NIKKI FERNANDO

TOPIC: JURISDICTION

UY v. CA276 SCRA 374

BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:Rosa Uy was employed as an accountant in Don Tim Shipping Company owned by the husband of one Consolacion Leong. While helping her husband manage their lumber business Rosa and Consolacion agreed to form a partnership. Various sums were claimed to have been given by Consolacion as capital of the lumber business of Rosa, but no receipt was ever issued. The friendship of the two turned sour, thus, Consolacion demanded the return of her money but the checks issued by Rosa were all dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Consolacion filed a complaint for Estafa and for violation of BP 22. The Manila RTC acquitted the petitioner of Estafa but convicted her of the charges under BP 22. Petitioner contends that Manila RTC never acquired jurisdiction over offenses under BP 22 and assuming arguendo that she raised the matter of jurisdiction only upon appeal, she cannot be estopped from questioning the jurisdiction.

ISSUE:Whether or not the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the violation of theBouncing checks law.

RULING:The crimes of Estafa and violation of the Bouncing Checks Law are two different offenses having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied.

The respondent court is wrong to conclude that inasmuch as the RTC of Manila acquired jurisdiction over the Estafa case then it also acquired jurisdiction over the violation of BP 22. No proof has been offered that the checks were issued, delivered, dishonored or knowledge of insufficiency of funds occurred in Manila, which are essential elements necessary for the Manila court to acquire jurisdiction. BP 22 on the other hand, as a continuing offense, may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committee.

Petitioner also timely questioned the jurisdiction of the court. As provided by jurisprudence, we can see that even if a party fails to file a motion to quash, he may still question the jurisdiction of the court later on. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over a subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceeding, even on appeal.

WHEREFORE, finding the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br 32, to have no jurisdiction over Crim. Case Nos. 84-32335 to 84-32340, inclusive, the assailed decision of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the trial court dated 24 September 1991 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate charges against petitioner with the court of competent jurisdiction when warranted.

CRUZ v. CA388 SCRA 79

Carpio, J.;

TOPIC: JURISDICTION

FACTS:Lutgarda Cruzexecuted before a Notary Public the City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of a parcel of land stating that she was the sole surviving heir of the registered owner when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision acquitting petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. However, on the same decision, the trial court rendering decision on the civil aspect of the case, ordered the return to the surviving heirs of the parcel of land located in Bulacan. A Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied for lack of merit. A second move for a reconsideration was likewise denied by the trial court. Petitioner asserts that both copies of the motion for reconsideration were sent to the trial court and the City Prosecutor by registered mail on February 10, 1994. CA held that if service is made by the registered mail, proof shall be made by such affidavit and registry-receipt issued by the mailing office.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that the prosecution was duly furnished a copy of the petitioners motion for reconsideration with respect to the decision on the civil aspect of the case.

Whether or not the CA erred in finding that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the case.

RULING:1. Petitioner asserts that both copies of the motion for reconsideration were sent to the trial court and the City Prosecutor by registered mail on Feb. 10, 1994.

SC agrees to the ruling of the CA. An MR filed, thru a registered mail, without proof of service is considered a mere scrap of paper. Hence the period continued to run and lapsed making the trial courts decision final and executory. Proof of service is mandatory.

2. Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules that pertain to civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit. There are 3 important requisites which must be present in order that a court acquires jurisdiction: first, jurisdiction over the subject matter; second, over the territory; third, over the person. The trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has conferred on the court the power to hear cases involving Estafa through falsification of document. The RTC also had jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. Lastly, RTC had jurisdiction over the person of the accused-petitioner because she voluntarily submitted to the courts authority.

WHEREFORE, petitioner is given five days from receipt of this decision within which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party. Let this case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

Dela Cruz vs. Moya160 SCRA 838

CORTES, J.:

TOPIC: JURISDICTION

FACTS:Rodolfo Dela Cruz is a member of the Armed Forces Intelligence and Operations Section. Armed with a MISSION ORDER, Dela Cruz proceeds to Maco, Davao del Norte to investigate reports of illegal cockfighting being conducted. Dela cruz and company caught in flagrante delicto the operators of cockfighting, but the latter refused arrest. The operators, including Eusebio Cabilto, followed the soldiers on their way bak to the OC headquarters. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto. On Aug 2, 1979, Dela cruz was charged with homicide in the CFI of Davao.

ISSUE:Whether or not the civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the criminal case.

RULING:SC resolves the issue on the negative. In civil procedure, one of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the court hearing must have jurisdiction over of the subject matter of the case. Jurisdiction is determined by the statute at force at the time the action was commenced. At that time, General Order 59 was operative giving military tribunals exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed by military personnel while in the performance of their official duty. Since Dela cruz was executing a Mission Order, he his deemed performing his official duties.Court records contain a copy of Mission Order, thus, certificate from secretary of DND is unnecessary. CFI was without jurisdiction to try the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The proceedings in Criminal Case No. 4008 are declared null and void but without prejudice to the filing of another action in the proper forum. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Judge Advocate of the Philippine Constabulary, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for appropriate action.

GUEVARRA v. ALMODOVAR169 SCRA 476

PARAS, J.:

TOPIC: JURISDITION

FACTS:John Philipp Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend, Teodoro Amine, Jr. and other children. They were target-shooting a bottle cap with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collarbone which caused his unfortunate death. After preliminary investigation, Fiscal acquitted petitioner due to his age and because the unfortunate event appeared to be an accident. The parents of Teodoro appealed to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered to file a case against petitioner Guevarra for Homicide through reckless imprudence.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not an 11 year old could be charged with the crime of homicide thru reckless imrpudence 2. Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the fact that it did not pass thru the barangay lupon.

RULING:1. Intent and discernment are two different concepts. While they are products of mental processes within a person, intent refers to the desire of ones act while discernment refers to the moral significance that a person ascribes to an act. Minors 9 years to 15 years are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but this presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were capable of appreciating the nature and criminality of the act, that is, that they acted with discernment.

2. SC mentioned its ruling on a previous case. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for the offense and not the penalty imposed. In construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty, which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter, shall be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered. As categorically stated in Ebol v. Amin, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let the case be remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE v. MARIANO71 SCRA 600

MUNOZ PALMA, J.:

TOPIC: JURISDICTION

FACTS:Hermogenes Mariano is an appointed Liaison officer by Mayor Constantino Nolasco of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Mariano is authorized to receive and be receipted for US excess property of USAID/NEC. Mariano, instead of delivering it to the Office of the Mayor, misappropriated, misapply and converteed the said items for his personal benefit. Hence, the Office of Provinsial Fiscal of Bulacan filed an Information accusing private reponsdent Mariano of Estafa. Mariano filed a motion to quash thee information. He claimed that the items which were the subject matter of the Information against him were the same items for which Mayor Nolasco was indicted before a Military Commission under a charge of malversation of public property. The judge of RTC granted the motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisction. It held that it had already taken cognizance of the malversation case against Mayor Nolasco involving the same subject matter, as such the court has without the jurisdiction to pass upon anew the same subject matter.

ISSUE:Whether or not civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the offense of estafa of goods allegedly committed by a civilian.

RULING:Sec. 44 of Judicary Act of 1948 provides that:xxx CFI shall have original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months xxx

The offense charged against Mariano is penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum JUMAGDAO, CHRISMAIRE

PEOPLE vs. CHUPECO, 10 SCRA 838TOPIC: JURISDICTIONFacts: The accused-appellant, Jose L. Chupeco, was charged in the City of Manila, Philippines, under the information:That the said accused being the owner of, and, having previously on the 24th day of July, 1946, executed a Chattel Mortgage on the properties, sawmill machinery and equipment and transportation units to be used sawmill building, located at Sitio Saguing, Dinalupihan, Bataa, in favor of the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and choses in action were subsequently transferred to the herein complainant Rehabilitation Finance Corporation with principal office at the City of Manila, Philippines, to secure a loan of P20,000.00, from said Agricultural and Industrial Bank. The accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to defraud the said Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, pledge and incumber, or cause to be pledged and incumbered the same personal properties to one Mateo B. Pinile without having fully satisfied the mortgage and during the term thereof and without the consent of the mortgagee bank, knowingly transfer and remove, or cause to be transferred and removed the said properties to the municipality of Subic, Zambales, also without the written consent of the mortgagee bank, to the damage and prejudice of the said Rehabilitation Finance Corporation in the sum of P15,935.80, Philippine currency, representing the unpaid balance of the aforesaid mortgage.The accused moved to quash the foregoing information on the ground that more than one offense is charged and that the court had no jurisdiction. The accused attacks the jurisdiction of the trial court on the strength of the agreement with the fiscal to discard the charge of repledging or remembering the chattels already mortgaged to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank thus leaving in force only the accusation of having transferred the encumbered property from Bataan to Zambales without the consent of the mortgagee. It is argued that since the place where the chattels were, as well as the site to which they were moved, are both outside of Manila, the courts of the latter acquired no jurisdiction to try the case, because the offense was not committed within the Manila territory.Issue: Whether or not the trial court has a jurisdiction over Chupecos caseHeld: No. We find this stand without merit. The original terms of the charge averred (and it is not disputed) the crime of repledging already encumbered property without the creditor's consent, and one of the essential ingredients of the offense (the execution of the first mortgage) having been alleged, to have taken place in Manila, the court of first instance of that city acquired jurisdiction over the offense under the Rules of Court (People vs. Mission, 48 O.G., 1331; Rule 110, section 9). It is well-established that once vested, the jurisdiction is not tolled by subsequent amendment or which in this case amounted to no more than an avowal by the prosecution that it could not establish the other elements of the offense.Furthermore, the court actually rejected the defense motion to dismiss, and directed that the cue be tried on the original charge of repledging property already encumbered. The accused obeyed that directive, and by so doing it renounced the claim that the information had been so amended as to discard that particular averment.Even if the Court of First Instance of Manila had jurisdiction over the case, the accused cannot be found guilty on the evidence on record of the crime for which he stands indicted. FOR THE FOREGOING REASON, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and another one entered acquitting the accused Jose L. Chupeco.

MANILA RAILROAD CO. vs ATTY.GENERAL, 20 Phil 523TOPIC: JURISDICTIONFacts: In the month of December, 1907, the plaintiff began an action in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain real estate, stated by the plaintiff in his complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. It is alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff is authorized by law to construct a railroad line "from Paniqui to Tayug in the Province of Tarlac," and it is for the purpose of condemning lands for the construction of such line that this action is brought. The complaint states that before beginning the action the plaintiff had caused to be made a thorough search in the office of the registry of property and of the tax where the lands sought to be condemned were located and to whom they belonged. As a result of such investigations the plaintiff alleged that the lands in question were located in the Province of Tarlac.On the 4th day of October the plaintiff gave notice to the defendants that on the 9th day of October a motion would be made to the court to dismiss the action upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter, it having just been ascertained by the plaintiff that the land sought to be condemned was situated in the Province of Nueva Ecija, instead of the Province of Tarlac, as alleged in the complaint. This motion was heard and, after due consideration, the trial court dismissed the action upon the ground presented by the plaintiff. This appeal is taken from said judgment of dismissal.Issue: 1. The question for our consideration and decision is the power and authority of a Court of First Instance of Tarlac to take cognizance of an action by a railroad company for the condemnation of real estate located in another province.2. Whether or not Sec. 377[1] of the Code of Civil Procedure and Act. No. 1258 are applicable and therefore the CFI has no jurisdiction.Held: 1. Yes, CFI Tarlac has power and authority to take cognizance of condemnation of real estate located in another province.Sections 55 and 56[1] of Act No. 136 of the Philippine Commission confer perfect and complete jurisdiction upon the CFI of these Islands with respect to real estate in the Philippine Islands. Such jurisdiction is not made to depend upon locality. There is no suggestion of limitation. The jurisdiction is universal. It is nowhere suggested, much less provided, that a CFI of one province, regularly sitting in said province, may not under certain conditions take cognizance of an action arising in another province or of an action relating to real estate located outside of the boundaries of the province to which it may at the time be assigned.Furthermore, in terms of jurisdiction over person of the plaintiff, the procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of the subject matter. It means simply that he may thereby lose jurisdiction of the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. There is, of course, an important distinction between person and subject matter are both conferred by law. As to the subject matter, nothing can change the jurisdiction of the court over diminish it or dictate when it shall attach or when it shall be removed. That is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the legislature may change. On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the court over the person is, in some instances, made to defend on the consent or objection, on the acts or omissions of the parties or any of them. Jurisdiction over the person, however, may be conferred by consent, expressly or impliedly given, or it may, by an objection, be prevented from attaching or removed after it has attached.2. No. Sec. 377 contains no express inhibition against the court. The prohibition provided therein is clearly directed against the one who begins the action and lays the venue. The court, before the action is commenced, has nothing to do with it either. The prohibition is not a limitation on the power of the court but on the rights of the plaintiff. It establishes a relation not between the court and the subject, but between the plaintiff and the defendant. It relates not to jurisdiction but to trial. It simply gives to defendant the unqualified right, if he desires it, to have the trial take place where his land lies and where, probably, all of his witnesses live. Its object is to secure to him a convenient trial.Section 377 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to actions by railroad corporations to condemn lands; and that, while with the consent of defendants express or implied the venue may be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff nevertheless the defendants whose lands lie in one province, or any one of such defendants, may, by timely application to the court, require the venue as to their, or, if one defendant, his, lands to be changed to the province where their or his lands lie. In such case the action as to all of the defendants not objecting would continue in the province where originally begun. It would be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces. While we are of that opinion and so hold it can not affect the decision in the case before us for the reason that the defendants are not objecting to the venue and are not asking for a change thereof. They have not only expressly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court but are here asking that that jurisdiction be maintained against the efforts of the plaintiff to remove it.The judgment must be REVERSED and the case REMANDED to the trial court with direction to proceed with the action according to law.

FUKUZUME vs. PEOPLE, 474 SCRA 580

TOPIC: JURISDICTIONFacts: A petition for certiorari finding the accused-appelant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a crime of estafa.In an Information, dated November 4, 1994, filed with the RTC of Makati, Fukuzume was charged with estafa committed as follows:

That sometime in the month of July, 1991 up to September 17, 1992, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to prejudice and defraud Javier Yu y Ng, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make false representation and fraudulent manifestation that he is the duly authorized representative of Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd., in the Philippines, and was authorized to sell excess aluminum conductor materials not being used by Napocor and Furukawa, the accused knowing full well that those representations were false and were only made to induce and convince said Javier Yu y Ng to buy said materials, who believing said representations to be true, gave and delivered the total amount ofP424,000.00 but the accused once in possession of the money, far from complying with his obligation to deliver said aluminum conductor materials to herein complainant, with intent of gain, unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, applied and used for his own personal use and benefit the said amount and despite repeated demands failed and refused and still fails and refuses to account for, to the damage and prejudice of Javier Yu y Ng in the aforementioned amount ofP424,000.00.

Upon being arraigned on February 28, 1995, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty.[27]Trial ensued. In its Decision dated October 21, 1996, the trial court found Fukuzume guilty as charged. On March 13, 2000, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the findings and conclusions of the trial court but modifying the penalty imposed.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC of Makati have jurisdiction over the case of Fukuzume.Held: No. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged therein that on July 12, 1991, he gave Fukuzume the amount ofP50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we agree with Fukuzumes contention that Yu testified during his direct examination that on July 12, 1991 he gave the amount ofP50,000.00 to Fukuzume in the latters house. It is not disputed that Fukuzumes house is located in Paraaque.

More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction.CitingUy vs. Court of Appeals we held in the fairly recent case ofMacasaet vs. Peoplethat:

It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.(Emphasis supplied)Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, the court must keep strictly within the limits of the law authorizing it to take jurisdiction and to try the case and to render judgment.

In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed with and tried by the RTC of Makati. Thus, having found that the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to try the case against Fukuzume, we find it unnecessary to consider the other issues raised in the present petition.WHEREFORE, the instant petition isGRANTED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals areSET ASIDEon ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial Court of Makati

PEOPLE vs. MAGALLANES, 249 SCRA 212 TOPIC: JURISDICTIONFacts: In the evening of August 7, 1992, the Spouses Dumancas, under the direction and cooperation of P/Col. Nicolas Torres who took advantage of his position as station commander of the PNP, with Police Inspector Abetos cooperation, induced other police officers and civilian agents to abduct kidnap and detain Rufino Garagar and Danilo Lumangyao, with the use of a motor vehicle and then shot and killed the victims with evident premeditation, treachery and nocturnity. The other accuse secretly buried the victims in a make shifts shallow grave to conceal the crime of murder for a fee of P500.00 each. The cases were consolidated and the accused pleaded not guilty and filed motions for bail. The prosecution presented Moises Grandeza, the alleged one eyewitness and co-conspirator in the offense. After the prosecution rested its case, the trial court received evidence for the accused, but the reception of evidence was suspended because of the motions for inhibition of Judge Gravilles filed by several accused. Garvilles voluntarily inhibited himself and the case was re-raffled. However, the prosecution moved for the transmittal of the records to the Sandiganbayan because the offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. The trial court ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction because the informations do not state that the offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers and denied the Motion for the Transfer of Records to Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved to reconsider but the same was denied. The reception of evidence was resumed but the judge later inhibited himself. The cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order, challenging the refusal of the judge to transfer the cases to the Sandiganbayan. The private respondents were required to comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent judge to desist from proceeding with the trial of the case. Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over this case.Held: The jurisdiction of a court may be determined by law in force at the time of the commencement of the action. When the informations in the cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was P.D.1861, which provides that the Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving: 1.) violations of Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act; 2.) offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, where the penalty prescribed is higher than prision correccional for imprisonment of six (6) years or affine of P6,000, it shall be tried by the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Court, Municipal Trial Court or the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Jurisdiction is also determined by the allegations in the complaint or information and not by the result of the evidence after the trial. In the present case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the cases. The allegations in the complaint or information of taking advantage of his position are not sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition of the offenses committed in relation to public office. Its considered merely an aggravating circumstance. Moreover, the Sandiganbayan has partly lost its jurisdiction over cases involving violations of R.A. 3019, as amended in R.A. 1379 because it only retains jurisdiction on cases enumerated in subsection a) when the public officers rank is classified as Grade 27 or higher. In the case at bar, none of the PNP officers involved occupy a position classified as Grade 27 or higher. Accused Torres, who is the highest in rank among the accused only has a rank classified Grade 18. Lastly, the courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction which was already acquired before the subsequent enactment R.A. 7975 which limited the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction to officers whose rank is Grade 27 or higher, because the courts retain its jurisdiction until the end of litigation. Hence, cases already under the jurisdiction of the courts at the time of the enactment of R.A.7975 are only referred to the proper courts if trial has not yet begun at that time. Petition is DENIED and the challenged orders are AFFIRMED.

BUAYA vs. POLO, 169 SCRA 471 Facts: TOPIC: JURISDICTIONPetitioner Solemnidad Buaya was an insurance agent of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC) and was authorized to collect premiums for and in behalf of CBIC then make a report and accounting of the transactions and remit the same to the principal office of CBIC in Manila. However, an audit of Buayas account showed that there was a shortage in the amount of P358,850.7. As a result, she was charged with estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City, but the same was denied by respondent Judge Polo. The subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the present petition. Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction to try the criminal case against petitioner Buaya.Held:The allegation in the complaint or information determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases. 14(a) of Rule 110 provides that the action in all criminal prosecutions shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or where any of its essential elements took place. The subject information charges Buaya with estafa committed during the period of 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines. The claim of Buaya that RTC Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City is without merit.Clearly, RTC Manila has no jurisdiction since the respondents principal place of business in Manila and Buayas failure to remit the premiums caused damage and prejudice to respondent in Manila. Besides, estafa is a continuing offense which may be prosecuted at any place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. Petition is DISMISSED.

and prision correccional in its maximum period. Thus, Mariano falls under the original jurisdiction of the CFI.

In a previous case decided by SC, it ruled that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. In the case at bar, the law in force vesting jurisdiction upon CFI was the Judiciary Act of 1948.

SC also made it clear that Estafa and Malversation are two and separate distinct offenses.

Lastly, Military Commission is without power or authority to hear and determine the particular offense charged against respondent Mariano. Estafa falls within the sole exclusive jurisdiction of civil courts.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed Order dated March 14, 1975, is set aside and respondent Judge is directed to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. SM-649 without further delay.

SO ORDERED.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES),petitioner,vs.HON. DELFIN VIR. SUNGA, as Presiding Judge, CFI Branch I, Camarines Sur, ARISTON ANADILLA, RAFAEL ANADILLA and JOSE ANADILLA,respondentsFACTS: Information was for an attempted homicide was filed by provincial fiscal against private respondent Rafael Amadill, Ariston Amadilla and Jose Amadilla. Ariston and Jose Amadilla were arrested. Pending the arrest of Rafal Amadilla, an affidavit of desistance was exectuted by the offended party. In view thereof, the lowewr court with Judge Sunga as the presiding judge issued an order dismissing the case.ISSUE: Is the dismissal of the case valid on the basis of the affidavit of desistance?HELD: It is not valid. The filing of complaint or information initiates a criminal action. In effects, the court therby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which in the authority to hear and determine the case. When after the filing of the comlaint or information a warrant for the arrest of the accused is issued by the trail court or was duky arrested, the court thereby axquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON,Petitioners,vs.VIRGILIO M. TULIAO,Respondent.FACTS: Two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. The latter is the son of respondent SPO2 Maderal was arrested and executed a sworn confession identifying Jose Miranda, PO3 Romeo Ocon and SPO3 Alberto Dalmacio (Petitoners0 as responsible for the death. Hence, private respondent filed a criminal complaint for murder against the three petitioners. A motion to quash warrant of arrest was filed by petitioner. Noting the absence of petitioners, Judge Tumaliluan denied the same on the ground that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is not yet acquired. ISSUE: Is the dismissal valid?HELD: No, it is not valid. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused nor custody of the law over the body of the accused. As a general rule, the act of seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. The exemptionsto this rule are those whose pleading whose prayes is avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court. In criminal cases, these pleadings includes motion to quash a complaint on lack of jurisdiction over the peron of the accuse and motion to quash warrant. In these cases, custody over the body of the accuse no jurisdiction ober his person is not required.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION,Petitioners,vs.ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO,Respondent.FACTS: Alfredo Benipayo, then Chairman of the COMELEC, delivered a speech in the Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines held in UP Diliman. The same was published in Manila Bulletin. In the same speech he allegedly delivered libelous speech against Photokina Marketing Corporation regarding anomalous contract contracted by the latter. Hence, People of the Philippines with Photokina Marketing Corporation filed a criminal complaint for libel against Benipayo in RTC. Benipayo questioned the jurisdiction of RTC to try the libel case alleging that the speech was delivered in relation to his office and hence, it should be the Sandiganbayan that should have jurisdiction over the case.ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction to try the case. HELD: Yes, RTS has jurisdiction over the case. While the speech was delivered in relation to his office, Article 360of RPC is explicit in which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamation :

Thecriminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamationsas provided for in this chapter,shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance[now, the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense xxx

MAYOR FRANCISCO LECAROZ,Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN,Respondent.

FACTS:Petitioner was charged with the crime of grave coercion in an information filed before the Sandiganbayan. The complaint alleged that the accused, a public officer, being then the mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, taking advantage of his public position and which offense was committed in relation to his office, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take over the operation and control of the gasoline station owned by Pedro Par, sell the gasoline therein to the public issuing the invoices of said gasoline station and some pieces of yellow pad paper for the purpose, and padlock dispensing pump thereof without authority of law, depriving Pedro Par of the possession and exercise of a lawful trade or occupation. The information was amended with the insertion of the phrase "by ordering his policemen companions" between the words "Pedro Par" and "to sell the gasoline. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information principally on the ground that the respondent court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the case and that it should have been filed with the ordinary courts in Marinduque where the alleged crime was committed.ISSUE: Does Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try the case?HELD: Yes, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Rspondent court has jurisdictional competence not only over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices committed by public officers and employees but also over other crimes committed by them in relation to their office, though not involving graft and corrupt practices, as may be determined by law. If petitioner were not the mayor he would not have allegedly directed the policeman and the latter would not have followed his orders and instructions to sell Pedro Pars gasoline and padlocked the station.

PANFILO M. LACSON,petitionervs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.ROMEO M. ACOP and FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR.,petitioners-intervenors.

FACTS: Eleven persons believed to be members of theKuratong Balelenggang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involve in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, were slainalong Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). The ABRITG was composed of police officers with Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson. An information for murder was filed against petitioner after an allegation that was transpired was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between theKuratong Balelenggang members and the ABRITG. Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven amendedinformations before theSandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory. Accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended information, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court because RA 8249 FUKUZUME vs. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 143647, November 11, 2005Topic: Venue of criminal actions

FACTS: Private complainant Javier Ng Yu is a businessman engaged in buying and selling aluminum scrap wires. Sometime in 1991, Yu, accompanied by a friend, Mr. Jovate, went to the house of the accused-appellant Yusuke Fukuzume in Paraaque. Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is from Furukawa Electric Corporation and that he has at his disposal aluminum scrap wires. Fukuzume then told Yu that the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of NAPOCOR. Believing Fukuzumes representation to be true, Yu agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume. Thereafter on 1992, Fukuzume gave Yu a letter, authorizing Fukuzume to dispose of excess aluminum conductor materials. Fukuzume then agreed to accompany Yu when the latter is going to take the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound. When Yu arrived at the NAPOCOR compound, Fukuzume was nowhere to be found. Yu proceeded to show the documents of authorization to NAPOCOR personnel but the people from NAPOCOR did not honor the authorization letter. Unable to get the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound, Yu talked to Fukuzume and asked from the latter the refund of the money he paid him. Failing to refund the money, Yu then filed a criminal complaint in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati against Fukuzume for the crime of estafa.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the crime charged

RULING: No. The CA erred in ruling that the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged. The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI and the affidavit subscribed by Fukuzume. With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, it is clear that he alleged that he gave Fukuzume the amount of 50,000 in Makati. However, Yu testifed during his direct examination that he gave the said amount to Fukuzume in the latters house which is in Paraaque. Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court, the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate. Moreover, we find nothing in the cross examination of Yu to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume anywhere in Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa should be set aside for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. ASUNCION, MANIO, G.R. No. 108208, March 11, 1994Topic: Venue of criminal actions

FACTS: Private respondent Alexander Dionisio y Manio, a member of the PNP assigned to the Central Police District Command Station 2 in Novaliches, Quezon City, was dispatched by his Commanding Officer to Dumalay Street in Novaliches to respond to a complaint that a person was creating trouble there. Dionisio proceeded to that place, where he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang. Pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed with the RTC of Quezon City an Information charging Dionisio with the crime of homicide. The respondent Judge dismissed the criminal complaint "for re-filing with the Sandiganbayan" on the ground that the Sandiganbayan, and not the RTC, has jurisdiction over the case for crimes committed by public officer when penalty prescribed by law for the offense is higher than prision correccional. Private prosecutor moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal, citing the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that "crimes committed by PNP members are not cognizable by the Sandiganbayan" because "they fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts" and "the Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special court."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over all crimes committed by public officers with a penalty higher than prision correccional

RULING: No. If the crime committed by the public officer is not related to his public function, then the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction of the offense. There is no indication at all that the trouble-maker was the victim and that he was shot by the private respondent in the course of the latter's mission. However, it may yet be true that the crime of homicide charged therein was committed by the private respondent in the course of his public mission, which fact, however, was not alleged in the information. In view of this eventuality and the special circumstances of this case, and to avoid further delay, we shall direct the court a quo to conduct a preliminary hearing in this case to determine whether the crime charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office. If it be determined in the affirmative, then it shall order the transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall forthwith docket and proceed with the case as if the same were originally filed with it. Otherwise, the court a quo shall set aside the challenged orders, proceed with the trial of the case, and render judgment thereon. Any officer authorized to conduct a preliminary investigation who is investigating an offense committed by a public officer where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional, must determine if the crime was committed by the respondent in relation to his office. If it was, the investigating officer shall forthwith inform the Office of the Ombudsman which may either (a) take over the investigation of the case pursuant to Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770, 59 or (b) deputize a prosecutor to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of the case pursuant to Section 31 thereof. If the investigating officer determines that the crime was not committed by the respondent in relation to his office, he shall then file the information with the proper court.

PEOPLE vs. VANZUELA, G.R. No. 178266, July 21, 2008Topic: Venue of criminal actions

FACTS: Veneranda is the wife of the late Dionisio Paler, Sr. who is the registered owner of a parcel of irrigated riceland, situated in Barangay Mabini (Roxas), Mainit, Surigao del Norte. 1 hectare of this riceland (subject property) was cultivated by the respondents as agricultural tenants for more than 10 years, with an agreed lease rental of 12 cavans of palay, at 45 kilos per cavan, per harvest. The respondents allegedly failed to pay the rentals since 1997. Initially, Veneranda brought the matter before the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Office in Surigao del Norte, but no amicable settlement was reached by the parties. Thus, Veneranda filed a criminal complaint for estafa against the respondents. The RTC dismissed the criminal case contending that the instant case pertains to the non-payment of rentals by the accused to the private complainant, involving a lease of an agricultural land by the former from the latter. This being so, the controversy in the case involves an agrarian dispute which falls under the primary and exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC of Surigao City has jurisdiction over the charge for estafa even if it involves agricultural tenants of the private complainant

RULING: Yes. In the instant case, the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter because the law confers on it the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa. Second. The RTC also has jurisdiction over the offense charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction.Third. The RTC likewise acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the respondents because they voluntarily submitted to the RTC's authority. Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to resolve. Thus, based on the law and material allegations of the information filed, the RTC erroneously concluded that it lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter on the premise that the case before it is purely an agrarian dispute. In the instant case, the RTC failed to consider that what is lodged before it is a criminal case for estafa involving an alleged misappropriated amount of P80,000.00 -- a subject matter over which the RTC clearly has jurisdiction. Notably, while the RTC has criminal jurisdiction conferred on it by law, the DARAB, on the other hand, has no authority to try criminal cases at all. In Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. de Villena, we outlined the jurisdiction of the DARAB, to wit: For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the DAR; more specifically, in the DARAB.

KWONG SING vs. CITY OF MANILA, 41 Phil., 103

Topic: Cause of the accusation

FACTS: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and in behalf of all others having a common or general interest in the subject-matter of this action, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the city of Manila from enforcing Ordinance No. 532, questioning the ordinances validity. The said ordinance requires receipts in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. Appellants claim is that the ordinance savors of class legislation; that it unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances; and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. There are, in the city of Manila, more than 40 Chinese laundries. The laundrymen and employees in Chinese laundries do not, as a rule, speak, read, and write English or Spanish. Moreover, petitioner also contended that the ordinance is invalid, because it is arbitrary, unreasonable, and not justified under the police power of the city.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the enactment of the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power of the City of Manila

RULING: Yes. The ordinance invades no fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each everyone of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. Equally and uniformly the ordinance applies to all engaged in the laundry business, and, as nearly as may be, the same burdens are cast upon them. Even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the hands of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police power is the control of private interests for the public welfare. After the case was submitted to this court, counsel for appellants asked that a preliminary injunction issue, restraining the defendant or any of its officers from enforcing the ordinance, pending decisions. It was perfectly proper for the trial and appellate courts to determine the validity of the municipal ordinance on a complaint for an injunction, since it was very apparent that irreparable injury was impending, that a municipality of suits was threatened, and that complainants had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. But finding that the ordinance is valid, the general rule to the effect that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution should be followed.

ZALDIVIA vs. REYES, G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992Topic: Designation of Offense

FACTS: The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of an ordinance of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal. The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990. The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. The petitioner argues that the charge against her was governed by Sections 1 and 2 of the Rule on Summary Procedure and Act. No. 3326. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that the prescriptive period was suspended upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the said offense is governed by the Rules on Criminal Procedure or by the Rule of Summary Procedure.

RULING: The offense is governed by the Rule of Summary Procedure. The Court held that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the MTC of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.

ISSUE: Does Sandiganbayan has jurisdicition over the case?

HELD:No.

Fo acase to be within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it must be shown that the offense charged in the informationwas committed in relation to the office of the accused.In People vs. Montejo, the court held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated whie he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimacy must be alleged in he information, which determines the jurisdiction of the court. The controlling factor is the specific factual allegations in the information that would sow the close intimacy of the discharge of the accused official duties and the commission of the offense charged. It does not even matter the phrase committed in relation to his office appears in the information or not.

In the case at bar, what the amended information contains is a mere allegation that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his office and that is not sufficient. Such phrase is merely a conclusion of law. Since it was not proven that the crime of murder was committed in the discharge of their duties, the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over the case.

Rodriguez v. Gadiane et alGR No. 152903, July 17, 2006

Facts:The Court is called upon to resolve the question of whether a private offended party in a criminal proceeding may file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing an interlocutory order, without the conformity of the public prosecutor. Thomasita Rodriguez filed complainant, a criminal case, against Rolando Gadiane and Ricardo Rafols, Jr., for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. However, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petition was filed by the private complainant, instead of the government prosecutor representing the People of the Philippines in criminal cases.Issue:Whether or not the aggrieved person may file a special civil action for certiorari.

Ruling:A special civil action for certiorari may be filed by an aggrieved party alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.[8] In a long line of cases, this Court construed the term aggrieved parties to include the State and the private offended party or complainant.It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in name of said complainant.

Bautista v. FiscalGR No. 59830, July 31, 1984

Facts:Juan Bautista and Nenita Marquez filed with the office of the City Fiscal a complaint against Estrada, Banigued, and F. Bautista for estafa thru falsification of public document. The assistant Fiscal dismissed the case for lack of prima facie evidence. Bautista did not move for the reconsideration of the fiscal's resolution; neither did he appeal to the Ministry of Justice. Instead, Mr. Bautista filed a new complaint with the City Court of Dagupan against the same respondents, charging them with the same offense. The City Court found that an offense has been committed and the respondents therein are probably guilty thereof. Accordingly, a warrant for their arrest was issued and an order directing respondent city fiscal to file the corresponding information. However, the respondent city fiscal, through Assistant Fiscal Manaois, filed a manifestation with the city court that he will reinvestigate the case in view of his prior resolution. After reinvestigation, the city Fiscal, filed a motion to dismiss the case but was denied by the City Court. Thereafter, the city court again forwarded the records of the case to respondent city fiscal for the filing of the information. In turn, respondent city fiscal filed a manifestation informing the city court of his inability to prosecute the case because of his sincere and honest belief that he has no prima facie case to warrant the prosecution of the accused. The court filed a petition for mandamus, ordering the city fiscal to file the corresponding information for falsification of public documents. The court of appeals reversed the decision or the trial court and dismissed the petition for mandamus.

Issue:Whether or not the appellate court can direct the City Fiscal to file the corresponding information and to prosecute the case.

Ruling:The Supreme Court did not find any cogent reason to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of AppealsSection 4, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, specifically provides that "all criminal action either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.Indeed, how can the prosecuting fiscal secure the conviction of an accused on evidence beyond reasonable doubt when he himself is not convinced that he has a prima facie case against the petitioners. The better procedure would be to appeal the Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a special prosecutor.

Crespo v. MogulNo. L-53373, June 30, 1987

Facts:The Assistant Fiscal with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. However, the presiding judge, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. So the accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction in the Court of Appeals. CA, restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment. On the other hand, Undersecretary of Justice resolved the petition for review by reversing the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the Fiscal for Immediate dismissal of the information. However, respondent Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment. Hence, the accused filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals.

Issue:Whether or not the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits.

Ruling:Petition was dismissed.The rule therefore is that once a complaint or information is filed in the Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the court. The Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the secretary of Justice, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in the court

Padilla v. CAL-39999, May 31, 1984

Facts:The Fiscal accused the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion. Confederating and mutually helping one another, and acting without any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to close their stall. In committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with evident premeditation. The trial court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion. Hence an appeal to the Court of Appeals, which modified the ruling of the trial court, and decided in favor of the petitioners. Stating that they were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt but ordered them to pay for the actual damages. Still not content with the CAs decision, the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability.

Issue:Whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal charge

Ruling:The Supreme Court AFFIRMED the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition for lack of merit.The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811)Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission.

People v. CambaL-36471, November 19, 1980

Facts:Camba was found guilty of murder qualified by treachery with assault upon an agent of a person in authority was sentenced to death and to indemnify the heirs of Gongora. However, upon the observation of the court, the crime committed is more of robbery with homicide, for the reason that the victim Pat. Gongora was killed while responding to the call for help of a victim of snatching. Hencem the appellant claims that his conviction for murder should be set aside.

Issue:Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused of the offense charged despite the fact that what was proven was a different crime.

Ruling:It should be born in mind in this connection that the label or caption in the information in respect of the crime committed is not controlling- what matters are the material allegations in the information. The trial court found the appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery but without any other modifying circumstance. The crime was compounded, according to the trial court, with assault upon an agent of a person in authority. In this light the appropriate penalty, pursuant to Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, is death.If it be held as we do that the crime committed was robbery with homicide, the result will be the same for the aggravating circumstances of treachery and contempt of public authority will have to be assigned.The death penalty, however, cannot be imposed on the appellant who was only 20 years old when he committed the crime for lack of the necessary votes.The judgment of the court a quo is modified by reducing the sentence on the appellant to reclusion perpetua and consolidating the damages in the amount of P30,000.00.

Manangan JaenizBuhat vs. CA 265 scra 701Topic: Amendment of the InformationFacts:On March 25, 1993, an information for HOMICIDE was filed in the RTC against petitioner Danny Buhat, John Doe and Richard Doe. The information alleged that on October 16, 1992, petitioner Danilo Buhat, armed with a knife, unlawfully attacked and killed one Ramon George Yu while the said two unknown assailants held his arms, using superior strength, inflicting x x x mortal wounds which were x x x the direct x x x cause of his death.Even before petitioner could be arraigned, the prosecution moved for the deferment of the arraignment on the ground that the private complainant in the case, one Betty Yu, moved for the reconsideration of the resolution of the City Prosecutor which ordered the filing of the aforementioned information for homicide. Petitioner however, invoking his right to a speedy trial, opposed the motion. Thus, petitioner was arraigned on June 9, 1993 and, since petitioner pleaded not guilty, trial ensued.On February 3, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, finding Betty Yus appeal meritorious, ordered the City Prosecutor of Roxas City to amend the information by upgrading the offense charged to MURDER and implead therein additional accused Herminia Altavas, Osmea Altavas and Renato Buhat.On March 10, 1994, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed a motion for leave to amend information. The amendment as proposed was opposed by the petitioner.In an order, dated June 2, 1994, the RTC denied the motion for leave to amend information. The denial was premised on (1) an invocation of the trial courts discretion in disregarding the opinion of the Secretary of Justice as allegedly held in Crespo vs. Mogul and (2) a conclusion reached by the trial court that the resolution of the inquest prosecutor is more persuasive than that of the Secretary of Justice, the former having actually conducted the preliminary investigation where he was able to observe the demeanor of those he investigatedThe Solicitor General promptly elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals. He filed a petition for certiorari assailing the aforecited order denying the motion for leave to amend information. Finding the proposed amendment as non-prejudicial to petitioners rights, respondent court granted the petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the additional allegation of conspiracy is a substantial amendment2. Whether or not the upgrading of the crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of murder is such a substantial amendment that it is disallowed if made after the accused had pleaded "not guilty" to the crime of homicide

Held:

1. No. The additional allegation of conspiracy is only a formal amendment, hence petitioner's participation as principal is not affected by such amendment.

Petitioner undoubtedly is charged as a principal in the killing of Ramon George Yuwhom he is alleged to have stabbed while two unknown persons held the victim'sarms. The addition of the phrase, "conspiring, confederating and helping one another" does not change the nature of petitioner's participation as principal inthe killing.

Whether under the original or the amended information, petitioner would have to defend himself as the People makes a case against him and secures for public protection thepunishment of petitioner for stabbing to death, using superior strength, a fellow citizen inwhose health and safety society as a whole is interested. Petitioner, thus, has no tenablebasis to decry the amendment in question

2. The Court ruled in the negative. In the case of Dimalibot v. Salcedo,the Court ruled that the amendment of the information so as to change the crime charged from homicide to murder, may be made "even if it may result in altering the nature of the charge so long as it can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused."

Petitioner in the case at bench maintains that having already pleaded "not guilty" to the crime of homicide, the amendment of the crime charged in the information from homicide to murder is a substantial amendment prejudicial to his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him. He utterly fails to dispute, however, that the original information did allege that petitioner stabbed his victim "using superior strength." This particular allegation qualifies a killing to murder, regardless of how sucha killing is technically designated in the information filed by the public prosecutor, as provided for in Article 248 of the RPC.

Thus, the allegation of petitioner using superior strength constitutes a mere formal amendment, which is permissible even after arraignment.Manangan 2-D

Tehankee Jr. vs Madayag 207 scra 134Topic: Amendment of the InformationFacts:Petitioner was originally charged on July 19, 1991 in an information for the crime of frustrated murder of one Maureen Navarro Hultman.After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died.Consequently, private prosecutor Rogelio A. Vinluan filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file an amended information and to admit said amended information. The amended information, filed on October 31, 1991, reads:That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y. Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the death of said Maureen Hultman.Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, as well as a rejoinder to the reply of the prosecution. The trial court issued the questioned order admitting the amended information.Petitioner avers that the additional allegation in the amended information constitutes a substantial amendment since it involves a change in the nature of the offense charged, that is, from frustrated to consummated murder.Petitioner then postulates that since the amended information for murder charges an entirely different offense, it is essential that another preliminary investigation on the new charge be conducted before the new information can be admitted.At the scheduled arraignment on November 26, 1991, petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information for lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. By reason of such refusal, respondent judge ordered that a plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may legally and validly be admittedHeld: In the present case, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This is being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper.Petitioner would insist, however, that the additional allegation on the fact of death of the victim Maureen Navarro Hultman constitutes a substantial amendment which may no longer be allowed after a plea has been entered. The proposition is erroneous and untenable.Section 14 of Rule 110 provides that an amendment, either of form or substance, may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge and, thereafter, as to all After arraignment and during the trial, amendments are allowed, but only as to matters of form and provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. Now, an objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to be the prosecution's theory. It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite preliminary investigation does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial. The amended information could not conceivably have come as a surprise to petitioner for the simple and obvious reason that it charges essentially the same offense as that charged under the original information. Furthermore, as we have heretofore held, if the crime originally charged is related to the amended charge such that an inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other would reveal, a new preliminary investigation is not necessary. 17WHEREFORE, it being clearly apparent that respondent judge did not commit the errors speciously attributed to him, the extraordinary writs prayed for are hereby DENIED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Manangan 2-DJalandoni vs. Andaya 55 SCRA 261Topic: Jurisidction Facts:Petitioner instituted a criminal complaint for libel in the Municipal Court of the Municipality of Batangas presided over by the respondent Judge. The accused named therein was Serafin D. Cruz. There was the corresponding preliminary examination of the witnesses for the complainant with respondent Judge finding that there was reasonable ground to believe that such offense was committed by the person named. After respondent Cruz posted the corresponding bail bond for his provisional liberty, the respondent Judge set the case for hearing on the merits on July 13, 1964, at 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon. When that time came, complainant, now petitioner, through counsel manifested in open court that under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, respondent Judge was devoid of jurisdiction to do so. There was, as noted, a negative response. After hearing arguments on such motion for desistance including memoranda submitted by both sides, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioner's verbal motion to have Criminal Case No. 801 elevated to the Court of First Instance of Batangas. With a motion for reconsideration meeting the same fate, this petition for prohibition was filed. Issue: Whether or not respondent Judges insistence to try a prosecution for libel, instead of having it elevated to the proper court of first instance is correct

Held: There is no need to make mention against that it is a court of first instance that is specifically designated to try a libel case. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code so provides. Its language is categorical; its meaning is free from doubt. This is one of those statutory provisions that leaves no room for interpretation. All that is required is application. 4 What the law ordains must then be followed. It is as simple as that. It did not appear to be so to respondent Judge. He would go ahead. He therefore did invite a suit of this character bent as he was on treading grounds where his presence was, to put it at its mildest, unwelcome. He must be restrained.WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is granted and the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on December 18, 1964, is made permanent.

Manangan 2-DPeople vs Pineda 20 SCRA 748Topic: Consolidation of offenses in one InformationFacts:Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases for murder.On July 29, 1965, spouses Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza, along with their children were attacked by private respondents. Teofilo and the children were shot dead, leaving only Valeriana alive but wounded. Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed Tomas Narbasa and Tambak Alindo moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal case." Their plea is that "said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse."Giving the nod to defendants' claim, respondent Judge directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information in Case 1246. He also ordered that the other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the docket."The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon the ground that "more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more than one victim was killed." The defense opposed.Respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the position that the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though the series of shots killed more than one victim;" and that only one information for multiple murder should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one."Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge was correct in averring that the five cases be consolidated, and that only one information should be filed by the City FiscalHeld: The Court ruled in the negative. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. In People vs. Gatbunton, the spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule who were asleep were killed by one burst of machine gun fire; and then, by a second burst of machine gun fire, two of the couple's children also asleep were killed. The accused, Tomas Gatbunton, was found guilty by the trial court of quadruple murder. On appeal, this Court declared that "appellant must be declared guilty of four murders."The respondent Judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that consolidation of the five cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied.Upon the facts and the law, the Court holds that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented the five separate informations four for murder and one for frustrated murder.

Manangan 2-DPeople vs. Devaras 228 scra 482Topic: Qualifying circumstances shall be alleged in the InformationFacts: A pedicab driver and his passenger were attacked without provocation by two men who hacked them to death and later threw their bodies over the bridge with the help of another person. Investigation that same night disclosed the participation of the herein appellants, who were subsequently accused of murder in two informations alleging that they committed the offenses in conspiracy with each other and with treachery and abuse of superior strength.The principal witness for the prosecution was Raul Animos, who claimed to have witnessed the killing of the two victims. He said that on July 10, 1990, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the three appellants were drinking with him in the house of Devaras and that thereafter they joined him on his tour of duty as bantay-bayan. They had been making the rounds in the town for about four hours when, while at the Daguitan bridge, they saw a zigzagging pedicab approach. When the pedicab was halfway across the bridge, Blademir Devaras, who was carrying a long bolo, suddenly attacked Efren Verzosa, the pedicab driver. Efren fell from his seat but Blademir continued hacking him with the bolo, hitting him in the head and neck. At abut the same time, Ronilo Caisek, who also carrying a long bolo, attacked Felix Verzosa, the passenger, who tried to parry the blows with his arms as he got out of the vehicle. He fell, staggered and ran but was overtaken by Ronilo, who continued striking the helpless old man in the head, neck, chest and shoulders. Pablo Devaras did not participate in the brutal slaying but later helped Blademir throw Efren's body over the bridge into the river below. Ronilo himself was ordered to help throw the body of Felix and, although he initially hesitated, had to comply in the end because he was threatened with death if he refused to obey. The body of Felix was found the following morning under the bridge. The body of Efren was found about three hours later near the seashore. The autopsy revealed that Felix had sustained twenty wounds and nine wounds had been inflicted in Efren.All three accused denied participation in the killings. After assessing the evidence of parties, the trial court decided in favor of the prosecution and convicted Blademir Devaras as principal and Pablo Devaras as accessory in the murder of Efren Verzosa; and Ronilo Caisek for the murder of Felix Verzosa.

Issues: 1. Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting them of murder instead of homicide2. Whether or not the RTC erred in convicting appellant Pablo Devaras as an accessoryHeld:1. The first error assigned by the appellants is untenable because the evidence of record clearly shows that Blademir and Ronilo suddenly attacked their unarmed victims with bolos, thereby insuring the commission of the offense without risk themselves arising from the defense the victims might make. The killings would have been homicide only without the attendance of treachery, which is one of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.We agree that there was no conspiracy between the appellants to justify their common conviction for both murders. There is no evidence that Blademir and Ronilo had earlier come to an agreement to kill the Verzosas; on the contrary, it would appear that they had acted on impulse, independently of any common plan. The trial court was correct in finding Blademir guilty of the murder only of Efren Verzosa and Ronilo guilty of the murder only of Felix Verzosa instead of holding them equally liable for both murders.2. The second assigned error must also be dismissed. The determination of the persons to be prosecuted on the basis of the evidence against them rests primarily with the prosecutor, who is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the discharge of this function. We have held that, as an exception, the prosecutor can be compelled by mandamus if he abuses this discretion and refuses to include a person as a co-accused against whom there appears to be at least prima facie. However, this extraordinary writ is available only if the petitioner shows that he has first exhausted all remedies in the ordinary course of law, such as a motion filed with the trial court for the indictment of the person or persons excluded by the prosecutor. It does not appear that such a motion was filed by the appellants in the case at bar.An accessory is defined as one who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principal or an accomplice, takes part subsequent to its commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in order to prevent its discovery. For having assisted in throwing Efren's dead body into the river, Pablo Devaras was correctly held guilty as an accessory.WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED, but with modification.

BONA, MARGARETTE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NARCISO NAZARENO, et. al.G.R. No. 103964, August 1, 1996, Mendoza,J., Second Division

TOPIC: Prosecution of Offenses

FACTS:This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 136), finding accused-appellants Narciso Nazareno and Ramil Regala guilty of murder for the killing of Romulo "Molet" Bunye II in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Two others, accused with them, Manuel Laureaga and Orlando Hular, were acquitted.

On December 14, 1988, between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 a.m., Bunye took a stainless tricycle, which was driven by Fernando Hernandez. Unknown to Bunye was that two men were waiting outside his house and that the two hailed another tricycle in order to follow him. Bunye alighted at the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang, Muntinlupa and crossed to the left side of the street. Shortly after, the tricycle, driven by Rogelio de Limos, arrived and stopped in front of Hernandez's tricycle. One of the men jumped out of the tricycle and shot Bunye at the back of the head. When Bunye fell face down, the assailant fired another shot at Bunye's head. Then, the other man approached Bunye and shot him also in the head. The autopsy report on the victim showed that he died of gunshot wounds in the head.

On December 28, 1988, Ramil Regala, Narciso Nazareno, Orlando Hular and Manuel Laureaga were arrested. Regala and Nazareno were put in a police line-up. They were identified and pointed to as the assailants by the tricycle drivers. Regala executed affidavits, admitting participation in the slaying of Bunye and pointing to Nazareno and a certain Rey Taling as his co-conspirators. He claimed that they had been hired by Hular to kill the victim and told that th