beresorted to.

Orion Security Corp. vs. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 163287, April 27, 2007

If a resident defendant cannot be personally served with summons within a reasonable time,substituted service may be effected (1) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant'sresidence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (2) by leaving thecopies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge


thereof in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

Ma. Theresa Chaves Biaco vs. Phil. Countryside Rural Bank, G.R. No. 161417, February 8, 2007

Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is therefore required thatstatutory restrictions for effecting substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed.Failure to comply with this rule renders absolutely void the substituted service along with theproceedings taken thereafter. The underlying principle of this rigid requirement is that the person, towhom the orders, notices or summons are addressed, is made to answer for the consequences of thesuit even though notice of such action is made, not upon the party concerned, but upon anotherwhom the law could only presume would notify such party of the pending proceedings.

FEU-NRMF, et al. vs. FEU-NRMFEA-AFW, G.R. No. 168362, October 16, 2006

The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be servedpromptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff orthe sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but nospecific time frame is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is necessaryunder the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what thecontract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, ifany[,] to the other party." Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However,when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summonsand the latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiffmay then ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has failed. What then is a reasonabletime for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of promptservice? To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditiousprocessing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require thesheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff's Returnprovides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to besubmitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeedingmonth. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" withregard to personal service on the defendant.

Ma. Imelda M. Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 130974, August 16, 2006

In a long line of cases, this Court held that the impossibility of personal service justifyingavailment of substituted service should be explained in the proof of service; why efforts exertedtowards personal service failed. The pertinent facts and circumstances attendant to the service ofsummons must be stated in the proof of service or Officer's Return; otherwise, the substitutedservice cannot be upheld. It bears stressing that since service of summons, especially for actions inpersonam, is essential for the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, the resortto a substituted service must be duly justified. Failure to do so would invalidate all subsequentproceedings on jurisdictional grounds.


Administrative Circular No. 59 was precisely issued by this Court to stress the importance ofstrict compliance with the requisites for a valid substituted service.

Madrigal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129955, November 26, 1999


Sps. Patrick and Rafaela Jose vs. Sps. Helen and Romeo Boyon, G.R. No. 147369, October 23, 2003

[R]equirements to effect a valid substituted service:

(1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be servedpromptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff orthe sheriff is given a "reasonable time" to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but nospecific time range is mentioned. "Reasonable time" is defined as "so much time as is necessaryunder the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what thecontract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, ifany, to the other party." Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, whenthe court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and thelatter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff maythen ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has failed. What then is a reasonable timefor the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service?To the plaintiff, "reasonable time" means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditiousprocessing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, "reasonable time" means 15 to 30days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require thesheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff's Returnprovides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to besubmitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeedingmonth. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered "reasonable time" withregard to personal service on the defendant.

Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmostdiligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensationof justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service ondefendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service ofsummons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process onthe defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts bythe sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] whicheventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. "Several attempts" means atleast three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite whysuch efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of service can be confirmed oraccepted.


(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding theattempted personal service. The efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind thefailure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personalservice, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the allegedresidence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons ondefendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff'sReturn of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published bythe Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendantpersonally and the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5 dated November 9,1989 requires that "impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made tofind the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts," which should be made in the proof ofservice.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

If the substituted service will be effected at defendant's house or residence, it should be left witha person of "suitable age and discretion then residing therein." A person of suitable age anddiscretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered tohave enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. "Discretion" is defined as"the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understandingof what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed". Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, suchperson must know how to read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons,and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliestpossible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the "relation ofconfidence" to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of thereceipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the allegeddwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient's relationship with thedefendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summonsand his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receiptof summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.

(4) A Competent Person in Charge

If the substituted service will be done at defendant's office or regular place of business, then itshould be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom thesubstituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, suchas the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand theobligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising frominaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.

Constantino A. Pascual vs. Lourdes S. Pascual, G.R. No. 171916, December 4, 2009


In Montalban v. Maximo (G.R. No. L-22997, March 15, 1968), we held that substituted serviceof summons under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in personam againstresidents of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom is the normal method of service ofsummons that will confer jurisdiction on the court over such defendant.

Leah Palma vs. Danilo P. Galvez, et al., G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010

. . . A man temporarily absent from this country leaves a definite place of residence, a dwellingwhere he lives, a local base, so to speak, to which any inquiry about him may be directed and wherehe is bound to return. Where one temporarily absents himself, he leaves his affairs in the hands ofone who may be reasonably expected to act in his place and stead; to do all that is necessary toprotect his interests; and to communicate with him from time to time any incident of importance thatmay affect him or his business or his affairs. It is usual for such a man to leave at his home or withhis business associates information as to where he may be contacted in the event a question thataffects him crops up. If he does not do what is expected of him, and a case comes up in courtagainst him, he cannot just raise his voice and say that he is not subject to the processes of ourcourts. He cannot stop a suit from being filed against him upon a claim that he cannot be summonedat his dwelling house or residence or his office or regular place of business.

Not that he cannot be reached within a reasonable time to enable him to contest a suit againsthim. There are now advanced facilities of communication. Long distance telephone calls andcablegrams make it easy for one he left behind to communicate with him.

Considering that private respondent was temporarily out of the country, the summons andcomplaint may be validly served on her through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of theRules of Court . . . .

Leah Palma vs. Danilo P. Galvez, et al., G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010 citing Montalban v. Maximo,No. L-22997, March 15, 1968

Section 7 also designates the persons with whom copies of the process may be left. The rulepresupposes that such a relation of confidence exists between the person with whom the copy is leftand the defendant and, therefore, assumes that such person will deliver the process to defendant orin some way give him notice thereof.


Rule 14, Sec. 11 - Service upon domestic private juridical entity

Orion Security Corp. vs. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc., G.R. No. 163287, April 27, 2007

Bank of the Phil. Islands vs. Sps. Ireneo and Liwanag Santiago, et al., G.R. No. 169116, March 28, 2007





Kanlaon Construction vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 126625, September 18, 1997

The Rules of Court provides that personal service of petitions and other pleadings is the generalrule, while a resort to other modes of service and filing is the exception.

Pedro Tagabi vs. Margarito Tanque, G.R. No. 144024, July 27, 2006

Teresa Gabriel, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 149909, October 11, 2007

When we crafted Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, we did not intend it to be just somesilly rule the parties can ignore when convenient, and the courts disregard when expedient. Wedesigned it to serve a very real purpose: to ensure that pleadings, motions and other papers reach thecourts directly and promptly, so that they may be acted upon expeditiously; and to forestall thedeplorable practice among some lawyers of serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch theiropposing counsel off-guard. Thus, these lawyers leave the opposing counsel with little or no time torespond accordingly; or, upon receiving notice from the post office of the registered parcelcontaining the pleading or other papers from the adverse party, the latter may unduly procrastinatebefore claiming said parcel - or, worse, not claim it at all - and thereby cause undue delay in thedisposition of such pleading or other papers.

Under said rule, personal service and filing of pleadings and other papers is a mandatory mode,especially when the peculiar circumstances of the case — such as the proximity of the office of aparty's counsel to the court or to the office of the opposing party's counsel — make such modepracticable. If another mode is employed, there must be attached to the pleading or paper, a writtenexplanation of such recourse. Omission of a written explanation will give the court cause toexpunge the pleading or paper not personally served or filed. And ordinarily, such exercise ofdiscretion by the court will not be overruled on appeal, except when: a) on the face of the affidavitof service, it is patent that personal service and filing is impractical, such as when the parties ortheir counsels live in different provinces; b) there is prima facie merit in the pleading or paperexpunged; and c) the issue raised therein is of substantial importance. Under these exceptionalcircumstances the lack of written explanation may be excused and the pleading or paper served orfiled, accepted.

Alex M. Cadornigara vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 158073, November 23,2007

Sps. Julian, Sr. and Leonila Santiago, et al. vs. BPI, G.R. No. 163749, September 26, 2008

Service of summons on a domestic corporation is restricted, limited and exclusive to the personsenumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, following the rule in


statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius.

DOLE Phil., Inc. (Tropifresh Division) vs. Reinato G. Quilala, et al., G.R. No. 168723, July 9, 2008

Rule 14, Sec. 12 - Service upon foreign private juridical entity

Elucidating on the above provision of the Rules of Court, this Court declared in PioneerInternational, Ltd. v. Guadiz, Jr. (G.R. No. 156848, October 11, 2007) that when the defendant is aforeign juridical entity, service of summons may be made upon:

1. Its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose;

2. The government official designated by law to receive summons if the corporation does nothave a resident agent; or,

3. Any of the corporation's officers or agents within the Philippines.

Atiko Trans, Inc., et al. vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., G.R. No. 167545, August 17,2011

As amended [by A.M. No. 11-3-6-SC], said provision of the Rules of Court now reads:

SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private juridical entity. — When the defendant is aforeign private juridical entity which has transacted business in the Philippines, service maybe made on its resident agent designated in accordance with law for that purpose, or, if therebe no such agent, on the government official designated by law to that effect, or on any of itsofficers or agents within the Philippines.

If the foreign private juridical entity is not registered in the Philippines or has noresident agent, service may, with leave of court, be effected out of the Philippines throughany of the following means:

a) By personal service coursed through the appropriate court in the foreign countrywith the assistance of the Department of Foreign Affairs;

b) By publication once in a newspaper of general circulation in the country wherethe defendant may be found and by serving a copy of the summons and the court orderby-registered mail at the last known address of the defendant;

c) By facsimile or any recognized electronic means that could generate proof ofservice; or

d) By such other means as the court may in its discretion direct.

Atiko Trans, Inc., et al. vs. Prudential Guarantee and Assurance, Inc., G.R. No. 167545, August 17,


2011

Rule 14, Sec. 13 - Service upon public corporations

EDI-Staffbuilders International, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 145587, October 26, 2007


Rule 14, Sec. 14 - Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown


Rule 14, Sec. 15 - Extraterritorial service

Service of summons on a non-resident defendant must be in accordance with Section 15, Rule 14of the Rules of Court. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1)by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and forsuch time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the summons and order of the courtshould be sent by registered mail to the last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any othermanner which the court may deem sufficient. The third mode, like the first two, must be madeoutside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country wheredefendant resides.


Extrajudicial service of summons apply only where the action is in rem, that is, an action againstthe thing itself instead of against the person, or in an action quasi in rem, where an individual isnamed as defendant and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to theobligation or loan burdening the property. The rationale for this is that in in rem and quasi in remactions, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction onthe court provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

Erlinda R. Velayo-Fong vs. Sps. Raymond and Maria Hedy Velayo, G.R. No. 155488, December 6, 2006

As a rule, when the defendant does not reside and is not found in the Philippines, Philippinecourts cannot try any case against him because of the impossibility of acquiring jurisdiction over his


person unless he voluntarily appears in court. But when the case is one of actions in rem or quasi inrem enumerated in Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, Philippine courts have jurisdiction tohear and decide the case. In such instances, Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the res, andjurisdiction over the person of the non-resident defendant is not essential.

Actions in personam and actions in rem or quasi in rem differ in that actions in personam aredirected against specific persons and seek personal judgments. On the other hand, actions in rem orquasi in rem are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments withrespect thereto as against the whole world.

Margarita Romualdez-Licaros vs. LAbelardo icaros, G.R. No. 150656, April 29, 2003

Octavio Alvarez vs. Augustus C. Diaz, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-00-1283, March 3, 2004

Rule 14, Sec. 16 - Residents temporarily out of the Philippines


In Montefalcon v. Vasquez (G.R. No. 165016, June 17, 2008), we said that because Section 16 ofRule 14 uses the words "may" and "also," it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summonsallowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-resident whois temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the country,any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in section7 (formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3)service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deemsufficient.


Rule 14, Sec. 18 - Proof of service


Rule 14, Sec. 20 - Voluntary appearance



Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd vs. Dakila Trading Corp., G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007

A defendant's voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons.

DOLE Phil., Inc. (Tropifresh Division) vs. Reinato G. Quilala, et al., G.R. No. 168723, July 9, 2008

Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdictionover the defendants in a civil case is acquired either through the service of summons upon them inthe manner required by law or through their voluntary appearance in court and their submission toits authority. A party who makes a special appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of saidcourt based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to have submitted himself tothe jurisdiction of the court


[A] defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the court over hisperson, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have appeared voluntarilybefore the court. What the rule on voluntary appearance — the first sentence of the above-quotedrule — means is that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without qualification, inwhich case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of jurisdiction over his person due toimproper service of summons.

Edna Diago Lhuillier vs. British Airways, G.R. No. 171092, March 15, 2010, citing Garcia v.Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 170122, October 12, 2009

It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdictionover the person of the defendant by virtue of the latter's voluntary appearance.

Rapid City Realty and Development Corp. vs. Sps. Orlando and Lourdes Villa, G.R. No. 184197,February 11, 2010

Rule 15, Sec. 4 - Hearing of motion

Clodualdo C. De jesus vs. Rodolfo D. Obnamia Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-00-1314, September 7, 2000

Antonio M. Bangayan vs. Jimmy R. Butacan, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1320, November 22, 2000

Dolores Fajardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140356, March 20, 2001

Re: Release by Judge Muro, A.M. No. P-00-7-323-RTJ, October 17, 2001

Mahid M. Mutilan vs. Judge Santos B. Adiong, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1581, July 2, 2002

Winnie Bajet vs. Judge Vivencio S. Baclig, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1598, July 30, 2002

Republic of the Phil. vs. Marilyn A. Peralta, et al., G.R. No. 150327, June 18, 2003


Teodora and Rodolfo Capacete vs. Venancia Baroro, et al., G.R. No. 154184, July 8, 2003

A motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules ofCourt is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no right to receive andthe trial court has no authority to act upon.

Federico Pallada v. Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Br. 1, G.R. No. 129442, March 10, 1999

KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Adelina Calderon-Bargas, et al., G.R. No. 163785, December 27, 2007

The requirements in Sections 4 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on notice of hearing andproof of service thereof to the adverse party, far from being merely technical and procedural, arenecessary elements of procedural due process.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Augustine A. Vestil, A.M. Nos. RTJ-06-2030 & RTJ-07-2032,October 5, 2007

As may be gleaned (from Section 14 of Rule 15) and as held time and again, the noticerequirement in a motion is mandatory. As a rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing is consideredpro forma and does not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisitepleading.

Gliceria Sarmiento vs. Emerita Zaratan, G.R. No. 167471, February 5, 2007

Annie Tan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130314, September 22, 1998

Rule 15, Sec. 5 - Notice of hearing



Serena T. Bacelonia vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 143440, February 11, 2003

Dolores Fajardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140356, March 20, 2001

A motion which does not meet the requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules ofCourt is considered a worthless piece of paper, which the Clerk of Court has no right to receive andthe trial court has no authority to act upon.

Federico Pallada v. Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Br. 1, G.R. No. 129442, March 10, 1999

KKK Foundation, Inc. vs. Adelina Calderon-Bargas, et al., G.R. No. 163785, December 27, 2007

Aneco Realty and Development Corp. vs. Landex Development Corp., G.R. No. 165952, July 28, 2008

Jurisprudence confirms that the requirements laid down in Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the


Rules of Court that the notice of hearing shall be directed to the parties concerned, and shall statethe time and place for the hearing of the motion, are mandatory. If not religiously complied with,they render the motion pro forma. As such, the motion is a useless piece of paper that will not tollthe running of the prescriptive period.

Yet, again, there were previous cases with peculiar circumstances that had compelled us toliberally apply the rules on notice of hearing and recognize substantial compliance with the same.Once such case is Philippine National Bank v. Paneda, (G.R. No. 149236, February 14, 2007)where we adjudged: Thus, even if the Motion may be defective for failure to address the notice ofhearing of said motion to the parties concerned, the defect was cured by the court's takingcognizance thereof and the fact that the adverse party was otherwise notified of the existence of saidpleading. There is substantial compliance with the foregoing rules if a copy of the said motion forreconsideration was furnished to the counsel of herein private respondents. In the present case,records reveal that the notices in the Motion were addressed to the respective counsels of the privaterespondents and they were duly furnished with copies of the same as shown by the receipts signedby their staff or agents. Consequently, the Court finds that the petitioner substantially complied withthe pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing jurisprudence on the requirements ofmotions and pleadings.

City of Dumaguete vs. Phil. Ports Authority, G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011

Rule 15, Sec. 6 - Proof of service necessary


Lutgarda Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123340, August 29, 2002

Mahid M. Mutilan vs. Santos B. Adiong, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1581, July 2, 2002

The requirements in Sections 4 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on notice of hearing andproof of service thereof to the adverse party, far from being merely technical and procedural, arenecessary elements of procedural due process.

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Augustine A. Vestil, A.M. Nos. RTJ-06-2030 & RTJ-07-2032,October 5, 2007

Rule 15, Sec. 8 - Omnibus motion

Rationale for Rule


The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the party filing a pleading ormotion to raise all available exceptions for relief during the single opportunity so that single ormultiple objections may be avoided.


True, the Omnibus Motion Rule requires the movant to raise all available exceptions in a singleopportunity to avoid multiple piecemeal objections. But to apply that statutory norm, the objectionsmust have been available to the party at the time the Motion was filed.

PH Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals and Carlos M. Farrales, G.R. No. 109648, November 22,2001


The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the party filing a pleading ormotion to raise all available exceptions for relief during the single opportunity so that single ormultiple objections may be avoided.


Rule 16 - Motion to Dismiss

The Order of the trial court denying the motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory. Aninterlocutory order does not terminate nor finally dispose of the case, but leaves something to bedone by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. It is always under the control ofthe court and may be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds shown at any time before finaljudgment. This proceeds from the court's inherent power to control its processes and orders so as tomake them conformable to law and justice.

Bonifacio Construction Management vs. Bernabe, G.R. No. 148174, June 30, 2005

Rule 16, Sec. 1 - Grounds

In General

Forum non conveniens is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1, Rule 16 ofthe Rules of Court does not include it as a ground.


Kazuhiro Hasegawa, et al. vs. Minoru Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177, November 23, 2007

It is a well-settled rule that the order denying the motion to dismiss cannot be the subject ofpetition for certiorari. Petitioners should have filed an answer to the complaint, proceed to trial andawait judgment before making an appeal.

Bank of America vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120135, March 31, 2003

A motion to dismiss shall be filed within the time for but before filing the answer to thecomplaint or pleading asserting a claim.

Elidad C. Kho vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115758, March 19, 2002

The period to file a motion to dismiss depends upon the circumstances of the case. Section 1 ofRule 16 of the Rules of Court requires that, in general, a motion to dismiss should be filed withinthe reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading. Thus, a motion to dismiss allegingimproper venue cannot be entertained unless made within that period.

However, even after an answer has been filed, the Court has allowed a defendant to file a motionto dismiss on the following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) litis pendentia, (3) lack of cause ofaction, and (4) discovery during trial of evidence that would constitute a ground for dismissal.Except for lack of cause of action or lack of jurisdiction, the grounds under Section 1 of Rule 16may be waived. If a particular ground for dismissal is not raised or if no motion to dismiss is filed atall within the reglementary period, it is generally considered waived under Section 1, Rule 9 of theRules.

Felizardo S. Obando, et al. vs. Eduardo F. Figueras, et al., G.R. No. 134854, January 18, 2000

Accordingly, Rule 16, Section 1 of the Rules of Court does not consider as grounds for a motionto dismiss the allotment of the disputed land for another public purpose or the petition for a mereeasement of right-of-way in the complaint for expropriation. The grounds for dismissal areexclusive to those specifically mentioned in Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, and an actioncan be dismissed only on a ground authorized by this provision.

Robern Development Corp. vs. Jesus V. Quitain, G.R. No. 135042, September 23, 1999

The option of whether to set the case for preliminary hearing after the filing of an answer whichraises affirmative defenses, or to file a motion to dismiss raising any of the grounds set forth inSection 1, Rule 16 of the Rules are procedural options which are not mutually exclusive of eachother.

Associated Bank vs. Sps. Justiniano, Sr. and Ligaya Montano, et al., G.R. No. 166383, October 16,2009

Section 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the trial court may dismiss acomplaint on the ground that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff's complaint has beenpaid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. This ground essentially admits the obligation


set out in the complaint but points out that such obligation has been extinguished, in this caseapparently by abandonment after respondent received partial reimbursement from [the seller] as aconsequence of the cancellation of contract to sell between them.

Doña Rosana Realty and Dev't. Corp., et al. vs. Molave Dev't. Corp., G.R. No. 180523, March 26, 2010

(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause


Spouses Ma. Cristina D. Tirona and Oscar Tirona vs. Hon. Floro P. Alejo as Presiding Judge, G.R. No.129313, October 10, 2001

For litis pendentia to lie as a ground for a motion to dismiss, the following requisites must bepresent: (1) that the parties to the action are the same; (2) that there is substantial identity in thecauses of action and reliefs sought; and (3) that the result of the first action is determinative of thesecond in any event and regardless of which party is successful.

Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a finaljudgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. This situation is not present here.

DBP vs. Sps. Gatal, G.R. No. 138567, March 4, 2005

Litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means "a pending suit" and is variously referred toin some decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civilaction, it refers to the situation where two actions are pending between the same parties for the samecause of action, so that one of them becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policyagainst multiplicity of suits.

To constitute litis pendentia, not only must the parties in the two actions be the same; there mustas well be substantial identity in the causes of action and in the reliefs sought. Further, the identityshould be such that any judgment that may be rendered in one case, regardless of which party issuccessful, would amount to res judicata in the other.

Dotmatrix Trading vs. Rommel B. Legaspi, G.R. No. 155622, October 26, 2009

The rule on litis pendentia does not require that the case later in time should yield to the earliercase; what is required merely is that there be another pending action, not a prior pending action.Neither is it required that the party be served with summons before lis pendens can apply; it is thefiling of the action, not the receipt of summons, which determines priority in date.


The "more appropriate action test" considers the real issue raised by the pleadings and theultimate objective of the parties; the more appropriate action is the one where the real issues raisedcan be fully and completely settled.



In the "anticipatory test", the bona fides or good faith of the parties is the critical element. If thefirst suit is filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for itsdismissal, then the first suit should be dismissed.


Under this established jurisprudence on litis pendentia, the following considerations predominatein the ascending order of importance in determining which action should prevail: (1) the date offiling, with preference generally given to the first action filed to be retained; (2) whether the actionsought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action or to anticipate its filing and laythe basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating theissues between the parties.


(f), (h) and (i)

Under Section 5 of Rule 16, dismissals under paragraphs (f), (h), and (i) of Section 1 of Rule 16of the Rules of Court constitute res judicata.

Sps. Isidro and Lea Cruz vs. Sps. Florencio and Amparo Caraos, et al., G.R. no. 138208, April 23, 2007

(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no cause of action

There is a distinction between a motion to dismiss for failure of the complainant to state a causeof action and a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action. The first is governed by Rule 16,Section 1 (g), while the second by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court.

Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. vs. Dakila Trading Corp., G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007

Manila Banking Corp. vs. University of Baguio, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 159189, February 21, 2007

Republic of the Philippines vs. Juan C. Tuvera, et al., G.R. No. 148246, February 16, 2007

Melissa Domondon vs. Percival Mandap Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1696, June 20, 2002

A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action is filed by the defendant after the plaintiffhas presented his evidence on the ground that the latter has shown no right to the relief sought.While a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections which can be ventilatedbefore the beginning of the trial, a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is in the nature of a demurrer toevidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff hasrested his case.

Melissa Domondon vs. Judge Percival Mandap Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1696, June 20, 2002

In a motion to dismiss due to failure to state a cause of action, the trial court can consider all the


pleadings filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on record. However in so doing, thetrial court does not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely includes such documentsin the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding of lack of cause of action based on thesedocuments would not involve a calibration of the probative value of such pieces of evidence butwould only limit itself to the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the facts andthese supporting documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such a review are purequestions of law, and not questions of fact.

China Road and Bridge Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 137898, December 15, 2000

(j) That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with.

Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129242, January 16, 2001

It is a settled rule that an Order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and,therefore, not appealable, nor can it be subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such order mayonly be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. Theordinary procedure to be followed in that event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision isadverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.


Rule 16, Sec. 2 - Hearing of motion

Francisca L. Marquez vs. Simeon Baldoz, G.R. No. 143779, April 4, 2003

Spouses Horacio and Felisa Benito vs. Agapita Saquitan-Ruiz, G.R. No. 149906, December 26, 2002


William Alain Miailhe vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108991, March 20, 2001

Heirs of Nepomucena Paez vs. Ramon Am. Torres, et al., G.R. No. 104314, February 2, 2000

Rule 16, Sec. 3 - Resolution of motion

United Overseas Bank Phils. vs. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., et al., G.R. Nos. 159669 &163521, March 12, 2007

Douglas Lu Ym vs. Gertrudes Nabua, G.R. No. 161309, February 23, 2005


Wolfgang O. Roehr vs. Maria Carmen D. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003


Richard Teh vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 147038, April 24, 2003

Francisca L. Marquez vs. Simeon Baldoz, G.R. No. 143779, April 4, 2003


William Alain Miailhe vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108991, March 20, 2001

California and Hawaiian Sugar vs. Pioneer Insurance, G.R. No. 139273, November 28, 2000

Erlinda C. Pefianco vs. Maria Luisa C. Moral, G.R. No. 132248, January 19, 2000

Rule 16, Sec. 5 - Effect of dismissal

246 Corp. vs. Reynaldo B. Daway, G.R. No. 157216, November 20, 2003

Rule 16, Sec. 6 - Pleading grounds as affirmative defenses

246 Corp. vs. Reynaldo B. Daway, G.R. No. 157216, November 20, 2003


Tourist Duty Free Shops vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 107395, January 26, 2000

True, Section 6, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules, specifically provides that a preliminary hearing onthe affirmative defenses may be allowed only when no motion to dismiss has been filed. Section 6,however, must be viewed in the light of Section 3 of the same Rule, which requires courts toresolve a motion to dismiss and prohibits them from deferring its resolution on the ground ofindubitability. Clearly then, Section 6 disallows a preliminary hearing of affirmative defenses once amotion to dismiss has been filed because such defense should have already been resolved.

California and Hawaiian Sugar vs. Pioneer Insurance, G.R. No. 139273, November 28, 2000

The rule is based on practicality. Both the parties and the court can conveniently save time andexpenses necessarily involved in a case preparation and in a trial at large, when the issues involvedin a particular case can otherwise be disposed of in a preliminary hearing.

Associated Bank vs. Sps. Justiniano, Sr. and Ligaya Montano, et al., G.R. No. 166383, October 16,2009


Rule 17 - Dismissal of Actions

There are two ways by which an action may be dismissed upon the instance of the plaintiff. First,dismissal is a matter of right when a notice of dismissal is filed by the plaintiff before an answer ora motion for summary judgment has been served on him by the defendant. Second, dismissal isdiscretionary on the court when the motion for the dismissal of the action is filed by the plaintiff atany stage of the proceedings other than before service of an answer or a motion for summaryjudgment. While the dismissal in the first mode takes effect upon the mere notice of plaintiffwithout need of a judicial order, the second mode requires the authority of the court beforedismissal of the case may be effected. This is so because in the dismissal of an action, the effect ofthe dismissal upon the rights of the defendant should always be taken into consideration.

Limaco vs. Shonan Gakuen Children's House Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 158245, June 30, 2005

Rule 17, Sec. 1 - Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff

Susie Chan-Tan vs. Jesse C. Tan, G.R. No. 167139, February 25, 2010

Ma. Carminia C. Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139337, August 15, 2001

It is mandatory that the trial court issue an order confirming such dismissal (upon notice ofplaintiff) and, unless otherwise stated in the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice and could beaccomplished by the plaintiff through mere notice of dismissal, and not through motion subject toapproval by the court. Dismissal is ipso facto upon notice, and without prejudice unless otherwisestated in the notice.

Frederick Dael vs. Sps. Benedicto and Vilma Beltran, G.R. No. 156470, April 30, 2008

Rule 17, Sec. 2 - Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff

Susie Chan-Tan vs. Jesse C. Tan, G.R. No. 167139, February 25, 2010



Rule 17, Sec. 3 - Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff

Benedicta M. Samson, et al. vs. Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig, et al., G.R. No. 166356, February 2, 2010

Eduardo M. Martinez vs. Judge Orlando C. Paguio, A.M. No. MTJ 02-1419, December 27, 2002

Lilia J. Vicoy vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 138203, July 3, 2002


Emma Gallardo-Corro, et al. vs. Efren Don L. Gallardo, et al., G.R. No. 136228, January 30, 2001

Failure to make a substitution pursuant to Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court is a ground forthe dismissal of an action.

Rufus B. Rodriguez, et al. vs. Samuel A. Jardin, G.R. No. 141834, July 30, 2007

Under Rule 17, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, the dismissal of a case for lack of interest toprosecute had the effect of an adjudication on the merits.

Pablo C. Olivares, et al. vs. Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr., A.C. No. 6323, April 13, 2007

The rules contemplate certain instances where the complaint may be dismissed due to theplaintiff's fault: (1) if he fails to appear during a scheduled trial, especially on the date for thepresentation of his evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonablelength of time; (3) if he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court; or, (4) where theplaintiff fails to appear when so required at the pre-trial.

BPI vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117385, February 11, 1999

Dismissals of actions for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute is authorized under Section 3, Rule17 of the Rules of Court. A plain examination of the December 16, 2003 dismissal order shows thatit is an unqualified order and, as such, is deemed to be a dismissal with prejudice. "Dismissals ofactions (under Section 3) which do not expressly state whether they are with or without prejudiceare held to be with prejudice[.]"As a prejudicial dismissal, the December 16, 2003 dismissal order isalso deemed to be a judgment on the merits so that the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No.02-488 can no longer be refiled on the principle of res judicata. Procedurally, when a complaint isdismissed for failure to prosecute and the dismissal is unqualified, the dismissal has the effect of anadjudication on the merits. As an adjudication on the merits, it is imperative that the dismissal orderconform with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court on the writing of valid judgments and finalorders.

Shimizu Phil. Contractors, Inc. vs. Leticia B. Magsalin, et al., G.R. No. 170026, June 20, 2012

The reliance on Joaquin [Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 (1953)] is misplaced as it is based onthe conclusion the appellate court made in its April 8, 2005 resolution — i.e., that the pleading ofundisputed facts is equivalent to a prohibited appeal. The reliance is inattentive to both the


averments of the subject appeal and to the text of the cited case. The operative legal principle inJoaquin is this: "[W]here a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts arestated in the judgment and the issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, thequestion is one of law which [is properly subject to the review of this Court.]" In this case, asalready pointed out above, the facts supposedly supporting the trial court's conclusion of nonprosequitur were not stated in the judgment. This defeats the application of Joaquin.


The grounds specified by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for the motu proprio dismissalof a case for failure to prosecute. . . are as follows:

(a) Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to appear on the date of thepresentation of his evidence in chief;

(b) Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time;

(c) Failure of the plaintiff to comply with the Rules of Court; or

(d) Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.


The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff ischargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. Theremust be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute. While it is discretionary on the trialcourt to dismiss cases, dismissals of actions should be made with care. The repressive or restrainingeffect of the rule amounting to adjudication upon the merits may cut short a case even before it isfully litigated; a ruling of dismissal may forever bar a litigant from pursuing judicial relief under thesame cause of action. Hence, sound discretion demands vigilance in duly recognizing thecircumstances surrounding the case to the end that technicality shall not prevail over substantialjustice.


Rule 18, Sec. 1 - When conducted

Benedicta M. Samson, et al. vs. Geraldine C. Fiel-Macaraig, et al., G.R. No. 166356, February 2, 2010


Rule 18, Sec. 2 - Nature and purpose

Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.), Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 157594,March 9, 2010

Rule 18, Sec. 3 - Notice of pre-trial

Under the pre-1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of pretrial must be served separately onthe counsel and the client. If served only on the counsel, the notice must expressly direct the counselto inform the client of the date, the time and the place of the pretrial conference. The absence ofsuch notice renders the proceedings void, and the judgment rendered therein cannot acquire finalityand may be attacked directly or collaterally.

Mariano de Guia vs. Ciriaco de Guia, G.R. No. 135384, April 4, 2001

Rule 18, Sec. 4 - Appearance of parties

Noteworthy is the fact that Section 4, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Court is a new provision; andrequires nothing less than that the representative should appear in a party’s behalf fully authorizedin writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution,and to enter into stipulations of facts and of documents.

United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Miguel "Mike" Magpayo, G.R. No. 149908, May 27, 2004

Under Rule 18, Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is obligatory upon both a partyand her counsel to appear at a pre-trial conference. The failure of a party to appear at pre-trial, givenits mandatory character, may cause her to be non-suited or considered as in default.

Nora E. Miwa vs. Rene O. Medina, A.C. No. 5854, September 30, 2003

The rules require that the party-litigant himself must appear for pre-trial but if he chooses to berepresented thereat, he should grant a special power of attorney to his counsel or representative.



Rule 18, Sec. 5 - Effect of failure to appear

Indeed the dismissal of a case whether for failure to appear during trial or prosecute an action foran unreasonable length of time rests on the sound discretion of the trial court. But this discretionmust not be abused, nay gravely abused, and must be exercised soundly. Deferment of proceedingsmay be tolerated so that cases may be adjudged only after a full and free presentation of all theevidence by both parties. The propriety of dismissing a case must be determined by thecircumstances surrounding each particular case. There must be sufficient reason to justify thedismissal of a complaint.

BPI vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117385, February 11, 1999

Prior to the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the phrase "as in default" was initiallyincluded in Rule 20 of the old rules, and which read as follows:

Sec. 2. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suitedor considered as in default.

It was however amended in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Justice Regalado, in hisbook REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, explained the rationale for the deletion of the phrase "asin default" in the amended provision, to wit:

1. This is a substantial reproduction of Section 2 of the former Rule 20 with thechange that, instead of defendant being declared "as in default" by reason of hisnon-appearance, this section now spells out that the procedure will be to allow the ex partepresentation of plaintiff's evidence and the rendition of judgment on the basis thereof. Whileactually the procedure remains the same, the purpose is one of semantical propriety orterminological accuracy as there were criticisms on the use of the word "default" in theformer provision since that term is identified with the failure to file a required answer, notappearance in court.

Still, in the same book, Justice Regalado clarified that while the order of default no longerobtains, its effects were retained, thus:

Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period, and not failure toappear at the hearing, is the sole ground for an order of default, except the failure to appear ata pre-trial conference wherein the effects of a default on the part of the defendant arefollowed, that is, the plaintiff shall be allowed to present evidence ex parte and a judgmentbased thereon may be rendered against defendant.

As the rule now stands, if the defendant fails to appear for pre-trial, a default order is no longerissued. Instead, the trial court may allow the plaintiff to proceed with his evidence ex parte and thecourt can decide the case based on the evidence presented by plaintiff.

Philippine American Life & General Insurance Co. vs. Joseph Enario, G.R. No. 182075, September 15,


2010

Rule 18, Sec. 6 - Pre-trial brief

The pre-trial brief serves as a guide during the pre-trial conference so as to simplify, abbreviateand expedite the trial if not to dispense with it. It is a devise essential to the speedy disposition ofdisputes, and parties cannot brush it aside as a mere technicality. In addition, pre-trial rules are notto be belittled or dismissed, because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a party'ssubstantive rights. Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most persuasive ofreasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with thedegree of his thought[less]ness in not complying with the procedure.

Eufemia Balatico vda. de Agatep vs. Roberta L. Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. 170540, October 28, 2009

Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court mandates that parties shall file with the court and serveon the adverse party their pre-trial briefs at least three days before the scheduled pre-trial. The Rulesalso provide that failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at thepre-trial.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Ildefonso T. Oleta, G.R. No. 156606, August 17, 2007

Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of the defendant to filea pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff maypresent his evidence ex parte and the court shall render judgment on the basis thereof. The remedyof the defendant is to file a motion for reconsideration showing that his failure to file a pre-trialbrief was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect. The motion need not really stress thefact that the defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which contains hisdefenses is already on record.

Jacinto Saguid vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003


Rule 18, Sec. 7 - Record of pre-trial

LCK Industries Inc., et al. vs. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 170606, November 23, 2007

Hermogenes Datuin vs. Andres B. Soriano, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1640, October 15, 2002


Rule 19 - Intervention

Rule 19 of the Rules of Court allows a person to intervene in a civil case.

Manuel H. Nieto, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 166984, August 17, 2007

To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) themovant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay orprejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor becapable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding. The interest, which entitles one tointervene, must involve the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that theintervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Maximo D. Sison, G.R. No. 185954, February 16, 2010

The purpose of intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party in order for himto protect his interest and for the court to settle all conflicting claims. Intervention is allowed toavoid multiplicity of suits more than on due process considerations. To warrant intervention underRule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has a legal interest on thematter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of therights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly decided in aseparate proceeding.


CSMC's intervention should be treated as one pro interesse suo which is a mode of interventionin equity wherein a stranger desires to intervene for the purpose of asserting a property right in theres, or thing, which is the subject matter of the litigation, without becoming a formal plaintiff ordefendant, and without acquiring control over the course of a litigation, which is conceded to themain actors therein.


Rule 19, Sec. 1 - Who may intervene

The legal interest which entitles a person to intervene must be in the matter in litigation and ofsuch direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legaloperation and effect of judgment.

GSIS vs. Mariano A. Nocom, G.R. No. 175989, February 4, 2008


Elmar O. Perez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162580, January 27, 2006

To warrant intervention under Rule 19, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, two requisites mustconcur: (a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, and (b) intervention must notunduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of theintervenor be capable of being properly decided in a separate proceeding.

Union Bank of the Philippines vs. Danilo L. Concepcion, G.R. No. 160727, June 26, 2007

Intervention is not mandatory, but only optional and permissive. Notably, Section 2, Rule 12 ofthe then 1988 Revised Rules of Procedure uses the word 'may' in defining the right to intervene. Thepresent rules maintain the permissive nature of intervention in Section 1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rulesof Civil Procedure.

California Bus Lines, Inc. vs. State Investment House, Inc., G.R. No. 147950, December 11, 2003

Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the courts only when the statutoryconditions for the right to intervene is shown. Thus, the allowance or disallowance of a motion tointervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. In determining the propriety of letting aparty intervene in a case, the tribunal should not limit itself to inquiring whether "a person (1) has alegal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of either of the parties; (3) or an interestagainst both; (4) or when is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or otherdisposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof."

Domingo R. Manalo vs. Court of Appeals and Paic Savings And Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 141297,October 8, 2001

Intervention is not a matter of right but may be permitted by the Courts when the applicant showsfacts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing intervention. Under Section 1 Rule 19 ofthe Revised Rules of Court, what qualifies a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interestin the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, orwhen he is situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property inthe custody of the court or of an officer thereof. As regards the legal interest as qualifying factor,this Court has ruled that such interest must be of direct and immediate character not merelycontingent or expectant so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation ofthe judgment.

Firestone Ceramics vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 127022 & 127245, September 2, 1999

Fort Bonifacio Development Corp. vs. Yllas Lending Corp., et al., G.R. No. 158997, October 6, 2008

GSIS vs. Mariano A. Nocom, G.R. No. 175989, February 4, 2008

[A] motion for intervention shall be entertained when the following requisites are satisfied: (1)the would-be intervenor shows that he has a substantial right or interest in the case; and (2) suchright or interest cannot be adequately pursued and protected in another proceeding.


Eleazar P. Quinto, et al. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010

Rule 19, Sec. 2 - Time to intervene

This section is derived from the former Section 2, Rule 12, which then provided that the motionto intervene may be filed "before or during a trial." Said former phraseology gave rise to ambiguousdoctrines on the interpretation of the word "trial," with one decision holding that said Motion maybe filed up to the day the case is submitted for decision, while another stating that it may be filed atany time before the rendition of the final judgment. This ambiguity was eliminated by the presentSection 2, Rule 19 by clearly stating that the same may be filed "at any time before rendition of thejudgment by the trial court," in line with the second doctrine above-stated. The clear import of theamended provision is that intervention cannot be allowed when the trial court has already renderedits Decision, and much less, when even the Court of Appeals had rendered its own Decision onappeal.

Learning Child, Inc., et al. vs. Ayala Alabang Village Association, et al., G.R. Nos. 134269, 134440 &144518, July 7, 2010

We have ruled however that allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on thesound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. Rule 19 of theRules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully andcompletely available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promotethe administration of justice. Thus, interventions have been allowed even beyond the prescribedperiod in the Rule in the higher interest of justice. Interventions have been granted to affordindispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision hasbeen rendered by the trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment was already submittedfor decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become finaland executory.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Florita A. Masing, et al., G.R. No. 165416, January 22, 2008

As a rule, intervention is allowed "before rendition of judgment by the trial court," as Section 2,Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has recognized exceptions to this rule in the interestof substantial justice . . . But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated,is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of theCourt fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice.Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. Itwas created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Itdoes not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It isdesigned as the means best adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end."

Edna Collado, et al. vs. Court of Appeals and Republic of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 107764,


October 4, 2002

It is not appropriate for petitioner to intervene at the execution stage of the decision. Such right tointervene has lapsed.

Emilia T. Boncodin vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 130757, January 18, 2002

Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action, and not anindependent proceeding; it is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the casebetween the original parties. Where the main action ceases to exist, there is no pending proceedingwherein the intervention may be based.

Domingo R. Manalo vs. Court of Appeals and Paic Savings And Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 141297,October 8, 2001

Alberto Looyuko, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 102696, July 12, 2001

It was error for the trial court to entertain the motion for intervention when it was filed after thecase had not only been submitted for decision but was in fact partially executed. The interventionunduly delayed and disrupted the smooth operation of the trial and prejudiced the adjudication ofthe rights of the principal parties, especially so since the intervenor's rights could be fully protectedin a separate proceeding. More so, the motion for intervention should have been denied it appearingclearly and succinctly that a Compromise Agreement had already been entered into.

Crisostomo Magat, et al. vs. Albert M. Delizo, et al., G.R. No. 135199, July 5, 2001

Thus, intervention may be granted only where its allowance will not unduly delay or prejudicethe rights of the original parties to a case. Generally, it will be allowed "before rendition ofjudgment by the trial court", as Rule 19, §2 expressly provides. After trial and decision in a case,intervention can no longer be permitted. Certainly it cannot be allowed on appeal without undulydelaying the disposition of the case and prejudicing the interest of the parties.

Reggie Christi Limpo vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 124582, June 16, 2000

Intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment.

Francisco I. Chavez vs. PCGG, G.R. No. 130716, May 19, 1999

Henry C. Seveses vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 102675, October 13, 1999

[A]llowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of thecourt after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule ofprocedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice.Its purpose is not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Thus,interventions have been allowed even beyond the prescribed period in the Rule in the higher interestof justice. Interventions have been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not beenimpleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court, when thepetition for review of the judgment was already submitted for decision before the Supreme Court,


and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing (310Phil. 722 (1995)], the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was allowedby this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for all the substantive issuesraised by the parties.

Strategic Alliance Development Corp. vs. Radstock Securities Limited, et al., G.R. Nos. 178158 &180428, December 4, 2009

Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the Rule, when demandedby the higher interest of justice. Interventions have also been granted to afford indispensable parties,who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by thetrial court, when the petition for review of the judgment has already been submitted for decisionbefore the Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final andexecutory.

Eleazar P. Quinto, et al. vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010

Rule 20, Sec. 2 - Assignment of cases

The raffle of cases is vital to the administration of justice because it is intended to ensureimpartial adjudication of cases and obviates public suspicion regarding assignment of cases topredetermined judges. We have set rules in raffling, precisely to provide a uniform method ofassignment of cases for more equitable distribution of cases. Thus, a raffle must be conducted sothat all branches of the court in that station or grouping shall receive more or less the same numberof civil, criminal and other kinds of cases. In the event that there are inequalities, which inevitablyoccur due to vacancies or absences, "once the vacancy is filled or the absent judge has returned, thesala shall be assigned such number of cases as will equalize its caseload equitably with the rest ofthe other branches in the same station". Hence, the assignment to the branch with the least numberof cases will still have to be through a raffle and not on the basis of the preference of any judge.

Antonio J. Fineza vs. Bayani S. Rivera, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1545, August 6, 2003

Office of the Court Administrator vs. Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr., et al., A.M. No. RTJ-07-2074, October 24,2008

Rule 21, Sec. 3 - Form and contents

Purita Alipio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 134100, September 29, 2000

Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum, operates


under the requirements of reasonableness and relevance. For the production of documents to bereasonable and for the documents themselves to be relevant, the matter under inquiry should, in thefirst place, be one that the Ombudsman can legitimately entertain, investigate and rule upon.

Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum of Acting Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman,A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC, March 2, 2010

Rule 21, Sec. 4 - Quashing a subpoena

Under the Rules of Court, the issuance of subpoenas, including a subpoena duces tecum, operatesunder the requirements of reasonableness and relevance. For the production of documents to bereasonable and for the documents themselves to be relevant, the matter under inquiry should, in thefirst place, be one that the Ombudsman can legitimately entertain, investigate and rule upon.

Re: Subpoena Duces Tecum of Acting Director Aleu A. Amante, PIAB-C, Office of the Ombudsman,A.M. No. 10-1-13-SC, March 2, 2010

Rule 21, Sec. 8 - Compelling attendance

A judge may issue a warrant of arrest against a witness simply upon proof that the subpoena hadbeen served upon him but he failed to attend the hearing. The purpose is to bring the witness beforethe court where his attendance is required, not to punish him for contempt which requires a previoushearing.

Samuel D. Pagdilao vs. Adoracion G. Angeles, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1467, August 5, 1999

Rule 22, Sec. 1 - How to compute time

Rodolfo Alarilla, Sr., et al. vs. Reynaldo C. Ocampo, G.R. No. 144697, December 10, 2003

Republic of the Phil. Thru the DPWH vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116463, June 10, 2003

Roberto R. Serrano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139420, August 15, 2001

Ma. Vilma S. Labad vs. University of Southeastern Phils., G.R. No. 139665, August 9, 2001

Medina Investigation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144074, March 20, 2001


Unity Fishing Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 145415, February 2, 2001

Rule 22, Sec. 2 - Effect of interruption

PDIC vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139998, October 29, 2002

Rule 23 - Depositions Pending Action

While the taking of depositions pending trial is not expressly provided [for] under the Rules onCriminal Procedure, we find no reason for public respondent to disallow the taking of the same inthe manner provided for under Section 1 of Rule 23 under the circumstances of the case. Todisallow petitioner to avail of the specific remedies provided under the Rules would deny him theopportunity to adequately defend himself against the criminal charge of rape with homicide nowpending before the public respondent and, further, [it] loses sight of the object of procedure which isto facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties.

People of the Phil. vs. Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, G.R. No. 132577, August 17, 1999

Rule 23, Sec. 1 - Depositions pending action, when may be taken


Producers Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110495, January 29, 1998

Rule 24 - Depositions Before Action or Pending Appeal

Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112710, May 30, 2001


Rule 24, Sec. 1 - Depositions before action petition

Producers Bank of the Phils vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110495, January 29, 1998

Rule 24, Sec. 7 - Depositions pending appeal


Rule 26, Sec. 1 - Request for admission

The purpose of the rule governing requests for admission of facts and genuineness of documentsis to expedite trial and to relieve parties of the costs of proving facts which will not be disputed ontrial and the truth of which can be ascertained by reasonable inquiry.

Allied Agri-Business Dev. Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118438, December 4, 1998

This particular Rule seeks to obtain admissions from the adverse party regarding the genuinenessof relevant documents or relevant matters of fact through requests for admissions to enable a partyto discover the evidence of the adverse side thereby facilitating an amicable settlement of the caseor expediting the trial of the same. However, if the request for admission only serves to delay theproceeding by abetting redundancy in the pleadings, the intended purpose for the rule will certainlybe defeated.

Fortunata N. Duque vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125383, July 2, 2002

Rule 26, Sec. 2 - Implied admission

Fortunata N. Duque vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125383, July 2, 2002

Cristina Diman, et al. vs. Florentino M. Alumbres, et al., G.R. No. 131466, November 27, 1998

The application of the rules on modes of discovery rests upon the sound discretion of the court.In the same vein, the determination of the sanction to be imposed upon a party who fails to complywith the modes of discovery rests on the same sound judicial discretion. It is the duty of the courtsto examine thoroughly the circumstances of each case and to determine the applicability of the


modes of discovery, bearing always in mind the aim to attain an expeditious administration ofjustice.

Rey Lañada vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 102390 & 102404, February 1, 2002

Each of the matters of which an admission is requested shall be deemed admitted unless within aperiod designated in the request which shall not be less than fifteen (15) days after service thereof,or within such further time as the court may allow on motion, the party to whom the request isdirected files and serves upon the party requesting the admission a sworn statement either denyingspecifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail the reasons whyhe cannot truthfully either admit or deny those matters. Upon service of request for admission, theparty served may do any of the following acts: (a) he may admit each of the matters of which anadmission is requested, in which case, he need not file an answers; (b) he may admit the truth of thematters of which admission is requested by serving upon the party requesting a written admission ofsuch matters within the period stated in the request, which must not be less than ten (10) day afterservice, or within such further time as the court may allow on motion and notice; (c) he may file asworn statement denying specifically the matter of which an admission is requested; or, (d) he mayfile a sworn statement setting forth in the detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully either admit ordeny the matters of which an admission is requested.

Allied Agri-Business Dev. Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118438, December 4, 1998

Rule 27 - Production or Inspection of Documents or Things

Rule 27 of the Revised Rules of Court permits "fishing" for evidence, the only limitation beingthat the documents, papers, etc., sought to be produced are not privileged, that they are in thepossession of the party ordered to produce them and that they are material to any matter involved inthe action.

Solidbank Corp. vs. Gateway Electronics Corp., et al., G.R. No. 164805, April 30, 2008

Rule 27, Sec. 1 - Motion for production or inspection; order

Carmelita S. Santos, et al. vs. PNB, G.R. No. 148218, April 29, 2002

Security Bank Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 135874, January 25, 2000

Roberto S. Alberto vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 132242, July 27, 1999

A more than cursory glance at the above text would show that the production or inspection of


documents or things as a mode of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court may be availed of byany party upon a showing of good cause therefor before the court in which an action is pending. Thecourt may order any party: a) to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing ofany designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,which are not privileged; which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in theaction; and which are in his possession, custody or control; or b) to permit entry upon designatedland or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring,surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon.

Air Phil. Corp. vs. Pennswell, Inc., G.R. No. 172835, December 13, 2007

Secretary of National Defense, et al. vs. Raymond Manalo, et al., G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008

Rule 30, Sec. 2 - Adjournments and postponements

Report on the Judicial Audit, A.M. No. 98-8-262-RTC, March 21, 2000

Leticia G. Matias vs. Sergio A. Plan, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1159, August 3, 1998

Rule 30, Sec. 5 - Order of trial

Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all theevidence he relies upon and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal. The obvious rationale of therequirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and the consequent delay in theadministration of justice.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 152375, December 16, 2011

Section 5(f)

The exercise of the court's discretion under the exception of Section 5 (f), Rule 30 of the Rules ofCourt depends on the attendant facts — i.e., on whether the evidence would qualify as a "goodreason" and be in furtherance of "the interest of justice." For a reviewing court to properly interferewith the lower court's exercise of discretion, the petitioner must show that the lower court's actionwas attended by grave abuse of discretion. Settled jurisprudence has defined this term as thecapricious and whimsical exercise of judgment, equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the exercise ofpower in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or sogross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandatedduty, or to act at all in contemplation of the law. Grave abuse of discretion goes beyond the bare and


unsupported imputation of caprice, whimsicality or arbitrariness, and beyond allegations that merelyconstitute errors of judgment or mere abuse of discretion.


Rule 30, Sec. 9 - Judgment to receive evidence; delegation to clerk of court

Vernette Umali-Paco, et al. vs. Reinato G. Quilala, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-02-1699, October 15, 2003

Rule 31, Sec. 1 - Consolidation

It is well recognized that consolidation of cases avoids multiplicity of suits, guards againstoppression and abuse, prevents delay, clears congested court dockets, simplifies the work of thecourts and seeks to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to litigants. Generally,consolidation applies only to cases pending before the same judge and not to cases pending indifferent branches of the same court or in different courts. Yet in appropriate instances and in theinterest of justice, cases pending in different branches of the court or in different courts may beconsolidated, consistent with the rule in our jurisdiction that leans towards permitting consolidationof cases whenever possible and irrespective of the diversity of the issues for resolution. Hence,consolidation of cases is proper when the actions involve the same reliefs or the same parties andbasically the same issues, or when there is real need to forestall the possibility of conflictingdecisions being rendered in the cases, provided that the measure will not give one party an undueadvantage over the other, or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.

Bank of Commerce vs. Estela Perlas-Bernabe, et al., G.R. No. 172393, October 20, 2010

The consolidation of cases is addressed to the sound discretion of judges.

People of the Phil. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 149495, August 21, 2003

The main object of consolidation is to avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression orabuse, prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the trial court and saveunnecessary costs and expense.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang, et al., G.R. No. 130907, November 27, 2001


Rule 32, Sec. 2 - Reference ordered on motion

Under Section 2, Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, a court may, motu proprio, direct a reference to acommissioner when a question of fact, other than upon the pleadings, arises upon motion orotherwise, in any stage of a case, or for carrying a judgment or order into effect. The order ofreference can be limited exclusively to receive and report evidence only, and the commissioner maylikewise rule upon the admissibility of evidence. The commissioner is likewise mandated to submita report in writing to the court upon the matters submitted to him by the order of reference.

Manotok Realty, Inc., et al. vs. CLT Realty Development Corp., G.R. Nos. 123346 & 134385, December14, 2007

Rule 32, Sec. 3 - Order of reference; powers of the commissioner

Aljem's Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122216, March 28, 2001

Rule 32, Sec. 5 - Proceedings before commissioner

Aljem's Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122216, March 28, 2001

Rule 33 - Demurrer to Evidence

There is a distinction between a motion to dismiss for failure of the complainant to state a causeof action and a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action. The first is governed by Rule 16,Section 1 (g), 54 while the second by Rule 33 of the Rules of Court.

Melissa Domondon vs. Percival Mandap Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1696, June 20, 2002


Manila Banking Corp. vs. University of Baguio, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 159189, February 21, 2007


Rule 33, Sec. 1 - Demurrer to evidence

The general rule is that upon the dismissal of the demurrer in the appellate court, the defendantloses the right to present his evidence and the appellate court shall then proceed to render judgmenton the merits on the basis of plaintiff's evidence. . . . It thus becomes the Court's duty to rule on themerits of the complaint, duly taking into account the evidence presented by the Republic, andwithout need to consider whatever evidence the Tuveras have, they having waived their right topresent evidence in their behalf.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Juan C. Tuvera, et al., G.R. No. 148246, February 16, 2007


While a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections which can beventilated before the beginning of the trial, a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is in the nature of ademurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after theplaintiff has rested his case.

Melissa Domondon vs. Judge Percival Mandap Lopez, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1696, June 20, 2002

It should be underscored that the nature of an election protest case differs from an ordinary civilaction. Because of this difference, the Rules of Civil Procedure on demurrer to evidence cannotapply to election cases even "by analogy or in a suppletory character," especially because theapplication of said Rules would not be " practicable and convenient."

Gelacio P. Gementiza vs. Comelec, et al., G.R. No. 140884, March 6, 2001

When a demurrer to evidence granted by a trial court is reversed on appeal, the reviewing courtcannot remand the case for further proceedings. Rather, it should render judgment on the basis ofthe evidence proffered by the plaintiff.

Radiowealth Finance Co. vs. Sps. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, July 6, 2000

Rule 34, Sec. 1 - Judgment on the pleadings

Laurentino D. Bascug vs. Judge Graciano H. Arinday, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1591, April 11, 2002

Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is thepresence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any issue, thatis, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations ofthe adverse party's pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with themat all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when the Answer specifically


denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other wordsraises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. "A'genuine issue' means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguishedfrom an issue which is fictitious or contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial."

Eugenio Basbas, et al. vs. Beata Sayson, et al., G.R. No. 172660, August 24, 2011

. . . The answer would fail to tender an issue . . . if it does not comply with the requirements for aspecific denial set out in Section 10 (or Section 8) of Rule 8; and it would admit the materialallegations of the adverse party's pleadings not only where it expressly confesses the truthfulnessthereof but also if it omits to deal with them at all.

Now, if an answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of the complaint in themanner indicated by said Section 10 of Rule 8, and/or asserts affirmative defenses (allegations ofnew matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the complaint expressly or impliedly,would nevertheless bar recovery by the plaintiff) . . ., a judgment on the pleadings would naturallynot be proper.

Eugenia D. Polido vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 170632, July 10, 2007

Pesane Animas Mongao, et al. vs. Pryce Properties Corp., G.R. No. 156474, August 16, 2005

Under Section 1 of Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, a judgment on the pleadings is proper when ananswer fails to render an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party'spleading. The essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. A judgmenton the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant, who is the party seeking to recover upon aclaim, counterclaim or cross-claim; or to obtain a declaratory relief.

Romeo C. Garcia vs. Dionisio V. Llamas, G.R. No. 154127, December 8, 2003

While this rule [our ruling in Viajar vs. Estenzo] is true in the summary proceedings under Rule34 of the Revised Rules of Court, it does not apply to summary proceedings under Rule 35. Adifferent rationale operates in the latter for it arises out of facts already established or admittedduring the pre-trial held beforehand, unlike in the former where the judge merely relies on themerits of the movant's allegations. Rule 34 pertains to a judgment on the pleadings while Rule 35relates to a summary judgment which was the holding in this case.

Rodolfo P. Velasquez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124049, June 30, 1999

The trial court has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by a partyif there is no controverted matter in the case after the answer is filed. A judgment on the pleadingsis a judgment on the facts as pleaded, and is based exclusively upon the allegations appearing in thepleadings of the parties and the accompanying annexes.

Doris U. Sunbanun vs. Aurora B. Go, G.R. No. 163280, February 2, 2010


Rule 35 - Summary Judgments

A summary judgment under Rule 35 of the Rules of Court is a procedural technique that is properonly when there is no genuine issue as to the existence of a material fact and the moving party isentitled to a judgment as a matter of law. It is a method intended to expedite or promptly dispose ofcases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions,and affidavits on record. Upon a motion for summary judgment the court's sole function is todetermine whether there is an issue of fact to be tried, and all doubts as to the existence of an issueof fact must be resolved against the moving party. In other words, a party who moves for summaryjudgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, and anydoubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant. Thus, in ruling on amotion for summary judgment, the court should take that view of the evidence most favorable to theparty against whom it is directed, giving that party the benefit of all favorable inferences.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division), et al., G.R. Nos. 166859, 169203 & 180702,April 12, 2011

A summary judgment is granted to settle expeditiously a case if, on motion of either party, thereappears from the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits that no important issues of factare involved, except the amount of damages.

Manuel Ybiernas, et al. vs. Ester Tanco-Gabaldon, et al., G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011

Under the applicable provisions of Rule 35, the defending party or the claimant, as the case maybe, must invoke the rule on summary judgment by filing a motion. The adverse party must benotified of the motion for summary judgment and furnished with supporting affidavits, depositionsor admissions before hearing is conducted. More importantly, a summary judgment is permittedonly if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgmentas a matter of law.

Florentino Pineda vs. Heirs of Eliseo Guevara, et al., G.R. No. 143188, February 14, 2007

Summary judgment is a procedure aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an earlystage of the litigation. The proper inquiry in this regard would be whether the affirmative defensesoffered by petitioners constitute genuine issues of fact requiring a full-blown trial. In a summaryjudgment, the crucial question is: are the issues raised by petitioners not genuine so as to justify asummary judgment? A "genuine issue" means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation ofevidence, as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived, an issue that does notconstitute a genuine issue for trial.

Wood Technology Corp. vs. Equitable Banking Corp., G.R. No. 153867, February 17, 2005

The term genuine issue has been defined as an issue of fact that calls for the presentation ofevidence as distinguished from an issue that is sham, fictitious, contrived, set up in bad faith, and


patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. The court can determine thison the basis of the pleadings, admissions, documents, affidavits, and counter-affidavits submitted bythe parties to the court. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,proceedings for a summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division), et al., G.R. Nos. 166859, 169203 & 180702,April 12, 2011

Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, except as to the amount of damages, whenthere is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as amatter of law, summary judgment may be allowed. Summary or accelerated judgment is aprocedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of thelitigation thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial.

The law itself determines when a summary judgment is proper. Under the rules, summaryjudgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact which call for the presentation ofevidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when theaffidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summaryjudgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law. What is crucial fordetermination, therefore, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.

Evadel Realty and Development Corp. vs. Antero and Virginia Soriano, G.R. No. 144291, April 20, 2001

Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended, which gives authority to trial courts togrant relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where thefacts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, admissions and affidavits. This rule doesnot vest in the court summary jurisdiction to try the issues on pleadings and affidavits but gives thecourt limited authority to enter summary judgment only if it clearly appears that there is no genuineissue of material fact. On a motion for summary judgment, the court is not authorized to decide anissue of fact but to determine whether the pleadings and records before the court create an issue offact to be tried. It is impossible to state a general rule for determining whether a genuine issue offact exists in a particular case. The determination will depend upon the particular circumstances ofeach case. Nevertheless, the language used by courts in making a determination in particular casesmay serve to indicate the manner in which a court should approach the question to be determined. Itis repeated often enough that the court is not authorized to try the issue of fact but to determinewhether there is an issue to be tried. Where the motion is made by a claimant, the defending partymust show that he has a plausible ground of defense, something fairly arguable and of a substantialcharacter.

Ray U. Velasco, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 121517, March 31, 2000

Simply stated, what distinguishes a judgment on the pleadings from a summary judgment is thepresence of issues in the Answer to the Complaint. When the Answer fails to tender any issue, thatis, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations ofthe adverse party's pleadings by admitting the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with themat all, a judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. On the other hand, when the Answer specifically


denies the material averments of the complaint or asserts affirmative defenses, or in other wordsraises an issue, a summary judgment is proper provided that the issue raised is not genuine. "A'genuine issue' means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence, as distinguishedfrom an issue which is fictitious or contrived or which does not constitute a genuine issue for trial."

Eugenio Basbas, et al. vs. Beata Sayson, et al., G.R. No. 172660, August 24, 2011

Rule 35, Sec. 1 - Summary judgment for claimant

A summary judgment, or accelerated judgment, is a procedural technique to promptly dispose ofcases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions andaffidavits on record, or for weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation toavoid the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. When the pleadings on file show that there areno genuine issues of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate relief by way ofsummary judgment, that is, when the facts are not in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the casesummarily by applying the law to the material facts.

Phil. Business Bank vs. Felipe Chua, G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010

Eland Phil., Inc. vs. Azucena Garcia, et al., G.R. No. 173289, February 17, 2010

Cotabato Timberland Co., Inc. vs. C. Alcantara and Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 145469, May 28, 2004


Korea Exchange Bank vs. Filkor Business Integrated, G.R. No. 138292, April 10, 2002

Ley Construction vs. Union Bank, G.R. No. 133801, June 27, 2000

Under the afore-quoted procedural rules, for a summary judgment to be proper, the movant mustestablish two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for theamount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitledto a judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, includingdocuments appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce agenuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled toa summary judgment.

National Power Corp. vs. Santa Loro Vda. De Capin, et al., G.R. No. 175176, October 17, 2008

Benjamin Bitanga vs. Pyramid Construction Engineering Corp., G.R. No. 173526, August 28, 2008

Summary judgment may be allowed where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact andwhere the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. In Yuchengco v. Sandiganbayan(515 Phil. 1, 12 (2006)), the Court has previously discussed the importance of summary judgment inweeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of the litigation in order to avoid the expense


and loss of time involved in a trial, viz.:

Even if the pleadings appear, on their face, to raise issues, summary judgment maystill ensue as a matter of law if the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that suchissues are not genuine. The presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material factdetermines, at bottom, the propriety of summary judgment. A "genuine issue", asdifferentiated from a fictitious or contrived one, is an issue of fact that requires thepresentation of evidence. To the party who moves for summary judgment rests the onus ofdemonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in thecomplaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.

Even if in the Answer itself there appears to be a tender of issues requiring trial, yet when therelevant affidavits, depositions, or admissions demonstrate that those issues are not genuine butsham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summaryjudgment for plaintiff.

Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. vs. Republic of the Phil., G.R. Nos. 189434 & 189505, April 25, 2012

Summary judgment, or accelerated judgment as it is sometimes known, may also call for ahearing so that both the movant and the adverse party may justify their positions. However, thehearing contemplated (with 10-day notice) is for the purpose of determining whether the issues aregenuine or not, not to receive evidence of the issues set up in the pleadings. In Carcon DevelopmentCorporation v. Court of Appeals, the Court ruled that a hearing is not de riguer. The matter may beresolved, and usually is, on the basis of affidavits, depositions, and admissions. This does not meanthat the hearing is superfluous; only that the court is empowered to determine its necessity.

It is the law itself that determines when a summary judgment is proper. Under the rules, summaryjudgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact that call for the presentation ofevidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when theaffidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summaryjudgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law. What is crucial to adetermination, therefore, is the presence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact. Whenthe facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then summary judgment is called for.


Rule 35, Sec. 2 - Summary judgment for defending party



Rule 35, Sec. 3 - Motion and proceedings thereon

Eland Phil., Inc. vs. Azucena Garcia, et al., G.R. No. 173289, February 17, 2010

Romeo C. Garcia vs. Dionisio V. Llamas, G.R. No. 154127, December 8, 2003

Monterey Foods Corp., et al. vs. Victorino E. Eserjose, G.R. No. 153126, September 11, 2003


Ley Construction vs. Union Bank, G.R. No. 133801, June 27, 2000

Eustaquio Mallilin vs. Ma. Elvira Castillo, G.R. No. 136803, June 16, 2000

Under Section 3, Rule 35, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment may beallowed where, save for the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact andthe moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Summary or accelerated judgment is aprocedural technique aimed at weeding out sham claims or defenses at an early stage of thelitigation, thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial. Even if the pleadingsappear, on their face, to raise issues, summary judgment may still ensue as a matter of law if theaffidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine.The presence orabsence of a genuine issue as to any material fact determines, at bottom, the propriety of summaryjudgment. A "genuine issue", as differentiated from a fictitious or contrived one, is an issue of factthat requires the presentation of evidence. To the party who moves for summary judgment rests theonus of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in thecomplaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial.

Alfonso T. Yuchengco, et al vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 149802, January 20, 2006

Edward T. Marcelo, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 156065, August 28, 2007

Under the afore-quoted procedural rules, for a summary judgment to be proper, the movant mustestablish two requisites: (a) there must be no genuine issue as to any material fact, except for theamount of damages; and (b) the party presenting the motion for summary judgment must be entitledto a judgment as a matter of law. Where, on the basis of the pleadings of a moving party, includingdocuments appended thereto, no genuine issue as to a material fact exists, the burden to produce agenuine issue shifts to the opposing party. If the opposing party fails, the moving party is entitled toa summary judgment.

National Power Corp. vs. Santa Loro Vda. De Capin, et al., G.R. No. 175176, October 17, 2008

A summary judgment is allowed only if, after hearing, the court finds that except as to theamount of damages, the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and admissions show no genuine issue asto any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The purpose ofa summary judgment is to avoid drawn out litigations and useless delays because the facts appearundisputed to the mind of the court. Such judgment is generally based on the facts provensummarily by affidavits, depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties. For a full-blown trial


to be dispensed with, the party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstratingclearly the absence of genuine issues of fact, or that the issue posed is patently insubstantial as toconstitute a genuine issue. "Genuine issue" means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation ofevidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived.

Mangontawar M. Gubat vs. NAPOCOR, G.R. No. 167415, February 26, 2010

A genuine issue of fact is that which requires the presentation of evidence, as distinguished froma sham, fictitious, contrived or false issue. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested orundisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue. Summary judgment is proper in such a case. . . .Notably, however, both Piltel and Smartnet admit that they entered into a contract to sell coveringthe Valgoson Property; that Smartnet agreed to pay Piltel P560 million for it, with a down paymentof P180 million; and that Smartnet failed to pay the balance of the purchase price on or about April30, 1997. With these common admissions, it is clear that there are no genuine issues of fact as to theexistence and nature of the contract to sell as well as Smartnet's failure to pay the balance of thepurchase price within the agreed period. Thus, the RTC was correct in skipping trial and decidingthe case through a summary judgment based on the undisputed facts.

Pilipino Telephone Corp. vs. Radiomarine Network (Smartnet) Phil., Inc., G.R. No. 160322, August 24,2011

Rule 35, Sec. 4 - Case not fully adjudicated on motion

This is what is referred to as a partial summary judgment. A careful reading of this sectionreveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment," asit does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has notentitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for." The Rules provide for a partial summaryjudgment as a means to simplify the trial process by allowing the court to focus the trial only on theassailed facts, considering as established those facts which are not in dispute. After this siftingprocess, the court is instructed to issue an order, the partial summary judgment, which specifies thedisputed facts that have to be settled in the course of trial. In this way, the partial summary judgmentis more akin to a record of pre-trial, an interlocutory order, rather than a final judgment. The partialsummary judgment envisioned by the Rules is an interlocutory order that was never meant to betreated separately from the main case.

Phil. Business Bank vs. Felipe Chua, G.R. No. 178899, November 15, 2010

Rule 35 on summary judgments, admits of a situation in which a case is not fully adjudicated onmotion, and judgment is not rendered upon all of the reliefs sought. In Philippine Business Bank v.Chua, (G.R. No. 178899, 15 November 2010) we had occasion to rule that a careful reading of itsSection 4 reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "finaljudgment," as it does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or


has not entitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for." In this case, there was never any final orcomplete adjudication of Civil Case No. 0141, as the Sandiganbayan's partial summary judgment inthe Swiss Deposits Decision made no mention of the Arelma account.

Section 4 of Rule 35 pertains to a situation in which separate judgments were necessary becausesome facts existed without controversy, while others were controverted. However, there is nothingin this provision or in the Rules that prohibits a subsequent separate judgment after a partial

summary judgment on an entirely different subject matter had earlier been rendered. There is nolegal basis for petitioners' contention that a judgment over the Swiss accounts bars a motion forsummary judgment over the Arelma account. Thus, the Swiss Deposits Decision has finally and

thoroughly disposed of the forfeiture case only as to the five Swiss accounts. Respondent's 2004Motion is in the nature of a separate judgment, which is authorized under Section 5 of Rule 36.


Rule 36, Sec. 1 - Rendition of judgments and final orders

Ubaldino A. Lacurom vs. Juanita C. Tienzo, A.M. No. RTJ-07-2075, October 9, 2007

Mariano "Mike" Z. Velarde vs. Social Justice Society, G.R. No. 159357, April 28, 2004

Jaime C. Taran vs. Jose S. Jacinto, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1436, April 3, 2003

People of the Phil. vs. Freddie Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003

Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court also requires that a judgment or final order determiningthe merits of the case "shall be in writing, personally and directly prepared by the judge, statingclearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with theclerk of court." This requirement is an assurance to the parties that, in reaching judgment, the judgedid so through the processes of legal reasoning. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly statethe facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached.

Erlinda B. Dandoy vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150089, August 28, 2007

The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1) toavoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge ofjudicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights andobligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. The doctrineis not a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a matter of public policy as well as atime-honored principle of procedural law.

Apo Fruits Corp., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 164195, December 4, 2009


The doctrine of the law of the case means that whatever is irrevocably established as thecontrolling legal rule between the same parties in the same case, whether correct on generalprinciples or not, continues to be the law of the case for as long as the facts on which the legal rulewas predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court. It applies in a situation where anappellate court has made a ruling on a question on appeal and thereafter remands the case to thelower court for further proceedings; the question then settled by the appellate court becomes the lawof the case binding the lower court and any subsequent appeal, and questions necessarily involvedand dealt with in a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the case in a subsequent appeal,although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, inasmuch as thepresumption is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received dueconsideration whether all or none of them are mentioned in the opinion.

EPZA vs. Jose Pulido, et al., G.R. No. 188995, August 24, 2011

The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand, and an interlocutoryorder, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No.L-60036, January 27, 1987) viz.:

The concept of 'final' judgment, as distinguished from one which has 'become final' (or'executory' as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A 'final' judgment or order isone that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto,e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial declarescategorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or ajudgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata orprescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy ordetermining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be doneby the Court except to await the parties' next move (which among others, may consist of the filingof a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, tocause the execution of the judgment once it becomes 'final' or, to use the established and moredistinctive term, 'final and executory. . . . Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of thecase, and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining theirrights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to bedone by the Court, is 'interlocutory,' e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of theRules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendmentthereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection ofdocuments or things, etc. Unlike a 'final' judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointedout, an 'interlocutory' order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal thatmay eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.


The nullity of the dismissal order is patent on its face. It simply states its conclusion that the caseshould be dismissed for non prosequitur, a legal conclusion, but does not state the facts on which


this conclusion is based. . . . A trial court should always specify the reasons for a complaint'sdismissal so that on appeal, the reviewing court can readily determine the prima facie justificationfor the dismissal. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on whichit is based leaves the parties in the dark and is especially prejudicial to the losing party who isunable to point the assigned error in seeking a review by a higher tribunal.


Rule 36, Sec. 2 - Entry of judgments and final orders

A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer bemodified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of factor law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.All the issues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest once a judgment becomesfinal and executory; execution of the decision proceeds as a matter of right as vested rights areacquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal within the prescribedperiod, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decision on the case.After all, a denial of a petition for being time-barred is tantamount to a decision on the merits.Otherwise, there will be no end to litigation, and this will set to naught the main role of courts ofjustice to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law and the maintenance of peace and order bysettling justiciable controversies with finality.


Under Section 2, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a judgment or final order becomes final andexecutory if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed within the periodprovided by the Rules.

Emerlito F. Aguila, et al. vs. Carmen R. Baldovizo, et al., G.R. No. 163186, February 23, 2007

The precipitate entry of judgment worked injustice against petitioner, and the People whompetitioner represents. In effect, the entry of judgment, done in haste, foreclosed petitioner's right toappeal the adverse decision of the Court of Appeals to this Court.

People of the Phil. vs. Nazar U. Chavez, G.R. No. 140690, June 19, 2001

A "final order" issued by a court has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter inits entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but toenforce by execution what has been determined by the court. As distinguished therefrom, an"interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something moreto be adjudicated upon.


This Court has previously held that an order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order ifno motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed.


Rule 36, Sec. 5 - Separate judgments

The Sandiganbayan rightly characterized their ruling on the 2004 Motion as a separatejudgment, which is allowed by the Rules of Court under Section 5 of Rule 36 . . . Rule 35 onsummary judgments, admits of a situation in which a case is not fully adjudicated on motion, andjudgment is not rendered upon all of the reliefs sought. In Philippine Business Bank v. Chua, (G.R.No. 178899, 15 November 2010) we had occasion to rule that a careful reading of its Section 4reveals that a partial summary judgment was never intended to be considered a "final judgment," asit does not "[put] an end to an action at law by declaring that the plaintiff either has or has notentitled himself to recover the remedy he sues for." In this case, there was never any final orcomplete adjudication of Civil Case No. 0141, as the Sandiganbayan's partial summary judgment inthe Swiss Deposits Decision made no mention of the Arelma account.

Section 4 of Rule 35 pertains to a situation in which separate judgments were necessary becausesome facts existed without controversy, while others were controverted. However, there is nothingin this provision or in the Rules that prohibits a subsequent separate judgment after a partialsummary judgment on an entirely different subject matter had earlier been rendered. There is nolegal basis for petitioners' contention that a judgment over the Swiss accounts bars a motion forsummary judgment over the Arelma account. Thus, the Swiss Deposits Decision has finally and

thoroughly disposed of the forfeiture case only as to the five Swiss accounts. Respondent's 2004Motion is in the nature of a separate judgment, which is authorized under Section 5 of Rule 36.


Rule 37, Sec. 1 - Grounds of and period for filing motion for new trial or reconsideration

Requisites for Newly Discovered Evidence

Under the Rules of Court, the requisites for "newly discovered evidence" are: 1) the evidencewas discovered after trial (in this case, after investigation); 2) such evidence could not have beendiscovered and produced during the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and 3) it ismaterial, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if


admitted, will probably change the judgment.

Michael Syiaco vs. Eugene Ong, G.R. Nos. 179282-83, December 1, 2010

When Evidence Is Deemed Newly Discovered

In order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly appreciated as newly discovered,what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence first came into existence or the timewhen it first came to the knowledge of the party now submitting it. What is essential is that theoffering party had exercised reasonable diligence in trying to locate such evidence before or duringtrial (or investigation), but had nonetheless failed to secure it. The Rules does not contain an exactdefinition of due diligence. It is often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to thedefendant." It has both a time component and a good faith component. It contemplates a situationwhere the party acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain evidence, in light of the totality of thecircumstances and the facts known to him.


The question of whether the pieces of evidence are newly discovered has two aspects: a temporalone, i.e., when the evidence was discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when should or could it havebeen discovered.


The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of apetition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual orperceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of thecase. The rule is, however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions, such as (a) where the order isa patent nullity, as where the court a quo had no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in thecertiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same asthose raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for theresolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government orof the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances,a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process andthere is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest isurgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings inthe lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte, or inwhich the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of lawor where public interest is involved.

Beatriz Siok Ping Tang vs. Subic Bay Distribution, Inc., G.R. No. 162575, December 15, 2010

Republic of the Philippines vs. Vicente A. Hidalgo, et al., G.R. No. 161657, October 4, 2007

Sps. Shem G. Alfarero and Aurelia Tagalog vs. Sps. Petra and Sancho Sevilla, G.R. No. 142974,September 22, 2003


Danilo Cansino vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125799, August 21, 2003

Dulos Realty vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128516, November 28, 2001

Anastacio Fabela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142546, August 9, 2001

Under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "negligence" must be excusable andgenerally imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the counsel, it is binding on the client.To follow a contrary rule and allow a party to disown his counsel's conduct would renderproceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to re-opening by the mere subterfuge of replacing thecounsel. What the aggrieved litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against the erringcounsel and not ask for the reversal of the court's ruling.

Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. Nos.141104 & 148763, June 8, 2007

Sps. Benigno and Erlinda Que vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150739, August 18, 2005

New trial is a remedy that seeks to "temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure ofjustice." Thus, the Rules allows the courts to grant a new trial when there are errors of law orirregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial, or whenthere exists newly discovered evidence. The grant or denial of a new trial is, generally speaking,addressed to the sound discretion of the court which cannot be interfered with unless a clear abusethereof is shown.

Manuel Ybiernas, et al. vs. Ester Tanco-Gabaldon, et al., G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011

Rule 37, Sec. 2 - Contents of motion for new trial or reconsideration and notice thereof

People of the Phil. vs. Zeida Aurora B. Garfin, et al., G.R. No. 153176, March 29, 2004


National Commercial Bank of Saudi Arabia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124267, January 31, 2003


Marina Properties Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125447, August 14, 1998

Rule 37, Sec. 3 - Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration



Rule 37, Sec. 4 - Resolution of motion

It is settled that when a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition for failure to comply withformal and substantive requirements, the challenged decision, together with its findings of fact andlegal conclusions, are deemed sustained.

Sps. Jose and Margarita Chua vs. Pedro Gutierrez, et al., G.R. No. 172316, December 8, 2010

Jose B. Custodio vs. Jesus V. Quitain, A.M. No. RTJ 03-1761, April 30, 2003

The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence iswhether the [proffered] evidence is in fact a "newly discovered evidence which could not have beendiscovered by due diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has twoaspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., whenshould or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence hasrelevance. We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regardedas newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidenceoffered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party nowsubmitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence inseeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.

Manuel Ybiernas, et al. vs. Ester Tanco-Gabaldon, et al., G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011, citingCustodio v. Sandiganbayan

The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exerciseddue diligence depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. Nonetheless, it has beenobserved that the phrase is often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to thedefendant." In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faithcomponent. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidencein support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligencecontemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence in light ofthe totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.

Manuel Ybiernas, et al. vs. Ester Tanco-Gabaldon, et al., G.R. No. 178925, June 1, 2011, citingCustodio v. Sandiganbayan

Rule 37, Sec. 5 - Second motion for new trial



Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court is explicit that a second motion for reconsideration shallnot be allowed.

Hermenegilda dela Cruz Loyola vs. Anastacio Mendoza, G.R. No. 163340, November 23, 2007

Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the proscription against a secondmotion for reconsideration is directed against "a judgment or final order." Although a secondmotion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a mere"rehash" of the arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be rejected onthe ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the rules as a prohibited motion.


Rule 37, Sec. 6 - Effect of granting of motion for new trial

New trial is a remedy that seeks to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure ofjustice. The effect of an order granting a new trial is to wipe out the previous adjudication so thatthe case may be tried de novo for the purpose of rendering a judgment in accordance with law,taking into consideration the evidence to be presented during the second trial. Consequently, amotion for new trial is proper only after the rendition or promulgation of a judgment or issuance ofa final order. A motion for new trial is only available when relief is sought against a judgment andthe judgment is not yet final. Verily, in the case at bench, the filing by Spouses Guevarra of amotion for new trial was premature and uncalled for because a decision has yet to be rendered bythe trial court in Civil Case No. 2187-00. Let it be underscored that the December 22, 2003Decision of Judge Español was effectively set aside by the December 15, 2004 Omnibus Order ofJudge Mangrobang. Hence, there is technically no judgment which can be the subject of a motionfor new trial.

Nemia Castro vs. Sps. Jamir and Rosalyn Guevarra, G.R. No. 192737, April 25, 2012

Rule 37, Sec. 7 - Partial new trial or reconsideration



Rule 37, Sec. 9 - Remedy against order denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration

Bienvenido P. Jaban, et al vs. Alvin Garcia, et al., G.R. No. 138336-37, February 16, 2004


Republic of the Phil. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 129846, January 18, 2000

Section 9 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court indicates that the proper remedy against the denial ofthe petitioners' motion for reconsideration was an appeal from the final order dismissing the actionupon the respondents' motion to dismiss.

The restriction against an appeal of a denial of a motion for reconsideration independently of ajudgment or final order is logical and reasonable. A motion for reconsideration is not puttingforward a new issue, or presenting new evidence, or changing the theory of the case, but is onlyseeking a reconsideration of the judgment or final order based on the same issues, contentions, andevidence either because: (a) the damages awarded are excessive; or (b) the evidence is insufficientto justify the decision or final order; or (c) the decision or final order is contrary to law. By denyinga motion for reconsideration, or by granting it only partially, therefore, a trial court finds no reasoneither to reverse or to modify its judgment or final order, and leaves the judgment or final order tostand. The remedy from the denial is to assail the denial in the course of an appeal of the judgmentor final order itself.


Rule 38 - Relief from Judgments, Orders or Other Proceedings

Mario Basco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125290, August 9, 2000

Rufino Valencia vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 119118, February 19, 2001


Philadelphia Agan vs. Heirs of Sps. Andres and Diosdado Nueva, G.R. No. 155018, December 11, 2003

A petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is of equitable character, allowed only inexceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy.

Tancredo Redena vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 146611, February 6, 2007

A judicial compromise may be rescinded or set aside on the ground of fraud in accordance withRule 38 of the Rules on Civil Procedure on petition for relief from judgment.


Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, et al., G.R. Nos. 169914 and 174166, April 18, 2008

The mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court pertains generally to mistake of fact,not of law, which relates to the case. The word "mistake" which grants relief from judgment, doesnot apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have committedin the trial. Such error may be corrected by means of an appeal.

Romeo Samonte vs. S.F. Naguiat, Inc., G.R. No. 165544, October 2, 2009

Rule 38, Sec. 1 - Petition for relief from judgment, order or other proceedings

Eleuterio Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127827, March 5, 2003

The 60-day period is reckoned from the time the party acquired knowledge of the order,judgment or proceedings and not from the date he actually read the same.

Corazon L. Escueta, et al. vs. Rufina Lim, G.R. No. 137162, January 24, 2007

Relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptionalcircumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present. Where thedefendant has other available or adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial or appeal from theadverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.

Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition for relief must be filed withinsixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order or other proceeding to be setaside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusablenegligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause ofaction or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it should be filed with the same courtwhich rendered the decision.


A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in exceptionalcases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedyavailable to him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse decision ofthe trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence fromfiling such motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. In order for apetition for relief to be entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show that he hasfaithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of Rule 38. It is also incumbent upon thepetitioner to show that the said petition was filed within the reglementary period specified inSection 3, Rule 38 (within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, orother proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final orderwas entered, or such proceeding was taken). And the rule is that the reglementary period is reckoned


from the time the party's counsel receives notice of the decision for notice to counsel of the decisionis notice to the party for purposes of Section 3 of Rule 38.

Mercury Drug Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138571, July 13, 2000

The mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of Court pertains generally to mistake of fact,not of law, which relates to the case. The word "mistake" which grants relief from judgment, doesnot apply and was never intended to apply to a judicial error which the court might have committedin the trial. Such error may be corrected by means of an appeal.

Romeo Samonte vs. S.F. Naguiat, Inc., G.R. No. 165544, October 2, 2009

Rule 38, Sec. 2 - Petition for relief from denial or appeal

Insular Life Savings and Trust Co. vs. Sps. Runes, G.R. No. 152530, August 12, 2004

Fukuzumi vs. Sanritsu Great International Corp., G.R. No. 140630, August 12, 2004




Under Section 2 of Rule 38, of the Rules of Court, a party prevented from taking an appeal froma judgment or final order of a court by reason of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence,may file in the same court and in the same case a petition for relief praying that his appeal be givendue course. This presupposes, of course, that no appeal was taken precisely because of any of theaforestated reasons which prevented him from appealing his case. Hence, a petition for relief underRule 38 cannot be availed of in the CA, the latter being a court of appellate jurisdiction. For sure,under the present Rules, petitions for relief from a judgment, final order or other proceedingrendered or taken should be filed in and resolved by the court in the same case from which thepetition arose. Thus, petition for relief from a judgment, final order or proceeding involved in a casetried by a municipal trial court shall be filed in and decided by the same court in the same case, justlike the procedure followed in the present Regional Trial Court.

Tancredo Redena vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 146611, February 6, 2007

[T]he proper remedy for allegations of mistake or inexcusable negligence of counsel, whichprevented a party from taking an appeal, is a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.The petition must be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, orother proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final orderwas entered. It must be filed within the reglementary period, which is reckoned from the time theparty's counsel receives notice of the decision for notice to counsel of the decision is notice to the


party.

Jaime T. Torres vs. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 165408, January 15, 2010

Rule 38, Sec. 3 - Time for filing petition; contents and verification

Mercury Drug Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138571, July 13, 2000

Public Estates Authority vs. Jesus S. Yujuico, et al., G.R. No. 140486, February 6, 2001

DAP Mining Assn. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92328, June 6, 2001

Gold Line Transit vs. Luisa Ramos, G.R. No. 144813, August 15, 2001



Teresita Villareal Manipor, et al. vs. Sps. Pablo and Antonia Ricafort, G.R. No. 150159, July 25, 2003

Under Section 3, Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, a verified petition for relief must be filed withinsixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be setaside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered or suchproceeding was taken.

Heirs of the Late Faustina Borres, et al. vs. Julius L. Abela, et al., G.R. Nos. 131023, 131505 and131768, July 17, 2007

Clear it is from the above that a petition for relief from judgment must be filed within: (a) sixty(60) days from knowledge of judgment, order or other proceedings to be set aside; and (b) six (6)months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. These two periods must concur.Both periods are also not extendible and never interrupted. Strict compliance with these periodsstems from the equitable character and nature of the petition for relief. Indeed, relief is allowed onlyin exceptional cases as when there is no other available or adequate remedy. As it were, a petitionfor relief is actually the "last chance" given by law to litigants to question a final judgment or order.And failure to avail of such "last chance" within the grace period fixed by the Rules is fatal.

Sps. Eugenio and Vicenta Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 150722, August 17, 2007

Quelnan vs. VHF Philippines, G.R. No. 138500, September 16, 2005

[T]he proper remedy for allegations of mistake or inexcusable negligence of counsel, whichprevented a party from taking an appeal, is a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.The petition must be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, orother proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final orderwas entered. It must be filed within the reglementary period, which is reckoned from the time the


party's counsel receives notice of the decision for notice to counsel of the decision is notice to theparty.

Jaime T. Torres vs. China Banking Corp., G.R. No. 165408, January 15, 2010

Rule 39 - Execution, Satisfaction and Effect of Judgments

Execution under Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court is a remedy afforded by law for theenforcement of a judgment, its object being to obtain satisfaction of the judgment on which the writis issued. It issues by order of the court a quo, on motion of the judgment obligee, upon finality of ajudgment or order sought to be enforced, and is directed to an officer authorizing and requiring himto execute the judgment of the court.

Cagayan de Oro Coliseum vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129713, December 15, 1999

Rule 39, Sec. 1 - Execution upon judgments or final orders

Eliza Mina, et al. vs. Benjamin T. Vianzon, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1682, March 23, 2004

Socorro R. Hoehne vs. Judge Ruben R. Plata, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1458, October 10, 2002

Sps. Adriano and Hilda Monterola vs. Judge Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-01-1620, March 18,2002

Jaime Tan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136368, January 16, 2002

Vda. De Cochingyan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116092, June 29, 2001

Sy Chin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 136233, November 23, 2000

Teresita Jason vs. Briccio C. Ygaña, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-00-1543, August 4, 2000

Vlason Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121662-64, July 6, 1999

Arsenia T. Bergonia vs. Alicia B. Gonzalez-Decano, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1505, October 29, 1999

Federico Pallada, et al. vs. Rtc of Kalibo, et al., G.R. No. 129442, March 10, 1999

PNB vs. Marcelino L. Sayo, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 129918, July 9, 1998

The execution of a judgment or final order that has attained finality and another pending appealrequire different motions from the prevailing party. Put differently, a judgment or final order thathas become final and executory mandatorily requires a specific motion to execute the same.


Odel S. Janda, et al. vs. Eddie R. Rojas, et al., G.R. No. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2054, August 23, 2007

Under Sec. 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion,upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the periodto appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

Nora Bueno Pasion vs. Simplicio R. Melegrito, G.R. No. 166558, March 28, 2007

It has been opined that Section 1 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court now requires that the motionfor execution "must be with notice to the adverse party, with a hearing when the circumstances sorequire, to enable him to file any objection thereto or bring to the attention of said court matterswhich may have transpired during the pendency of the appeal and which may have a bearing on theexecution sought to enforce the judgment."

Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Amalik P. Espinosa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 162922,January 31, 2007

Rule 39, Sec. 2 - Discretionary execution

Fernando U. Batul vs. Lucilo Bayron, et al., G.R. Nos. 157687 & 158959, February 26, 2004

Thelma C. Baldado vs. Arnulfo O. Bugtas, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1586, October 24, 2003

Arturo G. Mackay vs. Adoracion G. Angeles, et al., G.R. No. 144230, September 30, 2003

City of Iligan vs. Principal Management Group, G.R. No. 145260, July 31, 2003

State Investment Trust vs. Delta Motors, G.R. No. 144444, April 3, 2003

Mortimer F. Cordero vs. Alan G. Go, et al., G.R. No. 149754, September 17, 2002

Javier E. Zacate vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 144678, March 1, 2001

Marawi Marantao Gen. Hospital vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141008, January 16, 2001

Corona International vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127851, October 18, 2000

As a discretionary execution, execution pending appeal is permissible only when good reasonsexist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before theexpiration of the period to appeal. Good reasons, special, important, pressing reasons must exist tojustify execution pending appeal; otherwise, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, itmay well become a tool of oppression and inequality. Good reasons consist of exceptionalcircumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffershould the appealed judgment be reversed later.

Stronghold Insurance Co. vs. Nemesio S. Felix, et al., G.R. No. 148090, November 28, 2006


The prevailing doctrine and principle then — which continues to be the same as provided inParagraph 2, Section 2 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — is that discretionaryexecution is permissible only when good reasons exist for immediately executing the judgmentbefore finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the time to appeal.

Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lestjudgment becomes illusory, or the prevailing party may after the lapse of time become unable toenjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may apparently have no case except todelay.

Jose B. L. Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 135180-81, August 16, 2000

Shuhei Yasuda vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112569, April 12, 2000

PBCom vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126158, September 23, 1997

This rule is strictly construed against the movant, for "courts look with disfavor upon any attemptto execute a judgment which has not acquired a final character." In the same vein, the Court hasheld that such execution "is usually not favored because it affects the rights of the parties which areyet to be ascertained on appeal."


Bonifacio Sanz Maceda vs. DBP, et al., G.R. No. 135128, August 26, 1999

So also, mere issuance of a bond to answer for damages is no longer considered a good reasonfor execution pending appeal. To consider the mere posting of a bond as a "good reason" wouldprecisely make immediate execution of judgment pending appeal routinary, the rule rather than theexception.

The rule on execution pending appeal must be strictly construed being an exception to the generalrule. Applying the rule on statutory construction, it should be interpreted only so far as the languagethereof fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general rule rather than theexceptions.

Planters Products vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106052, October 22, 1999

The execution of a judgment before its finality must be founded upon good reasons. Theyardstick remains the presence or the absence of good reasons consisting of exceptionalcircumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer,should the appealed judgment be reversed later. Good reason imports a superior circumstance thatwill outweigh injury or damage to the adverse party.

Phil. Nails & Wires Corp. vs. Malayan Insurance, G.R. No. 143933, February 14, 2003

Diesel Construction Co. vs. Jollibee Foods Corp., G.R. No. 136805, January 28, 2000

A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be


based "upon good reasons to be stated in a special order."

Roque Fermo vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 140179, March 13, 2000

By its provisional nature, the remedy of execution pending appeal requires only a "final"judgment or order (as distinguished from an "interlocutory" order) and not a "final and executory"judgment or order.

Intramuros Tennis Club vs. PTA, G.R. No. 135630, September 26, 2000

Section 2 (a)

The execution of a judgment or final order that has attained finality and another pending appealrequire different motions from the prevailing party. Put differently, a judgment or final order thathas become final and executory mandatorily requires a specific motion to execute the same.

Odel S. Janda, et al. vs. Eddie R. Rojas, et al., G.R. No. A.M. No. RTJ-07-2054, August 23, 2007

Rule 39, Sec. 3 - Stay of discretionary execution

Planters Products vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106052, October 22, 1999

Diesel Construction Co. vs. Jollibee Foods Corp., G.R. No. 136805, January 28, 2000

A supersedeas bond secures the performance of the judgment or order appealed from in case ofits affirmation. Section 3 finds application in ordinary civil actions where the interest of theprevailing party is capable of pecuniary estimation, and consequently, of protection, through thefiling of a supersedeas bond. Thus, the penultimate sentence of Section 3 states: "[T]he bond thusgiven may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety." Consequently, it finds noapplication in election protest cases where judgments invariably include orders which are notcapable of pecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office and perform its functions.

Charito Navarosa vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 157957, September 18, 2003

Rule 39, Sec. 4 - Judgments not stayed by appeal

Diamond Builders Conglomeration, et al. vs. Country Bankers Insurance Corp., G.R. No. 171820,December 13, 2007

Augustus Caezar R. Gan vs. Hon. Antonio C. Reyes, G.R. No. 145527, May 28, 2002


Intramuros Tennis Club vs. PTA, G.R. No. 135630, September 26, 2000

Rule 39, Sec. 5 - Effect of reversal of executed judgment

Jimmy T. Go, et al. vs. Zeus C. Abrogar, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1759, February 27, 2003

Sps. Guillermo Agbada and Maxima Agbada vs. Inter-Urban Developers, et al., G.R. No. 144029,September 19, 2002

BF Corp. vs. EDSA Shangri-La Hotel, G.R. No. 132655, August 11, 1998

Rule 39, Sec. 6 - Execution by motion or by independent action

Asuncion Macias, et al. vs. Mariano Lim, et al., G.R. No. 139284, June 4, 2004

Oliverio Laperal vs. Pablo V. Ocampo, G.R. No. 140652, September 3, 2003

Winnie Bajet vs. Vivencio S. Baclig, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1598, July 30, 2002

Sps. Leoncio & Enriqueta Barrera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123935, December 14, 2001

Jon and Marissa De Ysasi vs. Arturo and Estela Arceo, G.R. No. 136586, November 22, 2001

Ma. Valentina Santana-Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120176, July 20, 2001


Sec. 6 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that an action to revive judgment only requires proofof a final judgment which has not prescribed and has remained unexecuted after the lapse of five (5)years but not more than ten (10) years from its finality. Nowhere does the rule require proof that thejudgment is still enforceable by and against the original parties who have died. While the action isstill subject to defenses and counterclaims which arose after the judgment became effective, proofof the death of some of the parties is not required because the judgment call still be enforced by theexecutor, administrator or successor-in-interest of the judgment creditor against the judgmentdebtor.

Juan Enriquez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137391, December 14, 2001

A judgment may be executed on motion within five years from the date of its entry or from thedate it becomes final and executory. Thereafter, before barred by the statute of limitations, byaction. However, there are instances where this Court allowed execution by motion even after thelapse of five years upon meritorious grounds.


Esteban Yau vs. Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr., G.R. Nos. 158848 & 171994, February 4, 2008

Rule 39, Sec. 7 - Execution in case of death of party

Heirs of Lorilla vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118655, April 12, 2000

Rule 39, Sec. 8 - Issuance, form and contents of a writ of execution

Paterno R. Plantilla vs. Rodrigo G. Baliwag, A.M. No. P-00-1446, June 6, 2001

Section 8 (e)

A writ of execution is required under paragraph (e), Section 8 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court(to) "specifically state the amount of the interest, costs, damages, rents, or profits due as of the dateof the issuance of the writ, aside from the principal obligation under the judgment."

Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Amalik P. Espinosa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 162922,January 31, 2007

Rule 39, Sec. 9 - Execution of judgments for money, how enforced

Phil. Airlines, Inc. vs. Balubar, Jr., A.M. No. P-04-1767, August 12, 2004

Luzita Alpeche vs. Expedito B. Bato, A.M. No. P-02-1592, October 16, 2003

Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Guevarra, G.R. No. 154037, April 30, 2003

Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation vs. Oriental Assurance Corporation, G.R. No. 140613, October15, 2002

Judge Gregorio R. Balanag vs. Alonzo B. Osita, A.M. No. P-01-1454, September 12, 2002

Sps. Felipe and Roselyn Biglete vs. Bonifacio V. Maputi, Jr., A.M. No. P-00-1407, February 15, 2002

GSIS vs. Bengson Commercial Buildings, G.R. Nos. 137448 & 141454, January 31, 2002

DBP vs. Ruben S. Nequinto, A.M. No. P-00-1371, January 23, 2002

Gloria O. Benitez vs. Medel P. Acosta, A.M. No. P-01-1473, March 27, 2001


Under Rule 39, in executing a money judgment against the property of the judgment debtor, thesheriff shall levy on all property belonging to the judgment debtor as is amply sufficient to satisfythe judgment and costs, and sell the same paying to the judgment creditor so much of the proceedsas will satisfy the amount of the judgment debt and costs. Any excess in the proceeds shall bedelivered to the judgment debtor unless otherwise directed by the judgment or order of the court.

Jacobus Bernhard Hulst vs. PR Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007

If the judgment is for money, the sheriff or other authorized officer must execute the samepursuant to the provisions of Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Jacobus Bernhard Hulst vs. PR Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007

Garnishment is proper only when the judgment to be enforced is one for payment of a sum ofmoney.

National Electrification Administration, et al. vs. Danilo Morales, G.R. No. 154200, July 24, 2007

Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court lays down the procedure to be followed by the sheriff inimplementing money judgments.

When the judgment obligee is not present at the time the judgment obligor makes the payment,the sheriff is authorized to receive it. However, the money received must be remitted to the clerk ofcourt within the same day or, if not practicable, deposited in a fiduciary account with the nearestgovernment depository bank. Evidently, sheriffs are not permitted to retain the money in theirpossession beyond the day when the payment was made or to deliver the money collected directly tothe judgment obligee.

Domingo Peña, Jr. vs. Achilles Andrew V. Regalado II, A.M. No. P-10-2772, February 16, 2010

Section 9 (b)

Jimmy T. Go vs. Zeus Abrogar, et al., G.R. No. 152672, October 2, 2007

Rule 39, Sec. 10 - Execution of judgments for specific act


Baikong Akang Camsa vs. Judge Aurelio D. Rendon, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-02-1395, March 28, 2003

Leody Manuel vs. Jose and Daisy Escalante, G.R. No. 134141, August 13, 2002

Winnie Bajet vs. Pedro M. Areola, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1615, June 19, 2001


Jaime Morta, Sr. vs. Jose S. Sañez, et al., A.M. No. RTJ 00-1593, October 16, 2000

Equatorial Realty Devt. vs. Mayfair Theater, G.R. No. 136221, May 12, 2000

Section 10 (c) - Delivery or Restitution of Real Property

A writ of possession is defined as "a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recoverthe possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its possession to theperson entitled under the judgment."

There are three instances when a writ of possession may be issued: (a) in land registrationproceedings under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (b) in judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is inpossession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, hadintervened; and (c) in extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No.3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.

Metrobank vs. Salvador Abad Santos, et al., G.R. No. 157867, December 15, 2009

Possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Where the ownership of a parcel of land wasdecreed in the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included inthe decision, it appearing that the defeated party's claim to the possession thereof is based on hisclaim of ownership. Furthermore, adjudication of ownership would include the delivery ofpossession if the defeated party has not shown any right to possess the land independently of hisclaim of ownership which was rejected.

Bernardo de Leon vs. Public Estates Authority, et al., G.R. Nos. 181970 & 182678, August 3, 2010

A judgment for the delivery or restitution of property is essentially an order to place theprevailing party in possession of the property. If the defendant refuses to surrender possession of theproperty to the prevailing party, the sheriff or other proper officer should oust him. No express orderto this effect needs to be stated in the decision; nor is a categorical statement needed in the decisionthat in such event the sheriff or other proper officer shall have the authority to remove theimprovements on the property if the defendant fails to do so within a reasonable period of time. Theremoval of the improvements on the land under these circumstances is deemed read into thedecision, subject only to the issuance of a special order by the court for the removal of theimprovements. It bears stressing that a judgment is not confined to what appears upon the face ofthe decision, but also those necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

Bernardo de Leon vs. Public Estates Authority, et al., G.R. Nos. 181970 & 182678, August 3, 2010

Section 10 (d) - Removal of Improvements on Property Subject of Execution


When the property subject of the execution contains improvements constructed or planted by thejudgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements


except upon special order of the court, issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after duehearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by thecourt.

Katipunan ng Tinig sa Adhikain, Inc. vs. Luis Zenon O. Maceren, et al., A.M. No. MTJ-07-1680, August17, 2007

Rule 39, Sec. 11 - Execution of special judgments

Petition for Habeas Corpus of Benjamin Guevarra, G.R. No. 154037, April 30, 2003

Knecht vs. United Cigarette Corp., G.R. No. 139370, July 4, 2002

Julian B. San Juan, Sr. vs. Ariel S. Sangalang, A.M. No. P-00-1437, February 6, 2001

The implementation of a judgment for the performance of an act other than the payment ofmoney is governed by Section 11, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

National Electrification Administration, et al. vs. Danilo Morales, G.R. No. 154200, July 24, 2007

Rule 39, Sec. 12 - Effect of levy on execution as to third persons

Clearly, the levy does not make the judgment creditor the owner of the property levied upon. Hemerely obtains a lien. Such levy on execution is subject and subordinate to all valid claims and liensexisting against the property at the time the execution lien attached, such as real estate mortgages.

Flor Martinez vs. Ernesto G. Garcia, et al., G.R. No. 166536, February 4, 2010

Rule 39, Sec. 13 - Property exempt from execution

Batong Bahay Gold Mines vs. Dela Serna, G.R. No. 86963, August 6, 1999

Rule 39, Sec. 14 - Return of writ of execution


Serafin A. Añonuevo vs. Jose Noel R. Rubio, et al., A.M. No. P-04-1782, July 30, 2004

Luzita Alpeche vs. Expedito B. Bato, A.M. No. P-02-1592, October 16, 2003

Salvador L. Bernabe vs. Winston T. Eguia, A.M. No. P-03-1742, September 18, 2003

Edna Fe F. Aquino vs. Jose R. Martin, A.M. No. P-03-1703, September 18, 2003

Vedasto Tolarba vs. Angel C. Conejero, A.M. No. P-02-1576, July 17, 2003

Dominador Arevalo, et al. vs. Edgardo S. Loria, et al., A.M. No. P-02-1600, April 30, 2003

Fernando Fajardo vs. Rodolfo V. Quitalig, A.M. No. P-02-1535, March 28, 2003

Renato Miguel D. Garcia vs. Pershing T. Yared, A.M. No. P-01-1492, March 20, 2003

Winnie Bajet vs. Judge Vivencio S. Baclig, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1598, July 30, 2002

Concerned Citizen vs. Viven M. Torio, A.M. No. P-01-1490, July 11, 2002

Sps. Felipe and Roselyn Biglete vs. Bonifacio V. Maputi, Jr., A.M. No. P-00-1407, February 15, 2002

DBP vs. Ruben S. Nequinto, A.M. No. P-00-1371, January 23, 2002

Giselle G. Talion vs. Esteban P. Ayupan, A.M. No. P-01-1529, January 23, 2002

Esmeraldo D. Visitacion vs. Gredam P. Ediza, A.M. No. P-01-1495, August 9, 2001

Gloria O. Benitez vs. Medel P. Acosta, A.M. No. P-01-1473, March 27, 2001

Accordingly, the sheriff is mandated to make periodic reports on partially satisfied or unsatisfiedwrits every 30 days, until the judgment is satisfied or its effectivity expires. The reason for thisrequirement is to update the court on the status of the execution and to explain to it why thejudgment has not been satisfied. It also enables the court to determine how efficiently courtprocesses are carried out after the promulgation of judgment. The over-all purpose of therequirement is to ensure the speedy execution of decisions.

Rogelio V. Urbanozo vs. Crisanto T. Flora, A.M. No. P-06-2169, March 28, 2008

Filomena Meneses vs. Albert S. Zaragoza, A.M. No. P-04-1768, February 11, 2004

Salvador L. Bernabe vs. Winston T. Eguia, A.M. No. P-03-1742, September 18, 2003

Sheriffs are obliged to make a return of the writ of execution to the clerk or judge issuing it. Ifthe judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after their receipt of the writ, theofficers shall report to the court and state the reason or reasons therefor. The officers are likewisetasked to make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon untiljudgment is satisfied in full or its effectivity expires.

Leticia T. Malsi vs. Silvino R. Malana, Jr., A.M. No. P-07-2290, May 25, 2007

Section 14, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that the writ of execution shall be returnableto the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the


judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shallreport to the court and state the reason therefor. The officer shall make a report to the court everythirty days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivityexpires.

Cebu International Finance Corp. vs. Arthur R. Cabigon, A.M. No. P-06-2107, February 14, 2007

The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court immediately after the judgment had beensatisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within 30 days after his receiptof the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. He is likewise requiredto make a report to the court every 30 days until judgment is satisfied in full or its effectivityexpires.

Leopoldo C. Lacambra, Jr. vs. Christopher T. Perez, A.M. No. P-08-2430, July 14, 2008

The Rules clearly provide that it is mandatory for sheriffs to execute and make a return on thewrit of execution within 30 days from receipt of the writ and every 30 days thereafter until it issatisfied in full or its effectivity expires. Even if the writs are unsatisfied or only partially satisfied,sheriffs must still file the reports so that the court, as well as the litigants, may be informed of theproceedings undertaken to implement the writ. Periodic reporting also provides the court insights onthe efficiency of court processes after promulgation of judgment. Over-all, the purpose of periodicreporting is to ensure the speedy execution of decisions.

Proserpina V. Anico vs. Emerson B. Pilipiña, A.M. No. P-11-2896, August 2, 2011

We will reiterate that a sheriff's duty in the execution of a writ is purely ministerial; he is toexecute the order of the court strictly to the letter. He has no discretion whether to execute thejudgment or not. He is mandated to uphold the majesty of the law as embodied in the decision.When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his duty, in the absence of any instructions to thecontrary, to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to execute it according to its mandate.Accordingly, a sheriff must comply with his mandated ministerial duty as speedily as possible.There is even no need for the litigants to "follow up" a writ's implementation.

Proserpina V. Anico vs. Emerson B. Pilipiña, A.M. No. P-11-2896, August 2, 2011

Rule 39, Sec. 15 - Notice of sale of property on execution

Aurora Guiang vs. Eva T. Co, G.R. No. 146996, July 30, 2004

Saad Anjum vs. Cesar L. Abacahin, et al., A.M. No. P-02-1640, October 13, 2003

Ofelia J. Villavicencio vs. Alejandro A. Mojares, et al., G.R. No. 142648, February 27, 2003

David de Guzman vs. Paulo M. Gatlabayan, A.M. No. P-99-1323, February 20, 2001


Section 15 (d)

Rule 39 of the Rules of Court unequivocally provides the time in which the auction sale is to beconducted as well as the procedure to be followed in the redemption of the properties.

Roela D. Co vs. Allan D. Sillador, A.M. No. P-07-2342, August 31, 2007

Rule 39, Sec. 16 - Proceedings where property claimed by third person

Ildefonso P. Jacinto vs. Bernabe M. Castro, A.M. No. P-04-1907, July 3, 2007

Jimmy T. Go, et al. vs. Zeus C. Abrogar, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1759, February 27, 2003

Sps. Ching vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118830, February 24, 2003

Arthur R. Camarote vs. Pablo R. Glorioso, AM P-02-1611, July 31, 2002

MR Holdings, Ltd. vs. Sheriff Carlos P. Bajar, G.R. No. 138104, April 11, 2002

Section 16, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, explicitly mandates that the indemnity bond shall be ina sum not less than the value of the property levied on.


Under the above Rule, a third-party claimant or a stranger to the foreclosure suit, like respondentsherein, can opt to file a remedy known as terceria against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ byserving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor. By theterceria, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property and could be answerable for damages. Athird-party claimant may also resort to an independent "separate action," the object of which is therecovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arisingfrom wrongful seizure and detention of the property despite the third-party claim. If a "separateaction" is the recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent jurisdictionan action, distinct and separate from the action in which the judgment is being enforced, evenbefore or without need of filing a claim in the court that issued the writ. Both remedies arecumulative and may be availed of independently of or separately from the other. Availment of theterceria is not a condition sine qua non to the institution of a "separate action."

China Banking Corp. vs. Sps. Ordinario, G.R. No. 121943, March 24, 2003

Jurisprudence is likewise replete with rulings that since the third-party claimant is not one of theparties to the action, he could not, strictly speaking, appeal from the order denying his claim, butshould file a separate reinvindicatory action against the execution creditor or the purchaser of theproperty after the sale of public auction, or a complaint for damages against the bond filed by the


judgment creditor in favor of the sheriff.

Yupangco Cotton Mills vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126322, January 16, 2002

Annie Fermin, et al. vs. Antonio M. Esteves, et al., G.R. No. 147977, March 26, 2008

Ma. Fe Bacos vs. Domingo Arcega, G.R. No. 152343, January 18, 2008

Rule 39, Sec. 19 - How property sold on execution; who may direct manner and order ofsale

David de Guzman vs. Paulo M. Gatlabayan, A.M. No. P-99-1323, February 20, 2001

Drawing from Section 19, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which states that "all sales of propertyunder execution must be made at public auction, to the highest bidder," it naturally follows that thehighest bid submitted is the amount that should be credited to the account of the judgment debtor.


Rule 39, Sec. 21 - Judgment obligee as purchaser

LCK Industries Inc., et al. vs. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 170606, November 23, 2007

Aurora Guiang vs. Eva T. Co, G.R. No. 146996, July 30, 2004

Ofelia J. Villavicencio vs. Alejandro A. Mojares, et al., G.R. No. 142648, February 27, 2003

Conspicuously emphasized under Section 21 of Rule 39 is that if the amount of the loan is equalto the amount of the bid, there is no need to pay the amount in cash. Same provision mandates thatin the absence of a third-party claim, the purchaser in an execution sale need not pay his bid if itdoes not exceed the amount of the judgment; otherwise, he shall pay only the excess.

Sps. Esmeraldo and Elizabeth Suico vs. Philippine National Bank, et al., G.R. No. 170215, August 28,2007

Rule 39, Sec. 27 - Who may redeem real property so sold

Restituto L. Castro vs. Carlos Bague, A.M. No. P-99-1346, June 20, 2001


Erlinda M. Villanueva, et al. vs. Angel S. Malaya et al., G.R. No. 94617, April 12, 2000

Rule 39, Sec. 28 - Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions;notice to be given and filed

Hi-Yield Realty vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138978, September 12, 2002

Vicente P. Lim vs. Judge Jacinta B. Tambago, et al., A.M. No. RTJ 99-1498, September 17, 2001

Sps. Estanislao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143687, July 31, 2001

Enrique M. Belo vs. Phil. National Bank, G.R. No. 134330, March 1, 2001

Paragraph 2

Rule 39 of the Rules of Court unequivocally provides the time in which the auction sale is to beconducted as well as the procedure to be followed in the redemption of the properties.


Desiring to avoid any confusion arising from the conflict between the texts of the Rules of Court(1940 and 1964) and Act No. 3135, on one hand, and the jurisprudence clarifying the reckoning ofthe redemption period in judicial sales of real property, on the other hand, the Court hasincorporated in Section 28 of Rule 39 of the current Rules of Court (effective on July 1, 1997) the .. . judicial construction of reckoning the redemption period from the date of the registration of thecertificate of sale, . . .

Eligio P. Mallari vs. GSIS, et al., G.R. No. 157659, January 25, 2010

Rule 39, Sec. 29 - Effect of redemption by judgment obligor, and a certificate to bedelivered and recorded upon; to whom payments on redemption made

Restituto L. Castro vs. Carlos Bague, A.M. No. P-99-1346, June 20, 2001

Rule 39, Sec. 33 - Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; bywhom executed or given


Isaac Villegas vs. Victor Lingan, et. al., G.R. No. 153839, June 29, 2007

Candelaria Q. Dayot vs. Shell Chemical Co., (Phils.), Inc., G.R. No. 156542, June 26, 2007

China Banking Corp. vs. Sps. Ordinario, G.R. No. 121943, March 24, 2003

PNB vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135219, January 17, 2002

Rule 39, Sec. 36 - Examination of judgment obligor when judgment unsatisfied

Ramon D. Montenegro vs. Ma. Teresa L. Montenegro, et al., G.R. No. 156829, June 8, 2004

Rule 39, Sec. 37 - Examination of obligor of judgment obligor

PNB Mgt. & Devt. Corp. vs. R&R Metal Casting, G.R. No. 132245, January 2, 2002

Rule 39, Sec. 38 - Enforcement of attendance and conduct of examination

Ramon D. Montenegro vs. Ma. Teresa L. Montenegro, et al., G.R. No. 156829, June 8, 2004

Rule 39, Sec. 47 - Effect of judgments or final orders

Leonardo Chua vs. Mutya B. Victorio, G.R. No. 157568, May 18, 2004

Rural Bank of Sta. Ignacia vs. Pelagia Dimatulac, G.R. No. 142015, April 29, 2003

State Investment Trust vs. Delta Motors, G.R. No. 144444, April 3, 2003

Jose Clavano vs. HLURB, G.R. No. 143781, February 27, 2002

Alma G.De Leon vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127182, December 5, 2001

The Malayan Bank vs. Agustin Lagrama, G.R. No. 144884, April 27, 2001

Bryan U. Villanueva vs. Tirso D.C. Velasco, G.R. No. 130845, November 27, 2000


Maria Mercedes Nery, et al. vs. Gabriel Leyson, et al., G.R. No. 139306, August 29, 2000

Rodolfo Barretto vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110259, February 3, 2000

Cagayan De Oro Coliseum vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129713, Dec. 15, 1999

Pribhdas J. Mirpuri vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114508, November 19, 1999

Maria G. Baluyut, et al. vs. Rodolfo Guiao, et al., G.R. No. 136294, September 28, 1999

Ricardo T. Gloria vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999

Ayala Corp. vs. Ray Burton Devt. Corp., G.R. No. 126699, August 7, 1998

The above-quoted provision lays down two main rules. Section 49 (b) enunciates the first rule ofres judicata known as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by judgment," which states that thejudgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties and theirprivies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the same cause ofaction either before the same or any other tribunal… The second rule of res judicata embodied inSection 47 (c), Rule 39 is "conclusiveness of judgment." This rule provides that any right, fact, ormatter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of an action beforea competent court in which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled bythe judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether ornot the claim or demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two suits is the same. It refers to asituation where the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to the mattersactually determined or which were necessarily included therein.

Ernesto C. Del Rosario, et al. vs. Far East Bank and Trust Company, et al., G.R. No. 150134, October31, 2007

Bar by prior judgment exists when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered, andthe second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter andcause of action. When the three (3) identities are present, the judgment on the merits rendered in thefirst constitutes an absolute bar to the subsequent action. It is final as to the claim or demand incontroversy, including the parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every matter whichwas offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissiblematter which might have been offered for that purpose. But where between the first case whereinjudgment is rendered and the second case wherein such judgment is invoked, there is no identity ofcause of action, the judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually anddirectly controverted and determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what istermed conclusiveness of judgment.

Veronica Padillo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119707, November 29, 2001

The doctrine of res judicata actually embraces two (2) concepts: the first is "bar by priorjudgment" under paragraph (b) of Rule 39, Section 47, and the second is "conclusiveness ofjudgment" under paragraph (c) thereof. In the present case, the second concept — conclusiveness of


judgment — applies.

Ramon D. Ocho vs. Bernardino Calos, G.R. No. 137908, November 22, 2000

Codidi Mata vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103476, November 18, 1999

It is clear that a judgment is not confined to what appears on the face of the decision, but also tothose necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

Natividad P.Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131641, February 23, 2000

Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, which is also known as "preclusion of issues"or "collateral estoppel," issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raisedin any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action. In other words,petitioner is barred from challenging the pronouncement of the trial court that his alleged lot iswithin the property of respondents.

Domingo Celendro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131099, July 20, 1999

There is "Conclusiveness of judgment", when, between the first case where judgment wasrendered and the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, not ofcauses of action. The judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actuallyand directly controverted and determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein.

Augusto A. Camara vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100789, July 20, 1999

The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties oughtnot be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that when the right or fact has beenjudicially determined, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should beconclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.

Marciana Serdoncillo vs. Fidel Benolirao, et al., G.R. No. 118328, October 8, 1998

The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system ofjurisprudence and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law,namely: (1) public policy and necessity which makes it to the interest of the State that there shouldbe an end to litigation — republicae ut sit litium, and (2) the hardship on the individual that heshould be vexed twice for the same cause — nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrarydoctrine would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefergratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the publictranquility and happiness.

The requisites of res judicata are: (1) there must be a final judgment or order; (2) the courtrendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgmentor order on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the two cases, identity of parties, subjectmatter and causes of action.

The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects, to wit: (1) the effect of a judgment as a bar to the


prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action; and (2) precluderelitigation of a particular fact or issue in another action between the same parties on a differentclaim or cause of action.

Jose A. Linzag vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122181, June 26, 1998

Sps. Nicanor and Rosario Tumbokon vs. Apolonia G. Legaspi, et al., G.R. No. 153736, August 4, 2010

It is settled that when a final judgment is executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. Thejudgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correctwhat is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether themodification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land.The doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk ofoccasional errors, judgments must become final at some definite point in time. The only recognizedexceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries inwhich case there is no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void.

GSIS vs. RTC-Branch 71 of Pasig City, et al., G.R. Nos. 175393 & 177731, December 18, 2009

Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomesimmutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification ismeant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless ofwhether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court ofthe land. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, thewinning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case. Thedoctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy andsound practice, and that, at the risk of occasional errors, the judgments or orders of courts mustbecome final at some definite time fixed by law; otherwise, there would be no end to litigations,thus setting to naught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of therule of law and the maintenance of peace and order by setting justiciable controversies with finality.

GSIS vs. RTC-Branch 71 of Pasig City, et al., G.R. Nos. 175393 & 177731, December 18, 2009

The doctrine of immutability and inalterability of a final judgment has a two-fold purpose: (1) toavoid delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge ofjudicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights andobligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. The doctrineis not a mere technicality to be easily brushed aside, but a matter of public policy as well as atime-honored principle of procedural law.

Apo Fruits Corp., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 164195, December 4, 2009

Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomesimmutable and unalterable. The enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or evaded,for the immediate enforcement of the parties' rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a major


component of the ideal administration of justice. This is the reason why we abhor any delay in thefull execution of final and executory decisions. Thus, a remedy intended to frustrate, suspend, orenjoin the enforcement of a final judgment must be granted with caution and upon a strictobservance of the requirements under existing laws and jurisprudence. Any such remedy allowed inviolation of established rules and guidelines connotes but a capricious exercise of discretion thatmust be struck down in order that the prevailing party is not deprived of the fruits of victory.

Angelina Pahila-Garrido vs. Eliza M. Tortogo, et al., G.R. No. 156358, August 17, 2011

Rule 39, Sec. 47 (b) and (c)

The res judicata rule bars the re-litigation of facts or issues that have once been settled by a courtof law upon a final judgment on the merits. Section 47 (b) and (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Courtestablishes two rules: (a) a judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction bars theparties and their privies from bringing a new action or suit involving the same cause of actionbefore either the same or any other tribunal; and (b) any right, fact or matter directly adjudged ornecessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court that rendersjudgment on the merits is conclusively settled and cannot be litigated again between the parties andtheir privies, regardless of whether the claims, purposes or subject matters of the two suits are thesame.

The first is commonly referred to as "bar by former judgment"; the second as "conclusiveness ofjudgment." It is the second that is relevant to this case.

Conclusiveness of judgment or auter action pendent ordains that issues actually and directlyresolved in a former suit cannot be raised anew in any future case involving the same partiesalthough for a different cause of action. Where the rule applies, there must be identity of issues butnot necessarily identity in causes of action.

Pacifico R. Cruz vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 174599-609, February 12, 2010

Rule 39, Sec. 47 (d)

It is fundamental that the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudgedor as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between theparties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action orspecial proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity.


Rule 39, Sec. 48 - Effect of foreign judgments


As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable inour jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, muststill be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreignjudgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that theparties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowedunder Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure).

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order forthe court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules ofCourt clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem,a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a partyand, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.


Under Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment in an action inpersonam rendered by a foreign tribunal clothed with jurisdiction is presumptive evidence of a rightas between the parties and their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title.

Gil Miguel T. Puyat vs. Ron Zabarte, G.R. No. 141536, February 26, 2001

In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar asthe immediate parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so long as it is convincinglyshown that there has been an opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competentjurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation orvoluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure animpartial administration of justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in courtand in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. A foreignjudgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contraryshowing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice inthe foreign forum.

Phil. Aluminum Wheels vs. Fasgi Ent., G.R. No. 137378, October 12, 2000

Rule 40, Sec. 1 - Where to appeal

Under the Rules of Court, final orders or resolutions of an MTC should be appealed to the RTCexercising territorial jurisdiction over the former.

Go Ke Chong, Jr. vs. Mariano M. Chan, G.R. No. 153791, August 24, 2007


Rule 40, Sec. 2 - When to appeal

Ma. Imelda Argel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128805, October 12, 1999

Rule 40, Sec. 5 - Appellate court docket and other lawful fees

The non-payment of the prescribed filing fees at the time of the filing of the complaint or otherinitiatory pleading fails to vest jurisdiction over the case in the trial court. Yet, where the plaintiffhas paid the amount of filing fees assessed by the clerk of court, and the amount paid turns out to bedeficient, the trial court still acquires jurisdiction over the case, subject to the payment by theplaintiff of the deficiency assessment.

Fedman Development Corp. vs. Federico Agcaoili, G.R. No. 165025, August 31, 2011

The filing of the complaint or other initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docketfee are the acts that vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the claim. In an action where the reliefssought are purely for sums of money and damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of theaggregate amount being claimed. Ideally, therefore, the complaint or similar pleading must specifythe sums of money to be recovered and the damages being sought in order that the clerk of courtmay be put in a position to compute the correct amount of docket fees.


If the amount of docket fees paid is insufficient in relation to the amounts being sought, the clerkof court or his duly authorized deputy has the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment, andthe plaintiff will be required to pay the deficiency. The non-specification of the amounts of damagesdoes not immediately divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case, provided there is no badfaith or intent to defraud the Government on the part of the plaintiff.


The prevailing rule is that if the correct amount of docket fees are not paid at the time of filing,the trial court still acquires jurisdiction upon full payment of the fees within a reasonable time as thecourt may grant, barring prescription. The "prescriptive period" that bars the payment of the docketfees refers to the period in which a specific action must be filed, so that in every case the docketfees must be paid before the lapse of the prescriptive period, as provided in the applicable laws,particularly Chapter 3, Title V, Book III, of the Civil Code, the principal law on prescription ofactions.



Rule 40, Sec. 7 - Procedure in the Regional Trial Court

The appellant is duty-bound to submit his memorandum on appeal. Such submission is not amatter of discretion on his part. His failure to comply with this mandate or to perform said duty willcompel the RTC to dismiss his appeal.

Melba Moncal Enriquez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140473, January 28, 2003

Section 7 (b), Filing of Memorandum Mandatory

Rule 40, Section 7 (b) provides that, "it shall be the duty of the appellant to submit amemorandum" and failure to do so "shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal". The use of theword "shall" in a statute or rule expresses what is mandatory and compulsory. Further, the Ruleimposes upon an appellant the "duty" to submit his memorandum. A duty is a "legal or moralobligation, mandatory act, responsibility, charge, requirement, trust, chore, function, commission,debt, liability, assignment, role, pledge, dictate, office, (and) engagement". Thus, under the expressmandate of said Rule, the appellant is duty-bound to submit his memorandum on appeal. Suchsubmission is not a matter of discretion on his part. His failure to comply with this mandate or toperform said duty will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal. In rules of procedure, an act which isjurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection or benefit ofthe party affected is mandatory. As private respondent points out, in appeals from inferior courts tothe RTC, the appellant's brief is mandatory for the assignment of errors is vital to the decision of theappeal on the merits. This is because on appeal only errors specifically assigned and properly arguedin the brief or memorandum will be considered, except those affecting jurisdiction over the subjectmatter as well as plain and clerical errors. Otherwise stated, an appellate court has no power toresolve an unassigned error, which does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter,save for a plain or clerical error. It is true that the Rules should be interpreted so as to give litigantsample opportunity to prove their respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justicedue to legal technicalities should be avoided. But it is equally true that an appeal being a purelystatutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules ofCourt. In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play by the rules. This thepetitioner failed to do when she did not submit her memorandum of appeal in Civil Case No. 12044as required by Rule 40, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. That she lost her case is notthe trial court's fault but her own.

Lorna Villa vs. Heirs of Enrique Altavas, G.R. No. 162028, July 14, 2008

Melba Moncal Enriquez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140473, January 28, 2003


Rule 41 - Appeal from the Regional Trial Courts

Rosario Yambao vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140894, November 27, 2000

Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order thatcompletely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the RevisedRules of Court to be appealable.

Francisco Magestrado vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 148072, July 10, 2007

The remedy to question a final order is appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. vs. Pampanga Omnibus Development Corp., et al., G.R. No. 168088,April 4, 2007

There are two modes of appeal from a final order of the trial court in the exercise of its originaljurisdiction — (1) by writ of error under Section 2 (a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court if questions offact or questions of fact and law are raised or involved; or (2) appeal by certiorari under Section 2(c), Rule 41, in relation to Rule 45, where only questions of law are raised or involved.

First Bancorp, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 151132, June 22, 2006

Herminia Cando vs. Spouses Aurora and Claudio Olazo, G.R. No. 160741, March 22, 2007

Failure to interpose an appeal within the reglementary period renders an order or decision finaland executory unless a party files a motion for reconsideration within the 15-day reglementaryperiod. The law grants an aggrieved party a period of fifteen (15) days from his receipt of the court'sdecision or order disposing of the action or proceeding to appeal or move to reconsider the same.After the lapse of the fifteen-day period, an order becomes final and executory and is beyond thepower or jurisdiction of the court which rendered it to further amend or revoke. The court losesjurisdiction over the case and not even an appellate court would have the power to review ajudgment that has acquired finality. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation and would set tonaught the main role of courts of justice which is to assist in the enforcement of the rule of law andthe maintenance of peace and order by setting justiciable controversies with finality.

Heirs of Tungpala vs. CA, G.R. No. 136207, June 21, 2005

It is doctrinally entrenched that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege.Hence, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it.The Rules of Civil Procedure provide, among others, that the appeal should be taken within fifteen(15) days from the notice of judgment or from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, and that,upon motion and payment of the docket fees before the expiration of the reglementary period, theCA may grant an extension to file the petition for review. Moreover, there must be a proof of


service of a copy of the petition on the adverse party and the court a quo, and a written explanationwhy service was not done personally, in case the service is made through registered mail or othermodes of service. Undisputedly, the petitioner failed to meet these requirements.

Time and again, it has been held that the rules of procedure are mere tools intended to facilitatethe attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. A strict and rigid application of the rules mustalways be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance fairtrials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of theother party. Every party-litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and justdetermination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.

Rosario Dalton-Reyes vs. CA, G.R. No. 149580, March 16, 2005

Starting March 20, 2003, the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC, sitting as aspecial agrarian court, in a petition for determination of just compensation is a petition for reviewunder Rule 43, not a notice of appeal under Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Land Bank of the Phil. vs. Hermin Arceo, et al., G.R. No. 158270, July 21, 2008

Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held, time and again, thatthe right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege.Thus, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not onlymandatory but also jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal willrender the judgment final and executory. Once a decision attains finality, it becomes the law of thecase irrespective of whether the decision is erroneous or not and no court — not even the SupremeCourt — has the power to revise, review, change or alter the same. The basic rule of finality ofjudgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at therisk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies mustbecome final at some definite date fixed by law.

Land Bank of the Phil. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 190660, April 11, 2011, citing ZamboangaForest Managers Corp. v. New Pacific Timber and Supply Co., et al., G.R. No. 143275

To recapitulate, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with therequirements of the rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The rulesrequire that from the date of receipt of the assailed RTC order denying one's motion forreconsideration, an appellant may take an appeal to the CA by filing a notice of appeal with theRTC and paying the required docket and other lawful fees with the RTC Branch Clerk of Court,within the 15-day reglementary period for the perfection of an appeal. Otherwise, the appellant'sappeal is not perfected, and the CA may dismiss the appeal on the ground of non-payment of docketand other lawful fees. As a consequence, the assailed RTC decision shall become final andexecutory and, therefore, the prevailing parties can move for the issuance of a writ of execution.

Augustus Gonzales, et al. vs. Quirico Pe, G.R. No. 167398, August 8, 2011


Rule 41, Sec. 1 - Subject of appeal

Bienvenido P. Jaban, et al vs. Alvin Garcia, et al., G.R. No. 138336-37, February 16, 2004

Basilio Rivera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141863, June 26, 2003


GSIS vs. Bengson Commercial Buildings, G.R. No. 137448, January 31, 2002

MMDA vs. Jancom Environmental Corp., G.R. No. 147465, January 30, 2002

Anastacio Fabela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142546, August 9, 2001

Ramon Oro vs. Gerardo D. Diaz, G.R. No. 140974, July 11, 2001


Shuhei Yasuda vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112569, April 12, 2000

Maria G. Baluyut, et al. vs. Rodolfo Guiao, et al., G.R. No. 136294, September 28, 1999

According to Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, governing appeals from theRegional Trial Courts (RTCs) to the Court of Appeals, an appeal may be taken only from ajudgment or final order that completely disposes of the case or of a matter therein when declared bythe Rules to be appealable. Said provision, thus, explicitly states that no appeal may be taken froman interlocutory order.

Judy Anne L. Santos vs. People of the Phil., et al., G.R. No. 173176, August 26, 2008

The first mode of appeal, governed by Rule 41, is taken to the Court of Appeals on questions offact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal, covered by Rule 42, is broughtto the Court of Appeals on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The thirdmode of appeal, provided for by Rule 45, is elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law.

Emelinda V. Abedes vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 174373, October 15, 2007

It is explicit from (Section 1 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court) that no appeal may be taken froman order of execution; instead, such order may be challenged by the aggrieved party via a specialcivil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

A & C Minimart Corp. vs. Patricia S. Villareal, et al., G.R. No. 172268, October 10, 2007

Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that no appeal may be taken from an orderdisallowing or dismissing an appeal.

Heirs of Teofilo Gaudiano vs. Constancio Benemerito, et al., G.R. No. 174247, February 21, 2007

Under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the aggrieved party can no longer appeal from the


order denying the petition since this is proscribed under Section 1 of Rule 41. The remedy of theparty is to file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 from the order rejecting the petitionfor relief from judgment.

Domingo Realty, Inc., et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 126236, January 26, 2007

While this provision prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory order, the aggrieved party isafforded the chance to question an interlocutory order through a special civil action of certiorariunder Rule 65; the petition must be filed within sixty days from notice of the assailed judgment,order, resolution, or denial of a motion for reconsideration.


Section 1 (c)

Under Section 1 (c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an interlocutory order is not appealable. Anorder denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable.

Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc. vs. Felicidad Navarro, G.R. No. 152575, June 29, 2007

Douglas Lu Ym vs. Gertrudes Nabua, G.R. No. 161309, February 23, 2005

The fundamental distinction between a final judgment or order, on one hand, and an interlocutoryorder, on the other hand, has been outlined in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No.L-60036, January 27, 1987) viz.:

The concept of 'final' judgment, as distinguished from one which has 'become final' (or'executory' as of right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A 'final' judgment or order isone that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto,e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial declarescategorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or ajudgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata orprescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy ordetermining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be doneby the Court except to await the parties' next move (which among others, may consist of the filingof a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, tocause the execution of the judgment once it becomes 'final' or, to use the established and moredistinctive term, 'final and executory. . . . Conversely, an order that does not finally dispose of thecase, and does not end the Court's task of adjudicating the parties' contentions and determining theirrights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to bedone by the Court, is 'interlocutory,' e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of theRules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendmentthereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection ofdocuments or things, etc. Unlike a 'final' judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointedout, an 'interlocutory' order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that


may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.


The December 20, 2007 amendment to the Rules of Civil Procedure has deleted Section 1 (a) ofRule 41 which contains the express provision that no appeal may be taken from an order denying amotion for new trial or reconsideration.

Gertrudes Nabua, et al. vs. Douglas Lu Ym, G.R. No. 176141, December 16, 2008

The appropriate remedy to be taken from an interlocutory order is a special civil action underRule 65.

Valente Raymundo vs. Teofista Isagon vda. De Suarez, et al., G.R. No. 149017, November 28, 2008

Section 1 (h)

A dismissal without prejudice does not operate as a judgment on the merits, for there is nounequivocal determination of the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the cause ofaction and subject matter thereof.

Rizalina P. Positos vs. Jacob M. Chua, G.R. No. 179328, December 23, 2009

Section 1, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that an appeal may be taken onlyfrom a final order that completely disposes of the case; that no appeal may be taken from (a) anorder denying a motion for new trial or reconsideration; (b) an order denying a petition for relief orany similar motion seeking relief from judgment; (c) an interlocutory order; (d) an order disallowingor dismissing an appeal; (e) an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment by consent,confession or compromise on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress, or any other ground vitiatingconsent; (f) an order of execution; (g) a judgment or final order for or against one or more of

several parties or in separate claims, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party complaints,while the main case is pending, unless the court allows an appeal therefrom; or (h) an orderdismissing an action without prejudice. In all the above instances where the judgment or final orderis not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action for certiorari underRule 65.


Certiorari is an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory order (1) when the tribunal issuedsuch order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; and (2) when theassailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal would not affordadequate and expeditious relief. Recourse to a petition for certiorari to assail an interlocutory orderis now expressly recognized in the ultimate paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules ofCourt on the subject of appeal.

Republic of the Phil. vs. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), et al., G.R. No. 159275, August 25, 2010


The enumeration of the orders that were not appealable made in the 1997 version of Section 1,Rule 41 of the Rules of Court — the version in force at the time when the CA rendered its assaileddecision on May 15, 2002 — included an order denying a motion for new trial or motion forreconsideration . . . It is true that Administrative Matter No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27,2007, has since amended Section 1, Rule 41, supra, by deleting an order denying a motion for newtrial or motion for reconsideration from the enumeration of non-appealable orders, and that such arevision of a procedural rule may be retroactively applied. However, to reverse the CA on that basiswould not be right and proper, simply because the CA correctly applied the rule of procedure inforce at the time when it issued its assailed final order.


The settled rule precluding certiorari as a remedy against the final order when appeal is availablenotwithstanding, the Court rules that the CA should have given due course to and granted thepetition for certiorari for two exceptional reasons, namely: (a) the broader interest of justicedemanded that certiorari be given due course to avoid the undeserved grossly unjust result thatwould befall the petitioners otherwise; and (b) the order of the RTC granting the motion to dismisson ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter evidently constituted grave abuse ofdiscretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.

On occasion, the Court has considered certiorari as the proper remedy despite the availability ofappeal, or other remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court ofAppeals, (G.R. Nos. 117622-23, October 23, 2006) the Court has declared that the requirement thatthere must be no appeal, or any plain speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of lawadmits of exceptions, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable damages and injury to aparty; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c) where theremay be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, andinsufficient; (e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved;and (g) in case of urgency.

Specifically, the Court has held that the availability of appeal as a remedy does not constitutesufficient ground to prevent or preclude a party from making use of certiorari if appeal is not anadequate remedy, or an equally beneficial, or speedy remedy. It is inadequacy, not the mere absenceof all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of justice without the writ, that must usuallydetermine the propriety of certiorari. A remedy is plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptlyrelieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lowercourt or agency. It is understood, then, that a litigant need not mark time by resorting to the lessspeedy remedy of appeal in order to have an order annulled and set aside for being patently void forfailure of the trial court to comply with the Rules of Court.

Nor should the petitioner be denied the recourse despite certiorari not being available as a properremedy against an assailed order, because it is better on balance to look beyond proceduralrequirements and to overcome the ordinary disinclination to exercise supervisory powers in order


that a void order of a lower court may be controlled to make it conformable to law and justice.Verily, the instances in which certiorari will issue cannot be defined, because to do so is to destroythe comprehensiveness and usefulness of the extraordinary writ. The wide breadth and range of thediscretion of the court are such that authority is not wanting to show that certiorari is morediscretionary than either prohibition or mandamus, and that in the exercise of superintending controlover inferior courts, a superior court is to be guided by all the circumstances of each particular case"as the ends of justice may require." Thus, the writ will be granted whenever necessary to prevent asubstantial wrong or to do substantial justice.


Rule 41, Sec. 2 - Modes of appeal

Madrigal Transport, Inc. vs. Lapanday Holdings Corp., G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004

La Salette College, et al. vs. Victor C. Pilotin, G.R. No. 149227, December 11, 2003

Land Bank of the Phil. vs. Arlene and Bernardo de Leon, G.R. No. 143275, September 10, 2002

Napocor vs. Vine Development Corp., G.R. No. 137785, September 4, 2000

Asset Privatization Trust vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 121171, December 29, 1998

Macawiwili Gold Mining vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115104, October 12, 1998

While admittedly a complaint for expropriation is not a special proceeding, the above-quoted rulerequires the filing of a record on appeal in "other cases of multiple or separate appeal."Jurisprudential law, no doubt, recognizes the existence of multiple appeals in a complaint forexpropriation.

NPC vs. Aguirre-Paderanga, G.R. No. 155065, July 27, 2005

Under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an appeal may be taken from a judgment or final order thatcompletely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by the RevisedRules of Court to be appealable.

Francisco Magestrado vs. People of the Phil., et al, G.R. No. 148072, July 10, 2007

Section 2 (a)

RTC judgments, final orders or resolutions meanwhile are appealable to the CA either through anordinary appeal, if the case was originally decided by the RTC, or a petition for review under Rule42 if the case was decided under the RTC's appellate jurisdiction.


Go Ke Chong, Jr. vs. Mariano M. Chan, G.R. No. 153791, August 24, 2007

Section 2 (b)

The Rule is clear. In cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, appealto the Court of Appeals is taken by filing a notice of appeal. On the other hand, in cases decided by

the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, appeal to the Court of Appeals is by a petitionfor review under Rule 42.

BF Citiland Corp. vs. Marilyn B. Otake, G.R. No. 173351, July 29, 2010

Section 2 (c)

Section 2 (c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that in all cases where questions of law areraised or involved, the appeal shall be to this Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule45.

Ericsson Telecommunications, Inc. vs. City of Pasig, G.R. No. 176667, November 22, 2007

Under Section 2 (c), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, it is provided that in all cases where onlyquestions of law are raised, the appeal from a decision or order of the RTC shall be to the SupremeCourt by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45, Section 1.

Gerardo Mendoza, et al. vs. Soledad Salinas, G.R. No. 152827, February 6, 2007

Republic of the Philippines vs. Heirs of Juan Faber, G.R. No. 159589, December 23, 2008

This Court has invariably ruled that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the periodlaid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. The failure to perfect an appeal asrequired by the rules has the effect of defeating the right to appeal of a party and precluding theappellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. The right to appeal is not a natural rightnor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the mannerand in accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same mustcomply with the requirement of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. The reason forrules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, andintolerable delays would result, without rules governing practice. Public policy and sound practicedemand that judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed bylaw. Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly discharge of judicialfunctions. Thus, we have held that the failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribedreglementary period is not a mere technicality, but jurisdictional. Just as a losing party has theprivilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlativeright to enjoy the finality of the decision. Failure to meet the requirements of an appeal deprives theappellate court of jurisdiction to entertain any appeal. There are exceptions to this rule,unfortunately respondents did not present any circumstances that would justify the relaxation of saidrule.


In Re: Heirship of the Late Hermogenes Rodriguez, et al., G.R. No. 182645, December 4, 2009

Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for partition of property withaccounting, in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage. Therationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to enable the rest of the case toproceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. Insuch a case, the filing of a record on appeal becomes indispensable since only a particular incidentof the case is brought to the appellate court for resolution with the rest of the proceedings remainingwithin the jurisdiction of the trial court.

Voltaire I. Rovira vs. Heirs of Jose c. Deleste, et al., G.R. No. 160825, March 26, 2010

Rule 41, Sec. 3 - Period of ordinary appeal; appeal in habeas corpus cases


Manila Memorial Park vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137122, November 15, 2000

Tung Chin Hui vs. Rufus B. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 137571, September 21, 2000

Ma. Imelda Argel vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128805, October 12, 1999

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity toappeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which tofile the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing amotion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.

Sps. Ricardo and Leonila delos Santos vs. Ma. Socorro V. Vda. De Mangubat, et al., G.R. No. 149508,October 10, 2007

The fifteen (15)-day period (mentioned in Section 3 of Rule 41) begins to run upon receipt ofnotice of the decision or final order appealed from. Such period has been considered to begin uponreceipt of notice by the counsel of record, which is considered notice to the parties.

Vicente delos Santos, et al. vs. Fred Elizalde, et al., G.R. No. 141810 & 141812, February 2, 2007

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment orfinal order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leavingnothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligationsof the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.

Domingo Neypes vs. CA, G.R. No. 141524, September 14, 2005

Makati Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Wilfredo D. Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 167403, August 6, 2008


Rule 41, Sec. 4 - Appellate court docket and other lawful fees


Noli Alfonso, et al. vs. Sps. Henry and Liwanag Andres, G.R. No. 139611, October 4, 2002

Teodora Buenaflor, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 142021, November 29, 2000

Ayala Land vs. Sps. Morris and Socorro Carpo, G.R. No. 140162, November 22, 2000

Oriental Assurance Corp. vs. Solidbank, G.R. No. 139882, August 16, 2000


Gabriel Lazaro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137761, April 6, 2000

Mactan Cebu International Airport vs. Cuizon Mangubat, G.R. No. 136121, August 16, 1999

The payment of docket fees is a requirement in filing an ordinary appeal from the decision orfinal order of the RTC.

Tereso Tan, et al. vs. Manuel “Guy” Link, et al., G.R. No. 172849, December 10, 2008

In cases of ordinary appeal, Section 2, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides that the appeal tothe CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken byfiling a notice of appeal with the RTC (the court which rendered the judgment or final orderappealed from) and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. Section 3 thereof states that theappeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealedfrom. Concomitant with the filing of a notice of appeal is the payment of the required appeal feeswithin the 15-day reglementary period set forth in Section 4 of the said Rule.


It bears stressing that payment of docket and other fees within this period is mandatory for theperfection of the appeal. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost. This is so because a court acquiresjurisdiction over the subject matter of the action only upon the payment of the correct amount ofdocket fees regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court. The payment of appellatedocket fees is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement, withoutwhich the decision or final order appealed from becomes final and executory as if no appeal wasfiled.

D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. vs. City of Parañaque, et al., G.R. No. 170728, August 31, 2011

The right to appeal is not a natural right. It is also not part of due process. It is merely a statutoryprivilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.


Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules.Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.

D.M. Wenceslao and Associates, Inc. vs. City of Parañaque, et al., G.R. No. 170728, August 31, 2011

Rule 41, Sec. 5 - Notice of appeal

Aquilina Estrella, et al. vs. Nila Espiridion, G.R. No. 134460, November 27, 2003

Rule 41, Sec. 9 - Perfection of appeal; effect thereof

Eusebio Osorio vs. Agustin S. Dizon, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-04-1838, March 18, 2004

Atlantic Erectors vs. Herbal Cove Realty Corp., G.R. No. 148568, March 20, 2003

Accordingly, in order to perfect an appeal from a decision rendered by the RTC in the exercise ofits original jurisdiction, the following requirements must be complied with. First, within 15 days, anotice of appeal must be filed with the court that rendered the judgment or final order sought to beappealed; second, such notice must be served on the adverse party; and third, within the same15-day period, the full amount of appellate court docket and other legal fees must be paid to theclerk of the court that rendered the judgment or final order.

It should be noted that full payment of the appellate docket fees within the prescribed period ismandatory, even jurisdictional, for the perfection of the appeal. Otherwise, the appellate courtwould not be able to act on the subject matter of the action, and the decision or final order sought tobe appealed from would become final and executory.


Procedural rules setting the period for perfecting an appeal or filing a petition for review aregenerally inviolable. It is doctrinally entrenched that appeal is not a constitutional right, but a merestatutory privilege. Hence, parties who seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutesor rules allowing it. The requirements for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary periodspecified in law must, as a rule, be strictly followed. Such requirements are consideredindispensable interdictions against needless delays and are necessary for the orderly discharge of thejudicial business. Furthermore, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the periodpermitted by law is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Failure to perfect the appeal rendersthe judgment of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file anappeal within the prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the


finality of the decision.

Elpidio Calipay vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 166411, August 3, 2010

Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules explains that the court of origin loses jurisdiction over the caseonly upon the perfection of the appeal filed in due time by the appellant and the expiration of thetime to appeal of the other parties. Withal, prior to the transmittal of the original records of the caseto the CA, the RTC may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of theprevailing party, as in this case, the issuance of the writ of execution because the respondent'sappeal was not perfected.


While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determinationof his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, the failure to perfect an appeal within thereglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises jurisdictional problem, as it deprives theappellate court of its jurisdiction over the appeal. After a decision is declared final and executory,vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as a losing party has the right to appeal withinthe prescribed period, the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the decisionon the case.


Rule 41, Sec. 10 - Duty of clerk of court of the lower court upon perfection of appeal

Saturnino Obañana, Jr. vs. Armando R. Ricafort, A.M. No. MTJ-04-1545, May 27, 2004

Eusebio Osorio vs. Agustin S. Dizon, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-04-1838, March 18, 2004

Section 10, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that if the records are found to beincomplete, measures should be taken to complete the records. In his comment, however, Clerk ofCourt made no mention of any steps taken to complete the records. At any rate, the failure tocomplete the records does not justify its non-transmittal. Under the Rules, when the records cannotbe completed, respondent should "indicate in his letter of transmittal the exhibits or transcripts notincluded in the records being transmitted to the appellate court, the reasons for their non-transmittal,and the steps taken or that could be taken to have them available".

Luminza Delos Reyes vs. Danilo S. Cruz, et al., A.M. No. RTJ-08-2152, January 18, 2010


Rule 42, Sec. 1 - How appeal taken; time for filing

Heirs of Sps. Dela Cruz vs. Heirs of Quintos, G.R. No. 149692, July 30, 2002

This Court has explained that the purpose in limiting the period of appeal is to forestall or avoidan unreasonable delay in the administration of justice and to put an end to controversies. Where noelement of intent to delay the administration of justice could be attributed to petitioners, a one-daydelay does not justify their petition's dismissal.

In Department of Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez v. Pennisi (G.R. No. 169958, March 5,2010), this Court elucidated on the rules on reglementary periods, to wit: The general rule is that theperfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is, not onlymandatory, but jurisdictional, and failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment sought tobe reviewed final and unappealable. By way of exception, unintended lapses are disregarded so as togive due course to appeals filed beyond the reglementary period on the basis of strong andcompelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof.The purpose behind the limitation of the period of appeal is to avoid an unreasonable delay in theadministration of justice and to put an end to controversies.

In Samala v. Court of Appeals (416 Phil. 1 (2001), we said: The rules of procedure are mere toolsdesigned to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application especially ontechnical matters, which tends to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must be avoided.Even the Revised Rules of Court envision this liberality. Technicality, when it deserts its properoffice as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scantconsideration from the courts.

Heirs of Rodolfo Crisostomo vs. Rudex International Development Corp., G.R. No. 176129, August 24,2011

Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides that a party who desires to appeal from adecision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall file averified petition for review with the Court of Appeals.

Sps. Maximo and Engracia C. Abadilla, et al. vs. Virginia Hofilena-Europa, et al., G.R. No. 146769,August 17, 2007

The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review when appealing cases decided bythe Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases is the need for absolute dispatch in thedetermination of just compensation. Just compensation means not only paying the correct amountbut also paying for the land within a reasonable time from its acquisition. Without prompt payment,compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequencesof being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more beforeactually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Such objective is more in keepingwith the nature of a petition for review.


Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal orcompletion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted. A petition for review hastensthe award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the government-acquired property, an endnot foreseeable in an ordinary appeal. . . .

LBP vs. Luz L. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 148892, May 6, 2010

Rule 42, Sec. 2 - Form and contents

Francisco Dee vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133542, January 29, 2004

Santiago Alcantara vs. Court of Appeals and The Peninsula Manila, G.R. No. 143397, August 6, 2002

Sps. Anton and Eileen Lim vs. Uni-Tan Marketing Corp., G.R. No. 147328, February 20, 2002

Santiago Eslaban vs. Clarita Vda. De Onorio, G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001

Nelia Atillo vs. Buenaventura Bombay, G.R. No. 136096, February 7, 2001

Cornelia P. Cusi-Hernandez vs. Eduardo Diaz, et al., G.R. No. 140436, July 18, 2000

Far Eastern Shipping vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130068, October 1, 1998

The requirement to file a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory, and failure to complytherewith cannot be excused. The certification is a peculiar and personal responsibility of the party,an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involvingbasically the same parties, issues and causes of action. Hence, the certification must beaccomplished by the party himself because he has actual knowledge of whether or not he hasinitiated similar actions or proceedings in different courts or tribunals.

Rural Bankers Association of the Phil. vs. Ma. Rosario Tanghal-Salvana, G.R. No. 175020, October 4,2007

Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152392, May 26, 2005

The requirements as to form and content of a petition for review of a decision of the RTC are laiddown in Section 2 of Rule 42 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Virginia Real vs. Sisenando H. Belo, G.R. No. 146224, January 26, 2007

Non-compliance with these requirements is sufficient ground for the dismissal of the Petition,pursuant to Section 3 of the same Rule, . . . .

Sps. Heber and Charlita Edillo vs. Sps. Norberto and Desideria Dulpina, G.R. No. 188360, January 21,2010


Rule 42, Sec. 2 (d)

While Rule 42, Section 2 (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, requires that,inter alia, the petition shall "be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original or true copies ofthe judgments or final orders of both lower courts," the cited deficiency in petitioner's petition doesnot make it insufficient in form and substance since it is the decision of the RTC, not that of theMTCC, which is the subject of her appeal.

Evelyn Barredo vs. People of the Phil., et al., G.R. No. 183467, March 29, 2010

Rule 42, Sec. 3 - Effect of failure to comply with requirements

Nelia Atillo vs. Buenaventura Bombay, G.R. No. 136096, February 7, 2001

Cornelia P. Cusi-Hernandez vs. Eduardo Diaz, et al., G.R. No. 140436, July 18, 2000