DEMOGRAPHY of UNBELIEF 243

DEMOGRAPHY OF UNBELIEF. Until the twentieth cen-tury all peoples were highly religious: supernaturalbelief was nearly universal and pervaded daily life. Aslate as 1900, AGNOSTICISM and absolute ATHEISM mayhave been held by only a few million persons, mainlyintellectuals. Following the unprecedented growth inglobal communications and travel in the wake of theIndustrial Revolution, many Western Christians pre-sumed that their faith, then embraced by a third of theplanet's population, would finally sweep the world inthe twentieth century. This expectation inspired theevangelical Watchword movement. For their part, at thedawn of the twentieth century many nontheists thoughtthe age of science would soon herald the end of massfaith. This expectation became known as the seculariza-tion hypothesis.

Which of these opposing visions has proven moreaccurate? The answer lies in a body of large-scale inter-national surveys that recently sampled rates of belief andunbelief worldwide. During the 1990s, two massivestudies, the International Social Survey Program-Reli-gion I and II, measured religiosity in seventeen andthirty-three nations, respectively. The 2002 Pew GlobalAttitudes Project asked respondents in forty-four nationsto rank religion's importance in their lives. The 2004BBC/lCM survey of ten nations sought opinions on anumber of issues bearing on religion. The results of thesestudies generally agree with polls conducted in single

DEMOGRAPHY of UNBELIEF 243

nations by Gallup and similar organizations. Anotherresource, the evangelical-authored World ChristianEncyclopedia, tabulates national census data on religion,though faith communities' official membership statisticsare sometimes contradicted by surveys designed to cap-ture actual opinions among church members.

The twentieth century can be seen as a grand culturewar, a vast, historically unique societal experiment inwhich agnostics, absolute atheists, and other nonreli-gious ballooned to about one billion, a sixth of theworld's population. Driven largely by conversion ofbelievers, this vast expansion in unbelief-a multi-hun-dredfold upsurge in absolute numbers, and a fiftyfoldincrease in percentage of population in one long lifespan-far outstrips the growth of any major faith in thetwentieth century, and probably.in history.

Current Situation. Believers in the supernaturalbelong to some ten thousand significant sects, mostaligned within ten major organized religions. Chris-tianity's percentage of the population has remained stag-nant overall, at about one in three. Christians are dividedamong some thirty-four thousand denominations, one ofwhich-Roman Catholicism-claims almost half of allChristians. Most demographic losses among Christiansrepresent conversions to nontheism rather than to any ofthe other major religions. Among the ten major religions,only Islam has seen major relative growth, moving fromabout 12 percent of the global population in 1900 tonearly 20 percent today, largely due to populationgrowth rather than conversion. The third-largest faith,Hinduism, claims about a seventh of the global popula-tion. Traditional animists, New Agers, and variouspagans make up about a sixth of the world's people. Inalarmed reaction to the fast growth of secularization,Abraharnic and Hindu fundamentalists mounted a resur-gence in recent decades.

In general, rising levels of education and income cor-respond to higher rates of religious skepticism. Forexample, despite anomalously high religious belief inthe United States (see below), most American scientistsare nontheists; the degree of skepticism is highest amongthe most distinguished researchers. This pattern repeatsat the level of nations: in most second and third worldcountries, rates of belief remain high and relatively littlechanged from the past. In these nations 80 to nearly 100percent of survey respondents report remaining absolutebelievers and rate religion as very important in theirlives. Even so, secularism has made gains. Among LatinAmerican respondents, up to a third describe religion asonly somewhat important. Fully a third of Turks are onlysomewhat religious, proof that a Muslim nation canexperience significant secularization. Most interestingamong the second world examples is South Korea,where only a quarter of respondents identify as stronglyreligious and a third report little interest, although fewreport none. Forty percent of South Korean respondentsclaimed to be agnostics and atheists.

244 DEMOGRAPHY of UNBELIEF

Theism suffered severe losses under Communism.Contrary to Christian claims of a great post-Cold Warrevival, the percentage that reported considering religionvery important remains in the mere teens in Russia,eastern Germany, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic.Across this region half to three-quarters of respondentsreport limited or no interest in religion. In Russia somepolls suggest high rates of religious interest and reportthat absolute belief in theism has doubled, but theistsstill constitute only a quarter of respondents and churchattendance is low. A third of Russian respondents stillidentify as agnostics or absolute atheists. Meanwhile ineastern Germany, even after reunification fully half ofrespondents continue to express no interest in religionand profess to be agnostics and atheists. This is thehighest reported incidence of unbelief in any democraticregion. Still higher rates of disbelief may exist in China,which probably has the largest absolute number of non-theists, and in North Korea (though tempered by abizarre superstitious aura surrounding the latter's fanat-icalleadership). In Vietnam just a quarter of the sampleclaim strong interest in religion, half report low or non-existent interest. In Islamic Uzbekistan, religious interestremains high among just a third of respondents; the same-is true even in Poland, despite the cachet of Catholi-cism's role in helping to topple Communism.

Crisis in the West. Most striking is the crisis faced byorganized religion in the west. During the last half of thetwentieth century, all but one of the nineteen major pros-perous developed democracies (the Western Europeannations, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan)experienced dramatic declines in religious belief andpractice. Japan qualifies as among the most skeptical offirst world democracies, with just 4 percent of respon-dents reporting "absolute" belief in God and fully a thirdself-identifying as agnostics and atheists. More than ninein ten Japanese respondents claim at most limitedinterest in religion; more than one in five report nonewhatever. In addition, rates of religious practice are low.No other democracy has so large a skeptical populationin absolute terms. France exhibits even lower rates ofreligiosity, with a full third of respondents reporting nointerest in religion, and four of ten identifying asagnostic or atheistic; the percentage reporting absolutebelief in a creator is in the teens. Scandinavia, too, is abastion of secularism, with absolute believers ranking inthe teens, agnostics and atheists comprising a quarter toa third of respondents, and rates of religious practice atvery low levels. Western Europe's Catholic nations aremore theistic, yet even among Italians only a quarterreport strong involvement in religion, while a thirdreport little or none. Indeed half or more of Italians,Spaniards, and Irish hold no absolute belief in God.Taken as a bloc, only about one-quarter of the inhabi-tants of the secularized developed democracies describethemselves as absolute believers; an equal number reportagnosticism or absolute atheism. In all of these coun-

tries, sizable majorities accept human descent from ani-mals. In general, European Christianity is today gener-ally liberal, with biblical literalists and "born-agains"comprising marginalized minorities.

It is difficult to overstate the dire condition of organ-ized religion in the secularized democracies (that is, all ofthem except the United States). In none does a majorityof the populace report ardent belief in a divine Christ.Meanwhile atheists are openly elected to high office andin some cases control state churches; believers in suchevangelical staples as the Rapture are thought to be daft.Churches that lack state support are experiencing finan-cial crises to the point that many churches are being con-verted to nonreligious uses or are renting space to com-mercial enterprises. So powerful is this secularizing tidethat a commission of the Church of England has proposeddropping ill-attended Sabbath services and concludedthat the advent of modem lifestyles "coincides with thedemise of Christendom." No lesser authority than PopeJohn Paul II labeled Scotland "heathen." So beleagueredis European Christianity that second and third worldchurches are dispatching missionaries back to Europe,No significant grass roots revival appears to be in prospectin any of the secularized developed democracies. Instead,overall trends in faith point downward; for example, thenumber of non theists in France has nearly doubled overthe last quarter century. Although alternative modes ofspirituality, including evangelicalism, Buddhism, and theNew Age movement, have replaced mainstream Chris-tian observance for some, they are by no means popularenough to offset Christianity's broad decay, especially asincreasingly large numbers abandon any interest what-ever in the supernatural. Likewise, though many reportbelief in varied paranormal claims, their level of interestis usually superficial and idle. All in all, nontheism haswon the culture war in Europe, and has done so remark-ably quietly and with little effort or cost.

The American Exception. The culture war still ragesin the United States; alone among first world democra-cies, this nation displays primitive rates of religiosityotherwise seen only in the second and third worlds.Nearly two-thirds of Americans absolutely believe inGod and consider religion important in their lives; ninein ten are favorable to the existence of a higher power,Not only is the United States the only nation to combinematerial prosperity with high levels of faith, AmericanChristianity is exceptionally conservative by Westernstandards. Four in ten US respondents self-identify asborn-again, about a third claim to believe that the Bibleis literally true, and almost halfdeny human evolution.End-time novels are best-sellers and religious-themedfilms are blockbusters, while the media celebrates amythical reconciliation of science and faith.

This has not always been the American norm. Many ofthe nation's revered founders were non-Christian deists,skeptics of a divine Christ who probably could not beelected today. Church membership has risen fairly

steadily, climbing from less than one in five in revolu-tionary times to greater than three in five in the 1990s. Inthe latter third of the twentieth century, fundamentalismgained at the expense of less conservative Christiandenominations. A Gallup analysis of multiple indicatorsconcluded that US religiosity rose in the 1990s, reversinga long but modest decline during the 1950s and 1960s.Meanwhile, more than a third of Americans distrustunbelievers; 70 percent consider them unsuitable mates.

Yet US believers have a number of reasons for con-cern. Differing surveys place agnostics and atheists at 3to 10 percent of the US population, making skepticsmore numerous than American Jews or Mormons.American tolerance for unbelievers is growing.Lifestyles are increasingly secularized and liberalized:Sundays have largely become homogenized with therest of the week, civil marriages are rising at theexpense of religious ceremonies, and once-shocking"alternative" lifestyles and entertainment have becomeat least widely tolerated and frequently highly popular.Only a few percent of Americans live strict Bible-basedlifestyles, and divorce rates remain high even among theborn-again. Absolute God belief among Americans isalready somewhat lower than typical in the thirdworld-by inference, lower than it was in the Americanpast. The percentage of those who absolutely believe inGod, claim to be born-again, or accept literal descentfrom Adam and Eve has not risen for decades. A seriesof Gallup polls measured a consistent halving of claimsof belief in the literal truth of the Bible, from nearlytwo-thirds in the 1960s to half that today. The mostintriguing evidence comes from a growing body of sur-veys that consistently report declining rates of Biblereading, prayer, and church membership and atten-dance. Remarkably, Protestanism is quickly droppingfrom a significant majority down toward minoritystatus, and Christianity as a whole is in proportionaldecline, from nearly 90 percent to about 75 percent. Thesurveys further indicate that the unchurched doubledduring the 1990s, now comprising a quarter of the pop-ulation; over the same period those who express no reli-gious preference also doubled, in this case to a sixth ofthe total, having started from just a few percent a halfcentury ago. Detatchment from religioius indoctrinationleaves people further inclined toward disbelief, so thechurches face a retention crisis. Also, most nonreligiouspersons are men, and most children pick up their reli-gious beliefs from their fathers. That Southern Baptistsare baptizing members at the same rate they did half acentury ago when the population was half as large illus-trates the faith-based recruitment crisis: In the 1940sand 1950s between 1 and 2 percent of Gallup respon-dents said they did not believe in God, and up to 98 per-cent did. In two 2005 Gallup surveys, combined agnos-tics and atheists were more than 5 and 9 percent of thesamples. There is no question that nontheism, including'explicit atheism and agnosticism, is growing in America


at the expense of faith, despite the strenuous work of theworld's wealthiest religious industry.

Although high rates of religiosity are found over muchof the globe, they are specific to third and second worldnations and the aberrant United States. Among the

. remaining developed democracies, secularism is increas-ingly the standard. If not for influxes of characteristicallyreligious second and third world immigrants, all, of thedeveloped democracies, including the United States,would be undergoing greater secularization.

Geographic Distribution of Religiosity. Geographi-cally, devout Christianity is nearly extinct in its MiddleEastern home and has been largely abandoned in its his-torical European bastion; in the northern temperate zone,it is a strong majority phenomenon only in the UnitedStates. Christianity remains robust in much of LatinAmerica, but is making major gains only in third worldAfrica, where it must compete with local animist beliefs.Two continents, Europe and Australia, can be consideredwholly de-Christianized and secularized. Meanwhile,Islam continues to span the tropical Old World from theAtlantic to the Indian Oceans; mass Hinduism remainslimited to the Indian subcontinent.

Demographics and the Secularization Hypothesis.Although modernity has by no means annihilated super-naturalism, for the first time religion has been dealt majorblows, especially in advanced nations, partially fulfillingthe secularist hypothesis and greatly disappointing evan-gelicals. Refuted is the widely debated chapter in Starkand Finke's Acts of Faith titled "Secularization, R. I. P.,"in which the two pioneering sociologists of religion deri-sively deny Western secularization, arguing that faith iscompetitively superior to its alternative. Also contradictedis the widely held view that most people are stronglygenetically, psychologically, or spiritually predisposedtoward supernatural beliefs. Quite the contrary, religiousopinion stands exposed by the data as brittle and readilysubject to abandonment. The demographics of unbeliefverify the argument that ardent mass faith requires evan-gelical promulgation by a conservative religious propa-ganda industry, consistently fading in the face of secular-ized liberal religion. In contrast, mass secularization is sopotent that it occurs by spontaneous individual conversioneven in the face of large-scale proselytizing and despitethe absence of any comparably extensive-+or expen-sive-secularist "missionary" movement.

Put simply, encouraging the inherently rational disbe-lief in supernatural deities is many times more costeffective than is promoting belief in what cannot beshown to exist. Were nontheism as evangelical and wellorganized as religion, then faith would be much worseoff than it already is.

The Foundation of Belief. The factors behind thesecular revolution's great potency are numerous andcomplicated, but one causal factor is clearly criticalabove others. Rather than being based upon unques-tioning faith as is often supposed, the belief of most reli-


gious individuals actually rests upon the notion that theuniverse and humanity must have been created by agreater intelligence. Until the early 1800s, science wasseen as verifying natural theology, making denial of acreator difficult. Modem advances in geology, paleon-tology, cosmology, and evolutionary biology havelargely eliminated the need for a creator in order toaccount for the state of the world. Deprived of its auraof physical necessity, supernatural belief can be recog-nized as mere unsubstantiated opinion and large num-bers of people will simply abandon it. The better edu-cated a person is in modern science, the more likely oneis to make this rational decision (see DARWINISM).

The close negative correlation between the accept-ance of human descent from animals and the existenceof a creator in the developed democracies verifies theclose inverse relationship between these factors. Forinstance, the Japanese report the strongest acceptance ofevolution and the weakest belief in a creator; Americansdisplay the opposite pattern. There is no documentedcase in which a prosperous democracy's population isboth well-versed in evolutionary science and high intheistic belief and practice, or vice versa-and it isunlikely that any exists. Not well understood is whether.acceptance of evolution leads to loss in faith, or thereverse, or-as seems most likely-that the two worktogether in a feedback system. The importance ofadvancing science in undermining faith cannot be over-stated. Without it, the other contributing factors wouldbe irrelevant.

Some of these other factors themselves depend uponscience and technology. For example, the dramatic socialchanges of the industrial age have driven secularization.Two centuries ago, most people lived lives not much dif-ferent from those of their ancient ancestors, with juve-nile mortality rates of 50 percent, short adult life spans,and, by modem standards, almost ubiquitous poverty.Today, particularly in the first world, vast numbers ofpeople travel the world almost at will, live in relativecomfort and opulence, and enjoy abundant food andadvanced medical care. Childhood death is rare andpeople regularly live into their seventies or eighties.Birth control and safe abortion allow sex to occur out-side of sanctified marriage without the complication ofpregnancy. The masses enjoy unprecedented access to apreviously unimaginable variety of entertainment andinformation media. As the Church of England commis-sion has acknowledged, living like pampered and pro-tected demigods has undoubtedly emboldened millionsto discard their beliefs in archaic myths.

The postwar collapse of religion in Europe's seculardeveloped democracies has been associated with dra-matic rises in both prosperity and education. Even Ire-land threw off centuries of Catholic domination simulta-neously with a technology-driven economic boom.

Historical Factors Influencing American Excep-tionalism. While the collapse of ardent supernaturalism

in virtually all prosperous democracies is readilyexplained, its survival-so far-in the United States ismore puzzling. Historical patterns may playa role. Evenafter its Christianization, much of Europe, Scandinaviain particular, may not have been as devout as previouslysupposed. Disastrous events such as the Black Death, theCrusades, and extended religious wars combined withthe impact of the Renaissance and Enlightenment toweaken faith further. Another possible factor may havebeen the steady export of religious zealots to NorthAmerica, which in turn might explain why the youngUnited States was markedly more theistic than Europe.The strongly theistic Scots-Irish who have greatly influ-enced southern and midwestern culture may be espe-cially important. Stark and Finke support the hypothesisthat separation of church and state created a religiousfree market in which American churches and clerics hadto compete for adherents, in marked contrast to a Europedominated by state churches whose clerics felt little needto work at retaining communicants. But this hypothesisdoes little to explain the thorough secularization of Aus-tralia and New Zealand, where relations between churchand state resembled those in the United States. Thoroughsecularization has also occurred in democracies in whichstate and church were sundered long ago, such asCanada, in which religion was disestablished in the mid-1800s.

Historical Factors Influencing European Secu-larism. Vatican and clerical corruption, ranging from the"Irish Gulag" of juvenile slave laundry facilities to long-term ties with organized crime, has contributed to thecollapse of European Catholicism. Likewise Catholiccorruption may encourage declining piety in Mexico andother Latin American countries. Looking back, the shockof World War I severely damaged the concept of divine-right monarchy and encouraged the first major decline inEuropean religion. The economic collapse of the 1930s,followed by the catastrophes of World War II and theHolocaust, delivered further blows to a Christianity thathad signally failed to provide either the moral guidanceor the divine intervention that might have been hopes tokeep the historical stronghold of Christianity fromdescending into horrific chaos. Meanwhile atheismgained favor, in part because skeptics were conspicuousamong opponents of fascism.

More recently, the continued failings of faith havecontinued to discourage belief in democracies moreattuned to the international situation than America. Forexample, the most Christian African nations are strife-tom Rwanda and the Congo, where 80 to 95 percent areardent believers. Violent Christian terrorist militaryorganizations such as Zambia's Lumpa Church andUganda's Lord's Resistance Army are committing massatrocities of extreme brutality. When Baptist laypreacher Charles Taylor stepped down from his blood-drenched rule of Liberia, he cited God at length.

The Impact of World War II. The effect of World

War II on religious belief was most direct in Japan. Inwhat may be history's single most effective blow againstany faith, following the cataclysm an apologetic emperoradmitted that he was not divine, instantly creating anation of skeptics. Also affected by one person waspost-World War I Turkey, were the antireligious Ataturkinitiated a wave of secularism.

The American experience with the two world warswas quite different: they served as economic boosters,raising the country's global power and status whileleaving it relatively unscathed, evidence to many ofdivine favor. Conservative America widely perceived thesubsequent Cold War as an epic struggle between God-less communism and God-fearing democracy, an attitudethat has now been transplanted more or less intact intorhetoric of a struggle between Christian righteousnessand virulent Islam.

US Political and Religious Conservatism: A ViciousCycle. The traditional historical, cultural, and politicalconservatism of the United States buttressed the popu-larity of conservative religions, which tended to exhibitthe high levels of ardor needed to perpetuate theirmythology. In turn, religious conservatism encouragedcultural-political conservatism in a classic feedbacksystem. In particular, the common failure of US publicand private school systems properly to teach evolu-tionary science is driven by the conservative religiouscommunity-nearly four in ten science teachers favorteaching creationism-which then benefits from theantievolutionism that favors conservative Christianity. Itis no accident that the most conservative prosperousdemocracy is the most religious and vice versa, the onedepending greatly on the other.

It is correspondingly ironic that the bulk of anti-Dar-winist religious conservatives so ardently support free-market capitalism, which is strongly socially Darwin-istic. High economic disparity results in higher US ratesof poverty and maleducation than in Europe, perhapsencouraging more zealous faith (but see below). The factthat the more secular prosperous democracies enjoylower rates of murder, incarceration, juvenile and adultmortality, STD infection, juvenile pregnancy, and abor-tion than in the United States may reduce their peoples'perceived need for the comfort of a benign deity. Con-trary to the American conceit that the faith-based nationstands as a "shining city on a hill" to an increasinglySkeptical world, the deep societal dysfunction of the soleprosperous Christian nation helps inspire growing skep-ticism in the rest of the West, aborting the very revivalmany Americans desire.

What Does the Future Hold? From the believer'sperspective, then, the future of faith appears grim.S. Bruce observes that if the current trends continue,Christianity in England may soon be too small to beself-sustaining, in which case major denominationscould go essentially extinct early in this century. Withpopular theism practically dead in Scandinavia and


Japan and showing no signs of revival in any other pros-perous democracy, the United States is the last greatWestern hope of Christianity. But as D. G. Barrett et al.reluctantly acknowledge, the quickly rising number ofthe unchurched and those with no religion suggest thatthe United States is belatedly secularizing toward theWestern norm. In fact, the level of nonreligiosity thatBarrett et al. predicted for the year 2025 appears alreadyto have been reached.

The options available to the defenders of faith are lim-ited because most entail undesirable consequences. Thecurrent reactionary campaign to govemmentalize faith byextending public funding to religious organizations in theUnited States risks assisting secularization in the waystate churches arguably have done elsewhere. Althoughsocial conservatives have been successful in blaming lib-eralism for the materialistic, sex-focused, hedonisticmass culture that undermines faith-based lifestyles, thesame conservative Christians lionize the corporate-drivensocial Darwinism that is by far the most powerful agentin defining culture away from traditional values. Evolu-tionary theory enjoys overwhelming scientific support..being a major contributor to the science and technologythat remain central to the US economy and its place in theworld. Evangelicals have little prospect of persuadingmore Americans to accept pseudoscientific creationismthan already do so. Many liberal theists hold that faith canthrive in the face of widespread acceptance of evolu-tionary theory, but this view appears naive. 1. Judis andR. Texeira predict a US sociopolitical liberalization thatshould encourage further declines in religiosity; the rapidgrowth of the unchurched and the nonreligious suggeststhat this process too is already under way.

Can Christianity compensate for an American declineby recruiting elsewhere in the world? Major Christianinroads are unlikely in formerly Communist Europe, inChina, India, and the Islamic world, or among nonthe-ists. The only rich sources of converts to Christianity arepagans and animists in the third and second worlds, par-ticularly in Africa. Catholicism is poised to become apredominantly third world faith; meanwhile; if otherChristians hoped that the low-grade war between polit-ical Islam and the secular/Christian West would spark areligious revival, they have few successes to point to. Asfor Islam, though it will continue to gain in numbersthrough population growth, the chronically poor eco-nomic performance of most Islamic nations will prob-ably render it largely impotent. There is no reason toexpect Hinduism to make major gains outside the Indiansubcontinent. Nor are New Age or other alternativebeliefs likely to sweep the globe.

Conclusion. The nineteenth-century expectation thatadvancing science and rationality would vanquish organ-ized religion has not been disconfirmed after all. Unbe-lievers, particularly in the United States, may feel exas-peration that religion has not collapsed more quickly andthoroughly, but the message of the demographic data is


clear: it is believers in the supernatural, not skeptics,who have the most to fear in the twenty-first century.

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GREGORY S, PAWL

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