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Justice Teresita Leonardo-De Castro Cases (2008-2015) Criminal Law

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FELONIES(Stages of execution)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO DOMINGUEZ, JR., alias SANDYG.R. No. 180914, November 24, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro

We cannot simply assume that there was attempted rape simply because accused undressed

himself and the offended party, plus the fact that accused did rape the latter on three other occasions.

Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his

sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own

spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed.

Facts:

Domingo Dominguez, Jr. (Domingo) was indicted for four counts of rape and one count of

attempted rape, all qualified by his relationship with and the minority of the private offendedparty.

Based on the combined testimonies of the witnesses and documentary evidence for the

prosecution, the RTC accounted the prosecutions version of the facts as follows:

The evidence for the prosecution shows and as narrated in open court by the victim

herself [AAA]; that the first incident of rape (Criminal Case No. 02-548) happened

before the fiesta of Magallanes which was in the month of July 2001. Her small

siblings were already asleep and she was about to go to sleep also, when she noticed

her father (the accused) already beside her. Her father (accused) undressed her

while he also undressed himself, and as he was about to mount her for the purpose

of raping her, her mother arrived and inquired why she was naked. Because of fearof bodily harm brought about by the threat coming from the accused who was then

holding a bolo, the victim did not say anything. She positively identified her father

(the accused) inside the courtroom when asked to do so by the public

prosecutor. The accused failed to consummate the rape during the first incident.

The second rape (Criminal Case No. 02-549) happened after a week from the first

attempt, which could be between the fourth week of July or first week of August

2001 because the victim stated that it was no longer in the month of July 2001. It

happened in a coconut farm in Anibong, Magallanes, Sorsogon. The victim was asked

by her father to accompany him in getting coconut leaves because they are going to

weave it in their house. When the two (2) of them reached the place, her father

(accused) undressed her and thereafter undressed himself also and made her liedown then inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt weak and pain all over her

body including her vagina which she felt to be swollen at that time. She tried to

struggle but she was helpless, particularly so, that the accused was also armed with

a bolo at that time. After the bestial act was consummated they proceeded home

bringing with them the coconut leaves that they gathered. She did not tell anyone

about the incident because of fear of the accused and the thought that they might

not believe her.

BOOK 1 (Articles 1-99, RPC)




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The third incident of rape (Criminal Case No. 02-550) happened two (2) weeks after

the second incident, which was sometime in the month of August 2001. While the

fourth incident of rape (Criminal Case No. 02-551) happened three (3) weeks after

the third incident which was sometime in the month of September 2001. The fifth

and last incident of rape happened according to the victim sometime in the 20th

ofNovember 2001. All the 3rd, 4th and 5th incidents of rape happened in the same

coconut farm although in the different places of the farm. The same pattern of

execution was adopted by the accused. He would ask the victim to go with him to

the coconut farm to gather coconut leaves, and once they reached the place the

accused would undress the victim then undress himself also and have sexual

intercourse with her against her will. The victim could not refuse or disobey the

command of the accused (her father) because he will scold and threaten her with

punishment if she would not go with him. She could not also tell her mother about it

because of fear. At the time of the first and second rapes the victim was only 12

years old. She was already 13 years old when the third, fourth, and fifth incidents of

rape happened. Her date of birth was January 3, 1989.

During the fifth incident of rape (Criminal Case No. 02-552) on November

20, 2001 the accused and the victim [were] again in the same coconut farm in order

to get coconut leaves. Both of them were already naked and the accused was about

to mount the victim when they were seen by prosecution eyewitness [CCC] who

shouted at them, thats why the accused fled leaving the victim behind. Because of

what happened the victim was able to gain enough courage to tell her mother and to

report the incident to the barangay captain of their place, thus leading to the

apprehension of the accused.

In its Decision, the RTC found Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of

qualified rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-549, 02-550 and 02-551, and two counts of attempted rape

in Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552.

Domingo interposed his appeal from the judgment of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. He

asserted his innocence and asked for his acquittal from all the charges.

On the two counts of attempted rape, Domingo claimed that the prosecution failed to show

any overt act which would prove his intent to rape AAA. AAAs claims during her testimony that he

was about to rape her or about to go on top of her were it not for the timely arrival of her mother,

BBB, in Criminal Case No. 02-548, or were it not for the fortunate appearance of a relative, CCC, in

Criminal Case No. 02-552, were allegedly so vague that one cannot make a clear conclusion whether

the he really intended to rape AAA.

Domingo also noted that should his conviction for the crime of attempted rape be sustained,the trial court committed an error in the imposition of the proper penalty. With the abrogation of

the death penalty, the imposable penalty for the crime of rape committed in the attempted stage,

which must be two degrees lower than that of the penalty imposed for the crime intended to be

committed, should be prision mayor .

Anent the three counts of qualified rape, Domingo denied the accusations and questioned

the motive of AAA in charging him with said crime. He pointed out that it was implausible that AAA




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would not tell her mother and siblings about the alleged rapes. It was also incredible that AAA

would still accompany him repeatedly to the coconut farm despite her having been previously

sexually assaulted by him, with AAA knowing that their seclusion was another opportunity for him

to sexually assault her again. He averred that AAAs unexplained silence and continuous

acquiescence to the sexual abuses supposedly committed against her made her accusations

dubious.

After its review of the evidence, the Court of Appeals affirmed Domingo’s conviction in

Criminal Case Nos. 02-549, 02-550, and 02-551 for three counts of qualified rape; while it modified

the RTC judgment in Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552 and convicted Domingo for two counts

of acts of lasciviousness. Thereafter, Domingo appealed his convictions before us.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting Domingo of the crime of

rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-549, 02-550 and 02-551.

2. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting Domingo of the crime of

attempted rape in Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552.

3. Granting arguendo that Domingo is guilty of attempted rape in Criminal Case Nos.

02-548 and 02-552, is the penalty imposed proper?

Ruling:

On the first issue, We sustain the findings of the Court of Appeals and affirm Domingo’sconviction in Criminal Case Nos. 02-549, 02-550, and 02-551 for three counts of qualified rape.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of rape is committed by aman having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) through

force, threat or intimidation; (2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise

unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (4) when the

offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the

circumstances mentioned above be present. In People v. Orillosa, we held that in incestuous rape of

a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be employed where the overpowering moral

influence of the father would suffice.

In this case, the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-

appellant, through force, threat or intimidation, had carnal knowledge of his daughter, AAA, who

was then only 12 to 13 years old.

On the second issue, We also affirm the convictions of accused-appellant in Criminal Case

Nos. 02-548 and 02-552, for two counts of acts of lasciviousness and not for attempted rape.

Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when the offender

commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of

execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own

spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape, penetration is an essential act of execution to produce

the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted rape, the accused must have commenced the act of




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penetrating his sexual organ to the vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than

his own spontaneous desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed . (Perez v. Court

of Appeals)

We also reiterated in Perez our pronouncements in People v. Caingat , that the offenders acts

of lying on top of the victim, embracing and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his handinside her panty, and touching her sexual organ, which were interrupted were it not for the timely

arrival of the victims mother, do not constitute the crime of attempted rape, absent any showing

that the offender actually commenced to force his penis into the victims sexual organ, and that said

acts rather constitute the crime of acts of lasciviousness punishable under Article 336 of the

Revised Penal Code.

In Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552, there is a similar dearth of evidence that accused-

appellant was able to commence penetration of his penis into AAAs vagina. What the evidence on

record established was that during these two occasions, accused-appellant was only able to undress

himself and his daughter before the arrival of BBB and CCC.

We cannot simply assume in Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552 that accused-appellantwas intending to rape AAA simply because accused-appellant undressed himself and AAA during

these two instances, plus the fact that accused-appellant did rape AAA on three other

occasions. Such a presumption hardly constitutes proof beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

attempted rape. The gauge in determining whether the crime of attempted rape had been

committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis into

the vagina, before the interruption.

As the Court of Appeals found, it has been established beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal

Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552 that accused-appellant committed the crime of acts of lasciviousness.

The elements of acts of lasciviousness, punishable under Article 336 of the Revised Penal

Code, are:

1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

2) it is done under any of the following circumstances:

a. By using force or intimidation; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and

3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.

All elements are present in Criminal Case Nos. 02-548 and 02-552.

Lewdness is defined as an obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous act which signifies that

form of immorality carried on a wanton manner. It is morally inappropriate, indecent, and lustfulfor accused-appellant to undress himself and his own daughter (who was completely capable of

dressing or undressing herself), while his wife was away and his other children were asleep; or

doing the same acts in an isolated coconut farm where only the two of them were present.

Finally, we adopt the penalties imposed by the Court of Appeals upon accused-appellant,

but modify the damages awarded in AAAs favor.




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Given the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346, the Court of Appeals properly reduced the

penalty of death and, instead, imposed upon accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion

perpetua without eligibility for parole for each count of his three convictions for qualified rape in

Criminal Case Nos. 02-549, 02-550, and 02-551.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH BARRAG.R. No. 198020, July 10, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The crime of robbery remained unconsummated because Elmer Lagdaan refused to give his

money to Joseph Barra and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was for this reason

that Elmer Lagdaan was shot. Joseph Barra can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with

homicide.

Facts:

Ricardo de la Peña (De la Peña) testified that he knew Barra for a long time. He stated that

he was on his way home to the neighboring barangay, when, at around 9:00 p.m. on October 9,

2003, in the light of a bright moon, he saw Joseph Barra (Barra) enter the house of Elmer Lagdaan(Lagdaan), which was lit with a lamp, and poked a gun to Lagdaan’s right forehead and demanded

money. De la Peña hid behind a tree ten meters away. When Lagdaan stated that the money was

not in his possession, Barra shot him. He went home and reported the incident the following

morning.

Ely Asor (Asor) testified that on the night of October 9, 2003, he was on his way to the

Lagdaan’s house to collect his daily wage when he saw Barra in the yard of Lagdaan’s house. He

inquired from Barra if Lagdaan was around. Barra responded that Lagdaan was not around. Asor

went home. It was while Asor was in his house that he heard a gunshot. It was the following

morning that he learned that Lagdaan died. Asor then proceeded to report the incident.

In his defense, Barra denied the charges against him. Barra claimed that he was in BatangasCity, with his brother Benjamin, visiting his sister when he was arrested and brought to Camarines

Sur and charged with the crime of “robbery with murder.” Barra’s brother, Benjamin, tried tocorroborate his testimony.

The RTC, after taking into consideration all the evidence presented, found Barra guilty

beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. It stated that the affirmative

testimony of the prosecution’s witnesses deserved more weight than Barra’s defense of denial and

alibi. Thus, finding the prosecution’s witnesses to be credible and that the killing of Lagdaan to beby reason of the robbery.

However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals only found Barra guilty of attempted robbery with

homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not Barra should be held liable for the crime of robbery with homicide or

attempted robbery with homicide only.

Ruling:




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He is guilty of attempted robbery with homicide only.

In the case before us, Barra’s intention was to extort money from the Lagdaan. By reason of

the Lagdaan’s refusal to give up his personal property — his money — to Barra, the Lagdaan was

shot in the head, causing his death. We, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the elementof taking was not complete, making the crime one of attempted robbery with homicide as opposed

to the crime Barra was convicted in the RTC. Barra is, therefore, liable under Article 297 of the

Revised Penal Code, not under Article 294 as originally held by the RTC.

In the present case, the crime of robbery remained unconsummated because the Lagdaan

refused to give his money to Barra and no personal property was shown to have been taken. It was

for this reason that Lagdaan was shot. Barra can only be found guilty of attempted robbery with

homicide, thus punishable under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code. Since the RTC and the Court

of Appeals found Barra’s crime to be aggravated by disregard of dwelling, the Court of Appeals

correctly imposed the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua.

CONSPIRACY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNOLD GARCHITORENA Y CAMBA A.KA. JUNIOR; JOEYPAMPLONA A.K.A. NATO AND JESSIE GARCIA Y ADORINOG. R. No. 175605, August 28, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Acts of conspiracy of each accused need not be directly proved as it can be inferred from the

acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent to the incident. What is material is that the actions

of the accused pertain to a joint purpose, concert of action or community of interest in conspiracy an

act one is the act of all.

Facts:

Arnold Garchitorena, Joey Pamplona and Jessie Garcia were charged of the crime of murder

for the killing of Mauro Biay. During the trial, the prosecution presented Dulce Borero, the sister of

the accused, the forensic expert who conducted the autopsy over the victim and the victim’s widow,

Amelia Biay.

According to her, Dulce Borero was selling balut with her brother Mauro Biay. She was

about 7 arms length from her brother when he was called by Jessie Garcia. When Biay approached

Garcia, the latter twisted the former’s hand behind his back and Garcia’s companions, JoeyPamplona and Arnold Garchitorena, repeatedly stabbed Biay. Biay tried to free himself from the

three but failed to do so. Borero went home to call her elder brother Teodoro, but when they

returned to the scene, the Biay was no longer there as he had already been brought to the hospital

where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

According to the autopsy report, Biay’s death was caused by multiple stab wounds. Dr.

Poblete, who conducted the autopsy, specified the victim suffered eight (8) stab wounds and the

nature of stab wounds indicated that it may have been caused by more than one bladed instrument.




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Amelia Biay, testified that she incurred burial expenses amounting to P16,700.00 due to the

death of her husband and alleged that her husband earned a minimum of P300.00 a day as a balut

vendor and P100.00 occasionally as a part-time carpenter.

Pamplona denied that he participated in the stabbing of Mauro Bay while Garcia interposed

the defense of alibi, and Garchitorena raised the defense of insanity. The respective defenses of theaccused were:

Pamplona claimed that he was seated on a bench when co-accused Arnold came along. Then

the balut vendor arrived and Joey saw Arnold stand up, pull something from the right side of his

pocket and stab the balut vendor and that due to fear that Arnold might also stab him, he also ran

away from the scene. A certain Danilo Garados testified that Garcia was not there and Pamplona

allegedly ran away when Arnold stabbed Mauro. Garcia also took the stand and claimed that he was

still riding a bus from his work in Blumentritt when the incident happened. With respect to

Garchitorena, Dr. Evelyn Belen, Medical Officer III and resident physician of the National Center for

Mental Health, testified that she examined the accused Arnold and based on the history of the

patient, it was found that he had been using prohibited drugs two (2) years prior to the stabbing

incident and that he was allegedly suffering from schizophrenia. However, Dr. Belen also testifiedthat the accused Garchitorena had remissions and understands what he was doing and was aware

of his murder case in court.

The trial court found that Garchitorena, Pamplona and Garcia were in conspiracy and used

superior strength in killing Mauro Biay and therefore, guilty of the crime of murder and were

sentenced to death. Further, they were ordered to pay jointly and severally Amelia Biay, widow of

the victim Mauro Biay, the following sums: a) 50,000.00 as and for civil indemnity, b) 50,000.00 as

and for moral damages, c) 50,000.00 as and for exemplary damages, d) 16,700.00 as and for actual

damages, e) 408,000.00 as and for loss of the earning capacity of Mauro Biay; and, f) To pay the

costs of suit.

The accused appealed to the CA but the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trialcourt in toto. Hence, the automatic review. Pamplona and Garcia contended that the trial court

erred in giving credence to the testimony of Dulce Borero and failed to appreciate the evidence in

favor of them. Further, the judge who decided the case was not the same judge who heard the

testimonies during the trial. Garcia also claimed that there was no proof presented to prove that

they conspired nor used superior strength to kill Mauro. As to Garchitorena, he claimed that the

trial court erred in not considering the testimony of his expert witness as to his mental state. Lastly,

they are questioning the propriety of awarding of moral and exemplary damages absent any proof

from the prosecution.

Issues:

1. Whether or not there was conspiracy2. Whether or not the accused used superior strength

Ruling:

1. Accused-appellant Garcia also argues that there was no conspiracy, as there was no

evidence whatsoever that he aided the other two accused-appellants or that he participated in their

criminal designs. We are not persuaded. In People v. Maldo, we stated:




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Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning

the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential, for

conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused prior to, during or subsequent

to the incident . Such acts must point to a joint purpose, concert of action or

community of interest. Hence, the victim need not be actually hit by each of theconspirators for the act of one of them is deemed the act of all . (citations omitted,

emphasis ours)

In this case, conspiracy was shown because accused-appellants were together in performing

the concerted acts in pursuit of their common objective. Garcia grabbed the victim’s hands andtwisted his arms; in turn, Pamplona, together with Garchitorena, strangled him and straddled him

on the ground, then stabbed him. The victim was trying to free himself from them, but they were

too strong. All means through which the victim could escape were blocked by them until he fell to

the ground and expired. The three accused-appellants prior act of waiting for the victim outside

affirms the existence of conspiracy, for it speaks of a common design and purpose.

Where there is conspiracy, as here, evidence as to who among the accused rendered thefatal blow is not necessary. All conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the intent and

the character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all.

2. The aggravating circumstance of superior strength should be appreciated against the

accused-appellants. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces

between the victim and the aggressor, considering that a situation of superiority of strength is

notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and is selected or taken advantage of by him in the

commission of the crime. This circumstance was alleged in the Information and was proved during

the trial. In the case at bar, the victim certainly could not defend himself in any way. The accused-

appellants, armed with a deadly weapon, immobilized the victim and stabbed him successively

using the same deadly weapon.

All told, the trial court correctly convicted the accused-appellants of murder, considering

the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Since an aggravating circumstance of

abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime, each of the accused-appellants

should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of death in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised

Penal Code. Murder, under Article 248of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by reclusion

perpetua to death. Following Article 63 of the same code, the higher penalty of death shall be

applied.

In view, however, of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, otherwise known as the Anti-Death

Penalty Law, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, reclusion perpetua without

eligibility for parole should instead be imposed. Accordingly, accused-appellants shall be sentenced

to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole in lieu of the penalty of death.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH SERRANO and ANTHONY SERRANO

G.R. No. 179038, May 6, 2010 , J. Leonardo-De Castro

Conspiracy is always predominantly mental in composition because it consists primarily of a

meeting of minds and intent. It is present when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one

performing one part and another performing another so as to complete it with a view to the




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attainment of the same object, and their acts though apparently independent were in fact concerted

and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of

sentiments. Clearly, it is attendant in circumstances when there was concerted action between the

accused-appellants before, during and after the offense which ably demonstrated their unity of design

and objective in successfully committing the crime.

Facts:

In the afternoon of January 18, 2003, Major Jerry Galvan received a telephone call from a

concerned citizen about an illegal drug trade being conducted by a certain alias "Tune" in Barangay

Bambang, Pasig City. Thereafter, Major Galvan coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement

Agency (PDEA) for the conduct of a buy-bust operation. Thus, a team led by SPO3 Leneal Matias,

PO3 Carlo Luna and PO1 Michael Familara (PO1 FAMILARA) was formed to buy "shabu" from

"Tune" with the aid of a confidential informant. Preparations were then made, and two (2) One

Hundred Peso bills were marked "MRF" and delivered to the assigned poseur-buyer, PO1

FAMILARA. The composite team thereafter proceeded to the aforementioned location, the

confidential informant pointed to a house where accused-appellant Joseph Serrano (JOSEPH) was

found standing. SPO3 Leneal Matias and PO3 Carlo Luna positioned themselves at a distance wherethey can see PO1 FAMILARA, who approached JOSEPH together with the confidential informant.

The latter greeted JOSEPH and informed him that his companion, PO1 FAMILARA, would buy Php

200.00 worth of shabu. JOSEPH thereafter knocked at the door of "Tune", who turned out to be

accused-appellant Anthony Serrano (ANTHONY). ANTHONY partially opened the door and

conferred with JOSEPH. PO1 FAMILARA thereafter handed the marked money to JOSEPH, who in

turn handed the same to ANTHONY. Upon receiving the money, the latter then took out a plastic

sachet containing a white crystalline substance from his pocket and handed the same to the

JOSEPH, who, in turn, handed the plastic sachets to PO1 FAMILARA. As such, FAMILARA

immediately grabbed JOSEPH's hand while the rest of the team rushed to the scene to arrest the

accused-appellants. ANTHONY even attempted to escape to his house but was subsequently

likewise apprehended.

Both accused-appellants were bodily frisked after their apprehension. Recovered from

ANTHONY were four heat-sealed plastic sachets with white crystalline substances, two (2) marked

one hundred peso bills, a pair of scissors, a disposable lighter and one plastic bag containing several

pieces of empty plastic sachets. However, nothing aside from the heat-sealed plastic sachet he

previously handed to PO1 FAMILARA was recovered from accused-appellant JOSEPH.

Upon examination by P/Insp. Lourdeliza Gural, the five heat-sealed plastic sachets

containing white crystalline substances were found positive [for] Methylamphetamine

Hydrochloride or commonly known as "shabu."

In their defense, both ANTHONY and JOSEPH denied the charges against them. The latter

averred that the plastic sachets containing the white crystalline substance were shown to him onlyat the police station. For his part, ANTHONY argued that they only came to know the reason for

their arrest and detention when they were already in court.

The RTC rendered judgment convicting the brothers for illegal sale of shabu in Criminal

Case No. 12007-D and Anthony Serrano for illegal possession of shabu in Criminal Case No. 12008-

D. In view of the imposition of the penalty of life imprisonment on the accused-appellants, the case




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was elevated to the Court of Appeals for automatic review. The appellate court affirmed the said

decision.

Issue:

Whether or not conspiracy is present in the case at bar,

Ruling:

Conspiracy, as settled in our jurisprudence, is always predominantly mental in composition

because it consists primarily of a meeting of minds and intent. By its nature, conspiracy is planned

in utmost secrecy. Hence, for collective responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that

conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime as only rarely

would such agreement be demonstrable since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are

rarely documented by agreements in writing. However, the courts are not without resort in the

determination of its presence as it may be inferred and proved through the acts of the accused,

whose conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime point to a common purpose,

concert of action, and community of interest. In short, conduct may establish conspiracy. Anaccepted badge of conspiracy is when the accused by their acts aimed at the same object, one

performing one part and another performing another so as to complete it with a view to the

attainment of the same object, and their acts though apparently independent were in fact concerted

and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of

sentiments.

As testified to by the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation, it was accused-

appellant JOSEPH who negotiated with the poseur-buyer, PO1 FAMILARA, received the buy-bust

money, and handed the same to ANTHONY. The latter, after receiving the money from JOSEPH,

handed to JOSEPH the sachet of shabu to be given to PO1 FAMILARA. It was JOSEPH who delivered

the illegal drug to PO1 FAMILARA. When ANTHONY was frisked during the arrest, the police

officers retrieved the marked money that JOSEPH gave him, together with other sachets of shabuand paraphernalia used in packing the illegal drug, such as several empty plastic bags, a disposable

lighter and a pair of scissors. Clearly, there was concerted action between the brothers JOSEPH and

ANTHONY before, during and after the offense which ably demonstrated their unity of design and

objective to sell the dangerous drug.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RESTITUTO CARANDANG, HENRY MILAN AND JACKMANCHUA

G.R. No. 175926, July 6, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a finding of conspiracy. Unlike

evident premeditation, there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient period

of time to elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises onthe very moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject felony.

Facts:

The drug enforcement unit of the La Loma Police Station 1 received a request for assistance

from the sister of accused Milan regarding a drug deal that would allegedly take place in her house.

After they talked to Milan’s sister, the police formed a team.




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When the team reached the place at around 4:00 p.m., they alighted from their vehicles and

surrounded Milan’s house. Henry Milan, Restituto Carandang and Jackman Chua were all inside the

room of Milan when the team of Policemen arrived. The door of the room was open but was

suddenly closed by Milan when they were alerted of the presence of the police officers. When the

police officers were finally able to break open said door, Carandang peppered them with bullets.PO2 Alonzo and SPO2 Red died instantly as a result while SPO1 Montecalvo was mortally wounded.

Then, upon seeing their victims helplessly lying on the floor and seriously wounded, Chua ordered

Milan to attack the police officers. Following the order, Milan rushed towards Montecalvo but the

latter, however, was able to shoot him.

The Trial court found Carandang, Milan and Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the

crime of two counts of murder for the killing of SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar Red and PO2 Dionisio Alonzo

and one count of frustrated murder qualified by treachery and acting in conspiracy with each other.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC‘s ruling that Carandang, Milan and Chua acted in

conspiracy in the commission of the crimes charged. Thus, despite the established fact that it was

Carandang who fired the gun which hit SPO2 Red, PO2 Alonzo and SPO1 Montecalvo, all threeaccused were held equally criminally responsible therefor. The trial court explained that

Carandang, Milan and Chua‘s actuations showed that they acted in concert against the police

officers. Milan and Chua argued that there‘s no direct evidence showing that they conspired with

Carandang during the latter‘s act of shooting the three victims.

Issue:

Can conspiracy exist even if there is no full opportunity for meditation and reflection at the

time the crime was committed.

Ruling:

Yes, there can be conspiracy even if at the time the crime was committed, there is no full

opportunity for meditation and reflection.

In People v. Sumalpong, the Court held that conspiracy may also be proven by other means:

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a

felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual agreement among the

conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the crime. Proof of

concerted action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates their unity of design and

objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all regardless of

the degree of participation of each.

The conclusion that Milan and Chua conspired with Carandang was established by their acts(1) before Carandang shot the victims (Milan‘s closing the door when the police officers introduced

themselves, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush), and (2) after the shooting (Chua‘s directive to

Milan to attack SPO1 Montecalvo and Milan‘s following such instruction). Contrary to the

suppositions of appellants, these facts are not meant to prove that Chua is a principal by

inducement or that Milan‘s act of attacking SPO1 Montecalvo was what made him a principal by

direct participation. Instead, these facts are convincing circumstantial evidence of the unity of




Page 12 of 299

purpose in the minds of the three. As co-conspirators, all three are considered principals by direct

participation.

Neither can the rapid turn of events be considered to negate a finding of conspiracy. Unlike

evident premeditation, there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient

period of time to elapse to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracyarises on the very moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject felony.

As held by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, Milan‘s act of closing the door facilitated

the commission of the crime, allowing Carandang to wait in ambush. The sudden gunshots when

the police officers pushed the door open illustrate the intention of appellants and Carandang to

prevent any chance for the police officers to defend themselves. Treachery is thus present in the

case at bar, as what is decisive for this qualifying circumstance is that the execution of the attack

made it impossible for the victims to defend themselves or to retaliate.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALLAN NIEGAS y FALLOREG.R. No. 194582, November 27, 2013, J . Leonardo-De Castro

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the

commission of a felony and decide to commit it. While it is mandatory to prove it by competent

evidence, direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy — it may be deduced from the mode, method,

and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves

when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. The

mere circumstance that accused did not personally perform all the acts necessary to consummate the

crime is irrelevant when conspiracy is proven, since in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

Facts:

Mila Rose Fernandez (Fernandez) worked for Augusto Manikis, Jr. (Augusto) as the nanny of

his son, James Augusto Manikis (James). She testified that on December 9, 2002, at around 7:30 in

the morning, she took James, who was then crying, outside the house. She saw Augusto’s driver,

accused-appellant Niegas, who offered to take them to Jollibee at the Maysilo Circle to pacify the

child. They used Augusto’s car, a brown Toyota Revo.

From Jollibee, Fernandez thought that accused-appellant Niegas was driving them home.

However, accused-appellant Niegas kept on driving and only stopped to allow an unknown man to

board the vehicle. She told accused-appellant Niegas to take them home, warning him that the

child’s grandmother might get angry. The unknown man, however, insisted that accused -appellant

Niegas take them to Barangka where he would alight, and accused-appellant Niegas complied.

Two other unknown men boarded the vehicle and sat to the left and right of Fernandez. At

Boni Avenue, she was forced to wear covered shades so she could not see anything. They drove for

around four hours, and apparently got lost somewhere in Calamba, Laguna. She heard the unknown

men asking for directions to go to a place called Larang. They detained Fernandez and James, a

minor, for eleven days, for the purpose of extorting ransom. Fernandez and James were only

released after Augusto gave them the ransom money.




Page 13 of 299

Augusto never saw accused-appellant Niegas since the kidnapping incident. Fernandez told

Augusto that accused-appellant Niegas was one of the kidnappers who took them somewhere in

Laguna, and that when she asked accused-appellant Niegas to help them escape, he punched her

stomach. Augusto filed a criminal complaint against accused-appellant Niegas in Mandaluyong City.

He thereafter learned that accused-appellant Niegas was arrested one year later and was told that

the person who organized the crime was the father of accused-appellant Niegas’s girlfriend.The RTC of Mandaluyong City rendered its Decision finding accused-appellant Niegas guilty

of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in toto.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of kidnapping

despite the absence of direct evidence to establish his criminal culpability?

Ruling:

The testimonies of Fernandez and Augusto, which were believed by both the trial court and

the Court of Appeals, clearly attribute all the elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention toaccused-appellant Niegas and his companions, collectively. Specifically, Fernandez’s and Augusto’s

testimonies proved that the offenders detained Fernandez, a female, and James, a minor, for more

than three days, for the purpose of extorting ransom. The mere circumstance that accused-

appellant Niegas did not personally perform all the acts necessary to consummate the crime is

irrelevant when conspiracy is proven, since in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the

commission of a felony and decide to commit it. While it is mandatory to prove it by competent

evidence, direct proof is not essential to show conspiracy — it may be deduced from the mode,

method, and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused

themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of

interest. On this point, accused-appellant Niegas argues that mere driving and allowing other mento board their vehicle are not sufficient to establish conspiracy. The records, however, reveal

otherwise. Accused-appellant Niegas’ acts unequivocally show that he was complicit in the jointpurpose and design of the kidnapping of Fernandez and James:

1. Instead of driving Fernandez and James home, accused-appellant Niegas kept on driving

and only stopped to allow an unknown man to board the vehicle. He later let several other men to

board;

2. When they reached their destination, it was accused-appellant Niegas himself who took

Fernandez and James into the concrete house. Accused-appellant Niegas told them that she should

follow their instructions if she wants to go home alive;

3. When Fernandez attempted to escape, it was accused-appellant Niegas who caught her

and pushed her towards the room;

4. When Fernandez tried to shout upon seeing an old person, accused-appellant Niegastold her he will kill her if she does that.

Moreover, after the incident, accused-appellant Niegas did not report what happened to the

authorities or even try to contact Augusto to explain his alleged non-participation in the incident.

Instead, he went home to his province and it took the authorities one year to apprehend him.

Accused-appellant Niegas’ excuse that he lost his wallet and therefore cannot contact Augusto is

absurd, as it is inconceivable for someone’s personal driver for at least half a year to simply forget




Page 14 of 299

the address of his employer or to fail to communicate with the latter in some way and seek

permission to return to the province if he is indeed innocent. We have held on several occasions

that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt; and flight, when

unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. Indeed, the wicked

flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as lion.

In view of the foregoing, we find no reason to reverse the Decisions of the trial court and the

Court of Appeals finding accused-appellant Niegas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of

kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The trial court likewise correctly imposed the penalty of

reclusion perpetua. While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom under

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is death, Republic Act No. 9346 has proscribed the imposition

of death penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua.

JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

SEVERINO DAVID, JR. Y ECHANE and TIMOTEO GIANAN vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 136037, August 13, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro

It is well settled that unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent

danger —not merely threatening and intimidating action. Thus, unless the victim has committed

unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no selfdefense on the part of the latter .

Facts:

Between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. on 01 March 1992 while Datalio was walking alone in an

alley in Valenzuela, he met David and Gianan both of whom were not his acquaintances. David

stabbed him while Gianan tried to hit him with an adobe stone, but Datalio kicked him. Wounded,

Datalio ran out of the alley and called for his sister to bring him to the hospital. At the house where

suspect Severino was, the policemen were allowed to enter by the owner. Then, Severino came out

and surrendered a fan knife.

In an Information dated March 2, 1992, Severino David, Jr. and Timoteo Gianan were

accused of frustrated homicide. The RTC found petitioner David and Gianan guilty of the crime

charged. David and Gianan appealed their conviction to the CA which affirmed in toto the decision

of the trial court.

In pleading selfdefense, David asserted that it was the victim Datalio who knocked on the

door of his house and challenged him to a fight. Allegedly, the former had no choice but to defend

himself when Datalio attempted to stab him with a bladed weapon. Gianan did not join David in the

present petition.

Issue:

Can David be acquitted because of selfdefense?

Ruling:

No.




Page 15 of 299

The accused who maintains that the killing arose from an impulse of self defense has the

onus probandi of proving the elements thereof. The essential requisites being: (1) unlawful

aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or

repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to

selfdefense. To invoke self defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked

attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict the injury or woundupon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.

First, as narrated by petitioner David, the victim was drunk and walking in a zigzag manner

before reaching the door of his house. Clearly, if this was true, Datalio would not have been

physically strong enough to pose a danger to petitioner David who was then sober and already

sleeping inside his house. Second, after allegedly being challenged to a fight by a drunk outside his

house, we find it unbelievable that petitioner David would come out and confront this intoxicated

person if this person was in a position to harm him. It certainly goes against human nature to go

out, court danger and meet headon the alleged unlawful aggression when one is already in the

safety and confines of his own house. Third, both testimonies of petitioner David and defense

witness Ecalnir that it was the victim Datalio who was holding the fan knife when he fell down after

the scuffle are contrary to the testimony of SPO3 Montallana, that after being accosted in his sister’shouse, petitioner David came out and surren dered the fan knife allegedly used in the stabbing

incident. Fourth, petitioner David himself testified that the victim Datalio had no motive nor reason

to challenge him to a fight as they did not have any misunderstanding or disagreement. These

circumstances undeniably negate the existence of the unlawful aggression.

Verily, his act of fleeing from the scene of the crime instead of reporting the incident to the

police authorities is contrary to his proclaimed innocence. Selfdefense is not credible in the face of

petitioner David’s flight from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities about the

incident.

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. RAMON REGALARIO, MARCIANO REGALARIO,

SOTERO REGALARIO, BIENVENIDO REGALARIO and NOEL REGALARIOG.R. No. 174483, March 31, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro

When self-defense is invoked by an accused, the three (3) elements of self-defense, namely: (a)

unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to

prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person

defending himself, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

In conspiracy, it does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is the act of

all, and each incurs the same criminal liability.

Facts:

Accused-appellants, all surnamed Regalario, are barangay officials of Natasan, Libon, Albay

and related to one another by consanguinity. Marciano, barangay chairman, Sotero, barangay

kagawad and Ramon, barangay tanod, are brothers while Bienvenido Regalario, also barangay

tanod, is their cousin and Noel is the son of Marciano.

On the night of February 22, 1997, a dance and singing contest was being held in the

barangay pavilion of Natasan, Libon, Albay. Rolando Sevilla and Armando Poblete were enjoying the




Page 16 of 299

festivities when appellant Sotero Regalario approached them. To avoid trouble, the two distanced

themselves from Sotero. Nevertheless, a commotion ensued. Appellants Sotero and Bienvenido

Regalario were seen striking Rolando Sevilla several times with their respective nightsticks, locally

known as bahi. The blows caused Sevilla to fall down in a sitting position but after a short while he

was able to get up. He ran away in the direction of the house of appellant Mariano Regalario, the

barangay captain. Bienvenido and Sotero Regalario chased Sevilla. When Sevilla was already nearMarciano’s house, he was waylaid by appellant Ramon Regalario and at this point, MarcianoRegalario and his son Noel Regalario came out of their house. Noel was carrying a seven-inch knife.

Armed with their nightsticks, appellants took turns in hitting the victim until he slumped to the

ground face down. In that position, Sevilla was boxed by Marciano in the jaw. After a while, when

Sevilla was no longer moving, Marciano ordered the others to kill the victim and to tie him up.

Bienvenido, with the help of Sotero, tied the neck, hands and feet of the victim with a nylon rope

used by farmers for tying carabao. The rest of the group just stood by watching.

In the early morning, Cynthia Sevilla, the victim’s widow, tried to report the incident at the

police station but her statements were not entered in the police blotter because appellant Marciano

Regalario had earlier reported to them a different version of the incident. Marciano alleged that it

was the victim Sevilla who shot his brother Ramon and that Sevilla, allegedly still alive, was placedunder the custody of the barangay tanods. The policemen proceeded to the crime scene and took

the victim’s cadaver to the police station where pictures were taken showing the victim’s hands andlegs tied behind him. The cause of death was sever blood loss secondary to stab wound and

multiple lacerated wound, probably secondary to intracranial hemorrhage.

The trial court ruled out accused-appellant Ramon Regalario’s claim of self defense, andheld that there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants in the commission of the crime.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the victim was killed in self-defense;

2. Whether or not there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants in the commission of thecrime;

Ruling:

1. No. When self-defense is invoked by an accused charged with murder or homicide he necessarily

owns up to the killing but may escape criminal liability by proving that it was justified and that he

incurred no criminal liability therefor. Hence, the three (3) elements of self-defense, namely: (a)

unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to

prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person

defending himself, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. However, without unlawful

aggression, there can be no self-defense, either complete or incomplete.

Accused-appellant Ramon contends that the victim Rolando Sevilla committed an act of

unlawful aggression with no provocation on his Ramon’s part. Ramon testified that he was trying to

investigate a commotion when, without warning, Rolando emerged from the group, thrust and fired

his gun at him, hitting him in the left shoulder. To disable Rolando from firing more shots, Ramon

struck the victim’s head at the back with his nightstick, causing the victim to reel backward and leanon the bamboo fence. He continued hitting Rolando to prevent the latter from regaining his balance

and, as he pressed on farther, the victim retreated backward.




Page 17 of 299

By Ramon’s own account, after he was shot, he hit the victim at the back of the latter’s head

and he continued hitting the victim who retreated backward. From that moment, the inceptive

unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased to exist and the continuation of the offensive

stance of Ramon put him in the place of an aggressor. There was clearly no longer any danger, but

still Ramon went beyond the call of self-preservation. In People v. Cajurao, we held:

The settled rule in jurisprudence is that when unlawful aggression ceases, thedefender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the formeraggressor. Retaliation is not a justifying circumstance. Upon the cessation of the

unlawful aggression and the danger or risk to life and limb, the necessity for the

person invoking self-defense to attack his adversary ceases. If he persists in

attacking his adversary, he can no longer invoke the justifying circumstance of self-

defense. Self-defense does not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressorwho is retreating from the fray.

Ramons claim of self-defense is further belied by the presence of two (2) stab wounds on

the neck, four (4) lacerated wounds on the head, as well as multiple abrasions and contusions ondifferent parts of the victims body, as shown in the Medico-Legal Report. Dr. Mario Cerillo who

conducted the post-mortem examination on the victim revealed that the victim’s lacerated wounds

could have been caused by a blunt instrument like a hard stick, a stone or an iron bar; his stab

wounds by a sharp-edged instrument or knife; his contusions and hematoma by a fist blow or

through contact with a blunt instrument. Indeed, even if it were true that the victim fired a gun at

Ramon, the number, nature and severity of the injuries suffered by the victim indicated that the

force used against him by Ramon and his co-accused was not only to disarm the victim or prevent

him from doing harm to others.

2. Yes. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the

commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for

criminals do not write down their lawless plans and plots. The agreement to commit a crime,however, may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred

from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of intent. It

does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is the act of all, and each incurs

the same criminal liability.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EFREN LAURIO Y ROSALESG.R No. 182523, September 13, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof. He must prove all the elements of

self-defense. However, the most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression on the part of the

victim.

Moreover, factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses’credibility are entitled to great weight and respect particularly when the Court of Appeals affirms the

said findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain

facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the case. It is the trial judge

who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and deportment on the stand, and the

manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore is in a better position to

determine the veracity of the witnesses’ testimony.




Page 18 of 299

Facts:

A kabataang barangay kagawad and daughter of the owner of the vulcanizing shop where

Efren Laurio (Laurio) worked narrated that at around 9:30 p.m. she went to the sari-sari store to

buy cigarettes for her father. Upon her arrival at the store, she saw the victim, a balut vendor,

drinking a bottle of Red Horse and inquiring from the saleslady about the price of the deposit forthe bottle. As she was about to leave, the victim threw a bottle in the direction where Laurio and his

co-accused Gullab were engaged in a drinking spree. Gullab confronted the victim. Gullad punched

the victim, causing him to fall to the ground. It was while the victim was down that appellant

stabbed him on the chest several times. Pangan related that she saw appellant wrapping a knife

with a white hand towel bearing the inscription “Good Morning.” She then told her father about theincident and called the police. The bloodstained towel was recovered by the second floor occupants

of the vulcanizing shop from the rest room at the first floor and was later surrendered to the police

officers. The testimony of the witness was affirmed by Dr. Emmanuel Aranas, medico-legal officer of

the Western Police District who was also presented as a witness by the prosecution.

After weighing the evidence presented by both parties, the RTC rendered decision finding

appellant guilty of the crime of murder which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals but modifiedthe award of damages. Appellant filed his notice of appeal and averred that the court failed to note

his plea of self-defense as the victim was the one who drew a weapon first. Even assuming that self-

defense was not availing, appellant claims that he could only be liable for the crime of homicide

since the attack was sudden, thus negating the presence of treachery.

Issue:

Whether or not Laurio shall be held guilty of the crime charged despite his claim of self-

defense.

Ruling:

Yes, Laurio is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.

The Court has often stated that factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of

the witnesses’ credibility are entitled to great weight and respect particularly when the Court ofAppeals affirms the said findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court

overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the

case.It is the trial judge who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’ demeanor and

deportment on the stand, and the manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge

therefore is in a better position to determine the veracity of the witnesses’ testimony.

In the present case, appellant has failed to produce any scintilla of evidence to warrant a

reexamination of the facts and circumstances as found by the RTC and affirmed by the Court ofAppeals. In any event, well-settled is the rule that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if credible

and positive, is sufficient to support a conviction, even in a charge of murder.

Anent his claim of self-defense, appellant had to prove the following essential elements: (1)

unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to

prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person

resorting to self-defense. A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof. He must prove




Page 19 of 299

all the elements of self-defense. However, the most important of all the elements is unlawful

aggression on the part of the victim. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-

defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. Unlawful aggression is an

actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person. In case of

threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. It

“presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger - not merely threatening andintimidating action.” It is present “only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat toone's life.”

In the present case, the element of unlawful aggression is absent. Mere allegation by

appellant that the victim pulled out a knife is insufficient to prove unlawful aggression and warrant

the justification of the victim’s killing. In fact, the testimony of eyewitness Pangan shows that the

victim, who had fallen on the ground when he was repeatedly stabbed by appellant, was not

capable of unlawful aggression.

Contrary to his claim of self-defense, appellant’s act of stabbing the victim while he was

down demonstrates treachery. We previously ruled that treachery is present when the offender

commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution,which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from

the defense which the offended party might make.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. M. MALICDEMG.R. No. 184601, November 12, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the

Revised Penal Code, are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and

convincing evidence. Such affirmative defenses involve questions of facts adduced to the trial and

appellate courts for resolution. By admitting killing the victim in self-defense or by accident without

fault or without intention of causing it, the burden is shifted to the accused to prove such affirmative

defenses. He should rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. If the accused fails to prove his affirmative defense, he can no longer be acquitted .

Facts:

At around 9:00 p.m., while the witnesses and victims were seated on the septic tank,

Malicdem Marcial Malicdem (Malicdem) arrived asking if they knew the whereabouts of his godson,

Rogelio Molina (Rogelio). They answered in the negative. They noticed that Malicdem was reeking

of alcohol and was drunk. Malicdem asked again for the whereabouts of Rogelio. As they stood to

leave, Malicdem suddenly embraced Wilson and lunged a six-inch knife to the left part of his chest.

When he moved to strike again, Wilson was able to deflect this blow which resulted to a cut on his

right arm. Intending to help his friend, Bernardo was hit by the knife in his stomach. In the course of

aiding Wilson, Joel boxed the appellant. During the brawl, Francisco Molina, Rogelio’s father,arrived at the scene, but was stabbed in the stomach by appellant. Appellant then ran away.

Afterwards, Joel brought Wilson aboard a police patrol car to the Region I Medical Center in

Dagupan City where Wilson was declared dead on arrival.

The RTC, after observing inconsistencies in the testimonies of the appellant and his wife,

found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The Court of Appeals

affirmed with modification the decision of the RTC as to damages.




Page 20 of 299

Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not Malicdem shall be held guilty of the crime of murder.

Ruling:

Yes, Malicdem is guilty.

Time and again, this Court has stated that, in the absence of any clear showing that the trial

court overlooked or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which would alter a conviction, it

generally defers to the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses especially if such

findings are affirmed by the Court of Appeals. This must be so since the trial courts are in a better

position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses themselves and having

observed firsthand their deportment and manner of testifying under grueling examination.

Given the factual circumstances of the present case, we see no need to depart from the

foregoing rules. Appellant failed to present proof of any showing that the trial court overlooked,misconstrued or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have

affected the result of the case. Prosecution witnesses positively identified appellant to have stabbed

the victim.

We agree that the death of Wilson at the hands of appellant was not occasioned by self-

defense. For this Court to consider self-defense as a justifying circumstance, appellant has to prove

the following essential elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable

necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient

provocation on the part of the person resorting to selfdefense. The Court has repeatedly stated that

a person who invokes selfdefense has the burden to prove all the aforesaid elements. The Court also

considers unlawful aggression on the part of the victim as the most important of these elements.

Thus, unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded,whether complete or incomplete.

Based on the summary of facts by the RTC as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the defense

failed to discharge its burden to prove unlawful aggression on the part of Wilson by sufficient and

satisfactory proof. The records were bereft of any indication that the attack by Wilson was not a

mere threat or just imaginary. Bernardo, Joel and Wilson were just in the act of leaving when

appellant suddenly plunged a knife to Wilson’s chest.

Anent the finding of treachery by the RTC, we agree that appellant’s act of suddenly

stabbing Wilson as he was about to leave constituted the qualifying circumstance of treachery. As

we previously ruled, treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against

persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to

insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended partymight make. Here, appellant caught Wilson by surprise when he suddenly embraced him and

proceeded immediately to plunge a knife to his chest. The swift turn of events did not allow Wilson

to defend himself, in effect, assuring appellant that he complete the crime without risk to his own

person.

Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, paragraph 4 of

the Revised Penal Code, are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear




Page 21 of 299

and convincing evidence. Such affirmative defenses involve questions of facts adduced to the trial

and appellate courts for resolution. By admitting killing the victim in self-defense or by accident

without fault or without intention of causing it, the burden is shifted to the accused to prove such

affirmative defenses. He should rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of

that of the prosecution. If the accused fails to prove his affirmative defense, he can no longer be

acquitted.

Hence, we sustain the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals of the qualifying

circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO PUNZALAN, JRG.R. No. 199892, December 10, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to successfully invoke avoidance of

greater evil as a justifying circumstance, the following requisites should be complied with: (1) the evil

sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; and (3)

there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. Moreover, Punzalan failed to

satisfy the third requisite that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, infliction of damage or injury to another so

that a greater evil or inj ury may not befall one’s self may be justified only if it is taken as a last resort

and with the least possible prejudice to another. If there is another way to avoid the injury without

causing damage or injury to another or, if there is no such other way but the damage to another may

be minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to one’s self, then such course should be taken.

Facts:

In August 2002, Seaman 1st Class (SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1 Evelio

Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among the members

of the Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval Education and

Training Command (NETC) in , San Antonio, Zambales.

On August 10, 2002, at around 5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon, they went to the “AllinOne”

Canteen to have some drink. Later, at around 10:00 in the evening, they transferred to a nearby

videoke bar, “Aquarius,” where they continued their drinking session. Shortly thereafter, a heatedargument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant Arturo Punzalan, Jr (Punzalan) regarding a flickering

light bulb inside “Aquarius.” When SN1 Bacosa suggested that the light be turned off (“Patayin angilaw”), Punzalan who must have misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa’s statement

belligerently reacted asking, “Sinong papatayin?,” thinking that SN1 Bacosa’s statement was

directed at him.

To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave “Aquarius” and return to theNETC camp. They walked in two’s, namely, SN1 Bundang and SN1 Domingo in the first group,

followed by the group of SN1 Bacosa and SN1 Cuya, and SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna in the last

group, with each group at one arm’s length distance from the other. Along the way, they passed by

the NETC sentry gate. SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna even stopped by to give the sentries some

barbecue before proceeding to follow their companions.

Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and F1EN Dimaala

flagged down a rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van with plate number DRW 706. The




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sentries approached the van and recognized Punzalan, who was reeking of liquor, as the driver.

Punzalan angrily uttered, “kasi chief, gago ang mga ‘yan!,” while pointing toward the direction of the

navy personnel’s group. Even before he was given the go signal to proceed, Punzalan shifted gears

and sped away while uttering, “papatayin ko ang mga ‘yan!” While F1EN Dimaala was writing the

van’s plate number and details in the logbook, he suddenly heard a loud thud.

Punzalan, who was driving his van from behind, suddenly bumped and ran over the victims.

The victims were thrown away, resulting in the instantaneous death of SN1 Duclayna and SN1

Andal and causing injuries to the other victims.

Punzalan was later charged for double murder and multiple attempted murder. RTC

convicted Punzalan as indicted. CA affirmed. Hence this appeal.

Punzalan claimed that the trial court erred in not finding that he may not be held criminally

liable as he merely acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury, a justifying circumstance under

paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code. His act of increasing his vehicle’s speed wasreasonable and justified as he was being attacked by two men whose four companions were also

approaching. He asserted that the attack against him by the two navy personnel constituted actualand imminent danger to his life and limb. The sight of the four approaching companions of his

attackers created in his mind a fear of greater evil, prompting him to speed up his vehicle to avoid a

greater evil or injury to himself. According to Punzalan, if he accidentally hit the approaching navy

men in the process, he could not be held criminally liable therefor. The instinct of self-preservation

would make one feel that his own safety is of greater importance than that of another.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Punzalan acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury, a justifying

circumstance under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code

Ruling:

No. Punzalan did not act in avoidance of greater evil or injury, a justifying circumstance

under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.

After a thorough review of the records of this case and the arguments of the parties, this

Court affirms appellant’s conviction.

Punzalan’s version of the crime, upon which the justifying circumstance of avoidance of

greater evil or injury is invoked, is baseless. This is because his assertions anent the existence of the

evil which he sought to be avoided did not actually exist as they neither conformed to the evidence

at hand nor were they consistent with the testimony of his own witness, Alicia Eusantos.

Punzalan’s own witness, Alicia Eusantos, not only failed to corroborate his claim but also

belied his claim that he was attacked by the Philippine Navy personnel. Alicia Eusantos

categorically stated that she did not witness any unusual incident in the evening of August 10, 2002

while on board the Nissan Urvan Van driven by Punzalan while they were cruising the access road

going to the NETC compound. Punzalan claim, therefore, is more imaginary than real. The justifying

circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or injury cannot be invoked by the Punzalan as the alleged

evil sought to be avoided does not actually exist




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Moreover, whether or not Punzalan acted in avoidance of greater evil or injury is a question

of fact. It is an issue which concerns doubt or difference arising as to the truth or the falsehood of

alleged facts. This Court has combed through the records of this case and found no reason to

deviate from the findings of the trial and appellate courts. There is nothing that would indicate that

the RTC and the Court of Appeals “ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogentfacts and circumstances of substance, which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the case.”

Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, to successfully invoke avoidance of

greater evil as a justifying circumstance, the following requisites should be complied with: (1) the

evil sought to be avoided actually exists; (2) the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it;and (3) there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals rejected Punzalan’s s self -serving and uncorroborated

claim of avoidance of greater evil. The trial and appellate courts noted that even Punzalan’s own

witness who was in the van with appellant at the time of the incident contradicted appellant’s claim.Thus, the RTC and the Court of Appeals concluded that the evil Punzalan claimed to avoid did not

actually exist. This Court agrees.

Moreover, Punzalan failed to satisfy the third requisite that there be no other practical and

less harmful means of preventing it. Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,

infliction of damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or injury may not befall one’s self maybe justified only if it is taken as a last resort and with the least possible prejudice to another. If there

is another way to avoid the injury without causing damage or injury to another or, if there is no

such other way but the damage to another may be minimized while avoiding an evil or injury to

one’s self, then such course should be taken.

In this case, the road where the incident happened was wide, some 6 to 7 meters in width,

and the place was well-lighted. Both sides of the road were unobstructed by trees, plants or

structures. Punzalan was a driver by occupation. However, Punzalan himself testified that when heshifted to the second gear and immediately stepped on the accelerator upon seeing the four navy

personnel approaching from in front of him, he did not make any attempt to avoid hitting the

approaching navy personnel even though he had enough space to do so. He simply sped away

straight ahead, meeting the approaching navy personnel head on, totally unmindful if he might run

them over. He therefore miserably failed to resort to other practical and less harmful available

means of preventing the evil or injury he claimed to be avoiding.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GARY VERGARA y ORIEL and JOSEPH INOCENCIO y PAULINOG.R. No. 177763, July 3, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

A person who invokes self-defense has the burden of proof. He must prove all the elements of

self-defense. However, the most important of all the elements is unlawful aggression on the part of thevictim. Unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded,

whether complete or incomplete.

Facts:

At around midnight of February 10, 2001, Gary Vergara (Vergara) and Joseph Inocencio

(Inocencio) were causing a ruckus on Libertad Colayco Streets, Pasay City by throwing water




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bottles at passersby. At around 2:00 a.m., the victim, Miguelito Alfante (Alfante), who was

seemingly drunk, walked down the street. Vergara approached Alfante and told him: “Pare,

mukhang high na high ka.”Alfante retorted: “Anong pakialam mo?” At this juncture, Vergara threwhis arm around Alfante’s shoulder, received a knife from Inocencio, and suddenly stabbed Alfante.

Vergara then said “Taga rito ako.”

Thereafter, Vergara and Inocencio ran from the scene but were pursued by several

witnesses. Alfante, meanwhile, was brought to the Pasay City General Hospital where he died.

In his defense, Vergara denied the version of the prosecution. He testified that on February

10, 2001, at around midnight, he and Inocencio went to a convenience store to buy salted eggs for

“baon” the following day. When they passed by Libertad corner Colayco Streets in Pasay City to go

to the 711 convenience store, they saw Alfante together with nine other persons. Contrary to the

testimony of prosecution witnesses, it was Alfante who approached Vergara, knife in hand and

proceeded to stab him. He was able to evade the attack and grappled with Alfante for possession of

the knife and, in the course of their struggle, Alfante sustained his injuries. Inocencio stood by his

side for the duration of the incident. Thereafter, he fled the scene. He went to the nearest police

station and was subsequently brought to the Ospital ng Maynila for treatment for the injury on hisright palm sustained during the tussle.

After evaluating the respective evidence of the contending parties, on December 29, 2001,

the RTC found Vergara and Inocencio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as

defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as principal and accomplice, respectively.

On March 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification as to the award of

damages the Decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not Vergara and Inocencio are entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense under Article 11, Chapter 2 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.

Ruling:

No. They are not entitled.

Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat to inflict real imminent

injury, upon a person. In case of threat, it must be offensive and strong, positively showing the

wrongful intent to cause injury. It “presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger —

not merely threatening and intimidating action.” It is present “only when the one attacked faces

real and immediate threat to one’s life.”

In the present case, the element of unlawful aggression is absent. By the testimonies of all

the witnesses, the victim’s actuations did not constitute unlawful aggression to warrant the use of

force employed by Vergara. The records reveal that the victim had been walking home albeit drunk

when he passed by Vergara. However, there is no indication of any untoward action from him to

warrant the treatment that he had by Vergara’s hands.




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The victim was just walking, he [was] neither uttering invectives words nor provoking the

Vergara and Inocencio into a fight. Vergara was the unlawful aggressor. He was the one who put

the life of the victim in actual peril. This can be inferred from the wounds sustained by the victim.

It is thus clear that there being no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the act of

Vergara of taking a knife and stabbing the victim was not made in lawful self-defense.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMON REGALARIO, MARCIANO REGALARIO,SOTERO REGALARIO, BIENVENIDO REGALARIO and NOEL REGALARIO

G.R. No. 174483, March 31, 2009, J. De Castro

To take advantage of superior strength is to use force out of proportion to the means available

to the person attacked to defend himself.

Tying the victim hog-style after rendering him immobilized constituted outraging or scoffingat the corpse of the victim.

For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, it must be spontaneous, in such a manner that it

shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he

acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense of finding and

capturing him.

Facts:

Accused-appellants, all surnamed Regalario, are barangay officials of Natasan, Libon, Albay

and related to one another by consanguinity. Marciano, barangay chairman, Sotero, barangay

kagawad and Ramon, barangay tanod, are brothers while Bienvenido Regalario, also barangaytanod, is their cousin and Noel is the son of Marciano.

On the night of February 22, 1997, a dance and singing contest was being held in the

barangay pavilion of Natasan, Libon, Albay. Rolando Sevilla and Armando Poblete were enjoying the

festivities when appellant Sotero Regalario approached them. To avoid trouble, the two distanced

themselves from Sotero. Nevertheless, a commotion ensued. Appellants Sotero and Bienvenido

Regalario were seen striking Rolando Sevilla several times with their respective nightsticks, locally

known as bahi. The blows caused Sevilla to fall down in a sitting position but after a short while he

was able to get up. He ran away in the direction of the house of appellant Mariano Regalario, the

barangay captain. Bienvenido and Sotero Regalario chased Sevilla. When Sevilla was already near

Marciano’s house, he was waylaid by appellant Ramon Regalario and at this point, Marciano

Regalario and his son Noel Regalario came out of their house. Noel was carrying a seven-inch knife.Armed with their nightsticks, appellants took turns in hitting the victim until he slumped to the

ground face down. In that position, Sevilla was boxed by Marciano in the jaw. After a while, when

Sevilla was no longer moving, Marciano ordered the others to kill the victim and to tie him up.

Bienvenido, with the help of Sotero, tied the neck, hands and feet of the victim with a nylon rope

used by farmers for tying carabao. The rest of the group just stood by watching.




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In the early morning, Cynthia Sevilla, the victim’s widow, tried to report the incident at thepolice station but her statements were not entered in the police blotter because appellant Marciano

Regalario had earlier reported to them a different version of the incident. Marciano alleged that it

was the victim Sevilla who shot his brother Ramon and that Sevilla, allegedly still alive, was placed

under the custody of the barangay tanods. The policemen proceeded to the crime scene and took

the victim’s cadaver to the police station where pictures were taken showing the victim’s hands andlegs tied behind him. The cause of death was sever blood loss secondary to stab wound and

multiple lacerated wound, probably secondary to intracranial hemorrhage.

The trial court ruled out accused-appellant Ramon Regalario’s claim of self defense, and

held that there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants in the commission of the crime. It

further ruled that the killing was qualified to murder by abuse of superior strength and by their

scoffing at the body of the victim. It also appreciated the presence of the mitigating circumstance of

voluntary surrender. On appeal, the CA did not appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender in favor of the accused-appellants.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the crime was committed with a qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior

strength;

2. Whether or not the crime was committed with a generic aggravating circumstance of scoffing at

the body of the victim;

3. Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated

Ruling:

1. Yes. To take advantage of superior strength is to use force out of proportion to the means

available to the person attacked to defend himself. In order to be appreciated, it must be clearly

shown that there was deliberate intent on the part of the malefactors to take advantage thereof. In

this case, as testified to by the prosecution eyewitnesses, accused-appellants Ramon, Sotero andBienvenido, with the exception of Marciano, were armed with nightsticks (bahi) while Noel was

holding a knife. Clearly they took advantage of their superiority in number and arms in killing the

victim, as shown by numerous wounds the latter suffered in different parts of his body.

2. Yes. Accused-appellants did not just kill the victim. They tied him hog-style after rendering him

immobilized. This action constituted outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the victim. In this

connection, we agree with the trial courts observation:

Not satisfied with delivering mortal blows even when their hapless victim was

already immobile, Bienvenido and Sotero, upon order of their co-accused Marciano,

tied their victim hog style. The manner by which Rolando was tied as vividly

captured in the picture clearly speaks for itself that it was nothing but to scoff attheir victim.

3. No. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, it must be spontaneous, in such a manner that it

shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because he

acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense of finding and

capturing him. In the case at bar, accused-appellants remained at large even after Judge Jose S.

Saez issued the warrant for their arrest on February 6, 1998. Accused-appellants surrendered




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only on September 9, 1998 after several alias warrants of arrest were issued against them. Hence,

voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in their favor as mitigating circumstance.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH ASILAN Y TABORNALG.R. No. 188322, April 11, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

It is basic in our penal law that treachery is present when the offender employs means,

methods or forms which tend directly and especially to insure the execution of the crime, without risk

to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Facts:

Joseph Asilan was charged with the complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder.

The prosecution, based on the testimony of Joselito Binosa, narrated that in one evening,

Binosa while chatting with his friends heard a gunshot nearby. He then went to the place where the

sound came and from where he was standing, he saw a uniformed policeman, who was arrestingsomeone and order the latter to lay on the ground.

The police officer pushed the man to the wall and was about to handcuff the latter when

another man, Asilan, arrived, drew something from his back and stabbed the police officer on his

back several times until the latter fell to the ground. The man who was being arrested then took the

officer’s gun and shot the lat ter with it.

Binosa then threw stones at the malefactors who subsequently left the place. Then, Binosa

followed Asilan and his companion. Thereafter Asilan returned to the place of the incident. At that

moment, a policeman passed by and Binosa pointed Asilan to him. Asilan then was arrested and the

knife which was used in the stabbing was confiscated by the policeman.

In his defense, Asilan stated that while he was waiting for a jeepneet, 3 motorcycles stopped

in front of him, the passengers of which approached and frisked him. He was thereafter brought to

the police station and he was forced to admit the stabbing of a police officer.

The RTC acquitted Asilan for the crime of direct assault for the reason that the prosecution

failed to establish that the police officer was in the performance of his duty. On the other, the RTC

convicted him for the crime of murder. The Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming in toto

the RTC’s ruling. Hence this appeal.

One of the arguments of Asilan was that treachery cannot be appreciated in the presennt

case as the prosecution failed to establish that he had consciously or deliberately adopted the mode

of attack employed upon the police officer. He further argues that the mere suddenness of the attackis not enough to constitute treachery.

Issue:

Whether the RTC correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery in killing

the police officer




Page 28 of 299

Ruling:

Yes.

It is basic in our penal law that treachery is present when the offender employs means,

methods or forms which tend directly and especially to insure the execution of the crime, withoutrisk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest

provocation on the part of the person attacked. Treachery is present when the offender commits

any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof,

which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk arising from the defense

which the offended party might make.

The eyewitness testified on how Asilan attacked the police officer from behind. The police

officer could not have defended himself because Asilan stabbed him at his back repeatedly sans

provocation or warning. The deciding factor is that Asilan’s execution of his attack made it

impossible for the police officer to defend himself or retaliate.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL AQUINO y CENDANAG.R. No. 201092, January 15, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro

When the victim was stabbed by accused, the latter inside the trial, judicial notice can be taken

that when the tricycle driver is seated on the motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the level of

the roof of the side car which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers who are seated in the side car.

Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing of his body both

from the people seated in the side car and those seated behind him. Thus, treachery is present. There is

treachery when the means, methods, and forms of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity

to defend himself or to retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately

and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. What is decisive in anappreciation of treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend

himself.

Furthermore, in a case of special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be

proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design

of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on

the occasion thereof.

Facts:

On September 5, 2005, at around 8:30 in the evening, the victim Jesus Lita (Lita),

accompanied by his ten-year old son, Jefferson, went out aboard the former’s black Kawasakitricycle. Upon reaching San Jose del Monte Elementary School, appellant Joel Aquino (Aquino)

together with Noynoy Almoguera a.k.a. Negro, Rodnal, Bing, John Doe and Peter Doe boarded the

tricycle. Noynoy Almoguera instructed the victim to proceed to the nipa hut owned by Aquino.

Upon reaching the said nipa hut, Jesus Lita, Aquino and his companions had a shabu session while

Jefferson was watching TV. After using shabu, Noynoy Almoguera demanded from the victim to pay

Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00), but the victim said that he had no money. Bing suggested to her

companions that they leave the nipa hut, thus, the victim mounted his tricycle and started the




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engine. Noynoy Almoguera and John Doe rode in the tricycle behind the victim while Aquino and

Rodnal rode in the sidecar with Jefferson sitting at the toolbox of the tricycle. Inside the tricycle,

Aquino pointed a knife at Jefferson while Noynoy Almoguera stabbed the Lita’s side. After the Litawas stabbed, he was transferred inside the tricycle while Aquino drove the tricycle to his friend’s

house where they again stabbed Lita using the latter’s own knife. Then they loaded the victim to the

tricycle and drove to a grassy area where Aquino and his companions dumped the body of Lita.Thereafter, they returned to Aquino’s residence. Jefferson told the sister of Aquino about the death

of his father but the sister only told him to sleep.

The next day, Jefferson was brought to the jeepney terminal where he rode a jeepney to get

home. Jefferson told his mother, Ma. Theresa Calitisan-Lita, about the death of his father. Ma.

Theresa Calitisan-Lita and Jefferson were about to leave for the morgue when they met a police

outside their residence. The police informed Ma. Theresa that the body of the victim was found in

Barangay San Rafael IV. Jefferson told the police that he was with his father at the time of his death

and he brought the police officers to the place where his father was stabbed and to the hut owned

by Aquino. Thereat, the police officers recovered a maroon colored knife case and the sandals of

Lita. Aquino was invited to the police station for questioning but he refused alleging that he does

not know anything about the incident. The police officers were able to obtain a picture of Aquinowhich was shown to Jefferson and he positively identified the same as "Akong" one of those who

stabbed his father. Likewise, a video footage of Noynoy Almoguera alias "Negro" was shown to

Jefferson and he likewise identified the person in the video footage as the same "Negro" who also

stabbed his father. Aquino denied the accusations against him.

RTC found Aquino guilty for murder and carnapping; the CA affirmed the decision with

modifications on penalties.

Issues:

1) Whether the trial court erred in finding that treachery attended the killing.

2) Whether the CA committed an error on the imposition of penalty.

Ruling:

1) Treachery is present in the case at bar.

The qualifying circumstance of treachery did attend the killing of Jesus. The Court has

consistently held that treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against

persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to

insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party

might make. On this point, we quot e with approval the Court of Appeals’ discussion of this aspect of

the case, to wit:

The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an

unsuspecting victim, depriving him of any real chance to defend himself. Even when the

victim was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since

what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to

defend himself or to retaliate. Records disclose that Jesus was stabbed by the group on the

lateral part of his body while he was under the impression that they were simply leaving the

place where they had [a] shabu session. Judicial notice can be taken that when the tricycle




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driver is seated on the motorcycle, his head is usually higher or at the level of the roof of the

side car which leaves his torso exposed to the passengers who are seated in the side car.

Hence, there was no way for Jesus to even be forewarned of the intended stabbing of his

body both from the people seated in the side car and those seated behind him. Thus, the

trial court’s finding of treachery should be affirmed. There is treachery when the means,

methods, and forms of execution gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himselfor to retaliate; and such means, methods, and forms of execution were deliberately and

consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. What is decisive in an

appreciation of treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the

victim to defend himself.

2) No, the CA did not commit any error in the imposition of penalty.

Jurisprudence tells us that to prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide,

there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the

original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the

commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. The appellate court correctly observed

that the killing of Jesus cannot qualify the carnapping into a special complex crime because thecarnapping was merely an afterthought when the victim’s death was already fait accompli. Thus,

appellant is guilty only of simple carnapping.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELINO DADAO, ANTONIO SULINDAO,EDDIE MALOGSI (deceased) and ALFEMIO MALOGSI

G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The accused, charged for the felony of murder, questions the appreciation of the qualifying

circumstance of abuse of strength when the same was not in the Information. The Court ruled that

even if abuse of superior strength was properly alleged and proven in court, it cannot serve to qualify

or aggravate the felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of

abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.

Facts:

Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi (deceased) and Alfemio Malogsi was

charged for the felony of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code when the accused

conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another, with intent to kill, by means of

treachery, armed with guns and bolos, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack,

assault and shot Pionio Yacapin, hitting his back and left leg, inflicting wounds that caused his death

thereafter. Prosecution presented as witness Ronie Dacion, a 14-year old stepson of the Yacapin,

testified that on July 11, 1993 at about 7:30 in the evening he saw accused Marcelino Dadao,

Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi and Alfemio Malogsi helping each other and with the use of

firearms and bolos, shot to death the victim, Pionio Yacapin in their house at Barangay Salucot,Talakag, Bukidnon. The testimony of the second witness for the prosecution, Edgar Dacion, a 12-

year old stepson of the victim, corroborates the testimony of his older brother Ronie Dacion. The

RTC ruled that the accused are guilty beyond reasonable doubt; CA affirmed the decision of the RTC,

thus, the instant petition.

Issue:




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Whether the RTC erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior

strength when the same was not alleged in the information.

Ruling:

The petition is without merit.

Contrary to appellants’ claim that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiorstrength was used by the trial court to qualify the act of killing committed by appellants to murder

despite it not having been alleged in the criminal information filed against them, the text of the

assailed January 31, 2005 Decision of the trial court clearly shows that, even though abuse of

superior strength was discussed as present in the commission of the crime, it was not appreciated

as either a qualifying or generic aggravating circumstance.

As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the lower court appreciated treachery, which

was alleged in the information, as an aggravating circumstance which qualified the offense to

murder. This is proper considering that, even if abuse of superior strength was properly alleged and

proven in court, it cannot serve to qualify or aggravate the felony at issue since it isjurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength concurs with

treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter.

Time and again, SC has declared that treachery is present when the offender commits any of

the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend

directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense

which the offended party might make. Furthermore, SC has also held that the essence of treachery

is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner,

affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In the case at

bar, the manner by which Pionio Yacapin was killed carried all the indubitable hallmarks of

treachery. We quote with approval the following discussion of the Court of Appeals on this matter,to wit:

Treachery, which was alleged in the information, was duly proven by the prosecution. The

Court notes, in particular, the testimony of Nenita Yacapin who declared that when the victim was

making a fire in the kitchen, she heard shots and she saw the barrel of the gun inserted on the

bamboo split walling of their house. Exhibit "B", the anatomical chart certified by the Philippine

National Police (PNP) personnel, shows the relative location of the gunshot wounds sustained by

the victim. The chart indicates that the victim was shot from behind. Clearly, the execution of the

attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.

TREACHERY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANTE JADAP

G.R. No. 177983, March 30, 2010 , J. Leonardo-De Castro

The essence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery is the suddenness, surprise and the

lack of expectation that the attack will take place, thus, depriving the victim of any real opportunity

for self-defense while ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.

Facts:




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In the evening of February 20, 2001, Robert Alisbo (Alisbo), the victim, together with his

friends were in a drinking spree at Raagas Beach Resort. The group were in a spot lighted by a

fluorescent light approximately 2.5 meters away from them. Around 9:30 p.m., Dante Jadap (Jadap)

suddenly appeared from nowhere behind Robert Alisbo and Rollie Arciso. Without provocation

from the latter’s group, Jadap took out a .38 caliber revolver and shot Alisbo, hitting him on theright side of his body which caused his death. Then, he pointed the gun at the friends of Alisbo and

fired it twice, causing them to immediately scamper away. However, Rollie Arciso, Lenderico

Sabanal, and Ferlin Alberca stayed, taking cover under the cottage’s table. He hit Ferlin Alberca andLenderico Sabanal who was injured on his left leg. Thereafter, accused-appellant casually walked

away towards Bayabas, a nearby barangay. On July 3, 2001, an Information was filed against Jadap

charging him with the crime of murder. Eventually, the trial court rendered a decision finding him

guilty of murder qualified by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed

firearm. The appellate court affirmed the said decision with modification only as to the penalty

imposed. As he was ordered to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH by lethal injection, the entire

record of the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: 1) Alisbo's friends who wereeyewitnesses to the said crime; and 2) Dr. Ryan R. Mortiz who operated on the victim. The latter

testified that the wound was considered fatal because the bullet entered the chest area through the

right side of the body, about 6" below the nipple with no exit wound, the slug was found on and

damaged the spinal cord, including the right lung and chest cavity. They also presented proof that

Jadap was not a licensed firearm holder.

Accused Jadap, a former police officer who was discharged from the service due to absence

without leave, contended that he stayed at Bayabas, Cagayan de Oro which is about a kilometer

away from Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro, with his children as he was separated de facto from his wife.

He only goes to the latter place whenever his wife calls him to fetch their children. On the night

when the crime was committed, he argued that he was at home attending to his two children and

that he never knew that he was charged of murder until the time his wife turned him over to thepolice due to a misunderstanding.

Issue:

Whether or not Jadap was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified

by treachery with the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm.

Ruling:

The guilt beyond reasonable doubt of Jadap was established by the following:

1) It has been settled that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the

highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal considering that the trial court was in a betterposition to decide thereon, having personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment

and manner of testifying during the trial. Its findings on the credibility of witnesses and the facts

must be given great weight on appeal, unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked

which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. Here, there is no reason to deviate from the

trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ testimonies which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.




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2) The defense of Jadap of denial and alibi cannot stand taller than the positive identification of the

eyewitnesses presented. Their testimonies were straightforward, clear and consistent and they

could not be mistaken in pinpointing Jadap as the person who gunned down Alisbo, because the

place where the incident happened was illuminated by a fluorescent light. Also, Jadap did not even

rebut their testimonies that they knew him. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be

established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof that it was physically impossible for theaccused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, and not merely that the

accused was somewhere else. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where

the accused was when the crime happened and the place where it was committed, as well as the

facility of the access between the two places. In the case at bar, Jadap failed to prove the element of

physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it took place. He himself

admitted that it would only take him about ten minutes to walk from his house in Bayabas to his

wife’s house at Raagas Beach, Bonbon, Cagayan de Oro City, where the crime was committed.

3) The truthfulness of the testimonies of the witnesses presented was also bolstered by the physical

evidence supported by the testimony of the doctor who operated on the victim.

4) Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides thattreachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,

methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the

offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make. This definition sets out what

must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of such

means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or

retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. To reiterate,

the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation that

the attack will take place, thus, depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while

ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor.

In the case at bar, evidently, the attack was unexpected and swift. The victim and his friends

were drinking on the beach when Jadap suddenly appeared from behind, walked towards theirright side, and without any warning pulled out a gun and fired at the victim. This shot was followed

by more shots directed at the victim’s friends. The victim had no opportunity to defend himself andJadap was not exposed to any danger in view of the unexpected attack. Also, he deliberately and

consciously adopted his mode of attack by using a .38 caliber revolver and made sure that the

victim, who was unarmed, would have no chance to defend himself.

5) Records also show that Jadap was not a licensed firearm holder. Pursuant to Section 1 of

Republic Act No. 8294, when an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of the crime, it should

be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Hence, taking into account all the foregoing considerations, the penalty imposed should be

the maximum penalty, which is death. However, in view of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346,entitled " An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," on June 24, 2006, the

penalty imposed must be reduced from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SAMSON ESCLETOG.R. No. 183706, April 25, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing




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means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,

without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Facts:

Samson Escleto was charged with the crime of murder of Alfredo Marchan.

During the trial, the prosecution presented Benjamin Austria, who was personally present

during the stabbing. According to the prosecution, Alfredo and Merly Marchan was on their way

home from a birthday party when they passed by Benjamin’s house. Benjamin and Samson were

drinking wine at the balcony of the said house. Samson called Alfredo. Subsequently, Samson went

down from the balcony as Alfredo dismounted from the caraboa and approached Samson. However,

once Samson and Alfredo were facing another, Samson suddenly stabbed Alfredo in the chest,

causing Alfredo’s death. Samson fled right after the stabbing.

The defense presented a totally different version. Samson testified that while Samson and

Alfredo grappled with each other, Benjamin approached them. Benjamin tried to stab Samson but

accidentally hit Alfredo in the chest instead. Hence, Samson ran away.

The RTC promulgated a decision finding Samson Escleto to be guilty beyond reasonable

doubt. The RTC further found that Samson employed treachery in killing Alfredo, therefore

qualifying the crime committed to murder.

Issue:

Whether treachery attended Samson’s stabbing to death of Alfredo, hence qualifying the

crime of murder

Ruling:

Yes.

The stabbing of Alfredo by Samson was qualified by treachery. There is treachery when the

offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the

execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender

arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

We have also held that: in order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements

must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and

(2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of

attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an

aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself andthereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself.

While it is true that in this case the attack on Alfredo was frontal, the same was so sudden

and unexpected. Alfredo was completely unaware of the imminent peril to his life. Alfredo was

walking to meet Samson, expecting that they would only talk. Alfredo was unarmed while Samson

had a knife. Alfredo was deprived of the opportunity to defend himself and repel Samsons attack.




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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIL RARUGAL alias "AMAY BISAYA,"


Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing

means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,

without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

Facts:

While victim Arnel Florendo (Florendo) was cycling along Novaliches, Quezon City,

appellant, Ramil Rarugal, with the use of a long double-bladed weapon, stabbed Florendo; thus,

forcibly depriving him of his bicycle. Immediately thereafter, Ramil hurriedly fled the scene. This

incident was witnessed by Roberto Sit-Jar, who positively identified appellant in court. Florendo

arrived home bleeding. He was quickly attended to by his siblings, including his brother Renato.

When Renato recounted the events of that night to the court, he testified that Florendo told him and

his other relatives that it was appellant who had stabbed him. They then took Florendo to

Tordesillas Hospital but had to transfer him to Quezon City General Hospital, due to the

unavailability of blood. It was there that Florendo.

In his defense, Ramil Rarugal denied that he stabbed Florendo since he was at that time

working as a farm administrator for the town mayor in Pangasinan. He said he was living with his

cousin in Pangasinan, where he had been staying since 1997. He stated that during the period 1997

to 1998, he did not visit Manila at any point.

RTC found Rarugal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision

of the RTC. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime?

Ruling:

Yes. Qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the commission of the crime.

Anent the finding of treachery by the RTC, we agree that Rarugal’s act of suddenly stabbing

Florendo while he was innocently cycling along Novaliches, Quezon City constituted the qualifying

circumstance of treachery. As we previously ruled, treachery is present when the offender commits

any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which

tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the

defense which the offended party might make. Here, Rarugal surprised Florendo when he suddenlyand swiftly attacked and stabbed him in the chest. The swift turn of events left Florendo defenseless

to protect himself, allowing Rarugal to commit the crime without risk to his own person.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIL MORESG.R. No. 189846, June 26, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The manner by which appellant deliberately rolled the grenade on the ground towards the

dance floor packed with the unsuspecting revelers, leaving one dead and scores wounded in the




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aftermath of the sudden blast was accompanied with treachery. There is treachery when the offender

commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution

thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from

the defense which the offended party might make.

Facts:

The accused appellant was charged with the complex crime of Murder with Multiple

Attempted Murder. He pleaded not guilty to the charged. Upon trial, the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses were summarized in this manner: In the evening of January 24, 1994, while

of the Roxas Gymnasium, and while a dance was being held, the accused-appellant was seen to

pulled out a round object from his left pocket, transferred it to his right hand and then threw it on

the dance floor full of revelers as if rolling a ball. Thereafter an explosion occurred causing the

death of Ramie Balasa and multiple injuries to other victims. When apprehended, the accused

interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He claimed that in the evening of January 24, 1994 he

slept early at his house with his wife and their two-year old child.

At the conclusion of the proceedings, the trial court convicted appellant for the felony of

Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death, hencethe automatic review.

Issue:

1. Whether the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery in

the commission of the crime charged

2. Whether the accused appellant is guilty of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple

Attempted Murder

Ruling:

1. No. Article 14, Paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code states that “there is treachery

when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, , employing means, methods or formsin the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk to

himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.” It is long settled in

jurisprudence that two elements must concur in order to establish treachery: (a) that at the time of

the attack. The victim was not in a position to defend himself; (that the offender consciously

adopted the particular means of attack comes without warning and in a swift, deliberate, and

unexpected manner, affording the helpless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist

or escape.

The manner by which appellant deliberately rolled the grenade on the ground towards the

dance floor packed with the unsuspecting revelers, leaving one dead and scores wounded in the

aftermath of the sudden blast was accompanied with treachery. Mores’ unexpected action which

was immediately followed by the grenade’s lethal explosion left the victims with utterly no chanceto escape that blast area nor to find protective cover. Though Mores stood a short distance away. He

knowingly positioned himself safely from the reach of the grenade’s destructive force. The

foregoing can confidently conclude the presence of treachery.

2. Yes. The single act of pitching or rolling the hand grenade on the floor of the gymnasium

which resulted in the death of Ramie Balasa and injuries to other victims constituted a complex

crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which states that when a single act constitutes

two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,




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the same to be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for the most serious crime of Murder

under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpertua to death. Thus, applying Article

48, the death penalty should be imposed. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the proper

sentence therefore is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LITO HATSEROG.R. No. 192179, July 3, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other

place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to

be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.

The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift

and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist

or escape.

Facts:

Thirty-eight year old truck driver Alex Barroa (Barroa) testified that the victim, Mamerto

Gravo (Gravo), was the first cousin of his wife. He knew Lito Hatsero (Hatsero) as a hauler or

“pakyador” of sugarcane in their place.

On August 27, 2000, at 12:30 a.m., Barroa was with Gravo, celebrating the barangay fiesta at

the dance hall of Sitio Tunga, Barangay Dulangan, Pilar, Capiz. Barroa and Gravo were about to go

home when they passed by a group drinking behind the dance hall, in front of the store of a certain

Yulo. He recognized Hatsero as one of the drinkers, but failed to recognize his companion who was

seated in a dark place. Hatsero invited Gravo to have a drink. While Gravo was holding the glass,

Hatsero stabbed him, and ran towards the store. Gravo was not armed when this happened.

Barroa saw everything since he was only about 58 inches away from them. Barroa was stunned

with what he saw, but he managed to run towards the door of the gate of the dance hall, where hegot people to help him bring Gravo via a tricycle to the Bailan District Hospital. Barroa then had the

incident recorded with the Barangay Captain.

Lito Hatsero was 33 years old at the time of his testimony. He was a lumberjack chainsaw

operator. He testified that he was sleeping in his house at around 12:30 a.m., on August 27, 2000.

Earlier in the evening, however, he went with his children to the dance hall. He asserted that he left

the dance hall at around 10:00 p.m., denied having killed Mamerto Gravo, and believed that he was

implicated because he refused Mamerto Gravo’s wife’s request to be a witness when she asked him

to pinpoint the real killer. He denied knowing Alex Barroa, and claimed that the latter’s testimony isincredible as he was wrong as regards the number of wounds inflicted.

On August 22, 2006, the trial court rendered its Decision convicting Hatsero of the crime ofmurder. The trial court held that Hatsero was positively identified as the assailant, that the

eyewitness account was categorical and consistent, and that there was no showing of ill motive on

the part of the prosecution witnesses. The defense, on the other hand, failed to conclusively

establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the approximate

time of its commission.




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Hatsero elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which rendered its Decision affirming the

conviction. The Court of Appeals agreed with the assessment of the trial court that Alex Barroa

described the stabbing incident in a clear and convincing manner.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the defense of alibi by Hatsero is sufficient to rebut the positive

identification of Barroa that the former killed Gravo.

2. Whether or not there exist a qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Ruling:

1. No. It is not sufficient.

In the face of this positive identification, Hatsero puts up the defense of alibi, claiming that

he was sleeping in his house at the time of the incident. It has been consistently held by this Court

that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some otherplace at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him

to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. In the case of Hatsero, however, it was

established in his very own direct testimony that his house is within the immediate vicinity of the

scene of the crime.

Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. In

the case at bar, it is even weaker because of the failure of Hatsero to prove that it was physically

impossible for him to be at the locus delicti at the time of the crime, and in the face of the positive

identification made by Barroa.

2. Yes. Treachery exists.

“The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift

and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to

resist or escape.” The manner Mamerto Gravo was stabbed by Hatsero has treachery written allover it. The Supreme Court cannot think of any other reason Hatsero would make the friendly

gesture of offering a drink to a person he intended to kill, other than to intentionally lure the latter

into a false sense of security.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERRY SABANGAN and NOLI BORNASALG.R. No. 191722, December 11, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employingmeans, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its

execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The

essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting victims,

depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without

risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims.

Facts:




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Accused-appellant Gerry Sabangan was charged with murder for the death of Barangay

Captain Abe Felonia together with his co-accused, Noli Bornasal. Both accused pleaded not guilty to

the crime charged against them.

Prosecution presented the testimonies of 2 witnesses who saw Sabangan shoot the victim todeath; another witness who saw both accused running away from the vicinity immediately after the

shooting incident; the Chief of Police of Kidapawan City who investigated the shooting incident; and

the daughter of the victim who testified on the damages suffered by Felonia’s heirs.

According to the testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses, on December 27, 1999, thevictim (Abe Felonia) who was the barangay captain of Duroloman, Arakan, Cotabato, was gunned

down at Mega Market in Kidapawan City. Eden Allado and Flora Navales testified that they were

inside a store at Mega Market with the victim when the accused went inside the store and shot the

victim three times at the back of the head of Felonia.

Roberto Badian, the Chief of Polcie of Kidapawan said he conducted an investigation right

after the shooting incident and came up with the information from bystanders and witnesses thatGerry Sabangan who had a pending robbery case in Kidapawan but out on bail, was one of the

suspects. Thereafter, when Gerry Sabangan was spotted in Antipaz, he was invited to the police

safehouse where the 3 witnesses positively identified and pointed the accused as the man who shot

the victim. Sabangan was arrested and locked up in jail and a case for murder against him was

initiated by the police. Accused Noli Bornasal was subsequently apprehended based on the account

of one witness who testified that he saw him running away from the vicinity with Sabangan

immediately after the shooting incident.

Sabangan denied the accusations against him and put up the defense that he was at

Barangay Luhong, Antipas, Cotabato at the time of the incident, helping in the preparation of a

wedding ceremony of a relative. He argued that it was physically impossible for him, on the date of

the shooting incident, to be in Kidapawan City when Felonia was killed considering that KidapawanCity was approximately 40 kilometers away from Antipaz, Cotabato. Sabangan also complained of

the irregularity in the conduct of the investigating police officers during the out-of-court

identification of Sabangan by the witnesses.

Bornasal argued, on the other hand that no other circumstantial evidence was presented by

the prosecution to establish the alleged conspiracy between him and Sabangan to kill Felonia.

The RTC found both Sabangan and Bornasal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder

of Felonia. On appeal, both accused asserted that the award of actual damages in the total sum of

P234,080.00 was excessive, contrary to what was sufficiently proven during trial.

The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of Sabangan but acquitted Bornasal on theground of reasonable doubt, and modified the award of damages. Hence the instant petition.

Issues:

1. Whether or not accused Sabangan is guilty for the crime of murder?

2. Was there convincing proof of evident premeditation in the case at bar?




Page 40 of 299

Ruling:

1. Yes, the totality of evidence for the prosecution against Sabangan established with moral

certainty all the essential elements of the crime of murder qualified by treachery.

Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to

insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party

might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on

unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby

ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the

part of the victims.

In this case, Felonia was at a store, chatting with Allado. He was unarmed with his guard

down. Sabangan went in and out of the store, around three times, apparently waiting for the perfect

opportunity to commit the crime. When he saw his chance, Sabangan positioned himself behind the

unsuspecting Felonia, suddenly brought out his gun, and without the slightest provocation on

Felonia’s part, shot the latter once in the head and twice in the back. Sabangan clearly employedtreachery in killing Felonia. Sabangan’s attack on Felonia was sudden and unexpected, the manner

of which was deliberately adopted to give Felonia little or no chance at all to defend himself or

retaliate.

2. No, the Court found no convincing proof of evident premeditation in the case at bar.

In order to be appreciated, the circumstance must not merely be premeditation; it must be

“evident premeditation.” To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution mustestablish the confluence of the following requisites:

(a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime;

(b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and(c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to

allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

Evident premeditation, like other circumstances that would qualify a killing as murder,

must be established by clear and positive evidence showing the planning and the preparation

stages prior to the killing. Without such evidence, mere presumptions and inferences, no matter

how logical and probable, will not suffice.

In this case, the prosecution’s evidence pertained merely to the actual commission bySabangan of the crime. It did not submit any proof that Sabangan, at some prior time, determined to

kill Felonia; that Sabangan performed an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his

determination to kill Felonia; and that there was sufficient interval of time between hisdetermination and execution which allowed Sabangan to reflect upon the consequences of his act.

In order to give credence to the defense of alibi, it must not only appear that the accused

interposing the same was at some other place but also that it was physically impossible for him to

be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.




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In the case at bench, it was established that the travel time from Luhong to Kidapawan City

is only about an hour. As such, it was not physically impossible for accused Gerry Sabangan to travel

from Luhong to Kidapawan City, the place where the crime was committed, simply because you can

reach Kidapawan for only an hour by riding on a Jeepney from Luhong.

There is no cogent reason for the Court to overturn the credence and evidentiary valueaccorded by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the positive identification of Sabangan as

Felonia’s assailant by the disinterested witnesses of the prosecution, rather than Sabangan’s alibi,

corroborated by his relatives, that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the

crime.

EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NELIDA DEQUINA Y DIMAPANAN, JOSELITO JUNDOC YJAPITANA & NORA JINGABO Y CRUZ


A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under theimpulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because

he does not act with freedom. An act done by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated

must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but

against his will. A threat of future injury is not enough.

Facts:

On September 27, 1999, while Jundoc and Jingabo were tending to their fish stall in Iloilo

Public Market, Dequina, their friend, came and invited them to meet her, for a still undisclosed

reason, at the ground floor of the Gaisano Mall, early in the morning of the following day, September

28, 1999. As agreed upon, they met at the designated place and time. Not long thereafter, Sally

joined them.They knew Sally to be Dequina’s supplier of RTWs and other merchandise. For a while,Dequina and Sally excused themselves and proceeded to the first floor of the mall where they talked

privately. Soon after Sally left, Jingabo and Jundoc asked Dequina what they talked about. Instead of

answering, Dequina asked if they are willing to go with her to Manila in order to get

something. While a little bit surprised, Jingabo and Jundoc readily agreed as they had never been in

the city before. Dequina handed to them their plane tickets. They were told that the same were

given by Sally. However, they noticed that the plane tickets were not in their names but in the

names of other persons. When they called the attention of Dequina about it, the latter simply

replied “Anyway that is free”. Jingabo noticed anxiety got the better of Nelida at that

time. Nevertheless, the three of them enplaned for Manila at around 7:45 a.m. of September 28,

1999.

From the Ninoy Aquino Domestic Airport, they proceeded to the house of Dequina’s aunt inGuadalupe, Makati City. In the afternoon, their host noticed the presence of unfamiliar

vehicles. Some of these vehicles were even parked right in front of the house. Unmindful about it,

they left Guadalupe at around 6:00 p.m. and proceeded to a Philippine Rabbit Bus

Terminal. Thereat, two male persons approached Dequina and handed to her bus tickets. They were

pointed to the particular vehicle where they were to board.




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They reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga between 12:30 and 1:00 a.m. of September 29,

1999. While they were having their snacks, a couple approached Dequina and they had a

talk. Thereafter, the couple motioned them to three male persons, each carrying a bag, at the

opposite side of the road. Upon Dequina’s instruction, they took the bags from the three men. Then,

they waited for their ride back to Manila.

As they boarded the bus, the conductor loaded their bags inside the compartment. They

alighted at SM EDSA at around 6:00 a.m. of September 29, 1999. They boarded a waiting

tricycle. When they reached a certain store, the trike driver bought carton boxes where they loaded

two of the three bags. Thereafter, the tricycle driver pointed Dequina to a waiting taxi where they

boarded along with their baggages.

As they entered the pier premises, a police officer on board a mobile patrol car ordered

them to stop. They were ordered to alight and the police officers ordered the driver to open the

taxi’s compartment. One of the police officers took a knife from his pocket and slashed one of the

bags. Then, the policemen told them that what they had in their bags were marijuana. The police

officers ordered them to board the mobile car while the bags were loaded inside the compartment

of the same car.

They were brought to a sari-sari store where a certain Chief Sapitula, whom they later knew

to be the police officers superior, was waiting. Sapitula interrogated Dequina and at one point, he

slapped her. Sapitula summoned press people who took their photographs. Thereafter, they were

brought to the Hospital ng Bayan and finally, to the police precinct were they were charged

accordingly.

In its Decision dated August 16, 2006, the appellate court affirmed accused-appellants

conviction. Hence, accused-appellants appealed to this Court.

In order to exonerate herself from criminal liability, Dequina contends that she transported

the marijuana under the compulsion of an irresistible fear. Jundoc and Jingabo, on the other hand,claim that they went along to accommodate Dequina, a trusted childhood friend.

Issue:

Whether or not Dequina’s contention that she acted under compulsion and Jundoc and

Jingabo’s assertion of blind trust in Dequina are meritorious.

Ruling:

We are unconvinced with Dequina’s contention that she acted under compulsion and

Jundoc and Jingabo’s assertion of blind trust in Dequina.

A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the

impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability

because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non est meus actus. An act done by me

against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor

to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress, force, fear or

intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-

grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future injury




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is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the

accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat. Here, Dequinas version of events that

culminated with her and Jundoc and Jingabos arrests on September 29, 1999 is implausible. Equally

far-fetched is Jundoc and Jingabos assertion of blind trust in Dequina and total ignorance of the

transportation of marijuana.

Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when said

acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. Although the

same degree of proof required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of the

presence of conspiracy, it need not be proven by direct evidence. Conspiracy may be deduced from

the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANICETO BULAGAOG.R. No. 184757, October 5, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

For the defense of Bulagao that he was suffering from mental retardation be given credit,

There must be a showing from the findings of the psychologist that Bulagao had the same mental or psychological condition at the time of the said incidents. The RTC noted that the psychological

examination of Bulagao was conducted more than a couple of years after the dates of the complained

of incidents. Even assuming that accused-appellant was of such mental state at the time of the

incidents, the psychologist testified that accused-appellant had the capacity to discern right from

wrong.

Facts:

Aniceto Bulagao was charged with two counts of rape in separate Informations both dated

December 21, 2000. On June 17, 2000, at around 8:00 p.m., AAA and FFF were sleeping in a room

which had no door. AAA was suddenly awakened when she felt somebody enter the room. She

recognized Bulagao as the intruder, and saw that he was holding a knife. Bulagao poked the knife atAAAs neck, causing her to freeze in fear. Bulagao removed AAAs clothes, and then his own. Both

AAA and Bulagao were wearing t-shirt and shorts before the undressing. Bulagao kissed her neck

and inserted his penis into her vagina. FFF woke up at this moment, but Bulagao did not stop and

continued raping AAA for one hour.

On June 29, 2000, AAA was residing in the house of her sister, also located in Lolomboy,

Bocaue, Bulacan. At around 11:00 p.m. on that day, AAA was sleeping in the second floor of the

house, where there are no rooms. AAA was roused from her sleep when Bulagao was already

undressing her. Bulagao removed his shorts and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA tried to

resist, but Bulagao held her hands. Bulagao then touched her breasts and kissed her. And he

remained on top of her for half an hour. AAA told her mother, BBB, and her brother, EEE, about the

rape incidents. Upon learning of the same, BBB, the mother did not believe AAA and whipped her.

Upon arraignment on February 26, 2001, Bulagao pleaded not guilty on both

counts. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Only private complainant AAA took the witness stand

for the prosecution. AAA was born on April 13, 1986 (14 years old). In April 2000, AAA arrived

from the province and settled in the house of her brother DDD and his wife in Lolomboy, Bocaue,

Bulacan. With AAA in the house were two other brothers, EEE and Aniceto Bulagao, and her




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younger sister, then six-year-old FFF who were also the children of BBB, the mother and CCC, the

father (deceased) AAA being an adopted child.

When it was time for the defense to present their evidence more than a year later, it also

presented as its witness AAA, who recanted her testimony for the prosecution. This time, she

testified that the sexual encounters between her and the Bulagao appellant were consensual. Shefabricated the charge of rape against the Bulagao because she was supposedly angry with him. She

also claimed that she was instructed by the police officer who investigated the incident to say that

the accused-appellant used a knife. She also testified that she was raped by her father CCC when she

was seven years old. She was recanting her previous testimony because she purportedly was no

longer angry with Bulagao.

On redirect examination, AAA testified that Bulagao did not force himself upon her. She

affirmed that he had a little defect in his mind. Another witness for the defense was Yolanda Palma,

a clinical psychologist. She conducted a mental examination on Aniceto Bulagao, and found that

Bulagao was suffering from mental retardation as he had an IQ of below 50. Aniceto Bulagao, who

was 40 years old claimed that AAA seduced him by removing her clothes. He asserted that they

ended up merely kissing each other and did not have sexual intercourse. He denied pointing a knifeat AAA. AAA accused him of rape because she was asking for P300 from him after they kissed. He

also testified that there was no legal proceeding for the adoption of AAA (ampun-ampunan lang). On

January 23, 2006, the RTC rendered its joint Decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable

doubt. On April 14, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming that of the RTC.

Hence, accused-appellant interposed the present appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not Aniceto Bulagao was suffering from mental retardation that would entitle

him of an exempting circumstance.

Ruling:

No, Bulagao is not entitled to an exempting circumstance.

As regards the defense of Bulagao that he was suffering from mental retardation, the RTC

noted that the psychological examination of Bulagao was conducted more than a couple of years

after the dates of the complained of incidents. There was no showing from the findings of the

psychologist that accused-appellant had the same mental or psychological condition at the time of

the said incidents. Even assuming that accused-appellant was of such mental state at the time of the

incidents, the psychologist testified that accused-appellant had the capacity to discern right from

wrong.

Accused-appellant, in his appeal, did not insist on the allegation in the trial court that hewas suffering from mental retardation. Nevertheless, we agree with the finding of the trial court

that there was no proof that the mental condition accused-appellant allegedly exhibited when he

was examined by Yolanda Palma was already present at the time of the rape incidents. Anyone who

pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and

convincing evidence. Besides, this Court observes that neither the acts of the accused-appellant

proven before the court, nor his answers in his testimony, show a complete deprivation of

intelligence or free will. Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason




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or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. Only when there is a

complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission of the crime should the

exempting circumstance of insanity be considered.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICHARD O. SARCIAG.R. No. 169641, September 10, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro

When the prosecution fails to prove the exact date of the commission of the offense and there is

a question whether the accused reached the age of majority at the time of the commission, such

question shall be resolved in favor of the accused and therefore shall benefit from the mitigating

circumstance of minority.

Facts:

In 1996, AAA, a 5-year old girl, played with her cousin (7 years old) and other children

when Richard Sarcia invited her to go to the backyard of a certain Saling Crisologo. Unknown to theaccused, AAA’s cousin followed them. There, Sarcia pulled down the shorts and panties of AAA and

succeeded to have carnal knowledge with her. AAA’s cousin saw the said act and proceeded to tellAAA’s mother what happened but the latter disregarded the story of AAA’s cousin stating that they

were too young to understand those matters. AAA’s father was, at the time, working in Manila.

Almost after four years, Sarcia was charged by AAA’s father with rape. Sarcia denied theallegations and contended that the rape case was only instituted to bolster the arguments in

another case where he was charged of murder of a certain Christine Camu. In the said murder case,

Sarcia was accused of Christine’s grandmother of the said and even helped AAA’s family to pursue

the rape case against him.

During the trial, the testimonies of AAA, AAA’s cousin and AAA’s father were presented, aswell as the medical examination report which contained that AAA had no scars nor healed wounds

inside but the hymen showed signs of trauma caused by a blunt object which could be a medical

instrument or a penis. Also, the prosecution was only able to establish that the crime was

committed in 1996 but no specific date was proven and Sarcia was about to turn 18 years old at the

time. Sarcia asseverated that the absence of scars and healed wounds negated the allegations of

rape against him and that the testimonies of the AAA and AAA’s cousin were inconsistent as to thetime and place of commission of the offense and failed to establish his guilt. Sarcia also noted that

the rape charge was only instituted almost four years from the alleged time of commission and that

the delay of filing affected the credibility of the witnesses.

The RTC found Sarcia guilty of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of

reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the decision but modified the penalty to death. Hence, thepresent petition.

Issues:

Whether or not the penalty should be reduced on the ground of minority

Ruling:




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Yes. We cannot agree with the CA’s conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed

a minor at the time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating

circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. When accused

appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in

1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place inany month and date in the year 1996. Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date

and time when the rape was committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or

after he reached 18 years of age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance

of minority, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the

latter. In fact, in several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone

declaration of the accused regarding his age.

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years,

the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper

period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged

mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.

Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.

PAROLE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE CANDELLADAG.R. No. 189293, July 10, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

No jurisprudence in criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses,

for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason it is generally rejected.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 provides that persons convicted of offenses punished with

reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, shall not be eligible for

parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended

Facts:

[AAA] was the second of three daughters of Candellada and his deceased first wife. [AAA]

lived with Candellada and the latter’s second wife, while [AAA]’s two sisters lived with Candellada’s

mother. While they were still living in Davao, Candellada impregnated [AAA]. When [AAA] was

already five months pregnant, Candellada brought her with him to Lanao del Norte. Candellada and

[AAA] arrived in Lanao del Norte on May 30, 2004.

While they were staying at Gemina’s (the owner of the house in Lanao del Norte where

Candellada and [AAA] lived) old house, Candellada had intercourse with [AAA] many times, but

[AAA] could only remember eight specific dates.

On December 28, 2004, Candellada again made amorous advances on [AAA]. [AAA] refused

so Candellada became violently angry. He mauled [AAA] and hit her head with a piece of wood,

which rendered her unconscious. Gemina, who saw what happened, asked help from the Barangay

Captain. The Barangay Captain and civilian volunteers arrested Candellada.




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Vicente Candellada (Candellada), father of [AAA], was charged with attempted rape and 8

counts of rape before the RTC, Branch 7, of Tubod, Lanao del Norte for attempting to rape and

raping [AAA], who is a minor at the time of the commission of the said crimes contrary to and in

violation of R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law in relation to R.A. 7610 otherwise

known as the Anti-Child Abuse Law.

Candellada was arraigned on May 17, 2005 with the assistance of counsel. He pleaded not

guilty to the charges against him. During pretrial, the defense admitted that Candellada is the father

of private complainant [AAA] and that [AAA] was 15 years of age at the time of the commission of

the crimes charged and/or filing of the cases. Thereafter, the nine criminal cases were tried jointly.

Candellada outright called [AAA] a liar. He denied raping [AAA] eight times between May

30, 2004 to December 25, 2004. He also asserted that he could not have made an attempt to rape

AAA on December 28, 2004 as he was already in jail by that time. Candellada claimed that he was

already arrested on December 23, 2004, a Tuesday, after he struck [AAA].

The RTC rendered its Consolidated Decision on December 23, 2005. The RTC found that

there was not enough evidence to prove Candellada’s culpability for the charge of attempted rapeon December 28, 2004. Citing Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, 35 the RTC pointed out that the

overt acts committed by Candellada resulted only in AAA’s physical injuries that took five to sevendays to heal and slight physical injuries were not necessarily included in the charge of attempted

rape. As for the charge of eight counts of consummated rape, the RTC pronounced that “[AAA’s]down-to-earth testimony was convincing and straightforward that she was abused [by] her father

in x x x Lanao del Norte” and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of Death in each of the 8 count sthereof.

In its Decision dated April 29, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of

conviction against Candellada but modified the sentence from death penalty to reclusion perpetua

and award of damages.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the defense of alibi by Candellada is sufficient to rebut the testimony of

[AAA] that she was raped by the former.

2. Whether or not Candellada is entitled for parole under the provisions of the

Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Ruling:

1. No. It is not sufficient.

Candellada’s denial and alibi deserve scant consideration. No jurisprudence in criminal law

is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to

disprove, and for which reason it is generally rejected. It has been consistently held that denial and

alibi are the most common defenses in rape cases. Denial could not prevail over complainant’s

direct, positive and categorical assertion. As between a positive and categorical testimony which

has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other, the former is generally held to

prevail.




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2. No. He is not entitled for parole.

With the guilt of Candellada for the eight rapes already established beyond reasonable

doubt, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without

eligibility of parole, instead of death, for each count of rape, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9346 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death, when

the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code. Section

3 of Republic Act No. 9346 further provides that persons convicted of offenses punished with

reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, shall not be eligible

for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

FALSIFICATION BY PUBLIC OFFICER, EMPLOYEE OR NOTARY OR ECCLESIASTICAL MINISTER

ROMEO D. LONZANIDA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 160243-52, July 20, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro

In the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private

persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person;

the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as

therein solemnly proclaimed.

Facts:

Petitioner Romeo D. Lonzanida, then Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales, was among

those criminally charged with Falsification of Public Document as defined and penalized under

Paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutoron separate complaints

filed on various dates by Efren Tayag, Elsie de Dios, Daniel Alegado and

Rene Abad. The complaints alleged that Lonzanida, as Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales,

notarized thirteen Affidavits of Ownership of parcels of 117hectare public land. The Affidavits of

Ownership appeared to have been executed by certain persons who in turn either denied executing

the same or had no capacity to do so. The complaints also alleged that Lonzanida notarized thirteen

identically worded Joint Affidavits of two disinterested persons purportedly executed and signed by

Rufino Aniceto who is an illiterate and Roberto Querubin who was already deceased at the time of

their execution. Upon arraignment, Lonzanida, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of “not guilty” toall the charges. On October 20, 2000, the Sandiganbayan through its Fourth Division rendered a

decision

convicting petitioner of ten counts of Falsification. After three motions for

reconsideration, Sandiganbayan gave in to Lonzanida’s plea for a new trial and allowed him a last

chance to present evidence in his behalf. On July 25, 2003, the Sandiganbayan promulgated aDecision convicting Lonzanida of the crimes charged. In so ruling, the Sandiganbayan belittled the

recantation of the three prosecution witnesses. Lonzanida filed a motion for reconsideration and a

supplemental motion for reconsideration but both motions were denied by the Sandiganbayan

hence, this present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

BOOK II (Articles 114-365, RPC) and related Special Laws




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Whether petitioner Lonzanida is guilty of falsification defined and penalized under Art. 171

of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:

Yes, he is.

Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, for falsification of a public document to be

established, the following elements must concur: 1. That the offender is a public officer, employee,

or notary public; 2. That he takes advantage of his official position; 3. That he falsifies a document

by committing any of the following acts: a) Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature

or rubric; b) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they

did not in fact so participate;

c) Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or

proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them; d) Making untruthful statements in a

narration of facts; e) Altering true dates; f) Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine

document which changes its meaning; g) Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to

be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a

statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; h) Intercalating anyinstrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.

Undeniably, the foregoing elements of the crime were proven in the present case. Lonzanida

is a public officer who has taken advantage of his position to commit the felonious acts charged

against him. In the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by

private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a

third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing

punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly

proclaimed. In the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by

private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or intent to injure a third

person. This notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that Lonzanida consummated his act in falsifying

the documents, and which documents he used in successfully obtaining the tax declaration in thenames of the alleged applicants causing prejudice to the real occupant, Efren Tayag.

COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH SERRANO and ANTHONY SERRANO

G.R. No. 179038, May 6, 2010 , J . Leonardo-De Castro

When all the elements of the crimes charged were present thereby establishing the guilt

beyond reasonable doubt of the accused, no error has been committed in the court’s decision ofconviction. In fact, settled is the principle that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature

are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; and speculative,

arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The rule finds an even

more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.

Facts:

In the afternoon of January 18, 2003, Major Jerry Galvan received a telephone call from a

concerned citizen about an illegal drug trade being conducted by a certain alias "Tune" in Barangay

Bambang, Pasig City. Thereafter, Major Galvan coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement




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Agency (PDEA) for the conduct of a buy-bust operation. Thus, a team led by SPO3 Leneal Matias,

PO3 Carlo Luna and PO1 Michael Familara (PO1 FAMILARA) was formed to buy "shabu" from

"Tune" with the aid of a confidential informant. Preparations were then made, and two (2) One

Hundred Peso bills were marked "MRF" and delivered to the assigned poseur-buyer, PO1

FAMILARA. The composite team thereafter proceeded to the aforementioned location, the

confidential informant pointed to a house where accused-appellant Joseph Serrano (JOSEPH) wasfound standing. SPO3 Leneal Matias and PO3 Carlo Luna positioned themselves at a distance where

they can see PO1 FAMILARA, who approached JOSEPH together with the confidential informant.

The latter greeted JOSEPH and informed him that his companion, PO1 FAMILARA, would buy Php

200.00 worth of shabu. JOSEPH thereafter knocked at the door of "Tune", who turned out to be

accused-appellant Anthony Serrano (ANTHONY). ANTHONY partially opened the door and

conferred with JOSEPH. PO1 FAMILARA thereafter handed the marked money to JOSEPH, who in

turn handed the same to ANTHONY. Upon receiving the money, the latter then took out a plastic

sachet containing a white crystalline substance from his pocket and handed the same to the

JOSEPH, who, in turn, handed the plastic sachets to PO1 FAMILARA. As such, FAMILARA

immediately grabbed JOSEPH's hand while the rest of the team rushed to the scene to arrest the

accused-appellants. ANTHONY even attempted to escape to his house but was subsequently

likewise apprehended.

Both accused-appellants were bodily frisked after their apprehension. Recovered from

ANTHONY were four heat-sealed plastic sachets with white crystalline substances, two (2) marked

one hundred peso bills, a pair of scissors, a disposable lighter and one plastic bag containing several

pieces of empty plastic sachets. However, nothing aside from the heat-sealed plastic sachet he

previously handed to PO1 FAMILARA was recovered from accused-appellant JOSEPH.

Upon examination by P/Insp. Lourdeliza Gural, the five heat-sealed plastic sachets

containing white crystalline substances were found positive [for] Methylamphetamine

Hydrochloride or commonly known as "shabu."

In their defense, both ANTHONY and JOSEPH denied the charges against them. The latteraverred that the plastic sachets containing the white crystalline substance were shown to him only

at the police station. For his part, ANTHONY argued that they only came to know the reason for

their arrest and detention when they were already in court.

The RTC rendered judgment convicting the brothers for illegal sale of shabu in Criminal

Case No. 12007-D and Anthony Serrano for illegal possession of shabu in Criminal Case No. 12008-

D. In view of the penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon them, the case was elevated to the

Court of Appeals for automatic review. The appellate court affirmed the said decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused-appellants for the crimescharged was successfully established by the prosecution.

Ruling:

We find that the degree of proof required in criminal cases has been met in this instance.

Hence, there is no reason to deviate from both the lower courts' findings and conclusions that

accused-appellants committed the offenses charged.




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Fundamental is the principle that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and

which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross

misapprehension of facts; and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered

from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the

credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and mannerof testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings

are sustained by the Court of Appeals.

For the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Section 5,

Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the

buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment

therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the

transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus

delicti.

Here, the records bear out that all the elements of the offense have been established beyond

reasonable doubt. The Court finds the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses credible,straightforward and corroborative of each other. Their testimonies sufficiently proved that a

legitimate buy-bust operation took place wherein the accused-appellants were apprehended.

Moreover, the shabu subject of the sale was brought to, and properly identified in, court. Accused-

appellants were likewise positively identified as the persons who sold the sachet containing the

crystalline substance which was later confirmed to be shabu according to the Chemistry Report of

the forensic chemist.

With respect to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article

II of Republic Act No. 9165 against ANTHONY, we also find that the elements of the offense have

been established by the evidence of the prosecution. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the

elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a

prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely andconsciously possessed the said drug.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, most notably that of the arresting officer, PO3

Luna, showed that four sachets containing white crystalline substance were recovered from

ANTHONY when the latter was told to empty his pockets upon his apprehension. As a result of a

chemical analysis thereof, the substance in the plastic sachets was confirmed to be shabu.

In view of the positive and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the denials

of the accused-appellants must, perforce, fail. Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive

testimony of a witness; it is self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater

evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. As

between the categorical testimony that rings of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other,the former is generally held to prevail.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA,G.R. No. 176066 August 11, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Tuan was charged with illegal possession of prohibited drugs and contended that he should

not be convicted to such crime due to discrepancies and testimony of the witnesses. The court ruled




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that Discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and

not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies

of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the

principal occurrence

Facts:

Two male informants namely, Jerry Tudlong (Tudlong) and Frank Lad-ing (Lad-ing) arrived

at the office of the 14th Regional CIDG (Criminal Investigation and Detention Group) at DPS

Compound, Marcoville, Baguio City, and reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug

Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain Estela Tuan had been selling marijuana at Barangay

Gabriela Silang, Baguio City. Afterwards they conducted surveillance operations which resulted

positive that indeed Tuan was selling marijuana. SPO2 Fernandez prepared an Application for

Search Warrant for accused-appellants house.

SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed the Application for a Search

Warrant before Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities

(MTCC), Baguio City, Branch IV, at about one oclock in the afternoon on January 25, 2000. Twohours later, at around three oclock, Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong,

and Lad-ing, after which, she issued a Search Warrant, being satisfied of the existence of probable

cause.

Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, SPO2 Fernandez, his team supervisor Police Senior

Inspector Rodolfo Castel, SPO1 Carrera, Police Senior Inspector Ricarte Marquez and PO2 Chavez

implemented the warrant. Before going to the accused-appellants house, SPO2 Fernandez

invited barangay officials to be present when the Search Warrant was to be served, but since no one

was available, he requested one Eliza Pascual (Pascual), accused-appellants neighbor, to come

along. The CIDG team thereafter proceeded to accused-appellants house. Even though accused-

appellant was not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the house by Magno Baludda

(Magno), accused-appellants ather, after he was shown a copy of the Search Warrant. SPO2Fernandez and Police Senior Inspector Ricarte Marquez guarded the surroundings of the

house, while SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez searched inside. SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez began

searching the rooms on the first floor in the presence of Magno and Pascual. They continued their

search on the second floor. They saw a movable cabinet in accused-appellants room, below which

they found a brick of marijuana and a firearm. At around six oclock that evening, accused-appellant

arrived with her son. The police officers asked accused-appellant to open a built-in cabinet, in

which they saw eight more bricks of marijuana. PO2 Chavez issued a receipt for the items

confiscated from accused-appellant and a certification stating that the items were confiscated and

recovered from the house and in accused-appellants presence. The nine bricks of marijuana were

brought to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for examination.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused Tuan is guilty of Illegal possession of prohibited drugs

Ruling:

Yes, he is guilty of the offense charged.




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Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following

elements concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a

prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and

consciously possesses the said drug. All the foregoing elements were duly proven to exist in

Criminal Case No. 17619-R. The search conducted by SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez in accused-

appellants house yielded nine bricks of marijuana. Marijuana is a prohibited drug, thus, accused-appellants possession thereof could not have been authorized by law in any way. Accused-appellant

evidently possessed the marijuana freely and consciously, even offering the same for sale. The

bricks of marijuana were found in accused-appellants residence over which she had complete

control. In fact, some of the marijuana were found in accused-appellants own room. Accused-

appellant challenges the judgment of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, finding her guilty of

illegal possession of marijuana, by pointing out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of

prosecution witnesses that supposedly manifested their lack of credibility, i.e., the date of the test

buy and the manner by which the doors of the rooms of the house were opened. These alleged

inconsistencies and contradictions pertain to minor details and are so inconsequential that they do

not in any way affect the credibility of the witnesses nor detract from the established fact of illegal

possession of marijuana by accused-appellant at her house. The Court has previously held that

discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details, and notin actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair their credibility. Testimonies

of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and relevant details concerning the

principal occurrence

Although Criminal Case No. 17619-R involves illegal possession of marijuana, the following

pronouncement of this Court in People v. Salazar , relating to the illegal sale of the same drug, still

rings true: Neither is her right to confront witnesses against her affected by the prosecution's

failure to present the informer who pointed to her as a drug pusher. The presentation of aninformant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for asuccessful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative andcumulative. In a case involving the sale of illegal drugs, what should be proven beyond reasonable

doubt is the fact of the sale itself. Hence, like the non-presentation of the marked money used inbuying the contraband, the non-presentation of the informer on the witness stand would not

necessarily create a hiatus in the prosecutions' evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHITO GRATIL y GUELASG.R. No. 182236, June 22, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation No. 3, Series of

1979 is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is totally

irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that the commission of the crime of

illegal sale of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is established.

Facts:

A confidential informant arrived at the PNP Central Narcotics Office at EDSA, Quezon City

and talked to P/Insp. Nolasco Cortez in the presence of several other police officers regarding the

alleged illegal drug activity of one Chito Gratil.

Immediately, P/Insp. Cortez formed a team for the purpose of conducting a buy bust

operation. SPO2 Manglo was designated as poseur buyer and was given a P500 bill the serial




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number of which he took and which he also marked with his initial on the side of the face of the

person on the bill and also a dot on the nose. The genuine P500 bill was put on top of boodle money.

At 11:40 o’clock of that same morning, SPO2 Manglo and the confidential informant

proceeded to the house of accused Chito Gratil. They proceeded to McDonald’s at Harrison Plaza

where they would meet with accused Gratil for the final arrangement. At around noontime, accusedGratil arrived and talked to the confidential informant. Accused Gratil instructed the confidential

informant to go to Gratil’s house at 4:00pm so that the transaction on the shabu could be

completed. After the meeting, SPO2 Manglo and the informant returned to the Central Narcotics

Office and reported to P/Insp. Cortez.

That afternoon, the team composed of P/Insp. Cortez, PO1 Molina, SPO2 Antonio, and SPO2

Manglo together with the confidential informant proceeded to the house of accused Gratil on board

a vehicle. Upon learning that SPO2 Manglo was the buyer of the 400 grams of shabu which the

confidential informant earlier confirmed that morning to be available, accused Gratil begged leave

to get the stuff outside: "Saglit lang at kukunin ko". Ten minutes after, more or less, accused

returned and handed over a white plastic bag with the Mercury Drug label to SPO2 Manglo which

the latter verified if it contained shabu. SPO2 Manglo opened the black clutch bag wherein theboodle money was put in and then handed it to the accused. After accused Gratil received the bag

and before he could start counting the money, SPO2 Manglo introduced himself as a NARCOM

policeman and then he pulled out his Icom radio which was tucked behind his back and called for

back up.

Accused Gratil was arrested for selling shabu to a poseur buyer by the team of policemen

and in the process SPO2 Antonio recovered from the accused the marked money. From there, they

brought the accused together with the shabu and the marked money back to the Central Narcotics

Command where the apprehending policemen executed their affidavit of arrest and other related

documents. P/Insp. Mary Leocy Jabonillo, a Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp

Crame testified that the specimen reacted with a positive result for methamphetamine

hydrochloride, a regulated drug.

On the other hand, accused Gratil and Imelda Redolvina testified for the defense. Accused

Gratil was on his way to his cousin’s house.. As he walked, he saw people running at an alley

(eskinita) going towards him. Suddenly someone grabbed him by the collar and told accused Gratil:

"Putangina mo sama ka." Accused Gratil asked: "Bakit po?" And the man holding him said: "Doon ka

sa presinto magpaliwanag."

Imelda Revoldina testified that on August 24, 1997 between the hours of 4:00 and 5:00 in

the afternoon she and others were undergoing training for soap making business in front of the

Alay Kapwa center. There were people shouting and running towards them. After the first group of

people passed by her, she saw Chito Gratil collared and held by the police.

A criminal information was filed against Chito Gratil. The RTC found Gratil guilty beyond

reasonable doubt for violating the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. On appeal, the Court of

Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Gratil alleged that the prosecution failed to prove beyond

reasonable doubt the identity of the drug which constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense.

Moreover, he alleged that proper procedure for taking custody of the seized prohibited drugs was

not faithfully followed.




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Issues:

1. Whether or not the prosecution was able to satisfy its burden

2. Whether or not the failure to observe the proper procedure for taking custody of seized

prohibited drugs is fatal to the prosecution of the case

Ruling:

1. Prosecution was able to satisfy its burden. Gratil is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

In prosecutions involving the illegal sale of drugs, what is material is proof that the

transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or

regulated drug as evidence. For conviction of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited or regulated

drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object,

and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.

A perusal of the records would reveal that the foregoing requisites are present in the case at

bar. The proof of the shabu transaction was established by prosecution witness Senior PoliceOfficer (SPO) 2 William Manglo, the poseur-buyer, who made a positive identification of the

appellant as the one who gave him the "Mercury Drug" bag and to whom he gave the marked

money during the buy-bust operation.

2. The alleged procedural infirmity pointed out by appellant does not prove fatal to the

prosecution’s case.

Section 1 of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board

Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which was cited by appellant as the rule of procedure which the

arresting police officers did not strictly observe, provides that all prohibited and regulated drugs

shall be physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused who shall be

required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

However, the failure to conduct an inventory and to photograph the confiscated items in the

manner prescribed under the said provision of law applicable at the time of appellant’s arrest and

which is now incorporated as Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 (The Comprehensive

Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) that repealed Republic Act No. 6425 cannot be used as a ground for

appellant’s exoneration from the charge against him.

The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation No. 3, Series

of 1979 is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is

totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that the commission of the

crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is

established.

First, it must be made clear that in several cases decided by the Court, failure by the buy-

bust team to comply with said section did not prevent the presumption of regularity in the

performance of duty from applying.

Second, even prior to the enactment of R.A. 9165, the requirements contained in Section

21(a) were already there per Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Despite the




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presence of such regulation and its non-compliance by the buy-bust team, the Court still applied

such presumption. x x x.

Notwithstanding the minor lapse in procedure committed by the police officers in the handling of

the illegal drugs taken from appellant, the identity and integrity of the evidence was never put into

serious doubt in the course of the proceedings of this case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDWIN ULAT y AGUINALDO @ PUDONGG.R. No. 180504, October 5, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

In the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must be able to successfully prove the

following elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the

delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The conspicuous variance in the testimonies for

the prosecution casts serious doubt on the arresting teams due care in the custody of the confiscated

illegal drug. We declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to

establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu, and the irregularity which

characterized the handling of the evidence before it was finally offered in court, fatally conflicts with

every proposition relative to the culpability of the accused.

Facts:

In an Information filed against the Edwin Ulat charged with violation of Section 5, Article II

of Republic Act No. 9165,that the above-named accused, without the necessary license or

prescription and without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously sell, deliver and distribute Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug,

weighing zero point zero two (0.02) gram, in consideration of P100.00. Edwin Ulat pleaded not

guilty to the charge, thereafter, trial commenced.

The prosecutions version of the events leading to Edwin Ulat’s arrest is as follows: On

February 10, 2003, a confidential informant relayed information regarding the illegal drug pushingactivities of one alias Pudong along Seabird Street, Barangay Rizal, Makati City to Barangay

Chairman Dreu, head of the Makati Anti-Drug Abuse Council. The MADAC in coordination with the

Makati Police Drug Enforcement Unit met and decided to go to the place of alias Pudong to verify if

alias Pudong is indeed selling illegal drugs and to conduct an entrapment operation. During the

briefing, it was agreed that one of the MADAC volunteers, Armando Pol-ot, together with the

confidential informant, would act as poseur buyer and buy illegal drugs from alias Pudong that very

same day. The buy-bust money was then marked and was handed to the poseur-buyer. Pol-ot, who

was then accompanied by the confidential informant, approached alias Pudong and was introduced

by the informant as a buyer in need of shabu. Alias Pudong asked how much and Pol-ot replied Piso

lang naman, meaning One Hundred Pesos only. Thereafter, alias Pudong took the marked money

and left. Upon his return, he handed Pol-ot a small plastic sachet containing suspected substance.

Pol-ot then gave the pre-arranged signal and lighted a cigarette, signifying that the transaction wasconsummated. Upon seeing the pre-arranged signal, PO1 Santos and Rogelio Patacsil approached

alias Pudong and apprehended him. Alias Pudong was then ordered to empty the contents of his

pockets and the marked money was recovered. The confiscated substance contained in the plastic

sachet which Pol-ot bought from alias Pudong was then marked EUA. Pudong was brought to the

Makati DEU office for proper investigation. The duty investigator prepared a request for laboratory

examination of the specimen marked EUA and a drug test for the accused. The following day PO1

Santos and MADAC volunteers Pol-ot and Patacsil executed a sworn statement entitled Pinagsanib




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na Salaysay ng Pag-aresto in connection to the buy-bust operation which led to the arrest of

appellant Edwin Ulat y Aguinaldo alias Pudong.

On the other hand, the defense narrated the following: In the evening of 10 February 2003,

at about 7:30 oclock p.m., the accused, EDWIN ULAT, was at home watching television when he saw

five (5) to seven (7) men in front of their door whom he thought were looking for someone. Heapproached them and asked who they were looking for. Suddenly, a gun was poked at him and he

was told to go with them to the barangay hall. Ulat then asked who they were but he was told not to

ask question or else he might get hurt. Two (2) of the men forced him out of the house. He resisted

but he was punched in the stomach and was dragged towards a blue Revo. The accused was

likewise asked if he knew a certain Sandy. He denied knowing the said person. He was brought to

the barangay hall and then to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID).

After due proceedings, the trial court convicted Edwin Ulat of violation of Section 5, Article

II of Republic Act No. 9165. On review, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

Thus, interposed the present appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty with

violation of section 5, article ii of R.A. 9165 despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the

offense charged beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

Yes, the trial court gravely erred.

The law presumes that an accused in a criminal prosecution is innocent until the contrary is

proved. This basic constitutional principle is fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the

prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyondreasonable doubt. Whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left for the trial courts to

determine. Owing to the built-in dangers of abuse that a buy-bust operation entails, the law

prescribes specific procedures on the seizure and custody of drugs, independently of the general

procedures geared to ensure that the rights of people under criminal investigation and of the

accused facing a criminal charge are safeguarded.

In this regard, Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 states: The

apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure

and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or

the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or

counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected

public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

In the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must be able to successfully prove

the following elements: (1) identities of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Similarly, it is essential that the

transaction or sale be proved to have actually taken place coupled with the presentation in court of

evidence of corpus delicti which means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime

charged. A meticulous review of the records of this case has led us to the conclusion that the




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prosecution failed to demonstrate with moral certainty that the identity and integrity of the

prohibited drug, which constitutes the corpus delicti, had been duly preserved.

First, the records reveal that the prosecution did not establish the exact location where the

confiscated illegal drug was marked and the identity of the person who marked it because of

contradicting testimonies from the prosecutions witnesses. This conspicuous variance in thetestimonies for the prosecution casts serious doubt on the arresting teams due care in the custody

of the confiscated illegal drug. Worse, the foregoing is not the only instance of conflict between the

narrations of Pol-ot and PO1 Santos with regard to the handling of the confiscated sachet of shabu.

In other words, the prosecution could not present an unbroken chain of custody for the seized

illegal drug.

In a string of cases, we declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of

key witnesses to establish a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu, and the

irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before it was finally offered in

court, fatally conflicts with every proposition relative to the culpability of the accused. We are not

unaware of existing jurisprudence holding that non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust

team with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable groundtherefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are

properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. It is this assurance of evidentiary integrity

that is lacking in the case at bar. Thus, as a consequence thereof, appellants acquittal from the

criminal charge against him would be in order. However, in the present case, there were not merely

trifling lapses in the handling of the evidence taken from the accused but the prosecution could not

even establish what procedure was followed by the arresting team to ensure a proper chain of

custody for the confiscated prohibited drug.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GREGG C. BUENAVENTURAG.R. No. 184807, November 23, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

In a buy-bust operation, the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officersconducting the operation are not only authorized, but duty-bound, to apprehend the violator and to

search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime.

Facts:

An entrapment operation was planned in response to a tip given by a confidential informant

of rampant selling of illegal drugs by one, Gregg C. Buenaventura, at Teachers Village, Barangay San

Miguel, Pasig City. P01 Espares was designated as the poseur-buyer and two P100 bills were

marked with his initials ME. P03 Sanchez and the other members of the entrapment team

positioned themselves nearby to observe the transaction between PO1 Espares and accused

Buenaventura.

PO1 Espares then executed the pre-arranged signal to let the other police officers know that

the buy-bust transaction had been consummated. Buenaventura, already sensing that something

was wrong, attempted to escape by locking himself up in his house and jumping off the roof to an

adjoining vacant lot. The police officers pursued and eventually arrested Buenaventura, and seized

from him the marked bills in his possession. The plastic sachet containing white crystalline

substance, obtained by PO1 Espares from Buenaventura, was duly marked at the place where

Buenaventura was apprehended. Thereafter, the contents of the plastic sachet were subjected to




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forensic examination which yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride,

otherwise known as shabu.

Buenaventura’s defense consisted only of denial and claim of frame-up. He also asserts the

violation of his constitutional right as the police officers did not have a warrant to search his person

and to seize the marked money in his possession.

Both the RTC and CA found Buenaventura guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling

dangerous drugs without lawful authority, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.

9165

Issue:

Can the police officers conducting a buy-bust operation search accused’s person and seizethe marked money in his possession without a warrant?

Ruling:

Yes, they can.

A buy-bust operation is far variant from an ordinary arrest; it is a form of entrapment which

has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs

Law. In a buy-bust operation, the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers

conducting the operation are not only authorized, but duty-bound, to apprehend the violator and to

search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the crime.

The SC sustained the judgment of conviction against Buenaventura, for the prosecution has

proven beyond reasonable doubt that he was selling dangerous drugs without lawful authority, in

violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

For the successful prosecution of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the

buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment

therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the

transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus

delicti. The presence of all of these elements in the instant case has been duly established.

As has been held, denial as a rule is a weak form of defense, particularly when it is not

substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has

been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a

common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NENITA LEGASPI y LUCASG.R. No. 173485, November 23, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Legaspi claims that she was instigated into committing the crime as charged, as she was the

one approached by San Andres, who was then looking to buy shabu cannot stand. To use instigation as

a defense, the accused must prove with sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit

the offense. Legaspi was never forced, coerced, or induced to source the prohibited drug. Unless there is

clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust operation team were inspired by




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improper motive or did not properly perform their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full

faith and credit.

Facts:

On April 23, 2003 Nenita Legaspi y Lucas, also known as Nita, was charged before the RTCfor violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. On or about April 22, 2003, the accused,

not being lawfully authorized to sell, possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug, did then and

there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to Police Officer Arturo San

Andres, a police poseur buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white

crystalline substance weighing sixteen (16) decigrams (0.16 grams), which was found positive to

the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride (Shabu), a dangerous drug, in violation of said law.

Upon arraignment Legaspi pleaded not guilty to the charge against her. The prosecution evidence,

upon which the RTC anchored its finding of guilt, consisted of the testimonies of two of the

operatives involved in the buy-bust operation, Police Officer (PO) 2 Arturo San Andres and PO1

Janet A. Sabo.

On April 22, 2003, at around 4:00 p.m., a certain informant, approached San Andres toreport about the rampant incidence of drug abuse at Centennial Village, Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City

and about the drug pusher who was identified as Legaspi. San Andres immediately informed his

superior, Police Inspector Villaruel, who instructed him, Sabo, PO1 Aldrin Mariano, and PO1 Roland

Panis to conduct a buy-bust operation. Villaruel designated San Andres to act as the poseur-buyer

and gave him two pieces of one hundred-peso (₱100.00) bills to be used as buy-bust money.

At around 5:15 p.m., the team proceeded to Legaspis house, while the others strategically

placed themselves in the entrapment area, keeping San Andres within their view. After San Andres

gave Legaspi the buy-bust money, which he had previously marked with his initials ABS, Legaspi

reached into her pocket and gave him one heat-sealed plastic sachet containing the

suspected shabu. The team then brought Legaspi to Rizal Medical Center for a check-up, and then to

the police station wherein they filed the appropriate charges against her. Meanwhile, San Andres

sent the sachet to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory and requested for an

examination to determine the nature of its contents.

After the prosecution had rested its case, Legaspi was called to the witness stand to relay her

version of the events. Legaspi primarily denied the charges against her. She testified that, while she

was inside her house taking care of her grandson, San Andres and Mariano peeked through her

window and asked her if she was Nita. Legaspi alleged that after she answered in the affirmative,

the two police officers pushed the door open and told her to go with them. She claimed that because

of the shock the events had caused her, she was not able to ask the police officers why they were

taking her with them. In convicting Legaspi, the RTC stated that it was more convinced with the

version of the prosecution. The RTC held that the positive testimonies of the two police officerswere stronger than Legaspis negative testimony. The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision,

affirming the RTCs judgment of conviction.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the Legaspi of the crime charged

despite the fact that the police instigated the alleged buy-bust transaction.




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Ruling:

No, the trial court did not err in convicting Legaspi.

Entrapment is sanctioned by the law as a legitimate method of apprehending criminals. Its

purpose is to trap and capture lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. Instigation, onthe other hand, involves the inducement of the would-be accused into the commission of the

offense. In such a case, the instigators become co-principals themselves. Instigation is recognized as

a valid defense that can be raised by an accused. To use this as a defense, however, the accused

must prove with sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the

offense. Legaspi claims that she was induced into committing the crime as charged, as she was the

one approached by San Andres, who was then looking to buy shabu.

We find, however, that Legaspi’s defense of instigation must fail. It is an established rule

that when an accused is charged with the sale of illicit drugs, the following defenses cannot be set

up: (1) that facilities for the commission of the crime were intentionally placed in his way; or

(2) that the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the decoy or poseur-buyer seeking to

expose his criminal act; or (3) that police authorities feigning complicity in the act were presentand apparently assisted in its commission.

The prosecution evidence positively showed that Legaspi agreed to sell ₱200.00 worth

of shabu to San Andres, who was then posing as a buyer. Legaspi was never forced, coerced, or

induced to source the prohibited drug for San Andres. In fact, San Andres did not even have to ask

her if she could sell him shabu. Legaspi was merely informed that he was also a scorer; and as soon

as she learned that he was looking to buy, she immediately asked him how much he needed. Under

the circumstances, the police officers were not only authorized but were under an obligation to

arrest Legaspi even without an arrest warrant as the crime was committed in their presence. The

RTC was correct in upholding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in applying the

presumption of regularity in the performance of duty by the police officers, especially since Legaspi

failed to impute on them any motive to falsely testify against her. Unless there is clear and

convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust operation team were inspired by improper

motive or did not properly perform their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith

and credit. Furthermore, when Legaspi testified in court, her defense was one of denial and not

instigation. While instigation is a positive defense, it partakes of the nature of a confession and

avoidance.

Legaspi also argues that the veracity of the buy-bust operation is suspect as it was conducted

without prior surveillance. This Court has many times discussed the dispensability of prior

surveillance in buy-bust operations, as it is not a pre-requisite for the validity of an entrapment or

such buy-bust operation. Legaspi further contends that the failure to present the informant as a

witness in court is very material and relevant in the case at bar, inasmuch as she had denied havingsold shabu to anyone. The presentation of an informant is not a requisite for the successful

prosecution of drug cases. Informants are almost always never presented in court because of the

need to preserve their invaluable service to the police.

People of the Philippines vs. Benjamin Amansec y DonaG.R. No. 186131, December 14, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro




Page 62 of 299

Prior surveillance is not required for a valid buy-bust operation, especially if the buy-bust team

is accompanied to the target area by their informant. Furthermore, the failure of the police officers to

use ultraviolet powder on the buy-bust money is not an indication that the buy-bust operation was a

sham. The use of initials to mark the money used in a buy-bust operation has been accepted by the SC.

Facts:

Amansec was charged and convicted for selling methylamphetamine hydrochloride, more

popularly known as shabu, in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,

Amansec argues that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses as they failed to pass the test in determining the value of a witnesss

testimony that such must be in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of

mankind.

Amasec claims that the charges against him were merely planted and enumerates the

following as evidence, which supposedly creates reasonable doubt as to the allegation of theprosecution that a buy-bust operation was conducted:

1. Only Amansec was charged with violating Republic Act No. 9165, and not Pintis, whom the

police officers alleged to have bought shabu from him, while the buy-bust operation was being

conducted.

2. The prosecution failed to produce and present in court the ₱100.00 bill Pintis allegedly used tobuy shabu from Amansec.

3. The informant was not presented in court, and no explanation was given by the prosecution for

their failure to do so.

4. There was no surveillance prior to the buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers.

5. The buy-bust money used by Mabutol was not dusted with ultraviolet powder.

Amansecs arguments are untenable. As we have held before, [i]t is for the party to plan its ownstrategy and to choose which witnesses to call and what evidence to submit to support its own

cause.

Amansec asserts that his conviction was incorrect because the evidence against him was

obtained in violation of the procedure outlined in Republic Act No. 9165. He claims that Section 21

of the aforesaid act was violated when the police officers who arrested him did not take his picture

with the shabu they confiscated from him, and when they made no physical inventory of the shabu

in his presence, or in the presence of his representative, the media, the department of justice, or any

elected public official. Amansec avers that his presumption of innocence prevails over the

presumption that the police officers performed their duty in a regular manner.

He also avers that the prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody of the evidenceobtained from him as the station investigator, to whom the specimens were turned over, was not

presented in court. Moreover, Amansec claims, there was no evidence to show that the forensic

chemist examined the same articles allegedly confiscated from him. Amansec says that the

stipulations made as regards the testimony of the forensic chemist mentioned nothing about the

chemists actual receipt of the specimens from the Investigator or from any other person. Amansec

argues that the prosecutions failure to establish the evidences chain of custody is fatal and leads to

the unavoidable suspicion on its integrity.




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Issue:

Whether or not both the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in convicting Amansec for

violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165

Ruling:

No, there was no error on the part of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals in convicting

Amansec for violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.

We have been consistent in our ruling that prior surveillance is not required for a valid buy-

bust operation, especially if the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by their informant.

In People v. Eugenio,we held:

There is no requirement that prior surveillance should be conducted before a buy-bust

operation can be undertaken especially when, as in this case, the policemen are accompanied to thescene by their civilian informant. Prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an

entrapment or a buy-bust operation, there being no fixed or textbook method for conducting one. We

have held that when time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior surveillance.

The failure of the police officers to use ultraviolet powder on the buy-bust money is not an

indication that the buy-bust operation was a sham. The use of initials to mark the money used in a

buy-bust operation has been accepted by this Court.

In People v. Rivera, we declared:

It was x x x the prerogative of the prosecution to choose the manner of marking the money to

be used in the buy-bust operation, and the fact that it was not dusted with fluorescent powder did notrender the exhibit inadmissible. Indeed, the use of initials to mark the money used in the buy-bust

operation has been accepted by this Court in numerous cases

Ideally, the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken. However a

testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible to

obtain an unbroken chain.

Thus, even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical inventory and

photograph of the seized drugs as required under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, this will not

render Amansecs arrest illegal or the items seized from him as inadmissible in evidence.

This Court has consistently held that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of theintegrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, because the same will be utilized in

ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the

evidence seized had been preserved. Both the prosecution witnesses were categorical and

consistent that Amansec offered three plastic sachets containing shabu to Mabutol and Pintis. These

were later recovered from Amansec, Pintis, and Mabutol himself. As soon as the police officers,




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together with Amansec and Pintis, reached the La Loma Police Station, the seized sachets were

marked with the initials of the police officers, with each officer marking the sachet he personally

retrieved from the suspects. This was done before the specimens were turned over to the station

investigator for the preparation of the request for laboratory examination. Thereafter, the

specimens were forwarded to the crime lab by the police officers themselves. The Chemistry Report

prepared by the forensic chemist listed the same specimens, which bore the initials of the policeofficers, and which were later identified by Mabutol and Pascua in open court as the plastic sachets

they marked with their initials.

Besides, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved will remain

unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence. Amansec

bears the burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers

handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties. This,

Amansec failed to do.

Furthermore, there is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in its implementing rules, which

requires each and everyone who came into contact with the seized drugs to testify in court. As long

as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly established to have not been broken and theprosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and

every person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand

The successful prosecution of the sale of dangerous drugs case depends on the satisfaction

of the following elements:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

To elucidate on the foregoing elements, this Court has said that [i]n prosecutions for illegal

sale of shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupledwith the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.

It is evident in the case at bar that the prosecution was able to establish the said elements.

Amansec was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses, as the person who sold to the

poseur-buyer a heat-sealed plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. He had been

caught red-handed in the entrapment operation conducted by the SDEU of the La Loma Police. Such

positive identification must prevail over Amansecs uncorroborated and weak defense of denial, and

unsubstantiated defense of frame-up.

The corpus delicti of the crime was also established with certainty and conclusiveness.

Amansec gave one of the two remaining plastic sachets to Mabutol after receiving the ₱100.00 buy -

bust money.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCOS SABADLAB y NARCISO @ "Bong PangoG.R. No. 186392, January 18, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were

inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the

buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit. Settled is the rule that in cases involving violations of




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the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers, for they

are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the

contrary suggesting ill motive on the part of the police officers or deviation from the regular

performance of their duties

Facts:

The respondent, Marcos Sabadlab, was charged with illegal sale and possession of

dangerous drugs under RA 9165 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

The prosecution presented PO3 Lowaton as witness where he testified that they received an

informat ion that a certain “Bong Pango” was selling shabu around the streets of Makati. Acting on

this information, the PO3 Lowaton planned an entrapment or a buy-bust operation. They then

arrested Sabadlab. The Regional Trial Court gave credence to the testimony of PO3 Lowaton and

convicted Sabadlab for illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the Court of

Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, the current petition.

It is the contention of Sabadlab that the lower courts erred in giving credence to thetestimony of PO3 Lowaton and the fact that there was no close coordination with PDEA and no

prior surveillance made his arrest and conviction doubtful. In addition, he contends that it is

contrary to human nature for him to bring his son during a drug sale transaction.

Issue:

Whether or not, considering the contention of Sabadlab, he should be convicted of illegal

sale and possession of dangerous drugs.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ruled thatSabadlab must be convicted for violation of the provisions of the Dangerous Drug Act.

It is a well-settled rule that the courts gives ample value to the testimony of police officers in

the absence of any evidence that the testimony made by the said police officer arises out of an ill

and improper motive. This is premised upon the principle of regularity of performance of the duties

of the law enforcement agencies. In the case at bar, Sabadlad failed to present any evidence that the

testimony made by PO3 Sabadlad is derived from an ill and improper motive. Moreover, the

contention of Sabadlad that there must be a prior surveillance in order for the buy-bust operation

to be valid is untenable. Prior surveillance is not a necessity or a condition precedent to a valid buy-

bust operation. The police officers are given the discretion whether or not to conduct surveillance,

they may decide to dispense with surveillance when time is of the essence in order to arrest the

offender. In addition, the implementing rules and the Dangerous Drug Act itself is silent as to theeffect when the police fails to closely coordinate with PDEA. This silence, the Supreme Court held,

cannot be construed to make the arrest or the evidence confiscated through a buy-bust operation

inadmissible as evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL CLARITE y SALAZARG.R. No. 187157, February 15, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro




Page 66 of 299

In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution

witnesses who are police officers on the ground that they are presumed to have performed their duties

in a regular manner. The exception is when there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill motive on

the part of the police officers or deviation from the regular performance of their duties. In the case at

bar, accused-appellant’s only evidence of ill motive on the part of the NBI operatives is his own

testimony of frame-up and extortion, a very common defense in dangerous drugs cases. We have heldthat such defense is viewed with disfavor, for it can be easily concocted. To substantiate such a defense,

therefore, the evidence must be clear and convincing.

Facts:

Police officer Romano received an information from their asset Cedeno that a certain

“Arnel” who is a supplier of illegal drugs is looking for a buyer. Upon this information, the policeofficers planned an entrapment operation. Arnel was then arrested as he was caught inflagrante

delicto selling drugs. The Regional Trial Court convicted the Arnel of violation of Section 5 of RA

9165 for illegal sale of dangerous drugs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the

RTC.

Accused-appellant’s main contention is that he was arrested while he was riding a tricycle

and not while he was supposedly selling shabu. Thus, since he was not caught in flagrante delicto,

he can only be arrested with a warrant. Consequently, according to accused-appellant, the search

conducted upon him cannot be deemed to have been incidental to a lawful arrest, thus, making the

evidence obtained therefrom inadmissible. In making such argument, accused-appellant challenges

the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals which both accepted the version of the

prosecution.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent Arnel should be convicted of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and ruled that the

accused must be convicted of the crime charged.

Unfortunately for accused-appellant, findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when

affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon this Court, save only for certain compelling

reasons. We perused the records of the case at bar and found no reason to disturb the findings of

the courts a quo.

In cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution

witnesses who are police officers on the ground that they are presumed to have performed theirduties in a regular manner. The exception is when there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill

motive on the part of the police officers or deviation from the regular performance of their duties.

In the case at bar, accused-appellant’s only evidence of ill motive on the part of the NBI operatives

is his own testimony of frame-up and extortion, a very common defense in dangerous drugs cases.

We have held that such defense is viewed with disfavor, for it can be easily concocted. To

substantiate such a defense, therefore, the evidence must be clear and convincing.




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Jurisprudence holds that the elements of the crime of illegal sale of drugs are the following:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the

thing sold and payment therefor.

The testimonies of Romano, corroborated by his fellow NBI investigators Jimenez and Dizon

and informant Cedeño established the sale and delivery by accused-appellant Clarite to Romano ofwhat was initially believed to be 50 grams of shabu in four plastic sachets, in exchange for what

Clarite thought was P50,000.00. Romano positively identified accused-appellant Clarite as the

person who sold the plastic sachets of shabu to him.

As for accused-appellant’s argument that he would not have sold shabu in a crowded place,

we find the same unconvincing. We have already held in Ching v. People that:

This Court observed in many cases that drug pushers sell their prohibited articles to any

prospective customer, be he a stranger or not, in private as well as in public places, even in the

daytime. Indeed, drug pushers have become increasingly daring, dangerous and, worse, openly

defiant of the law. Hence, what matters is not the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of

agreement and the acts constituting sale and delivery of the prohibited drugs.

Accused-appellant also claims that the alleged buy-bust operation was conducted without

the authorization of or coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), in

violation of Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165. This Court has already held that the silence of the

foregoing provision as to the consequences of the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the

prior authority of the PDEA cannot be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without

such PDEA participation illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSEMARIE MAGUNDAYAO y ALEJANDRO alias "ROSE,"G.R. No. 188132, February 29, 2012, J. Leonardo–De Castro

We therefore stress that the ‘objective’ test in buy -bust operations demands that the details ofthe purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial

contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the

consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale.

The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to

purchase the drug, the payment of the ‘buy -bust’ money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether

to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure

that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.

Facts:

Two criminal complaints were filed against respondent Rosemarie Alejandro for illegal sale

and illegal possession of dangerous drugs in violation of the provisions of RA 9165. The RegionalTrial Court convicted the accused of the crime charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the

decision of the RTC. Hence, the current petition.

The accused-appellant claims that there exist in the records of the case certain facts and

circumstances that makes doubtful the prosecution’s version of events. She pointed to the allegedlycontradictory statements in the testimonies of PO3 Arago and PO2 Memoracion as to how their

team leader, P/Chief Insp. Paat, received the information disclosed by the informant. Specifically,




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PO2 Memoracion testified that the informant himself talked to P/Chief Insp. Paat. PO3 Arago,

however, stated in his testimony that the information was first given to the other members of their

team and the same was thereafter relayed to P/Chief Insp. Paat.

The accused-appellant also argues that the inventory of the items seized from the accused-

appellant lacked the requisite signatures of a representative of the media, the Department of Justiceor any elected public official. This procedural lapse was allegedly not explained adequately by the

witnesses of the prosecution. In like manner, the police did not photograph the confiscated items in

the presence of the above-enumerated individuals. These procedural lapses, the accused-appellant

posits, violated the provisions of Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165, thus proving that the

police failed to perform their duty properly. Accordingly, in praying for her acquittal, the accused-

appellant submits that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot

be invoked as a basis for her conviction given the presence of facts and circumstances tending to

negate said presumption. She concludes that "the presumption of regularity in the performance of

official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not

overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt."

Issue:

Whether or not Alejandro must be convicted of illegal sale and possession of dangerous

drugs.

Ruling:


accused is guilty of the crime charged.

Appellant rightly argues that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official

duty by law enforcement agents should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence. In

fact it is on this premise that we have laid down the ‘objective’ test in scrutinizing buy -bustoperations. In People v. Doria, we said:

We therefore stress that the ‘objective’ test in buy-bust operations demands that the details

of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial

contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of

the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of

the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant,

the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the ‘buy -bust’ money, and the delivery of the illegal

drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by

courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.

In consonance with the above-stated "objective test," the testimony of PO2 Memoracionduly established that the members of the SAID-SOTF of the Taguig City Police Station properly

performed their duties in the conduct of the buy-bust operation on April 14, 2005. The testimony of

PO2 Memoracion, which was corroborated by the testimony of PO3 Arago. Consequently, the

accused-appellant’s claim of frame-up cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony and the

positive identification made by the witnesses for the prosecution. Hence, the presumption of

regularity in the performance of official duties on the part of the police officers in this case stands.




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As regards the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO2 Memoracion and PO3

Arago, the Court finds the same unpersuasive. People v. Lazaro states that "[f]or a discrepancy or

inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as basis for acquittal, it must refer to the

significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence of the accused for the crime charged. An

inconsistency which has nothing to do with the elements of the crime cannot be a ground for the

acquittal of the accused."

In People v. Padua, the Court stated that "[c]learly, the purpose of the procedure outlined in

the implementing rules is centered on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the

seized items." Furthermore, we reiterated in People v. Naquita that "[n]either would non-

compliance with Section 21 render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from

him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the

evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt

or innocence of the accused."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUSA FIGUEROA Y CORONADOG.R. No. 186141, April 11, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

It is settled that Sec. 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not invalidate operations on account of the

law enforcers’ failure to maintain close coordination with the PDEA.

Facts:

Jesusa Figueroa was charged for a violation of Sec. 26 of Republic Act No. 9165.

For the version of the prosecution, it testified that an informant came to the office of Supt.

Yabut, Chief of the Special Operation of PNP Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force and

informed him of the drug pushing activities of a certain “Baby” later identified as Figueroa. Supt.Yabut instructed his task force to conduct discreet surveillance operation to verify the information.

PO3 Callora, together with the informant, met with Figueroa at the parking area of SM

Bicutan in Taguig, Manila. The informant introduced PO3 Callora to Figueroa as the one who was

willing to regularly buy shabu from her should the sample be of good quality. Figueroa however told

them that she had no stock of shabu at that time, but she promised to inform PO3 Callora through

the informant once she already has supply of good quality shabu.

Figueroa informed PO3 Callora that she had a stock of shabu and she agreed to deliver the

shabu in front of 7-eleven Convenience Store at the corner of San Joaquin, Pasig City. The task force

proceeded to the agreed meeting place. PO3 Callora and the informant waited Figueroa, who after a

few minutes, arrived driving a car. Stopping near them, Figueroa rolled down the window of her car

and asked where the money was. At that juncture, Figueroa opened a Chowking plastic bag and

showed a plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. When PO3 Callora was about tohand over the buy-bust money, Figueroa, sensed the presence of police officers in the area, so she

sped away. Figueroa’s vehicle was finally blocked at Kalayaan Avenue. At the time, a police office saw

a boy alighted from the backdoor of the car and threw the Chowking plactic bag to the pavement.

The police officer picked it up and saw a heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white

crystalline substance inside. Subsequently, Figueroa was arrested.

On her defense, Figueroa denied that she met and transacted with PO3 Callora. She likewise




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denied knowledge of the plastic sachets of shabu that were recovered. Furthermore she alleged that

the buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers was irregular because of lack of prior

coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency.

The RTC rendered a decision finding Figueroa guilty of the offense of violation of Sec. 26 of

RA 9165 which was also affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Issue:

Whether the buy-bust operation was irregular because there was lack of prior coordination

with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency

Ruling:

No.

It is settled that Sec. 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not invalidate operations on account of

the law enforcers’ failure to maintain close coordination with the PDEA. The Court noted thatSection 86, as well as the Internal Rule and Regulations implementing the same, is silent as to the

consequences of the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek authority of the PDEA prior to

conducting a buy-bust operation. Hence this silence cannot be interpreted as a legislative intent to

make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained pursuant to such an

arrest inadmissible.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JIMMY BIYALA VELASQUEZG.R. No. 177224, April 11, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following elements

concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;

(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed thesaid drug.

Facts:

Jimmy Biyala Velazquez was charged with violation of Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as

the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended.

The testimonies of the prosecution stated that a certain Manuel De Vera reported to the office

of the Regional Criminal Investigation and Detectiin Group that Velazquez is engaged in selling

shabu and marijuana leaves in his residence at Baguio City.

Hence, a team of police officers was formed to implement a search warrant. They sought theassistance of Barangay Kagawad Udani and Somera to witness the search. The police officers

together with Udani and Somera proceeded to the residence of Velazquez, introduced themselves

and presented the search warrant.

In the course of the search, the police officers found in the bedroom of Velazquez a plastic bag

containing a brick of dried leaves suspected to be marijuana. After informing Velazquez that they

found illegal drugs inside his bedroom, the police officer arrested him. When Velazquez was frisked,




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one transparent heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance suspected to be

shabu was found in his pocket.

In his defense, Velazquez stated that he was frame-up and that when he was bodily searched,

they found nothing on him. Furthermore, Velazquez claimed that when the conduct of the search

started, the barangay officials Udani and Somera were not present.

The RTC rendered a decision finding Velazquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime

charged against him.

Issue:

Whether Velazquez is guilty of the crime charged

Ruling:

Yes.

Illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs is committed when the following elements

concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited

drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously

possessed the said drug.

All these elements were established beyond reasonable doubt in the cases against

Velazquez. The prosecution witnesses consistently and categorically testified that pursuant to a

search warrant duly issued by a judge, they found and seized from accused-appellants house and

actual possession a brick of marijuana leaves and heat-sealed sachets of methamphetamine

hydrochloride or shabu.

In contrast, Velazquez only proffered the defenses of denial and frame-up, that the dangerousdrugs and paraphernalia were planted by the police officers. However, other than his bare

allegations, there is no other evidence on record to corroborate his version of the events that

transpired at his house. Denial as a rule is a weak form of defense, particularly when it is not

substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has

been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a

common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARICAR BRAINER y MANGULABNANG.R. No. 188571, October 10, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

This Court has already ruled in several cases that the failure of the arresting officer to comply

strictly with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal. It will not render the arrest of the accusedillegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost important is the

preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be

utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Also, in every prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation of the drug,

i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in court is material. In fact, the existence of the dangerous drug is

crucial to a judgment of conviction. It is, therefore, indispensable that the identity of the prohibited




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drug be established beyond doubt. Even more than this, what must also be established is the fact that

the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered in court as exhibit.

The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts

concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

Finally, the Court acknowledged that a testimony about a perfect chain is not always thestandard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. The Court stresses that what is

of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items.

Facts:

At around 6:00 p.m. on June 22, 2004, a confidential informant apprised a certain PO2 of

Sampaloc Police Station 4 (PS4) that a certain Cacay was looking for a shabu buyer. Such

information was relayed to the Chief of the Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Task Unit

(SAID-SOTU), who immediately organized a buy-bust team composed of himself, PO3 Renaldo

Robles (Robles), PO3 Ronaldo Intia (Intia), PO3 Jonathan Dy, PO1 Arnel Pornillosa (Pornillosa), and

PO2 Gatdula as the poseur-buyer. A coordination report was faxed to the Philippine Drug

Enforcement Agency stating that the entrapment would be conducted on June 22-23, 2004. PoliceInspector and Forensic Chemical Officer Reyes conducted the physical examination of the specimen

and stated in her Chemistry Report No. D-1158-0410 that the said specimen positively tested for

methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

Thus, respondent Brainer was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act

No. 9165. Respondent testified in her own defense. According to him, the buy-bust operation did

not take place and the shabu allegedly confiscated during the said operation was not hers. The

defense also called on several other people to testify for the defense. One of them corroborated

respondent’s testimony regarding the arresting police officers’ demand for P 300,000.00 in

exchange for respondent’s freedom. Another declared that he knew Brainer since childhood as theywere neighbors; and there had never been a report in the barangay that respondent used or pushed

illegal drugs. The other claimed that she was the one who introduced Brainer to PO2 Gatdula whenrespondent’s friend was in trouble.

The trial court gave full faith and credit to the police officer’s straight, clear, and convincing

testimony, and found that an entrapment actually took place. This was affirmed by the appellate

court.

Issues: 1) Whether or not the failure of the arresting officer to comply strictly with Section 21 of

Republic Act No. 9165 is fatal and would be a ground for the acquittal of the accused.

2) Whether or not the case should be dismissed based on chain of custody.

Ruling:

1. No, it’s not fatal.

In every prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the presentation of the drug, i.e.,

the corpus delicti, as evidence in court is material. In fact, the existence of the dangerous drug is

crucial to a judgment of conviction. It is, therefore, indispensable that the identity of the prohibited




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drug be established beyond doubt. Even more than this, what must also be established is the fact

that the substance bought during the buy-bust operation is the same substance offered in court as

exhibit. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary

doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.

Furthermore, the fact that the item allegedly seized and confiscated from her was notimmediately marked after her arrest and that there was no physical inventory and photograph of

the item supposedly seized and confiscated from her is not enough to warrant dismissal of the case.

This Court has already ruled in several cases that the failure of the arresting officer to

comply strictly with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal. It will not render the arrest of

the accused illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost

important is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the

same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations which expounds on how Section

21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 is to be applied and, notably, also provides for a saving

mechanism in case the procedure laid down in the law was not strictly complied with, to wit:(a) x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under

justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized

items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render

void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis ours.)

For the successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements

must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is the proof that the

transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.

The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money

consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. In other

words, the commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, merely requiresthe consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the exchange of money

and drugs between the buyer and the seller takes place.

A review of the records of this case reveals that the prosecution was able to prove all the

essential elements of illegal sale of shabu. PO2 Gatdula, the poseur-buyer, was able to positively

identify Brainer as the person who sold to him the plastic sachet containing white crystalline

substance, later determined to be shabu, for the sum of P 1,000.00, during a legitimate buy-bust

operation. As the RTC expressly observed, Gatdula’s narration of the circumstances leading to theconsummation of the sale of illegal drugs and the arrest of Brainer was given in a clear, positive,

and straightforward manner.

The defense utterly failed to prove any ill motive on PO2 Gatdula’s part which would havespurred the police officer to falsely impute a serious crime against Brainer. Where there is nothing

to indicate that the witnesses for the prosecution were moved by improper motives, the

presumption is that they were not so moved, and that their testimony is entitled to full faith and

credit. Neither was respondent able to present clear and convincing evidence of frame-up and

extortion to overturn the presumption that PO2 Gatdula regularly performed his duty.




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Charges of extortion and frame-up are frequently made in this jurisdiction. Courts are, thus,

cautious in dealing with such accusations, which are quite difficult to prove in light of the

presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers’ duties. To substantiate suchdefense, which can be easily concocted, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show

that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly

performing their duty. Otherwise, the police officers’ testimonies on the operation deserve full faithand credit.

2. No, the case should not be dismissed.

Respondent tries to raise doubts on the chain of custody of the item seized and confiscated

from her. Brainer argues that since no one testified as to how the alleged seized and confiscated

transparent plastic sachet, containing shabu, reached the PNP Crime Laboratory, then there is

reasonable suspicion whether the item physically examined by the Forensic Chemical Officer was

the very same one seized and confiscated by the buy-bust team from her.

Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002, which implements

Republic Act No. 9165, defines "chain of custody" as follows:

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized

drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each

stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to

presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall

include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the

date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in

court as evidence, and the final disposition.

The Court acknowledged that a testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard

as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. The Court stresses that what is of

utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items.

There is nothing herein that would have convinced the Court that the integrity and evidentiaryvalue of the seized items could have been jeopardized.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERIAM GURU y KAZANG.R. No. 189808, October 24, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The elements that should be proven in both the sale and possession of dangerous drugs

intrinsically include the identification of what was seized by police officers to be the same item

examined and presented in court. This identification must be established with moral certainty and is a

function of the rule on the chain of custody.

FACTS:

Respondent Meriam Guru y Kazan was charged in two separate Informations, charging her

with violation of Sections 5 and 11(3), respectively, of Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 or the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. A confidential informant went to the Moriones Police

Station 2, Station Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operations Task Unit (SAIDSOTU) and informed that

respondent was conducting illegal shabu activities along Isla Puting Bato, Tondo, Manila. They

verified the information and carried out a buy-bust operation.




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The buy-bust team and the confidential informant arrived at Isla Puting Bato at around 4:00

p.m. They found accused-appellant seated in an alley in front of her house. They approached

respondent, who recognized the confidential informant, and asked, “Kukuha ka ba? Magkano?” Theinformant replied, “Siya daw kukuha,” pointing to PO1 Juaño. PO1 Juaño confirmed, “Piso lang” (P

100.00), and showed respondent the money. Respondent took a small plastic sachet from her pants’

back pocket and handed it to PO1 Juaño. PO1 Juaño introduced himself as a police officer.Respondent was surprised. PO1 Juaño arrested respondent, while SPO3 Del Rosario and PO1

Bajarias rushed to the scene for assistance. The marked P 100-bill was recovered from respondent.

respondent was asked to empty her pocket. Another small transparent plastic sachet was recovered

from him.

The defense presented the testimony of respondent herself. She testified that she was at

home on the day the buy-bust operation took place. It was also alleged that the police officers failed

to indicate the name of the respondent in the pre-operation report and to conduct an examination

of marked money for fingerprints. The respondent also alleged that the prosecution failed to

comply with the procedure for the proper custody and disposition of the confiscated drugs. The

RTC rendered a decision finding the respondent guilty of the crimes charged. This was later on

affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent shall be held guilty of the crimes charged despite non-

compliance by the police officers with the requirements for the proper custody of seized dangerous

drugs.

RULING:

No, respondent cannot be held guilty of the crimes charged.

In the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs, the elements that should be proven are the following: (1)

the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of thething sold and the payment therefor. The prosecution must (1) prove that the transaction or sale

actually took place, and (2) present in court evidence of the corpus delicti. As regards the

prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements to be proven are the following:

(1) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated

drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously

possessed the said drug.

However, in order for the prosecution to successfully overturn the constitutionally

mandated presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, it should, in drug-related cases, prove

not only the acquisition of the subject specimens through a legitimate buy-bust operation, but

likewise the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti by a substantially unbroken chain in the

custody of said specimens from their acquisition to the necessary laboratory examination.

The above elements that should be proven in both the sale and possession of dangerous

drugs intrinsically include the identification of what was seized by police officers to be the same

item examined and presented in court. This identification must be established with moral certainty

and is a function of the rule on the chain of custody.

In the case at bar, according to PO1 Juaño, the buy-bust team brought respondent to the

station, where the items recovered were marked by “the investigator” in his presence. He, however,




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failed to mention the name of this investigator. The sachet sold to PO1 Juaño was marked “MG,”while the sachet recovered from accused-appellant was marked “MGK.”35 PO1 Juaño further

testified that PO1 Bajarias prepared a request for the examination of the specimens. Curiously

though, the specimens were not discussed in the testimony of PO1 Bajarias, except for his account

of accused-appellant handing a transparent plastic sachet to PO1 Juaño in exchange for the buy-

bust money.

It is noteworthy that there was no further testimony regarding the subject specimens. As

Forensic chemist P/Insp. Mariano was not presented as a witness due to the stipulation by the

defense as to her qualification, as well as the “genuineness and due execution of the documents she

executed together with the specimen.” However, the prosecution likewise admitted that P/Insp.

Mariano “does not have personal knowledge as to the ultimate source of the subject specimen,”leaving it to the other witnesses to establish that the specimen examined by P/Insp. Mariano were

the same ones recovered in the buy-bust operation.

Pertinently, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides as follows:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,

immediately after seizure and confiscation , physically inventory and photograph the same in thepresence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or

his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice

(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and

be given a copy thereof[.] (Emphasis supplied.)

While this Court has disregarded the strict compliance of the requisites under Section 21 of

Republic Act No. 9165, such liberality, as stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations, can be

applied only when the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved.

In the case at bar, the physical inventory of the subject specimens was made only at the

police station and by an unnamed investigator. This, in itself, evokes to a reasonable mind several

questions on the safekeeping of the specimens from the time accused-appellant was arrested, up tothe time she and the buy-bust team arrived at the police station. The identity of the person who

marked the specimens and his or her competence to distinguish between the item sold by accused-

appellant and the item recovered from her are likewise relevant points of inquiry. Finally, the

conflicting evidence as regards the persons who had custody of the specimens after the marking

casts serious doubts as to whether the identity and integrity of said items had truly been preserved.

We find that these are all substantial gaps in the chain of custody which inevitably creates a

rational uncertainty in the appreciation of the existence of the corpus delicti.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RONALD DEL ROSARIOG.R. No. 188107, December 5, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

This Court has reviewed and scrutinized in detail the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

and found glaring inconsistencies that relate to the identity of the prohibited drug allegedly

confiscated from Del Rosario. The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of PO2 Mendoza and

PO3 Besmonte necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu identified in court is the

same one allegedly seized f rom Del Rosario. In light of the foregoing, we find merit in Del Rosario’s

claim that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and

in sustaining a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti




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must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the illegal

drug’s unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to

tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or

uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the

illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered from the accused-appellant;

otherwise, the prosecution for possession under Republic Act No. 9165 fail .

Facts:

Accused- appellant Ronald M. del Rosario (Del Rosario) was apprehended in a buy-bust

operation pursuant to an information from a confidential informant.

Upon apprehension, it appears that the apprehending officer PO3 Besmonte, marked the

plastic sachet with “RMR-April 26, ‘03” before turning it over to PO2 Dalagdagan, the investigatoron duty that night. Del Rosario later was brought to the Office of the Drug Enforcement Unit [DEU]

of Las Piñas City and the confiscated items, including the sachet containing white crystalline

substance, and the P100 marked money were turned- over to the duty investigator, PO3 Rufino

Dalagdagan. According to PO2 Mendoza, PO3 Dalagdagan placed Del Rosario’s initials “RMR” andthe date “April 27, 03” on the confiscated sachet and prepared a request for its laboratory

examination. When subjected to qualitative examination at the Southern Police District Crime

Laboratory Office, the content of the plastic sachet was found to weigh 0.03 gram and tested

positive for shabu, a dangerous drug.

RTC later convicted Del Rosario. CA affirmed, hence, this appeal.

Del Rosario posits that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt as he was

convicted because of the weakness of his defense, rather than the strength of the prosecution’sevidence. He highlighted the inconsistencies in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies, which are

material to the establishment of the identity of the dangerous drug allegedly confiscated from him.

Del Rosario also points out the noncompliance by the police officers with the guidelines in the chainof custody of seized drugs.

Issue:

Whether or not Del Rosario’s guilt for the illegal sale of shabu, a dangerous drug, was

proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

After a thorough deliberation, this Court resolves to acquit Del Rosario for the prosecution’sfailure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This Court finds that the prosecution failed to

satisfactorily establish that the plastic sachet of shabu presented in court was the same oneconfiscated from Del Rosario.

In a prosecution for the sale of a dangerous drug, the following elements must be proven:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery ofthe thing sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, in prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu, what

is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the

presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.




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While it is true that in many cases this Court has overlooked the non-compliance with the

requirements under the foregoing provisions, it did so only when the integrity and the evidentiary

value of the seized items had been preserved. While it is admitted that the police officers failed to

conduct an inventory and to photograph the seized shabu in Del Rosario’s presence immediately

after he was apprehended, as required under the above provisions, what creates a cloud on theadmissibility of the evidence seized, the plastic sachet of shabu in particular, is the failure of the

prosecution to prove that the sachet of shabu they presented in court was the very same one they

confiscated from Del Rosario.

It must be remembered that to successfully prosecute a case of illegal sale of dangerous

drugs, it is not enough that the buyer, seller, and consideration for the transaction are identified. It

is equally important that the object of the case is identified with certainty. The prosecution must be

able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the shabu, from the moment it was seized

from Del Rosario, up to the time it was presented in court as proof of the corpus delicti , “i.e., the

body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed, as shown

by presenting the object of the illegal transaction.”

The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the very corpus delicti of the

offense and in sustaining a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165, the identity and integrity of the

corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily

arises from the illegal drug’s unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily identifiable,and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by accident or otherwise. Thus, to

remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the seized drug, evidence must

definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same illegal drug actually recovered

from the accused-appellant; otherwise, the prosecution for possession under Republic Act No. 9165fail.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the

admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter inquestion is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the

chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way

that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received,

where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which itwas received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These

witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in

the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the

same.

This Court has reviewed and scrutinized in detail the testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses and found glaring inconsistencies that relate to the identity of the prohibited drugallegedly confiscated from Del Rosario. The patent inconsistency between the testimonies of PO2

Mendoza and PO3 Besmonte necessarily leads us to doubt that the plastic sachet of shabu identified

in court is the same one allegedly seized from Del Rosario. In light of the foregoing, we find merit in

Del Rosario’s claim that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyondreasonable doubt.

The prosecution was not able to salvage the above inconsistencies with a logical and rational

explanation. Moreover, it offered no explanation as to how PO3 Besmonte was able to identify




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the plastic sachet presented in court as the one he seized from Del Rosario, considering that it

contained a marking different from the one he just said he made. PO3 Besmonte’s testimony on the

matter ended with the statement that the Investigator would be the best person to explain the

different marking on the plastic sachet; however, it must be remembered that the Investigator’s

testimony was already dispensed with early in the trial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO LAPASARANG.R. No. 198820, December 10, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

It may be gleaned that to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation is as follows:

first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the

apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the

investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic

chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal

drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals. A

perusal of the records of the case revealed that after the dangerous drugs were seized from Lapasaran,

the same were marked “RML” and “RML1” by the buy-bust team. PO1 Saez and PO2 Maglana then

turned over “RML” and “RML1” to investigating officer P/SInsp. Obong, who in turn, delivered thesame to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Based on the Physical Science Report timed, dated

and signed by Forensic Chemist Bonifacio, “RML” and RML1” tested positive for the presence of shabu.

Lastly, both sachets were then presented and turned over by P/SInsp. Bonifacio to the court. The

Certificate of Inventory, request for laboratory examination and the consequent testimonies in Court

leaves no doubt in the Court’s mind that the chain of custody rule was duly followed.

Facts:

Appellant Renato Lapasaran (Lapasaran) was arrested after a buy- bust operation was

conducted against him at around 5:30 in the afternoon of September 2006 in front of his residence

at after receiving reports from an informant on his supposed illegal drug activities. During the said

operation, PO1 Saez acted as the poseur buyer who pretended to be a drug user wherein he used 2marked P100.00 bills, or the total sum of P200.00. After being introduced by their informant to

their “target person” PO1 Saez handed the said bills to the Lapasaran and the latter, in turn,

purportedly gave a plastic sachet containing suspected shabu which he chose out of the 2 sachets

supposedly shown to him. When PO1 Saez gave the prearranged signal PO2 Maglana then rushed to

the scene to assist him. Lapasaran was then arrested by PO2 Maglana and recovered by PO1 Saez

from him were the marked bills as well as another plastic sachet containing suspected shabu. As

such] Lapasaran was then brought to the police headquarters for investigation wherein the

arresting officers executed a joint affidavit regarding the incident.

Lapasaran was later charged for illegal possession and sale of methamphetamine

hydrochloride, in violation of Section 11(3) and Section 5(1), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,

otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

RTC later convicted him of the crimes as charged which was later affirmed by the CA.

Lapasaran asserts that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt his

commission of the crimes charged. He argues that no testimony was presented by the prosecution

to attest to the police officer’s compliance with Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and to

establish that the chain of custody rule had been complied with.




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Issue:

2. Whether or not the appellate court erred in affirming his conviction.

Ruling:

No. The appellate court did not err in affirming Lapasaran’s conviction.

The appeal must be dismissed for lack of merit.

For prosecution for both illegal sale and illegal possession of a dangerous drug, the corpus

delicti of the offenses is the dangerous drug itself, in this case shabu. In People v. Alcuizar, 647 SCRA

431 (2011), this Court stated that: The dangerous drug itself, the shabu in this case, constitutes the

very corpus delicti of the offense and in sustaining a conviction under Republic Act No. 9165, the

identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must definitely be shown to have been preserved. This

requirement necessarily arises from the illegal drug’s unique characteristic that renders itindistinct, not readily identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either by

accident or otherwise. Thus, to remove any doubt or uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the

seized drug, evidence must definitely show that the illegal drug presented in court is the same

illegal drug actually recovered from the accusedappellant; otherwise, the prosecution forpossession under Republic Act No. 9165 fails.

It may be gleaned that to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation is as follows:

first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the

apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to

the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to theforensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the

marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

We agree with the finding of the Court of Appeals. A perusal of the records of the case

revealed that after the dangerous drugs were seized from Lapasaran, the same were marked “RML”

and “RML1” by the buy-bust team. PO1 Saez and PO2 Maglana then turned over “RML” and “RML1”

to investigating officer P/SInsp. Obong, who in turn, delivered the same to the PNP Crime

Laboratory for examination. Based on the Physical Science Report timed, dated and signed by

Forensic Chemist

Bonifacio, “RML” and RML1” tested positive for the presence of shabu. Lastly, both sachets were

then presented and turned over by P/SInsp. Bonifacio to the court. The Certificate of Inventory,

request for laboratory examination and the consequent testimonies in Court leaves no doubt in theCourt’s mind that the chain of custody rule was duly followed.

Moreover, this Court has often said that the prosecution of cases involving illegal drugs

depends largely on the credibility of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. It is

fundamental that the factual findings of the trial courts and those involving credibility of witnesses

are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, or speculative,

arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The trial court is in a

better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed




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their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent

application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , vs. MALIK MANALAO y ALAUYAG.R. No. 187496, February 06, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

When prosecuting an illegal possession of dangerous drugs case, the following elements must

be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a


consciously possessed the drug; With regards to Chain of Custody, unless there is a showing of bad

faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered or meddled with, the presumptions that the

integrity of such evidence had been preserved and that the police officers who handled the seized

drugs had discharged their duties properly and with regularity remain.

Facts:

PO1 Solarta said that their office had received reports of Manalao’s drug pushing and using

activities in the area of Lanao del Norte. Thus, upon instructions of their Officer-in-Charge, PoliceInspector (P/Insp.) Renato Salazar, they prepared to conduct an entrapment or buy-bust operation

against Manalao. PO1 Solarta narrated that, the buy-bust operation team composed of P/Insp.

Salazar, Senior Police Officer 3 (SPO3) Expedito Daulong, and himself, prepared two P100.00 bills

as drug money by having them signed by P/Insp. Salazar and then photocopying them.

At around seven in the evening, the team, together with a civilian agent who was to act as

the poseur-buyer, proceeded to the carenderia of Josephine Tamarong. At the carenderia, the team

pretended to be customers and had some coffee while waiting for Manalao. PO1 Solarta, who

claimed to have been only around three to four meters away from the scene, testified that when

Manalao arrived, the civilian agent immediately established contact with him. Following a brief

conversation, the civilian agent handed Manalao the buy-bust money and in turn, Manalao "got

something from his pocket, opened it, and gave something" to the civilian agent. After the "give andtake" transaction, the civilian agent approached the buy-bust team, who without delay arrested

Manalao.

During the arrest, the buy-bust team introduced themselves to Manalao and bodily searched

him, from which three decks of shabu and money, including the buy-bust money of two pieces

ofP100.00 bills, were recovered. Manalao, together with the items seized from him, were brought to

the police station. Thereafter, P/Insp. Salazar marked the seized items in front of the other

apprehending officers and Manalao. PO1 Solarta, aside from narrating his account of the

entrapment operation, also identified the certificate of inventory of the items seized from Manalao,

which he enumerated to be one deck of shabu, three decks of shabu, two P100.00 bills, and one

small, black and white, lady’s purse. He likewise identified the shabu presented in court to be the

same one recovered from Manalao and examined by Forensic Chemist Mag-abo.

RTC convicted Manalao guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime in violation of Section

5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of

2002. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision. Manalao is now before this Court

posits that the sale of the drugs was not established; and that the chain of custody of evidence of the

drugs was not established




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Issue:

Whether or not Manalo is guilty of the crime in violation of Section 5, Article II, of Republic

Act No. 9165.

Ruling:

Yes. Manalo is guilty of the crime in violation of Section 5, Article II, of Republic Act No.

9165.

The elements necessary to successfully prosecute an illegal sale of drugs case are:

(1) [T]he identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and

(2) [T]he delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.

Simply put, the prosecution must establish that the illegal sale of the dangerous drugs actually took

place together with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the dangerous drugs seized in

evidence.

It is clear from the records that the prosecution was able to establish the above elements.Manalao was positively identified by PO1 Solarta, who knew him even before the operation, as the

one who sold the seized shabu subject of this case to the poseur-buyer. Manalao was caught in

flagrante delicto in the entrapment operation conducted by the PNP of Tubod, Lanao del Norte.

Moreover, the corpus delicti of the crime was also established with certainty and conclusiveness.

Manalao handed to the poseur-buyer one deck of shabuupon his receipt of the P200.00 buy-bust

money. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the

marked money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping

officers and Legaspi.

Manalao’s insistence that the non-presentation of the civilian agent, who posed as the

buyer, weakens the prosecution’s case is without merit. In People v. Berdadero, this Court,

presented with the exact query, held: The non-presentation of the poseur-buyer is fatal only if thereis no other eyewitness to the illicit transaction

This Court would also like to emphasize the fact that Manalao himself testified that when

the police officers recovered some money from him, P/Insp. Salazar, immediately, without leaving

his sight, took out the photocopy of the buy-bust money and told him to compare it to the

two P100.00 bills found on him. Manalao admitted, both in his direct and cross-examination, that

the serial numbers of the bills obtained from him matched the serial numbers of the bills in the

photocopy. Moreover, while he claimed that he only had P500.00 with him, with P400.00 meant for

his nephew and P100.00 meant for him, he contradicted himself by saying that the police officers

recovered more than P600.00 of his money on his person.

With regards to chain of custody, a perusal of the law reveals that failure to strictly complywith Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 will not render an arrest illegal or the items seized from

the accused inadmissible in evidence. What is crucial is that the integrity and evidentiary value of

the seized items are preserved for they will be used in the determination of the guilt or innocence of

the accused.

In People v. Llanita and Buar , this Court elucidated on the concept of "chain of custody" and,

quoting People v. Kamad , enumerated the different links that must be proven to establish it: "Chain




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of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or

controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage,

from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to



date and time when such transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping and use incourt as evidence, and the final disposition.

In the case of People v. Kamad, the Court had the opportunity to enumerate the different

links that the prosecution must prove in order to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust

operation, namely:

First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the

apprehending officer;

Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating

officer;

Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for

laboratory examination; and

Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to thecourt.

In the case at bar, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to establish that the

integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal drugs had been maintained. P/Insp.

Salazar, who was one of the apprehending officers, marked the seized items in front of Manalao and

the other apprehending officers. P/Insp. Salazar, who was also the investigating officer, thereafter

signed a request for the laboratory examination of the seized drugs, which was received by Forensic

Chemist Mag-abo, together with the items enumerated therein. She then testified in open court on

how her examination confirmed that the seized items, which she submitted in court, tested positive

forshabu.

Besides, unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has beentampered or meddled with, the presumptions that the integrity of such evidence had been

preserved and that the police officers who handled the seized drugs had discharged their duties

properly and with regularity remain. The burden to overcome such presumptions lies on Manalao,

and this Court finds that he failed to do so.

When prosecuting an illegal possession of dangerous drugs case, the following elements

must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a


consciously possessed the drug.

The prosecution was able to satisfy all the foregoing elements during the joint trial of the

cases. The three decks of shabu subject of the case for illegal possession of drugs were validlyobtained upon searching Manalao after he was arrested in flagrante delicto for the illegal sale of

dangerous drugs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LINDA ALVIZ y YATCO and ELIZABETH DE LA VEGA yBAUTISTA

G.R. No. 177158, February 06, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro




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The elements that must be established for the successful prosecution of illegal sale of

dangerous drugs, viz: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2)

the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the same. What is material is the proof that the

transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti. The

delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummate the

buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. The chain of custody of theseized drugs in a buy-bust operation had been sufficiently established when there was proof of the

following: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused

by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer

to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the

forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked

illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

Facts:

The Officer-in-Charge formed a team to conduct surveillance and buy-bust operations at

Quezon City. PO2 Edsel Ibasco was designated as the poseur-buyer with SPO4 Edgardo Rebu Riano

and other policemen as back-up. Upon arrival at the place, PO2 Ibasco and the confidentialinformant approached Linda Alviz outside her house. The confidential informant told Linda that

PO2 Ibasco was deeply in need of shabu. Linda asked for the money and PO2 Ibasco gave a P100.00

bill on which he earlier placed his initials "EI." Linda called for Elizabeth dela Vega, who was inside

the house, and the two talked. Elizabeth then went inside the house.

After a while, Elizabeth came out and handed a plastic sachet to Linda. Linda gave

the P100.00 bill to Elizabeth and the plastic sachet to PO2 Ibasco. PO2 Ibasco then gave the pre-

arranged signal by scratching his head. SPO4 Rebu[r]iano, who was only two (2) meters away,

rushed to the group, arrested Elizabeth and recovered from the latter the buy-bust money, while

PO2 Ibasco arrested Linda. The police officers brought Linda and Elizabeth to the police station.

PO2 [Ibasco] placed the letters "EV-LA" on the plastic sachet containing white crystallinesubstance. A request for laboratory examination of the white crystalline substance was made by the

La Loma Police Station 1 to the PNP Central Police District Crime Laboratory Office

(CPDCLO). Forensic Analyst submitted a Report stating that the qualitative examination conducted

on the specimen gave positive result to methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

RTC convicted them for violating RA 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of

2002 which was affirmed by CA. Now, only Elizabeth appealed to the Court wherein she insists that

there was no buy-bust operation and what actually took place was an unlawful warrantless arrest;

that they are not liable for violation of RA 9165 since they were just framed-up and that police

officers blatantly ignored the mandatory provisions of Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No.

9165, particularly, the requirements on making an inventory report and taking photographs of the

seized drugs in the presence of the accused or the lat ter’s representative or counsel.

Issue:

Whether or not Elizabeth and Linda are liable for violation of RA 9165 or The

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

Ruling:




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Yes, they are liable for violation of RA 9165 or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of

2002.

Jurisprudence has identified the elements that must be established for the successful

prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, viz : (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, theobject, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for the same. What

is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the

presentation in court of the corpus delicti. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and

the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping

officers and the accused. In other words, the commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous

drugs, like shabu, merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the

moment the exchange of money and drugs between the buyer and the seller takes place.

The RTC found, and the Court of Appeals eventually affirmed, that all these elements have

been amply proven by the prosecution. The prosecution, through the detailed testimonies of PO2

Ibasco and SPO4 Reburiano, established that there was a consummated sale of shabu by Linda and

Elizabeth to PO2 Ibasco during the buy-bust operation.

Charges of extortion and frame-up are frequently made in this jurisdiction. Courts are, thus,

cautious in dealing with such accusations, which are quite difficult to prove in light of the

presumption of regularity in the performance of the police officers’ duties. To substantiate suchdefense, which can be easily concocted, the evidence must be clear and convincing and should show

that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly

performing their duty. Otherwise, the police officers’ testimonies on the operation deserve full faith

and credit.

In this case, there is absolute lack of evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were

stirred by illicit motive or had improperly performed their duties in arresting Linda and Elizabeth.

Both Linda and Elizabeth admitted that they did not know the police officers prior to their arrest.Hence, there could not have been any bad blood between them and said police officers.

As a result of the finding that a buy-bust operation actually took place and that Linda and

Elizabeth were apprehended in flagrante delicto, the evidence gathered and presented by the

prosecution on the occasion of their lawful arrest without warrant cannot be deemed as the "fruits

of a poisonous tree," but are admissible and competent proof of their guilt. Indeed, in a prosecution

for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the proof that the accused peddled illicit

drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, both of which were satisfactorily

complied with by the prosecution in this case.

Article II, Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 9165 provides: Sec. 21. Custody and

Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of DangerousDrugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory

Equipment . - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of

dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as

instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or

surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after

seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the




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accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her

representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),

and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given

a copy thereof

The above rule is implemented by Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulationswhich expounds on how it is to be applied, and notably, also provides for a saving mechanism in

case the procedure laid down in the law was not strictly complied with:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,

immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the

presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or

his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice

(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and

be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at

the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office

of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless

seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable

grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properlypreserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and

custody over said item

The integrity and evidentiary value of seized items are properly preserved for as long as the

chain of custody of the same are duly established. Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board

Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, implementing Republic Act No. 9165, defines chain of custody as

follows: Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized

drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each

stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to



date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use incourt as evidence, and the final disposition.

In several cases, the Court found that the chain of custody of the seized drugs in a buy-bust

operation had been sufficiently established when there was proof of the following: first , the seizure

and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending

officer; second , the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the

investigating officer; third , the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic

chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal

drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

Given the law, rules, and jurisprudence, the failure of the police officers to make an

inventory report and to photograph the drugs seized from Linda and Elizabeth, as required byArticle II, Section 21, paragraph 1 of Republic Act No. 9165, are not automatically fatal to the

prosecution's case, as it was able to trace and prove the chain of custody of the same: after arresting

Linda and Elizabeth during the buy-bust operation, the police officers brought the two women to

the police station; at the police station, P02 lbasco, who acted as the poseur-buyer, marked the

sachet of suspected shabu he received from Linda and Elizabeth during the buy-bust with his

initials "EV -LA" and turned over the same to P/Insp. Villanueva; P/Insp. Villanueva prepared the

Request for Laboratory Examination of the contents of the sachet; P02 Ibasco delivered the Request




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for Laboratory Examination and the sachet of suspected shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory,

CPDCLO, Quezon City, where the Request and specimen were received by P02 Piau; the contents of

the sachet were examined by Forensic Analyst Jabonillo, who prepared Chemistry Report No. D-

198-2003, confirming that the specimen tested positive for shabu and lastly, during the trial, the

marked sachet of shabu, as well as the marked money used in purchasing the same, were presented

as evidence and identified by P02 Ibasco and SP04 Reburiano.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICTOR DE JESUS y GARCIA


A testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it is almost always impossible

to obtain an unbroken chain." The arresting officers’ failure to conduct a physical inventory and to

photograph the items seized from De Jesus will not render his arrest illegal or the items confiscated

from him inadmissible in evidence as they were able to nonetheless preserve the integrity and the

evidentiary value of the said items. This is what is of utmost importance as the seized items are what

would be used in the determination of De Jesus’ guilt or innocence.

What is significant is that the links in the chain of custody were all accounted for by the

prosecution, from the time the items were confiscated from De Jesus, up to the time they were presented in court during trial as proof of the corpus delicti. In any case, unless De Jesus can show that

there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering with the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the

evidence has been preserved, and that the police officers discharged their duties properly and with

regularity, will remain

Facts:

A report reached the office of the Bulacan PDEG about the alleged drug selling activities of

one alias Vic, herein appellant Victor De Jesus y Garcia, along Baliuag, Bulacan. Upon instructions of

the chief of the PDEG, a surveillance was conducted in the area by SPO2 Violago, as the team leader,

together with PO1 Quizon, PO1 Dimla, and PO2 Carlito Bernardo, as members. A buy bust operation

was instructed by the PDEG chief with the assistance of a confidential agent, known as alias "Erap".PO2 Carlito Bernardo was designated as the poseur buyer with SPO2 Violago, PO1 Jacinto, and PO1

Quizon as back up. The former was given two (2) pieces of marked one hundred peso bills of which

he placed his initials CB on the center of the seal of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas of each bill.

The buy-bust team proceeded to the house of their confidential agent at Barangay

Poblacion. PO2 Carlito Bernardo and the confidential agent proceeded to the house of [De Jesus] in

the guise of buying sachets of shabu. Upon arrival thereat, the confidential agent introduced PO2

Carlito Bernardo to De Jesus. He then asked about the money. PO2 Carlito Bernardo handed the

money to him consisting of two (2) pieces of marked one hundred peso bills. He ,in turn, received

the money and took out a white colored cylindrical plastic film case. From the film case, he took out

a medium sized transparent plastic sachet and gave it to PO2 Carlito Bernardo. After receiving the

sachet, the latter held De Jesus and introduced himself as a police officer. PO2 Carlito Bernardorecovered the film case from the right hand of De Jesus. The film case contained two (2) medium

sized and six (6) small sized transparent plastic sachets. The marked money was recovered from

the pocket of De Jesus. After asking De Jesus to bring out the contents of his pocket, a sachet of

marijuana was likewise recovered. De Jesus was then informed of his constitutional rights.

While still at the scene of the incident, PO2 Carlito Bernardo marked the medium sized

transparent plastic sachet handed by De Jesus to him as A-BB and CB and other sachet found. De




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Jesus was immediately taken to the police station for proper investigation. The incident was logged

and the evidence were turned over to the station’s invest igator, PO2 Tomas Nachor. PO2 Tomas

Nachor, in turn prepared the request for the laboratory examination of the recovered specimen and

personally submitted the same to the crime laboratory office, which were later found positive for

shabu and marijuana.

On the other hand, De Jesus, in his brief, denied the charges and claimed that he was framed

by the confidential agent for personal reasons. RTC convicted De Jesus for violation of Section 5,

Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 which was affirmed by RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not De Jesus is liable for violation of Republic Act No. 9165.

Ruling:

Yes, De Jesus is liable for violation of Republic Act No. 9165?


(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of

the thing sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, "[in] prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu,

what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the

presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence."

To reiterate, the prosecution must establish the actual occurrence of the transaction

between the buyer and seller of the dangerous drug, simultaneous with the presentation of the very

same dangerous drug in court as evidence. This burden, the prosecution was able to successfully

discharge. Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 outlines the procedure on the chain of custody of

confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs:

Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, provide as follows:SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant

Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,

Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment . – The PDEA shall take charge and have

custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and

essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so

confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,

immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same

in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated

and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and

the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign

the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant

sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as

instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to

the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under

oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours

after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided , That when the volume of the dangerous




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drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals

does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory

examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous

drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however , That a final

certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same

within the next twenty-four (24) hours;(4) After the filing of the criminal case, the Court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours,

conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous

drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals,

including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the

PDEA shall within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter proceed with the destruction or

burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items

were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from

the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall

draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s

which shall be borne by the offender: Provided , That those item/s of lawful commerce, as

determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate

purposes: Provided, further , That a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded isretained;

(5) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning

of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the

PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In all instances, the

representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;

(6) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally

observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission

of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative after

due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours

before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice

shall appoint a member of the public attorney’s office to represent the former;

(7) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representativesample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board of

the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request the court for leave to turn over

the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within

twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the same; and

(8) Transitory Provision: a) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of this Act,

dangerous drugs defined herein which are presently in possession of law enforcement

agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the presence of

representatives of the Court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused and/or

his/her counsel, and, b) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and

burning or destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section

shall be implemented by the DOH.

Its Implementing Rules and Regulations state:

SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant

Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,

Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment . — The PDEA shall take charge and have







Page 90 of 299

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,

immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same

in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated

and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and

the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign

the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physicalinventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is

served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending

officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further,that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long asthe integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved bythe apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of andcustody over said items;

(b) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant

sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as

instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to

the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;

(c) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done underoath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours

after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, that when the volume of the dangerous

drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals

does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory

examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous

drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, that a final

certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same

within the next twenty-four (24) hours;

(d) After the filing of the criminal case, the court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours,

conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous

drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals,

including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through thePDEA shall, within twenty-four (24) hours thereafter, proceed with the destruction or

burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items

were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from

the media and the DOJ, civil society groups and any elected public official. The Board shall

draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s

which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, that those item/s of lawful commerce, as

determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes;

Provided, further, that a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained;

(e) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning

of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the

PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In cases of seizures

where no person is apprehended and no criminal case is filed, the PDEA may order theimmediate destruction or burning of seized dangerous drugs and controlled precursors and

essential chemicals under guidelines set by the Board. In all instances, the representative

sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board;

(f) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally

observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission

of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative after

due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours




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before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice

shall appoint a member of the public attorney’s office to represent the former;

(g) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representative

sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board of

the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request the court for leave to turn over

the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction withintwenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the same; and

(h) Transitory Provision:

h.1) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of the Act, dangerous drugs

defined herein which are presently in possession of law enforcement agencies shall,

with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the presence of representatives of the

court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused and/or his/her counsel;

and

h.2) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning or

destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section

shall be implemented by the DOH.

In the meantime that the PDEA has no forensic laboratories and/or evidence rooms, as wellas the necessary personnel of its own in any area of its jurisdiction, the existing National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police (PNP) forensic laboratories shall continue to

examine or conduct screening and confirmatory tests on the seized/surrendered evidence whether

these be dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential

chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment; and the NBI and the PNP shall

continue to have custody of such evidence for use in court and until disposed of, burned or

destroyed in accordance with the foregoing rules: Provided, that pending appointment/designation

of the full complement of the representatives from the media, DOJ, or elected public official, the

inventory of the said evidence shall continue to be conducted by the arresting NBI and PNP

operatives under their existing procedures unless otherwise directed in writing by the DOH or

PDEA, as the case may be. (Emphasis supplied.)

It was held, however, that "a testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard as it

is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." The arresting officers’ failure to conducta physical inventory and to photograph the items seized from De Jesus will not render his arrest

illegal or the items confiscated from him inadmissible in evidence as they were able to nonetheless

preserve the integrity and the evidentiary value of the said items. This is what is of utmost

importance as the seized items are what would be used in the determination of De Jesus’ guilt orinnocence.

Verily, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and the evidentiary value

of the evidence had been preserved. PO2 Bernardo’s testimony as to how they learned of De Jesus’

drug dealing activities up to the time they arrested him and confiscated the items subject of this

case was clear and positive. He was also categorical in his statements on how he marked the seizeditems and to whom he turned them over. His mistake as to the exact date of the buy-bust operation

will not render his testimony incredible. It must be remembered that aside from the fact that these

police officers handle numerous cases everyday, the first hearing held for this case was years after

the date of De Jesus’ arrest. Besides, it is settled that the exact date of the commission of the crime

need not be proved unless it is an essential element of the crime. What is significant is that the links

in the chain of custody were all accounted for by the prosecution, from the time the items were




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confiscated from De Jesus, up to the time they were presented in court during trial as proof of

the corpus delicti.

In any case, unless De Jesus can show that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering with the

evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the evidence has been preserved, and that the police

officers discharged their duties properly and with regularity, will remain. It is worthy to note thatthe ill motive De Jesus speaks of is imputed against the informant and not the police officers. This

Court agrees with the Court of Appeals when it said that it is highly incredible that the arresting

officers would waste their time and effort, and even run the risk of losing their jobs and tainting

their reputations just so they could accommodate an informant with a grudge against De Jesus.

In prosecuting cases for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must

establish the following elements:

(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or

regulated drug;

(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and

(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

The above elements were all duly established by the prosecution. After De Jesus was validly

arrested for the illegal sale of drugs, he was searched and frisked, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 126

of the Rules of Court

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LOLITA QUESIDO y BADARANGG.R. No. 189351, April 10, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Noncompliance with Section 21(1 ), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 regarding chain of

custody, does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible because what is

essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved which would be


Facts:

On November 28, 2006, a buy bust operation was conducted wherein the accused appellant

Lolita Quesido y Badarang was apprehended. Appellant was thereafter formally prosecuted for

violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 as indicated in the Information dated

December 4, 2006. Appellant pleaded “not guilty” to the aforementioned charge upon her

arraignment on January 16, 2007. Thereafter, trial ensued.

In her defense, appellant narrated a different version of the story which basically states that

at around 2:00 in the afternoon of November 28, 2006, she was at home when two persons entered

the same and then invited her to go with them to the police station. Thereafter, she complied

because she was already handcuffed by them. In its Decision dated May 7, 2008, the trial court

found appellant guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Appellant

challenged her conviction with the Court of Appeals but her appeal was turned down by theappellate court in its Decision dated July 27, 2009, which in turn affirmed the ruling of the trial

court. In the instant petition, appellant argues that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply

with the procedural requirements of Republic Act No. 9165 and she insists that the chain of custody

for the supposed seized drug was not properly established.

Issue:




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Whether the failure to comply with the procedural requirements of Republic Act No. 9165

will render the acquittal of the accused

Ruling:

No. The relevant procedural rule referred to by appellant is Section 21(1), Article II ofRepublic Act No. 9165, which provides the procedure for the handling of seized or confiscated

illegal drugs. Section 21. Custody and Noncompliance with Section 21 does not necessarily render the

arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible because what is essential is that the integrity and

evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved which would be utilized in the determination of the

guilt or innocence of the accused.—Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous

Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,

Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment.—The PDEA shall take charge and have




(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after

seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of theaccused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her

representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),

and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given

a copy thereof.

Nonetheless, despite the apparent mandatory language that is expressed in the foregoing

rule, the court have always reiterated in jurisprudence that noncompliance with Section 21 does

not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items seized inadmissible because what is essential is

that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved which would be utilized in

the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARILYN AGUILAR y MANZANILLOG.R. No. 191396, April 17, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Denial or frameup is a standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the

Dangerous Drugs Law. As such, it has been viewed by the court with disfavor for it can just as easily be

concocted.

When the accused is charged with the sale of illicit drugs, the following defenses cannot be set

up: (1) that facilities for the commission of the crime were intentionally placed in his way; or ( 2) that

the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the decoy or poseurbuyer seeking to expose his

criminal act; or (3) that police authorities feigning complicity in the act were present and apparentlyassisted in its commission.

Facts:

Following a buy-bust operation, on December 1, 2004, two separate Informations were filed

against Aguilar in the Pasay City RTC, Branch 116 charging her with violation of Sections 5 and 11,

respectively, of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Aguilar pleaded not guilty to both charges when

arraigned on January 10, 2005. Thereafter, trial ensued. Upon trial, Aguilar contradicted the

prosecution and denied the charges against her. She claimed that on November 30, 2004, at around

10:00 a.m., while she and her niece, Lazaro, were waiting for a jeepney to Baclaran along NAIA




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Road, PO2 Medrano and PO2 Mendoza accosted and handcuffed her without any explanation.

Aguilar argued that there could have been no buybust operation as she was already in detention at

the station at the time such operation was supposedly conducted. She averred that while she was

once a resident of Pasay City, she no longer lived there and that she would only go there to visit her

mother. On August 19, 2005, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution’s version and found Aguilar

guilty beyond reasonable doubt in both cases. Aguilar’s denial and theory of frame-up, the RTC held,cannot be accepted over the prosecution’s case, which was not only clear and convincing, but alsoamply supported by the evidence. Finding that the prosecution has proven Aguilar’s guilt of the two

crimes beyond reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s Decision on November26, 2009.

Issue:

1. Whether the trial court erred in not giving weight and credence to accused-appellant’sdefense of denial and frame-up

2. Whether the buy-bust operation was valid.

Ruling:

1. No. Time and again, the Court has looked at the defenses of denial and frameup with

disfavor. The explanation of the court in People v. Cruz, 652 SCRA 286 (2011), with regard to the

defenses of denial and frameup finds applicability in this case, given that Aguilar also accused the

police officers of extorting money from her, to wit: Denial or frameup is a standard defense ploy in

most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. As such, it has been viewed by the

court with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted. It should not accord a redoubtable

sanctuary to a person accused of drug dealing unless the evidence of such frame up is clear and

convincing. Without proof of any intent on the part of the police officers to falsely impute appellant

in the commission of a crime, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and

the principle that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great

respect, deserve to prevail over the bare denials and selfserving claims of appellant that he hadbeen framed up. Neither can appellant’s claim of alleged extortion by the police operatives be

entertained. Absent any proof, appellant’s assertion of extortion.

2. Yes. In resolving issues involving the validity of a buybust operation, specifically the

question of whether the government had induced the accused to commit the offense as charged, the

Court usually finds it instructive to first distinguish between entrapment and instigation. The

court’s distinction in the recent case of People v. Legaspi, 661 SCRA 171 (2011), is elucidative, to

wit: Entrapment is sanctioned by the law as a legitimate method of apprehending criminals. Its

purpose is to trap and capture lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. Instigation, on

the other hand, involves the inducement of the wouldbe accused into the commission of the

offense. In such a case, the instigators become coprincipals themselves. Where the criminal intent

originates in the mind of the instigating person and the accused is lured into the commission of theoffense charged in order to prosecute him, there is instigation and no conviction may be had.

Where, however, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense

is completed, even after a person acted as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the

accused an opportunity for the commission of the offense, or the accused was aided in the

commission of the crime in order to secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no

instigation and the accused must be convicted. The law in fact tolerates the use of decoys and other

artifices to catch a criminal.




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The court recognizes instigation as a valid defense that can be raised by the accused.

However, for this defense to prosper, the accused must prove, with sufficient evidence, that the

government induced him or her to commit the offense.36 Aguilar claims that she was instigated by

the informant to sell shabu to PO2 Medrano. Her only evidence to support this claim was her

interpretation of PO2 Medrano’s testimony. The Court finds Aguilar’s defense of instigationunworthy of belief. It has been established that when the accused is charged with the sale of illicit

drugs, the following defenses cannot be set up: (1) that facilities for the commission of the crime

were intentionally placed in his way; or (2) that the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the

decoy or poseur-buyer seeking to expose his criminal act; or (3) that police authorities feigning

complicity in the act were present and apparently assisted in its commission. The Court agreed with

the Court of Appeals’ pronouncement that “[t]here was no showing that the informant employed

any act of inducement such as repeated requests for the sale of prohibited drugs or offers of

exorbitant prices.” Aguilar was never forced or coerced to sell the prohibited drug to PO2 Medrano.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANTE L. DUMALAGG.R. No. 180514, April 17, 2013, J. Leonardo- De Castro

“Marking” of the seized items “immediately after seizure and confiscation” may be undertaken

at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an

accused in illegal drugs cases.

Facts:

After a buy bust operation, two separate informations were filed charging accused-

appellant Dante Dumalang of violating Article II, Sections 5 and 11 of Republic Act No. 9165,

otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Accusedappellant pleaded not guilty to both

charges when he was arraigned on June 14, 2005. Thereafter, trial ensued. Upon trial, the defense

averred that the police officers framed accusedappellant after failing to extort money from him. On

November 16, 2005, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding accusedappellant guilty beyondreasonable doubt of the felonies charged.

On appeal, accusedappellant argued that the police officers who arrested him and purportedly

confiscated the sachets of shabu from his possession failed to strictly comply with the mandated

procedure under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165. The said provision of the law and

jurisprudence on the matter require that the marking of the drugs be done immediately after they

are seized from the accused; otherwise, reasonable doubt arises as to the authenticity of the seized

drugs. Accusedappellant claimed that the sachets of shabu supposedly seized from his possession

were marked when he was already at the police station and not at the place of his arrest. In its

Decision dated July 3, 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the RTC judgment of conviction.

Hence, this appeal.

Issues:

1. Whether the prosecution failed to comply with the procedures in the custody of seized

prohibited and regulated drugs as embodied in Section 21 of Republic Act 9165 by the

failure of the police to mark the seized items immediately upon their confiscation

2. Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous

drugs




Page 96 of 299

Ruling:

1. No. Accused-appellant’s insistence that the police officers broke the chain of custody rule when

they failed to mark the seized items immediately upon their confiscation at the place where he was

apprehended lacks legal basis. It has already been settled that the failure of police officers to markthe items seized from an accused in illegal drugs cases immediately upon its confiscation at the

place of arrest does not automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody and render the

confiscated items inadmissible in evidence. In People v. Resurreccion, the Court explained that

“marking” of the seized items “immediately after seizure and confiscation” may be undertaken at

the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an

accused in illegal drugs cases. It was further emphasized that what is of utmost importance is the

preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be

utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. The Court elaborated in this

wise:

Jurisprudence tells us that the failure to immediately mark seized drugs will not

automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody. The failure to strictly comply with

Sec. 21(1), Art. II of RA 9165 does not necessarily render an accused’s arrest illegal or theitems seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the

preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be


2. For a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug to prosper, it must be shown that (a)

the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated

drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused was freely and conscious ly

aware of being in possession of the drug. In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of

prohibited drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller,

object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. What is

material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or

sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence.In this case, prosecution witnesses, PO3 Albano and PO2 Valdez, categorically stated under oath

that as members of the buybust team, they caught accused appellant in flagrante delicto selling

and possessing shabu. The prosecution was able to establish that (a) accusedappellant had no

authority to sell or to possess any dangerous drugs; (b) during the buy-bust operation conducted bythe police on January 5, 2005 at the Sexy Beach Resort in Barangay Estancia, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte,

accusedappellant sold and delivered to PO3 Albano, acting as a poseurbuyer, for the price of Two

Hundred Pesos (P200.00), one heatsealed plastic sachet containing 0.023 grams of white

crystalline substance, chemically confirmed to be shabu; and (c) as a result of a search incidental tothe valid warrantless arrest of accusedappellant, he was caught in possession of three more

heatsealed plastic sachets containing 0.01, 0.015, and 0.04 grams of white crystalline substance, all

chemically confirmed also to be shabu.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO ENRIQUEZ y DELOS REYESG.R. No. 197550, 25 September 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

When, of all the individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical possession of

the shabu allegedly seized from the accused, only the arresting officer testified for the specific purpose

of identifying the evidence, and his testimony miserably failed to demonstrate an unbroken chain as it

ended with his identification of the money and seized items he marked and documents he signed, then




Page 97 of 299

the requirement of chain of custody is broken. In effect, the custodial link ended with the arresting

officer when he testified that he brought the seized items, together with the accused, to the police

station. Such a break in the chain of custody is fatal to the prosecution’s case, and the accused must beacquitted.

Facts:

Two separate informations were filed with the RTC, charging accused-appellant Arturo

Enriquez with violation of R.A. No. 9165 or the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”. Theprosecution alleged that police officers SPO2 David, SPO2 Divina and SPO1 Garung caught Enriquez

selling shabu in a buy-bust operation. During the buy-bust, Enriquez handed SPO2 David a sachet of

shabu. The search on the body of Enriquez yielded several plastic sachets of a white crystalline

substance.

Enriquez avers that he was eating alone in an eatery when he was approached by three men

in civilian clothes. One of them, SPO2 David, poked a gun at him and asked if he knew of a certain

truck driver who was suspected of selling shabu. When he denied knowledge thereof, he was

immediately handcuffed and was brought to the police station for further investigation. He wasdetained and was told that he is being suspected of selling shabu.

The RTC convicted Enriquez, and the CA affirmed the conviction. Hence the appeal.

Enriquez claims, among others, that the prosecution was not able to prove with moral certainty the

identity of the corpus delicti for failure of the police officers to comply with Section 21(a) of

Republic Act No. 9165, on the custody and disposition of confiscated or seized dangerous drugs. He

avers that there was neither physical inventory nor a photograph of the seized items. Moreover,

Enriquez says, the markings on the confiscated items were not immediately made upon its seizure,

at the place of the incident, nor were there any indication in the records that it was made in his

presence. Enriquez points out that while “non-compliance x x x with Section 21 is not fatal, as police

lapses, may at times occur, these errors, however, must be supported with justifiable grounds and

the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items must be preserved.

Issue:

Did the prosecution fail to establish the chain of custody of the confiscated shabu?

Ruling:

The appeal is granted. Enriquez is acquitted.

[T]he prosecution must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the

dangerous drug, from the moment it was seized from the accused up to the time it was presented in

court as proof of the corpus delicti. The chain of custody requirement “ensures that unnecessarydoubts respecting the identity of the evidence are minimized if not altogether removed.”

[T]he following are the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust

situation:

First , the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused

by the apprehending officer;




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Second , the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the

investigating officer;

Third , the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for

laboratory examination; and

Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic

chemist to the court.

While non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not automatically

render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, this is true only when

i. “there is a justifiable ground for such noncompliance, and

ii. the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.”Thus, any divergence from the prescribed procedure must be justified and should not affect the

integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband. Absent any of the said conditions, the

non-compliance is an irregularity, a red flag that casts reasonable doubt on the identity of the

corpus delicti.

In the case at bar, not only was there no justifiable ground offered for the non-compliance

with the chain of custody requirement, there was an apparent failure to properly preserve theintegrity and evidentiary value of the seized items to ensure the identity of the corpus delicti from

the time of seizure to the time of presentation in court. In other words, the prosecution’s evidencefailed to establish the chain that would have shown that the sachets of shabu presented in court

were the very same items seized from Enriquez.

The first crucial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure from Enriquez of the

dangerous drugs and its subsequent marking. Under the law, such marking should have been done

immediately after confiscation and in the presence of the accused or his representative. While it is

true that the items presented in court bore the initials of SPO2 David, who was also the poseur-

buyer and primary apprehending officer, nowhere in the documentary and testimonial evidence of

the prosecution can it be found when these items were actually marked and if they were marked in

the presence of Enriquez or at least his representative. Emphasizing the importance of this firstlink, this Court in People v. Zakaria, pronounced that marking upon seizure is the starting point in

the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover,

the value of marking of the evidence is to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other

similar or related evidence from the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of

criminal proceedings, obviating switching, “planting” or contamination of evidence. A failure to

mark at the time of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the

law requires.

The second link in the chain of custody is the turnover of the illegal drug by the

apprehending officer to the investigating officer. Both SPO2 David and SPO2 Divina testified that

after the buy-bust operation, they brought Enriquez and the seized items to the police station.

However, they both failed to identify the person to whom they turned over the seized items.Records show that the request for laboratory examination was prepared by Chief of Police Erese,

and yet there is no evidence to show that he was the person who received the seized items from the

apprehending officers. There is therefore a crucial missing link, i.e., what happened to the seized

items after they left the hands of SPO2 David and SPO2 Divina and before they came to the hands of

Chief of Police Erese.




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As for the third and the last links, although records show that Chief of Police Erese signed

the request for laboratory examination, he was not presented in court to testify as such. The

testimony of Chief of Police Erese is indispensable because he could have provided the critical link

between the testimony of SPO2 David, and the tenor of the testimony of P/Insp. Dizon, which the

parties have stipulated on. The unaccounted for whereabouts of the seized items from the time they

were brought to the police station to the time they were submitted to P/Insp. Dizon for examinationconstitutes a clear break in the chain of custody. Moreover, no one testified as to how the

confiscated items were handled and cared for after the laboratory examination.

Overall, the prosecution failed to observe the requirement that the testimonies of all

persons who handled the specimen are important to establish the chain of custody. Of all the

individuals who came into direct contact with or had physical possession of the shabu allegedly

seized from Enriquez, only SPO2 David testified for the specific purpose of identifying the evidence.

However, his testimony miserably failed to demonstrate an unbroken chain as it ended with his

identification of the money and seized items he marked and documents he signed. In effect, the

custodial link ended with SPO2 David when he testified that he brought the seized items, together

with Enriquez, to the police station.

Under the above premises, it is clear that there was a break in the chain of custody of the

seized substances. The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence's chain of custody is fatal

to its case as we can no longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary

value of the confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GIOVANNI OCFEMIA y CHAVEZG.R. No. 185383, 25 September 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of R.A. 9165 does not necessarily render an

accused’s arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmostimportance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items , as

these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. Consistency withthe “chain of custody” rule requires that the “marking” of the seized items – to truly ensure that

they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence –

should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon

confiscation. Thus, even if the police officers failed to immediately make an inventory and marking of

the seized sachet of shabu at the place where the accused was apprehended does not destroy the

integrity and evidentiary value of said sachet of shabu, if the chain of custody could be continuously

traced from its receipt by the arresting officer, the transfer to the police laboratory for examination, it

being kept in police custody awaiting trial, and its presentation as evidence before the RTC.

Facts:

Accused-appellant Giovanni Ocfemia was charged before the RTC with illegal sale ofdangerous drugs, penalized under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The prosecution averred that a team of PDEA and PNP agents and officers conducted a buy-bust

operation against Ocfemia. PO2 Aldea was assigned to act as the poseur-buyer, and after Ocfemia

handed to him a sachet of shabu, PO2 Aldea gave the signal to the team to arrest Ocfemia. The latter

was brought to the police station, where PO2 Aldea marked the sachet of shabu sold to him by

Ocfemia. PO2 Aldea then submitted the same to their crime laboratory. P/SUPT Arroyo conducted




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the chemical examination of the substance which tested positive for methamphetamine

hydrochloride.

Ocfemia denied the charge and asserted that he was framed-up by the police. As a police

asset, he joined some of the members of the PDEA/PNP team in a buy-bust operation, where

Ocfemia would be the poseur-buyer. After the supposed suspect was arrested, PO2 Aldea disclosed

that Ocfemia would be charged with illegal sale of shabu.

The RTC convicted Ocfemia, and the CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue:

Did the prosecution fail to prove with moral certainty that the sachet of shabu presented in

court is the same one Ocfemia allegedly sold during the buy-bust operations?

Ruling:

The appeal is denied.

Ocfemia protests that the prosecution failed to prove with moral certainty that the sachet of

shabu presented before the RTC was the same one he allegedly sold during the buy-bust operations

since the police officers who had initial custody and control thereof neither showed an inventory

nor a photograph taken of the same; and that assuming it was marked, the marking was not

immediately done after its seizure and confiscation at the place where he was apprehended.

Ocfemia contends that the police officers disregarded Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 which

requires that the drugs seized must be physically inventoried and photographed immediately after

seizure and confiscation in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel, a

representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official. On

that premise, Ocfemia additionally argues that the prosecution cannot rely on the presumption of

regularity in the performance of official duties by the police officers.

Ocfemia’s assertions are bereft of merit.

Jurisprudence has already decreed that the failure of the police officers to make a physical

inventory, to photograph, and to mark the shabu at the place of arrest do not automatically render it

inadmissible in evidence or impair the integrity of the chain of its custody. The failure to strictly

comply with Sec. 21(1), Art. II of R.A. 9165 does not necessarily render an accused’s arrest illegal orthe items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the

preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items , as these would be


Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. 9165 provides, in part: the physical inventory and

photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at thenearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever ispracticable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance withthese requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary valueof the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall notrender void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.




Page 101 of 299

What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify isthe matter of “marking” of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that theevidence seized upon apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory andphotography when these activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at theplace of arrest. Consistency with the “chain of custody” rule requires that the “marking” of

the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and areeventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in the presence of theapprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation.

In this case, the chain of custody of the sachet of shabu sold by Ocfemia could be

continuously traced from its receipt by PO2 Aldea, the poseur-buyer, during the buy-bust

operation; its transfer to the police laboratory for examination; it being kept in police custody while

awaiting trial; and its presentation as evidence before the RTC. PO2 Aldea himself marked the said

sachet of shabu with his initials upon arriving at the police station with the arrested Ocfemia. He

also personally submitted the same sachet of shabu to the PNP crime laboratory for forensic

examination. When he testified before the RTC, PO2 Aldea identified the sachet of shabu and

confirmed his initials thereon. P/SUPT Arroyo was the forensic officer who conducted the chemical

examination of the contents of the sachet bearing PO2 Aldea’s initials and she confirmed on thewitness stand that the said contents tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thus, the

integrity and evidentiary value of the sachet of shabu presented in evidence against Ocfemia was

properly preserved in substantial compliance with Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MICHAEL MAONGCO y YUMONDA and PHANS BANDALI ySIMPAL

G.R. No. 196966, October 23, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

While the accused may not be convicted of illegal sale of shabu due to the absence of all the

elements of the crime, they may still be convicted for illegal delivery of shabu if all its elements are

present and proven by the prosecution. The accused may also be convicted for illegal possession of

dangerous drugs as the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs necessarily includes the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

Facts:

Two separate informations were filed with the RTC, against Michael Maongco and Phans

Bandali, charging them for illegally dispensing, delivering, transporting, distributing, or acting as

brokers of dangerous drugs. The prosecution alleged that the police arrested Alvin Carpio for illegal

possession of shabu, which, according to him, came from Maongco. An entrapment operation was

later planned. PO2 Arugay approached Maongco and introduced himself to Maongco as Carpio’scousin, and claimed that Carpio was sick and could not be there personally. PO2 Arugay then asked

from accused-appellant Maongco for Carpio’s order of “dalawang bulto.” Accused-appellant

Maongco drew out from his pocket a sachet of shabu and showed it to PO2 Arugay. When PO2Arugay got hold of the sachet of shabu, he immediately revealed that he was a police officer,

arrested accused-appellant Maongco, and apprised the latter of his constitutional rights.

When the police team questioned accused-appellant Maongco as to the other “bulto” of

shabu Carpio had ordered, Maongco disclosed that the same was in the possession of accused-

appellant Bandali, who was then at Jollibee Pantranco branch along Quezon Avenue. The police

team, with Carpio and accused-appellant Maongco, went to the said restaurant where accused-




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appellant Maongco identified Bandali to the police team as the one wearing a blue shirt. PO2 Ong

approached accused-appellant Bandali and demanded from the latter the other half of the drugs

ordered. Accused-appellant Bandali voluntarily handed over a sachet of shabu to PO2 Ong.

Thereafter, PO2 Ong apprised Bandali of his constitutional rights and arrested him.

The RTC convicted Maongco and Bandali for illegally selling shabu. The CA affirmed theRTc.

Issues:

1. Did the RTC and CA erroneously convicted Maongco for illegal sale of shabu?

2. Did the RTC and CA likewise erroneously convicted Bandali for illegal sale of shabu?

Ruling:

The appeal is partly meritorious.

1. Yes, but Maongco is guilty of illegal delivery of shabu.

In the case of accused-appellant Maongco, the Court finds that the RTC and the Court of

Appeals both erred in convicting him in Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731 for the illegal sale of shabu under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165. The evidence on record does not support

accused-appellant Maongco’s conviction for said crime, especially considering the following

answers of prosecution witness PO1 Arugay during the latter’s cross -examination, practically

admitting the lack of consideration/payment for the sachet of shabu. Inarguably,

consideration/payment is one of the essential elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, without

which, accused-appellant Maongco’s conviction for said crime cannot stand. Nonetheless, accused -

appellant Maongco is still not absolved of criminal liability.

A review of the Information in Criminal Case No. Q-04-127731 readily reveals that accused-appellant Maongco was not actually charged with illegal sale of shabu. Said Information specifically

alleged that accused-appellant Maongco “willfully and unlawfully dispense[d], deliver[ed],transport[ed], distribute[d] or act[ed] as broker” in the transaction involving 4.50 grams of shabu.

These acts are likewise punishable under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.

As for the illegal delivery of dangerous drugs, it must be proven that (1) the accused passed

on possession of a dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means; (2) such

delivery is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused knowingly made the delivery. Worthy of note

is that the delivery may be committed even without consideration.

It is not disputed that accused-appellant Maongco, who was working as a taxi driver at the

time of his arrest, had no authority under the law to deliver any dangerous drug. The existence ofthe two other elements was established by PO1 Arugay’s testimony.

There was a prior arrangement between Carpio and Maongco. When PO1 Arugay appeared

for his purportedly indisposed cousin, Carpio, and asked for his order of shabu, Maongco

immediately understood what PO1 Arugay meant. Maongco took out a sachet of shabu from his

pocket and handed over possession of said sachet to PO1 Arugay.




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Based on the charges against accused-appellant Maongco and the evidence presented by the

prosecution, accused-appellant Maongco is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal delivery of shabu under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165.

2. Yes, Bandali was also erroneously convicted for illegal sale of shabu, but must be

convicted for illegal possession of shabu.

For the same reasons cited in the preceding paragraphs, the RTC and the Court of Appeals

also erred in convicting accused-appellant Bandali for the crime of illegal sale of shabu in

Criminal Case No. Q-04-127732.

The Information against accused-appellant Bandali, same as that against accused-appellant

Maongco, charged him with “willfully and unlawfully dispens[ing], deliver[ing], transport[ing],distribut[ing] or act[ing] as broker” in the transaction involving 4.45 grams of shabu. However,

unlike accused-appellant Maongco, accused-appellant Bandali cannot be convicted for illegal

delivery of shabu under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, given that the circumstances

surrounding the arrest of the latter were radically different from those of the former.

In Bandali’s case, it cannot be said that he knowingly passed on the sachet of shabu in his

possession to PO2 Ong. PO2 Ong approached accused-appellant Bandali as a police officer, absent

any pretense, and demanded that the latter bring out the other sachet of shabu. Bandali’s voluntary

production of the sachet of shabu in his possession was in subservience to PO2 Ong’s authority. PO2Ong then acquired the sachet of shabu from Bandali by seizure, not by delivery. Even if there may be

doubt as to whether or not Bandali was actually aware at that moment that PO2 Ong was a police

officer, the ambiguity would still be resolved in Bandali’s favor.

This does not mean though that accused-appellant Bandali goes scot free. The evidence for

the prosecution did establish that Bandali committed illegal possession of dangerous drugs,

penalized under Article II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165.

For the prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to prosper, the following

essential elements must be proven, namely: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object

that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the

accused freely and consciously possess the said drug.30 Accused-appellant Maongco informed the

police officers that the other sachet of shabu was in the possession of accused-appellant Bandali.

Accused-appellant Bandali herein was in possession of the sachet of shabu as he was sitting at

Jollibee Pantranco branch and was approached by PO2 Ong. Hence, Bandali was able to

immediately produce and surrender the said sachet upon demand by PO2 Ong. Bandali, admittedly

jobless at the time of his arrest, did not have any authority to possess shabu. And as to the last

element, the rule is settled that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of

knowledge or animus possidendi, which is sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a

satisfactory explanation of such possession.

But can Bandali be convicted for illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Article II,

Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 when he was charged with illegal dispensation, delivery,

transportation, distribution or acting as broker of dangerous drugs under Article II, Section 5 of the

same statute? The Court answers in the affirmative.




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Well-settled in jurisprudence that the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs necessarily

includes the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The same ruling may also be applied to

the other acts penalized under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 because for the accused

to be able to trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in

transit, or transport any dangerous drug, he must necessarily be in possession of said drugs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARILYN SANTOS and ARLENE VALERAG.R. No. 193190, November 13, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The testimonies of the police officers who conducted the buy-bust operations are credible

when they are consistent in establishing the elements of illegal sale of shabu, despite their

consistencies on peripheral matters. In addition, objections to the alleged violation to the chain of

custody rule must be made during trial and not first time on appeal, otherwise the objection must be

denied.

Facts:

Santos and Valera were charged with illegal sale of shabu, in violation of R.A. No. 9165.According to the prosecution, an informant notified the police that a certain Marilyn and Arlene will

sell her shabu. A buy-bust operation was then conducted, with SP02 Aninas as the poseur buyer.

The appellants Santos and Valera entered inside the vehicle occupied by the informant, P02 Aninas

and SP02 Male. After the sale was completed, Santos and Valera were arrested. The six pieces of

plastic sachets containing shabu which were taken from the appellants were marked by PO2

Aninas. And were inventoried in Camp Vicente Lim.

The RTC convicted the appellants, and the CA affirmed the decision.

Issues:1. Were the testimonies of the police officers inconsistent to such extent as to warrant

acquittal for Santos and Valrea?2. Did the police officers violate the chain of custody rule?

Ruling:

1. No. The testimonies of PO2 Aninias and SPO2 Male, stating that the same corroborated

each other on material points and established beyond reasonable doubt that the crime

of illegal sale of dangerous drugs was indeed consummated.

To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be

established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration;

and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof.” People v. Nicolas adds that “[w]hat

is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction orsale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.”

In handing down its judgment of conviction against appellants, the RTC gave more credence

to the testimonies of PO2 Aninias and SPO2 Male that appellants were caught in flagrante delicto of

selling illegal drugs in a buy-bust operation. The RTC ruled that the inconsistencies pointed out by

appellants did not destroy the credibility of the police officers’ testimonies. The inconsistencies

merely involved peripheral matters that did not totally cause damage to the declarations of the




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police officers, which the RTC found to be credible and consistent on material points. The RTC

found that appellants acted in conspiracy with each other in the selling of shabu to PO2 Aninias as

both appellants were present and actively participated in the sale. As regards the testimonies of the

defense witnesses, the trial court deemed the same insufficient to refute the affirmative allegations

of the police officers and the presumption of regularity in the performance of their official

functions.

The Court of Appeals also found credible the testimonies of PO2 Aninias and SPO2 Male,

stating that the same corroborated each other on material points and established beyond

reasonable doubt that the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs was indeed consummated. The

appellate court added that, based on the conduct of appellants during the buy-bust operation, their

actions collectively could not be interpreted to mean anything other than their eagerness to sell

illegal drugs to the poseur-buyer.

To our mind, the above seemingly incompatible statements of PO2 Aninias and SPO2 Male

did not destroy their credibility. Nor are these statements utterly irreconcilable as appellants would

like this Court to believe. As to the sale transaction itself, the testimony of PO2 Aninias is of greater

relevance considering that he was the poseur-buyer who dealt directly, i.e., face to face, withappellants. PO2 Aninias stated in his cross examination that he was seated at the passenger seat of

their vehicle and his head was turned towards appellants while he was talking to them. On the

other hand, SPO2 Male, who was sitting in the driver’s seat, merely listened to the conversation

between PO2 Aninias and the appellants. SPO2 Male had no actual participation in the exchange of

illegal drugs and boodle money. His recollection of events might not be as precise as that of PO2

Aninias. Thus, PO2 Aninias was in a better position to testify on who handed to him the box

containing the shabu and to whom he gave the boodle money. The variance in the statements of

SPO2 Male as to the role(s) played by appellants does not detract from the fact that both accused

were involved in the transaction with the poseur-buyer. Neither did the same mean that the police

officers in this case were guilty of prevarication or otherwise in bad faith in their testimonies.

Brushing aside the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,the Court finds that the testimonial evidence of the prosecution duly established the fact that

appellants sold to PO2 Aninias, the poseur-buyer, six heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets that

contained white crystalline substance that later tested positive for shabu. Thus, the elements of the

crime charged had been sufficiently established.

2. No. The failure of the appellants to object on the alleged lapse of the police officers

regarding the chain of custody of the drugs during trial is fatal to their claim.

The Court notes, however, that appellants raised the issue of the police officers' non-

compliance with the above provisions only in their appeal. The memorandum42 of the appellants

before the RTC and the transcript of stenographic notes of this case did not contain any objections

regarding the safekeeping and the integrity of the shabu seized from appellants on account of thefailure of the police officers to maintain an unbroken chain of custody of said drugs. This lapse is

fatal to appellants' case.

The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable

grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from

complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant[s] did not question during trial

the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers' alleged violations of




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Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were instead

raised for the first time on appeal. In no instance did [the] appellant[s] least intimate at the trial

court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and

evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party

desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without

such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARISSA CASTILLOG.R. No. 190180, November 27, 2013, J. Leonardo-de Castro

Non-compliance with Section 21 does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items

seized inadmissible because what is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized

items are preserved which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the

accused. The failure to take photographs and to make an inventory of the seized evidence, and the lack

of participation of the representatives from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any

elected public official in the operation will not render the evidence seized as inadmissible.

Facts:

While on duty at the drug enforcement unit of the Eastern Police District, a confidential

informant (CI) came and informed PO2 Santos and his colleagues at the said office about the illegal

activity of the accused Marissa Castillo and one alias "Ompong" who were reported to be selling

shabu along J.B. Miguel St., Brgy. Bambang, Pasig City. Acting on such tip, a buy-bust information

was conducted.

On the same day, the CI introduced PO2 Santos and PO1 Grace Chavez to Marissa as

potential buyers. During the transaction, Marissa brought out three (3) plastic sachets and then

gave one of the plastic sachets to PO2 Santos. PO2 Santos examined the plastic sachet given to him

after which he scratched his head with his right hand which was the pre-arranged signal to signify

that the sale had been consummated. PO2 Santos and his companions then introduced themselvesas police officers after which PO2 Santos grabbed the left hand of Marissa Castillo. PO2 Santos was

able to recover the Php200.00 buy bust money from the left hand of Marissa and the two other

plastic sachets containing suspected shabu. Marissa’s companion, however, was able to run away.

After PO2 Santos had arrested accused Castillo, he informed her of her rights and then put

markings on the plastic sachets confiscated from the accused. Thereafter, the accused was brought

to the office of the SDEU while the plastic sachets confiscated from the accused were brought to

crime laboratory for examination. The examination shows that the contents of the plastic sachets

tested positive for shabu. PO2 Santos identified the accused Marissa Castillo in open court.

The RTC found the accused guilty of violation of Section 5 and Section 11 (sale and

possession of illegal drugs, respectively), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs Act of 2002. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

In the instant appeal, appellant avers that the police officers who apprehended her failed to

strictly comply with the procedural requirements of Section 21(1), Article II of Republic Act No.

9165, specifically, the failure to take photographs and to make an inventory of the seized evidence,

and the lack of participation of the representatives from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ),

and any elected public official in the operation.




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Issues:

Whether or not the failure to take photographs and to make an inventory of the seized

evidence, and the lack of participation of the representatives from the media, the Department of

Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official in the operation will render the evidence seized asinadmissible.

Ruling:

No, the evidence will not be rendered inadmissible because of such failure.

Non-compliance with Section 21 does not necessarily render the arrest illegal or the items

seized inadmissible because what is essential is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the

seized items are preserved which would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of

the accused.

Moreover, despite the seemingly mandatory language used in the procedural rule at issue, aperusal of Section 21, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165

reveals the existence of a clause which may render non-compliance with said procedural rule non-

prejudicial to the prosecution of drug offenses: “…that non-compliance with these requirements

under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are

properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such

seizures of and custody over said items.”

Essentially, Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 ensures that the chain of custody of the

seized drugs to be used in evidence must be complete and unbroken. We have defined "chain of

custody" as the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled

chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping

to presentation in court for destruction.

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost

always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential

when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its

condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its

uniqueness The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration,

tampering, contamination and even substation and exchange. In other words, the exhibit’s level of

susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering – without regard to whether the same is

advertent or otherwise not – dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody

rule.

In the case at bar, we concur with appellant’s assertion that the arresting officers involved

were not able to strictly comply with the procedural guidelines stated in Section 21(1), Article II ofRepublic Act No. 9165. However, our affinity with appellant’s argument does not sway us towardsgranting her absolution because, notwithstanding the procedural error, the integrity and the

evidentiary value of the illegal drugs used in this case were duly preserved and the chain of custody

of said evidence was shown to be unbroken.

At the outset, it should be noted that appellant did not raise the issue of the alleged non-

compliance with the aforementioned procedural rule when the case was still being heard in the trial




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court. In People v. Robelo, we ruled that this assertion must be argued before the trial court and not

on appeal for the first time.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ASIR GANI and NORMINA GANIG.R. No. 198318, November 27, 2013, J. Leonardo-de Castro

In dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make a physical inventory and to

photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to mark the sachets at the place of arrest, do not render

the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the integrity of the chain of custody

of the said drugs. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary

value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of

the accused.

Facts:

On May 5, 2004, Special Investigator Elson Saul (SI Saul) received information from a

confidential informant that accused-appellant Normina Gani (Normina), alias Rohaima, was looking

for a buyer of shabu. SI Saul arranged for a meeting with Normina, and the two eventually agreedon the sale of 100 grams of shabu for One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00) to be

consummated in the afternoon of the following day, May 6, 2004, at FTI Complex corner Vishay

Street, Taguig City. After reporting the negotiation to his NBI superior, SI Saul, in coordination with

PDEA, formed a buy-bust team.

On May 6, 2004, Normina arrived in the agreed place together with Asir Gani. SI Saul

showed the accused the marked money and the accused, in turn, showed two plastic packs

containing a white crystalline substance. The exchange took place, then SI Saul lighted a cigarette to

signal the other members of the buy-bust team. The accused were arrested and duly advised of

their constitutional rights.

During the search incidental to the arrest, the buy-bust team seized from accused-appellants’ possession, two other sachets of shabu, the marked money, accused-appellant Asir’s .45

caliber pistol, and the motorcycle. The team and the accused then proceeded to the FTI Barangay

Hall.

At the FTI Barangay Hall, SI Saul conducted an inventory of the items recovered from

accused-appellants, including the two plastic sachets of shabu subject of the sale, which SI Saul

marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04," representing SI Saul’s initials and the date of the

buy-bust. All these were done in the presence of accused-appellants and two barangay officials. SI

Saul’s inventory report, however, did not include the two other sachets of shabu seized from

accused-appellants’ possession. Thereafter, the buy-bust team brought accused-appellants to the

NBI Headquarters in Manila.

An Information for violation of Section 5, Art. II, R.A. 9165 in relation to Art. 62, Par. 2, of the

Revised Penal Code was then filed in court. During the pre-trial phase, one of the stipulated facts

include the existence of the four (4) plastic sachets, but not their source or origin. RTC Pasig City

found the accused guilty. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

The appeal in the CA and the instant appeal are grounded on the alleged violation of the

chain of custody rule under RA 9165. The accused claim that there is no showing that the inventory




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and picture-taking of the shabu were conducted in their presence, as well as in the presence of a

representative from the media, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official,

immediately after arrest. It is likewise not clearly established where and when the markings on the

plastic sachets of shabu were made. They also claim that suspicions could have been avoided had

the prosecution presented the testimonies of the barangay officials who signed the inventory

report. They further pointed out that the prosecution’s evidence conflicted as to the number ofsachets of shabu seized from them.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the the rules on the custody of seized drugs provided under Section 21 of

Republic Act No. 9165 were complied with in the case.

2. Whether or not the inventory of the drugs should be conducted in the presence of all persons

enumerated in Sec.21 of RA 9165.

3. Whether or not the testimonies of the Brgy. Officials who signed the inventory should be

presented in trial

Ruling:

1. Yes, they have complied.

The Court finds that the arresting officers had substantially complied with the rule on the

chain of custody of the dangerous drugs as provided under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

Jurisprudence has decreed that, in dangerous drugs cases, the failure of the police officers to make a

physical inventory and to photograph the sachets of shabu, as well as to mark the sachets at the

place of arrest, do not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence or automatically impair the

integrity of the chain of custody of the said drugs. What is of utmost importance is the preservation

of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as these would be utilized in the

determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

In this case, testimonial and documentary evidence for the prosecution proved thatimmediately after accused-appellants’ arrest, they were brought to the FTI Barangay Hall. It wasthere, in the presence of two barangay officials, that SI Saul conducted an inventory of the two

plastic sachets of shabu plus the other items seized. It was also at the barangay hall where SI Saul

marked the two plastic sachets of shabu sold to him with his initials and the date.. Thereafter, the

buy-bust team, proceeded to the NBI Headquarters. At the NBI Headquarters, SI Saul made a

request for examination of the two plastic sachets of shabu, marked "ES-1 05-06-04" and "ES-2 05-

06-04," and personally handed the same to NBI Forensic Chemist II Patingo. NBI Forensic Chemist II

Patingo, conducted the laboratory examination of the contents of the two sachets marked "ES-1 05-

06-04" and "ES-2 05-06-04" and kept said sachets in his custody until the same were submitted to

the RTC as evidence during trial.

Contrary to accused-appellants’ averment, prosecution witness, SI Saul, was able to explain

why there were a total of four sachets of shabu presented during trial, when SI Saul only bought

two sachets during the buy- bust operation. SI Saul testified that in addition to the two plastic

sachets of shabu sold to him by accused-appellants, there were two more sachets of shabu

recovered from accused-appellants’ possession by the buy-bust team during the body search

conducted incidental to accused-appellants’ lawful arrest.

2. No, it is not necessary.




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The failure of the buy-bust team to take pictures of the seized drugs immediately upon

seizure and at the site of accused-appellants’ apprehension, and to mark and make an inventory of

the same in the presence of all the persons named in Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, are not

fatal and did not render the seized drugs inadmissible in evidence given that the prosecution was

able to trace and establish each and every link in the chain of custody of the seized drugs and,

hence, the identity and integrity of the said drugs had been duly preserved.

3. No, it is not necessary.

For the same reasons, it was not imperative for the prosecution to present as witnesses

before the RTC the two barangay officials who witnessed the conduct of the inventory. At best, the

testimonies of these two barangay officials will only be corroborative, and would have no

significant impact on the identity and integrity of the seized drugs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSELITO TACULOD y ELLEG.R. No. 198108, December 11, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the

seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment

therefor, which the prosecution has satisfactorily established.

Facts:

On September 24, 2003, a confidential informant called the Caloocan City Police Station,

telling the police officers about the drug-peddling activities of the appellant.

On September 25, 2003, in a buy-bust operation, accused-appellant was arrested while in

possession of three heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing shabu weighing 0.02 gram

each. He also sold and delivered shabu weighing 0.02 gram to a police officer, who posed as buyer.On September 30, 2003, accused was charged for violations of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise

known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

During the trial, the defense painted a different picture of the events that transpired on the

day the appellant was arrested. The appellant was arrested while watching a basketball game on

September 24, 2003 at about 6:00 or 7:00 o’clock in the evening at Sabalo St., Dagat-Dagatan,

Caloocan City. While simply observing his neighbors play basketball, the appellant was suddenly

approached by several unidentified individuals who inquired if his name is "Lito." After replying in

the affirmative, they suddenly grabbed and handcuffed him for no apparent reason. He tried to

resist but to no avail, the policemen succeeded in seizing him and thereafter, brought him to the

police station. Thereat, he was told that the reason why he was arrested was because he had

quarrelled with their assets on April 22, 2003.

The appellant denied the charges filed against him and that he only came to know about

such charges at the police station. Nevertheless, the trial court found the appellant guilty of the

crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of

Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The

Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of the appellant. The appellant, thus, filed the instant

appeal to the Supreme Court.




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Issues:

1. Whether or not there was indeed a buy-bust operation. 2. May the accused interpose the defense of denial and frame-up in the case at bar?

Rulings:

1. Yes.

The issue of whether or not there was indeed a buy-bust operation primarily boils down to

one of credibility. In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, a case becomes a

contest of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. When it comes to credibility, the trial

court’s assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted witharbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is

obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner oftestifying, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial

evidence properly. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said findings aresustained by the Court of Appeals.

What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is

proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and

the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment

therefor, which the prosecution has satisfactorily established. The prosecution satisfactorily proved

the illegal sale of dangerous drugs and presented in court the evidence of corpus delicti.

On the other hand, for an accused to be convicted of illegal possession of prohibited or

regulated drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or

object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and

(3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.

With respect to the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the police officer positively

identified the appellant as the person who sold to him one plastic sachet of shabu worth P100.00 in

a buy-bust operation. The police officer also identified in court the plastic sachet of shabu he bought

from the appellant. The testimony of the police officer was in turn corroborated by the testimony of

a member of the buy-bust team who also categorically pointed to the appellant as the person whom

he saw the police officer who bought illegal drugs from. To further prove that a buy-bust operation

was actually conducted, the prosecution also presented the testimony of a forensic chemist

assigned to the case.

On the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the police officer testified that when

he bought shabu from the appellant, the latter took out from his pocket four plastic sachets. Theappellant gave one sachet to the police officer and put the rest back in his left pocket. After the

arrest of the appellant, the police officer relayed this information to another police officer and the

latter ordered the appellant to empty the contents of his pocket. The appellant then brought out the

three remaining plastic sachets of shabu, which the police officer marked accordingly.

3. No.




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The appellant could only muster a defense of outright denial, with nary any evidence to

adequately support his version of the events that led to his arrest. Sadly for the appellant, this

omission does nothing to help his cause. The defense of denial and frame-up has been invariably

viewed by this Court with disfavor, for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard

defense ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the

defense of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGANG.R. No. 200304, January 15, 2014, J. Leonardo-de Castro

When the prosecution was able to establish the elements for conviction for the crime of illegal

sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, illegal possession of regulated and prohibited drugs and the guilt

of the accused, the Court must affirm the decision of trial court and the CA.

As to imposition of penalties in illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, illegal possession

of regulated and prohibited drugs, as provided by law, it shall depend on the amount sold and

possessed by the accused.

Facts:

Donald Vasquez (Don), claiming that he was an employee of the National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI), was arrested, together with Reynar Siscar, through a buy-bust operation of the

Philippine National Police. The police found six plastic bags of shabu seized during the buy-bust

operation contained in a self-sealing plastic envelope placed inside a brown envelope. When the

brown envelope was confiscated from Don, the police put her initials "JSF" therein and signed it.

The police also noticed that there were markings on the envelope that read "DD-93-1303 re

Antonio Roxas y Sunga" but the police did not bother to check out what they were for or who made

them. When they interrogated Don about the brown envelope, they found out that the same was

submitted as evidence to the NBI Crime Laboratory. The police also testified that after the appellant

was arrested, they conducted a body search on the two suspects. The search yielded 12 moreplastic sachets of drugs from the appellant which vary in sizes and were contained in a white

envelope and marked each of the 12 sachets with his initials "CVT" and the date. The police officers

then informed the suspects of their rights and they proceeded to the police headquarters in Fort

Bonifacio.

Don denied all the allegations of the prosecution stating that the drug specimen was

obtained from him through force when the police entered his house and searched his room, picking

up what they could get. One of the police opened a cabinet and got drug specimens in [Donald’s]possession in relation to his work as a laboratory aide; from two (2) cases and marked as DD-93-

1303 owned by Antonio Roxas, and DD-96-5392 owned by SPO4 Emiliano Anonas. The drug

specimen contained in the envelope marked as DD-93-1303 was intended for presentation on 3

April 1998. Aside from the drug specimens, the policemen also took his jewelry, a VHS player, andhis wallet containing P2,530.00.

Issues:

1. Whether the accused is guilty of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs and illegal

possession of regulated and prohibited drugs.




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2. Whether the CA proper imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as to the crime of illegal

sale of of regulated or prohibited drugs and applying ISLAW as to the crime of illegal

possession of regulated and prohibited drugs.

Ruling:

1. The accused is guilty of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs and illegal possession of

regulated and prohibited drugs.

To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the

following elements should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the

object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. On

the other hand, the elements of illegal possession of drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an

item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by

law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

In the case at bar, the testimonies of the police officers established that a buy-bust

operation was legitimately carried out in the wee hours of April 3, 1998 to entrap the appellant. Thepolice/poseur-buyer, positively identified the appellant as the one who sold to her six plastic bags

of shabu that were contained in a big brown envelope for the price of P250,000.00. She likewise

identified the six plastic bags of shabu, which contained the markings she placed thereon after the

same were seized from the appellant. When subjected to laboratory examination, the white

crystalline powder contained in the plastic bags tested positive for shabu. The Court finds that the

police’s testimony on the events that transpired during the conduct of the buy -bust operation was

detailed and straightforward. It was also consistent and unwavering in her narration even in the

face of the opposing counsel’s cross-examination.

The records of this case are also silent as to any measures undertaken by the appellant to

criminally or administratively charge the police officers herein for falsely framing him up for selling

and possessing illegal drugs. Being a regular employee of the NBI, the appellant could have easilysought the help of his immediate supervisors and/or the chief of his office to extricate him from his

predicament. Instead, what the appellant offered in evidence were mere photocopies of documents

that supposedly showed that he was authorized to keep drug specimens in his custody. That the

original documents and the testimonies of the signatories thereof were not at all presented in court

did nothing to help the appellant’s case. To the mind of the Court, the evidence offered by the

appellant failed to persuade amid the positive and categorical testimonies of the arresting officers

that the appellant was caught red-handed selling and possessing a considerable amount of

prohibited drugs on the night of the buy-bust operation. Thus, the Court is convinced that the

prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the appellant of the crimes charged.

2. The CA properly imposed the penalties.

Anent the proper imposable penalties, Section 15 and Section 16, Article III, in relation to

Section 20(3) of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, state:

SEC. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of

Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five

hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless

authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any regulated drug.




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Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the

offense is a minor, or should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be

the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided

shall be imposed.

SEC. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to deathand a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed

upon any person who shall possess or use any regulated drug without the corresponding

license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

SEC. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of

the Crime. - The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and

Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs

involved is in any of the following quantities:

1. 40 grams or more of opium;

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

4. 40 grams or more of heroin;5. 750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana;

6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrocholoride; or

8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic

requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after

public consultations/hearings conducted for the purpose.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall

range from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.

In the criminal case involving the crime of illegal sale of regulated drugs, the appellant was

found to have sold to the poseur-buyer in this case a total of 247.98 grams of shabu, which amountis more than the minimum of 200 grams required by the law for the imposition of either reclusion

perpetua or, if there be aggravating circumstances, the death penalty.

Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that when the law prescribes a penalty

composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating

circumstances in the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Thus, in this case,

considering that no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended the appellant’s violation of

Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed

the trial court’s imposition of reclusion perpetua. The P5,000,000.00 fine imposed by the RTC on

the appellant is also in accord with Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

As to the charge of illegal possession of regulated drugs, the Court of Appeals properlyinvoked our ruling in People v. Tira in determining the proper imposable penalty. Indeed, we held in

Tira that:

Under Section 16, Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, the imposable penalty of

possession of a regulated drug, less than 200 grams, in this case, shabu, is prision

correccional to reclusion perpetua. Based on the quantity of the regulated drug subject of

the offense, the imposable penalty shall be as follows:




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QUANTITY IMPOSABLE PENALTY

Less than one (1) gram to 49.25 grams prision correccional

49.26 grams to 98.50 grams prision mayor

98.51 grams to 147.75 grams reclusion temporal

147.76 grams to 199 grams reclusion perpetua

Given that the additional 12 plastic sachets of shabu found in the possession of the appellant

amounted to 4.03 grams, the imposable penalty for the crime is prision correccional. Applying the

Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance in this case, the

imposable penalty on the appellant should be the indeterminate sentence of six months of arresto

mayor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. The

penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, thus, falls within the range of the proper imposable

penalty. In Criminal Case No. 98-164175, no fine is imposable considering that in Republic Act No.

6425, as amended, a fine can be imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusionperpetua to death.

Incidentally, the Court notes that both parties in this case admitted that the appellant was a

regular employee of the NBI Forensics Chemistry Division. Such fact, however, cannot be taken into

consideration to increase the penalties in this case to the maximum, in accordance with Section 24

of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. Such a special aggravating circumstance, i.e., one that which

arises under special conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period, was

not alleged and charged in the informations. Thus, the same was properly disregarded by the lower

courts.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSELITO MORATE Y TARNATE

G.R. No. 201156, January 29, 2014, J. Leonardo–De Castro

For there to be illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be present: (1) the

identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery to

the buyer of the thing sold and receipt by the seller of the payment therefor. Thus, upon delivery of the

illicit drug to the buyer and the receipt of the payment by the seller, illegal sale of dangerous drugs is

committed.

Facts:

On April 2006, the Philippine National Police in Tabaco City received a confidential

information that “Palito” of Cormidal, Tabaco City is engaged in the illegal sale of marijuana. Upon

investigation, it was later on confirmed that “Palito”, the accused–appellant Joselito Morate(Morate), is indeed involved in the sale of illegal drugs. The police officers then planned for the buy-

bust operation with PO1 Manamtam designated as poseur-buyer.

Morate was then arrested through the buy-bust operation and was brought to the police

station. Upon arrival at the police station, the items confiscated during the buy–bust were counted,

marked and inventoried. The marking and inventory of the seized items were witnessed by

Barangay Kagawad Julio Marbella of Cormidal, Tabaco City and Emmanuel Cea III, a local newsman,




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both of whom signed the Certification of Inventory. The seized items were all transferred to PO3

Eva as the evidence custodian.

PO3 Eva thereafter prepared a Receipt of Seized Evidence/Property before handing the

seized items to PO1 Reynaldo Borromeo who signed the receipt upon taking hold of the items. PO1

Borromeo proceeded to the PNP Crime Laboratory in Legazpi City bringing with him the seizeditems and a Request for Laboratory Examination. The seized items were received by the PNP Crime

Laboratory in Legazpi City where PSInsp. Josephine Macura Clemen, a forensic chemist, examined

them. PSInsp. Clemen subsequently presented the seized drugs to the trial court as the

prosecution’s evidence in the course of her testimony.

The lower court finds the accused, Joselito Morate, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

Violation of Section 5 of Art. II of R.A. 9165 and Section 11, Art. II of the same law. Morate appealed

his case to the Court of Appeals questioning the non –compliance with the rule on chain of custody

of seized illegal drugs. CA rejected the contentions of Morate and denied his appeal. Hence, the

petition of Morate.

Issue:

Whether Morate is guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs.

Ruling:

This Court denies Morate’s appeal.

A successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs requires that the following

elements be established:

1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration of the sale; and

2) the delivery to the buyer of the thing sold and receipt by the seller of the paymenttherefor.

On the other hand, there can be conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs only if

the following elements are present:

1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited

drug;

2) such possession is not authorized by law; and

3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

Illegal sale of dangerous drugs is committed when the sale transaction is consummated, that

is, upon delivery of the illicit drug to the buyer and the receipt of the payment by the seller. In thiscase, the RTC and the Court of Appeals both found beyond reasonable doubt that the accused –appellant, as seller, sold 1.0291 grams of marijuana to the poseur–buyer, PO1 Manamtam, for

P100.00. Morate handed PO1 Manamtam three sachets of marijuana after the latter paid the

P100.00 consideration for the sale. Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, such illegal sale of

dangerous drugs, regardless of quantity, is punishable with the penalty of life imprisonment to

death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos

(P10,000,000.00). In light of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346, otherwise known as “An Act




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Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,” the imposition of the supremepenalty of death has been proscribed. Consequently, the penalty applicable to the accused–

appellant shall only be life imprisonment, without eligibility for parole, and fine. Thus, the accused–appellant was correctly meted the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred

Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00). Under Section 11(3) of Republic Act No. 9165, illegal possession of

less than 300 grams of marijuana is punishable with the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three Hundred Thousand Pesos

(P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (P400,000.00). Thus, in accordance with the

Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused–appellant was correctly meted the penalty of

imprisonment for a minimum term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to a maximum term of

twenty (20) years, and a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMANOS CONSTANTINO, JR. y BINAYUG, a.k.a. "JOJIT"

G.R. No. 199689, March 12, 2014 , J. Leonardo-De Castro

In cases of illegal sale of regulated and prohibited drugs, it is necessary that the identity and

integrity of the seized drugs and other related articles have been preserved from the time they were

confiscated from the accused until their presentation as evidence in court. The following links must beestablished in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable,

of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the

illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn over by the

investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,

the turn over and submission of the marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

When the seizing officer (the poseur-buyer) failed to mark the seized illegal drugs and it was only

when the drugs were turned over to the investigating officer that they were marked, there is already

failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the evidence’s chain of custody and the Court can nolonger consider or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated

dangerous drug were properly preserved.

Facts:

On January 20, 2005, Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Mariano Rodriguez (Rodriquez), the

Chief of Police of Tuguegarao City, received a report from a confidential informant (CI) that a

certain “Jojit” (Hermanos Constantino, Jr., hereinafter referred as Constatino) was selling illegal

drugs in the said city. P/Supt. Rodriguez immediately formed a buy-bust group composed of Senior

Police Officer (SPO) 2 Noel Taguiam (Taguiam), SPO2 Alexander Tamang (Tamang), SPO1 Arthur

Blaquera (Blaquera), Police Officer (PO) 3 Edwin Hernandez (Hernandez), and PO3 Rolando

Domingo (Domingo). PO3 Domingo was designated as the poseur-buyer. The buy-bust money,

consisting of one P500.00 bill and five P100.00 bills, were dusted with fluorescent powder and their

respective serial numbers were recorded in the police blotter.

On the same day, the team proceeded to Reynovilla St., Caritan Centro, Tuguegarao City, theplace where, according to the CI, Jojit was selling shabu. PO3 Domingo positioned himself beside a

street light while the rest of the team hid behind a nearby concrete fence. After waiting for about 45

minutes, Constantino arrived on board a tricycle. PO3 Domingo recognized Constantino as the Jojit

described by the CI. PO3 Domingo approached Constantino and asked him if he was Jojit. When

Constantino replied in the affirmative, PO3 Domingo next asked, "Mayroon ka bang stuff?" ("Do you

have stuff?") In response, Constantino inquired of PO3 Domingo how much he wanted to buy. PO3

Domingo said he wanted to buy P1,000.00 worth of shabu, simultaneously handing over the buy-




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bust money to Constantino, who, in turn, handed two plastic sachets to PO3 Domingo. Thereupon,

PO3 Domingo turned his cap backwards, the pre-arranged signal for the consummated sale. Upon

seeing the signal, the other members of the buy-bust team approached the scene at once and

arrested Constantino, from whom SPO2 Taguiam recovered the buy-bust money.

Constantino was then brought to the police station where the recovered drugs and moneywere turned over to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang. The recovered drugs were then marked with

the initials "A-1" and "A-2." The incident was recorded in the police blotter with an inventory of the

recovered drugs and money. Later that evening, the two plastic sachet with white crystalline

substance marked as "A-1" and "A-2" was submitted to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime

Laboratory Services, Camp Marcelo Adduru, Tuguegarao City, for laboratory examination to

determine the presence of dangerous drugs; as well as both hands of Constantino, one

piece P500.00 bill, and five pieces P100.00 bills, to determine the presence of the ultra violet

powder. It was, later on, found out through the chemistry report the contents of the two plastic

sachets tested positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride; while the other specimens tested

positive for the presence of bright-yellow ultraviolet fluorescent powder.

Constantino denied the accusation against him and asserted that he was merely framed-up.He was, thereafter, charged of illegal sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly

known as shabu, under Article II, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the

Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. RTC, after hearing, ruled that Constantino is guilty as

charged. On appeal, CA affirmed in toto the judgment of conviction of the RTC against Constantino.

The appellate court held that Constantino’s defense of frame-up was not worthy of credence as his

Issue:

Whether Constantino is guilty of illegal sale of regulated and prohibited drugs beyond

reasonable doubt

Ruling:

The appeal is impressed with merit.


(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of

the thing sold and the payment therefor. Simply put, “[in] prosecutions for illegal sale of shabu,what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the

presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.” And in the prosecution of these offenses, the

primary consideration is to ensure that the identity and integrity of the seized drugs and other

related articles have been preserved from the time they were confiscated from the accused until

their presentation as evidence in court.

Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002, defines "chain of

custody" as follows: “Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and

custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory

equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory

to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of

seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of




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the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of

safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.”

The following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation: first,

the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the

apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer tothe investigating officer; third, the turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the

forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over and submission of the

marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court.

After a careful scrutiny of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the Court finds

glaring inconsistencies affecting the integrity of the shabu purportedly confiscated from

Constantino. The inconsistent testimonies of PO3 Domingo, PO3 Hernandez, and P/SInsp. Tulauan

as to who, when, and where the two plastic sachets of shabu were marked lead the Court to

question whether the two plastic sachets of shabu identified in court were the very same ones

confiscated from Constantino. The doubtful markings already broke the chain of custody of the

seized shabu at a very early stage.

The first crucial link in the chain of custody is seizure and marking of the illegal drug. In this

case, PO3 Domingo, as poseur-buyer, received two plastic sachets of shabu from Constantino in

exchange for P1,000. However, PO3 Domingo himself did not put any markings on the two plastic

sachets of shabu. Instead, upon arrival of the buy-bust team with Constantino at the police station,

PO3 Domingo turned over the two plastic sachets of shabu to the investigator, SPO2 Tamang, who

was also a member of the buy-bust team. PO3 Domingo testified that it was SPO2 Tamang who put

the marking "NBT" on the said sachets of shabu. PO3 Hernandez, another member of the buy-bust

team, categorically pointed to SPO2 Taguiam, also a member of the buy-bust team, as the one who

put the mark ing "NBT" on the plastic sachets upon the team’s return to the police station.

The Court already emphasized in People v. Zakaria the importance of marking the seized

item right after seizure:Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized dangerous drugs or

other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for the marking

upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of the

evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to

separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from

the time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings,

obviating switching, "planting" or contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time

of taking of initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law

requires.

Herein, the prosecution is completely silent as to why PO3 Domingo, the poseur-buyer,

despite having immediate custody of the two plastic sachets of shabu purchased from Constantino,failed to immediately mark the seized drugs before turning over the custody of the same to another

police officer. This lapse in procedure opened the door for confusion and doubt as to the identity of

the drugs actually seized from Constantino during the buy-bust and the ones presented before the

trial court, especially considering that three different people, during the interval, supposedly

received and marked the same. To clarify the matter, the prosecution could have presented as

witness either SPO2 Tamang or SPO2 Taguiam to directly validate the marking in court, but

unfortunately, the prosecution chose to dispense with the testimonies of both officers. This




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omission diminished the importance of the markings as the reference point for the subsequent

handling of the evidence. As a consequence, an objective person could now justifiably suspect the

shabu ultimately presented as evidence in court to be planted or contaminated.

The failure of the prosecution to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is fatal to its case

as the Court can no longer consider or even safely assume that the integrity and evidentiary valueof the confiscated dangerous drug were properly preserved. In light of the foregoing, Constantino is

acquitted of the crime charged, not because the Court accords credence to his defense of frame-up,

but because the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving his guilt beyond reasonable

doubt.

MURDER

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DARWIN BERNABE GARCIAG.R. No. 185726, October 16, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The Court held that while there were indeed discrepancies in the testimony of the prosecution

witnessed, they are not sufficient to negate the guilt of accused. As long as the testimony jibes onmaterial points, the slight clashing statements neither dilute the credibility nor the veracity of their

testimony.

Facts:

Darwin Bernabe y Garcia a.k.a. Bong was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime

of Murder.

Accused Darwin invited Jomar, Alvin, and three girls to his house for a drinking spree. He

allowed his guests to stay on and sleep in his bedroom. At about 2:00 a.m., Jomar was awakened by

the voice of Darwin telling Alvin to join him in buying some cigarettes. Outside the house, they met

the victim Jann Michael Olivo. While the three were walking along Chico Street, the Jann toldDarwin that he knew the latter. Darwin poked a gun at the victim and ordered the latter to go with

them to the house where he started questioning the victim why he was roaming around the

house. Jomar, who was in the bedroom, heard Darwin strongly utter the words, Sino ang nagbayad

sa iyo na subaybayan ako, to which the victim answered Walang nagutos sa akin na subaybayan

ka. Then, Jomar heard some punching sounds and then he heard a person plead, Kuya Bong parang

awa niyo na ho kahit dito na lang ako tumira sa inyo, huwag mo lang akong patayin . Accused-

appellant replied, Hindi naman kita papatayin, aminin mo lang sa akin kung sinong nagbayad sa iyo

para subaybayan ako. Sabihin mo lang sa akin at dodoblehin ko ang bayad.

Jomar saw Darwin holding a piece of wood while the victim was sitting near the front door

of the house. He also saw Alvin, who was seemingly frightened, seated near another room. Jomar

stayed inside the bedroom from where he saw Darwin hit the victim thrice with the piece of wooduntil it broke. Darwin then instructed the weakened victim to undress while he went to the kitchen

to get a toothbrush and some lotion. He commanded the victim to bend over and the former then

put lotion on the victims butt. The victim shouted in pain as accused-appellant inserted the

toothbrush into the victims anus.

Accused Darwin continued to interrogate the victim and hit the latter two times with a

metal pipe. He then ordered the victim to lie down and tied his hands with a plastic straw. Accused




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got GI wire or alambre, placed a gray shirt over the victims head, and then strangled the latter with

the wire. While doing this, he called out to Jomar and Alvin and ordered the two to hold the

struggling victims feet. When the victim stopped breathing, Darwin got hold of two sacks from

hisbodega or stockroom, put the lifeless body inside the sacks, placed it at a corner of the house,

and covered it with yero or GI sheets. In the afternoon, Darwin and Alvin borrowed the sidecar of

Prudencio Aristan.

At dawn, Alvin and Jomar were commanded to load the body on the sidecar and dispose of

the same. The two dumped the corpse in a water lily-filled vacant lot. Thereafter, Alvin and Jomar

were threatened that Darwin will kill them if they report the incident to the police. Jomar and Alvin

then went their separate ways and into hiding.

After the victim’s body was found, the relatives of Jomar and Alvin arranged the surrender

of the two minors to the authorities. Upon inquiry, they divulged what they witnessed and how they

allegedly accidentally participated in the commission of the crime. They voluntarily offered

themselves to help in the immediate arrest of Darwin.

Darwin was arrested on follow-up operation at his hideout. The testimony of Dr. Ruperto J.Sambilon, Jr. was dispensed with in view of the stipulation of facts that he was an expert witness

and that he conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim Jann Michael Olivo. Based on his

findings, the cause of death of the victim was asphyxia by strangulation.

The defense had another version of the facts. Allegedly, it was Jomar and Alvin who asked

Darwin if they could stay in his house. He allowed them to go to his house and stayed behind in the

drinking session he was having with Noel Wagas, his caretaker. Arriving at 2 a.m. at his house, he

found Alvin and Jomar having an argument with the victim, who was allegedly unknown to him at

the time. He told them to fix the problem and make the victim leave the house. He then entered his

bedroom where he saw three girls sleeping. He slept in another room and when he woke up, the

victim was already gone, while the three girls were still sleeping. He found Jomar and Alvin fixing

things on the table.

He allegedly thereafter went to the manukan to check on his roosters and rested there and

then instructed Alvin to borrow a sidecar in the nearby junkshop and to dispose of the garbage. He

then proceeded to his brother-in-law’s house in Manuyo II, Las Pinas City but immediately went

home since his brother-in-law was not there.

Darwin denied the charges hurled against him. He claimed that he had no capacity to

strangle the victim because he could not use his left hand effectively after undergoing an operation

on his two fingers. Amy Bandala was the Medical Records Supervisor of Las Pias Doctors

Hospital and she caused the production of the original copy of the Record of Operation of Darwin

which showed that Dr. Francisco Raura operated on the neglected fracture on the 4 th and

5th fingers.

Issue:

Whether or not Darwin’s guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:




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Yes, he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused pointed out alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of eyewitnesses Alvin and

Jomar in their direct examination and cross examination regarding their locations in the house and

where they met the victim.

The Court held that while there were indeed discrepancies in the testimony, they are not

sufficient to negate the guilt of accused. The evident attempt of Alvin and Jomar to downplay their

participation in the commission of the crime did not completely render weightless the evidentiary

value of their testimonies. Alvin and Jomar were consistent in pointing to accused-appellant as the

one who hit the victim with a metal pipe in the head causing the latter to lose consciousness, and

who strangled the victim to death using a G.I. wire (alambre).

In People v. Togahan , the Court likewise held: “While witnesses may differ in their

recollections of an incident, it does not necessarily follow from their disagreement that all of them

should be disbelieved as liars and their testimonies completely discarded as worthless. As long as

the mass of testimony jibes on material points, the slight clashing statements neither dilute thewitnesses credibility nor the veracity of their testimony, for indeed, such inconsistencies are but

natural and even enhance credibility as these discrepancies indicate that the responses are honest

and unrehearsed.”

The trial court accorded greater weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and

dismissed defenses of denial and alibi, holding the same as self-serving evidence that cannot be

given evidentiary weight greater than that of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

The Supreme Court approved these findings of the trial court: “The primordial concern is the factthat it was the accused himself who killed the victim through strangulation and as testified by the

two witnesses who saw the said dastardly act. The qualifying circumstances of treachery and

cruelty indeed attended the killing of Jann Michael Olivo. Assuming ex gratia arguendo that the

statement of Jomar Butalid would be believed, i.e., that he and Alvin helped the accused in holdingthe legs of the victim, they would still be exempted from criminal liability as they did the said act

because of fear. Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts a person from criminal liability if he

acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, or under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of

equal or greater injury, because such persons did not act with freedom.’

As to the argument that Alvin and Jomar were the ones who went into hiding and not

Darwin himself, the Court held that different people react differently to a given situation, and there

is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, or

frightful experience. The fact that Alvin and Jomar were still minors at the time they witnessed the

crime was also considered. Moreover, they were threatened to be killed by the accused Darwin.

As to defenses of alibi and denial, accused must prove not only that he was at some otherplace at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to

be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. In this case, requirement of physical

impossibility was not met as he was within the immediate vicinity of the scene of the crime.

As to the allegation of the injury of the accused, evidence revealed that the disability did not

render him incapable of perpetrating the crime. Testimony of Dr. Raura, who did the operation,

showed that there was no total loss of the function of Darwin’s left hand.




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The two courts below correctly appreciated treachery, which qualified the killing of Jann

Michael Olivo to Murder. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an

aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself,

thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest

provocation on the part of the victim. Also, cruelty as an aggravating circumstance was alsoconsidered when the accused inhumanly augmented the suffering of the victim through the

insertion of the toothbrush to the victim’s anus.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO TABARNERO and GARY TABARNEROG.R. No. 168169, February 24, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, without which there can be no self-defense,

whether complete or incomplete.

Facts:

Late at night, Gary went to the house of the deceased Ernesto Canatoy, where the formerused to reside as the live-in partner of Mary Jane Acibar, Ernesto’s stepdaughter. Gary and Ernesto

had a confrontation during which the latter was stabbed nine times, causing his death.

Gary and his father, Alberto, were charged with the crime of Murder on March 3, 2000. On

March 27, warrants for their arrest were issued. On April 22, 2001, Gary surrendered to Barangay

Tanod Edilberto Alarma. During that time, Alberto remained at large. A pre-trial conference was

held wherein Gary admitted having killed Ernesto, but claimed that it was an act of self-defense. A

reverse trial ensued.

Gary testified that he stayed in Ernesto’s house from 1997 to 1999, as he and Mary Ja ne

were living together. However, Gary left the house because of a misunderstanding with Ernesto

when the latter allegedly stopped the planned marriage of Gary and Mary Jane, who was pregnantat that time.

At the night in question, Gary was allegedly in his house at around 11:40 p.m. Overcome

with emotion over being separated from Mary Jane, Gary then went to Ernesto’s house, but was notable to enter as no one went out of the house to let him in. He instead shouted his pleas from the

outside, asking Ernesto what he had done wrong that caused Ernesto to break him and Mary Jane

up, and voicing out several times that he loved Mary Jane and was ready to marry her. When Gary

was about to leave, the gate opened and Ernesto purportedly struck him with a lead pipe. Ernesto

was aiming at Gary’s head, but the latter blocked the blow with his hands, causing his left indexfinger to be broken. Gary embraced Ernesto, but the latter strangled him. At that point, Gary felt

that there was a bladed weapon tucked at Ernesto’s back. Losing control of himself, Gary took the

bladed weapon and stabbed Ernesto, although he cannot recall how many times he did so.

According to Gary, Ernesto fell to the ground, and pleaded, “saklolo, tulungan niyo po ako”

three times. Gary was stunned, and did not notice his father, Alberto, coming. Alberto asked Gary,

“anak, ano ang nangyari?” To which Gary responded “nasaksak ko po yata si Ka Erning,” referring to

Ernesto. Gary and Alberto fled, allegedly out of fear.




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Gary denied that he and Alberto conspired to kill Ernesto. Gary claims that it was he and

Ernesto who had a fight, and that he had no choice but to stab Ernesto, who was going to kill him.

In August 2001, Alberto was apprehended and his defense was denial. He stated that did not

consider surrendering because, although he wanted to clear his name, nobody would work to

support his family.

Emerito Acibar, the brother of Mary Jane, as the eyewitness, testified that he was inside

their house in with his brother and his stepfather, Ernesto, at around 11 p.m. on the night of the

incident. He heard somebody calling for Ernesto, but ignored it. He then heard a kalabog, followed

by Ernesto’s plea for help. Emerito was already at the door of their house when he saw Ernestobeing held by a certain Toning Kulit and another person, while Gary and Alberto were stabbing

Ernesto with fan knives. Emerito lost count of the number of stabs, but each inflicted more than

one, and the last stab was made by Alberto. Emerito shouted for help. The four assailants left when

somebody arrived, allowing Emerito to approach Ernesto and bring him to the Bulacan Provincial

Hospital.

SPO2 Ronnie Morales testified that he was on duty at the police station on that night.Emerito reported at the police station that Ernesto had been stabbed. SPO2 Morales and Emerito

proceeded to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital, where SPO2 Morales saw Ernesto in the operating

room, very weak due to multiple injuries. While in the presence of two doctors on duty, SPO2

Morales asked Ernesto who stabbed him. Ernesto answered that the assailants were the father and

son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero.

As they went to the hospital, Emerito did not inform SPO2 Morales that he witnessed the

incident. SPO2 Morales did not find it odd that Emerito did not tell him who the suspects were

when Emerito reported the incident, because they immediately proceeded to the hospital,

considering that Ernesto, was still alive.

Issue:

(1) Whether or not the justifying circumstance of self-defense of Gary should be considered

(2) Whether or not Gary is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender

(3) Whether or not Alberto is guilty as a principal in the crime

Ruling:

(1) No, Gary’s self -defense cannot be considered.

The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; 2) lackof sufficient provocation on the part of the accused; and 3) employment of reasonable means to

prevent and repel aggression.

There was allegedly unlawful aggression on the part of Ernesto when the latter delivered

the first blow with the lead pipe. According to the defense, the means Gary used to defend himself

was reasonable, and the shouted professions of his feelings for Mary Jane could not be considered

provocation sufficient for Ernesto to make the unlawful aggression.




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The Court of Appeals noted that the only evidence presented by the defense to prove the

alleged unlawful aggression was Gary’s own testimony. Citing Casitas vs. People, the Court ofAppeals held that the nine stab wounds inf licted upon Ernesto indicate Gary’s intent to kill, and not

merely intent to defend himself. The number of wounds also negates the claim that the means used

by Gary to defend himself was reasonable.

The Court agreed. Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requirement of self-defense.

Gary’s own testimony is insufficient and self -serving. By invoking self-defense, Gary, in effect,

admitted killing Ernesto, and thus, shifting upon him the burden of evidence to prove the elements

of the said justifying circumstance. A plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated where it

is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also extremely doubtful in

itself.

The defense further argued he would nevertheless be entitled to the mitigating

circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court disagreed. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non, without which therecan be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete. There is incomplete self-defense when the

element of unlawful aggression by the victim is present, and any of the other two essential

requisites for self-defense. Having failed to prove the indispensable element of unlawful aggression,

Gary is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance, even assuming the presence of the other two

elements of self-defense.

(2) No, Gary is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender

In order that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be credited to the

accused, the following requisites should be present: (a) the offender has not actually been arrested;

(b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be

voluntary. A surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous, i.e., there must be an intent to submitoneself to authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save them

the trouble and expenses in capturing him.

The surrender was made almost one year and six months from the incident, and almost one

year and one month from the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. The Court ruled that the

mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be credited to Gary. A surrender to be

voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself

unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save

them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender

presupposes repentance.

(3) Yes, Alberto is guilty as principal in the crime of murder

Conspiracy need not even be proven by the prosecution in this case, since Alberto was

categorically pointed by the eyewitness, Emerito, as one of the assailants who actively and directly

participated in the killing of Ernesto.

Even more persuasive is the statement of the victim himself, Ernesto, as testified to by SPO2

Morales, that it was the father and son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero who stabbed him. As an




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exception to the hearsay rule, the Court held that it must be shown that a dying declaration was

made under a realization by the decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence—not so much

the rapid eventuation of death—is at hand. This may be proven by the statement of the deceased

himself or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedents wounds, or other relevant

circumstances.

The Court considered that a dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence, for no

person who knows of his impending death would make a careless or false accusation.

The Court declared there was treachery as amply demonstrated by the restraint upon

Ernesto, which effectively rendered him defenseless and unable to effectively repel, much less

evade, the assault. Thus, the crime committed is murder.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROBERTO ASIS AND JULIUS PEARANDAG.R. No. 177573 July 7, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Donald Pais was killed by the accused appellants however, the latter denied such allegations.

The court ruled that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was atsome other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible

for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity

Facts:

Ma. Theresa Ramos was inside her store when she saw Donald Pais (the deceased- victim),

standing from a distance of five meters. She also saw Alex Costuna, accused-appellant Julius

Pearanda and another person in front of her store. Suddenly, a commotion broke out and stones

were being thrown by different persons. Accused-appellant Julius Pearanda placed his arms around

Donalds shoulders, after which, Alex Costuna punched Donald who initially fought back but was

eventually outnumbered. Donald was hit in the head. He ran away limping because he was stoned in

the legs. However, Alex Costuna, accused-appellant Roberto Asis and several other persons caughtup with Donald and ganged up on him. Thereupon, Alex Costuna took out a knife and repeatedly

stabbed Donald. Accused-appellant Roberto Asis also did the same thing. The victim sat on the

ground with hands crossed, covering his head to ward off his attackers. According to witness

Theresa Ramos, she saw around nine to ten persons ganging up on the victim, but she could not tell

who among them initiated the attack. However, she saw that aside from accused-appellant Roberto

Asis and Alex Costuna, other men also hit and boxed Donald Pais. She shouted for help but nobody

came. The victim was bloodied and holding his stomach. After accused-appellants group left,

Theresa and her husband boarded the victim on a tricycle and took him to Fairview General

Hospital in Quezon City where he died shortly after . Dr. Anthony Joselito Llamas, a medico-legal

officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory autopsied the victims body, and his findings are reduced in a

medico-legal report which concluded the cause of death was multiple stab wounds of the trunk.

Accused-appellant Julius Pearanda denied before the court his alleged participation in the killing ofDonald Pais. According to him at the time of the incident, he was in their house sleeping because he

was a little drunk so he slept early. He attended the birthday celebration of his brother-in-law

Roberto Asis. They had a drinking spree at the back of their house together with Alex Costuna and a

certain Bong. Julius insisted that he only learned about the death of Donald Pais from his mother

the following day. He asked who killed Donald but [his] mother did not know. RTC ruled that the

accused appellants were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for treachery was

present and correctly appreciated in the killing of Donald Pais. The victim was caught defenseless




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when accused-appellant Pearanda suddenly put his arms on the shoulder of the victim and

thereafter, accused-appellant Asis and his group punched and stabbed him several times. The

attack was so swift and unexpected, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no

opportunity to resist or defend himself.which was thereafter affirmed in toto by the CA and added

that it is well settled is the rule that inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters

irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be considered as grounds for acquittal. Indeed, theaccused-appellants alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive identification by the

prosecution witnesses as the perpetrators of the crime. Again, for alibi to qualify as a valid defense,

it must first be shown that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been present in the

crime scene at the supposed time of its commission. In this case, the place where the murder was

committed was also within the same vicinity as the accused-appellants houses where the two allege

to have been in deep slumber while the killing was being committed. The accused-appellants,

therefore, were not so geographically removed from the locus criminis as to conclusively rule out

the possibility that they were responsible for the felony.

Accused-appellants insist that the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable

doubt. They assail the credibility of prosecution witnesses Ma. Theresa Ramos and Clifford

Magsanoc, whose testimonies, accused-appellants contend, are conflicting and inconsistent. Theyparticularly point out that while Ma. Theresa testified that the victim was sitting on the ground

while he was being attacked, Clifford testified that the victim was lying prostrate on his

back. Likewise, Ma. Theresa testified that the other assailants punched the victim while Clifford

declared that he saw the other assailants stab the victim. Accused-appellants also argue that the

testimonies of these witnesses did not jibe with the medico-legal findings which cast doubt as to the

veracity of the said testimonies and their culpability for the crime charged.

Issue:

Whether or not the prosecution has failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt due

to the inconsistencies of the testimonies of the witnesses

Ruling:

No. The court did not erred in proving their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are not

sufficient to adversely affect their credibility. They merely pertain to the position of the victim at

the time he was attacked and the participation of the unknown assailants. The materiality of the

victims exact position when he was attacked as well as the participation of the unknown assailants

are minor details and of little significance. The more important consideration is that both Ma.

Theresa and Clifford categorically and positively identified accused-appellants as the persons who

assaulted the victim. As the Court declared in People v. Lacbayan It is perfectly natural for different

witnesses testifying on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as there may be somedetails which one witness may notice while the other may not observe or remember. In fact,

jurisprudence even warns against a perfect dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it

could mean that their testimonies were pre-fabricated and rehearsed.

The testimonies of these two witnesses on material details are coherent, categorical and

consistent with each other. Ma. Theresa saw accused-appellant Pearanda put his arms around the

victim, after which, a certain Alex Costuna punched the victim who initially retaliated but eventually




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ran away because he was outnumbered. However, accused-appellants and their group caught up

with the victim, ganged up on him and thereafter stabbed him. Both witnesses personally saw

accused-appellants at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. Contrary to accused-

appellants assertions, the declarations of these two witnesses established beyond reasonable doubt

their identity as the perpetrators of the crime. It must be emphasized that the RTC gave full faith

and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The time-tested doctrine is that atrial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and is even

conclusive and binding on this Court. The reason is obvious. The trial court has the unique

opportunity to observe at firsthand the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and

attitude in the course of the trial.

Accused-appellants also claim that the testimonies of Ma. Theresa and Clifford did not

coincide with the findings of the medico-legal officer. Ma. Theresa testified that the victim was

stabbed thrice, while Clifford declared that the victim was stabbed twice by Costuna and once each

by Asis, Pearanda, and a certain Romy Manzanilla. In addition, accused-appellants unknown

companions, numbering around five to six persons, also stabbed the victim. On the other hand, the

medico-legal report indicated that the victim sustained just six stab wounds. Again, this seeming

inconsistency does not detract from the certitude of Ma. Theresas and Cliffords testimonies thatthey saw accused-appellants stab the victim. True, they may have been mistaken with respect to the

exact number of wounds inflicted on the victim by the accused-appellants and their group, but their

account of the events remains credible. The essential thing is that the medico-legal findings which

concluded that the victims cause of death was multiple stab wounds confirmed the interlocking

testimonies of prosecution witnesses that the victim was stabbed by several men including

accused-appellants. Indeed, this Court declared in People v. Bihison that: Eyewitnesses to a

horrifying event cannot be expected, nor be faulted if they are unable, to be completely accurate in

picturing to the court all that has transpired and every detail of what they have seen or

heard. Various reasons, mostly explainable, can account for this realty; the Court has long

acknowledged the verity that different human minds react distinctly and diversely when

confronted with a sudden and shocking event, and that a witness may sometimes ignore certain

details which at the time might have appeared to him to be insignificant but which to anotherperson under the same circumstances, would seem noteworthy. Moreover, accused-appellants have

not shown any evidence of improper motive on the part of Ma. Theresa and Clifford that would have

impelled them to falsely testify against them. Where there is nothing to indicate that the witnesses

for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their positive and categorical declarations

on the witness stand under the solemnity of an oath deserve full faith and credence

Accused-appellants defense of denial was properly rejected by both the Court of Appeals

and the RTC. We quote with approval the trial courts ratiocination, The Court is not convinced of

the defense of the accused that they did not participate in the commission of the crime and were

neither at the place of the incident because they were positively identified by prosecution

witnesses. Defenses of denial and alibi are inherently weak and have always been viewed with

disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted. (People vs. Danao, 253SCRA 146). The alibi of the accused deserves scant consideration in the absence of evidence that it

was physically impossible for the two accused to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was

committed. In fact, evidence shows that both accused never left the area at all before, during or

after the incident and their sole defense was that they were sleeping at their respective houses at

the time the crime was committed. There is therefore no physical impossibility for them to be at the

scene of the crime taking into account the distance between the place of the incident and the place

where they were allegedly situated. As consistently enunciated by this Court, the established




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doctrine is that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at

some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible

for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity . From the aforequoted findings of the

trial court, accused-appellants failed to demonstrate satisfactorily that it was physically impossible

for them to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. The crime of murder

happened in San Juan Evangelista St., Payatas, Quezon City or exactly the same area where accused-appellants houses were located and claimed to be sleeping when the crime occurred. Weak as it is,

alibi becomes weaker in the face of the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses as

in this case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSING.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011, J. Leonardo–De Castro

Basic is the rule that in order to affirm the conviction of an accused person, the prosecution

must establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the

prosecution’ s own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense.

Facts:

On November 6, 2002, in the Municipality of Carigara, Leyte, Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin

with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and abuse of superior

strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and wound Felipe

Lagera Y Obero, 65 years old and Ranil Tagpis Y Lagera, 1 year old, with the use of a long bolo

(sundang) which the accused had provided himself for the purpose.

The prosecution presented several witnesses: Dr. Ma. Bella V. Profetana, Municipal Health

Officer of Carigara, Leyte; Carmela Tagpis, the 5-year-old granddaughter of the victim Felipe Lagera

and sister of the victim Ranil Tagpis, Jr.

Dr. Profetana testified that she conducted a post-mortem examination on the body of thevictim Felipe Lagera. She stated that Felipe sustained three hacking wounds and the said wound

was fatal and could have been caused by a sharp instrument such as a bolo. She also conducted a

post-mortem examination on the body of Ranil Tagpis, Jr. The results revealed that Ranil sustained

a hacking wound. The instrument that was most likely used was sharp-edged like a bolo.

Carmela Tagpis testified as an eyewitness. She pointed to Rosendo as the "Bata Endong"

(Uncle Endong) who hacked her grandfather and brother. She stated that Ranil was hit in the

forehead, while Felipe was hit on the face, the left shoulder and the right shoulder. Carmela said

that she saw that a long bolo was used in the killing of Felipe and Ranil. She related that Felipe also

owned a bolo but he was not able to use the same when he was attacked. She was then inside the

house with Felipe and her two younger brothers, Jericho and Bitoy (Ranil). She was sitting about

four meters away when the hacking incident occurred indoors.

The defense presented the following witnesses, Raymond Rance, the stepson of the accused-

appellant; Renerio Arminal, the barangay chairperson of Brgy. Canlampay, Carigara, Leyte; and

accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin.

Raymond Rance testified that his mother’s name is Marites Rance. Rosendo is not his

biological father but the former helped in providing for his basic needs. He narrated that on the




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night of July 18, 2002, he saw Felipe Lagera inside their house and placed himself on top of

Raymond’s mother, who was lying down. In different date, Raymond recounted that he saw Felipe ’s

son, Artemio alias Timboy, inside their house. Timboy kept trying to place himself on top of

Raymond’s mother. Rosendo was working in Manila when the incidents happened. Raymond said

that his mother left for Manila. When Rosendo arrived in Leyte, he told him about the incidents

involving Felipe and Timboy.

Renerio Arminal testified that Rosendo surrendered to him. Arnulfo Alberca was called

upon to the witness stand to prove that the voluntary surrender was entered into the records of the

police blotter.

Rosendo testified on November 6, 2002, he went to the house of barangay chairperson

Arminal to place a call to his wife who was in Manila. When he talked to his wife, she confirmed that

she was sexually molested by Felipe and Timboy. He went home, it rained heavily so he first sought

shelter at the place of his friend, Enok. The latter was drinking gin and he was offered a drink. He

remembered that he had to buy kerosene so he went to the store of Felipe Lagera. When he reached

the house of Felipe, the latter was feeding chickens. He confronted Felipe about the alleged sexual

abuse of his wife. Felipe allegedly claimed that Rosendo had a bad purpose for being there and thatthe latter wanted to start a fight. Felipe allegedly got mad and hurled the cover of a chicken cage at

him, but he was able to parry it with his hand. Rosendo then drew his long bolo and hacked Felipe,

as the latter was about to run to the house. He also went inside the house since Felipe might get

hold of a weapon. When they were both inside and he was about to deliver a second hacking blow,

Felipe held up and used the child Ranil as a shield. As the second hacking blow was delivered

suddenly, he was not able to withdraw the same anymore such that the blow landed on Ranil. He

then left and surrendered to the barangay chairperson.

The RTC rendered a decision, convicting Rosendo of the crime of double murder and

sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH. The manner by which the accused adopted in

killing the victim, Felipe Lagera, and Ramil Tagpis, Jr. was a premeditated decision and executed

with treachery.

The case was originally elevated to this Court on automatic review but the Court ordered

the transfer of the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition.

The Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the RTC. The appellate court adopted the

position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the felonious acts resulted in two separate

crimes of murder as the evidence of the prosecution failed to prove the existence of a complex

crime of double murder. The Court of Appeals subscribed to the findings of the RTC that the killing

of Felipe Lagera was attended by the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident

premeditation. With respect to the mitigating circumstances, the Court of Appeals credited the

circumstance of voluntary surrender, but rejected intoxication, immediate vindication of a grave

offense and voluntary confession. As for the death of Ranil, the appellate court also ruled that thesame was attended by the aggravating circumstance of treachery and the mitigating circumstance

of voluntary surrender.

Issue:

Can the Court a quo gravely erred when it ruled that Rosendo is guilty for the crime of

murder and not homicide?




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Ruling:

No, the court a quo did not commit an error when it ruled that Rosendo is guilty for the

crime of murder and not homicide.

Basic is the rule that in order to affirm the conviction of an accused person, the prosecution

must establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the

prosecution’s own evidence, not on the weakness or even absence of evidence for the defense.

In the instant case, the evidence of the prosecution established the fact that the killings of

Felipe and Ranil were attended by treachery, thus qualifying the same to murder.

According to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, any person who shall kill

another shall be guilty of murder if the same was committed with the attendant circumstance of

treachery, among other things, and that the situation does not fall within the provisions of Article

246. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing

means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure itsexecution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, offering an unarmed and unsuspecting

victim no chance to resist or to escape. There is treachery even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden

and unexpected, with the victims having no opportunity to repel it or defend themselves, for what is

decisive in treachery is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victims to defend

themselves or to retaliate.

In the case at bar, the RTC gave more weight to the testimony of Carmela Tagpis in

establishing the presence of treachery in the manner with which the accused-appellant carried out

the violent killings of Felipe and Ranil.

Carmela categorically pointed to Rosendo as the person who entered the house of Felipe.She clearly stated that the attack was not preceded by any fight between the accused-appellant and

Felipe. Without any provocation, Rosendo suddenly delivered fatal hacking blows to Felipe. The

abruptness of the unexpected assault rendered Felipe defenseless and deprived him of any

opportunity to repel the attack and retaliate. As Felipe was carrying his grandson Ranil, the child

unfortunately suffered the same fatal end as that of his grandfather. In the killing of Ranil, the trial

court likewise correctly appreciated the existence of treachery.

The said circumstance may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was

not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the

two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack or become aware of it. The

killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of assault is not shown. For the

weakness of the victim due to his tender years results in the absence of any danger to the accused.

On the strength of the evidence of the prosecution, we sustain the ruling of the RTC and the

Court of Appeals that the circumstance of treachery qualified the killings of Felipe and Ranil to

murder.

The Court finds erroneous, however, the trial court ’s and the Court of Appeals’ appreciation

of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. For evident premeditation to aggravate a




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crime, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself, of the following elements: (1)

the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that

he clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time, between determination and

execution, to allow himself to reflect upon the consequences of his act. It is not enough that evident

premeditation is suspected or surmised, but criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious

outward acts evidencing determination to commit the crime. In order to be considered anaggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation"; it must be

"evident premeditation."

In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence that tended to establish the

exact moment when the accused-appellant devised a plan to kill Felipe, that the latter clung to his

determination to carry out the plan and that a sufficient time had lapsed before he carried out his

plan.

Likewise, the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of abuse of

superior strength, dwelling, minority and intoxication. When the circumstance of abuse of superior

strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter. While dwelling, minority and

intoxication cannot be appreciated as aggravating circumstances in the instant case consideringthat the same were not alleged in the information that was filed.

With regard to the conflicting rulings of the RTC and the CA vis-à-vis the nature of crimes

committed, we agree with the appellate court that the accused-appellant should be held liable for

two (2) separate counts of murder, not the complex crime of double murder.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "[w]hen a single act constitutes two or

more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the

other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its

maximum period." There are, thus, two kinds of complex crimes. The first is known as compound

crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The second is

known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.

The Court finds that there is a paucity of evidence to prove that the instant case falls under

any of the two classes of complex crimes. The evidence of the prosecution failed to clearly establish

the fact that Felipe and Ranil were killed by a single fatal hacking blow. It was neither proven that

the murder of Felipe was committed as a necessary means for committing and/or facilitating the

murder of Ranil and vice versa. Rosendo should be made liable for two separate and distinct acts of

murder.

In the determination of the penalty to be imposed on Rosendo, we uphold the trial court ’s

ruling that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated. For

voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: (1) the

offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authorityor to the latter’s agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. To be sufficient, the surrender must be

spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender

unconditionally, either because they acknowledge their guilt or wish to save the authorities the

trouble and the expense that will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing them.

Rosendo has duly established that, after the attack on Felipe and Ranil, he surrendered

unconditionally to the barangay chairperson and to the police on his own volition and before he




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was actually arrested. The prosecution also admitted this circumstance of voluntary surrender

during trial.

We reject, however, Rosendo's contention that the trial court erred in failing to appreciate

the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and immediate vindication of a grave offense.

The third paragraph of Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the intoxication of

the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender has

committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to

commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an

aggravating circumstance.

The Court finds that Rosendo is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of intoxication

since his own testimony failed to substantiate his claim of drunkenness during the incident in

question. During his cross-examination, he positively stated that he was only a bit tipsy but not

drunk when he proceeded to the house of Felipe. He cannot, be allowed to make a contrary

assertion on appeal and pray for the mitigation of the crimes he committed on the basis thereof.

As regards the mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense, the

same cannot be appreciated. Article 13, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the act

be "committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony

(delito), his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or

relatives by affinity within the same degrees." The established rule is that there can be no

immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his

equanimity.

In the case at bar, Rosendo points to the alleged attempt of Felipe and Timboy Lagera on the

virtue of his wife as the grave offense for which he sought immediate vindication. He testified that

he learned of the same from his stepson, Raymond, on November 2, 2002. Four days thereafter, on

November 6, 2002, he carried out the attack that led to the deaths of Felipe and Ranil. To our mind,a period of four days was sufficient enough a time within which he could have regained his

composure and self-control.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion

perpetua to death for the crime of murder. In this case, apart from the qualifying circumstance of

treachery, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of any other aggravating circumstance in

both the murders of Felipe and Ranil. On the other hand, as the presence of the lone mitigating

circumstance of voluntary surrender was properly established in both instances, Article 63,

paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code mandates that the proper penalty to be imposed is reclusion

perpetua for each of the two counts of murder.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision of the Court of Appeals.The accused-appellant Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of murder for

the deaths of Felipe Lagera and Ranil Tagpis, Jr. and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of

reclusion perpetua for each count.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CLEOFE BAROQUILLO y VILLANUEVA and LEONARDOMAHILUM y CAÑETE

G.R. No. 184960, August 24, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro




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We agree with Cleofe and Leonardo that alibi is indeed a good defense and could certainly

exculpate a person accused of a crime. However, this is true only if the accused ’ s alibi strictly meets the

following requisites: 1. His presence at another place at the time of the commission of the crime; and 2.

The physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.

Facts:

Accused Lorenza Madeloso y Demecillo (Lorenza) and victim Nelson Madeloso (Nelson) are

spouses with five children. In 1994, accused Lorenza met accused Cleofe Baroquillo y Villanueva

(Cleofe) and nurtured a special friendship that culminated to an amorous relationship.

Accused Lorenza disclosed to her kumare Ellen Dajao (Ellen), her intimacy with accused

Cleofe. Accused Lorenza told Ellen that she wanted her husband killed because he no longer gives

her money.

Accused Lorenza went to her father-in-law Gregorio Madeloso (Gregorio), in Cotabato City

to get the P23,000.00 which the latter promised as financial assistance for her intended trip abroad.On the same day, accused Lorenza went back to Iligan City with the money.

On 10 January 2001, at around twelve o’clock noon, accused Lorenza met and had lunch with

accused Cleofe and accused Leonardo Mahilum (Leonardo) at Dado’s Lechon House.

At around 8:15 p.m., Lorenza, with one of her children, arrived home. Nelson flagged down

Meneleo, their neighbor driving his motorcycle. When the latter asked where he was headed,

Nelson responded, "Mamang(Lorenza) called for me."

At around nine o’clock in the evening, in Bagong Silang, Nelson was shot dead by accused

Leonardo. The prosecution witness, Ricky Ramos (Ricky), saw the incident while walking on hisway home. He recounted that he saw Nelson sitting by the gutter of the road when two (2) men,

identified later on as accused Cleofe and Leonardo, crossed the street and approached Nelson.

Accused Cleofe pulled Nelson up towards him and held him, while Leonardo pulled out a gun from

his side and shot Nelson in the head several times.

Neighbors, then accompanied accused Lorenza to Bagong Silang. When accused Lorenza saw her

husband’s lifeless body, she embraced him and cried but her cry allegedly x x x appeared feigned

and insincere.

When the police received the information of accused Lorenza and accused Cleofe’s extra-marital

affair, Lorenza was invited to the police station for questioning where she confessed her illicit

relation with accused Cleofe.

While at the police station, Lorenza received a phone call from Leonardo. Leonardo

instructed her to meet him at Dado’s Lechon House to which she agreed with the approval of the

police. Accused Lorenza, together with the police, arrived at Dado’s Lechon House. After thirty

minutes, accused Leonardo arrived and sat at the table occupied by accused Lorenza. The police

approached the two accused persons and invited accused Leonardo to the police station for

questioning.




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Cleofe and Leonardo, along with Lorenza, were charged with Murder under Article 248 of

the Revised Penal Code before the RTC. Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised

Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation.

RTC convicted all three accused of Murder.

The Court of Appeals AFFIRMED the decision of the RTC in so far as it found accused Cleofe

Baroquillo y Villanueva and Leonardo Mahilum y Cañete GUILTY of murder. While, accused Lorenza

Madeloso y Demecillo is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.

The Court of Appeals agreed that Cleofe and Leonardo were guilty beyond reasonable doubt

for the murder of Nelson, it found the evidence against Lorenza insufficient to convict her as a

principal by inducement.

The prosecution presented none of the percepto (command) or pacto (consideration)

required to establish the liability of accused Lorenza. It bears stressing that it is incumbent upon

the prosecution to prove that accused Lorenza had an influence over accused Cleofe and Leonardoso great that such inducement would be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by

the material executor. We can only surmise, at the very least, the motive of the other accused, Cleofe

and Leonardo, in killing Nelson. But, our surmises and conjectures, no matter how strong, are no

substitute to proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:

Can the Court reverse the decision of the RTC and CA convicting accused Cleofe and

Leonardo of the crime of murder?

Ruling:

No, the Court cannot deviate from the decisions of the lower court.

Cleofe and Leonardo were charged and convicted of Murder under Article 248 of the

Revised Penal Code:

Art. 248. Murder. – Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill

another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if

committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing

means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity;

2. In consideration of a price, reward, or promise;

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or

assault upon a railroad, fall of an airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other

means involving great waste and ruin;




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4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake,

eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity;

5. With evident premeditation;

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outragingor scoffing at his person or corpse.

This Court has reviewed the entire records of the case and finds no reason to overturn the

conviction of Cleofe and Leonardo.

The two accused-appellants contend that "contrary to the common notion, alibi is in fact a

good defense," and that "it cannot be concluded that the accused-appellants conspired with each

other to kill Nelson x x x, when such conclusion was only brought about by the statements of the

prosecution witnesses that the three (3) accused-appellants were seen eating lunch together on the

day of the commission of the crime charged."

We agree with Cleofe and Leonardo that alibi is indeed a good defense and could certainlyexculpate a person accused of a crime. However, this is true only if the accused ’s alibi strictly meets

the following requisites:

1. His presence at another place at the time of the commission of the crime; and

2. The physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime.

However, neither Cleofe nor Leonardo was able to establish by clear and convincing

evidence that not only was he somewhere else when Nelson was killed, but also that it was

physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. "By physical impossibility, we

refer to the distance and the facility of access between the situs criminis and the place where he

says he was when the crime was committed."

Noting the distances between Bagong Silang, where Nelson was killed, and the respective

locations of Leonardo and Cleofe at the time the crime was committed, the trial court correctly

concluded that given the relative proximity of the places, the availability of transportation, and the

physical fitness of both accused to travel, it was not impossible for them to have traversed to and

from the scene of the crime and their alleged locations that fateful evening of January 10, 2001.

The testimonies of Cleofe’s and Leonardo’s witnesses who corroborated their alibis, did

little to help their case as they were either relatives or close family friends of the accused. Not a

single disinterested witness was presented by Cleofe or Leonardo to support their alibis. In People

v. Abatayo, this Court held that "alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is corroborated

only by a relative or a close friend of the accused."

Furthermore, contrary to Cleofe’s and Leonardo’s arguments, their conviction was not

based on circumstantial evidence but on the positive identification of an unbiased witness. It is

well-settled that since alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and

is worthless in the face of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused

perpetrated the crime.




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The issue therefore boils down to the credibility of the prosecution ’s lone eyewitness, Ricky

Ramos. This Court sees no reason to disturb the trial court ’s evaluation and assessment of the

credibility of Ricky Ramos, which the Court of Appeals also sustained.

The RTC adequately addressed and rebuked each doubt the defense tried to cast on Ricky

Ramos’s testimony. Moreover, it sufficiently explained why Ricky Ramos’s testimony was enough toconvict the accused-appellants, to wit:

The credibility of evidence is not necessarily determined by the number of witnesses but by the

quality of the testimony. (People v. pascual, Jr. 127 SCRA 179). A perusal of the records will not

yield any trace of bias in the testimony of Ricky Ramos. In fact, when asked if he was sure of his

identification of the two accused, considering the gravity of the crime charged against them, he

categorically replied that "he can stand on his words." It is contrary to human nature for a witness

to finger innocent persons as the perpetrators of a very serious crime. Thus, absent any showing

that there was any ill motive on the part of Ricky Ramos, his categorical, consistent, and positive

identification deserves full weight and credit.

This Court also agrees with the lower courts’ appreciation of the attendance of thequalifying circumstance of treachery, and the conspiracy between Cleofe and Leonardo to kill

Nelson.

Article 14, No. 16, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing

means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its

execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

It was established in this case that Nelson was attacked with treachery because aside from

having had no idea of what was to befall him when he stood up as Cleofe and Leonardo approached

him, Nelson was also defenseless against the sudden gunshots Leonardo delivered to him. The factthat the attack on Nelson was frontal does not preclude the presence of treachery in this case as the

same made the attack no less unexpected and sudden.

Conspiracy was also duly established as Ricky Ramos testified that while Cleofe pulled

Nelson, Leonardo fired shots at Nelson. Conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements

of the two accused, their common purpose, being, to kill Nelson. In People v. Quinao, we expounded

on the concept of conspiracy as follows:

It is well-settled that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement

concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest

on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a

common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. It is notnecessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement

setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be

carried out. The rule is that conviction is proper upon proof that the accused acted in concert, each

of them doing his part to fulfill the common design to kill the victim. In such a case, the act of one

becomes the act of all and each of the accused will thereby be deemed equally guilty of the crime

committed.




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WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as it found the

accused-appellants Cleofe Baroquillo y Villanueva and Leonardo Mahilum y Cañete GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VICENTE VILBAR


In a number of cases, surveyed in People v. Rivera, we ruled that treachery cannot be

appreciated simply because the attack was sudden and unexpected. We can not presume that

treachery was present merely from the fact that the attack was sudden. The suddenness of an attack,

does not of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the

decision was made all of a sudden and the victim's helpless position was accidental. . . . While it

appears that the attack upon the victim was sudden, the surrounding circumstances attending the

stabbing incident, that is, the open area, the presence of the vi ctim’s families and the attendingeyewitnesses, works against treachery. If accused-appellant wanted to make certain that no risk

would come to him, he could have chosen another time and place to stab the victim.

Facts:

The respondent Vicente Vilbar was charged and convicted for the crime of murder. The

conviction by the RTC was affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals lowering the crime

from murder to homicide ruling that the prosecution failed to prove that there was treachery on the

part of the accused. Hence, the current petition.

Vicente Vilbar contends that the lower courts erred in convicting the accused by giving

credence to the testimony of the witnesses. He argues that there are inconsistencies and

discrepancies in their testimonies. Moreover, he contends that the witnesses presented by the

prosecution are not credible.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in convicting the accused for the crime of

homicide.

Ruling:

Case laws mandate that "when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of

the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative

weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not

conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is

settled that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings

are generally binding upon this Court." There is no compelling reason for us to depart from thegeneral rule in this case.

Maria Liza Patricio is credible. She recognizes the accused, she was just behind him when he

stabbed her husband who was facing the accused. There was proper illumination of the place x x x

and her testimony was not destroyed in the cross-examination. Her testimony is positive and

spontaneous. The Court notes nothing in her demeanor and flow of testimony that would indicate

some contradiction or incredibility.




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The other witness, Pedro Luzon, corroborates the testimony of Maria Liza Patricio.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals brushed aside the alleged inconsistencies in the

testimonies of Maria Liza and Pedro, these being relatively trivial and insignificant, neither

pertaining to the act constitutive of the crime committed nor to the identity of the assailant. Also,

these minor contradictions were expected from said witnesses as they differ in their impressions of

the incident and vantage point in relation to the victim and the accused-appellant.

In the observation of the Court, the accused is inconsistent and he talked unintelligibly. His

testimony is not credible and perceived to be flimsy excuses. If it is true that his wife was with him

at the time of the incident and he was not involved in the stabbing, why did he have to leave the

place and his wife and go to the house of his parents-in-law rather than their house? The accused

should have presented his wife to corroborate his testimony in that regard, and also his parents-in-

law so the latter can testify regarding the alleged visitors, the alleged parents of one Dodong

Danieles who came to their place when the accused was also there days after the incident, telling

him not to help the family of the victim.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty only of homicide in the

absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. In a number of cases, surveyed in People v.

Rivera,we ruled that treachery cannot be appreciated simply because the attack was sudden and

unexpected:

[W]e agree with accused-appellant that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not

established. Surveying the leading decisions on this question, in People v. Romeo Magaro we

recently stated:

In People v. Magallanes, this Court held:

"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,

employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to

insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party

might make. Thus, for treachery or alevosia to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the

prosecution must establish the concurrence of two (2) conditions: (a) that at the time of the attack,

the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the

particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. . . .

. . . where the meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was

done impulsively, there is no treachery even if the attack was sudden and unexpected. As has been

aptly observed the accused could not have made preparations for the attack, . . .; and the means,

method and form thereof could not therefore have been thought of by the accused, because theattack was impulsively done.

Treachery cannot also be presumed from the mere suddenness of the attack. . . .

Applying these principles to the case at bar, we hold that the prosecution has not proven

that the killing was committed with treachery. Although accused-appellant shot the victim from

behind, the fact was that this was done during a heated argument. Accused-appellant, filled with

anger and rage, apparently had no time to reflect on his actions. It was not shown that he




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consciously adopted the mode of attacking the victim from behind to facilitate the killing without

risk to himself. Accordingly, we hold that accused-appellant is guilty of homicide only.

Similar to Rivera and the cases cited therein, the prosecution in the instant case merely

showed that accused-appellant attacked Guilbert suddenly and unexpectedly, but failed to prove

that accused-appellant consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of thekilling without risk to himself.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DIOSDADO CAMAT and MAMERTO DULAYG.R. No. 188612, July 30, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

There is treachery or alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,

employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to

insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the offended party might

make. The testimonial evidence gathered in this case clearly indicates that the victims who were

simply engaged in conversation in a private residence were caught entirely by surprise with the

assailants’ swift, deliberate and unexpected attack using multiple firearms thereby negating the

possibility for the victims to escape or defend themselves.

Facts:

Between 3:00 o’clock and 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of November 3, 1999, Aurelio,

together with Anastacio, Juanito, Ricardo, Pedro, Marcelina, Abelardo, Elmer, all surnamed Hidalgo,

Lydia Flores, some young ladies, their children, and his nephews and nieces were in front of the

yard of his brother Anastacio Hidalgo (Anastacio).

While engaged in conversation, Aurelio noticed a motorcycle pass by two times. At the first

pass, he noticed that only Oning Campos was on board. The second time, both Oning Campos and

Pilo Cabangas were on board the motorcycle. After a few minutes, gunfire coming from the back of

and directed at Aurelio’s group suddenly erupted. The gunfire came from the other side of the roadin front of a three feet high concrete fence fronting the house of Anastacio. Aurelio saw both

accused-appellants Diosdado Camat and Mamerto Dulay armed with long firearms shoot at his

group. Although there were six other persons armed with short firearms (Henry Caoile, Junior

Lopez, John Laurean, Ibot Campos, Rogelio Campos, and Serafin Dulay), standing at the back of

accused-appellants, Aurelio, however, only saw accused-appellants firing their guns at his group

because he saw them place their long firearms on top of the concrete fence. The gunmen were

approximately six meters away from Aurelio’s group.

Aurelio said that during the shooting, his aunt Marcelina Hidalgo, and his nephew were hit

and Elmer Hidalgo fell down. They died on the spot. Juanito Hidalgo was hit on his right leg. Ricardo

Hidalgo was hit on the buttocks. The bullet exited near his anus. Pedro Hidalgo was injured on thebuttocks and left arm. Aurelio was himself hit on both legs.

Consequently, six separate criminal informations were charged against the appellant Camat

alias "Boyet" and his other co-accused, the accused Dulay (referred to in the title of this case), John

Laurean alias "Masong," Rogelio Campos, Ibot Campos, Henry Caoile, Serafin Dulay, and Junior

Lopez with the crimes of Murder with the Use of Unlicensed Firearm and Frustrated Murder.




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As a defense, the Accused-Appellant Camat firmly claimed that on the day of the crime, he

was in Baguio to do some carpentries.

Issue:

Whether or not Camat’s conviction of murder is warranted upon due consideration of theevidence on record.

Ruling:

Yes.

As encapsulated in jurisprudence, to be liable for Murder, the prosecution must prove that:

(1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the

qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor

infanticide.

All the elements of the crime of murder concur in this instance. With regard to the firstelement, the prosecution was able to establish the fact of death of Marcelina and Elmer Hidalgo as

shown by their death certificates as well as the autopsy reports. The fourth element is present as

well since both the victims are adults and not related by consanguinity or affinity to appellant

Camat which forecloses any possibility of classifying their fatal shooting as either parricide or

infanticide. As for the second element, there can be no doubt that the prosecution also proved the

participation of appellant Camat in the crimes subject of this case. During the hearing, the

prosecution witnesses correctly pointed and identified Camat as the murderer who was then

present in the court room.

Moreover, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was adequately shown to exist in this

case, thus, satisfying the third element of Murder.

There is treachery or alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against the

person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and

specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which the

offended party might make. For alevosia to qualify the crime to Murder, it must be shown that: (1)

the malefactor employed such means, method or manner of execution as to ensure his or her safety

from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim; and (2) the said means, method and manner of

execution were deliberately adopted. Moreover, for treachery to be appreciated, it must be present

and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.

The testimonial evidence gathered in this case clearly indicates that the victims who were

simply engaged in conversation in a private residence were caught entirely by surprise with theassailants’ swift, deliberate and unexpected attack using multiple firearms thereby negating thepossibility for the victims to escape or defend themselves.

Finally, since the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were credible, this Court cannot

accept appellant Camat’s defenses of alibi and denial in light of the positive identification of him asone of the gunmen involved in that dreadful massacre. It bears repeating that this Court has

consistently held that alibi, as a defense, is inherently weak and crumbles in light of positive

identification by truthful witnesses. Moreover, positive identification of the accused, when




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categorical and consistent, and without any ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on

the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARK JOSEPH ZAPUIZ Y RAMOS "JAYMART"


To hold the accused liable for murder, the prosecution must prove that: (1) a person was

killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances

mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor

infanticide.

Facts:

Victim Emmanuel Ramirez y Arellano (Emmanuel) was at his house, sitting before a table,

writing something. Emmanuel’s house was well lighted since Avon products were being sold there.Edwin was just standing around on the street, about five steps away from Emmanuel, when Edwin

noticed a man, later identified as Jaymart, walk past him. Jaymart positioned himself behind

Emmanuel, and poked and fired a gun at the back of Emmanuel’s head. Emmanuel fell from wherehe was sitting. Jaymart walked away still holding the gun. Although frightened, Edwin managed to

bring Emmanuel to the Gat Bonifacio Hospital where Emmanuel was pronounced dead on arrival.

Thereafter, Edwin informed Emmanuel’s mother, Olivia A. Ramirez (Oliv ia), about the

shooting. The very next day, Edwin executed a Sworn Statement before Senior Police Officer in

which he averred that the man who shot Emmanuel is called Jaymart and that he would be able to

recognize Jaymart if he sees him again. Days later, a confidential agent informed the police that

Jaymart was confined at the Ospital ng Maynila for a gunshot wound. A police team, which included

SPO3 Labarda, fetched and brought Edwin to the Ospital ng Maynila, wherein Edwin positively

identified Jaymart as the person who shot Emmanuel. The police team arrested Jaymart after

informing him of his constitutional rights.

The RTC promulgated its decision, given the presence of the qualifying circumstance of

treachery, it convicted Jaymart of murder which was affirmed by CA. However, Jaymart asserts

that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues that Edwin’s testimony isinconsistent with the physical evidence, particularly, the location of Emmanuel’s wounds. Edwin

testified that Jaymart shot Emmanuel at the back of the head while Emmanuel was sitting down,

writing something; yet Dr. Salen reported that the trajectory of the bullet was upward so that the

gunman, when he fired the fatal shot, must have been in a position lower than Emmanuel.

Issue:

Whether or not Jaymart is guilty for crime of murder?

Ruling:

Yes, Jaymart is guilty for crime of murder.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides: Art. 248. Murder . – Any person who,

not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall

be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following circumstances:




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1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing

means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

To hold the accused liable for murder, the prosecution must prove that: (1) a person was

killed; (2) the accused killed him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying

circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) the killing is neitherparricide nor infanticide. All elements were established beyond reasonable doubt by the

prosecution in the present case.

First , it is undisputed that Emmanuel died from a gunshot wound sustained. Second , Jaymart

was positively identified by eyewitness Edwin as the one who shot and killed Emmanuel As the RTC

and the Court of Appeals observed, Edwin was positive and steadfast in his identification of Jaymart

as the man who shot and killed Emmanuel. Edwin clearly saw Jaymart shoot Emmanuel at the back

of the head because the locus criminis was well lighted and Edwin was just a few steps away from

both Jaymart and Emmanuel at the time of the shooting. Edwin also had an opportunity to take a

good look at Jaymart when Jaymart passed by him before the shooting.

In the case at bar, it must be noted that the victim was sitting while he was writingsomething on the table. What accused-appellant failed to consider was that when a person writes

while seated, his head is naturally bowing down. Consequently, the path of the bullet, that is –

entering from the back portion of the head and exiting on top of the right eye, will take an upward

trajectory. Thus, contrary to the argument advanced by Jaymart, that the assailant must have

positioned himself lower than his victim, the posture of the victim’s head caused the upward

trajectory of the bullet.

Indeed, alibi is an inherently weak defense, and it becomes weaker in the face of the positive

identification made by the prosecution witness.18 It is likewise well-settled that where there is

nothing to indicate that a witness for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the

presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.

In addition, for his alibi to prosper, Jaymart must prove that not only was he somewhere

else when Emmanuel was killed, but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at

the scene of the crime. "Physical impossibility" refers to the distance between the place where the

appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the

facility of access between the two places. Where there is the least chance for the accused to be

present at the crime scene, the defense of alibi must fail.

Third , the killing of Emmanuel was attended by treachery. The law provides that an

offender acts with treachery when he "commits any of the crimes against a person, employing

means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its

execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make."

Thus, there is treachery when the attack against an unarmed victim is so sudden that he had clearlyno inkling of what the assailant was about to do. In this case, Emmanuel was sitting down before a

table, busily writing, when Jaymart came up behind him and, without warning, shot him at the back

of the head. Evidently, Emmanuel, who was unarmed and unaware, had no opportunity at all to

defend himself.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/feb2013/gr_199713_2013.html#fnt18







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And finally, the killing of Emmanuel constitutes neither parricide nor infanticide. All told,

the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Jaymart was responsible for the murder of

Emmanuel

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GARY ALINAO

G.R. No. 191256, 18 September 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are generally conclusive upon the

Supreme Court when supported by evidence on record. Thus, when the trial court gave credence to the

testimony of the witnesses who saw that the accused and his son set fire on the victim’s house and later

shoot the victim and the CA affirmed the trial court’s findings, the SC will affirm the conviction of theaccused for murder.

The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be

preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a

space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. When the time it took the accused and his son to

device their plan, plot where the gasoline should be poured, and procure the gasoline and the firearms,

as well as the time it took to go to Antonio Ardet’s house, and even the time when they waited for Antonio Ardet to come out of the house, all afforded the accused sufficient opportunity to reflect upon

the consequences of his act to kill his brother-in-law and his determination to commit the cold-blooded

deed from the time of its conception until it was carried out, it clearly shows that the accused and his

son had a previously and carefully crafted plan to kill the victim.

Facts:

Accused-appellant Gary Alinao, together with his son Jocel Alinao, was charged with

murder with the use of illegally possessed firearm. The prosecution witnesses testified that they

saw Gary and Jocel poured gasoline and set on fire the house of Gary’s brother -in-law, Antonio

Ardet. Nestor Ardet, brother of the victim, was peeping through a window when he saw Antonio try

to escape, but Gary shot him with a shotgun. This made Antonio fall back inside the burning house.

Gary denied the accusation and presented witnesses who testified that Gary was attending a

wake at the time of the incident, and arrived at the scene of the crime only when the body of

Antonio was already placed meters away from his burning house. It was also impossible for Nestor

to see him and his son because of the narrow gap in the window through which he allegedly saw

Gary and his son, and that there are obstructions to that view. Nestor and some witnesses also

failed to immediately execute an affidavit to implicate Gary.

With Jocel still at large, the RTC found Gary guilty of murder with evident premeditation as

the qualifying circumstance. The CA affirmed the decision.

Issues:

1. Did the prosecution fail to prove that Gary killed Antonio Ardet?

2. Should evident premeditation not be considered?

Ruling:

1. Gary’s guilt was sufficiently proven.




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After a thorough review of the testimonies of all the witnesses and other evidence

presented, we find no reason to disturb the findings of fact of the trial court. As we have held time

and again, factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are

generally conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record.

This Court observes that in the case at bar, counsels for both sides went the extra mile in

questioning the witnesses through in-depth cross-examinations, re-direct and re-cross

examinations, and even bringing them back as rebuttal and sur-rebuttal witnesses. The trial court,

for its part, was also very active in trying to ascertain the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court

thus had every opportunity to take advantage of observing the witnesses’ demeanor, conduct, andattitude, as well as the emphasis, gesture, and inflection of their voices, as potent aids in

ascertaining which of them were telling the truth. As we find nothing material in the records which

the trial court seems to have ignored, misunderstood or misconstrued that could warrant the

reversal of its factual findings, said findings should be affirmed.

Gary hinges his defense mainly on discrediting Nestor Ardet, Antonio Ardet’s brother. The

testimony of Nestor Ardet, however, was clear and straightforward. The defense’s contentionsagainst his ability to have seen the incident are likewise merely excessive nitpicking. Based on

experience, a three-inch opening of either a door or a window is certainly wide enough to give the

observer a full view of the outside if he “peeps” (peering with the eyes very close to the crevice)

through it, as Nestor said he did. The defense likewise failed to show how the barbed-wire fence,

the roof of the porch, and the elevation of Antonio’s house could have completely blocked Nestor’s

view of the house.

We are also more inclined to believe the testimony of Nestor Ardet over that of his sister,

Linda Alinao. While both are siblings of the deceased, Antonio Ardet, Linda Alinao is the wife of

Gary himself, and is naturally expected to be protective of him. Linda Alinao’s testimony is likewisehearsay as she was not present when Nestor Ardet was allegedly maltreated and forced to testify

against her husband. Furthermore, we cannot emphasize enough that Nestor Ardet and LindaAlinao were recalled on the same trial date to refute each other’s testimonies. The trial court was

thus afforded an even better opportunity to observe their demeanor, conduct, attitude, gesture, and

inflection of their voices, and ultimately believed Nestor over Linda.

2. Evident premeditation must be considered.

For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the following elements must be proved:

a. the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;

b. an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination; and,

c. sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect

upon the consequences of his act.

The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must bepreceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during

a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.

In the case at bar, Gary, in razing Antonio Ardet’s house in order to drive him out and

shooting him the moment he appears at his front door, clearly had a previously and carefully crafted

plan to kill his victim. We are convinced that the time it took Gary and his son to device their plan,

plot where the gasoline should be poured, and procure the gasoline and the firearms, as well as the




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time it took to go to Antonio Ardet’s house, and even the time when they waited for Antonio Ardetto come out of the house, all afforded Gary sufficient opportunity to reflect upon the consequences

of his act to kill his brother-in-law and his determination to commit the cold- blooded deed from

the time of its conception until it was carried out.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ROLANDO LAS PIÑAS, JIMMY DELIZO AND MERWIN LASPIÑASG.R. No. 191723, July 23, 2014 , J. Leonardo-De Castro

To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: (1)

that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by

any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that

the killing is not parricide or infanticide. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and

without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and

unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated,

two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend

himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or

forms of attack employed by him. These elements are extant in the facts of this case and as testified toby Roger above-quoted.

In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It does not need to be proven by direct evidence

and may be inferred from the conduct – before, during, and after the commission of the crime –

indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments as in conspiracy.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he was

present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically

impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility involves

the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and the location of the accused when

the crime was committed. The accused must demonstrate that he was so far away and could not have

been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed.

Facts:

Roger and his brothers, Edgardo and Benjamin, and their cousin, Carlito Lasala, were at

Edgardo’s fishpen. The fishpen was supported by four wooden posts arranged in a square. On top ofthe posts was a 9 to 10-meter bamboo platform about four to five meters above the sea. While on

the platform, they lighted three pressure lamps in the middle of the fishpen to attract the fish. After

checking the fishnet and eating supper, they took turns in resting and watching.

While Roger was on guard duty and the rest were sleeping, the Rolando Las Pinas et al.

arrived on board a "sibid-sibid," a long wooden boat mobilized by paddles. The accused thenclimbed up the platform and opened fire at the Aringo brothers and Carlito.

Specifically, Roger narrated that he saw accused Armando and Rolando shoot Edgardo and

Benjamin, while he witnessed Jimmy, Merwin and Freddie shoot Carlito. He likewise witnessed

Armando slash the throat of Edgardo after the latter was incapacitated, and throw his (Edgardo)

body into the sea. As for himself, Roger testified that his assailants were accused Renato, Salvador

and Gilberto; and tha the sustained gunshot wounds on his right cheek, left chest, and left buttock.

The carnage finally ended when the accused thought that the three Aringo brothers and Carlito




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were all dead; and then they boarded their boat and left. Roger recognized all the accused because

they used to be neighbors at Sorsogon.

Of the four, only Roger remained alive by daybreak and was eventually rescued by a passing

fisherman. He was brought to the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital for treatment. Initially, only the

bodies of Benjamin and Carlito were recovered from the platform. But four days later, Edgardo’sbody was found floating in the water. 3 informations were filed against Rolando Las Pinas et al with

the crime of Murder which circumstance was attended by treachery. On the other hand, Rolando

Las Pinas et al. denied such allegation by using the defense of alibi.

RTC convicted Rolando Las Pinas et al. of the crime of Murder which was affirmed by CA.

Issue:

1)

Whether or not Rolando Las Pinas et al. can be held liable for the crime of murder.

2)

Whether or not there was Conspiracy.

3)

Whether or not defense of denial and alibi can be admitted.

Ruling:

1) Yes, they can be held liable for the crime of murder.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides that

Article 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill

another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if

committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or

employing means toweaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity

To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established:

(1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended

by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4)

that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.

In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Edgardo, Benjamin and

Carlitowere shot and killed; (2) the accused appellants were three of the eight perpetrators who

killed them; (3) Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito’s killing was attended by the qualifyingcircumstance of treachery as testified to by prosecution eyewitness, Roger; and (4) the killing of

Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito were neither parricide nor infanticide.

Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery as the direct

employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend

directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense

which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and

without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and

unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In order for treachery to be properly

appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a




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position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular

means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. These elements are extant in the facts of this

case and as testified to by Roger above-quoted.

To emphasize, the victims, Roger, Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito, were caught off guard

when the accused, including the accused-appellants, in the dead of night, arrived at the fishpen andclimbed the same, and without warning, opened fire at the sleeping/resting victims to disable them.

Upon disabling the victims, the accused and the accused-appellants continued shooting at the

victims – accused Armando and accused-appellant Rolando shot Edgardo and Carlito; accused-

appellants Jimmy and Merwin and accused Freddie shot Benjamin; and accused Renato, Salvador

and Gilberto shot Roger. Accused Armando even slashed Edgardo’s throat after shooting him and

threw his body out to the sea – the stealth, swiftness and methodical manner by which the attack

was carried out gave the four victims no chance at all to evade the bullets and defend themselves

from the unexpected onslaught. Thus, there is no denying that the collective acts of the accused and

the accused-appellants reek of treachery.

2) Yes, there was Conspiracy.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code states that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons

come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." It does not

need to be proven by direct evidence and may be inferred from the conduct – before, during, and

after the commission of the crime – indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence

of sentiments as in conspiracy. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.

That there was conspiracy among the accused and accused-appellants is a matter not in

issue. Both trial courts and the Court of Appeals deduced the conspiracy among the

accused/accused-appellants from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killings. This

Court is satisfied that their deduction was warranted. Proof of the actual agreement to commit the

crime need not be direct because conspiracy may be implied or inferred from their conduct –

before, during, and after the commission of the crime – indicative of a joint purpose, concerted

action, and concurrence of sentiments as in conspiracy. In this case, all the accused/accused-

appellants were convincingly shown to have acted in concert to achieve a common purpose of

assaulting their unarmed victims with their guns. Their acting in concert was manifest not only

from their going together to the fishpen located offshore on board the same boat, but also from

their joint attack commenced simultaneously, firing successive shots at the four victims and

immediately followed by clambering up the platform and resuming their shooting of Roger,

Edgardo, Benjamin and Carlito. It was also significant that they fled together on board the boat that

they arrived in as soon as they had achieved their common purpose. Their conduct – before, during,

and after the commission of the crime – indicated a joint purpose, concerted action, and

concurrence of sentiments. Hence, conspiracy attended the commission of the crimes.

3) No, twin defenses of denial and alibi must fail in light of the positive identification made

by one of their victims, Roger.

Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the

prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused as in this case. It

is also axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. The accused-appellants’alibis that they were at different places at the time of the shooting, and that family members and or

their friends vouched for their whereabouts are negative and self-serving assertions and cannot not




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be given more evidentiary value vis-àvis the affirmative testimony of a credible witness. The

accused-appellants and Roger, at one point, resided in the same barangay and, are, therefore,

familiar with one another. Therefore, Roger could not have been mistaken on the accused-

appellants’ identity, including the five other accused who remained at large.

Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove thefollowing: (i) that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and

(ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime during its commission.

Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access between the crime scene and

the location of the accused when the crime was committed. The accused must demonstrate that he

was so far away and could not have been physically present at the crime scene and its immediate

vicinity when the crime was committed. Here, the accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfy the

above-quoted requirements. As held by the Court of Appeals, "[j]udicial notice was taken of the fact

that Barangay Bitan-o in Sorsogon City where the accused claimed they were at the time of the

shooting and the area of the sea adjacent to the municipality of Castilla where the incident took

place are neighboring sites that can be negotiated with the use of a banca in one hour or less."

Certainly, the distance was not too far as to preclude the presence of accused-appellants at the

fishpen, and/or for them to slip away from where they were supposed to be, unnoticed.

Finally, the defense failed to show any ill motive on the part of the prosecution’s witnessesto discredit their testimonies. Absent any reason or motive for a prosecution witness to perjure

himself, the logical conclusion is that no such motive exists, and his testimony is, thus, worthy of full

faith and credit.

HOMICIDE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODEL LANUZA y BAGAOISANG.R. No. 188562, August 17, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

It is axiomatic that a person who invokes accident must prove that he acted with due care.

This was belied by the conduct of the Lanuza when he allegedly received the shotgun from the private

complainant. As he himself admitted, he received the shotgun by placing his pointer finger, also known

as the trigger finger because it is used to squeeze the trigger, inside the trigger guard and over the

trigger itself. Worse, he did so while the barrel of the gun was pointed at the private complainant.

Facts:

In view of Lanuza's assertion of an exempting circumstance in his favor, the RTC, in its Pre-

Trial Order ordered a reverse trial of the case. Thereafter, trial ensued. The RTC summarized the

evidence presented by the parties as follows:

From the defense evidence, the incident took place at the basement of the BIR office in

Laoag City while the private complainant as outgoing security guard was handing his shotgun to

Lanuza, the incoming security guard. Allegedly, the private complainant held it with both hands,

with the muzzle pointed at him and the butt towards the accused. At that moment, the accused

gripped the firearm with one hand, with his pointer finger inside the trigger guard and on top of the

trigger itself. The private complainant was hit on the left side of his waist. With the private

complainant bleeding the accused went to the telephone upstairs to call for an ambulance.

However, Lanuza heard the sound of a motorcycle leaving the BIR premises. He went down and




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discovered that the private complainant was no longer at the place where he had left him. Lanuza,

proceeded to the Laoag City police station and surrendered.

The prosecution presented a different scenario. According to the private complainant, he

did not actually hand the shotgun to the accused. Instead, he merely placed it on top of the security

guard’s table. While the private complainant who was about to go home was asking why theaccused did not report on his scheduled shift, the latter got the shotgun and shot him. Lanuza ran

upstairs, and the private complainant crawled to his motorcycle and drove it himself to the

provincial hospital.

At the end of the trial, the RTC promulgated its Judgment finding Lanuza guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide under Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the

Revised Penal Code and, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision, dismissing Lanuza's appeal and affirming his

conviction for the crime of frustrated homicide.

Issue:

Can the court a quo correctly ruled that Lanuza is guilty of frustrated homicide as opposed

to Lanuza's contention that the shooting is completely accidental?

Ruling:

Yes, the Court sustains the verdict of guilt against Lanuza.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as

manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal

wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying

circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, of the means used by the

malefactors; the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim; the conduct of the

malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; the circumstances

under which the crime was committed; and the motive of the accused. These elements are extant in

the case at bar.

The prosecution has satisfactorily proven that Lanuza intended to kill private complainant

based on the method of attack, the weapon used, and the location of the gunshot wound. He shot

private complainant with a shotgun at close range hitting the latter’s abdomen. Private complainant

sustained a wound that could have caused his death if not for the timely medical attention given to

him.

The RTC did not give probative weight to Lanuza's testimony that his shooting of private

complainant was completely accidental, for the following reasons:

It is axiomatic that a person who invokes accident must prove that he acted with due care.

This was belied by the conduct of the Lanuza when he allegedly received the shotgun from the

private complainant. As he himself admitted, he received the shotgun by placing his pointer finger,

also known as the trigger finger because it is used to squeeze the trigger, inside the trigger guard




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and over the trigger itself. Worse, he did so while the barrel of the gun was pointed at the private

complainant. Worst, he had been a security guard for three years prior to the incident and had

undergone lessons on gun safety. According to him, he knew that it was not proper for a person to

receive a firearm from another by immediately inserting a finger inside the trigger guard. Likewise,

he knew that the hand-over of a firearm with its barrel pointed towards the giver or any other

person was not proper. That he did these improper acts despite his training and experience as asecurity guard undermines any notion that he had acted with due care during the subject incident.

According to him, after the private complainant was shot and rendered unconscious, he did

not go near him. He made no attempt to check if he was still alive or if he could help him in any way.

That he offered no help to the wounded private complainant undermines his claim of accident. As

observed in People v. Reyes, "had [the shooting] really been accidental, then the natural tendency of

the accused would have been to immediately give help to his unfortunate victim and even to plead

and express his regret to the mother of the deceased."

Finally, the Court likewise sustains the penalty and damages imposed against accused-

appellant.

The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of frustrated homicide is one degree lower than

that prescribed by law for the crime of homicide. Under the indeterminate sentence law, the

maximum of the sentence shall be that which could be properly imposed in view of the attending

circumstances, and the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that

prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

Considering that the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion

temporal, the penalty for the crime of frustrated homicide would be prision mayor. Applying the

indeterminate sentence law, there being the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and no

aggravating circumstance, the maximum of the sentence should be within the range of prision

mayor in its minimum term which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years,

and that, on the other hand, the minimum should be within the range of prision correccional whichhas a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Thus, the imposition of

imprisonment from four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision

mayor, as maximum, is in order.1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of Lanuza is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision of the Court

of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ORLITO VILLACORTAG.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. He is guilty of slight physical injuries under

Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. Although the

charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical

injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former since the

essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the

offense of murder.




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Facts:

On June 21, 2002, an Information was filed against Villacorta charging him with the crime of

murder, as follows:

That on or about 23rd day of January 2002, in Navotas, Metro Manila, Villacorta, armed with asharpened bamboo stick, with intent to kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and

there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon one

DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ, thereby inflicting upon the victim serious wounds which caused his

immediate death.

During trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses Cristina Mendeja (Mendeja) and Dr.

Domingo Belandres, Jr. (Dr. Belandres).

Mendeja narrated that she was tending her sari-sari store and both Cruz and Villacorta

were regular customers. At around 2a.m, while Cruz was ordering bread, Villacorta suddenly

appeared and, without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz on the left side of Cruz ’s body using a

sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in Cruz ’s body. Immediately after thestabbing incident, Villacorta fled. Mendeja gave chase but failed to catch Villacorta. When Mendeja

returned to her store, she saw her neighbor Aron removing the broken bamboo stick from Cruz’s

body. Mendeja and Aron then brought Cruz to Tondo Medical Center.

Dr. Belandres was Head of the Tetanus Department at the San Lazaro Hospital. When Cruz

sustained the stab wound on January 23, 2002, he was taken to the Tondo Medical Center, where he

was treated as an out-patient. Cruz was only brought to the San Lazaro Hospital on February 14,

2002, where he died the following day. Dr. Belandres was able to determine, using Cruz’s medical

chart and diagnosis, that Cruz died of tetanus infection secondary to stab wound.

The defense presented Villacorta himself, who denied stabbing Cruz. Villacorta recounted

that he was on his way home from work. Villacorta went outside to buy cigarettes at a nearby store.When he was about to leave the store, Cruz put his arm around Villacorta’s shoulder. This prompted

Villacorta to box Cruz, after which, Villacorta went home. Villacorta did not notice that Cruz got

hurt. Villacorta only found out about Cruz’s death upon his arrest on July 31, 2002.

The RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery.

The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment of

conviction against Villacorta.

Issue:

Can the court a quo erred when it ruled that Villacorta is guilty of murder without takinginto considerations that given circumstances?

Ruling:

Yes, the court a quo erred when it ruled that Villacorta is guilty of murder without taking

into account the surrounding events that transpired.




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In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave full faith and credence to the

testimony of prosecution witness Mendeja.

Appellant ’s reason for concluding that witness Mendeja’s testimony is incredible because

she did not shout or call for help and instead run after the appellant, fails to impress the Court

because persons who witness crimes react in different ways.

"x x x the makings of a human mind are unpredictable; people react differently and there is no

standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.

His other argument that the swiftness of the stabbing incident rendered impossible the

identification of the assailant cannot prosper in view of his admission that he was in the store of

witness Mendeja on January 23, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the morning and that he assaulted the

victim by boxing him.

Appellant and the victim were known to witness Mendeja, both being her friends and

regular customers. There was light in front of the store. The victim was in front of the store buying

bread when attacked. After the stabbing, witness Mendeja ran after the appellant giving heradditional opportunity to identify the malefactor.

Villacorta was unable to present any reason for Mendeja to fabricate such a lie and falsely

accuse him of stabbing Cruz. We have ruled time and again that where the prosecution eyewitness

was familiar with both the victim and accused, and where the locus criminis afforded good

visibility, and where no improper motive can be attributed to the witness for testifying against the

accused, then her version of the story deserves much weight.

Villacorta could only muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating

justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it

also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary

weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.

Hence, we do not deviate from the foregoing factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the

Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, there is merit in the argument proffered by Villacorta that in the event he is

found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for slight physical injuries for the

stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. The proximate cause of Cruz ’s death is the tetanus infection, and

not the stab wound.

Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous

sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the

result would not have occurred."

In this case, immediately after he was stabbed by Villacorta in the early morning of January

23, 2002, Cruz was rushed to and treated as an out-patient at the Tondo Medical Center. On

February 14, 2002, Cruz was admitted to the San Lazaro Hospital for symptoms of severe tetanus

infection, where he died the following day. The prosecution did not present evidence of the

emergency medical treatment Cruz received at the Tondo Medical Center, subsequent visits by Cruz




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to Tondo Medical Center or any other hospital for follow-up medical treatment of his stab wound,

or Cruz’s activities between January 23 to February 14, 2002.

In Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court was confronted with a case of very

similar factual background as the one at bar. We quote extensively from the ratiocination of the

Court in Urbano:

The issue, therefore, hinges on whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the

time Javier was wounded until his death which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for

Javier's death.

We look into the nature of tetanus. Medically speaking, the reaction to tetanus found inside

a man's body depends on the incubation period of the disease.

The incubation period for tetanus infection and the length of time between the hacking

incident and the manifestation of severe tetanus infection created doubts in the mind of the Court

that Javier acquired the severe tetanus infection from the hacking incident. We explained in Urbano

that:

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence

of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are

dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must

convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a

distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause

later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore,

distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038).

We face the very same doubts in the instant case that compel us to set aside the conviction

of Villacorta for murder. There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing

and the date when Cruz was rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanusinfection. If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would

have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days later. As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus

infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days; and those that exhibit symptoms with

two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent (100%) mortality. Ultimately, we can

only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with

tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by

tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of

his death.

However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight

physical injuries under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted

upon Cruz. Although the charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesseroffense of slight physical injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily

included in the former since the essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form

part of those constituting the offense of murder.

We cannot hold Villacorta criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder because the

prosecution was not able to establish Villacorta’s intent to kill.




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The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as

to the homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor. The onus probandi lies not on accused-

appellant but on the prosecution. The inference that the intent to kill existed should not be drawn in

the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such

intent is lacking but wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical injuries

only.

Evidence on record shows that Cruz was brought to Tondo Medical Center for medical

treatment immediately after the stabbing incident. Right after receiving medical treatment, Cruz

was then released by the Tondo Medical Center as an out-patient. There was no other evidence to

establish that Cruz was incapacitated for labor and/or required medical attendance for more than

nine days. Without such evidence, the offense is only slight physical injuries.

We still appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it being sufficiently alleged in

the Information and proved during trial.

Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing

means, methods or forms which tend directly or especially to ensure its execution, without risk tothe offender, arising from the defense that the offended party might make. This definition sets out

what must be shown by evidence to conclude that treachery existed, namely: (1) the employment of

such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or

retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. To reiterate,

the essence of qualifying circumstance is the suddenness, surprise and the lack of expectation that

the attack will take place, thus, depriving the victim of any real opportunity for self-defense while

ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the aggressor. Likewise, even when the victim

was forewarned of the danger to his person, treachery may still be appreciated since what is

decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to

retaliate.

Cruz, the victim, was attacked so suddenly, unexpectedly, and without provocation. It wastwo o’clock in the morning, and Cruz, who was out buying bread, was unarmed. Cruz had his guard

down and was totally unprepared for an attack on his person. Villacorta suddenly appeared from

nowhere, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, and without uttering a word, stabbed Cruz at the

left side of his body, then swiftly ran away. Villacorta’s treacherous mode of attack left Cruz with no

opportunity at all to defend himself or retaliate.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court

is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered finding Villacorta GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of slight physical injuries, as defined and punished by Article 266 of

the Revised Penal Code and sentenced to suffer the penalty of thirty (30) days arresto menor.

RAPE

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARIO CASTROG.R. No. 172874, December 17, 2008, J. Leonardo- De Castro

Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault,

especially a minor, as in this case, because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and




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put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it not to

condemn an injustice and have the offender apprehended and punished.

It is enough that there is the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex

organ. The mere touching by the male organ of the labia of the pudendum of the woman’s private part

is sufficient to consummate rape. It was therefore consummated rape which accused-appellantcommitted.

Facts:

Accused-appellant Mario Castro was charged with the crime of rape. It was alleged that

on November 11, 1999 at about 11:00 in the evening, accused-appellant fetched AAA, a minor

fourteen (14) years of age, his sister-in-law, from her Aunt’s house at PNR Compound, Taguig,Metro, Manila. Appellant brought her to TEMIC Factory and told her to undress. When she refused,

appellant undressed her, after which, he undressed himself. Appellant kissed her on the different

parts of her body and, in an instant, forced his penis into her vagina until he satisfied his lust.

Appellant eventually told AAA to dress up. When AAA reached her residence she told her aunt and

her grandmother that she was raped. After her relatives learned of the incident, they brought her tothe Barangay Tanod and, later to Camp Crame for medical examination. When arraigned, accused-

appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The defense relied on the testimony of Margarita Salangsang, a lessee of accused-appellants

mother at Signal Village in Taguig. She testified that at around 9:30 in the evening on November 11,

1999, accused-appellant was in her house for her birthday celebration. Accused-appellant did not

leave the house at any time from the moment he arrived at 9:30 in the evening until he finally left

around midnight. She knew that accused-appellant went home straight after the party because she

even saw him at his house when she returned the pans she borrowed from accused-appellants

mother. Margarita declared that her house was located just at the back of accused-appellants house.

The trial court rendered its decision convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape. Onappeal, the CA upheld the conviction of accused-appellant and affirmed in toto the RTC decision.

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant insists that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond

reasonable doubt. He contends that complainant did not particularly describe the details of the

alleged rape as to whether she was forced to lie down or whether they were standing when he

inserted a part of his organ into her vagina. Accused-appellant also asserts that complainant failed

to categorically state that accused-appellant succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina, thus

undermining her allegation of consummated rape.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty of rape.

Ruling:

Yes.

There is no question that accused-appellant in this case committed rape by means of threat

and intimidation. Being 30 years old and the brother-in-law of complainant, accused-appellant

exercised not only physical superiority, but also moral ascendancy over his 14-year old victim such




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that his threat to inflict physical harm on her effectively cowed her into submitting to his lustful

designs.

Accused-appellant argues that he cannot be held liable for consummated rape following the

ruling in People v. Campuhan. It was held that the crime was merely attempted rape because all that

the victim said in that case was that accused's penis touched her organ but did not penetrate it. Theargument is misplaced. In the case at bar, testimony of the complainant herself established the

consummation of the crime of rape.

He cites the testimony of complainant that not all of accused-appellant's organ was inserted

into her vagina. Clearly, complainant's statement that not all of accused-appellant's organ was

inserted simply means that there was no full penetration. There can be no doubt, however, that

there was at least a partial entry, so as to make the crime consummated rape. As we have said in

unnumbered cases, full or deep penetration is not necessary to consummate sexual intercourse; it is

enough that there is the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ. The mere

touching by the male organ of the labia of the pudendum of the womans private part is sufficient to

consummate rape. It was therefore consummated rape which accused-appellant committed.

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. JOSELITO A. LOPITG.R. No. 177742, December 17, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro

In the prosecution of criminal cases, especially those involving the extreme penalty of death,

nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which

an accused is charged must be established. Qualifying circumstances or special qualifying

circumstances must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there

can be no conviction of the crime in its qualified form. As a qualifying circumstance of the crime of

rape, the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship to the accused -appellant must be

both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts:

Accused-appellant was charged in thee (3) separate informations, Criminal Case Nos. 85-

2003, 86-2003 and 87-2003, with three (3) counts of rape committed against his own 14-year old

daughter AAA on September 5, 7, and 9, 2003. Accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty in all

of the Information. During the pre-trial accused-appellant manifested his desire to plea-bargain. In

open court, he expressed willingness to plead guilty in Criminal Case No. 85-2003, on the condition

that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 86-2003 and 87-2003 be withdrawn. Victim AAA,

assisted by her mother BBB and the provincial prosecutor, expressed her conformity thereto. Thus,

accused-appellant entered a new plea of guilty to the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 85-

2003. This was done with the assistance of counsel de oficio and after the trial court conducted

searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the

accused-appellants plea. The trial court commenced with the reception of evidence to proveaccused-appellants guilt and degree of culpability. The prosecution presented the victim AAA and

her mother BBB as witnesses, while accused-appellant testified on his own defense.

The trial court rendered a decision imposing upon the accused-appellant the supreme

penalty of death. The records of these cases were forwarded to this Court for automatic review, in

view of the death penalty imposed. Accused-appellants appeal by way of automatic review was

transferred to the CA. The CA promulgated the herein challenged decision affirming in most part




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the decision of the trial court with modification only in the amount of the award of moral and

exemplary damages. Hence, this review. In his Brief, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court

gravely erred in imposing on him the supreme penalty of death.

Issue:

Whether or not the death penalty imposed is proper.

Ruling:

No.

In his Brief, accused-appellant does not question his conviction for raping his own

daughter. He only assails the imposition of the death penalty by the CA. Accused-appellant contends

that while the Information alleged the qualifying circumstances of both his relationship to the

victim and the latter’s minority, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt thesequalifying circumstances.

Here, the Information alleged the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship

to accused-appellant. However, except for the bare testimony of the victim and her mother as to the

formers age as well as their filiation to the accused-appellant, no birth certificate or baptismal

certificate or school record and marriage contract exist on record to prove beyond reasonable

doubt the victims age or her minority at the time of the commission of the offense. There is no

showing that the victim’s birth certificate and accused-appellants marriage contract were lost or

destroyed or were unavailable without the prosecutions fault. Therefore, the prosecution failed to

prove beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged special qualifying circumstance of minority

attended the commission of the crime of rape. Hence, accused-appellant should be convicted only of

simple rape. Simple rape is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article

63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single

indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravatingcircumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME CADAG JIMENEZG.R. No. 170235, April 24, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or

intimidation against her will or without her consent; the exact time of its commission is not an

essential element to the crime.

Facts:

On or about the 8th day of August 1996 and sometime during the last week of October of the

same year, accused Jaime Jimenez by means of force, coercion, intimidation and with lewd design or

intent to cause or gratify his sexual desire or abuse, humiliate, degrade complainant, did then and

there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his daughter AAA, a 12year

old girl against her will and consent. He was charged and convicted by the RTC of two counts of the

crime of Rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal, the CA

rejected Jaime’s contention that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.




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Thereafter, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court with the accused-appellant Jaime Jimenez

alleging that the prosecution failed to establish the exact dates of the commission of the crimes

charged and that such failure of AAA to recall these dates with certainty likewise clouds the veracity

of her testimony.

Issue: Whether failure of the prosecution to prove the exact dates of the commission of the crime

of rape will have to merit acquittal of the accused.

Ruling:

No, it will not.

The failure of the prosecution to prove the exact dates of the commission of the crimes

charged is immaterial and would not warrant the reversal of accused-appellant’s conviction. The

exact time of the commission of the crime of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime and

it is sufficient if the acts complained of are alleged to have taken place as near to the actual date at

which the offenses are committed as the information or complaint will permit. The gravamen of the

crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation against her will

or without her consent. As the exact date of the commission of the rape is not the essence of the

crime and it is sufficient to allege in the information a date as near to the actual date of the offense

as the circumstances allow, the dates of the rapes committed by the accusedappellant need not be

proven exactly as alleged in the criminal information.

The failure of AAA to recall minor details and the exact dates of the incidents of rape and

sexual assault likewise does not affect the veracity of her testimony. These lapses are

understandable taking into account the nature of these crimes she suffered at her young age. The

Court cannot impose the burden of exactness, detailedness, and flawlessness on the victim’srecollection of her harrowing experiences.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESSIE MARIANOG.R. No. 168693, July 19, 2009, J. Leonardo- De Castro

The mere touching by the male organ of the labia of the pudendum of the woman’s private part is sufficient to consummate rape.

Facts:

In three separate Informations, accusedappellant Jessie Mariano was charged with three

counts of rape allegedly committed against the tenyear old daughter of his commonlaw wife. On

his arraignment, Mariano pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During trial on the merits, the

prosecution presented the oral testimonies of victim AAA, her mother BBB and Dr. RonaldBandonil, medicolegal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Baguio City. On July 2, 2001,

the trial court rendered its decision

convicting accusedappellant of three counts of rape and

sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death for each crime charged. On appeal to the SC,

Accusedappellant Mariano insists that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable

doubt for the crime of rape. He assails the credibility of AAA, branding her testimony as

inconsistent and contradictory with that of Dr. Bandonil, the medicolegal expert.




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Issue:

Whether Dr. Bandonil’s testimony was incompatible with the claims of the victim.

Ruling:

No, it was not.

During trial, he categorically declared that the possible cause for the swelling of the victim’s

hymen could be the male organ which would connote that accused-appellant’s penis indeedtouched the labia of AAA’s organ. The mere touching by the male organ of t he labia of the

pudendum of the woman’s private part is sufficient to consummate rape. The fact that there was nodeep penetration of the victim’s vagina and that her hymen was intact does not negate rape, since

this crime is committed even with the slight est penetration of a woman’s sex organ. Significantly, ina number of cases, the Court has held that where penetration was not fully established, the Court

had anchored its conclusion that the rape was nevertheless committed on the victim’s testimony

that she felt pain.

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO BUBANG.R. No. 172710, October 30, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro

In cases of rape, the force and intimidation is viewed from the perspective of the victim. There

need not be physical force provided that the victim succumbed to the act out of fear. Furthermore, the

sweetheart theory as a defense does not carry any weight when it is not accompanied by independent

proof.

Facts:

AAA, then 17 years old, was already an orphan and has two other siblings named BBB (15

years old) and CCC (the youngest). Since she was a small child she had been living with her

aunt. Her aunt has nine children the eldest of whom named GGG is the one married to AlbertoBuban. She claimed that Buban succeeded to have carnal knowledge with her through force,

threats, intimidation and without her consent four times and that all incidents happened inside the

house of her aunt because the accused and his wife GGG used to live with them.

She was only able to file the cases for rape at the time when her aunt noticed that her

stomach was getting bigger. When her aunt learned that she was raped by Buban, her aunt

accompanied her to file a complaint. The declaration was corroborated by the testimony and the

findings of the medico-legal officer who examined the offended party. It was found out in the

examination that AAA was six months pregnant. She subsequently surrendered her child to a social

worker contending that she had no love for the child as it served as a remembrance of what Buban

did to her.

The defense upon the other hand, admitted Buban had carnal knowledge of the victim for

several times, but argued that the sexual intercourse had been consensual as Buban and AAA were

sweethearts. The accused further claimed that the instances of carnal knowledge happened so

frequently that he could no longer count them. Buban also mentioned that he initiated to break up

with the AAA but never expounded on the reason why.




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The RTC found Buban guilty of rape which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, hence, the

present review. Buban puts at issue the credibility of AAA that it is contrary to human nature and

experience that after having been previously raped twice, AAA would still feel comfortable, in the

presence of appellant, and that there were inconsistencies between AAA’s testimony as to the dates

of the commission of the four (4) rape incidents. Lastly, Buban asserts that there could be no rape

where the sexual act was consensual.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court erred in convicting Buban of rape

Ruling:

No, the CA did not err in convicting Buban.

The Court ruled in People v. Nazareno as follows:

In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following jurisprudentialguidelines: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove

but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) due to

the nature of the crime of rape in which only two persons are usually involved, the

testimony of complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) the

evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be

allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

Tersely put, the credibility of the offended party is crucial in determining the

guilt of a person accused of rape. By the very nature of this crime, it is usually only

the victim who can testify as to its occurrence. Thus, in rape cases, the accused may

be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim, provided that such

testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and thenormal course of things. Else wise stated, the lone testimony of the offended party, if

credible, suffices to warrant a conviction for rape.

Guided by these judicial doctrines, the Court scrutinized all the pieces of evidence on record,

especially the testimony of AAA and we find no reason to overturn the trial courts assessment of

her credibility, which had the opportunity of observing AAAs manner and demeanor on the witness

stand. AAAs testimony was indeed candid, spontaneous and consistent. As the trial court observed

and we quote:

xxx. Even on re-cross examination the victim remained consistent and

unwavering in her claim that she was sexually abused by the accused. Despite her

young age and lack of experience in court proceedings she remained steadfastunfazed by the lengthy cross-examinations conducted by the defense, thus, attesting

favorably to her credibility.

Well-established is the rule that for the crime of rape to exist, it is not necessary that the

force employed be so great or be of such character that it could not be resisted; it is only necessary

that the force employed by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose for which it

was inflicted. In other words, force as an element of rape need not be irresistible; as long as it




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brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible are

beside the point.

Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of the victim at the time of the

commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produced fear -

- fear that if she did not yield to the bestial demands of her ravisher, some evil would happen to herat that moment or even thereafter.

In the present case, there can be no doubt that accused-appellant employed that amount of

force sufficient to consummate rape. At the time rape incidents took place, the victim was only

seventeen (17) years old, while accused-appellant was more or less twenty-seven years old and in

his prime. The obvious disparity between their physical strengths manifests the futility of any

resistance exerted by AAA as clearly established in the latter’s testimony.

Accused-appellant failed to show any ill motive, on the part of the victim to fabricate such a

story. Since there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the complainant to

testify against the accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical

conclusion is that the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO GRANDEG.R. No. 170476, December 23 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The sweetheart defense, being an affirmative defense, must be established with convincing

evidence—by some documentary and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures

and the like. In this case, there was no evidence offered to prove that what transpired between accused

and victim was consensual.

Facts:

Fifteen-year-old student AAA was renting a room in a boarding house at Purok 1-A,Barangay San Roque, Mercedes, Camarines Norte. One night, she was roused from her sleep by

accused Ricardo Grande who was on top of her and in the act of removing her shirt. Ricardo,

already naked from the waist down, pressed on her keeping her hands crossed on her chest and

lowered her shorts and panty down to her knees. He then inserted his penis inside her private part

and made pumping motions causing unbearable pain. AAA pushed her attacker away but her efforts

proved futile for Ricardo was quite heavy. The push and pull motion lasted for about five minutes.

After satisfying his lust and before leaving, Ricardo threatened AAA not to report what happened or

he would kill her and her parents.

AAA retreated to one side of her room crying. That night she couldn’t bring herself to sleep.

She stayed in her room the next morning until her mother arrived. She wasted no time and

reported the incident to her mother. Accompanied by their neighbor Tiang Azon, AAA went toBombo Radio the next day to request for assistance. Then AAA and her mother went to the police.

Assisted by her mother, AAA executed a sworn statement narrating the incident. The following day,

they went to the Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital for medical examination. The Medico-Legal

Officer, Dr. Marcelito Abas, conducted the medical examination and found healed hymenal

laceration and that vagina admits one finger easily.




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For his defense, 25-year old Ricardo claimed that he and AAA were lovers. According to him,

she was introduced to him by her cousin. Thereafter, Ricardo courted her for two days before

winning her heart. Then, he left for Sariaya, Quezon for a year. When he returned to Camarines

Norte, he courted AAA again. Again, she answered him. Ricardo then would visit her boarding house

every afternoon. Sometimes, he would go there at night. According to him, they had gone out on

dates and he had sexual intercourse with AAA before the complained incident. On that night whensaid incident happened, Ricardo admitted that he was at the boarding house of AAA with her two

classmates. Shortly after those classmates left, he claimed that they subsequently had sex.

Both trial court and appellate courts did not give credence to the sweetheart theory.

Issue:

Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape

Ruling:

Yes, the Court found Ricardo guilty.

For conviction in the crime of rape as alleged in this case, the following elements must be

proved beyond reasonable doubt: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2)

that said act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation.

Accused Ricardo does not deny the sexual intercourse between him and AAA that took place

on August 21, 1997, the precise date mentioned in the Information. However, as to the second

element of the crime, he asserts an exculpatory claim that it was consensual sex because he and

AAA were sweethearts.

The Court ruled that the invocation of the sweetheart theory fails for lack of convincing

proof. In People v. San Antonio, Jr., it was held that the sweetheart defense, being an affirmativedefense, must be established with convincing evidence—by some documentary and/or other

evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like. Likewise, the sweetheart theory

appellant the proffers is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and

consequently places on him the burden of proving the supposed relationship by substantial

evidence. To be worthy of judicial acceptance, such a defense should be supported by documentary,

testimonial or other evidence.

Other than his self-serving assertions, no other evidence was proffered by Ricardo to

establish the existence of a romantic relationship between him and AAA. The Court cited the trial

court’s decision, noting that AAA was a girl of fifteen and barrio lass, while Ricardo was in his

twenties at the time of the incident. Other than his self-serving testimony, no other evidence, like

love letters, mementos or pictures were presented to prove his alleged relationship with AAA.Neither was there any corroborative testimony supporting this alleged voluntary intercourse.

In any event, it has been held often enough that love is not a license for rape because a man

does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires. People v. Napudo

ruled that the sweetheart defense is considered an uncommonly weak defense because its presence

does not automatically negate the commission of rape. The gravamen of the crime is sexual




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congress of a man with a woman without her consent. Hence, notwithstanding the existence of a

romantic relationship, a woman cannot be forced to engage in sexual intercourse against her will.

AAA clearly and positively identified the accused-appellant as her attacker and, in a

straightforward manner, consistently described how the latter succeeded by the use of force and

intimidation in having sexual intercourse with her against her will.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMINIGILDO SALLE SOBUSAG.R. No. 181083, January 21, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro

It has consistently been held that no family member would expose a fellow family member to

the ignominy of a rape trial or to the shame and scandal of having to undergo such an ordeal merely

to satisfy their alleged motive if the charge is not true.

Facts:

Accused Sobusa was a widower with children and working as a security guard of the

Philippine National Bank. After the marriage of AAA’s mother and Sobusa, she lived with hergrandmother. When her grandmother died, she lived with her mother and stepfather. However,

when her mother BBB left for Taiwan, she was left by her mother under the custody of her aunt

DDD, the elder sister of her mother. She stayed with DDD for only one month and a half because her

stepfather wrote her mother a letter that she was always sick, thus, to the house of Sobusa. She

lived there until April, 2000 only, because before the Holy Week of the year 2000 (April 17 to 21,

2000), according to her, she was raped, by Sobusa.

AAA narrated that at about a quarter of nine in the evening while she was sleeping, she was

awakened when she felt that somebody was mashing her whole body. When she woke up, she saw

her stepfather whom she called as her papa, as the one mashing her whole body. Accused Sobusa

then immediately covered her mouth by using his palm. She did not also shout because she was

afraid. Thereafter, accused undressed himself and pulled down her shorts with her panty to herknees and inserted his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement. While doing

these acts, accused was lying on the AAA’s back while the latter was lying face down. Accused alsolet her lie on her back, mashed her whole body and kissed her.

According to AAA, there was only a slight penetration because she did not feel the pain but

she was very sure that what was inserted into her vagina was the penis of the accused and not his

finger because his fingernails were sharp and pointed and besides the penis of the accused is bigger

in size than the finger of the accused. She did not feel the pain although she has not yet experienced

having sexual intercourse with a man.

After the said sexual act, AAA pulled her pillow and placed it between her thighs and the

following morning, she discovered that the pillow was wet with bloodstains. She then told Sobusaabout the bloodstains but he told her just to keep quiet because he will just wash the pillow and the

panty. Her Tita Bebing, the half-sister of Sobusa, overheard the same. Upon inquiry by her Tita

Bebing, she told her about the incident but her Tita told her just to keep quiet. In May 2000,

however, she also told her two friends about the incident that happened to her and her friends

advised her to tell everything to her aunt DDD which AAA did. Thereafter, they reported the

incident to the barangay captain and the latter also reported the same to the Municipal Hall and a

warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused.




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The Medico Legal Certificate indicated a presence of hymenal laceration. The old healed

hymenal laceration could have been inflicted on the victim a month or more prior to the date of the

examination, depending however on the healing process of the patient.

Sobusa testified that he only came to know about the filing of this case against him in May,2000 and upon knowing this, he voluntarily surrendered to SPO1 Juanito Molinas, Jr. of San Miguel

PNP and he was placed in the lock up cell.

He denied having raped AAA because being employed as Security Guard of the PNB, Iloilo

Branch, his duty was always during night time, from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m. or from 11 p.m. until 7 a.m. In

the months of March and April 2000, according to him, he was on night shift duty every day, and he

also had Daily Time Records showing the schedule of his duties as security guard.

He further stated that this case was only instigated by DDD, sister of his wife, their aunts and

cousins because according to them, he is a gambler, a drunkard and he had another family and they

wanted to separate them.

The testimony of the accused was corroborated by his aunt Margarita Sobusa. She testifiedthat the family of BBB was not in good terms with the family of Sobusa and she knew this fact

because Sobusa also shared his problem with her. According to her, the family of BBB does not

favor her marriage to the Sobusa because the latter had another family, and the money sent by BBB

to him was spent by the accused in his gambling activity.

The fact of Sobusa’s surrender to the police authorities was testified to by SPO1 Juanito

Molinos, a PNP member assigned at the San Miguel Police Station.

On rebuttal, the prosecution presented evidence to refute Sobusa’s claim that he was on

duty every night on the month of April of 2000 and to show that AAA was raped sometime on April

11 to 15, 2000.

The prosecution presented Severino Pago, Chief Security assigned at the PNB main branch.

Sobusa was under him since May, 1994, until this case was filed against him in the year 2000.

According to him accused Sobusa reported for day duty on April 10-16, 2000 and on April 15 he

was not on duty.

AAA testified that she was not very sure of the exact date when she was raped but as far as

she can remember, it was only a few days before the Holy Week. AAA stated that she was sure that

she was raped between the dates April 11 to 15, 2000.

Both trial court and appellate court found him guilty of qualified rape.

Issue:

Whether or not Sobusa is guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:

Yes, the Court sustained his conviction of rape, qualified by AAA’s minority and relationship

with him.




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There are three settled principles in reviewing evidence on rape cases: (1) an accusation for

rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though

innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two

persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme

caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannotbe allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

Accused was convicted beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape on the basis

of the following: (1) AAA’s credible testimony concerning the rape incident; (2) AAA’s positive

identification of accused-appellant as the one who raped her; (3) physical evidence consistent with

AAA’s assertion that she was raped; and (4) the absence of ill motive on AAA’s part in filing the

charge.

Testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl-

child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was

indeed committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity.

AAA’s testimony that she was raped is highly trustworthy not only because of the fact that

she was merely a young lass below twelve years of age at the time she testified before the trial court

who would not concoct a sordid tale against his stepfather whom she endearingly calls papa but

more so because of her candid, positive, direct, and consistent narration of how her stepfather

sexually abused her.

Jurisprudence is likewise settled that when the rape victim’s testimony is corroborated by

the physician’s finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of theessential requisite of carnal knowledge. Laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical

evidence of forcible defloration.

The prosecution successfully established the qualifying circumstance of relationship of AAAwith Sobusa as well as her minority. AAA is the stepdaughter of the accused-appellant in view of the

marriage of AAAs mother with accused-appellant. The birth certificate of AAA, on the other hand,

proves that she was only 10 years old on the month of April of the year 2000 or at the time the rape

was committed.

Ill motive on the part of AAA’s family in the filing of this case is bereft of convincing

evidence. The Court has consistently held that no family member would expose a fellow family

member to the ignominy of a rape trial or to the shame and scandal of having to undergo such a

debasing ordeal merely to satisfy their alleged motive if the charge is not true. The Court did not

believe that the relatives of AAA would subject the latter to the humiliating and agonizing

experience of a public trial just to falsely accuse a person of the commission of the crime of rape.

Aside from the fact that AAA positively testified that the accused-appellant was her

assailant and that she was raped a few days before the start of the Holy Week of the year 2000 or

sometime on April 11 to 15, 2000, the daily time records of the accused-appellant easily belie his

claim that he worked on the night shifts from April 10 to 16, 2000.

Jurisprudence requires that a surrender, to be voluntary, must be spontaneous and must

clearly indicate the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities. The




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following requisites should likewise be present: (1) the offender had not been actually arrested; (2)

the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent; (3) the surr ender

was voluntary; and (4) there is no pending warrant of arrest or information filed. In this case,

Sobusa surrendered only after having been informed of the charge of rape against him or about two

months from the commission of the alleged crime. The alleged surrender, therefore, does not

qualify as a mitigating circumstance.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARLON BARSAGA ABELLAG.R. No. 177295, January 6, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro

It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility

of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.

Facts:

Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of trial court convicting Marlon Barsaga Abella of the

crime of rape further ordering him to acknowledge and support his offspring with the victim AAA.

The trial court found the 38-year-old AAA as a credible witness and her testimony candid andtruthful despite her moderate mental retardation.

Dr. Emelito Alegre testified that he had conducted an ultrasound examination on AAA,

confirming her pregnancy. At the time of the examination, AAA was already 30.7 weeks pregnant.

Dr. Imelda Escuadra of the Women and Children Protection Unit of Bicol Medical Center,

Naga City, and a specialist in the field of psychiatry testified that AAA was referred to her clinic for

examination and evaluation by the Department of Social Work and Development. During the first

examination, she noticed that AAA was pregnant, was coughing, but responsive, coherent and

relevant with no auditory or visual hallucinations or delusions shown. AAA, as she had observed,

was not psychotic at the time of the examination.

Dr. Escuadra added that AAA had recurrent thoughts of the rape incident and the threats to

kill her if she would divulge the matter. It was also observed that AAA was not oriented as regards

to persons and dates and that she showed poor grasp of general information. She further testified

that AAA’s mental ability particularly on the arithmetic aspect was poor, as she could not even

count from 1-100. She concluded that although AAA’s chronological age was 38 years old, she

manifested a mental age of between 7-8 years old. AAA’s intelligence quotient was only 51, which isclassified as moderate mental retardation. Aside from her mental disadvantage, AAA also suffers

from dwarfism being only three feet and eight inches tall.

AAA testified that she knew Abella personally since he was a child because they lived in the

same neighborhood. Sometime at around 1 p.m., while she was alone at home, Abella entered their

house and started molesting her. He pulled down her shorts with his left hand while covering hermouth with his right hand. He then placed himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her

vagina. At that time, AAA did not shout as he was holding a knife. She recalled that when he inserted

his penis into her vagina, she had felt pain. Afraid for her life, she did not tell her parents about the

rape incident.

Several months after the incident, her stomach became big. Thinking that she was just ill,

she drank some bitter solution upon her mother’s instruction. As her stomach continued to grow,




Page 168 of 299

AAA was forced to tell her mother about the rape incident. Thereafter, AAA consulted a doctor who

confirmed that she was pregnant. Consequently she gave birth to a baby girl.

BBB, AAA’s mother, testified that Abella is the cousin of her husband. She claimed that she

noticed her daughter becoming pale and thinner. She also noticed that AAA’s stomach was getting

bigger and thus decided to bring her to a doctor. BBB then asked her daughter who was responsiblefor her pregnancy, and AAA replied that it was Abella. BBB immediately reported the matter to the

Municipal Hall of Pamplona. Thereafter, the appellant was arrested.

BBB also testified that Abella’s parents had tried to settle the case by offering P20,000.00.

They however declined said offer, as it was not even commensurate to the expenses they have

already spent for their daughter and her child. Abella and his family had never given them any

financial support.

Both testimonies of Abella and his father were principally anchored on denial, and

attributed that the filing of this case against the accused was ill motivated and was due to the bad

blood and personal animosities between their family and that of AAA.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of the crime of Rape

Ruling:

Yes, Abella is guilty. The Court affirmed the conviction.

Accused asserts that he should be acquitted of the crime charged because AAA allegedly

testified unsurely as to the identity of her assailant and that she testified incoherently as to the

details surrounding the rape incident. Accused pointed out that AAA mentioned that she was raped

by a certain Mang Ben.

The Court ruled that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that accused

had carnal knowledge of AAA, a demented person, through force, threat or intimidation. AAA was

psychiatrically evaluated as an adult woman with the mental age of a 7 to 8-year old child and that

she gave birth to a child despite her mental inability to give her consent to a sexual relationship.

These facts support the allegation of sexual abuse.

The Court found no real conflict in the testimony of AAA as to the identity of her assailant. A

close scrutiny of the testimony of AAA that a certain Mang Ben raped her shows her evident

confusion to the suggestive questions and insinuations of the defense counsel and to the

hypothetical questions of the trial court. AAA’s puzzling answers are understandable considering

her undisputed low mental ability to comprehend the true import of the questions. Nonetheless, onfurther clarificatory questions of the trial court, AAA rectified her answers and testified consistently

that she was raped by the accused-appellant, and not by a certain Mang Ben.

The Court cited the trial court’s finding on this matter. It noted that even if the victim had a

mental age of a 7 to 8 year-old child, yet, she was candid, sincere, straightforward and simple in her

testimony in court despite the grueling cross-examination conducted by Atty. Manlangit. The

aforesaid demeanor of AAA only showed that she was telling the truth. She never wavered in her




Page 169 of 299

testimony, that it was Marlon who raped her, the circumstances or details under which she was

raped; and in positively identifying Marlon Abella in court. The court likewise noted the limited

mental ability and poor aptitude of the complainant when she was extensively grilled and cross-

examined, and even upon clarificatory questions from the court, thus giving the impression to the

court that she was just being obedient and was coached by her parents in filing this instant case

against Marlon Abella. She likewise admitted that a certain Mang Ben also raped her, but, latercorrected herself. Such was understandable. Even Atty. Manlangit noted that the victim was already

tired and exhausted while testifying in court. Besides, there was no testimony from AAA that she

was merely instructed by her parents to file the rape case against Marlon Abella even if the same

were not true. The court considered the inconsistencies in her testimony as minor inconsistencies

which even strengthen her testimony.

It is doctrinally settled that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility

of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. This

is so because the trial court has the advantage of observing the victim through the different

indicators of truthfulness or falsehood.

The criminal information failed to allege the qualifying circumstance that the accused knewof the mental disability of AAA, thus, his conviction of statutory or simple rape committed with the

use of a deadly weapon, instead of qualified rape, is in order.

The Court also affirmed the ruling of the lower courts, that the accused was the biological

father of the two-year-old daughter of AAA as a result of the rape incident and in view of their

striking facial similarities and features. The order to acknowledge and support the offspring is in

accordance with Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL BAGOSG.R. No. 177152, January 6, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro

No parent would expose his or her own daughter to the shame and scandal of havingundergone such debasing defilement of her chastity if the charges were not true.

Facts:

Sometime in May 1998, AAA, her older brother CCC, younger sister DDD and friend Michael

went to Baling-Caguing River, sitio Camanggaan, barangay Caranglaan, Mabini, Pangasinan from

their house to take a bath. CCC and Michael then decided to fish at a different location in the river

about 50 meters from where the sisters were bathing. Thereafter, DDD left AAA to join them.

Later, AAA prepared to leave and follow her companions. However, accused Manuel Bagos

who was bathing nearby suddenly pulled her left leg causing her to slip towards him. He then

lowered the panty of AAA up to the level of her knees and, thereafter, removed his pants.

Bagos sat down and seated AAA on his lap while they were in the water which was neck-

deep in that position. AAA boxed the thighs of the appellant saying, “No uncle.” Despite herprotestations, accused placed his left hand over her stomach and used his right hand to insert his

penis inside her vagina which caused her pain. After satisfying his lust, appellant threatened to

shoot AAA if she reported the incident to anybody. She was frightened because she had seen his gun

when they played in his house one time prior to the incident.




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AAA’s mother, testified that AAA was ten years old when the incident happened since she

was born on July 18, 1987 as shown by her birth certificate. She was then troubled by the unusual

questions of her daughter such as: ‘Mama, is my stomach getting bigger?’ and ‘Mama, is my neck

beating faster?’ She then confronted AAA and asked her if somebody molested her. AAA confessed.

AAA underwent physical examination which was conducted by Dr. Maribel Lazo. Dr. Lazo

explained that the findings meant that the hymen had been ruptured and that the laceration took

place longer than two weeks before the day of the physical examination or that AAA was no longer

a virgin at that time.

Bagos denied swimming or bathing in the river near his house at that time, and claimed that

he only went near the river to gather coconuts. He has known AAA’s parents for approximately tenyears because they were neighbors. AAA’s grandmother and his father are also f irst cousins. He

insisted that he stayed at the river bank while gathering coconuts, but never went near AAA. He

denied that he raped AAA, much less squatted on the river while raping AAA since he has a physical

defect that renders him incapable of squatting down.

He recounted that when he went to their barangay hall, the barangay captain asked him if

he could afford to settle the case. He answered that he would not settle because he was innocent of

the crime charged against him. He speculated that AAA’s family accused him of raping her due to a

family misunderstanding and boundary dispute.

Issue:

Whether or not accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape

Ruling:

Yes, the Court found Bagos guilty.

Accused’s contentions essentially assail the credibility of AAA’s testimony. The Court heldthat when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the

finding of the trial court unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if

considered, might affect the result of the case. This is so because the trial court is in a better

position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and

manner of testifying during the trial.

The victim in the present case was only ten years old when the rape happened. Despite her

very young age, her narration of her ordeal on the witness stand was straightforward, spontaneous

and candid. Under rigid cross-examination, she was steadfast in the telling of the incident.

The prosecution has adequately established that the complainant was only 10 years old at

the time of the rape incident, as evidenced by her Certificate of Live Birth. Undeniably, the instant

case is one of statutory rape, the gravamen of which is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12

years old. Sexual congress with a girl under 12 years is always rape. Thus, force, intimidation or

physical evidence of injury is immaterial.




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AAA’s testimony is further corroborated by the medical findings. Where a rape victim's

testimony is corroborated by the physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient basis for

concluding that sexual intercourse did take place.

The theory of accused-appellant that that it was not possible for him to rape the

complainant in a sitting position because of his physical defect was properly rejected by the RTCwhen he was required to sit by placing his buttocks on the floor. With more reason then, that he can

sit under water which is easier to perform.

The Court was unconvinced of accused’s attempt to impute ill-motives on the part of AAA’s

family. As held in People v. Monteron, Not a few accused in rape cases have attributed the charges

brought against them to family feud, resentment, or revenge. But such alleged motives have never

swayed this Court from lending full credence to the testimony of the complainant where she

remains steadfast in her direct and cross examination. No parent would expose his or her own

daughter to the shame and scandal of having undergone such debasing defilement of her chastity if

the charges were not true. It is unnatural for a parent to use his own offspring as an engine of

malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma.

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO REPUBLO,G.R. No. 172962 July 8, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro

AAA was raped by Romeo but the latter denied such accusation. The court ruled that In order

that the defense of alibi may prosper, the appellant must prove both the presence of the appellant in

another place at the time of the commission of the offense and the physical impossibility of him being

at the scene of the crime

Facts:

AAA victim, her mother BBB. In 1997, BBB went to New Guinea Republic, West Africa, to

work, leaving her daughter, AAA, with the family of her older sister, RRR, in a house they wererenting in Bagong Silang, Caloocan City. Romeo Republo the accused-appellant is RRRs husband. All

three incidents happened sometime in September 1997, on three different dates.

The first incident occurred at around 9:00 a.m. on a Saturday, when then 11-year old AAA

was awakened from her sleep by Romeo Republo accused-appellant. Only AAA and Romeo Republo

accused-appellant were in the house at that time. Romeo Republo Accused-appellant, who was

wearing only his shorts, pulled her blanket, forced her to lie down and undressed her. Upon

removing her shorts, Romeo Republo accused-appellant inserted his penis inside her vagina. He

then left. The second incident happened at around 3:00 p.m., two days later. While AAA was doing

her schoolwork inside her room, Romeo Republo accused-appellant entered the room and

immediately went on top of her. However, as the daughter of Romeo Republo accused-appellant

was inside the house, AAA was able to run outside. AAA went to her aunt LLLs house. Aunt LLL isthe wife of BBBs brother. The latter was not in his and LLLs house at the time AAA went there.

Third incident was when AAA was preparing to sleep with accused-appellants children at around

10:00 p.m. AAA laid down beside the three children. When the Romeo Republo accused-appellants

three children were already sleeping, Romeo Republo accused-appellant laid down beside AAA, and

threatened her not to tell anybody about what was happening, or else he would kill her family. AAA

was afraid and believed that Romeo Republo accused-appellant would execute his threat as she




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knows that he is a bad man. Romeo Republo Accused-appellant then removed her shorts and

inserted his private part into hers.

The defense presented accused-appellant Republo as its lone witness. Republo denied

having raped AAA. Instead, he believed that the rape charges were filed against him in order to

teach him a lesson, as there were several incidents that allegedly infuriated BBB due to somepunishments he inflicted upon AAA because she had a boyfriend at her very young age.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in proving the guilt of Romeo Republo

accused appellant beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:

No. the Court of Appeals did not erred in proving the guilt of Romeo Republo

accused appellant beyond reasonable doubt

Accused-appellants argument is apparently meant to support his alibi, that he and AAA

supposedly lived in the same house only in November 1997 upon the request of AAAs parents after

AAAs grandfather died. Citing the following portion of BBBs cross-examination, accused-appellant

contends that it is highly inconceivable for AAAs grandmother, who was entrusted with the custody

of AAA, to let the children of BBB stay in accused-appellants house considering that BBB specially

provided an apartment for her children. Accused-appellant concludes that it was physically

impossible for him to have raped AAA in September 1997 considering that he and AAA lived in the

same house only in November 1997.

In order that the defense of alibi may prosper, the appellant must prove both the presence

of the appellant in another place at the time of the commission of the offense and the physical

impossibility of him being at the scene of the crime In Marco v. Court of Appeals, the Court did notfind the distance of twelve (12) kilometers far enough as to make it physically impossible for the

appellant therein to be at the scene of the crime. In People v. Bation, we ruled that there was no

physical impossibility for the appellant to be at the scene of the crime, citing that the appellant

claims to be merely twenty-six (26) kilometers away from said scene. In People v. Ignas, the

distance was even much farther:

Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere

else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at

the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the

appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the

facility of access between the two places. In these cases, the defense admitted that the distance

between La Trinidad, Benguet and Kayapa, Nueva Vizcaya is 79 kilometers, which can be negotiatedin 4 or 5 hours. Clearly, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the locus criminis at

the time of the killing. Hence, the defense of alibi must fail. SC therefore, find it difficult to uphold

accused-appellants defense of alibi in the case at bar, when he is merely claiming to be living in the

adjacent house to that of AAA.

SC furthermore agree with the finding of the trial court that it is unbelievable that AAA

would file complaints for two counts of rape and one count of attempted rape just to exact revenge




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for the time accused-appellant allegedly kicked her. scare convinced even less that BBB would

persuade her daughter to lie about such rape incidents because of her quarrel with accused-

appellant. Thus, have repeatedly held that: Not a few accused in rape cases have attributed the

charges brought against them to family feuds, resentment, or revenge. But such alleged motives

have never swayed the Court from lending full credence to the testimony of a complainant who

remained steadfast throughout her direct and cross-examinations, especially a minor as in thiscase. Further, we simply cannot believe that a lass of tender age would concoct a tale of defloration,

allow the examination of her private parts, and undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to

mention the trauma, of a public trial, unless she was in fact raped. No young and decent Filipina

would publicly admit that she was ravished and her honor tainted unless such was true, for it

would be instinctive for her to protect her honor.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NELSON BALUNSAT y BALUNSATG.R. No. 176743, July 28, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro

AAA a ten year old girl was raped by Nelson Balunsat who is her first cousin. Nelson denied

allegation. It is settled that when the victims testimony is corroborated by the physicians finding of

penetration, there is sufficient foundation to conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnalknowledge. Laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.

Facts:

Private complainant, [AAA], was ten (10) years old at the time of the commission of the

offense. At about 9:00 oclock in the morning of April 24, 1999 she was alone in their house at x x x

as her parents were in the cornfields working. When she was in the process of cooking lunch, the

accused Nelson Balunsat, who is the first cousin of the private complainant, their mothers being

sisters, arrived. He took off the shorts and underwear of the private complainant and, thereafter,

took off his short pants and underwear. He forced [AAA] to lie down on the floor and, opening wide

her legs, succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Then he said If you report this I will kill

you. Then he left the private complainant who could not do anything but cry. Her private parts bledand she felt extreme pain. She did not tell her parents about the incident because of the threats

made by the accused. On April 26, 1999 at about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, private complainant

[AAA] was sleeping in a room of the house of her grandmother CCC in the same barangay x x x,

Tuao, Cagayan. With her was her cousin [BBB]. The accused arrived and removed his shorts and

underwear and lay down beside [BBB]. The accused tried to insert his fully erect penis into [BBB]s

private parts. However, BBB resisted and the accused could not make any penetration of his penis

on the former. Failing to satisfy his lust on [BBB], the accused told her to move over and then lay

himself down beside private complainant [AAA]. He removed the shorts and panties of [AAA] and

had sexual intercourse with her. Then he left both girls. On April 28, 1999, [AAA] told her Aunt

[DDD] who then brought [AAA] first to the barangay authorities and later to the Tuao Police Station

to report the twin rapes. She was then brought to the Tuao District Hospital where she was medico-

legally examined by Dr. Roselyn B. Cardenas. The latter issued a medico-legal certificate (Exhibit C)where her findings showed the following: hymen with recent laceration at 1 oclock. The defense, on

the other hand, relied on denial and alibi, testified to by Nelson himself.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court in proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable

doubt.




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Ruling:

No. The trial court did not erred in proving the guilt of the accused beyond

reasonable doubt.

Nelson is charged in Criminal Case No. 763-T with statutory rape considering that AAA

was then below 12 years old. The gravamen of the offense of statutory rape, as provided for in

Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is the carnal knowledge of a

woman below 12 years old. Sexual congress then with a girl under 12 years of age is always

rape. Thus, force, intimidation or physical evidence of injury are immaterial. To convict an accused

of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the age of the complainant; second,

the identity of the accused; and last but not the least, the carnal knowledge between the accused

and the complainant As shown by AAAs Certificate of Live Birth, she was born on February 3,

1989. Hence, on April 24, 1999, when the rape charge in Criminal Case No. 763-T supposedly took

place, she was only 10 years and 2 months old. Inside the court room, AAA identified her first

cousin Nelson as her rapist. The remaining element of statutory rape which needed to be

established herein is carnal knowledge between Nelson and AAA.

The Court stresses that in the crime of rape, complete or full penetration of the

complainants private part is not at all necessary. Neither is the rupture of the hymen

essential. What is fundamental is that the entry or at least the introduction of the male organ into

the labia of the pudendum is proved. The mere introduction of the male organ into the labia majora

of the victims genitalia, even without the full penetration of the complainants vagina, consummates

the crime. Hence, the touching or entry of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the

pudendum of the victims genitalia consummates rape.

The Court has carefully gone over the records of this case, particularly, the transcript of

stenographic notes to ferret out the truth and we find AAAs testimony on the incident that took

place on April 24, 1999 to be candid, straightforward, truthful, and convincing, consistent with thefinding of the RTC, which had the opportunity to closely observe AAA as she was giving her

testimony. AAA was able to describe with the simplicity of a child the ordeal that she suffered, even

vividly recounting the pain caused by Nelsons penetration of her female organ, AAA broke down

and cried while narrating on the witness stand how she was sexually abused by Nelson. Such

spontaneous emotional outburst strengthens her credibility. The crying of a victim during her

testimony bolstered her credibility with the verity borne out of human nature and experience. As

previously held, when a young girl like private complainant cries rape, she is saying in effect all that

is necessary to show that rape has indeed been committed. It is settled that when the victims

testimony is corroborated by the physicians finding of penetration, there is sufficient foundation to

conclude the existence of the essential requisite of carnal knowledge. Laceration, whether healed or

fresh, is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration.

Nelsons defense consisted mainly of denial and alibi. Mere denial without any strong

evidence to support it cannot prevail over AAAs categorical and positive identification of

Nelson. His alibi is likewise unavailing. We give scant consideration to Nelsons claim that he went to

Barangay Lallalayug, Tuao, Cagayan, with five companions from Barangay x x x to play basketball in

the morning of April 24, 1999, after which, they stayed at the house of a certain Fred Ocab until

4:00 oclock in the afternoon. Nelson did not present as corroborating witness any one of his

supposed five companions to Barangay Lallalayug in the morning of April 24, 1999 or Fred Ocab in




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whose house he allegedly stayed at in the afternoon of the same date. For alibi to be considered, it

must be supported by credible corroboration, preferably from disinterested witnesses who will

swear that they saw or were with the accused somewhere else when the crime was being

committed. In the absolute absence of corroborating evidence, Nelsons alibi is implausible.

Concerning Criminal Case No. 781-T, the Court of Appeals modified the guilty verdict ofthe RTC against Nelson from attempted rape to acts of lasciviousness. We can no longer review the

downgrading of the crime by the appellate court without violating the right against double

jeopardy, which proscribes an appeal from a judgment of acquittal or for the purpose of increasing

the penalty imposed upon the accused. In effect, the Court of Appeals already acquitted Nelson of

the charge of attempted rape, convicting him only for acts of lasciviousness, a crime with a less

severe penalty. Hence, we limit ourselves to determining whether there is enough evidence to

support Nelsons conviction for acts of lasciviousness.

The elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness are: (1) that the offender commits any

act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force and intimidation, or (b) when

the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party

is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex. All theseelements are present in Criminal Case No. 781-T.

First, there were acts of lasciviousness or lewdness, i.e., Nelson lying naked on top of his

cousin BBB while the latter was sleeping at their grandmothers house; and Nelson attempting to

insert his penis into BBB even when the latter was fully-clothed. Second, the lascivious or lewd acts

were committed on BBB who was only 11 years old at the time of the incident. And third, the

offended party BBB is another person of the opposite sex. BBB positively identified Nelson as the

offender. We stress that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave great weight to BBBs testimony

and were convinced that Nelson committed a crime against BBB on April 26, 1999 at around 1:00

p.m., even though said courts may have varying views as to the precise designation of the crime. In

contrast, Nelson merely denied the accusation against him, proffering the alibi that he was at a

neighbors house the whole day of April 26, 1999, going home to his grandmothers place only to eatlunch at around 11:00 a.m.

Denial could not prevail over complainants direct, positive and categorical assertion. As

between a positive and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare

denial, on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Also, for Nelsons alibi to be credible and

given due weight, he must show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene

of the crime at the approximate time of its commission. His defense of alibi is not only self-serving

and easily fabricated, but is also the weakest defense he could interpose. We have uniformly held

that denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-

culpability to merit credibility.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TEDDY MAGAYONG.R. No. 175595 July 28, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro

AAA was raped by Magayon but the latter denied such allegation. The court ruled that a rape

victim, who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains

consistent, is a credible witness. Moreover, when the offended parties are young and immature girls, as

in this case, where the victim was only nine years old at the time the rape was committed, courts are

inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, not only because of their relative




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vulnerability, but also because of the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by

court trial, if the matter about which they testified were not true.

Facts:

At the onset, she BBB(grandmother) testified that her daughters inaction against Magayonpushed her to file the complaint on behalf of her granddaughter, since Magayons uncle was the

second husband of AAAs mother. She narrated that sometime in August, 1996, having heard of the

rumor about AAAs rape being spread around by Francisco Asi, she confronted the latter and

inquired on the veracity of the gossip. Francisco Asi confirmed to her that indeed Magayon sexually

abused AAA. After obtaining this information, BBB approached and sought the advice of the

Barangay Captain of XXX, Oriental Mindoro, who told her that, as AAAs grandmother, she had the

right to vindicate AAAs honor and suggested to her to have AAA undergo a medical

examination. BBB then brought AAA to Dr. Soller, who, after having examined AAA, instructed BBB

to lodge a complaint with the Police Station of Bansud. There, BBB executed an affidavit in

connection with her complaint.

Dr. Preciosa Soller, second witness for the prosecution, testified that she was the one whoconducted the physical examination on AAA on September 4, 1996 and found out that AAA has lost

its virginity. She further testified that the lacerated hymen could have been caused by an insertion

of a hard object into the vagina such as a hardened penis.

AAA testified that at around 9:00 oclock in the morning on August 9, 1996, she and her 11-

year old brother were in her grandmothers house with Magayon. Magayon took her out of the

house and brought her somewhere and raped her for about two minutes. As Magayon was doing it,

she felt pain in her vagina. After the episode, the two of them went back to the house. On the

witness stand, she identified the affidavit she made when she went to the police station. The final

witness presented by the prosecution was Violeta Nazareno, social worker of the DSWD, whose

duty was to assist victims of rape. Violeta came to know of AAA because the latter was referred to

her for assistance. She said she knew that AAA was born on September 18, 1986 because she cameinto possession of the victims birth certificate. Magayon denied such allegations. RTC ruled

convicting Magayon with Rape

Issue:

Whether or Not RTC erred in convicting the accused appellant Magayon with Rape

Ruling:

No. It did not erred in convicting the accused appellant with Rape

Rape is a serious transgression with grave consequences, both for the accused-appellantand the complainant; hence, a painstaking assessment of a judgment of conviction for rape must be

done. In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three principles: (1) an accusation of rape can

be made with facility, and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the

person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the crime,

only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the complainant should be scrutinized

with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and

cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Accused-




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appellant is charged in the information under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code of raping a

nine-year old girl. Noticeably, the applicable provision is paragraph 3 thereof which classified the

offense as statutory rape. The elements of statutory rape, as provided for in Article 335, paragraph

3 of the Revised Penal Code, are the following:

(1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and

(2) that such woman is under twelve (12) years of age.

In rape cases, the gravamen of the offense is sexual intercourse with a woman against her

will or without her consent. If the woman is under 12 years of age, such as in the case of AAA, proof

of force and consent becomes immaterial, not only because force is not an element of statutory

rape, but because the absence of free consent is presumed. Conviction will therefore lie, provided

sexual intercourse is proven.

The prosecution adequately proved that AAA was nine years old on August 9, 1996 at the

time accused-appellant allegedly had carnal knowledge of her. This was evidenced by AAAs birth

certificate, which showed that she was born on September 18, 1986. Since she was merely 9 yearsold at that time, no proof of involuntariness on her part is necessary. AAA, being a minor at the time

the act was committed against her, is considered by law to be incapable of consenting to the sexual

act. To convict accused-appellant of rape, the only circumstance that needs to be proven is the fact

of sexual intercourse. Here, in giving greater weight to the version of the defense, the trial court

observed that the victim was direct, unequivocal, convincing and consistent in answering the

questions propounded to her. The records disclose that AAA was categorical and straightforward

in narrating the distasteful details of her horrid experience as accused-appellant ravished her even

at such tender age. It must be stressed that AAA did not only identify Magayon as her rapist, she

also gave the specifics of how the sexual intercourse happened.

A rape victim, who testifies in a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank

manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness. Moreover, when the offended parties areyoung and immature girls, as in this case, where the victim was only nine years old at the time the

rape was committed, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, not

only because of their relative vulnerability, but also because of the shame and embarrassment to

which they would be exposed by court trial, if the matter about which they testified were not true.

Magayon denies raping the victim. His denial in this case, unsubstantiated by clear and

convincing evidence, is negative, self-serving evidence, which cannot be given greater evidentiary

weight than the testimony of the complaining witness who testified on affirmative matters. His

denial cannot prevail over the affirmative testimony of AAA, a minor less than 12 years old, who

narrated the sexual episode.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs EDGARDO OGARTEG.R. No. 182690, May 30, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

A certification from the Local Civil Registrar as to the date of birth of a victim of rape is

sufficient evidence to prove minority of a victim.

Facts:




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On May 2, 1997, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC, charging Ogarte with

two separate counts of Rape. He was alleged to have had sexual intercourse with his 16 year old

daughter AAA. During arraignment, Ogarte pleaded not guilty on both counts of rape.

AAA detailed her ordeal as follows. The first instance of rape happened at around ten

o’clock in the evening of November 1, 1996, in their home in xxx. AAA claimed that while she wassleeping beside her four younger sisters, Ogarte woke her up, held her hands, grabbed her head,

and brought her to the kitchen wherein she was forced to lie down on the floor. AAA said that after

Ogarte ejaculated. He threatened to kill her if she told her mother, who was at that time in

Guinabucan, Zamboanga del Sur.

The second instance of rape was when, upon her mother’s order, she reluctantly obeyed to

help Ogarte gather some firewood in the wooded area near their house. Ogarte carrying the bolo he

used to cut the wood, pulled her shoulders and told her not to make any noise. AAA recounted how

Ogarte then went on to remove her undergarments, and ignoring her cries, once again placed

himself on top of her and with a "push and pull motion," consummated his sexual desires.

Several attempts were made by Ogarte to again rape AAA. AAA was able to foil suchattempts by avoiding Ogarte and by pinching her siblings to waken them whenever Ogarte was

approaching AAA. AAA, mustered the courage to reveal to her mother the events that transpired on

November 1 and 3, 1996. Upon learning about this, Ogarte, in his anger, pulled AAA and was about

to stab her when he was stopped by AAA’s mother who arrived just in time. Thereafter, AAA’smother told her to keep quiet about what her father did to her.

AAA told her grandmother BBB her ordeal in the hands of her own father. On April 2, 1997,

AAA and BBB went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Dipolog City where they

executed the sworn affidavits that were used as bases for the charges against Ogarte.

On the other hand, Ogarte, vehemently denied that he had raped his own daughter on the

night of November 1, 1996. He said that although it was true that he was at their residence thatevening, his wife, AAA’s mother, was also there that night, contrary to AAA’s allegations. Ogarte

alleged that it would have been impossible to pull her and bring her to the kitchen without stepping

on or awakening his other children who were sleeping right beside AAA.

Ogarte likewise claimed innocence on the second charge of rape and averred that he was not in the

wooded area with AAA on November 3, 1996 as he was plowing his farm that day. Ogarte

contended that AAA filed these charges against him as an act of revenge because he and his wife

slapped her sometime in February 1997 when she adamantly denied having sexual intercourse

with three men at her school, as reported by Ogarte’s cousin who worked as a teacher in AAA’sschool.

The RTC found Ogarte guilty as charged in both criminal cases and imposed on him thesupreme penalty of death for each count of rape.

On appeal with the Court of Appeals, Ogarte alleged that AAA’s testimony was replete withinconsistencies, her minority was never duly established, and his credible alibi should have been

believed in view of the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence. However, the CA affirmed the RTC’sdecision. The CA imposed reclusion perpetua as penalty for each count of rape.




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Issue:

Whether or not the allegation of minority was sufficiently established

Ruling:

Yes. The minority of the victim was sufficiently established.

In reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided by three settled principles: (1) an accusation of

rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult

for the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering the intrinsic nature of the

crime, only two persons being usually involved, the testimony of the complainant should be

scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its

own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the

defense.

While we are aware of the divergent rulings on the proof required to establish the age of the

victim in rape cases, this has already been addressed by this Court in People v. Pruna, wherein weestablished certain guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime or as a

qualifying circumstance. We have reiterated these guidelines in the more recent case of People v.

Flores, as follows:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the

certificate of live birth of such party.

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate

and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or

otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree

such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the

Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she

is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she

is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she

is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s

mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided thatit is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the

accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.




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The qualifying circumstances of age and relationship were not only properly alleged in the

information but were also duly established by the prosecution during the trial of the cases against

Ogarte. Records show that AAA submitted a certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar

of Labason, Zamboanga del Norte that her birth records appear in its Register of Births and that her

date of birth is listed as "June 24, 1980." Under the above guidelines in establishing the victim’s age,this certification qualifies as an authentic document.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO MIRANDA y MICHAEL

G.R. No. 176634, April 5, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under the instances provided for

in the law. With the intrinsic nature of the said crime, only two parties, namely the victim and the

accused, are usually involved. As such, accused’s defense of denial will not stand as against the victim’s positive identification and credible testimony. This is especially so when it is qualified by minority and

relationship and the victim has no improper motive in purporting the accused as the perpetrator.

Moreover, in rape committed by a father or a person recognized by the victim as her father, the

prosecution need not prove the elements of force and intimidation as the same was substituted by the former’s moral ascendancy and influence over the latter.

Facts:

About noontime of June 23, 2000, AAA, a seventeen year-old young lady, while fetching

water in a " poso" near their house, came to learn that the live-in partner of her father died, hence,

she went to her father’s house to condole. Her father then told her to look after her half-brother,

CCC, and half-sister, BBB. She stayed at his house, cooked food and washed the dishes. She slept that

night with her half-sister in the sala. On the following day, June 24, 2000, her father left in the

morning but returned at lunch time and stayed in the house for the rest of the day. She was,

however, not feeling well because of a high fever and headache accompanied by vomiting spills

which started at noontime of the same day. After having dinner and while she was washing thedishes, her father came to know of her condition and he told his daughter, BBB to finish the dish

washing. She then went to the room and after wearing a pajama over her shorts and panty, she put

on the mosquito net. She then laid down and while preparing herself to rest and go to sleep, she

watched TV from 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. with a "Good Morning" towel stuck on her mouth to

prevent her from vomiting. When her father turned off the TV, she asked for the "Vicks Vaporub"

placed at the side of the TV set. Accused then entered the mosquito net and volunteered to massage

her head. While he was massaging her head, she felt that both his elbows were touching her breasts.

She tried to evade his elbows saying she would be the one to do the massaging but he refused. In an

attempt to forestall her father’s acts, she told him that she will tell her mother about it which madehim stop and instead, he massaged her hands. He then kissed her on her neck while slowly lifting

her T-shirt who thereafter sucked her breasts causing her to push him hard telling him not to do it

to her. Only his two children were inside the house but both were already asleep at that time. Aftersucking her breasts, he used his left hand in slowly pulling down her pajama and thereafter her

short and panty. He then held both her arms and with his head going down, he licked her vagina.

She resisted and tried to kick the wall to create some noise to awaken her half-siblings but he did

not stop. Out of fear of being hurt by her father, whom as testified by AAA, she saw with red eyes for

the first time, she did not shout for help. Thereafter, he removed his shorts with a garter and his

brief and she turned her back to him but he embraced her to make her face him. Then and there, he

laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt an entry into her vagina which she




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described to be painful. When her father removed his sex organ from hers, she felt something hot

flowed from her vagina. After the foregoing incident, he got dressed and wiped her vagina with the

"good morning" towel. She then waited for him to sleep and seeing him asleep, she fixed herself and

climbed the fence to get out from the house. She went to their house and after seeing that her

mother was still sleeping, she proceeded to the Barangay Hall where she saw her uncle who

accompanied her to Police Station where she executed a sworn statement. She was also brought toCamp Crame for a physical and genital check-up.

Thereafter, an Information for the crime of rape qualified by minority and relationship was

filed against Romeo Miranda y Michael (Miranda).

For his defense, Miranda denied having committed the crime. While he did not deny that

before they went to sleep, he massaged AAA’s aching forehead with efficascent from 9:00 to 9:30

p.m. as she was also feeling dizzy. He, however, vehemently denied having raped her asserting that

after massaging her head AAA transferred to another room while he, together with his two (2)

children, remained in the room where they eventually slept. He also described that the materials

separating his room from the room where AAA slept were made of carton and wood of good lumber

and one can hear and see if someone is talking or doing anything in the other room as it has nodoor.

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision finding Miranda guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

the crime of rape and was meted out the capital punishment of death. On automatic review to the

Court of Appeals, the said decision was affirmed with the modification that the death penalty

imposed was reduced to reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death penalty. Hence, the

records of the case were forwarded to this Court for automatic review.

Issue:

Whether or not Miranda is guilty of the crime of rape qualified with minority and

relationship.

Ruling:

As the special qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship were specifically

pleaded in the Information and proven during the trial, Miranda is found GUILTY beyond

reasonable doubt of QUALIFIED RAPE and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, in lieu of death, without

the possibility of parole.

Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following

instances: (1) when force or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is

otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve (12) years of age. Both the RTC and the

Court of Appeals found that Miranda committed rape under the first circumstance, i.e., by havingsexual intercourse with his 17-year old daughter with the use of force and intimidation.

As to Miranda’s challenge against AAA’s credibility, this Court held that: 1) In review of rape cases, the credibility of the private complainant is the single most

important factor for consideration. The case of the prosecution stands or falls on the credibility of

the victim. This is in accord with the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two parties,

namely the victim and the accused, are usually involved. In this regard, the appellate court will




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generally not disturb the assessment of the trial court on matters of credibility owing to its unique

opportunity to observe the deportment and manner of testifying of witnesses firsthand during the

trial unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect

the result of the case. In the instant case, there is no basis for this Court to overturn the finding of

the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the testimony of the victim, AAA, is credible. As

the RTC observed, the testimony of AAA, in which she positively identified her father as the onewho ravaged her, is straightforward, categorical, and spontaneous.

2) As to Miranda’s defense of denial, this Court has already settled that a mere denial, like

alibi, is inherently a weak defense and constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be

accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on

affirmative matters. As against the positive identification and credible testimony by the private

complainant, mere denials of the accused cannot prevail to overcome conviction by the trial court.

3) This Court takes judicial notice that ordinarily and customarily, Filipino children revere

and respect their elders. It is thus unthinkable, if not completely preposterous, that a daughter

would audaciously concoct a story of rape against her father in wanton disregard of the

unspeakable trauma and social stigma it may generate on her and the entire family. A teenageunmarried lass does not ordinarily file a rape complaint against anybody, much less her own father,

if it is not true. Even Miranda admitted that that he has no misunderstanding with AAA, thus, no

improper motive could be attributed to AAA for charging her father with the commission of such an

atrocious crime. Therefore, AAA’s testimony is worthy of full faith and credence because her onlyapparent motive is to bring her father to justice for raping her.

4) Moreover, we have held that where a rape victim did not lose time in reporting her

father’s dastardly act and in seeking help as soon as she was able to escape, such spontaneous

conduct was an eloquent attestation of her abhorrence and repugnance to her father’s perversity.

That AAA immediately told her uncle and police officials about her hellish ordeal and that she

willingly submitted herself to physical and genital examination evince the truthfulness of her

charge of rape against Miranda.

5) AAA’s account of the rape is reinforced by physical evidence. The Medico-Legal Report

and testimony of P/Sr. Insp. Ruby Grace Sabino, who physically examined her on June 25, 2000, a

day after the rape, established that AAA’s hymen had a deep fresh laceration at 6 o’clock posit ion,

evidencing penetration of the genitalia; and that seminal fluid was present in AAA’s vagina.

As to the argument that the prosecution failed to prove that Miranda used force and

intimidation against AAA, this court held that:

1) Contrary to Miranda’s averment that AAA failed to fight back or to cause any noise whilesupposedly being sexually abused is contrary to human experience, AAA’s testimony actually

revealed her several attempts to fight back at him. AAA threatened that she would tell her mother

about what Miranda was doing to her, but it only deterred Miranda for awhile. AAA pushed Mirandaaway, but he continued to kiss her breasts and undress her. AAA kicked the wall to create noise but,

unfortunately, it wasn’t loud enough to disturb her half-siblings’ sleep. AAA turned her body away

but Miranda grabbed and hugged her. AAA repeatedly begged Miranda to stop but her pleas fell on

deaf ears. Miranda overpowered all of AAA’s resistance. Without doubt, Miranda gained carnal

knowledge of AAA through force and intimidation.




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Notably, the prosecution need not even prove the elements of force and intimidation in this

case. Settled is the rule that in rape committed by a father or a person recognized by the victim as

her father, the former’s moral ascendancy and influence over the latter substitute for violence andintimidation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN PADILLA y UNTALANG.R. No. 182917, June 8, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The spontaneity with which the victim has detailed the incidents of rape, the tears she has shed

at the stand while recounting her experience, and her consistency almost throughout her account

dispel any insinuation of a rehearsed testimony. The eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the

medical findings attesting to her non-virgin state, should be enough to confirm the truth of her

charges

Facts:

Benjamin Padilla y Untalan of three (3) counts of rape against the private complainant AAA

which occurred in November 1999, on January 13, 2001 and on January 14, 2001.

AAA testified that the date of her birth was February 28, 1989. In September of the year

1999, her mother, BBB, went to work abroad. Since then, AAA had been living in their house in with

the accused-appellant, Benjamin Padilla; CCC, her older brother; DDD, her younger brother; and

EEE, her younger sister.

In November 1999, AAA recounted that at around seven o’clock in the morning, she was at

their house changing her clothes as she was about to go to school.. While AAA was changing clothes,

accused-appellant held her arm with his left hand and his right hand held a bolo. He pushed AAA

and the latter fell down on the floor in a lying position. He told her not to shout or he would kill her.

He proceeded to remove AAA’s short pants and panty. He was able to spread apart the legs of AAA

despite her efforts to prevent him. He then went on top of AAA and inserted his penis into hervagina. He then did the push and pull movement. Afterwards, he removed his penis, put on his brief

and shorts and went to the market.

On January 13, 2001, AAA related that the same likewise occurred at the upper floor of their

house in the evening of the said date. The facts for this second count of rape are relatively similar

with the first count.

On January 14, 2001, at dawn as AAA slept at the ground floor of their house. CCC was

already in the market, while DDD and EEE were sleeping at a distance of around two meters from

AAA. The accused-appellant woke up AAA and whispered to her not to shout or he would kill her.

He then removed her shorts and panty and spread her legs. He went on top of her, inserted his

penis in her vagina and did the push and pull movement.

AAA said that at noontime on January 14, 2001, she and her younger siblings went to the

house of her aunt, FFF. There, she reported the incidents of rape to FFF. They then waited for AAA’sgrandmother, GGG, and the latter accompanied AAA to the police station.




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CCC testified for the defense in order to prove that he had no knowledge of the allegations of

rape of his younger sister, AAA. He stated that, in 2001, the accused-appellant worked as a kargador

(porter) in the market. This fact was corroborated by accused-appellant’s testimony.

The RTC found accused-appellant, Benjamin Padilla guilty of the 3 counts of rape. On appeal,

the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. However, the CA modified the penalty imposed.

Issue:

Whether or not Benjamin Padilla, based on the evidence provided by the prosecution, is

guilty of 3 counts of statutory rape

Ruling:

Yes, accussed-appellant, Benjamin Padilla is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for 3 counts of

rape.

In the prosecution of statutory rape cases, force, intimidation and physical evidence ofinjury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and

whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a

will of her own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her

presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.33

In the instant case, the element of carnal knowledge was primarily established by the

testimony of AAA, which the Court of Appeals and the RTC found to be unequivocal and deserving

credence.

The testimony of AAA that the accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her was also

corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Taganas that AAA was no longer physically a virgin. In

People v. Oden, we held that "[t]he spontaneity with which the victim has detailed the incidents ofrape, the tears she has shed at the stand while recounting her experience, and her consistency

almost throughout her account dispel any insinuation of a rehearsed testimony. The eloquent

testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings attesting to her non-virgin state, should

be enough to confirm the truth of her charges.

Thus, the Court rules that the element of carnal knowledge of AAA by the accused-appellant

was sufficiently proven in each of the three (3) counts of rape in this case.

In the instant case, the accused-appellant merely denied that he raped AAA in November

1999. The testimony of CCC did not particularly provide any specific corroboration on this point, as

CCC merely testified that the accused-appellant usually goes to work at the Asingan market at 5:00

a.m. to 11:00 a.m. Furthermore, the accused-appellant failed to demonstrate that it was physicallyimpossible for him to be at their house at the time of the commission of the third incident of rape.

Thus, it would have been relatively easy for the accused-appellant to go back from the Asingan

market to their house to carry out the sexual abuse against AAA and then go to the market again.

Consequently, the accused-appellant’s defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive declaration of

AAA.




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As to the second element of statutory rape, the fact that AAA was under 12 years of age

when the incidents of rape occurred had likewise been clearly established in the instant case. Thus,

AAA was only 10 years old and 11 years old, respectively, when the incidents of rape charged

against the accused-appellant took place in November 1999 and January 2001. Moreover, the

parties previously stipulated during the pre-trial conference and, thereafter, the accused-appellant

admitted during trial that he is the biological father of AAA. The said fact is also evident in theCertificate of Live Birth of AAA.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NOEL DIONG.R. No. 181035, July 4, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

We have repeatedly held that the date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of

the crime. It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except when

time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element. What is

important is that the information alleges that the victim was a minor under twelve years of age and

that the accused had carnal knowledge of her, even if the accused did not use force or intimidation on

her or deprived her of reason.

Facts:

Noel Dion was accused of two counts of rape against AAA, a 10 year old minor.

The first count of rape occurred at around three o’clock in the afternoon, after she hadfinished throwing garbage at the "bakir" or garbage pit located some 300 meters from the back of

their house, Dion came out from behind some trees, beckoning her to approach him. Instead of

going to Dion, AAA started to run to their house, but she tripped and fell to the ground. This allowed

Dion to catch up to her. After threatening AAA that he will cut her tongue and neck if she shouted,

Dion forced her on her back and removed her undergarments. Dion then removed his own short

pants and briefs then climbed on top of her. AAA described how Dion made the "push and pull

movement" after he inserted his penis into her vagina.

The second count of rape occurred, AAA averred that at around ten o’clock in the evening of

June 16, 2001, while she was getting water from their kitchen, she heard knocking at the door. She

testified that all of a sudden, Dion was already inside their house. Once again, Dion gave the same

threats to AAA before raping her as he did previously, in April 2001. Dion had just finished his deed

and was about to go home when AAA’s uncle, CCC, arrived. Following the sound he had heard, CCC

found Dion hiding in a corner in the kitchen. CCC immediately collared Dion and woke up BBB,

AAA’s grandmother. BBB thereafter called Dion’s father and their Barangay Chairman.

After undergoing a physical examination, noticeable in the Medico-Legal Certificate were

the findings that the hymenal lacerations on AAA were not only healed but also only superficial.

Moreover, the cervicovaginal smear done on AAA to test for presence of spermatozoa yielded anegative result.

Negating AAA’s accusations, Dion denied that he had raped AAA, whom he claimed he had

never talked to. He alleged that he could not have raped AAA in April 2001 because he was in

Barangay Dusoc, Bayambang, Pangasinan the entire month, working as a "bata-bataan"20 (boy) in

the carnival which was situated there at that time. Allan Ramirez, also a resident of Rosales,

Pangasinan, was presented to corroborate Dion’s alibi that he was at the carnival in another




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barangay in April of 2001. Ramirez disclosed that he had come to know Dion in the carnival where

they both worked. He claimed that in April 2001, both he and Dion were working in the carnival,

which at that time was located in Barangay Dusoc, Bayambang.

The RTC found Dion guilty of the 2 counts of rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed

the decision of the RTC in toto.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Dion is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 2 counts of rape

2. Whether or not the inconsistencies in the medico-legal report has any bearing

Ruling:

Yes, Dion is guilty of 2 counts of rape.

Dion disputes the validity of the Complaint in Criminal Case No. 4355-R for allegedly having

grossly violated his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusationagainst him. Dion argues that because the complaint failed to state the exact, or at least the

approximate, date the purported rape was committed, he was not able to intelligently prepare for

his defense and persuasively refute the indictment against him.

It is clear from the foregoing that the requirement of indicating in the complaint or

information the date of the commission of the offense applies only when such date is a material

ingredient of the offense.

We have repeatedly held that the date of the commission of rape is not an essential element

of the crime. It is not necessary to state the precise time when the offense was committed except

when time is a material ingredient of the offense. In statutory rape, time is not an essential element.

What is important is that the information alleges that the victim was a minor under twelve years ofage and that the accused had carnal knowledge of her, even if the accused did not use force or

intimidation on her or deprived her of reason.

It is clear that the prosecution’s evidence consisting of AAA’s credible and straight forward

testimony, and the certification from the Municipality of Rosales, Pangasinan Office of the Municipal

Civil Registrar as to AAA’s date of birth, are sufficient to sustain Dion’s conviction. The defenseraised by Dion, which consisted of an alibi with respect to the April 2001 incident and denial as

regards the June 16, 2001 allegation, were not strong enough to create a doubt on AAA’s credibility.

Dion has failed to show us that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the

crime in April 2001. In fact, his alibi was discredited by the testimonies of his own witnesses. The

RTC cannot be faulted for not giving probative weight to Dion’s alibi. Besides being inherently weakfor not being airtight, Dion’s alibi cannot prevail against the positive identification and credible

testimony made by AAA. The documentary evidence submitted by Dion was a mere certification

that the carnival owned by Mr. Jose Miguel was in Bayambang for the entire month of April 2001.

The RTC was correct in not giving it due consideration as it was never authenticated by the one who

issued it. Moreover, it merely certified the whereabouts of the carnival, not Dion’s. The inconsistenttestimonies of Dion’s witnesses destroyed his defense from its very foundation.




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2. Inconsistencies in the medico-legal report is immaterial in the prosecution of the case

We accordingly reject accused-appellant’s arguments which hinge on allegedinconsistencies between the statements made by the private complainant vis-a-vis the medical

examination and report. The medical report is by no means controlling. This Court has repeatedly

held that a medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in the prosecution for rape, andno law requires a medical examination for the successful prosecution thereof. The medical

examination of the victim or the presentation of the medical certificate is not essential to prove the

commission of rape as the testimony of the victim alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the

accused of the crime. The medical examination of the victim as well as the medical certificate is

merely corroborative in character.

Dion had failed to impeach the credible and straightforward testimony of AAA. Well-settled

is the doctrine that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and credit. When a woman or a

girl-child says that she had been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape

was really committed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARNEL MANJARESG.R. No. 185844, November 23, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other

place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to

be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.

Facts:

On September 23, 1998, private complainant AAA filed with the National Bureau of

Investigation (NBI) a sworn complaint accusing her father, Arnel Manjares, of having raped her on

164 occasions, from the period of April 1992 until September 1995, while she was then still a

minor.The RTC convicted Manjares for the crime of twenty-seven (27) counts of rape.

On the other hand, Arnel Manjares argues that not only was the testimony of the alleged

victim inconsistent and uncorroborated but that it was also incredible since she claimed to have

been raped by him for several years without even telling her mother and grandmother.

Furthermore, Manjares claims that it is inexplicable that the victim did not shout while

being raped so that her siblings could have helped her, as she testified that most of the rapes were

committed inside their house while her other siblings were sleeping just beside her. In addition,

Manjeras argues that the elements of the crime of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code

were not present in the facts of the instant case.

The CA upheld the conviction of Arnel Manjares for all twenty-seven (27) counts of rape.

Issue:

Are all the essential elements of rape present in the case at bar?

Ruling:




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Yes, all the essential elements of rape are present.

The incidents of rape occurred prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape

Law of 1997), hence, the applicable law is Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of

rape under the said provision of law are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and

(2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived ofreason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age. The evidence on

record, particularly the victims detailed and damning testimony, clearly proves that Manjeras had

carnal knowledge of his own minor daughter on multiple occasions.

In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony

of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course

of things, as in this case. Furthermore, the SC has repeatedly declared that it takes a certain amount

of psychological depravity for a young woman to concoct a story which would put her own father to

jail for the rest of his remaining life and drag the rest of the family including herself to a lifetime of

shame. For this reason, courts are inclined to give credit to the straightforward and consistent

testimony of a minor victim in criminal prosecutions for rape.

The delay in reporting a rape could be attributed to the victims tender age and Manjares's

threats. A rape victims actions are oftentimes influenced by fear, rather than reason. In incestuous

rape, this fear is magnified because the victim usually lives under the same roof as the perpetrator

or is at any rate subject to his dominance because of their blood relationship.

It is settled jurisprudence that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove

not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it

was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.

Manjares own categorical admission that he regularly went to the alleged boarding house of the

victim and his two other children to give them their provisions for food and other expenses cast

major doubt on his defense of alibi because, even if it were true, this only demonstrates that it was

not physically impossible for Manjares to be at the locus delicti when the victim was repeatedlyraped.

The proper penalty for qualified rape is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole

pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibited the imposition of the death penalty.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY ARPON y JUNTILLAG.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the

gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details

which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime are not grounds for acquittal.

Facts:

On December 29, 1999, Henry Arpon y Juntilla was charged with eight (8) counts of rape in

separate informations. The accused-appellant insists that it was error on the part of the RTC to give

weight to the incredible testimony of AAA. He alleges that AAA could not state with consistency the

exact date when she was first supposedly raped, as well as her age at that time. The accused-

appellant also avers that AAA could not remember the dates of the other incidents of rape charged,

all of which were allegedly described in a uniform manner. Contrary to the judgment of the Court of




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Appeals, the accused-appellant posits that the above inconsistencies cannot merely be discounted

as insignificant. He further insists that the qualifying circumstances of AAAs minority and her

relationship to the accused-appellant were not duly proven by the prosecution. The accused-

appellant, thus, prays for a judgment of acquittal.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals found Juntilla guilty of one (1) count of statutory rape andseven (7) counts of qualified rape.

Issue:

Whether or not the date of the commission of the rape is an essential element of the crime

of rape

Ruling:

No, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime of rape,

for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman.

In particular, Article 266-A(1)(d) spells out the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the

elements of which are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a

woman is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented. The provision came into existence by

virtue of Republic Act No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22,

1997.

Prior to this date, the crime of rape was penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal

Code. The elements of statutory rape in Article 266-A and Art. 335 are essentially the same.

Thus, whether the first incident of rape charged in this case did occur in 1995, i.e., before

the amendment of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, or in 1998, after the effectivity of the Anti-

Rape Law of 1997, the prosecution has the burden to establish the fact of carnal knowledge and theage of AAA at the time of the commission of the rape.

Contrary to the posturing of the Juntilla, the date of the commission of the rape is not an

essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a

woman. Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the

crime are not grounds for acquittal.

As regards the first incident of rape, the RTC credited with veracity the substance of AAAs

testimony. In the instant case, we have thoroughly scrutinized the testimony of AAA and we found

no cogent reason to disturb the finding of the RTC that Juntilla indeed committed the first incident

of rape charged. AAA positively identified the accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the dastardly

crimes. With tears in her eyes, she clearly and straightforwardly narrated the said incident of rape.

The testimony of AAA was also corroborated by the Medico-Legal Report of Dr. Capungcol

and Dr. Gagala, who found old, healed, incomplete hymenal lacerations on the private part of AAA.

When the testimony of a rape victim is consistent with the medical findings, there is sufficient basis

to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge.




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Anent the five incidents of rape that were alleged to have been committed in July 1999, the Court

disagrees with the ruling of the trial court that all five counts were proven with moral certainty. The

testimony of AAA on the said incidents is as follows:

It is settled that each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime that the law

requires to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's evidence must pass the exactingtest of moral certainty that the law demands to satisfy the burden of overcoming the appellant's

presumption of innocence. Thus, including the first incident of rape, the testimony of AAA was only

able to establish three instances when Juntilla had carnal knowledge of her.

The allegation of Juntilla that the testimony of AAA described the incidents of rape in a

uniform manner does not convince this Court. To our mind, AAAs narration of the sexual abuses

committed by Juntilla contained an adequate recital of the evidentiary facts constituting the crime

of rape, i.e., that he placed his organ in her private part. Etched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine

that a victim of a savage crime cannot be expected to mechanically retain and then give an accurate

account of every lurid detail of a frightening experience a verity borne out of human nature and

experience.

We uphold the ruling of the RTC that the accused-appellants defense of alibi deserves scant

consideration. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly

unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he

was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was

physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Since

alibi is a weak defense for being easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face

of the positive identification by a credible witness that an accused perpetrated the crime.

In the instant case, we quote with approval the findings of fact of the trial court that:

The distance of [XXX] to Tacloban City is just a few kilometers and can be negotiated by passenger

bus in less than one (1) hour, hence, it is not impossible for the accused to be present in [XXX] atany time of the day after working hours while working in Tacloban. Besides, the accused has his day

off every Sunday, which according to him he spent in [XXX], Leyte.

The accused was positively identified by the victim as the person who sexually molested her

beginning that afternoon of 1995, and subsequently thereafter in the coming years up to August

1999. She can not be mistaken on the identity of the accused, because the first sexual molestation

happened during the daytime, besides, she is familiar with him being her uncle, the brother of her

mother.

As to Juntilla’s objection that there was no proof of the age of the victim, we affirm the trial

courts finding that the prosecution sufficiently established the age of AAA when the incidents of

rape were committed. The testimony of AAA that she was born on November 1, 1987, the voluntarystipulation of the accused, with assistance of counsel, regarding the minority of the victim during

pre-trial and his testimony regarding his recollection of the age of the victim, his own niece, all

militate against accused-appellants theory.

In People v. Pruna, the Court established the guidelines in appreciating age, either as an

element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, as follows:




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2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate

and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.


otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the

family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree

such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the

Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less

than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less

than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less

than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's

mother or relatives concerning the victim's age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that

it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the

accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

Notably, in its Decision, the trial court observed that at the time she took the witness stand

(when she was 14 years old), the victim, as to her body and facial features, was indeed a minor.

That the carnal knowledge in this case was committed through force, threat or intimidation

need no longer be belabored upon. In rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father, step-

father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or

intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and

intimidation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANIEL ORTEGAG.R. No. 186235 January 25, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

It has long been established that the testimony of a rape victim, especially a child of tender

years, is given full weight and credit. A rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,

spontaneous and frank manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness. Furthermore, this Court

has repeatedly ruled that matters affecting credibility are best left to the trial court because of its

unique opportunity to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness' deportment

on the stand while testifying, an opportunity denied the appellate courts which usually rely only on the

cold pages of the mute records of the case. In incestuous rape of a minor, it is not necessary that actual

force and intimidation be employed. The moral ascendancy of appellant over the victim, his daughter,

renders it unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation.




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Facts:

Respondent Daniel Ortega has been charged and convicted of two counts of rape of his 16

year old daughter. This decision of the RTC was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the

current petition.

Daniel Ortega contends that the lower courts erred in convicting the defendant because of

lack of sufficiency of evidence and failure on the part of the prosecution to prove his guilty beyond

reasonable doubt. Furthermore he contends that there were discrepancies in the testimony of the

complainant raising doubt as to her credibility and he, in addition, alleges that his daughter merely

accused him of raping her because she was jealous of the attention he gives to her step-brothers

and sisters. Moreover, he also asserts that the lower courts erred in giving credence to the sole

testimony of the complainant despite the fact that the testimony is tainted by discrepancies.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused Daniel Ortega should be convicted of the crime of rape as

punished by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code on the sole basis of the testimony of thecomplainant and despite the fact that such testimony is tainted with discrepancies.

Ruling:


lower courts correctly convicted the accused of the crime charged. The Court held that an accused

may be convicted of rape on the basis of the sole testimony of the complainant upon a finding that

such testimony is neither rehearsed and in the absence of any ill-motive on the part of the

complainant.

In reviewing rape cases, this Court had always been guided by three well-entrenched

principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult toprove, it is even more difficult to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two

persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be

scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its

own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the

defense. Yet, we have also held that an accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the victim’s

testimony, provided that such testimony is logical, credible, consistent, and convincing.

It has long been established that the testimony of a rape victim, especially a child of tender

years, is given full weight and credit. A rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,

spontaneous and frank manner, and remains consistent, is a credible witness. Furthermore, this

Court has repeatedly ruled that matters affecting credibility are best left to the trial court because

of its unique opportunity to observe that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness'deportment on the stand while testifying, an opportunity denied the appellate courts which usually

rely only on the cold pages of the mute records of the case.

Ortega’s insistence on the lack of evidence proving that he used force and intimidation

during both incidents of rape does little to change our mind. In incestuous rape of a minor, it is not

necessary that actual force and intimidation be employed. The moral ascendancy of appellant over

the victim, his daughter, renders it unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation.




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The purported inconsistencies or contradictions in AAA's testimony vis-a-vis her sworn

statement do not adversely affect her credibility. AAA was a minor at the time she was first raped

by her father, Ortega. Her painful experience, followed by the police investigation, medical

examination, and court trial in full view of the public, surely placed her under a lot of pressure and

caused her confusion, given her tender age. We have repeatedly held that "the precise time of thecommission of the crime is not an essential element of rape and it has no bearing on its

commission.” Despite her failure to give the exact time and date of the two rape incidents, AAA was

able to recall in detail how the sexual assault was committed against her by Ortega.

[I]t [is] most unnatural for a fourteen (14) year old to concoct a tale of defloration against

her very own father just to get back at him for having physically manhandled her. Certainly, an

unmarried teenage lass would not ordinarily file a complaint for rape against anyone, much less,

her own father, undergo a medical examination of her private parts, submit herself to public trial

and tarnish her family’s honor and reputation, unless she was motivated by a potent desire to seek

justice for the wrong committed against her.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PATERNO SARMIENTO SAMANDREG.R. No. 181497, February 22, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence

which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a credible

witness. Between the positive assertions of the [victim] and the negative averments of the [appellant],

the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary weight.

Facts:

The respondent Samandre was charged with four counts of rape for committing rape

against his daughter. The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused for the crime charged. On

appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, the current petition.

In his lone assignment of error, accused-appellant professes his innocence of the crimes

charged. Accused-appellant highlights the inconsistencies in AAA’s testimony, particularly, on

whether or not she has a suitor/boyfriend. Accused-appellant asserts that AAA’s initial concealmentof the fact that she already has a boyfriend supports accused-appellant’s contention that AAA

accused him of rape so he could go to jail and no longer prevent AAA from marrying her boyfriend.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused is guilty of committing four counts of rape against his daughter.

Ruling:


accused is guilty of the crime charged against him.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of rape is committed by a

man having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) through

force, threat or intimidation; (2) when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise




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unconscious; (3) by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and (4) when the

offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the

circumstances mentioned above be present. In People v. Orillosa, the Court held that "in incestuous

rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not even be employed where the overpowering

moral influence of appellant, who is private complainant’s father, would suffice."

The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant, taking

advantage of his moral ascendancy as a father, had carnal knowledge of his 16-year-old daughter,

AAA. The Court cannot give much weight to accused-appellant’s defenses, constituting of denial,alibi, and the imputation of ill motive on AAA’s part in the filing of the instant rape charges.

Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and constitute self-serving negative evidence

which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the positive declaration of a credible

witness. Between the positive assertions of the [victim] and the negative averments of the

[appellant], the former indisputably deserve more credence and are entitled to greater evidentiary

weight.

The inconsistencies in AAA’s statements do not destroy her credibility. Whether or not AAAhas a boyfriend does not have any relevance to any of the essential elements of the crime of rape.

The Court adopts the following disquisition of the Court of Appeals on this matter:

As aptly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General in the appellee’s brief, the initialdenial by AAA that she has a boyfriend is immaterial as it has no bearing whatsoever on the

essential elements of rape or the identity of the perpetrator.1âwphi1 Settled is the rule that

inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses that refer to minor or insignificant details do not

destroy the witnesses’ credibility. Moreover, no evidence was presented by accused-appellant to

support his claim that AAA wanted to marry her boyfriend, Freddie Fragata, and that the latter is

married.

"What does it take for a young daughter to wish her father to stay in jail possibly for the restof his life or even executed to death? Certainly not for the reason that her father refused to let her

marry someone. According to the accused in this case his daughter charged him of raping her

because he scolded her and prohibited her to marry her boyfriend who is a married man. This is

absurd especially as he did not try to show that his daughter has evil ways.

It bears stressing once again that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow the

examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth,

been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her. It is settled

jurisprudence that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is

necessary to show that rape was indeed committed. A woman would think twice before she

concocts a story of rape, especially against her own father, unless she is motivated by a patent

desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her.

The issue of credibility of witnesses is "a question best addressed to the province of the trial

court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence

of the witnesses' deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the

appellate courts" and "[a]bsent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the trial

court's assessments and conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's

findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been




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overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case."

The Court of Appeals further affirmed the findings of the RTC. In this regard, it is settled that when

the findings of the trial court have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally

conclusive and binding upon this Court. The Court finds no compelling reason herein to deviate

from said findings.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELECIO DE LOS SANTOS, JR.G.R. No. 186499, March 21, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive

declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him.

Facts:

Melecio De Los Santos, Jr. was charged with statutory rape against AAA.

Based on the testimony of AAA, who was then eleven years old at the time of the

commission of the crime, stated that Melecio De Los Santos was the younger brother of her mother.She narrated that De Los Santos arrived from Negros to stay in their house. On February 14, 1995,

AAA and her younger sister BBB, were sitting on the stairs of their house while De Los Santos was at

the window. Their mother soon arrived and called BBB for help. Thereafter, she went to their room

to lie down. Then De Los Santos closed the windows and the door. He git a knife from the kitchen

and pointed the same to her, He told her to undress. He went on top of her and he was naked. She

said that his penis penetrated her organ. He told her if she will reveal the incident to her family to

anyone, he will kill her family.

On the other hand, De Los Santos in his defense, testified that on that certain afternoon he

claimed that he was at their house in Negros attending to his sick adoptive father. He presented a

death certificate to prove that his father died on February 20, 1995.

The RTC rendered judgment pronouncing the guilt of De Los Santos.

Issue:

Whether De Los Santos is guilty for the crime of statutory rape

Ruling:

Yes.

The death certificate of Melecio de los Santos, Sr. which was offered in evidence to support

the accused-appellants claims, were not squarely in point. The said certificates evidenced only thefact of death of Melecio de los Santos, Sr. and in no way proved with certainty the whereabouts of

the accused-appellant on the date the incident of rape was committed.

In People v. Nieto, we stressed that it is an established jurisprudential rule that a

mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive

declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to

him.The accused-appellant likewise failed to impute any ill motive on the part of the prosecution




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witnesses that would have impelled them to prevaricate and charge him falsely.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGER TEJEROG.R. No. 187744, June 20, 2012, J. De Castro

Although the rape of a person under 18 years of age by the common-law spouse of the victim'smother is punishable by death, this penalty cannot be imposed on the offender because his relationship

was not what was alleged in the Informations. Thus, the offender is guilty only of three counts of

simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua for each count.

Facts:

Private complainant herself, [AAA] was only fourteen years old when the accused raped her

on three different occasions in the year 2004. She directly identified accused Roger Tejero as the

man who raped her repeatedly. She regarded him as her stepfather since he has been cohabiting

with her mother in their home when the criminal acts were committed by him. She claimed that she

was first raped by the accused on a Sunday February 1, 2004 at their living room. She stated that

this happened at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon when her mother was out selling vegetables andwhile her two siblings went to the family house of their maternal grandparents. She narrated that

she was suddenly pulled by her stepfather, removed her clothes and then raped her. He then

warned her not to tell anybody or else he would kill all of them. On February 8, 2004, the next

Sunday, the accused again raped her at their living room in the same house. At that time, her

mother was selling vegetables again in another barangay while the accused fended off her sisters to

the family house of their maternal grandparents again. For the third time, the accused again raped

her on April 4, 2004 at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon now inside a room at their house while

her mother was out selling vegetables again. In her sworn statement, she also revealed that she did

not report all the incidents to anyone because of her fear of her stepfathers repeated threats that he

would kill all of them if she did. Her mother [BBB] only came to know that she has been repeatedly

ravaged by him when she was hospitalized for three weeks due to her appendicitis. During her

check-up, her attending doctor discovered that she was already about five months pregnant. Shesaid that her pregnancy was a result of the rape. She eventually gave birth to a baby boy.

Issue:

Whether or not Tejero is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Rape.

Ruling:Yes.

When AAA was raped, Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (which repealed

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and classified rape as a crime against persons) was already

effective. The new provisions on rape, particularly, Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised PenalCode, read:

Art. 266-A. Rape; When and how committed . - Rape is committed

1.) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following

circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;




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Art. 266-B. Penalties.- Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be

punished by reclusion perpetua.

x x x x

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the

following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third

civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.

Under the above provision, one way to commit rape is having carnal knowledge of a woman

using force or intimidation. Tejero herein was able to have carnal knowledge of AAA thrice by

threatening to kill AAA and her family. Furthermore, Tejero also exercised moral ascendancy over

AAA since Tejero was then cohabiting with BBB, AAAs mother, and AAA considered Tejero as her

stepfather. Such moral ascendancy sufficiently qualifies as intimidation.

Although the rape of a person under 18 years of age by the common-law spouse of the

victim's mother is punishable by death, this penalty cannot be imposed on Tejero because his

relationship was not what was alleged in the Informations. Thus, Tejero is guilty only of threecounts of simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua for each count.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCIAL BAYRANTE Y BOAQUINAG.R. No. 188978, June 13, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Even if the alleged romantic relationship were true, this fact does not necessarily negate rape

for a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiance and worse, employ violence upon her on

the pretext of love because love is not a license for lust.

Facts:

Marcial Bayrante was charged for the crime of rape. The victim, AAA, is the niece of Marcialand she is a 20 year old mental retardate whose mental age is 9 to 10 years of age .

AAA testified that Marcial brought her to Poblacion, Pili, Caramines Sur, particulary to a

house, which she described to have many rooms. Thereat, Marcial undress her and himself, laid on

top of her and inserted his penis inside her vagina, during which she felt pain in her organ. After an

hour or so, Marcial again raped her.

In his defense, Marcial narrated that he stayed with the family of AAA because he and the

AAA’s father were first cousins. AAA confessed that she had feelings for him. He dissuaded her at

first, but AAA threatened to commit suicide if they do not become sweethearts. Further, he and AAA

left the house and went to Manapao. While in Manapao, AAA suggested that they go to the office of

the Barangay Captain to execute an affidavit to the effect that AAA’s act of going with him wasvoluntary. Subsequently, they checked in at a hotel in Pili, Caramines Sur, where they spent the night.

The next morning, they went to the house of his cousin to pick up their personal belongings, AAA’s

parents were there.

The RTC rendered a decision convicting Marcial for the crime of rape which was affirmed by

the Court of Appeals.




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In his appeal, Marcial maintains that AAA was his lover and she voluntarily eloped with him

as evidenced by the affidavit she signed before the barangay captain. Furthermore, he argues that

the prosecution failed to establish the mental state of AAA which is crucial to the charge that he

raped a woman who is of legal age but otherwise deprived of reason.

Issue:

Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting Marcial Bayrante for the crime of rape

Ruling:

No.

It is settled in jurisprudence that carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental deficiency is

considered rape because such a person is not capable of giving consent to a sexual act. In a recent

case, we had declared that in cases of rape involving a victim suffering from mental retardation,

proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish (1) the

sexual congress between the accused and the victim, and (2) the mental retardation of the victim.

In the case at bar, the undisputed expert testimony of Dr. Imelda Escuadra, a Medical

Specialist II and officer-in-charge of the Women and Children Protection Unit at

theBicol Medical Center who personally conducted the psychiatric tests on AAA, clearly established

that the victim is afflicted with mild mental retardation. She further testified that AAA was also

suffering from post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and that AAA possesses an IQ of 55 with a

mental age equivalent to that of a normal 9 to 10-year-old person.

Furthermore, AAA testified that she initially resisted Marcial carnal desire but was

eventually overcome by the latter because he used a knife to threaten her. At one point in her

testimony, AAA could not continue with her narration of the events that transpired during the

alleged rape incidents as she was overwhelmed by emotion, even weeping on the witness stand.Consequently, it was necessary for the trial court to call a recess in order to give AAA the chance to

collect herself.

In addition, for the sweetheart theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed relationship

must be proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce such evidence renders his

claim to be self-serving and of no probative value. For the satisfaction of the Court, there should be a

corroboration by their common friends or, if none, a substantiation by tokens of such a relationship

such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like.

Significantly, this Court has decreed that even if the alleged romantic relationship were true,

this fact does not necessarily negate rape for a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a

fiance and worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love because love is not a license forlust.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO OSMA, JR. y AGATONG.R. No. 187734, August 29, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

We held that actual force or intimidation need not be employed in incestuous rape of a minor

because the moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to




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his beastly desires. The absence of violence or offer of resistance would not affect the outcome of the

case because the overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the father over his daughter takes

the place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by an accused who did

not have blood relationship with the victim.

Facts:

Two separate informations were filed charging accused-appellant Agaton of two counts of

rape namely Criminal Case No. 4467 and No. 4468.

One night in the month of December 2000, while AAA was in the residence of her parents,

she slept in the sala with her father, her six-year-old brother, and younger sisters. Her mother slept

in an adjoining room. When AAA was awakened, her shorts were already pulled down. She saw

Agaton’s face as he was already on top of her. Agaton, his father, inserted his penis into her vagina,

causing pain. When Agaton was through, he placed her shorts back on and they went to sleep.

On March 14, 2002, AAA was in the residence of her parents. While she was gathering

pilinuts with her uncle, the latter asked her to get the scythe. She went into the house to get it.Agaton, who was waiting for her, pulled her into a corner. He removed her shorts and inserted his

penis into her vagina. During this time, Agaton and AAA were the only people in the house as her

mother, BBB, was washing clothes and her siblings were with her mother. Accused-appellant

thereafter placed back her shorts. AAA proceeded to get the scythe. AAA testified that she did not

immediately tell her mother, BBB, about the incidents because she was afraid of her father, who she

claimed was very cruel and was fond of beating them.

Issue:

Whether or not Agaton is liable for rape.

Ruling:

Yes.

Criminal Case No. 4467

Agaton assails the Decisions of the courts a quo primarily on the basis of the alleged lack of

credibility on the part of the private complainant, AAA. Accused-appellant cites an instance in AAA’s

testimony when she was smiling. According to accused-appellant, it is surprising that a daughter

who was sexually abused by his father would take such matter lightly, considering the gravity of the

accusation. Agaton further argues that AAA’s testimony that she was raped sometime in December

2000 is incredible, considering the size of the sleeping area where the act supposedly occurred. Thedefense points out AAA’s statement that a mere stretching of an arm during the time the supposedrape happened would disturb the person sleeping beside her.

This Court is unswayed by the foregoing arguments. In the determination of credibility of

witnesses, this Court, as a general rule, will not disturb the findings of the trial court unless it

plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the outcome

of the case. This is mainly due to the fact that it was the trial court that heard the witnesses and

observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. In the case at bar specifically,




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the trial court was in the best position to determine whether AAA’s facial expressions anddemeanor manifested a blithe unconcern about the alleged injustice done to her, or merely an effort

to appear courteous to the judge and lawyers. AAA’s smiling can hardly be conside red a fact of

substance and value that should affect the outcome of the case, especially since she is a very young

witness with little or no experience in court proceedings.

Since AAA was born on March 9, 1990, as evidenced by the Certification from the Civil

Registrar’s Office, she was 10 years and 9 months old when the crime charged in Criminal Case No.

4467 was committed. As such, the crime charged and proven is one of statutory rape. The two

elements of statutory rape are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that

the woman is below 12 years of age. Proof of force and consent is immaterial if the woman is under

12 years of age, not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, but also because the

absence of free consent is presumed. Conviction will lie provided sexual intercourse is proven.

Criminal Case No. 4468

Accused-appellant argued that it was impossible for him to have raped AAA when the

latter’s uncle, mother and siblings were within 50 meters from them. We disagree. We have heldtime and again that: Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along

the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in

the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping. It is not impossible or

incredible for the members of the victim's family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened

while a sexual assault is being committed. Lust is no respecter of time and place; neither is it

deterred by age nor relationship.

As observed by the Court of Appeals, however, the trial court erred in convicting accused-

appellant in Criminal Case No. 4468 for statutory rape. As clearly stated in the Certification by the

Civil Registrar’s Office of the Municipality where AAA was born, AAA was born on March 9, 1990.

AAA was thus 12 years and five days old when the second incident of rape occurred. Consequently,

accused-appellant cannot be convicted in Criminal Case No. 4468 for statutory rape, which requiresthat the victim be below 12 years of age.

However, even though accused-appellant cannot be convicted of statutory rape in Criminal

Case No. 4468, and despite the absence of evidence of resistance on the part of AAA on said count,

his criminal liability for rape nevertheless remains. In People v. Fragante, we held:

It must be stressed that the gravamen of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force and

without consent. In People v. Orillosa, we held that actual force or intimidation need not be

employed in incestuous rape of a minor because the moral and physical dominion of the father is

sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires. When a father commits the

odious crime of rape against his own daughter, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter

substitutes for violence and intimidation. The absence of violence or offer of resistance would notaffect the outcome of the case because the overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the

father over his daughter takes the place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases

committed by an accused who did not have blood relationship with the victim.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALEJANDRO VIOJELA y ASARTING.R. No. 177140, October 17, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro




Page 201 of 299

Following a long line of jurisprudence, full penetration of the female genital organ is not

indispensable. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the

pudendum of the female organ. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however

slight, is sufficient. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or

laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify conviction for rape.

Furthermore, in establishing the age of the victim, bare testimony of the victim’s mother or amember of the family would suffice only if the victim is alleged to be below seven years of age and

what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old.

Finally, the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some

other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for

him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to

the geographical distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime

was committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the

two places.

Facts:

Private complainant VEA was only 10 years old when the incident complained of took place,

she having been born on September 13, 1986. Respondent Alejandro Violeja y Asarin is the

common-law husband of VEL, VEA’s mother, with whom respondent has three children. VEAstarted living with them when she was four years old, after her mother VEL took her from Cagayan

Valley to live with her. VEA is VEL’s daughter from her deceased husband.

Sometime in June 1997, when VEL was not at home and VEA was left alone with

respondent. The latter instructed her not to make any noise, and then forced his penis into her

vagina. According to VEA, respondent was not able to insert his organ into her genitalia, but

respondent’s act of forcing his penis into her vagina was painful. VEA recounted another incident

prior to the one described above when they were still residing in a room situated inside a bakerywhere respondent worked. It is during this time when respondent finally admitted that he did

something to VEA. He told VEL that he molested VEA.

After VEL and VEA lodged a complaint with the barangay and police authorities, VEA was

brought to the Silang Municipal Health Center in Silang, Cavite, where she was examined. Based on

the medical certificate issued, the victim’s vagina does not admit her smallest finger. The

examination, however, revealed the presence of fresh lacerations at the 3:00 and 9:00 o’clock

positions at the labia minora of the victim’s vagina. Dr. further testified that the lacerations couldhave been caused by any forcible entry upon the victim’s vagina, and could have been inflictedwithin more or less a week from the time of the victim’s medical examination.

Accused-appellant invoked alibi in his defense. In his appeal, appellant maintains that hisalibi should be given more weight and credence over the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

which he claims to contain certain irreconcilable inconsistencies and inherent improbabilities.

Furthermore, appellant argues that the testimony of the prosecution’s own witness, Dr. LuzJaurigue-Pang (Dr. Pang), belies the charge of rape because said witness testified that, during her

medical examination of VEA,10 VEA’s vagina could not accommodate entry of even her smallestfinger. On the basis of this fact, appellant asserts that no consummated rape could have occurred

because if VEA’s vagina could not admit Dr. Pang’s smallest finger then it would be improbable for




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said sexual organ to have had admitted the appellant’s penis or be lacerated by it. Moreover,appellant insists that the lacerations on VEA’s vagina could have been caused by an object other

than appellant’s penis.

After a full-blown trial, the trial court did not give credit to appellant’s professed innocence

and convicted him. However, he was not convicted of the crime that he was originally charged inthe Information, which was rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, but with the offense of

statutory rape. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications as to the award of actual damages

the decision of the RTC.

Issues:

1) Whether or not responded should be acquitted of the crime charged due to failure of the

prosecution to prove that his penis penetrated the vagina of the victim.

2) Whether or not respondent should be convicted of statutory rape as ruled by the lower

court.

3) Whether or not the Appellate Court erred in disregarding respondent’s defenses of denial

and alibi.

Ruling:

1. No, respondent should not be acquitted.

It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted

solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with

human nature and the normal course of things.

We affirm the lower courts in ruling that all the elements of rape are present in the case atbar. The victim’s clear and credible testimony coupled with the corroboration made by the medical

findings of Dr. Pang points positively to the conclusion that appellant indeed committed the crime

of rape attributed to him. In her testimony, VEA was clear and straightforward, not to mention

consistent, in her recollection of the details of her sexual abuse in the hands of respondent.

Contrary to respondent’s assertions, Dr. Pang’s medical findings support, rather than negate, VEA’s

accusation of rape.

Appellant is grossly mistaken in his contention that no rape occurred because the

prosecution did not prove that his penis penetrated the vagina of the victim. Such an argument is of

little consequence in light of jurisprudence declaring that penetration of the penis, however slight,

of the labia minora constitutes consummated rape.

Following a long line of jurisprudence, full penetration of the female genital organ is not

indispensable. It suffices that there is proof of the entrance of the male organ into the labia of the

pudendum of the female organ. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ, however

slight, is sufficient. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without

rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify conviction for rape.

2. No, respondent is guilty of simple rape, not statutory rape.




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Although the Court is convinced that indeed rape had been committed by appellant, we find

that the prosecution failed to present VEA’s birth certificate or to othe rwise unequivocally prove

that VEA was indeed below 12 years of age at the time of the incident in question. In view of this

paucity in the prosecution’s evidence on the matter of the victim’s age, jurisprudence compels us to

reclassify appellant’s offense as simple rape.

In appreciating age as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance, the following

guidelines were formulated in response to the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the

sufficiency of evidence of the victim’s age in rape cases:



2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal

certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.


otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible , of the victim’s mother or a member of

the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respectingpedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule

130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that

she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that

she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that

she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s

mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice providedthat it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure ofthe accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.

6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

Measured against the jurisprudential guidelines that this Court has set forth, VEA and her

mother’s testimonies cannot be given sufficient weight to establish her age with moral certainty, for

in the absence of relevant documentary evidence or an express admission from the accused, the

bare testimony of the victim’s mother or a member of the family would suffice only if the victim is

alleged to be below seven years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12

years old. In the present case, VEA was supposedly 10 years of age on the material date stated in the

Information.

Nevertheless, simple rape was proven to have been committed by appellant since he is thecommon-law spouse of VEA’s mother and, thus, exercises moral ascendancy over VEA. In a recentcase, we reiterated that the moral ascendancy of an accused over the victim renders it unnecessary

to show physical force and intimidation. Indeed, in rape committed by a close kin, such as the

victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that

actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence

or intimidation.




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It is apropos to mention here that appellant’s offense could not be deemed qualified rape,despite the proviso in Article 335 (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659), imposing the death

penalty on rape committed when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a

parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil

degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. This is due to the fact that the "live-

in" or common-law relationship between appellant and VEA’s mother was not alleged in theInformation despite being proven in the trial court. What was alleged in the Information is that VEA

was the stepdaughter of the appellant but we have held that a stepfather-stepdaughter relationship

as a qualifying circumstance presupposes that the victim’s mother and the accused contractedmarriage. However, it was shown during trial that no marriage was ever contracted between

appellant and the victim’s mother.

3. No, respondent’s defenses of denial and alibi cannot be sustained.

We have consistently regarded the defenses of denial and alibi as inherently weak defenses

and must be rejected when the identity of the accused is satisfactorily and categorically established

by the eyewitnesses to the offense, especially when such eyewitnesses have no ill motive to testify

falsely. In the instant case, appellant failed to show that VEA, the victim and sole eyewitness to thecrime of rape, was motivated by ill will in accusing him of such a grave offense.

Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the assailed November 29, 2006 Decision of the Court

of Appeals, appellant’s alibi cannot be counted in his favor. For the defense of alibi to prosper, theaccused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the

crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its

immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the

place where the accused was and the place where the crime was committed when the crime

transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between the two places.

In the present case, appellant failed to establish the distance between the corn plantation

where he claimed to have been working and the house where the rape occurred. Failing in thisregard, doubt is cast on appellant’s defense of alibi because this leads to the conclusion that it was

not physically impossible for appellant to be at the place of the crime at the time when the victim

was raped.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS EDGAR PADIGOSG.R. No. 181202, December 5, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

After a careful review of the records of this case, we are persuaded that appellant is indeed

guilty of qualified rape. In People v. Pruna, 390 SCRA 577 (2002), we formulated a set of guidelines

that will serve as a jurisprudential benchmark in appreciating age either as an element of the crime or

as a qualifying circumstance in order to address the seemingly conflicting court decisions regarding

the sufficiency of evidence of the victim’s age in rape cases. The Pruna guidelines are as follows: 1. Thebest evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the

certificate of live birth of such party. 2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic

documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim

would suffice to prove age. 3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have

been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’smother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on

matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to




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Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances: a.

If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less

than 7 years old; b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is

that she is less than 12 years old; c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is

sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old. 4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth,

authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age,the complainant’s testimony suffice provided that it is expressly and clearl y admitted by the accused. 5.

It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the

accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. 6. The trial

court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim

Facts:

AAA who was then only six years old was sleeping inside their house on August 26, 2002

when her father, herein accused- appellant Edgar Padigos raped her. He undressed her and

removed her panty. He also took off his pants. He inserted his penis into her vagina and made push

and pull movements. She felt pain in her private organ. Her mother was not around as it was only

her and her father who were home.

The next day or on August 27, 2002, Padigos made her hold his penis. He, on the other hand,

touched her genitals and inserted his fingers into her vagina causing her to feel pain.

She related the incidents to her mother who simply gave her father a fierce piercing stare

but did nothing. She also confided to her aunt, sister of her mother, who brought her to a doctor for

medical examination and to the police station to report the matter.

Subsequently, two criminal informations were filed against Padigos. The first information

charged appellant with the crime of rape in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, while the other

information charged him with the crime of acts of lasciviousness also in relation to Republic Act No.

7610.

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. RTC convicted of the

crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness both in relation to Republic Act No. 7160 and considering

the aggravating qualifying circumstance of relationship to and minority of the victim, imposes upon

him the supreme penalty of death by lethal injection. The Court of Appeals denied Padigos’ appealand affirmed with modification the trial court judgment and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua

for the first crime and to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and

twenty (2[0]) days as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months as maximum of

reclusion temporal.

Issue:

Whether or not the accused was correctly charged and convicted.

Ruling:

Yes. After a careful review of the records of this case, we are persuaded that appellant is

indeed guilty of qualified rape.




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As cemented in jurisprudence, the elements of rape under the said provision of law are: (1)

the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and, (2) such act was accomplished through force

or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when thevictim is under 12 years of age. Thus, sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years old, which is the

subject of this case, is considered as statutory rape in this jurisdiction. According to the sixth

paragraph of Article 266B, the death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committedwhen the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,

stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the

common law spouse of the parent of the victim.

It would appear from the death penalty imposed by the trial court that it found appellant

guilty of qualified rape. This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, albeit reduced to reclusion

perpetua in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346.

In People v. Pruna, we formulated a set of guidelines that will serve as a jurisprudential

benchmark in appreciating age either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance in

order to address the seemingly conflicting court decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of

the victim’s age in rape cases. The Pruna guidelines are as follows:

1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true

copy of the certificate of live birth of such party;

2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal

certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age;

3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or

destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a

member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters

respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section

40, Rule130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved

is that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved


c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved


4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of thevictim’s mother or relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will sufficeprovided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.

5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The

failure of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against

him.




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6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim

In the case at bar, the prosecution may have been unable to present AAA’s birth certificateor other authentic document such as a baptismal certificate during trial, however, that failure to

present relevant evidence will not deter this Court from upholding that qualified rape was indeed

committed by appellant because he himself admitted, in his counter-affidavit which formed part ofthe evidence for the defense and the contents of which he later affirmed in his testimony in open

court, that AAA was below 7 years old around the time of the rape incident. In the Court’s view, this

admission from appellant, taken with the testimony of the victim, sufficiently proved the victim’sminority.

Utilizing the foregoing definition as a guide, it is beyond cavil that appellant’s act of making

AAA hold his penis and, subsequently, of touching her vagina with his fingers can be both

characterized as constituting acts of lasciviousness. As previously discussed, the moral influence or

ascendancy exercised by appellant over AAA takes the place of the element of force and

intimidation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ANASTACIO AMISTOSO y BROCAG.R. No. 201447, January 9, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

To raise the crime of simple rape to qualified rape, the twin circumstances of minority of the

victim and her relationship to the offender must concur. When a father commits the odious crime of

rape against his own daughter, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for

violence and intimidation. The absence of violence or offer of resistance would not affect the outcome

of the case because the overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the father over his daughter

takes the place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by an accused who

did not have blood relationship with the victim.

Facts:

AAA was the second of five children of Amistoso and BBB. On July 10, 2000, AAA was

exactly 12 years, one month, and eight days old. Prior to that date, Amistoso had often scolded AAA,

maliciously pinched AAA’s thighs, and even whipped AAA. On the night of July 10, 2000, AAA had

fallen asleep while Amistoso was eating. AAA was awakened, when Amistoso, already naked,

mounted her. Amistoso reached under AAA’s skirt and removed her panties. After he had

ejaculated, Amistoso stood up. AAA noticed white substance and blood coming from her vagina.

Amistoso told AAA not to tell anyone what happened between them, otherwise, he would kill her.

AAA told BBB what Amistoso did to her. BBB brought AAA to the Department of Social

Welfare and Development (DSWD), which in turn, brought AAA to Doctor for physical examination.

Thereafter, BBB and AAA went to the police and filed a Complaint against Amistoso. McTC issued an

Order of Arrest against Amistoso.

Amistoso recounted that on July 10, 2000, he was working, unloading diesel and kerosene,

at his employer’s warehouse. After finishing his work, he had dinner at his employer’s place before

going home. When Amistoso arrived home, he found the door and the windows to the house tied

shut. Amistoso’s children were inside the house with BBB and an unknown man whereby hesuspected that they were having sexual intercourse because they did not open the door when

Amistoso called out. Amistoso was told to wait so he did wait outside the house for 15 minutes.




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Meanwhile, BBB and the man made a hole in the floor of the house from where they slipped out,

crawled under the house, and fled. Amistoso said the children had been sleeping inside the house,

but BBB woke the children up. When BBB and her lover fled, the children were left together.

Amistoso believed that BBB, afraid she got caught with another man, manipulated AAA to falsely

charge Amistoso with rape.

RTC rendered its Decision finding Amistoso guilty of qualified rape. On appeal, the Court of

Appeals affirmed Amistoso’s conviction for qualified rape but modified the penalties imposed.

Amistoso argues that the defense of denial and alibi should not be viewed with outright

disfavor. The prosecution cannot profit from the weakness of Amistoso’s defense; it must rely onthe strength of its own evidence and establish Amistoso’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Amistoso

asserts that the prosecution failed even in this regard. Further, Amistoso was charged in the

Information with statutory rape and not qualified rape. He also asserts that AAA had ulterior

motive to falsely accuse him of rape due to his maltreating against her and that she had already

developed hatred or ill feeling against Amistoso. Such admission casts doubts on the veracity and

credibility of AAA’s rape charge and raises the question of whether the act complained of actually

occurred. Lastly, he claims lack of showing that AAA was below 12 years old or demented when shewas supposedly raped on July 10, 2000.

Issue:

1.

Whether or not Amistoso is guilty of qualified rape?

2.

Whether or not Amistoso’s defense of denial should be favored?

Ruling:

1. Yes. Amistoso is guilty of qualified rape.

As provided in the Revised Penal Code, as amended: ART. 266-A. Rape; when and how

committed. – Rape is committed –

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following

circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though

none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

Amistoso was specifically charged in the Information with statutory rape under Article 266-

A, paragraph (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. It is undisputed that AAA was over 12years old on July 10, 2000, thus, Amistoso cannot be convicted of statutory rape. Nonetheless, it

does not mean that Amistoso cannot be convicted of rape committed under any of the other

circumstances described by Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as

long as the facts constituting the same are alleged in the Information and proved during trial. What

is controlling in an Information should not be the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the

offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large,




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mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the

particular facts therein recited.

In addition, the Information need not use the language of the statute in stating the acts or

omissions complained of as constituting the offense. What is required is that the acts or omissions

complained of as constituting the offense are stated in ordinary and concise language sufficient toenable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged.

In this case, a perusal of the Information against Amistoso reveals that the allegations

therein actually constitute a criminal charge for qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph

(1)(a), in relation to Section 266-B, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,

are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such act was

accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. But when the offender is the victim’s father,there need not be actual force, threat, or intimidation, as the Court expounded in People v.

Fragante: It must be stressed that the gravamen of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force

and without consent.

In People v. Orillosa, we held that actual force or intimidation need not be employed in

incestuous rape of a minor because the moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to

cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires. When a father commits the odious crime of

rape against his own daughter, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for

violence and intimidation. The absence of violence or offer of resistance would not affect the

outcome of the case because the overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the father over

his daughter takes the place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by

an accused who did not have blood relationship with the victim.

Then to raise the crime of simple rape to qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph (1)

of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim and her

relationship to the offender must concur. The foregoing elements of qualified rape under Article266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Article 266-B , paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended, are sufficiently alleged in the Information against Amistoso, viz: (1) Amistoso succeeded

in having carnal knowledge of AAA against her will and without her consent; (2) AAA was 12 years

old on the day of the alleged rape; and (3) Amistoso is AAA’s father.

AAA’s aforequoted testimony already established the elements of rape under Article 266-A,

paragraph (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. AAA had positively and categorically

testified that Amistoso’s penis had entered her vagina, so Amistoso succeeded in having carnalknowledge of AAA. The Court reiterates that in an incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or

intimidation need not be employed where the overpowering moral influence of the father would

suffice. Even the twin circumstances for qualified rape, namely, minority and relationship, were

satisfactorily proved by the prosecution. That AAA was 12 years old on July 10, 2000 and that she isAmistoso’s daughter were established by AAA’s Certificate of Live Birth and Amistoso’sadmission before the RTC.

2. No, Amistoso’s defense of denial and alibi must not be favored.




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Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that alibi and denial cannot

prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of the complainant. Alibi is an

inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion because it can easily be fabricated. Denial

is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong evidence of non- culpability

to merit credibility. Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that it was physically

impossible for appellant to be present at the place where the crime was committed at the time of itscommission. By his own testimony, appellant clearly failed to show that it was physically

impossible for him to have been present at the scene of the crime when the rapes were alleged to

have occurred. Except for the first incident, appellant was within the vicinity of his home and in fact

alleged that he was supposedly even sleeping therein on the occasion of the second and third

incidents.

Except for his own testimony, Amistoso presented no other evidence to corroborate his alibi

that he was working at his employer’s warehouse when AAA was raped. Amistoso even admitted

that his employer’s warehouse was only a kilometer or a 10-minute hike away from the house

where AAA was raped, so it was not physically impossible for Amistoso to be present at the scene of

the crime at the time it occurred. Amistoso’s version of events is also implausible and irrational.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO BASALLO y ASPRECG.R. No. 182457, January 30, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with a woman against her will or

without her consent. We also previously declared that when a victim is threatened with bodily injury

as when the rapist is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a knife or bolo, such constitutes

intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the lustful desires of the rapist. Thus,

appellant’s succeeding in having non-consensual sexual intercourse with ABC through intimidation

using a knife plainly constitutes the crime of rape. Delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an

indication of a fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the

complainant Not all rape victims can be expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of

everyone.

Facts:

The victim ABC testified that she is a helper of the accused Antonio Basallo. Accused took

her as his helper for the past three (3) years. They are neighbors and she calls the accused "uncle."

While the children were sleeping at the first floor of the house, Basallo told her to take his shirt at

the second floor of the house. She went inside the first room and took the shirt at the back of the

door panel. After she entered the room, Basallo also followed her. He inserted his penis to her

vagina for thirty minutes while he was holding a knife, which prevented ABC to shout for help. She

was told by accused not to report the incident to her mother because the former would kill her.

After the incident, accused left and told her to take care of the children. She stayed at the house of

the accused for one more week. Thereafter, she told her mother that she was sexually abused byBasallo, when her mother discovered her pregnancy.

Subsequently, her mother brought her to the hospital where she was told that she was four

(4) months pregnant. She was issued a medical certificate when she consulted a doctor. Then they

filed a case against the Basallo. She did not talk to accused or the latter’s wife after she stoppedworking at their residence. Basallo went into hiding. The child is now six (6) years old.




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After trial on the merits, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape which was

affirmed by CA. However, Basallo contends that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond

reasonable doubt. He hinges this assertion on the belief that carnal knowledge and force or

intimidation, which are the two indispensable elements of the crime of rape under Article 335(1) of

the Revised Penal Code that the prosecution alleges to be present in this case, were not established

with moral certainty.

Issue:

Whether or not Basallo is liable for the crime of rape.

Ruling:

Yes. Basallo is liable for the crime of rape.

Since the incident of rape at issue happened prior to the enactment of Republic Act No.

8353, the applicable law is the previous definition of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal

Code, to wit:Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a

woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

According to the foregoing provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal

knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when

the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of

age.

In the case at bar, the prosecution insists that the elements of carnal knowledge and forceor intimidation are present. Time and again, the Court has held that, in rape cases, the accused may

be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and

consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.

On the basis of the foregoing consistent narratives from the victim, it is evident that carnal

knowledge and force or intimidation as elements of the crime of rape were unmistakably present in

this instance. This Court has held that the gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual intercourse with

a woman against her will or without her consent. We also previously declared that when a victim is

threatened with bodily injury as when the rapist is armed with a deadly weapon, such as a knife or

bolo, such constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring the victim to submission to the lustful desires

of the rapist. Thus, Basallo’s succeeding in having non-consensual sexual intercourse with ABC

through intimidation using a knife plainly constitutes the crime of rape.

Basallo points out that, if the incident at issue did occur as alleged by ABC, the said sexual

encounter should be characterized as consensual because, as evidenced by her own testimony, she

did not perform any overt and determined resistance to her rapist nor did she take advantage of

purported opportunities to escape.




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This Court cannot subscribe to such theory. It is settled in jurisprudence that the failure of

the victim to shout for help does not negate rape and even the victim’s lack of resistance especially

when intimidated by the offender into submission does not signify voluntariness or consent.

Furthermore, we have emphatically ruled that the failure of a rape victim to shout, fight back, or

escape from the scoundrel is not tantamount to consent or approval because the law imposes no

obligation to exhibit defiance or to present proof of struggle.

Further, Jurisprudence tell us that delay in reporting an incident of rape is not an indication

of a fabricated charge and does not necessarily cast doubt on the credibility of the complainant. We

also stated in another case that delay and vacillation in making a criminal accusation does not

necessarily impair the credibility of witnesses if such delay is satisfactorily explained. In the instant

case, appellant instilled the fear of bodily harm in ABC’s mind during the rape incident at issue and

this fear continued to firmly grip ABC even after the incident especially since ABC believed, rightly

or wrongly, that appellant held a reputation in their community as a "killer." This fear, coupled in all

likelihood with shame, reasonably explained ABC’s silence regarding her sordid ordeal at the hands

of appellant until she had no more choice but to admit the truth to her mother when ABC’spregnancy due to the rape could no longer be concealed. On this note we reiterate what we

declared in a previous ruling which states that human reactions vary and are unpredictable whenfacing a shocking and horrifying experience such as sexual assault. Not all rape victims can be

expected to act conformably to the usual expectations of everyone.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JONATHAN "UTO" VELOSO y RAMAG.R. No. 188849, February 13, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

In dealing with cases for rape, this Court has often acknowledged that there is often a want of

witnesses. Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often than

not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in the resolution of rape cases, the victim’s credibility

becomes the primordial consideration. . Inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not impair hercredibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of

the commission of rape. The testimonies of child-victims of rape are to be given full weight andcredence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who barely understands sex and

sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if what she claims is not true.

Facts:

At around 12:00 noon, Rama went looking for BBB’s brother. He went to BBB’s house asking

her to accompany him to her brother’s house. Since BBB was indisposed, she declined. Rama then

insisted that AAA, BBB’s daughter, accompany him instead. BBB consented. Thus, AAA with CCC,

BBB’s nephew, left the house with Rama. Instead of taking a padyak or tricycle , Rama opted to take

a boat. It was while they were in the middle of the river that Rama threatened to hit CCC with a

paddle if he would not jump off the boat. Immediately after CCC jumped off the boat, appellant

steered the boat towards the riverbank and pulled AAA out of the boat.

Thereafter, Rama made AAA lie in the water lily- and grass-covered banks and proceeded

to violate her, all the while threatening to drown her. AAA tried to fight Rama but was unsuccessful.

After satisfying his lust twice, appellant boxed AAA on her face, lips, stomach and thighs. Appellant

kicked AAA on the stomach, slapped and smashed her face to the ground, and choked her until she

became unconscious.




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Boral found a conscious but dazed, naked, and bloodied AAA along the grassy portion of the

riverbank. He shouted and called for BBB. Upon BBB’s arrival, she saw her daughter’s state. She

asked AAA what happened. AAA, however, could only say "Uto." BBB then c overed AAA’s body witha shirt and brought her to a nearby hospital.

RTC rendered a decision finding Rama guilty of the crime of rape which was affirmed by CA.However, Appellant argues that AAA’s testimony that she was made to lie down on a water lily an d

thereafter raped her was improbable since it was impossible for the water lily to have supported

their combined weights. Moreover, appellant questions AAA’s non-resistance to the rape except by

kicking. Lastly, appellant claims that the time of the physical examination preceded that of the rape

incident. Thus, appellant claims that due to the inconsistencies in AAA’s testimonies, his guilt for thecrimes charged was not proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.

Issue:

Whether or not Rama is guilty for crime of rape.

Ruling:

Yes. Rama is guilty for crime of rape.

The applicable law in this case is Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, which states that:

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even

though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shallcommit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or

any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

In dealing with cases for rape, this Court has often acknowledged that there is often a want

of witnesses. In People v. Dion, this Court said that: Due to its intimate nature, rape is usually a

crime bereft of witnesses, and, more often than not, the victim is left to testify for herself. Thus, in

the resolution of rape cases, the victim’s credibility becomes the primordial consideration. It is

settled that when the victim’s testimony is straightforward, convincing, and consistent with humannature and the normal course of things, unflawed by any material or significant inconsistency, it

passes the test of credibility, and the accused may be convicted solely on the basis

thereof. Inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the

inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission ofrape. The trial court’s assessment of the witnesses’ credibility is given great weight and is evenconclusive and binding.

In the present case, defendant argues that AAA’s testimony is improbable, especially her

testimony under cross-examination where she stated that appellant placed her on top of a water lily

floating on the water. Contrary to appellant’s submission, however, a careful scrutiny of the records

would show that the water lilies on which AAA was made to lie down were on the riverbank and




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not on the river. AAA’s testimony during the trial was straightforward, candid, clear and consistent.She was not moved nor cowed by the peroration of the cross-examiner. Her answers were direct

and concise. She was unmoved by the slings and arrows of her misfortune. She was bold,

determined and credible. The defense never broke her, in fact her answers enhanced her will to

correct a wrong, her quest for the protective mantle of the law and her passion to punish the

appellant.

In a litany of cases, this Court has ruled that the testimonies of child-victims of rape are to

be given full weight and credence. Reason and experience dictate that a girl of tender years, who

barely understands sex and sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, if

what she claims is not true. Her candid narration of how she was raped bears the earmarks of

credibility, especially if no ill will -- as in this case - - motivates her to testify falsely against the

accused. It is well-settled that when a woman, more so when she is a minor, says she has been

raped, she says in effect all that is required to prove the ravishment. The accused may thus be

convicted solely on her testimony -- provided it is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with

human nature and the normal course of things.

In any event, we have held that "the law does not impose a burden on the rape victim toprove resistance. What has to be proved by the prosecution is the use of force or intimidation by the

accused in having sexual intercourse with the victim."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDMUNDO VITEROG.R. No. 175327, April 3, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,

step parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the

common-law-spouse of the parent of the victim. The elements of the crime charged against accused-

appellant are: (a) the victim is a female over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a

parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil

degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnalknowledge of the victim either through force, threat, or intimidation.

Facts:

Edmundo Vitero, accused, and BBB were married on April 5, 1984. Out of the marriage, they

begot six (6) children, four (4) girls (AAA, the eldest, CCC, DDD and EEE) and two (2) boys (FFF and

GGG). In September 1996, accused and BBB separated. She left the conjugal home bringing with her

CCC, EEE, and GGG and established her own residence at Barangay.

AAA, DDD and FFF were left to the custody of the Edmundo Vitero. They transferred to the

house of the parents of the accused at Barangay XXX, Ligao City, Albay. AAA, then already thirteen

(13) years old, having been born on April 30, 1985, her sister DDD, and her brother FFF. AAA sleptin the extreme right portion of the room, immediately beside the wall separating their room from

that of her grandparents. To her left was the Edmundo Vitero followed by DDD and FFF.

AAA was roused from her sleep when she felt somebody on top of her. When she opened

her eyes, she saw her own father mounting her. AAA felt searing pain and her vagina bled. She

started to cry, but he was unmoved and warned her not to make any noise. She tried to resist his

lewd desires, but her efforts were in vain. She did not shout for help because she feared accused




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who had a 20-inch knife beside him might kill her. After ravishing AAA, accused dressed himself

and went back to sleep. Because of the harrowing experience she suffered from the hands of her

own father, AAA was not able to sleep anymore. AAA did not report her ordeal to her grandparents

for fear they would only scold her.

Sometime, Edmundo Vitero brought AAA to the house of his sister Salvacion at Batangas.Meantime, HHH, AAA’s maternal grandfather, visited his daughter BBB, and showed to her an

anonymous letter stating that AAA had been raped by [her] father. Thereafter, BBB went to see

Salvacion, her sister-in-law in her house at Lian, Batangas to look for AAA, but she did not find her

She finally found AAA in the house of her employer in Lian, Batangas. BBB asked AAA if she

was indeed raped by her father. AAA disclosed that accused ravished her six (6) times while they

were still living in her grandparents’ house. He usually raped AAA at night when she and her

siblings were already sleeping in their room. Upon learning they reported the incident to the Ligao

Police Station and with the help of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),

However, accused Edmundo vigorously denied the allegations against him. He testified that

he was employed as a construction worker in Manila. However, upon his return to Albay, he learnedthat he was criminally charged with raping his own daughter AAA.

Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction of the RTC. However, the penalty was

modified because of Republic Act No. 9346. Accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty

of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death finding appellant Edmundo Vitero guilty of the crime of

qualified rape and was affirmed in toto by CA.

Issue:

Whether or not Edmundo Vitero should be held guilty for crime of qualified rape.

Ruling:

Yes, Edmundo Vitero should be held guilty for crime of qualified rape

Accused-appellant was charged with qualified rape, defined and punishable under the

following provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353: Article 266-

A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

x x x x

Article 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished

by reclusion perpetua.x x x x

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following

aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step

parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-

law-spouse of the parent of the victim.




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The elements of the crime charged against accused-appellant are: (a) the victim is a female

over 12 years but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, stepparent,

guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law

spouse of the parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either

through force, threat, or intimidation.

There is no dispute that the first two elements exist in this case. Documentary and

testimonial evidence, including accused-appellant’s own admission, establish that AAA is thedaughter of accused-appellant and BBB and she was born on April 30, 1985. This means that AAA

was almost or already 13 years old when she was raped in April 1998.

As to the third element of the crime, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals ruled that it was

duly proven as well, giving weight and credence to AAA’s testimony. AAA was able to describe indetail how accused-appellant mounted her, undressed her, and successfully penetrated her against

her will, one night in April 1998.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO DELIGERO y BACASMOTG.R. No. 189280, April 17, 2013, J. LeonardoDe Castro

In rape committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or thecommonlaw spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed.

Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.

The sweetheart theory, as a defense, necessarily admits carnal knowledge, the first element of

rape.

Facts:

Accusedappellant was charged with qualified rape in an Information dated December 16,

2002. On September 9, 2003, accusedappellant pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented complainant AAA and MedicoLegal Officer Dr.

Edgar S. Savella. AAA was already seventeen (17) years old at the time of her testimony before the

court a quo. She was barely thirteen (13) years old when appellant allegedly raped her. Appellant is

AAA’s granduncle, being the brother of her paternal grandfather. Appellant had eight (8) childrenfrom his estranged wife who lived in another barangay. AAA fondly calls appellant “Papa.” In the

early part of 2000, appellant resided with AAA’s family for about four (4) months. After building hisown house, appellant moved in to his new house. AAA also transferred to appellant’s new house.

AAA’s parents were promised by appellant that he would send AAA to school. AAA recalled that shelived with appellant for about three (3) years and during those years, AAA claimed to have been

raped by appellant many times. Dr. Edgar S. Savella, medicolegal officer of NBI Caraga Regional

Office testified that when he examined AAA, the latter was already pregnant. He found no laceration

in AAA’s hymen.

For the defense, appellant testified that AAA’s father is his nephew, being the son of hisbrother. Appellant disclosed AAA became his lover. Appellant further testified that when he moved

in to his new house, AAA moved in with him as well. Appellant claimed that from that time on, he

and AAA were already living together as husband and wife. The alleged amorous relationship

between him and AAA was known to the public, particularly their neighbors.




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On September 20, 2006, the trial court rendered its decision convicting the accused. On

August 29, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the findings of the Trial Court.

Hence, this appeal. Accusedappellant anchors his prayer for acquittal on the following points,

which, according to him, are undisputed: (1) accused-appellant was unarmed; (2) there was no

proof of great disparity in terms of physical strength or capacity between accusedappellant and

AAA; and (3) AAA never put the slightest resist ance against accusedappellant.

Issue:

Whether the fact that the accused was not armed during the commission of the offense is

material in the crime of rape

Ruling:

Accused-appellant’s being unarmed is inconsequential considering the circumstances of the

instant case. The Court have previously held that “in rape committed by close kin, such as the

victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that

actual force or intimidation be employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence

and intimidation.” Accused-appellant, AAA’s granduncle, is certainly a person having moral

influence and ascendancy over AAA. AAA would surely observe the deference accorded by her own

parents to accused-appellant, her father’s uncle. Indeed, AAA herself fondly called

accused-appellant as “Papa,” showing that she more or less treated him like her own father.

Neither is it required that specific evidence be presented to prove the disparity in physical

strength between AAA and accusedappellant. As argued by the prosecution, accusedappellant is a

grown man who is used to hard work and manual labor as a farmer and a chainsaw operator, while

AAA is a very young girl when she was allegedly raped and when she testified. It was the trial court

which had the opportunity to observe the physical disproportion between them and considered the

same in finding accused appellant guilty.

The Court has likewise repeatedly held that the sweetheart theory, as a defense, necessarily

admits carnal knowledge, the first element of rape. In People v. Mirandilla, Jr., 654 SCRA 761

(2011), it was held that “[t]his admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for

it is not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; after the prosecution hassuccessfully established a prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused, who

has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual.” In the case at bar, accused-appellantmiserably failed to discharge this burden.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO BUSTAMANTE y ALIGANGAG.R. No. 189836, June 5, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Romeo Bustamante was accused of raping his minor daughter. There were no other witnesses

and the prosecution was not able to establish the element of force and intimidation. In convicting theaccused, the Supreme Court held that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on

the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature

and the normal course of things. The Court also ruled that the moral ascendancy of an accused over

the victim renders it unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation since, in rape committed by

a close kin, such as the victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother,

moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.

Facts:




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Accused-appellant Romeo Bustamante was charged of raping AAA, his eleven year old

daughter. Appellant pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. During trial, AAA testified that on or

about February 17, 1997, her father, while they were alone in their home, laid her down on the

floor and proceeded to rape her. After the act, he told her not to report what had happened and that

she was not able to resist because she was still young during that time. She reported the incident to

her mother and the police. There were no other evidence which would indicate that the accusedused force and intimidation upon the victim. Also, there were no other eyewitnesses of the crime.

At the conclusion of trial, the trial court convicted appellant of the crime of rape. Appellant

elevated his case to the Court of Appeals in the hope of having a reversal of judgment however, his

appeal was denied. Hence, this petition.

Issues:

1. Whether the accused can be convicted in the absence of evident force and intimidation

2. Whether the accused can be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim

Ruling:

1. Yes. Despite the absence of any evident force and intimidation, the same is still appreciated

in this case because it is doctrinally settled that the moral ascendancy of an accused over

the victim renders it unnecessary to show physical force and intimidation since, in rape

committed by a close kin, such as the victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law

spouse of her mother, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or

intimidation.

2. Yes. It is settled in jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be

convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and

consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. Jurisprudence is likewise

instructive that the factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of the rape

victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. In the

case at bar, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found AAA to be a credible witnessand her testimony worthy of full faith and credit. Furthermore, jurisprudence tells us that it

is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story that would expose herself as

well as her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her charge could mean the death

or lifetime imprisonment of her own father.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MOISES CAOILE

G.R. No. 203041, June 5, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the rape of a mentally disabled person

regardless of the perpetrator’s awareness of his victim’s mental condition. However, the perpetrator’s

knowledge of the victim’s mental disability, at the time he committed the rape, qualifies the crime andmakes it punishable by death under Article 266B, paragraph 10.

Facts:

Accused appellant Moises Caoile, in two separate Amended Informations filed before the

RTC on January 5, 2006, was charged with two separate counts of Rape of a Demented Person

under Article 266A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code. Caoile pleaded not guilty to both

charges upon his arraignment for both cases on March 1, 2006. The antecedents of this case, as

narrated by the prosecution, are as follows: [AAA], the herein victim, was left in the care of her




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grandmother and auntie in Alipang, Rosario, La Union when her mother left to work abroad when

she was still young. One of their neighbors was the accused whose daughter, Marivic, was the

playmate of [AAA]. One day, the accused invited [AAA] to go to the bamboo trees in their place.

Upon reaching thereat, the accused directed [AAA] to lie down on the ground. [AAA] followed the

instruction of the accused whom she called uncle Moises. Thereafter, the accused proceeded to have

carnal knowledge with the victim. [AAA] felt pain but she did not complain nor say anything aboutit. The sexual abuse was repeated until the grandmother of the victim learned of the assaults. Claire

Baliaga, a psychologist, testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation on [AAA] on August

10, 2007; that [AAA] obtained an overall score performance of 55, which is classified within themental retardation range; and that [AAA] has the mental age of a sevenyear, ninemonth old child

who is inadequate of sustaining mental processes. Such findings was affirmed by the findings of Dr.

Roderico V. Ramos, a psychiatrist of the ITRMC.

In his defense, the accused appellant claims AAA was his sweetheart and they had several

intimate relationship. He further contends that he did not know that [AAA] was a demented person

since she acted like a normal individual.

On May 6, 2009, after weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the RTC rendered itsJoint Decision finding Caoile guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape. In its Decision

dated March 21, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue:

Can the lack of knowledge of the accused that the victim suffers from mental retardation

sufficient to absolve him of the crime of rape?

Ruling:

No. Article 266A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides for two

circumstances when having carnal knowledge of a woman with a mental disability is considered

rape: 1. Paragraph 1(b): when the offended party is deprived of reason x x x; and 2. Paragraph 1(d):

when the offended party is x x x demented. Caoile was charged in the Amended Informations withrape of a demented person under paragraph 1(d). The term demented refers to a person who has

dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the

individual’s former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the

other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1(b) has been interpreted to include

those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically

diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a person who is “deprived of

reason,” and not one who is “demented.”

Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266A,

paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. This is because a mentally deficient person

is automatically considered incapable of giving consent to a sexual act. Thus, what needs to be

proven are the facts of sexual intercourse between the accused and the victim, and the victim’smental retardation. Verily, the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish that AAA is a mental

retardate. Anent the fact of sexual congress, it is worthy to note that aside from the prosecution’s

own testimonial and documentary evidence, Caoile never denied being physically intimate with

AAA. In fact, he has confirmed such fact, and even claimed that he and AAA often had sex, they being

sweethearts.




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Unfortunately, such defense will not exculpate him from liability. Carnal knowledge of a

female, even when done without force or intimidation, is rape nonetheless, if it was done without

her consent. To expound on such concept, this Court, in People v. Butiong, 659 SCRA 557 (2011),

said: In rape committed by means of duress, the victim’s will is nullified or destroyed. Hence, the

necessity of proving real and constant resistance on the part of the woman to establish that the act

was committed against her will. On the other hand, in the rape of a woman deprived of reason orunconscious, the victim has no will. The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such

lack of will may exist not only when the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also

when she is suffering some mental deficiency impairing her reason or free will. In that case, it is not

necessary that she should offer real opposition or constant resistance to the sexual intercourse.

Carnal knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect as to be incapable of legal consent constitutes

rape. Where the offended woman was feebleminded, sickly and almost an idiot, sexual intercourse

with her is rape. Her failure to offer resistance to the act did not mean consent for she was

incapable of giving any rational consent. The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental

abnormality or deficiency is enough. Cohabitation with a feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape.

Sexual intercourse with an insane woman was considered rape.

The Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes the rape of a mentally disabled personregardless of the perpetrator’s awareness of his victim’s mental condition. However, the

perpetrator’s knowledge of the victim’s mental disability, at the time he committed the rape,qualifies the crime and makes it punishable by death under Article 266B, paragraph 10, to wit: The

death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following

aggravating/qualifying circumstances: x x x x 10) When the offender knew of the mental disability,

emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of

the crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO PAMINTUAN y SAHAGUNG.R. No. 192239, June 5, 2013, J. Leonardo- De Castro

Article 266A(1)(d) provides the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the elements ofwhich are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman isunder twelve years of age or is demented. As a special qualifying circumstance of the crime of rape, the

concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship to the accused must be both alleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the

hymen necessary, to conclude that carnal knowledge took place; the mere touching of the external

genitalia by a penis that is capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal

knowledge.

A mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely overcome the positive

declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of appellant in the crimes attributed to him.

Facts:

On September 6, 2004, accusedappellant was charged before the Regional Trial Court

(RTC) of Manila with the crime of rape under Article 266A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code,

as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Accusedappellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. During

the trial of the case, the prosecution put forward AAA, the victim, as a witness. AAA testified that

accusedappellant was her uncle since the latter was the cousin of her father, BBB. He was also the

commonlaw husband of her mother, CCC, as her parents had already separated. AAA related that in




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September 2003, accusedappellant started to sexually abuse her inside their house. He pulled her

to her mother’s room when nobody else was around. He touched her breasts and her vagina.

Afterwards, accusedappellant was able to insert his penis into her organ. He was only able to insert

his penis halfway but the same hurt AAA. She cried and fought back by boxing him but he continued

to assault her. He also kissed her lips and licked her vagina. She said that she did not bleed after she

was raped. Accusedappellant succeeded in abusing her seven times. AAA presented in court herbirth certificate, which showed that she was born on November 6, 1992. Medical findings shows

that there is no evident injury at the time of examination but medical evaluation cannot exclude

sexual abuse.

For his defense, accusedappellant testified that AAA was his niece as he was the cousin of

AAA’s father. He was also the common-law husband of AAA’s mother, CCC. Accused-appellantdenied AAA’s accusation of rape against him. He stated that CCC’s children had a grudge against

him, as they did not want him to live with their mother.

On June 17, 2008, the RTC of Manila, Branch 38, adjudged accusedappellant guilty of

statutory rape. On November 24, 2009, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the RTC. Hence

this appeal.

Issues:

1. Whether the medical findings of lack of injuries or trauma to the vagina of the victim

belied AAA’s claim that she was raped seven times

2. Whether the accused-appellant is guilty of statutory rape

Ruling:

1. No. The Court has often held that “full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essentialingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary, to conclude that carnal knowledge took

place; the mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis that is capable of consummating the

sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge.” It was also said in People v. Opong, 554SCRA 706 (2008), that: In People v. Capt. Llanto, citing People v. Aguinaldo, the court likewise

affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape despite the absence of laceration on the victim’s

hymen since medical findings suggest that it is possible for the victim’s hymen to remain intactdespite repeated sexual intercourse. The strength and dilatability of the hymen varies from one

woman to another, such that it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse;on the other hand, it may be so resistant that its surgical removal is necessary before intercourse

can ensue. x x x x It also bears stressing that a medicolegal report is not indispensable to the

prosecution of a rape case, it being merely corroborative in nature. The credible disclosure of AAA

that appellant raped her is the most important proof of the commission of the

crime.……………………………………………………..

2. Yes. Article 266A(1)(d) provides the definition of the crime of statutory rape, the elements

of which are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such a woman isunder twelve years of age or is demented. The element of carnal knowledge was established by the

testimony of AAA. Her identification of accusedappellant as the perpetrator of the sexual attack

was positive, consistent and steadfast; her narration of the incident, detailed and straightforward.

When she was recounting her ordeal before the trial court, she was overcome with emotion and

shed tears on more than one occasion. She did not waver in her stance even as she underwent




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cross-examination by the counsel for the defense. These factors impress upon us that AAA’s claim

against accusedappellant was not at all fabricated. The age of AAA was duly alleged and proven in

this case. However, AAA’s relationship with accused-appellant, i.e., that accused-appellant was thecommon law spouse of her mother, was not specifically alleged in the information. Although this

circumstance was proven during trial, the same cannot qualify the crime committed. We held in

People v. Ramos, 394 SCRA 452 (2002), that “[a]s a special qualifying circumstance of the crime ofrape, the concurrence of the victim’s minority and her relationship to the accused must be bothalleged and proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, the accused-appellant’s bare denial of the crime charged is insufficient to

exculpate him. It is the rule that a mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can

scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of

appellant in the crimes attributed to him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO PIOSANGG.R. No. 200329, June 5, 2013, J. LeonardoDe Castro

The only subject of inquiry on statutory rape is the age of the woman and whether carnal

knowledge took place.

Facts:

On January 8. 1999, upon the sworn complaint of AAA’s mother, the City Prosecutor of

Quezon City filed with the RTC an Information charging the accused-appellant Ricardo Pionsang of

the crime of rape. He pleaded not guilty of the charge.

During trial, AAA, the child victim, testified that the accused-appellant lured her to go to his

house to play computer games. While they were on their way to his home, the accused-appellant

pushed her inside the detached toilet of his house and proceeded to rape her. Her testimony was

supported by the testimony of CCC, an eleven-year-old eye witness of the crime. In his defense, the

accused avers that he was at home, letting his hair dry in the garage, at the time of AAA’s rape. The

RTC rendered its Decision on November 26, 2009 finding accusedappellant guilty beyondreasonable doubt of raping AAA. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this

petition.

Issue:

Whether the accused is guilty of statutory rape

Ruling:

ART. 266A. Rape; When and How Committed.—Rape is committed— 1) By a man who

shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: x x x x d)

When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the

circumstances mentioned above be present .

Rape under paragraph 3 of the abovementioned article is termed statutory rape as it

departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a

woman below twelve years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and

whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a

will of her own on account of her tender years.




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The commission of rape was sufficiently established by the testimony of the child witness.

Testimonies of childvictims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,

particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to

show that rape has in fact been committed. Furthermore, AAA was born on July 21, 1994 as

evidenced by the Certification from the Civil Registrar’s O ffice so she was almost four years of age

when the crime was committed. Resultantly, accusedappellant was charged and proven guilty ofstatutory rape.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABEL DIAZG.R. No. 200882, June 13, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Accused-appellant Abel Diaz was convicted of the crime of rape. His appeal boils down to a

question of credibility of the prosecution’s primary witness, the private complainant Mara. He arguesthat the failure of Mara to make an outcry during the two hours he allegedly stayed in her room makes

her testimony not credible. In rejecting his contention the Supreme Court ruled that the precise

duration of the rape is not material to and does not negate the commission of the felony . When one is

being raped, forcibly held, weak and in great pain, and in shock, she cannot be reasonably expected to

keep a precise track of the passage of time down to the last minute.

Facts:

Accused-appellant Abel Diaz was charged with the crime of rape. During the trial, The

prosecution established that the offended party, 17 year old Mara, and the accusedappellant were

neighbors as they both resided at X Compound, Y Subdivision, Barangay Z, Tarlac City. At early

dawn of March 30, 2003, Mara was suddenly awakened when she felt somebody on top of her.

While the lights in her room were switched off, light coming from outside illuminated her room and

allowed her to recognize the then shirtless accused appellant as the intruder. Startled, she pushed

the accused appellant away and shouted for him to go away but she was not able to free herself as

he held her hands and he was straddling her. The accused boxed her and was able to penetrate her

despite of her shouts and resistance. The dastardly deed done, the accused appellant stood up,

wore his pants and left. Mara also testified that the accused stayed at her room at approximatelytwo hours.

Abel Diaz used the defense of denial and alibi. He claims that he was attending a party of

another neighbor at the time the crime was allegedly committed. He further contends that the

victim’ s failure to make an outcry for the two hours that he was allegedly in her room is not

credible.

After weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court found Mara’s testimony

categorical, spontaneous and consistent. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. Hence, this

petition.

Issue:

Is the precise duration of rape material to the commission of the felony ?

Rulings:

No. Mara’s testimony that the accused-appellant stayed for two hours in her room did notmake her credibility doubtful. It was a mere estimate and could not be expected to be accurate with

rigorous exactitude. When one is being raped, forcibly held, weak and in great pain, and in shock,

she cannot be reasonably expected to keep a precise track of the passage of time down to the last




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minute. Indeed, for a woman undergoing the ordeal that Mara underwent in the hands of the

accusedappellant, every moment is like an eternity of hell and the transit of time is a painfully slow

crawl that she would rather forget. Besides, the precise duration or the exact time or date of the

commission of the rape is not an essential element of the felony. Rape has no regard for time and

place. It has been committed in all manner of situations and in circumstances thought to be

inconceivable.

As regards his other defenses, the accused-appellant’s denial and alibi crumble in the face ofhis positive identification by Mara. In particular, his alibi is worthless as his presence at a mere 30

meters away from the scene of the crime at the time of its commission definitely does not constitute

a physical impossibility for him to be at Mara’s room at the time of the rape. On the contrary, it is in

fact an implied admission that there is facility of access for the accusedappellant to be at the place

where the crime happened when it happened.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERCIDITA T. RESURRECCIONG.R. No. 188310, June 13, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the

transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the presentation in court of the substance seized asevidence. With respect to illegal possession of dangerous drugs, possession of dangerous drugs

constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in

the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession.

Facts:

Two separate Informations for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs were

filed against the accused-appellant Mercidita Resurection. When arraigned, accusedappellant

pleaded not guilty to both charges. In its Decision promulgated on August 28, 2006, the RTC found

accusedappellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The trial court gave full

weight and credence to the evidence presented by the prosecution and disregarded

accused-appellant’s defenses of denial and frameup. Accusedappellant appealed her conviction

before the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated January 27, 2009, the Court of Appeals affirmed intoto the RTC judgment. Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue:

Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes

charged despite the failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Ruling:

The conviction of the accused-appellant was sustained by the Court.

In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the following elements

must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the

delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. What is material to the prosecution for illegal

sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually occurred, coupled with the

presentation in court of the substance seized as evidence.

With respect to illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its elements are the following: (1)

the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such

possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the saiddrug. Possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus




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possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such

possession. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that the prosecution was able to prove

beyond reasonable doubt all the foregoing elements of the crimes charged against

accusedappellant.

In this case, the vivid and detailed testimonies of prosecution witnesses PO2 Lique and

MADAC operative Abellana were not only credible by themselves, but were corroborated by

numerous documentary and object evidence. The sum of the evidence for the prosecution shows

that following the conduct of a surveillance, the Makati City SAIDSOTF planned and executed a

buybust operation against accusedappellant on May 16, 2006. During the operation,

accusedappellant was caught in flagrante delicto selling 0.02 grams of shabu for Three Hundred

Pesos (P300.00) and possessing a total of 0.24 grams of shabu, without any legal authority to do so.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMAN ZAFRA Y SERRANOG.R. No. 197363, June 26, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the

inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential fact of the commission of rape.

It is not uncommon for a rape victim to initially conceal the assault against her person for

several reasons, including that of fear of threats posed by her assailant. A rape charge only becomes

doubtful when the victim’s inaction or delay in reporting the crime is unreasonable or unexplained.

Facts:

On December 19, 2001, an Information was filed before the RTC, charging Zafra with the

crime of qualified rape of his minor daughter. Zafra pleaded not guilty to the charge upon his

arraignment on February 4, 2002. Thereafter, the parties held their pretrial conference, wherein

they stipulated on the facts that AAA was the daughter of Zafra, and that she was only 17 years old

on December 14, 2001. Upon trial, AAA testified that her father, Zafra, started molesting her whenshe was around 13 or 14 years old. He used to insert his finger in her vagina and mash her breasts,

which progressed into actual sexual intercourse when she was about 15. AAA claimed that her

mother knew what her father was doing to her but did nothing to stop it. Aside from her best friend

in school, AAA told no one about her ordeal for fear of her father, that her mother would not side

with her, and that rumors about her would spread. Sometime in November 2001 however, she

moved to her aunt’s house, after she was again raped by Zafra. On December 14, 2001, her brother

went to her aunt’s house to tell AAA that Zafra had some chores for her. AAA followed her brotherto their house, where she found Zafra, who asked her to fix the beddings and wash the dishes. When

her brother left the house, Zafra instructed AAA to get his dirty clothes in his room. AAA did as she

was told, but Zafra went inside the room and locked the door and proceeded to rape her. While she

was dressing up, Zafra warned her against telling anybody of what happened. AAA immediately

picked up the dirty clothes on the floor and went out the room. After having lunch with her mother,who arrived while she was doing the laundry, she returned to her aunt’s house. At her aunt’s house,

her mother asked her “inulit na naman ng tatay mo, ano?” to which, she replied yes. Her mother toldher that they would file a complaint, then went back to their house, got the linen in her father’s

room, then soaked it in water. Just as AAA was about to leave her aunt’s house, her mother arrivedand asked her where she was headed. AAA said she was going to file a complaint against her father.

AAA’s mother accompanied her but was prodding her not to file any complaint. AAA howeverproceeded to file the complaint, and was subjected to a medical examination on the same day.




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Zafra denied the charge against him and claimed that it was filed as an act of retaliation by

his wife. On January 20, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision, giving credence to the prosecution’s

version, found Zafra guilty of qualified rape of his minor daughter, and sentenced him to death. On

June 29, 2010, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s Decision. Zafra attacks the credibility of AAA

for being inconsistent. He claims that during AAA’s testimony, she was so confused that she

contradicted her own statements. Zafra also emphasizes the fact that prior to December 14, 2001,AAA acted as if nothing had happened at all. Zafra claims that the fact that she did not stay away

from him despite the alleged incidents of rape belie her claim of sexual

abuse.…………………………………

Issues:

1. Whether AAA’s inconsistent and contradictory testimony is an indication that she merely

concocted her story of rape

2. Whether AAA’s actions, of not immediately reporting that she was raped and returning to their

house, belie her claim of sexual abuse.

Ruling: 1. No. The court has ruled that since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions,

accuracy in a testimonial account has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a

witness. The inconsistencies Zafra are referring to are frivolous matters, which merely confused

AAA when she was being questioned. Those matters are inconsequential and do not even pertain to

AAA’s ordeal. Thus, such trivial and insignificant discrepancies, which in this case were immediately

clarified upon further questioning, will warrant neither the rejection of her testimony nor the

reversal of the judgment.

2. No. It is not uncommon for a rape victim to initially conceal the assault against her person for

several reasons, including that of fear of threats posed by her assailant. A rape charge only becomes

doubtful when the victim’s inaction or delay in reporting the crime is unreasonable or unexplained.

In this case, AAA testified that she did not immediately report the crime because she was afraid ofher father, that her mother would not side with her even though she was aware of what Zafra was

doing to her, and the rumors that might spread once word of what her father had been doing to her

comes out. It must be noted that AAA was only a young girl when Zafra started molesting her. It is

but natural that she factor in her decisions how her father and mother would react. Furthermore, it

is settled jurisprudence that delay in filing a complaint for rape is not an indication of falsehood,

viz.:

The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons

close to her or to report the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the

conclusion that she was not sexually molested and that her charges against the accused are

all baseless, untrue and fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the offense is not an indication of a

fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against therapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the

world or risk the offenders’ making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims. (Citations

omitted.)

Anent AAA’s behavior after the rapes, suffice it to say that there is no one standard reaction

that can be expected from a victim of a crime such as rape. Elucidating on this point, the Court, in

People v. Saludo, held:




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Not every victim of rape can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with

the usual expectations of everyone. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional

stress are unpredictable; people react differently. Some may shout, some may faint, whileothers may be shocked into insensibility. And although the conduct of the victim

immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost importance as it tends to

establish the truth or falsity of the charge of rape, it is not accurate to say that there is atypical reaction or norm of behavior among rape victims, as not every victim can be

expected to act conformably with the usual expectation of mankind and there is no standard

behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling experience, each

situation being different and dependent on the various circumstances prevailing in each

case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JADE CUAYCONG y REMONQUILLOG.R. No. 196051, October 2, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the rape victim, who was a minor, does not warrant a

finding of exculpating reasonable doubt when it fails to establish beyond doubt the innocence of the

appellant for the crime charged since the credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let aloneimpaired, by minor inconsistencies in her testimony.

Facts:

Two informations were filed with the RTC, charging accused-appellant Jade Cuaycong with

the felony of statutory rape. The victim, AAA, was the daughte r of Cuaycong’s live in partner, BBB.One evening, when BBB was at work, Cuaycong lay beside AAA, removed her shorts and laid on top

of AAA. Cuaycong then inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, and afterwards threatened to kill AAA’smother if AAA will not keep quiet. When CCC, BBB’s mother learned of the incident, CCC brought

AAA to the medical center, and the doctor who examined AAA reported to the police.

AAA also recalled that the same thing happened to her about a year ago at the store whichthey also utilized as their residence. At that time, AAA was tending their store while Cuaycong was

then sleeping beside her brother. When Cuaycong woke up, he approached her and removed her

shorts and standing from behind, he inserted his penis to her anus. She felt pain and cried, so that

Cuaycong was forced to stop. She also disclosed the incident to CCC.

Cuaycong denied the charges, stating that they were filed so that BBB could get rid of him as

he was jobless and that BBB wanted to live in with her new lover.

The RTC convicted Cuyacong on two counts of statutory rape. The CA affirmed the first

count, but reversed the conviction on the second count because, while the Information alleged rape

by carnal knowledge, the prosecution was able to prove rape by sexual assault since the rape

incident at issue involved penile penetration of the victim’s anus. The CA modified the conviction toacts of lasciviousness.

Issues:

1. Is AAA’s credibility is very much suspect and thus does not warrant the judgment ofconviction?

2. Does a shallow hymenal laceration negate the occurrence of rape?




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3. Was the CA correct in changing the conviction of the second charge from rape to acts of

lasciviousness?

Ruling:

1. No. Cuaycong’s contention that the inconsistencies found in the victim’s testimony warranta finding of exculpating reasonable doubt deserves scant consideration. Jurisprudence tells us that

for a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as a basis for acquittal, it

must establish beyond doubt the innocence of the appellant for the crime charged since the

credibility of a rape victim is not diminished, let alone impaired, by minor inconsistencies in her

testimony. We have also declared that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, when

referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their

declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies, moreover, they do not impair the

credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and

positive identification of the assailants. In the case at bar, the alleged inconsistencies in AAA’s

testimony do not deviate from the fact that AAA categorically identified Cuaycong as the one who

raped her on July 4, 2002 and earlier sexually assaulted her sometime in June of the year 2001. The

inconsistent statements pointed out by appellant merely affect minor and tangential aspects ofAAA’s testimony which do not significantly alter the integrity of her narrative concerning the

incidents of rape and sexual assault which are the subject matter of this case.

With regard to the credibility of AAA’s declarations against appellant as well as that of otherprosecution witnesses, we see no cogent reason to veer away from the jurisprudential principle of

affording great respect and even finality to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility ofwitnesses.

2. No. With regard to Cuaycong’s assertion that Dr. Carpio’s testimony indicated that the

shallow hymenal laceration present in AAA’s vagina rules out the probability of any penetration bya male sexual organ and could only have been caused by the insertion of a finger, we rule that the

said testimony does not negate the occurrence of rape. A perusal of the transcript would reveal thatthe same medico-legal officer did not totally discount the possibility of rape and, in fact, he admitted

that he was not competent to conclude what really caused the shallow hymenal laceration. During

cross-examination by defense counsel, Dr. Carpio even gave the inference that partial penetration of

the penis could have caused the shallow hymenal laceration found inside AAA’s vagina.

Jurisprudence states that carnal knowledge as an element of rape does not require full

penetration since all that is necessary for rape to be consummated is for the penis of the accused to

come into contact with the lips of the pudendum of the victim. Moreover, it is equally settled that

hymenal rupture, vaginal laceration or genital injury is not indispensable because the same is not

an element of the crime of rape.

3. Yes. As for the Court of Appeals’ ruling that the charge of rape in Criminal Case No. 02-0576should be downgraded to an act of lasciviousness, we find no justification to disturb the same. As

correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, it was settled in People v. Abulon that in view of the material

differences between the two modes of rape, the first mode is not necessarily included in the second,

and vice versa. Thus, since the charge in the information for the [second charge of] rape through

carnal knowledge, Cuaycong cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault although it was

proven, without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation against him. However, following the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation




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to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, Cuaycong can be found guilty of the lesser

crime of acts of lasciviousness.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CARLITO ESPENILLAG.R. No. 192253, September 18, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

If the testimony of the rape victim is clear, consistent and credible to establish the crime

beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it, notwithstanding its subsequent retraction.

Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate her original testimony. Thus, an

affidavit of retraction of the father of the victim unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence

cannot prevail over the positive declaration made by the victim herself.

Facts:

While AAA, a Grade 2 pupil was left in their house with her two younger siblings (as her

father BBB and stepmother were in the farm), accused-appellant Carlito Espenilla, who is the

brother of her stepmother, arrived and asked her for a tobacco leaf and a newspaper. When AAAwent inside the room to get what was asked of her, accused-appellant followed and closed the door

behind him. While inside the room, Espenilla who was then with a bolo, immediately undressed her

by taking off her shorts and panty and at the same time warning her not to tell anyone about what

is happening, otherwise, she will be killed. After she was undressed, Espenilla unzipped his pants,

put out his private organ, held her, and ordered her to lie down on the floor. With the unsheathed

bolo beside them, Espenilla inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. AAA cried because of the pain but

did not offer any resistance because Espenilla was very strong and had a bolo that was placed

beside her. Neither did she shout because there was no other person in the house (except her

younger siblings). And besides, she knows that nobody would come to her rescue.

Later that day, while AAA’s parents were still not around, Espenilla came back and rapedher again for the second time. She was threatened not to tell anyone said incident. AAA later ran

away from home to the nearest barangay and revealed the incident.

A complaint was filed with the trial court against Espenilla, charging him with rape. For his

defense, Espenilla presented the Affidavit of Recantation executed by BBB, the latter initially

claiming that he realized that he was made to falsely believe by AAA that Espenilla raped her. BBB

later changed his answer and stated that he merely forced AAA to say that she was raped by her

grandfather and Espenilla. The RTC found Espenilla guilty of Rape. The CA affirmed the RTC

decision.

Issue:

Did BBB’s recantation of the charges against Espenilla absolve the latter from criminal

liability?

Ruling:

The appeal is without merit.




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Based on the foregoing provision, the elements of rape under Article 335 of the Revised

Penal Code are:

(1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and

(2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of

reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under 12 years of age.

The records of this case reveal that the prosecution has sufficiently demonstrated that there

is ample evidence to prove that Espenilla had carnal knowledge of the then minor victim through

the use of force and intimidation. The testimony of AAA pertaining to the rape incident at issue

articulates in blunt detail her horrific experience at the hands of Espenilla.

It is a settled doctrine in our jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may

be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing, and

consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. It is likewise elementary that the

issue of credibility of witnesses is resolved primarily by the trial court since it is in a better position

to decide the same after having heard the witnesses and observed their conduct, deportment andmanner of testifying; accordingly, the findings of the trial court are entitled to the highest degree of

respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that it overlooked,

misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which would

otherwise affect the result of the case. In other words, as we have repeatedly declared in the past,

the trial judge’s evaluation, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, binds the Court, leaving to the

accused the burden t o bring to the Court’s attention facts or circumstances of weight that were

overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted by the lower courts but would materially affect the

disposition of the case differently if duly considered. Unfortunately, Epenilla failed to discharge this

burden.

We find that the testimony of AAA was indeed delivered in a clear and straightforward

manner; thus, the same is worthy of the belief that was bestowed upon it by the trial court and later

by the Court of Appeals.

Lastly, we declare that the Affidavit of Recantation executed by BBB, AAA’s father, fails to

convince considering that the said document, which seeks to exculpate appellant from the charge of

rape, was unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence.

Courts have long been skeptical of recantations of testimonies for they can easily be

obtained from witnesses through intimidation or for monetary consideration. A retraction does not

necessarily negate an earlier declaration.

In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused often depends almost

entirely on the credibility of the complainant’s testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is

generally unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for herself. When a rape victim’s

testimony is straightforward and marked with consistency despite grueling examination, it

deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be discarded. If such testimony is clear, consistent

and credible to establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it,




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notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not

necessarily vitiate her original testimony.

A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. It is exceedingly

unreliable for there is always the probability that such recantation may later on be repudiated. It

can easily be obtained from witnesses through intimidation or monetary consideration. Like anyother testimony, it is subject to the test of credibility based on the relevant circumstances and,

especially, on the demeanor of the witness on the stand.

Thus, with more reason, we cannot ascribe any weight to the recantation of the charges by

the victim’s father when the victim’s own categorical testimony remains on re cord. Alternatively

put, unless supported by clear and convincing evidence, BBB’s recantation cannot prevail over the

positive declaration of rape made by AAA.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MICHAEL ESPERA y CUYACOTG.R. No. 202868, October 2, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

When the rape victim’s testimony which identified the accused as the rapist is clear,

categorical, consistent and credible, the defense of alibi will crumble and the accused shall be held

liable. Thus, if the victim was able to identify the accused in the police station as the rapist and during

trial, he will be convicted for rape even if the rapist covered his face with his clothes and despite the

incident taking place in the dark of night.

Facts:

Two informations charging accused-appellant with rape were filed with the RTC. The

prosecution alleged that one evening, co-workers Ana and Susie decided to share a tricycle ride

home. As was her wont, Susie beamed a flashlight on the front part of the tricycle. Susie recognized

the driver, Espera in this case, as one of her husband’s friends. Ana recognized the driver by face,although she did not know his name. She noticed that he was wearing a red polo shirt and maong

pants.

After Susie disembarked, the tricycle moved down the road past Ana’s house, with Espera

claiming that the brakes were not working. The tricycle stopped at the quarry site, as Espera

claimed that the tricycle ran out of gas. Ana was walking home under a bright moonlight when she

realized that she was being followed. It was Espera, with his red polo shirt covering his face and a

gun in his hand. Ana tried to run but was caught by Espera, who threatened that he will kill her if

she shouted. Espera dragged Ana to a more secluded place, pushed her to the ground and forcefully

undressed her. He was able to force his manhood into Ana’s mouth. He then inserted his fingers into

her vagina, and while pointing the gun at her head, forcefully penetrated Ana.

Later, Ana and her parents reported the matter to the police. When she saw Espera at the

police station, she recognized him although he cut his hair and shaved his beard. And when she

heard his voice, she became more certain that he was her assailant and, with that realization, she

could only cry and was unable to say anything.




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Espera maintained that at the time the crime was committed, he was asleep in his house,

and saw Ana the first time at the police station, where he was considered as among the suspects for

the rape.

The RTC found Espera guilty of the crimes of rape by sexual assault and rape by sexual

intercourse. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue:

Did Ana fail to properly identify Espina as the perpetrator of the rape?

Ruling:


Ana and Susie positively identified Espera as the driver of the tricycle in red polo shirt,

which ferried them to Barangay Ekis on that fateful night. Instead of bringing Ana home, Espera

brought her to the quarry in the pretext that the tricycle’s brakes malfunctioned and the ve hiclesubsequently ran out of gas. Consequently, Ana was placed in a vulnerable situation that enabled

Espera to commit the crime charged. As Ana started to walk home from the quarry, Espera took off

his red shirt and covered his face with it and then followed her with a gun in his hand. She ran when

she noticed him and he ran after her until he caught her. He poked his gun at her, repeatedly

threatened her, mercilessly hit her and raped her twice, first by sexual assault and then by sexual

intercourse. His lust satiated, he went back to his tricycle and drove away. She recognized him as

the one who raped her when he was presented to her at the police station two days after the

incident, although he already cut his hair and shaved his beard. And she positively identified him in

open court when she gave her testimony.

While Espera attempts to hide his identity in the blackness of the night, his identity has

been revealed and the darkness that is his cover has been dispelled by the categorical testimoniesof Susie and Ana that, while it was late into the night when they boarded Espera’s tricycle at the

junction, they saw his face because the place was illuminated by light from lamp posts and the

nearby chapel as well as from the houses in the vicinity. Moreover, Susie beamed her flashlight at

the tricycle, giving Ana an opportunity to recognize Espera as the driver and to notice that he was

wearing denim pants and a red polo shirt, which was the same red polo shirt he used to cover his

face. In other words, the tricycle driver in the red polo shirt was the same man whose face was

covered with a red polo shirt --Ana’s rapist -- Espera.

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Ana identified Espera not only by his appearance

but also by the sound of his voice. She remembered his voice when he was negotiating with her and

Susie for a ride to Barangay Ekis, when Susie disembarked from the tricycle and when he told her

that the tricycle’s brakes malfunctioned and, later on, that the tricycle’s fuel had gone empty. It wasthe same voice that repeatedly threatened to kill her, ordered her to take him in her mouth, asked

her whether she recognized him and his tricycle, and directed her not to leave the scene of the

crime until after he was gone for some time. And when she met him at the police station, despite his

attempt to prevent her from recognizing him by cutting his hair and shaving his beard, it was the

same voice that made her recognize him and made her cry out of fear.




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Ana’s testimony is clear, categorical, consistent and credible. Under its evidentiary weight, Espera’sdenial and alibi collapse and crumble. Thus, beyond reasonable doubt, the crimes of rape by sexual

assault and rape by sexual intercourse committed against Ana have been established. Beyond

reasonable doubt, too, it is Espera who committed the said crimes.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICARDO M. VIDAÑAG.R. No. 199210, October 23, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

It is jurisprudentially settled that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted

solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing and consistent with human

nature and the normal course of things. Furthermore, it is likewise settled that the factual findings of

the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great weight and

respect, if not conclusiveness, since the trial court was in the best position as the original trier of the

facts in whose direct presence and under whose keen observation the witnesses rendered their

respective versions of the events that made up the occurrences constituting the ingredients of the

offense charged. Thus, the testimony of a rape victim who is 15-year old girl which recounted the

ordeal she experienced at the hands of her own father, if delivered in a straightforward and convincing

manner, is sufficient to convict the accused.

Facts:

An information was filed with the RTC, charging Ricardo M. Vidaña of rape in relation to R.A.

No. 7610. The prosecution alleged that one evening, Vidaña pulled AAA, his 15-year old daughter,

from her bed and into the sala. Vidaña covered her mouth and told her not to make noise, and

forcibly removed her clothes aft erwards. As she lay naked, Vidaña inserted his penis into AAA’s

vagina. During the consummation of Vidaña’s lust upon his daughter, he warned her not to tell

anybody or else he will kill her and her siblings. The next day, AAA went to the house of Vidaña’s

friend, who was able to learn about the incident. They accompanied AAA to the police to report the

incident. Vidaña, on the other hand, claimed that he was at the fields harvesting with AAA’s

stepmother. The RTC convicted Vidaña.

Issues:

1. Is AAA’s testimony not credible and thus does not warrant a judgment of conviction?

2. Did the RTC mistakenly characterize the offense as sexual abuse under R.A. no. 7610?

Ruling:


1. No, as the victim’s testimony may be the sole basis for conviction in rape cases.

It is jurisprudentially settled that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted

solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing and consistent with

human nature and the normal course of things. Furthermore, it is likewise settled that the factual

findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great

weight and respect, if not conclusiveness, since the trial court was in the best position as the

original trier of the facts in whose direct presence and under whose keen observation the witnesses




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rendered their respective versions of the events that made up the occurrences constituting the

ingredients of the offense charged.

A careful review of the evidence and testimony brought to light in this case does not lead to

a conclusion that the trial court and the Court of Appeals were mistaken in their assessment of the

credibility of AAA’s testimony. Absent any demonstration by appellant that both tribunalsoverlooked a material fact that otherwise would change the outcome of the case or misunderstood

a circumstance of consequence in their evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses, we are thus

inclined to affirm the facts as established by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

We are of the opinion that the testimony of AAA regarding her ordeal was delivered in a

straightforward and convincing manner that is worthy of belief. When AAA testified and, thus, was

constrained to recount the torment she suffered at the hands of her own father, she broke down in

tears in more than one instance. This can only serve to strengthen her testimony as we have

indicated in past jurisprudence that the crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the

truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotion indicates the pain that the victim feels

when asked to recount her traumatic experience. It is also worth noting that appellant’s counsel did

not even bother to cross-examine AAA after her direct examination by the prosecutor.

We have previously held that it is against human nature for a young girl to fabricate a story

that would expose herself as well as her family to a lifetime of shame, especially when her charge

could mean the death or lifetime imprisonment of her father. That legal dictum finds application in

the case at bar since appellant did not allege nor prove any sufficient improper motive on the part

of AAA to falsely accuse him of such a serious charge of raping his own flesh and blood. His

allegation that AAA’s admission in open court, that she is not close to him and that they do not

agree on many things, cannot suffice as a compelling enough reason for her to fabricate such a

sordid and scandalous tale of incest.

With regard to appellant’s contention that AAA’s lack of resistance to the rape committed

against her, as borne out by her own testimony, negates any truth to her accusation, we rule thatsuch an argument deserves scant consideration. It is settled in jurisprudence that the failure to

shout or offer tenuous resistance does not make voluntary the victim’s submission to the criminalacts of the accused since rape is subjective and not everyone responds in the same way to an attack

by a sexual fiend.

Furthermore, we have reiterated that, in incestuous rape cases, the father’s abuse of the

moral ascendancy and influence over his daughter can subjugate the latter’s will thereby forcing

her to do whatever he wants. In other words, in an incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or

intimidation need not be employed where the overpowering moral influence of the father would

suffice.

2. Yes, the RTC erred in impliedly characterizing the offense charged as sexual abuseunder Sections 5 and 31 of R.A. No. 7610.

Under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, it is required that “[t]he complaint orinformation shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or

omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If

there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the

statute punishing it.” The information clearly charged appellant with rape, a crime punishable




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under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, appellant was accused in the

information with feloniously having carnal knowledge of his own minor daughter against her will

by using his influence as a father.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DANIEL ALCOBER

G.R. No. 192941, November 13, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

When a rape victim is paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected to think and act coherently.

Her failure to take advantage of an opportunity to escape does not automatically vitiate the credibility

of her account. Rape victims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature

individuals would when placed in such a situation. The fact that AAA was not able to escape when she

had the opportunity to do so, her continued visit to their home after the incident, and her delay in

filing the complaint does not at all contradict her credibility.

Facts:

AAA testified that she was around 10 years old and was in Grade 5 when accused-appellant

and her mother started living together as husband and wife. She considered accused-appellant to beher father and calls him "Tatay." Her mother is the one earning for the family, by selling bananas in

Carigara, Leyte.

On July 20, 1999, at around 2:00 a.m., AAA was in their house in Tunga, Leyte. Her mother

was away, selling bananas in Carigara, while her younger siblings were upstairs, sleeping. At that

time, AAA was in second year high school and was thirteen years old. After working on her school

assignment, AAA cooked rice downstairs in the kitchen. While she was busy cooking rice, she did

not notice the arrival of accused-appellant, who suddenly embraced her from her back. She

identified accused-appellant as the person who embraced her since she immediately turned around

and the place was illuminated by a kerosene lamp. AAA resisted and was able to release herself

from accused-appellant’s hold. Accused-appellant unsheathed the long bolo, locally called a

sundang, from the scabbard on his waist and ordered her to go upstairs. Poking the sundang atAAA’s stomach, he then ordered AAA to take off her shorts, and told her he will kill her, her siblings

and her mother if she does not do as she was told.

AAA complied with accused-appellant’s orders. When she was lying on the floor, alreadyundressed, accused-appellant placed the sundang beside her on her left side. He took off his shirt

and shorts and went on top of her. AAA did not shout since accused-appellant threatened to kill

them all if she did. He held her hair with his right hand and touched her private parts with his left

hand. He then "poked" his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement. AAA felt pain.

Accused-appellant kissed her and said "Ah, you’re still a virgin." When accused-appellant was done,

he stood and said "If you will tell this to anybody, I will kill you."

AAA did not tell her mother about the incident as she was afraid accused-appellant willexecute his threat to kill them all. The sexual advances were thereafter repeated every time AAA’smother sold bananas on Wednesdays and Sundays.

On January 8, 2001, accused-appellant ordered AAA to pack and go with him to Tabontabon,

Leyte, threatening once more to kill her siblings if she does not comply. In Tabontabon, accused-

appellant once again forced AAA to have sex with him. The following day, AAA’s mother,

accompanied by police officers of Tunga, Leyte, arrived, searching for AAA and the accused-




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appellant. AAA was finally able to talk to her mother, which led to AAA’s filing a complaint for rapeagainst accused-appellant.

The RTC of Carigara, Leyte rendered a Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime

of rape. The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of rape?

Ruling: No

Accused-appellant asserts that AAA’s testimony that the sexual intercourse between themwas not consensual is "patently incredible." According to accused-appellant, AAA could have

escaped after she was raped for the first time on July 20, 1999. Since AAA was already residing in

her aunt’s house, she should never have returned to BBB and accused -appellant’s house in order to

prevent the repeated sexual intercourse after July 20, 1999 and the before the incident inTabontabon. Accused-appellant furthermore claim that the delay in revealing her alleged sexual

ordeals from July 20, 1999 up to January 10, 2001 creates serious doubts as to her contention that

she was raped.

We must emphasize that when the accused in a rape case claims, as in the case at bar, that

the sexual intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual, the burden of evidence

shifts to him, such that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship.

Being an affirmative defense, it must be established with convincing evidence, such as by some

documentary and/or other evidence like mementos, love letters, notes, pictures and the like.

Other than his self-serving testimony, however, accused-appellant failed to adduce evidence

of his supposed relationship with AAA. The testimony of Davocol as regards seeing AAA andaccused-appellant on July 20, 1999 boarding a jeep bound for Tacloban does not in any way suggest

a romantic or sexual relationship between them. On the other hand, we are convinced that the

sordid version of facts presented by accused-appellant is nothing but a depraved concoction by a

very twisted and obnoxious imagination. Accused-appellant’s tale of being seduced by his 13-year

old stepdaughter who calls him "Tatay" or "Papa," and having sexual intercourse with her while her

mother was watching and crying is not only nauseatingly repulsive but is likewise utterly

incredible. It is unthinkable for BBB, who helped AAA file the complaint and testified against

accused-appellant, to just passively endure such an outrage happening before her very eyes. The

trial court, which observed the demeanor of AAA, BBB and the accused-appellant on the witness

stand, did not find accused-appellant’s account plausible, and instead gave full faith and credence to

the testimonies of AAA and BBB. The trial court, in fact, described accused-appellant’s demeanor as

boastful and his narration as a make-believe story.

While at the witness stand, the accused boastfully testified and took out from the back

pocket of his pants a panty of a woman which according to him was given to him by AAA after their

sexual intercourse to which he exchanged it with his own brief as a proof that AAA enjoyed having

sexual intercourse with him.




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Contrary to the assertions of accused-appellant, the fact that AAA was not able to escape

when she had the opportunity to do so, her continued visit to their home after the incident, and her

delay in filing the complaint does not at all contradict her credibility. As discussed by the Court of

Appeals, when a rape victim is paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected to think and act

coherently. Her failure to take advantage of an opportunity to escape does not automatically vitiate

the credibility of her account. Similarly, in People v. Lazaro, we propounded on the impropriety ofjudging the actions of child rape victims by the norms of behavior that can be expected from adults

under similar circumstances:

It is not uncommon for a young girl to conceal for some time the assault on her virtue. Her

initial hesitation may be due to her youth and the molester’s threat against her. Besides, rapevictims, especially child victims, should not be expected to act the way mature individuals would

when placed in such a situation. It is not proper to judge the actions of children who have

undergone traumatic experience by the norms of behavior expected from adults under similar

circumstances. x x x. It is, thus, unrealistic to expect uniform reactions from them. Certainly, the

Court has not laid down any rule on how a rape victim should behave immediately after she has

been violated. This experience is relative and may be dealt with in any way by the victim depending

on the circumstances, but her credibility should not be tainted with any modicum of doubt. Indeed,different people react differently to a given stimulus or type of situation, and there is no standard

form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange or startling or frightful

experience. x x x.

In all, we do not find sufficient ground to overturn the guilty verdict rendered by the lower

courts. However, the proper penalty for qualified rape is reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic

Act No. 9346 which prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. Consistent with prevailing

jurisprudence, we modify the amount of exemplary damages for qualified rape by increasing the

same from Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)

following established jurisprudence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WELMO. LINSIE y BINEVIDEZG.R. No. 199494, November 27, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

In rape cases, the accused may be convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim,

provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and

the normal course of things. Rape victims are not expected to make an errorless recollection of the

incident, so humiliating and painful that they might be trying to obliterate it from their memory, thus,

a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the offended

party.

Facts:

At around 11 o’clock in the morning of December 14, 2005, accused-appellant, armed with aknife allegedly committed rape against complainant at Brgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque City. After

raping her, appellant threatened to kill her and told her not to tell her common law husband about

what happened. Because she could no longer hide from her husband what happened, she told him

about it the following day. They both went to the barangay and had the incident blottered. She was

able to have a medical checkup on December 17, 2005.




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On December 19, 2014, appellant was charged of rape. During the trial, complainant

testified that she has known appellant for a very long time because he is a "kababayan" from Bicol.

On the other hand, appellant testified that he does not know of any reason the complainant is

accusing him of rape. He denied that on December 14, 2005 at around 11:00 o’clock in the morning,

armed with a knife, he raped her. He left his house at around 6 o’clock in the morning to work as a

construction worker in the house of Aling Gigi and went home around 5 o’clock in the afternoon onthe same day.

Nevertheless, the trial court convicted accused-appellant of one count of the felony of

simple rape as defined and penalized in Article 266-A, paragraph 1 in relation to Article 266-B,

paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353.

Appellant appealed his conviction. On review, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment

affirming the trial court ruling. Undaunted, appellant filed the instant appeal before the Supreme

Court.

Issues:

1. Does the credibility of the rape victim’s testimony is a recurring crucial factor in the resolution of

a case of rape?

2. Is the failure of the rape victim to shout, fight back, or escape from the scoundrel is tantamount to

consent or approval?

3. Are a medical examination and a medical certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission of

rape, indispensable to a successful prosecution for rape?

Rulings:

1. Yes

It is settled in jurisprudence that in reviewing rape convictions, the court is guided by threeprinciples, namely:

a. That an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult for the complainant to

prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove;

b. That in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape as involving two persons, the

rapist and the victim, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;

and

c. That the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be

allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

In rape cases, the accused may be convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim,

provided that such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and consistent with human nature andthe normal course of things. With regard to appellant’s assertion that complainant’s testimony wasplagued with inconsistencies and variations that would merit appellant’s acquittal, it is concluded

that these discrepancies in complainant’s testimony involve minor matters that do not constitutematerial facts or circumstances of consequence. The suppositions that appellant could not have

raped the complainant as his legs at one point were supposedly sandwiching complainant’s legs orthat he could not have been able to undress while pointing a knife at the victim do not necessarily

render complainant’s testimony incredible. In the present case, the complainant categorically stated




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under oath that despite her attempts to resist, appellant succeeded in removing her panty and

inserting his penis inside her sexual organ, thereby consummating the crime of rape.

Furthermore, rape victims are not expected to make an errorless recollection of the

incident, so humiliating and painful that they might be trying to obliterate it from their memory,

thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of theoffended party.

2. No.

Appellant’s allegation that the complainant did not tenaciously resist his sexual advances isrejected. The victim’s testimony will bear out that she did exert efforts to refuse appellant’s carnal

desires by slapping the accused, kicking him and trying to create noise but she was physically

overpowered and intimidated by the threat of mortal harm posed by appellant’s knife as well asdebilitated by illness. Failure of a rape victim to shout, fight back, or escape from the scoundrel is

not tantamount to consent or approval because the law imposes no obligation to exhibit defiance or

present proof of struggle.

3. No.

Appellant’s attempt to discredit the medico-legal report cannot exculpate him from liability

for rape because the said document and the medico-legal’s subsequent testimony are not essentialfor the prosecution and conviction of a person accused of rape. A medical examination and a

medical certificate, albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not indispensable to a

successful prosecution for rape.

Both denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive

and credible testimony of the prosecution witness that the accused committed the crime. Thus, as

between a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and alibi

on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Moreover, for the defense of alibi to prosper,the appellant must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he

was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the

crime or at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Appellant’s alibi did not sufficiently

establish that he was working at a construction site when the complainant was raped and that it

was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Likewise,

the corroborating testimony of defense witness Talinghale does not discount the possibility that

appellant may have left the construction site to commit the dastardly act he was charged with and

came back afterwards

.

Appellant failed to show any motive why the complainant would testify falsely against him.

This fact further bolsters the veracity of the complainant’s accusation since no woman would

concoct a tale that would tarnish her reputation, bring humiliation and disgrace to herself and herfamily, and submit herself to the rigors, shame, and stigma attendant to the prosecution of rape,

unless she is motivated by her quest to seek justice for the crime committed against her. Therefore,

the conviction of appellant for the felony of simple rape is affirmed.

The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be appreciated in favor of

appellant; however, considering that the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua is single and

indivisible, the same may not serve to lower the penalty.




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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DALTON LAURIAN, JR. y PUGSOTG.R. No. 199868, December 11, 2013, J . Leonardo-De Castro

In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of

the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course ofthings. The very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the

credibility of the complainant’s testimony because of the fact that, usually, only the participants can

directly testify as to its occurrence.

Physical resistance need not be established when intimidation is brought to bear on the victim

and the latter submits out of fear — the failure to shout or offer tenuous resistance does not make

voluntary the victim’s submission to the criminal acts of the accused.

A love affair does not justify rape for a man does not have the unbridled license to subject his

beloved to his carnal desires against her will.

Facts:

At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of September 28, 2001, at Poblacion, Baguias, Benguet,the accused allegedly committed rape against a 16-year-old girl when he suddenly pulled the

complainant by the hand and led her towards a classroom at Baguias Central School while on her

way home after attending a fellowship at the Assembly of God Church. Out of fear, the complainant

never told anyone of the incident. It was only when her landlady wrote her mother, informing her

of her disappearance on that fateful night that she eventually told her mother what happened.

After learning of the incident, the complainant was immediately referred to a psychologist

and to a medico-legal officer for medical check-up. The examination conducted revealed shallow

healed lacerations at 3 and 7 o’clock positions and deep healed lacerations at 9 o’clock positions of

the hymen. On the other hand, the psychologist found her to be suffering intense anxiety, inferred

to be due to her traumatic experience of sexual abuse.

Thereafter, the complainant filed a criminal complaint against appellant. Upon learning of

the case, appellant went to the house of the complainant’s grandfather five times to offer marriageto the victim as a form of settlement.

On the other hand, the defense offered an alternate narrative that the accused and

complainant were sweethearts and having amorous relationship.

The trial court convicted the accused for the felony of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph

1(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Appellant appealed his case to the Court of Appeals but the

appellate court merely upheld the lower court’s judgment. Thus, the appellant, filed the instant

appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. In a prosecution for rape, may the accused be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the

victim?

2. Is there a need to establish physical resistance on the part of the rape victim?

3. May the accused interpose the defense of Sweetheart Theory in the case at bar?




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Ruling:

1. Yes.

In a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony

of the victim that is credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal courseof things. By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on

the credibility of the complainant’s testimony because of the fact that, usually, only the participants

can directly testify as to its occurrence.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines when and how the felony of rape is

committed, to wit: Rape is committed –

A. Bye a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following

circumstances:

(1) Through force, threat or intimidation;

(2) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

(3) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

(4) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, eventhough none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

B. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,

shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal

orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

2. No.

Contrary to appellant’s insistence that the essential element of the use of force orintimidation was not present in this case because the complainant never exhibited an adequate

amount of resistance despite the fact that appellant was drunk and unarmed, it is evident from the

transcript that appellant used his physical superiority to intimidate and force the complainant into

coming with him inside a dark classroom and later to knock her unconscious which facilitated theconsummation of rape. It matters not whether the complainant strongly resisted appellant’s

unwanted purpose for it is jurisprudentially settled that physical resistance need not be established

when intimidation is brought to bear on the victim and the latter submits out of fear –the failure to

shout or offer tenuous resistance does not make voluntary the victim’s submission to the criminalacts of the accused.

Furthermore, force or violence required in rape cases is relative –it does not need to be

overpowering or irresistible and it is present when it allows the offender to consummate his

purpose. In other words, the degree of force or violence required to be proven in a rape charge

varies because it is dependent upon the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to

each other.

Records show that the complainant was only 16 years old and 5 feet 3 inches in height when

she was raped; while appellant was 21 years old and 5 feet and 7 inches in height. Understandably,

a girl of such young age could only cower in fear and yield into submission to such an adult. Rape,

after all, is nothing more than a conscious process of intimidation by which a man keeps a woman

in a state of fear and humiliation. Thus, it is not even impossible for a victim of rape not to make an

outcry against an unarmed assailant.




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A rape charge becomes doubtful only when the delay or inaction in revealing its

commission is unreasonable and unexplained. With respect to the complainant’s act ions

immediately following the rape incident at issue as well as her delay in reporting the crime which

appellant both characterized as indicative of the falsity of her accusation, there has never been any

uniformity or consistency of behavior to be expected from those who had the misfortune of being

sexually molested. Some of them have found the courage early on to publicly denounce the abusesthey experienced, but that there were others who have opted to initially keep their harrowing

ordeals to themselves and to just move on with their lives as if nothing had happened, until the

limits of their tolerance were reached. The complainant belonged to the latter group of victims, as

her honest declarations to the trial court revealed. Also, it cannot be expected from the immature

and inexperienced complainant to measure up to the same standard of conduct and reaction that

we would expect from adults whose maturity in age and experience could have brought them to

stand up more quickly to their interest. Lastly, long silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape

to the proper authorities have not always been considered as an indication of a false accusation.

When the complainant relived her ordeal at the witness stand, she broke down in tears

more than once. This only serves to bolster her credibility considering that the crying of a victim

during her testimony is evidence of the truth of the rape charges, for the display of such emotionindicates the pain that the victim feels when asked to recount her traumatic experience.

The defense of denial was ineffectively supported by corroboration from witnesses who are

composed of appellant’s friends and acquaintances. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that denial,

just like alibi, cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of an

accused by the complainant and that mere denial, without any strong evidence to support it, can

scarcely overcome the positive declaration by the victim of the identity and involvement of

appellant in the crime attributed to him.

3. No.

Granting without conceding that the accused and the complainant knew each other prior tothe rape incident at issue and that he had been courting the complainant, implying they were

sweethearts holds true, the damning declaration made by the complainant that she was raped by

appellant stands undiminished. The use of force or intimidation in sexual intercourse is not

necessarily ruled out by the mere claim of an amorous relationship. Love affair does not justify rape

for a man does not have the unbridled license to subject his beloved to his carnal desires against

her will.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LINO PALDOG.R. No. 200515, December 11, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

It is a well-established rule that testimonies of rape victims, especially child victims, are given

full weight and credit. When a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, ineffect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Youth and immaturity are generally

badges of truth. Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual

assault, especially a minor, particularly in cases of incestuous rape, because no woman would be

willing to undergo a public trial and put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her

own degradation were it not to condemn an injustice and to have the offender apprehended and

punished.




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Facts:

Accused-appellant Lino Paldo was charged with qualified rape under Article 266-A(1) in

relation to Article 266-B(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 8353. An Information was

filed against him at the RTC in Banaue, Ifugao accusing him of having carnal knowledge with his

daughter, who was eight (8) years old at the time when the crime was committed.

Upon arraignment, accused Paldo pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

According to the prosecution’s version of events, in the evening of March 10, 2001, the

accused and her daughter (AAA) were sleeping at their residence when suddenly AAA was

awakened by her father who removed her pants and thereafter raped her. Although there were no

lights on, the victim knew it was the accused who sexually assaulted her, being very familiar with

her own father. The accused threatened her not to tell the victim’s mother who was not aroundwhen the incident happened. However, the victim narrated to her mother who arrived home on

March 12, 2001 about the incident thereby causing the filing of the present complaint against the

accused.

Accused, on his part, denied the accusations against him. He averred that from February to

March 2001, he was working for Maria Pin-ag in Kinakin, Chapeh, Banaue, Ifugao which was a two-

hour hike from their residence. He also averred that he did not go home to their residence on the

night of the alleged rape, rather he stayed in Chapeh with his two friends. He also asserted that he

could not have raped his daughter on March 10, 2001 since the victim was not staying in their

residence, but was living with her grandfather at the place where she was studying.

Much of the accused’s arguments focused on the purported inconsistencies of the victim’stestimony which cast doubt on credibility: (1) that there was no electric light inside their house

when the alleged rape took place so the victim could have seen the face of the rapist; (2) that the

school records reveal that the victim was not staying at their residence where the alleged rape took

place; and (3) that the rape case was filed against the accused at the instigation of his wife.

RTC found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for raping his daughter

and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The Appellate Court affirmed his conviction hence this

petition before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the testimony of minor victims of rape can be given full weight and credit.

2. Whether or not the accused’s denial and alibi will prosper.

3. Whether or not the presentation of the birth certificate is an all-exclusive requisite in proving the

age of the victim.

Ruling:

1. Yes, it is a well-established rule that testimonies of rape victims, especially child victims, are

given full weight and credit.

The Court has ruled that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped,

she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Courts usually give




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greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor,

particularly in cases of incestuous rape, because no woman would be willing to undergo a public

trial and put up with the shame, humiliation and dishonor of exposing her own degradation were it

not to condemn an injustice and to have the offender apprehended and punished.

In this case, the victim (AAA) was barely eight (8) years old when she was raped by theaccused-appellant.

Moreover, the fact that the room was dark because there was no electricity in the house is

insignificant and cannot be considered as a hindrance for the victim’s identification of the accused

as her rapist, especially considering that the accused is her father, with whom she is very familiar,

even when it is dark. During rape incidents, the offender and the victim are as close to each other as

is physically possible.

The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost

importance in establishing the truth and falsity of the charge of rape. When AAA immediately

narrated to her mother about the incident and thereafter, straightaway reported the matter to the

authorities, strengthened the belief that AAA had been raped by the accused-appellant.

2. No, the accused’s denial and alibi will not prosper.

The accused cannot totally deny that he was at their house when the rape happened in

order to counter and categorical declarations of AAA that her father raped her.

For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the defendant was somewhere else when

the crime was committed, but he must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for

him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time.

In this case, the accused acknowledged that the travel time of 1-2 hours from Chapeh to

their residence did not pose an insurmountable barrier for the accused to actually take a trip fromChapeh to their residence and back after committing the crime. Hence, it was not physically

impossible for the accused-appellant to be present at the scene of the crime at the time of its

commission.

3. No, the presentation of the birth certificate is not an all-exclusive requisite in proving the age of

the victim.

The following are the guidelines established by the Court in appreciating age as either an

element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance:

a) The best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth certificate or certified

true copy thereof;

b) In the absence of the abovementioned documents, similar authentic documents may be

presented such as baptismal certificates and school records;

c) If the original or certified true copy of the birth certificate is not available, credible

testimonies of the victim’s mother or a member of the family may be sufficient under

certain circumstances; and




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d) In the event that both the birth certificate or other authentic documents and testimonies

of the victim’s mother or other qualified relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim

may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the

accused.

It is prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of

the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him. The

trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.

In this case, the victim’s mother testified that her daughter (AAA) was born on February 9,2001 and was eight years old at the time of the rape. The victim herself categorically stated in her

Sworn Statement and Supplemental Sworn Statement that she was eight years old. Even accused-

appellant, in his testimony before the trial court, confirmed that the victim was 8 years old in March

2011.

Therefore, since the rape of victim was qualified by AAA’s minority and the accused’s

paternity, the Court of Appeals was correct in determining the proper penalty that can be imposedupon the accused which is reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERVIN GAHI


It is jurisprudentially settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect all

that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it satisfies the

exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the fate of the

accused in a rape case, ultimately and oftentimes, hinges on the credibility of the victim’s testimony. In

this regard, the Court defers to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of victim’ s testimony, most

especially, when it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Furthermore, it is not absurd nor contrary to human experience that AAA gave birth ten (10)

months after the alleged sexual assault as there may be cases of long gestations.

Facts:

AAA is sixteen years old and a resident of x x x, Leyte. She testified that she knows accused

Mervin Gahi (Mervin), the latter being the husband of her aunt DDD. Mervin was charged of two

instances of rape against AAA.

On the first instance of rape, AAA recounted that on March 11, 2002 at about 11:30 in the

morning, she was in her grandmother’s house, who was then out of the house to collect money from

debtors. While she was in the living room mopping the floor, Mervin arrived in the house. AAArecounted that Mervin came near her and instructed her to "Lie down, lie down". Fearful upon

hearing Mervin’s orders, AAA stopped mopping the floor. Mervin, with his right hand, then held

AAA’s right arm. He pushed AAA, causing her to lose her balance and fall on the floor. Mervin raised

AAA’s skirt and proceeded to take off her underwear. Mervin was holding a knife poking it at AAA’s

right breast. Fearful for her life, AAA did not resist Mervin’s initial advances. After taking off AAA’sunderwear, Mervin went on top of her and while in that position, he took off his shorts, inserted his

penis inside her vagina and ejaculated. AAA’s efforts to free herself from Mervin’s hold were




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unsuccessful. As a result of her struggle, she felt tired and weak. After satisfying his lust, Mervin

warned AAA to keep secret what transpired or else he would kill her. Afraid that he would make

good his threat, AAA did not mention to anybody what happened, even to her aunt DDD, the wife of

the accused.

On the second instance of rape, AAA recalled that the second rape occurred on March 12,2002 at about three o’clock in the afternoon. On her way to the field and with a carabao in tow, shewas met by Mervin along the foot trail. While on the foot trail, Mervin went near AAA, prompting

her to hurriedly scamper to BBB’s house. Mervin followed her. Once in the living room of BBB’shouse, Mervin approached AAA, poked a knife at the right side of her body, pushed her and made

her lie down. Out of fear, she didn’t resist Mervin’s advances. He threatened and ordered her to"keep quiet, don’t talk". Then he raised her skirt and took off her underwear, after which, he took

off his short pants and his brief, laid himself on top of her, and made pumping motions until he

ejaculated. Blood came out of AAA’s vagina. After the rape, AAA cried while the accused left thehouse. Just like before, she did not mention the incident to anybody, not even to her grandmother

and to her aunt DDD, for fear that Mervin might kill them.

AAA narrated that the first person she told about her ordeal was Lynlyn, her employer inOrmoc, where AAA spent three months working, when the former was able to detect her pregnancy.

It was also Lynlyn who accompanied her to the Capoocan Police Station to report and file the case.

After reporting the matter to the police, AAA did not go back to Ormoc anymore and later gave

birth. Instead, she and her baby stayed with the Department of Social Welfare and Development

(DSWD).

The defense presented several witnesses to belie the claim. After hearing, RTC found Mervin

guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of Rape plus damages. On appeal, CA affirmed the

decision with modification as to the damages. On this petition, Mervin maintains that AAA’s

incredible and inconsistent testimony does not form sufficient basis for him to be convicted of two

counts of rape. He argues that his testimony along with that of other defense witnesses should have

been accorded greater weight and credibility. He faults the trial court for ignoring the extendedtime period between the alleged rapes and the birth of AAA’s baby; and for disbelieving Jackie

Gucela’s testimony which stated that the latter was AAA’s lover and the father of AAA’s child,contrary to AAA’s claim that the baby was the fruit of appellant’s unlawful carnal congress with her.

He also insists that his alibi should have convinced the trial court that he is innocent because he was

at another place at the time the rapes were allegedly committed by him. On the strength of these

assertions, appellant believes that he is deserving of an acquittal that is long overdue because the

prosecution failed miserably to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Issue:

1. Whether Mervin is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape.

2. Whether sweetheart theory is a valid defense for Mervin.3. Whether the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty against Gahi.

Ruling:

1. Gahi is guilty of simple rape.




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Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines when and how the felony of rape is

committed, to wit:

Rape is committed –


circumstances:(a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even

though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,

shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth oranal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

It is jurisprudentially settled that when a woman says she has been raped, she says in effect

all that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is sufficient if it

satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused. Thus, in this jurisdiction,the fate of the accused in a rape case, ultimately and oftentimes, hinges on the credibility of the

victim’s testimony. In this regard, the Court defers to the trial court’s assessment of the credibilityof AAA’s testimony, most especially, when it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Furthermore, the Court express their agreement with the statement made by the Court of

Appeals that it is not absurd nor contrary to human experience that AAA gave birth ten (10) months

after the alleged sexual assault as there may be cases of long gestations. In any event, we dismiss

appellant’s contention as immaterial to the case at bar because jurisprudence tells us thatimpregnation is not an element of rape. This rule was eloquently explained in People v. Bejic:

It is well-entrenched in our case law that the rape victim’s pregnancy and resultant

childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not anessential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore was

fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is

important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the

latter’s will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful

manner.

2. Sweetheart theory is not applicable in this case.

The Court assigns no significance to the testimony of defense witness Jackie Gucela. Firstly,

AAA categorically denied that Jackie Gucela was her boyfriend or that she had sexual relations with

him or any other person other than appellant near the time of the rape incidents at issue. For the

sweetheart theory to be believed when invoked by the accused, convincing evidence to prove theexistence of the supposed relationship must be presented by the proponent of the theory. The Court

elucidated on this principle in People v. Bayrante, to wit:

For the ["sweetheart"] theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed relationship

must be proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce such evidence

renders his claim to be self-serving and of no probative value. For the satisfaction of the




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Court, there should be a corroboration by their common friends or, if none, a substantiation

by tokens of such a relationship such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like.

In the present case, although it is a person other than the accused who is claiming to be the

victim’s sweetheart and the father of her child, such an assertion must nonetheless be believably

demonstrated by the evidence. The defense failed to discharge the burden of proving that AAA andJackie Gucela had any kind of romantic or sexual relationship which resulted in AAA’s pregnancy.We quote with approval the discussion made by the Court of Appeals on this matter:

In any event, even assuming for the sake of argument that AAA had a romantic

attachment with a person other than the accused at the time of the rape incidents or

thereafter, this circumstance would not necessarily negate the truth of AAA’s statement that

the appellant, her aunt’s husband, twice had carnal knowledge of her through force andintimidation and without her consent.

3. The CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua against Mervin.

The Court of Appeals downgraded the penalty imposed on appellant from death (as decreedby the trial court) to reclusion perpetua. It has been established that appellant committed the

aforementioned felonies with the use of a deadly weapon which according to Article 266-B,

paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. There being no

aggravating circumstance present in this case, the proper penalty of imprisonment should be

reclusion perpetua for each instance of rape.

It is worth noting that appellant is an uncle by affinity of AAA.

Following the 5th paragraph (1) of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, a relationship

within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity taken with the minority of AAA would have

merited the imposition of the death penalty. However, no such close relationship was shown in this

case as accused appears to be the husband of AAA’s father’s cousin. In any case, the death penaltyhas been abolished by the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 which also mandated that the

outlawed penalty be replaced with reclusion perpetua. A qualifying or aggravating circumstance, if

properly alleged and proven, might not have the effect of changing the term of imprisonment but it

would, nevertheless, be material in determining the amount of pecuniary damages to be imposed.

Thus, in view of the foregoing, we affirm the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals which

was reclusion perpetua for each conviction of simple rape. The award of moral damages in the

amount P50,000.00 is likewise upheld. However, the award of civil indemnity should be reduced

from P75,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with jurisprudence. For the same reason, the award of

exemplary damages should be increased from P25,000.00 toP30,000.00.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BERNABE PAREJA y CRUZ G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014 , J. Leonardo-De Castro

When through evidence, the accused is guilty of ‘rape through sexual assault’ but the

information charged against him is ‘rape through carnal knowledge’, the accused cannot be found

guilty of rape by sexual assault even though it was proven during trial. This is due to the material

differences and substantial distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not

necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa. Consequently, to convict the accused of rape by




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sexual assault when what he was charged with was rape through carnal knowledge, would be to

violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

However, the accused, on the said information, may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of

lasciviousness.

Facts:

AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse

took place on three (3) different dates, particularly in December 2003, February 2004, and March

27, 2004. AAA’s parents separated when she was [only eight years old]. At the time of the

commission of the aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with Bernabe

Pareja (Pareja) who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother, together with three (3) of their

children, aged twelve (12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in Pasay City.

The first incident took place in December 2003 [the December 2003 incident]. AAA’s

mother was not in the house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of the

situation, Pareja, while AAA was asleep, placed himself on top of [her]. Then, [Pareja], who was

already naked, begun to undress AAA. Pareja then started to suck the breasts of [AAA]. Not satisfied,Pareja likewise inserted his penis into AAA’s anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she felt,

AAA immediately stood up and rushed outside of their house. AAA never told anyone about the

December 2003 incident for fear that Pareja might kill her. Pareja threatened to kill AAA in the

event that she would expose the incident to anyone.

In February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had again been molested by Pareja.

Under the same circumstances as the December 2003 incident, with her mother not around while

she and her half-siblings were asleep, Pareja again laid on top of her and started to suck her breasts.

But this time, Pareja caressed her and held her vagina and inserted his finger in it. With regard to

the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it was AAA’s mother who sawPareja in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAA’s

mother immediately brought AAA to the barangay officers to report the said incident. AAA thennarrated to the barangay officials that she had been sexually abused by Pareja many times.

Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the

Philippine General Hospital for a medical and genital examination. After the results of the medico-

legal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped, AAA’s mother then fi led a complaint for rape

before the Pasay City Police Station.

Pareja, on the other hand, offered both denial and ill motive of AAA against him as his

defense. He denied raping AAA but admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter of his live-in

partner and that they all stay in the same house. Pareja further averred that it would have been

impossible that the alleged incidents happened. To justify the same, [Pareja] described the layout of

their house and argued that there was no way that the alleged sexual abuses could have happened.According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters wide by ten (10)

meters, and was so small that they all have to sit to be able to fit inside the house. Further, the

vicinity where their house is located was thickly populated with houses constructed side by side.

Allegedly, AAA also had no choice but to sleep beside her siblings. All taken into account, [Pareja]

asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he could possibly still go about with his plan without

AAA’s siblings nor their neighbors noticing the same.




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Pareja was charged of two counts of rape and attempted rape. The RTC acquitted Pareja

from the charge of attempted rape but convicted him of the crimes of rape and acts of

lasciviousness in the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents, respectively. On appeal, CA

affirmed RTC’s ruling in toto.

Issue: Whether the accused is guilty of rape

Ruling:

The accused in not guilty of rape but may be convicted for acts of lasciviousness.

The enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, revolutionized the

concept of rape with the recognition of sexual violence on "sex-related" orifices other than a

woman’s organ is included in the crime of rape; and the crime’s expansion to cover gender-free

rape. "The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against persons

and the introduction of rape by ‘sexual assault’ as differentiated from the traditional ‘rape throughcarnal knowledge’ or ‘rape through sexual intercourse.’" Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article

335, the provision on rape in the Revised Penal Code and incorporated therein Article 266-A.

Under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways:

1. Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse, also known as

"organ rape" or "penile rape." The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is

carnal knowledge, which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called "instrument or

object rape," or "gender-free rape." It must be attended by any of the circumstances

enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.

In a previous case, the Court differentiated the two modes of committing rape as follows:

(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be

a man or a woman;(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the

offended party may be a man or a woman;

(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the

second is committed by inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice,or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and

(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.

Under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by sexual

assault is "by any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof,

shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal

orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person."

AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his penis

into her anus. While she may not have been certain about the details of the February 2004 incident,

she was positive that Pareja had anal sex with her in December 2003, thus, clearly establishing the

occurrence of rape by sexual assault. In other words, her testimony on this account was, as the

Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and probable. However, since the charge in the Information

for the December 2003 incident is rape through carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of

rape by sexual assault even though it was proven during trial. This is due to the material differences




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and substantial distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus, the first mode is not necessarily

included in the second, and vice-versa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of rape by sexual assault

when what he was charged with was rape through carnal knowledge, would be to violate his

constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. Thefollowing elements must be proven:

(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

a. By using force or intimidation; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and

(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.

Clearly, the above-mentioned elements are present in the December 2003 incident, and

were sufficiently established during trial. Thus, even though the crime charged against Pareja was

for rape through carnal knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness

without violating any of his constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape.

The February 2004 Incident

It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the prosecution

against Pareja, especially AAA’s testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC found AAA’s declaration on the

rape in the December 2003 incident credible enough to result in a conviction, albeit this Court had

to modify it as explained above. However, it did not find that the same level of proof, i.e., beyond

reasonable doubt, was fully satisfied by the prosecution in its charge of attempted rape and a

second count of rape against Pareja. In Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM, or the February 2004

incident, the RTC considered AAA’s confusion as to whether or not she was actually penetrated byPareja, and eventually resolved the matter in Pareja’s favor.

This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay, stated that aside

from sucking her breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. However, she was not able to

give a clear and convincing account of such insertion during her testimony. Despite being

repeatedly asked by the prosecutor as to what followed after her breasts were sucked, AAA failed to

testify, in open court, that Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. Moreover, later on, she

added that Pareja inserted his penis in her vagina during that incident. Thus, because of the

material omissions and inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape in the February 2004

incident. Nonetheless, Pareja’s acts of placing himself on top of AAA and sucking her breasts, fallunder the crime of acts of lasciviousness, which, as we have discussed above, is included in the

crime of rape. Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja sucked

both her breasts in the February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly convicted by the courts a

quo of the crime of acts of lasciviousness.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AURELIO JASTIVAG.R. No. 199268, February 12, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro

When the accused asserts that the cover of darkness and lack of lighting inside the "kamalig"

where the crime took place, utterly diminished victim’s ability to identify him or anyone for that

matter, is downright erroneous. The victim never claimed to have seen her attacker inside the




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"kamalig." What was testified was the fact that the victim saw appellant Jastiva when he walked past

her by the open door of the "kamalig" and his face was finally illuminated by the moonlight. The Court

have held that wicklamps, flashlight, even moonlight and starlight may, in proper situations, be

sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on this ground

unmeritorious. Furthermore, in other cases the Court ruled, “If identification of persons is possible even

by the light of stars, with more reason that one could identify persons by moonlight.”

Facts:

On August 3, 2004, then 67-year old AAA was drying corn in their small barn in a farmland

located at Sitio XXX, Zamboanga del Norte, when her husband, BBB, left her alone. BBB spent that

night in their permanent residence at Sitio WWW because their daughter has no companion.

At about 11:00 in the evening, AAA was fast asleep when a certain man she later identified

as accused-appellant Aurelio Jastiva (Jastiva) covered her mouth, threatened her with a knife and

told her not to scream because he will have sexual intercourse with her. AAA grabbed accused-

appellant’s hand and felt the blade of the knife he held. Thereafter, accused-appellant removed

AAA’s underwear. However, he cannot proceed with his lewd design because his penis was not yeterected (sic), accused-appellant therefore toyed with AAA’s sexual organ by licking it. Accused-

appellant then made his way up and tried to suck AAA’s tongue. The latter evaded her assaulter’ssexual advances by closing her lips tightly and in the process wounded the same through her teeth.

Once done, accused-appellant held his penis and inserted it to AAA’s vagina. After fulfilling hissexual desire and before AAA could stand up, accused-appellant tapped AAA’s shoulder and said

"Salamat" (Thank you).

AAA stood up and opened the door to let accused-appellant out. When the latter passed

through (sic) AAA, it was then that the (sic) AAA clearly recognized, through the illumination of the

moon, that it was their (sic) neighbor accused-appellant who abused her. Engulfed with fear, AAA

immediately closed the door because she thought that accused-appellant might go (sic) back and

kill her. AAA later learned that accused-appellant destroyed a particular rack in their kitchen toenter the small barn. AAA was no longer able to sleep after the incident.

In the morning of the next day, AAA relayed her ordeal to her neighbor Corazon Mokot and

her husband BBB. The latter immediately told her that they will bring the matter to the attention of

the authorities. AAA and BBB went to the Barangay Hall to report the incident. The officer-on-duty

wrote a barangay blotter about the incident. On the same day, AAA was medically examined which

revealed that AAA’s labia majora and labia minora on both sides showed signs of irritation and are

reddish in color, in addition to a partial separation of tissues noted between the labium. AAA’svaginal opening also showed signs of irritation and are (sic) reddish in color. The same also stated

that AAA sustained multiple scratches at both her upper and lower lips.

AAA filed a Complaint for Rape against Jastiva. On the other hand, the defense offeredtestimonies of several witnesses to counter the evidence. According to the defense, appellant

Jastiva, 49 years old at the time of the incident, could not have committed the crime because on the

date and time thereof, he was at home sleeping. After trial and upon evaluation of the evidence on

record, the RTC found appellant Jastiva guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, CA affirmed the

decision. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:




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Whether the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of appellant Jastiva beyond reasonable

doubt on the basis of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence

presented.

Ruling:

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime of rape, viz:

ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –


circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation.

From the above-quoted provision of law, the elements of rape (under paragraph 1,

subparagraph a) are as follows: (1) that the offender is a man; (2) that the offender had carnal

knowledge of a woman; and (3) that such act is accomplished by using force, (threat) orintimidation.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals were one in finding that appellant Jastiva had carnal

knowledge of AAA against the latter’s will through force and intimidation. Despite his vigorous

protestations, this Court agrees in the finding that the crime of rape committed by appellant Jastiva

against AAA was proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the following:

a) AAA’s credible, positive and categorical testimony relative to the circumstances

surrounding her rape;

b) AAA’s positive identification of appellant Jastiva as the one who raped her;

c) The physical evidence consistent with AAA’s assertion that she was raped; and

d) The absence of ill motive on the part of AAA in filing the complaint against

appellant Jastiva.

Firstly, the appeal of appellant Jastiva centers on the credibility of AAA, the main

prosecution witness. But credibility of a witness is the sole province of the RTC being the trial court

in this case. Basic is the rule that the findings of fact of the trial court on matters of credibility of

witnesses are generally conclusive on this Court, which is not a trier of facts. Such conclusiveness

derives from the trial court’s having the first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor and

manner of the victim when he/she testified at the trial.42 Undeniably, the calibration of the

testimony of a witness, and the assessment of the probative weight thereof, are virtually left, almost

entirely, to the trial court which has the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness at the

stand. Unless there are substantial matters that might have been overlooked or discarded,

generally, the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of a witness will not be disturbed on

appeal.

It is worthy to recall the three guiding principles in rape prosecutions: (1) an accusation of

rape is easy to make, and difficult to prove, but it is even more difficult to disprove; (2) bearing in

mind the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with

utmost care and caution; and (3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own

merits; and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. So, when a woman says that

she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the crime of rape was








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committed. In a long line of cases, this Court has held that if the testimony of the rape victim is

accurate and credible, a conviction for rape may issue upon the sole basis of the victim’s testimony.

This is because no decent and sensible woman will publicly admit to being raped and, thus, run the

risk of public contempt unless she is, in fact, a rape victim.

The testimony of AAA was shown to be credible, natural, convincing and consistent withhuman nature; and the fact that AAA is already of advanced age lends more credence to her

protestations of rape and inspires the thought that this case was filed for the genuine reason of

seeking justice.

Secondly, the circumstances after the commission of the rape testified to by AAA sufficed to

establish the ability of the latter to identify appellant Jastiva as the perpetrator of the crime.

Appellant Jastiva’s assertions that the cover of darkness and lack of lighting inside the "kamalig"where the crime took place, utterly diminished AAA’s ability to identify him or anyone for thatmatter, is downright specious. AAA never claimed to have seen her attacker inside the "kamalig."

What AAA testified to was the fact that she saw appellant Jastiva when he walked past her by the

open door of the "kamalig" and his face was finally illuminated by the moonlight. The Court have

held that wicklamps, flashlight, even moonlight and starlight may, in proper situations, be sufficientillumination, making the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on this ground unmeritorious.

The ruling in People v. Pueblas, citing the earlier ruling in People v. Vacal, is even more to the point,

“If identification of persons is possible even by the light of stars, with more reason that one could

identify persons by moonlight.”

Jastiva further tries to interject reasonable doubt by pointing out that AAA’s claim that heindulged in sexual foreplay prior to having sexual intercourse with her is unbelievable and contrary

to the normal conduct of a rapist, i.e., that "normally, a rapist, who is pressed for time so as not to be

caught in flagrante, would not leisurely engage in sexual intercourse with his victim, as what

actually happened in this case." He reasons that he could not have engaged in sexual foreplay

because he could not have known that AAA would be all alone in the farmhouse on the night in

question.

Case law, however, shows numerous instances of rape committed under indirect and

audacious circumstances. The lust of a lecherous man respects neither time nor place. Neither the

crampness of the room, nor the presence of people therein, nor the high risk of being caught, has

been held sufficient and effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape.

All told, this Court is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Jastiva committed

the crime of rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA using force and intimidation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HERMENIGILDO DELEN y ESCO BILLAG.R. No. 194446, April 21, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Under Section 3(b), Article I of Republic Act No. 7610, the term "child abuse" is defined as the

maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes the physical abuse of a child, among

other acts. In this case, AAA positively identified the accused-appellant as the person who kicked her in

the buttocks, hit her head with a hammer, and smashed her head on the wall on. Because of the said

brutal and inhumane acts of the accused-appellant, AAA suffered bruises and contusions in different

parts of her body. Furthermore, the Court finds no cogent reason to disbelieve AAA’s testimony, which




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was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Rivamonte and Dr. Arellano that the victim’s hymenhad "complete healed lacerations at 1, 3, 6, 9 o’clock positions." Jurisprudence provides that the

eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the medical findings attesting to her non-virgin state,

should be enough to confirm the truth of her charges of rape.

Facts:

Escobilla was separately charged with child abuse under Section 10(a), Article VI of

Republic Act No. 7610 and qualified rape in separate informations before the RTC. Said crimes were

alleged to have been committed against AAA as follows:

AAA was born on March 29, 1992 to Escobilla and BBB. AAA’s parents separated as theEscobilla was beating BBB. AAA then lived with her aunt until the Escobilla took her in. In the year

2000, AAA lived in the Escobilla’s house. One day, she was awakened from her sleep when theEscobilla removed her shorts and panty. Escobilla then removed his shorts and went on top of AAA.

He inserted his penis into her organ and told her not to create any noise because their neighbors

might hear them. He also warned AAA that he would kill her if she would report the incident. AAA

could not do anything but cry. Subsequently, at around 6:00 a.m. on January 17, 2005, AAA woke upwith her legs spread apart and tied to wooden panels on the wall. She was only wearing her upper

clothing and was not wearing her shorts and panty anymore. Escobilla removed his shorts and only

wore briefs. Escobilla then lay on top of her and began to insert his penis into her organ, which

caused her pain. While Escobilla was doing said act, he told AAA not to report the incident;

otherwise, he threatened to cut her tongue and kill her. Thereafter, the Escobilla untied her.

On January 23, 2005, Escobilla asked AAA to look for a lighter. When AAA failed to find one,

Escobilla told her to go inside a room in their house. There, he kicked AAA in the buttocks, hit her

head with a hammer and smashed her head on the wooden wall. She suffered injuries on her

forehead and the back of her head. Afterwards, she told the Escobilla that she was going to use the

toilet so she was able to go out of their house. She ran to the street and went to the house of a

neighbor, Ate Annie. Escobilla looked for her there so she hid under the bed. After Escobilla left,

AAA was brought to the house of Nanay Loleng, a neighbor of Ate Annie. They treated AAA’s

wounds and put her to sleep. When she woke up, the barangay tanods were already at the place.

They first talked to AAA then they called the police so that the Escobilla could be apprehended.

When Escobilla was arrested, AAA was brought to the police station where she gave her statement.

AAA was then taken to the hospital where she was treated and examined by doctors.

Issue:

Whether or not Escobilla is guilty of child abuse and qualified rape.

Ruling:

Yes.

In Criminal Case No. 13870, the RTC and the Court of Appeals found the accused-appellant

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing child abuse by infliction of physical injury against

AAA. Under Section 3(b), Article I of Republic Act No. 7610, the term "child abuse" is defined as the

maltreatment of a child, whether habitual or not, which includes the physical abuse of a child,

among other acts.




Page 256 of 299

In this case, AAA positively identified the accused-appellant as the person who kicked her in

the buttocks, hit her head with a hammer, and smashed her head on the wall on January 23, 2005.

Because of the said brutal and inhumane acts of the accused-appellant, AAA suffered bruises and

contusions in different parts of her body. The Medico-Legal Certification of Dr. Rivamonte and Dr.

Arellano clearly reflected the fact that AAA indeed sustained contusions, coupled with a finding that

she suffered multiple physical injuries secondary to mauling.

In the case of qualified rape, pursuant to Art. 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, a charge of

rape to prosper under the above provision, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender had

carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat, or

intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was

under twelve years of age or was demented.

In the instant case, the prosecution was able to establish that the accused-appellant had

carnal knowledge of AAA on January 17, 2005. AAA narrated in a straightforward manner the

harrowing details of how the Escobilla had sexual intercourse with her. Again, the RTC found

credible and convincing AAA’s testimony on this matter. Likewise, the Court finds no cogent reason

to disbelieve AAA’s testimony, which was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Rivamonteand Dr. Arellano that the vict im’s hymen had "complete healed lacerations at 1, 3, 6, 9 o’clock

positions." We held in People v. Oden that the "eloquent testimony of the victim, coupled with the

medical findings attesting to her non-virgin state, should be enough to confirm the truth of her

charges." As to the manner by which the rape was committed, the accused- appellant’s moralascendancy over AAA takes the place of the force and intimidation that is required in rape cases.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOEL ABAT y COMETAG.R. No. 202704, April 2, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Impregnation of a woman is not an element of rape.

Facts:

On November 15, 2001, an Information was filed before the RTC, charging Abat with the

crime of Rape allegedly committed against AAA, his niece, and a 15 year old minor. Abat pleaded

not guilty to the charge upon his arraignment on January 30, 2002. The pretrial conference was

held, after which, trial on the merits ensued. According to the prosecution, the facts of the case are

as follows: On September 22, 2001, around eight o’clock in the evening, AAA was home with herparents and siblings. Abat, (an uncle of AAA, being the half-brother of AAA’s father), with the

permission of AAA’s parents, brought AAA with him to the poblacion to buy medicine. The two

proceeded to the poblacion on board a tricycle driven by Abat. Then, he drove the tricycle to

Barangay Malabo. Upon reaching Barangay Malabo, Abat brought AAA to her grandfather’s nipa hut.Abat undressed himself then laid AAA down on a bamboo bed. Abat then succeeded to obtain carnal

knowledge of the victim. AAA struggled and tried to push Abat away but he threatened to kill her

and her family if she would tell anybody about the “act.” AAA, fearing that Abat will make good of

his threat, didn’t tell her parents of the assault.

On November 12, 2001, Abat tried to force AAA to go to his house. Thus, in the evening, AAA

informed her parents about the rape incident and they went to Victoria Police Station to lodge a

complaint against Abat. Because of rape, AAA, on April 24, 2002, gave birth to a baby girl. For his

defense, Abat claims that he and AAA considered themselves as lovers. She frequently visited him




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during Saturdays and Sundays. AAA’s parents filed a case against him when they discovered shewas pregnant.

Abat was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape by the RTC.

The Court of Appeals found no error committed by the RTC, and affirmed Abat’s conviction.

Abat is now alleging that he and AAA had a romantic relationship, which eventually turned sourwhen AAA started asking for money from him all the time. In support of this claim, he cites the birth

date of the baby, who was supposedly the product of his crime. Abat says that if the baby was born

in April 2002, then his version of the story, that they had consensual sex in July 2001, is more

credible than her story of rape in September 2001; otherwise, the baby would have been

premature.

Issues:

1. Is the determination of the exact date of fertilization material to the crime of rape?

2. Is denial and ill-motive a defense in the crime of rape?

Ruling:

1. No. The Court, in People v. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188 (1998), said: “[A]uthorities in forensicmedicine agree that the determination of the exact date of fertilization is problematic. The exact

date thereof is unknown; thus, the difficulty in determining the actual normal duration ofpregnancy.” Citing a Filipino authority, the Court further elucidated: “The average duration of

pregnancy is 270 to 280 days from the onset of the last menstruation. There is, however, no means

of determining it with certainty. Evidence derived from pregnancy following a single coitus is

trustworthy, but inasmuch as some authorities consider more than two weeks as the life span of the

spermatozoa in the vaginal canal, it is hard to ascertain the exact date of fertilization. There is no

synchrony between coitus and fertilization.

In any event, the impregnation of a woman is not an element of rape. Proof that the childwas fathered by another man does not show that accusedappellant is not guilty, considering the

positive testimony of Amalia that accused appellant had abused her. As held in People v. Alib:

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a

woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation;(2)When thewoman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3)When the woman is under twelve

years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding

paragraphs shall be present. It is therefore quite clear that the pregnancy of the victim is not

required. For the conviction of an accused, it is sufficient that the prosecution establish beyond

reasonable doubt that he had carnal knowledge of the offended party and that he had committed

such act under any of the circumstances enumerated above. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act

of a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman.

2. Abat’s attempt to escape liability by denying the charge against him and coupling it with

the imputation of ill motive against AAA’s parents must be ignored. “Motives such as resentment,

hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a

minor rape victim.” More so in this case, where the attribution of the improper motive is against

AAA’s parents and not her personally.




Page 258 of 299

Furthermore, the Court has never favorably looked upon the defense of denial, which

constitutes selfserving negative evidence that cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than

the positive declaration of a credible witness. To elucidate on the point, this Court, in People v.

Espinosa, held that: It is wellsettled that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence,

is a selfserving assertion that deserves no weight in law. Denial cannot prevail over the positive,

candid and categorical testimony of the complainant, and as between the positive declaration of thecomplainant and the negative statement of the appellant, the former deserves more credence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO DELA CRUZG.R. No. 192820, June 4, 2014, J . Leonardo-De Castro

Jurisprudence instructs that when the credibility of a witness is of primordial consideration, as in

this case, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its

assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are

accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is because the trial court has had the unique opportunity

to observe the demeanor of a witness and was in the best position to discern whether they were telling

the truth.

Facts:

In two separate Informations, the prosecution charged the accused-appellant with two (2)

counts of rape that were allegedly committed against AAA in the following manner:

[CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3253-M-2004]

That on or about the 9th day of September 2003, in [XXX], and within the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court, the above-named accused, father of the offended party, [AAA], did then and there

willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd

designs, have carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], then fifteen (15) years old, against her will and

without her consent.

[CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3254-M-2004]

That sometime in the month of October 1999, in [XXX], and within the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court, the above-named accused, father of the offended party, [AAA], did then and there

willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation and with lewd

designs, have carnal knowledge of the said [AAA], then eleven (11) years old, against her will and

without her consent.

[AAA] is the third of four (4) girls in the family of [CCC] and respondent Renato. The family

is living in a one-storey house with one bedroom in [XXX]. [CCC] the mother works as a "labandera"

and "plantsadora" while the father is a "mananari" or the person installing the bladed instrument

during cockfights. The mother usually leaves the house early in the morning to sell at the Bocauemarket.

The RTC in its decision held that respondent is indeed guilty of qualified rape for the

incident that occurred on September 9, 2003. However, respondent was only convicted for the

crime of Acts of Lasciviousness for the incident that transpired on October 1999. On appeal, the CA

affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

Issue:




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Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove that respondent is guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.

Ruling:

Yes, the prosecution was able to prove that respondent is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

the crimes charged.

For the charge of rape to prosper, the prosecution must be able to prove that (1) the

offender had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished the act through force, threat

or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was

under 12 years of age or was demented.

On the other hand, the crime of acts of lasciviousness, as punished under Article 336 of the

Revised Penal Code x x x

The elements of this crime are: (1) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or

lewdness; (2) it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation,

or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when theoffended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) the offended party is another person of either sex.

The lower courts gave credence to the testimony of AAA, who narrated the harrowing

details of the sexual abuses she experienced at the hands of the accused-appellant. AAA positively

identified the accused-appellant as the person who sexually abused her. AAA’s testimonyestablished the fact that sometime in October 1999, she was awakened from her sleep when the

accused-appellant kissed her and touched her body. Thereafter, AAA testified that on September 9,

2003, the accused-appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her when he was able to

partly insert his penis into her vagina before BBB caught them and the accused-appellant abruptly

got up to plead with BBB to not reveal what she saw. The lower courts also found the testimony of

AAA to be fully supported by the testimony of BBB, the sister of AAA, as well as the medico-legal

report, which concluded that AAA was in a "non-virgin state physically."

After a thorough review ofthe records of this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the above findings of fact of

the RTC and the Court of Appeals. As held in Dizon v. People:

Jurisprudence instructs that when the credibility of a witness is of primordial consideration,

as in this case, the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and

its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings

are accorded respect if not conclusive effect. This is because the trial court has had the unique

opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness and was in the best position to discern whether

they were telling the truth. When the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate

court, as in the present case, said findings are generally binding upon this Court. (Citation

omitted.)

Contrastingly, the accused-appellant’s bare defense of denial deserves scant consideration.The same cannot overcome the positive identification and affirmative testimonies of AAA and BBB.

Anent the accused-appellant’s argument that the alleged ill motives of AAA and BBB destroyed theircredibility, the same is utterly unconvincing. The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that ill

motives become inconsequential if there is an affirmative and credible declaration from the rape

victim, which clearly establishes the liability of the accused. In this case, AAA never wavered in her

identification of the accused-appellant as her abuser. We had occasion to rule in People v.

Balunsat that it is unlikely for a young girl and her family to impute the crime of rape to their own




Page 260 of 299

blood relative and face social humiliation if not to vindicate the victim’s honor. Indeed, no memberof a rape victim’s family would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the dishonor tainting

the family unless the crime was in fact committed, more so in this case where the offender and the

victim are father and daughter.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEMOCRITO PARASG.R. No. 192912, June 4, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Pregnancy is not an essential element of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore

was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and

decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter's will or without her

consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. Thus, when the victim, a 17-

year old girl who was the house helper of the sister of the accused, categorically and consistently

testified that the accused had carnal knowledge of her while pointing a gun in her mouth, the courts

will give credence to her testimony and convict the accused regardless of the pregnancy of the victim.

Facts:

Democrito Paras was charged with rape before the RTC. It was alleged that sometime in

March 1996, AAA, a 17-year old house-helper of the Spouses Sergio and Heny Agua, the latter being

accused-appellant Democrito Paras’s sister. AAA was weeding the grass of her employer’s yardwhen she was approached by a gun-wielding Paras. Paras pointed the gun at AAA’s mouth and

gained carnal knowledge of the latter. Subsequently, AAA got pregnant due to the incident, and gave

birth to a child.

Paras denied having raped AAA, and testified that he was in the market the whole day at the

time the alleged rape occurred. Paras also asserted that AAA accused her of rape due to a

misunderstanding between him and Sergio regarding the mango trees owned by Paras’s mother.

The RTC convicted Paras as charged, and the CA upheld the RTC. Hence the appeal.

Paras argues that since AAA was already 3 months pregnant when she was examined on

October 1996, AAA could have had sexual intercourse sometime in June or July 1996 and not in

March 1996 when the alleged rape was supposed to have been committed.

Issue:

Did the pregnancy of AAA prove that Paras did not rape her?

Ruling:


In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged the accused-appellant guilty of

rape by having carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent using force or intimidation. The

courts a quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the Paras as the

perpetrator of the sexual abuse. After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, the Court finds

that AAA was indeed categorical and consistent in her testimony that Paras was the one who




Page 261 of 299

pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. We, thus, see no reason to

disturb the lower courts’ appreciation of the credibility of AAA’s testimony.

Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape

victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is

important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter'swill or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DEMOCRITO PARASG.R. No. 192912, June 4, 2014 , J. Leonardo-De Castro

Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime

are not grounds for acquittal. As long as the inaccuracies concern only minor matters, the same do not

affect the credibility of witnesses. Truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to give error-free

testimonies considering the lapse of time and treachery of human memory. Inaccuracies may even

suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.

Authorities in forensic medicine agree that the determination of the exact date of fertilizationis problematic. The exact date thereof is unknown; thus, the difficulty in determining the actual

normal duration of pregnancy. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the

child which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no

moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim

against the latter's will or without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful

manner.

Facts:

While the victim [AAA], a house-helper of spouses Sergio and Heny Agua, was weeding

grass using a bolo at her employer’s farm in [XXX], appellant Democrito Paras approached her from

behind. He pulled [AAA] towards the lower portion of the farm and pointed a short firearm at her

mouth. While pointing the gun at [AAA], Democrito Paras pulled down her long pants and panties.

He also pulled down his pants and underwear. He laid [AAA] on the grassy ground and mounted

her. Since [AAA] was afraid of him and that she was also afraid to kill a person, she did not strike

appellant with the bolo she was holding. Democrito Paras told [AAA] not to shout. While struggling,

[AAA] even threw stones at him. After appellant consummated his bestial lust, he dressed up and

fled, while [AAA] went back to the house of her employers Subsequently, [AAA] got pregnant due to

the incident. She gave birth to a child who was more than a year old when [AAA] testified.

The defense, on the other hand, laid out the following narrative of denial and alibi. Accused-

appellant, Democrito Paras, knows the private complainant because she was the helper at the house

of his elder sister. He vehemently denie[d] having raped AAA.

RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime charged which was upheld by CA.

Issue:

Whether or not Democrito Paras is guilty for the crime of rape.




Page 262 of 299

Ruling:

Yes, Democrito Paras is guilty for the crime of rape.

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal

knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or

more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

In this case, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals adjudged the accused-appellant guilty ofrape by having carnal knowledge of AAA without her consent using force or intimidation. The

courts a quo relied on the testimony of AAA and her positive identification of the accused-appellant

as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case, the

Court finds that AAA was indeed categorical and consistent in her testimony that the accused-

appellant was the one who pointed a gun to her mouth and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her.

Inconsistencies pointed out by the accused-appellant in the testimony of AAA, namely, her

inability to remember the birth date of her child and the name of her neighbor, did not destroy her

credibility as a witness. These details had nothing to do with the essential elements of rape, that is,

carnal knowledge of a person through force or intimidation.

Inconsistencies and discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of thecrime are not grounds for acquittal. As long as the inaccuracies concern only minor matters, the

same do not affect the credibility of witnesses. Truth-telling witnesses are not always expected to

give error-free testimonies considering the lapse of time and treachery of human memory.

Inaccuracies may even suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been rehearsed.

Authorities in forensic medicine agree that the determination of the exact date of

fertilization is problematic. The exact date thereof is unknown; thus, the difficulty in determining

the actual normal duration of pregnancy. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape.

Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by the accused, or by some unknown

individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is that the accused had carnal

knowledge of the victim against the latter's will or without her consent, and such fact was testified

to by the victim in a truthful manner.

Anent the alleged failure of AAA to defend herself despite having many opportunities to do

so, we are not persuaded. People react differently under emotional stress. There is no standard

form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident, especially if the assailant is

physically near. The workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are

unpredictable. In a given situation, some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be frozen




Page 263 of 299

into silence. Consequently, the failure of complainant to run away or shout for help at the very first

opportunity cannot be construed consent to the sexual intercourse.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RENATO BESMONTEG.R. No. 196228, June 4, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro

To convict an accused for statutory rape, two elements must be proven: 1.) the victim is a

female under 12 years of age or is demented; and the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim.

Thus, where the prosecution was able to present a 7- year old girl’s credible, positive and categoricaltestimony relative to the circumstances surrounding her rape; and the physical evidence consistent

with AAA’s assertion that she was raped, the accused must be held guilty of statutory rape.

Facts:

Accused-appellant Renato Besmonte was charged with two counts of statutory rape. The

prosecution alleged that the victim AAA was merely seven years old when the first rape incident

was committed. Besmonte was in AAA’s house, and after her younger brothers left the house upon

Besmonte’s instructions, the latter ordered AAA to lie down on a mat and remove her clothes.Afterwards he undressed and tried to insert his penis into her vagina but was unable to penetrate

since AAA was crying because of pain. This prompted Besmonte to leave.

The second rape incident occurred when AAA was accompanying Besmonte in the upland to

get some root crops. AAA was made to sit down on a banana leaf Besmonte placed on the ground.

He tried to look for lice on her hair, and AAA was surprised when he poked a fan knife at her chest

and ordered her to lie down and remove her clothes. Thenceforth, he undressed himself, laid on top

of her, and succeeded in inserting his penis into AAA’s vagina. The latter felt pain and observed thather vagina was torn. Besmonte denied raping AAA, her niece, on both occasions.

The RTC found Besmonte guilty of the two counts of rape, and imposed the penalty of

reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue:Were the accusations of rape insufficiently proven?

Ruling:


Basic in the prosecution of statutory rape is that there must be concurrence of the following

elements:

1. the victim is a female under 12 years of age or is demented; and

2. the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim.

Thus, to successfully convict an accused for said crime, it is imperative for the prosecution to prove

that the age of the woman is under 12 years and carnal knowledge took place.

In this case, Besmonte was charged with two counts of statutory rape. The RTC and the

Court of Appeals were one in finding that he twice had carnal knowledge of AAA, a child of tender

years at the time of the commission of the two counts of rape. Despite his vigorous protestations,




Page 264 of 299

the Court agrees in the finding that the crime of rape committed by Besmonte against AAA was

proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the following:

a) AAA’s credible, positive and categorical testimony relative to the circumstancessurrounding her rape; and

b) The physical evidence consistent with AAA’s assertion that she was raped.

Besmonte would have the Court reverse his conviction for the first count of statutory rape

on the ground that AAA admitted in open court that the rape committed in March 2000 did not

happen.

His attempt is futile. A review of the transcript of the testimony of AAA clarified such

misleading assertion – her testimony that nothing happened simply meant that he tried to insert his

penis into her vagina but was unsuccessful because it did not fit. In fact, AAA cried out with pain at

his attempts to put it in; and her cry of pain was what prompted accused-appellant to leave

abruptly. That she suffered severe pain inside her genitalia while his penis was penetrating her,

could only be understood in light of the foregoing explanation made herein about his penis

attaining some degree of penetration beneath the surface of her genitalia.

Carnal knowledge, the other essential element in consummated statutory rape, does not

require full penile penetration of the female. In People v. Campuhan, the Court made clear that the

mere touching of the external genitalia by a penis capable of consummating the sexual act is

sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. All that is necessary to reach the consummated stage of

rape is for the penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act to come into contact

with the lips of the pudendum of the victim. This means that the rape is consummated once the

penis of the accused capable of consummating the sexual act touches either labia of the pudendum.

And People v. Bali-Balita instructed that the touching that constitutes rape does not mean mere

epidermal contact, or stroking or grazing of organs, or a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the

external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, but rather the erect penis touching thelabias or sliding into the female genitalia. xxx is required, however, that this manner of touching of

the labias must be sufficiently and convincingly established. For the Court, the proof of the touchingof the penis of accused-appellant and the labias of AAA had been convincingly established – from

AAA’s categorical testimony that his penis had gone beyond her mons pubis and had reached her

labias majora and minora.

With respect to the rape committed on May 4, 2001 the Court concurs with the RTC and the

Court of Appeals’ conclusion that AAA’s testimonial account thereon and the physical injury that

she sustained as a result thereof sufficiently and convincingly established the commission of the

second count of statutory rape. Besmonte tried to interject reasonable doubt thereto by claiming

that AAA’s account of t he second incident was highly incredible considering that she did not even

bother to escape from him; or why she even went with Besmonte in the first place in view of the

supposed earlier incident of rape.

But the Court, in People v. Jastiva taught that it does not follow that because the victim failed

to shout for help or struggle against her attacker means that she could not have been raped. The

force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term, depending not only on the age, size, and

strength of the parties but also on their relationship with each other. And physical resistance need

not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits

herself against her will to the rapist’s advances because of fear for her life and personal safety, or

the exercise of the moral ascendancy of the rapist over the victim.




Page 265 of 299

Time and again, this Court has recognized that different people react differently to a given situation

involving a startling occurrence. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress

are unpredictable, and people react differently - some may shout, others may faint, and still others

may be shocked into insensibility even if there may be a few who may openly welcome the

intrusion. More to the point, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a womaninvoluntarily succumbed to the lust of an accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANOG.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro

We differentiated the terms "deprived of reason" and "demented," as follows, the term

demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality,

characterized by marked decline from the individual's former intellectual level and often by emotional

apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b)

has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation.

Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be properly classified as a

person who is "deprived of reason," and not one who is "demented."

Facts:

BBB (AAA’s mother) testified that she knew accused -appellant Cataytay as her neighbor in

their compound in Mandaluyong City. Accused appellant was a shoe repairman who had a shop six

houses away from BBB’s house. Thirty minutes later, her neighbor, Lito, told her that there was a

problem, and brought her to the barangay outpost. AAA and the accused appellant were already at

the outpost. When BBB saw AAA, the latter told her, "Mommy, ni-rape po ako." BBB asked her who

raped her. AAA responded by pointing to accused-appellant.

During the interviews made by the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she was raped by

accused appellant, which ended when a certain "Mimi" knocked at the door. When Cataytay

answered the knock, Mimi told the former that she will shout if he does not leave the house. AAA

went out of the house and sought help from their neighbors. One of their neighbors, Amelita

Morante, called the barangay officials at the outpost.

BBB identified a Psychological Evaluation Report from the Department of Social Welfare

and Development (DSWD), which was conducted in connection with another rape case. The report

stated that AAA had the mental capacity of an eight-year-old child. BBB also identified AAA’s birthcertificate which showed that she was biologically 19 years old at the time of the incident.

On cross-examination, BBB confirmed that AAA was the victim in a rape case in 1999

against a certain Norberto Lerit. BBB admitted that she did not personally witness the alleged rapecommitted by the accused appellant. Cataytay countered such allegation by defense of denial and

alibi.

RTC rendered its Judgment finding accused Cataytay liable for crime of rape which was

affirmed by CA.

Issue:




Page 266 of 299

Whether or not Cataytay is liable for crime of rape.

Ruling:

Yes, Cataytay is liable for crime of rape.

Article 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. — Rape is committed —


circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reasonor is otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though

none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. (Emphasis supplied)

We differentiated the terms "deprived of reason" and "demented," as follows, the term

demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality,

characterized by marked decline from the individual's former intellectual level and often by

emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase deprived of reason under

paragraph 1 (b) has been interpreted to include those suffering from mental abnormality,

deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be

properly classified as a person who is "deprived of reason," and not one who is "demented."

In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have mental retardation with the mentalcapacity of a seven-year old child. The prosecution and the defense agreed to stipulate on the

conclusion of the psychologist that the "mental age of the victim whose chronological age at the

time of the commission of the offense is nineteen (19) years old x x x is that of a seven (7) year old

child." Accused-appellant is therefore criminally liable for rape under paragraph 1(b) of Article

266-A of the Revised Penal Code. The appropriate penalty is provided for by Article 266-B, which

relevantly provides:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the

following aggravating/qualifying circumstances xxx When the offender knew of the mental

disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of the

commission of the crime.

Since the accused-appellant’s knowledge of AAA’s mental retardation was alleged in theInformation and admitted by the former during the trial, the above special qualifying circumstance

is applicable, and the penalty of death should have been imposed. With the passage, however, of

Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion

perpetua shall instead be imposed.

JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006




Page 267 of 299

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MILAN ROXAS Y AGUILUZG.R. No. 200793, June 4, 2014, J. Leonardo-De Castro

In determining the age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability under R.A. 9344,

Section 6 thereof clearly refers to the age as determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and notthe mental age of the accused. Thus, a person who is eighteen years old at the time of the commission

of the crime of rape is not exempt from criminal liability despite having a mental age of nine years old.

Facts:

Accused-Appellant Milan Roxas was charged with five counts of rape with force and

intimidation. AAA testified that from 1997 to 1998, Roxas had carnal knowledge of his minor niece,

AAA, while pointing a sharp instrument at the latter. In his defense, Roxas presented the testimony

of Dr. Aglipay, the Regional Psychiatrist of the BJMP, who said that Roxas was suffering from a mild

mental retardation with a mental age of nine (9) to ten (10) years old.

The RTC held that accused-appellant Roxas is not exempt from criminal responsibility on theground that he cannot be considered a minor or an imbecile or insane person, since Dr. Aglipay

merely testified that he was an eighteen-year old with a mental development comparable to that of

children between nine to ten years old. The CA affirmed with modification the RTC decision.

Issues:

1. May Roxas, who was eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime, be

exempt from criminal liability under R.A. 9344 due to having a mental age of a nine year

old?

2. Is the qualifying circumstance of relationship between Roxas and AAA sufficiently proven?

Ruling:

1. No, the determining age is anniversary of one’s birth date, not the mental age.

In the matter of assigning criminal responsibility, Section 6 of Republic Act No. 934418 is

explicit in providing that “A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of age on the day of thefifteenth anniversary of his/her birthdate.”

In determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 clearly refers to

the age as determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not the mental age as argued byaccused-appellant Roxas. When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no

room for construction or interpretation. Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning

may the court interpret or construe its true intent.

2. No, mere allegation in the complaint that the victim is the niece of the accused is

insufficient.

While it appears that the circumstance of minority under Article 335 (old rape provision) and

Article 266-B was sufficiently proven, the allegation of the relationship between AAA and accused-

appellant Roxas is considered insufficient under present jurisprudence.




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In the case at bar, the allegation that AAA was accused-appellant Roxas’s “niece” in each

Information is therefore insufficient to constitute the qualifying circumstances of minority and

relationship. Instead, the applicable qualifying circumstance is that of the use of a deadly weapon,

for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Since there was no other aggravating

circumstance alleged in the Information and proven during the trial, the imposed penalty ofreclusion perpetua for each count of rape is nonetheless proper even as we overturn the lower

courts’ appreciation of the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship.

KIDNAPPING

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AIDA MARQUEZG.R. No. 181440, April 13, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

While one of the essential elements of this crime (Art 270 - Kidnapping and failure to return a

minor) is that the offender was entrusted with the custody of the minor, what is actually being

punished is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to restore the minor to his

parents or guardians.

Facts:

On December 28, 1998, Respondent Marquez was charged with Kidnapping under Article

270 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 18, before the RTC. Respondent

pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

According to the complainant, Carolina Cunanan Merano (Merano), she met Marquez at the

beauty parlor where she was working as a beautician. On September 6, 1998, Marquez allegedly

borrowed Merano’s then three-month old daughter Justine Bernadette C. Merano (Justine) to buy

her some clothes, milk and food. Merano said she agreed because it was not unusual for Marquez to

bring Justine some things whenever she came to the parlor. When Marquez failed to return Justine

in the afternoon as promised, Merano went to her employers’ house to ask them for Marquez’saddress. However, Merano said that her employers just assured her that Justine will be returned to

her soon.

Merano averred that she searched for her daughter but her efforts were unsuccessful until

she received a call from Marquez. During that call, Marquez allegedly told Merano that she will

return Justine to Merano the following day and that she was not able to do so because her own son

was sick and was confined at the hospital. When the supposed return of Justine did not happen,

Merano claimed that she went to Marquez’s house, using the sketch that she got from heremployers’ driver, but Marquez was not home.

On February 11, 1999, Marquez allegedly called Merano up again to tell her to pick up her

daughter at Modesto Castillo’s (Castillo) house. The following day, Merano, accompanied by SPO2Fernandez and SPO4 Rapal, went to the house of Castillo. Merano claimed that Castillo told her that

Marquez sold Justine to him and that they gave Marquez Sixty Thousand Pesos supposedly for

Merano who was asking for money. The Castillos asked Merano not to take Justine as they had

grown to love her but Merano refused. However, she was still not able to take Justine home with her

because the police advised her to go through the proper process. Merano then learned from Castillo

that in an effort to legalize the adoption of Justine, the Castillos turned over custody of Justine to the

Reception and Study Center for Children of the DSWD.




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The RTC rendered a decision finding respondent Marquez guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime charged. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of appeals.

Hence, this petition.

Marquez argues that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the

elements constituting the crime of serious illegal detention or kidnapping are not present in thiscase.

Issue:

Whether or not the guilt of Marquez was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

Yes, it was.

Accused is mistaken, if not misled, in her understanding and appreciation of the crime she

was charged with and eventually convicted of.

A reading of the charge in the information shows that the act imputed to Marquez

was not the illegal detention of a person, but involves her deliberate failure to restore a minor baby

girl to her parent after being entrusted with said baby’s custody.

Contrary to Marquez’s assertions, therefore, she was charged with violation of Article 270,and not Article 267, of the Revised Penal Code.

This crime has two essential elements:

1. The offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and

2. The offender deliberately fails to restore the said minor to his parents or guardians.

This Court, in elucidating on the elements of Article 270, stated that while one of the

essential elements of this crime is that the offender was entrusted with the custody of the minor,

what is actually being punished is not the kidnapping but the deliberate failure of that person to

restore the minor to his parents or guardians. As the penalty for such an offense is so severe, the

Court further explained what "deliberate" as used in Article 270 means:

Indeed, the word deliberate as used in Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code must imply

something more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly daring or

intentionally and maliciously wrong.

It is clear from the records of the case that Marquez was entrusted with the custody of

Justine. Whether this is due to Merano’s version of Marquez borrowing Justine for the day, or due to

Marquez’s version that Merano left Justine at her house, it is undeniable that in both versions,Marquez agreed to the arrangement, i.e., to temporarily take custody of Justine. It does not matter,

for the first element to be present, how long said custody lasted as it cannot be denied that Marquez

was the one entrusted with the custody of the minor Justine. Thus, the first element of the crime is

satisfied.

As to the second element, neither party disputes that on September 6, 1998, the custody of

Justine was transferred or entrusted to Marquez. Whether this lasted for months or only for a

couple of days, the fact remains that Marquez had, at one point in time, physical and actual custody




Page 270 of 299

of Justine. Marquez’s deliberate failure to return Justine, a minor at that time, when demanded to doso by the latter’s mother, shows that the second element is likewise undoubtedly present in this

case.

ROBERRY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALBERTO M. BASAO alias "Dodong," JOVEL S. APOLE,MELQUIADES L. APOLE, ESTRELITA1 G. APOLE, ROLANDO A. APOLE alias "Bebot," VICENTE C.

SALON, JAIME TANDAN, RENATO C. APOLE alias "Boboy," ROLANDO M. OCHIVILLO alias"Allan," LORENZO L. APOLE, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE and MIKE DOE, JOVEL S. APOLE,

ROLANDO A. APOLE, and RENATO C. APOLEG.R. No. 189820, October 10, 2012, J. Leonardo-De Castro

A truth-telling witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony considering the

lapse of time and the treachery of human memory. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony

jibes on material points, the slight clashing of statements dilute neither the witnesses’ credibility nor

the veracity of his testimony. Variations on the testimony of witnesses on the same side with respect to

minor, collateral, or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their united testimony to the prominent facts. Inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than

weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony.

The deprivation required by Article 267 means not only the imprisonment of a person, but also

the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation

where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention or is restricted or impeded in

his liberty to move. In other words, the essence of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’sliberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.

Facts:

On January 23, 2003 at 7:30 o’clock in the evening, witness private complainant EmelieLopio Hashiba and her brother Crisologo Pamad Lopio both testified that five (5) men entered their

house with gun pointed to her younger brother, Crisologo Lopio. Although she does not know their

names at the time of the incident, she recognized them during the trial and identified each one of

them as respondents Jovel Apole, Renato Apole and Rolando Apole except the two (2), whom she

failed to recognize as she forgot them.

Respondents brought Emelie Hashiba upstair at the second floor at their bedroom, which

was lighted and there she was divested of money and jewelries, their collection of their passenger

jeep, a samurai sword and icom radio. She was asked if that was her only money and she told them

“yes”. She was also asked about the gun of her husband, which she denied that her husband doesnot possess firearm. Then respondent Jovel asked her if that was the only money they had and she

answered in the affirmative.

Dissatisfied with the value of their loot, respondent Jovel and companion demanded three

(3) million pesos from her with the threat that if she will not give the amount demanded they would

bring with them her son. Shortly thereafter, they went down and back to the sala where

YASUMITSU HASHIBA and companions were gathered. EMELIE HASHIBA informed the accused

that they could not bring her son because he was sick, so she offered herself as the hostage, but

brought YASUMITSU YASUDA HASHIBA instead.




Page 271 of 299

On the 25th day, the kidnappers called but she was not around. On the following day, the

kidnappers again called her and instructed her to buy a cellular phone and advised her not to

withdraw money in the bank and wait for further instructions. Few days later, a policeman

informed her that her husband was released by the kidnappers. All of these was denied by the

respondents and questioned the inherent incredibilities and irrevocable inconsistencies of thewitnesses.

RTC found all the accused guilty of Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of

Persons by a Band and Kidnapping (for ransom) and Serious Illegal Detention which was affirmed

by the appellate court with modification as to penalty and damages.

Issue:

Whether or not respondents should be acquitted due to alleged inherent incredibilities and

irrevocable inconsistencies of the witnesses.

Ruling:

No, respondents are all guilty of the crimes of Robbery with Violence Against or

Intimidation of Persons by a Band and Kidnapping (for ransom) and Serious Illegal Detention.

As consistently adhered to by this Court, the matter of assigning values to declarations on

the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the

unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various

indicia available but not reflected on the record. Consequently, the settled rule is that when the

credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the

testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its

conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is

more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is settled that when the trialcourt’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon

this Court. Without any clear showing that the trial court and the appellate court overlooked,

misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance, the rule should

not be disturbed.

The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb, and is, therefore, conclusively bound by the

findings of fact and judgments of conviction rendered by the RTC, subsequently affirmed by the

Court of Appeals. The testimonies of Emelie and Crisologo established beyond reasonable doubt the

commission by accused-appellants of the crimes of robbery by a band and kidnapping for ransom.

The crime of robbery under Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code has the following

elements: (a) intent to gain, (b) unlawful taking, (c) personal property belonging to another, and (d)violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things. Under Article 296 of the same Code,

“when more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of robbery, it shall be

deemed to have been committed by a band.” It further provides that “[a]ny member of a band who

is present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be punished as principal of any of the

assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same.




Page 272 of 299

All of the foregoing elements had been satisfactorily established herein. At least five (5)

people, including accused-appellants, carrying guns and a hand grenade, barged into the home of,

and forcibly took pieces of jewelry and other personal properties belonging to, spouses Yatsumitsu

and Emelie Hashiba. Accused-appellants themselves made their intent to gain clear when they

assured their victims that they were only after the money.

As for the crime of kidnapping, the following elements, as provided in Article 267 of the

Revised Penal Code, must be proven: (a) a person has been deprived of his liberty, (b) the offender

is a private individual, and (c) the detention is unlawful. The deprivation required by Article 267

means not only the imprisonment of a person, but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever

form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the

place of confinement or detention or is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move. In other words,

the essence of kidnapping is the act ual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled with indubitableproof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation.

In the present case, Yasumitsu was evidently deprived by respondents of his liberty for

seven days. Armed with guns and a grenade, accused-appellants and their cohorts took Yasumitsu

from the latter’s home in Lanuza, Surigao del Sur, to Surigao City, by car; and then all the way toTubajon, Surigao del Norte, by boat. Accused-appellants held Yasumitsu from January 23 to January

29, 2003. During said period, Yasumitsu was unable to communicate with his family or to go home.

Also during the same period, accused-appellants called Emelie several times to ask whether the P

3,000,000.00 ransom payment was already available.

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons

come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred from the acts

of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when taken together,

would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently

made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. To be a conspirator, one need not participate in

every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the

exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator maybe assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact,

constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective. Once conspiracy is

shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of

participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.

There is conspiracy among accused-appellants and their cohorts when they kidnapped

Yasumitsu. Their community of criminal design could be inferred from their arrival at the Hashiba’s

home already armed with weapons, as well as from their clearly designated roles upon entry into

the house (i.e., some served as lookouts; some accompanied Emelie to the second floor to look for

jewelry, cash, and other property to take; and some guarded and hogtied the other people in the

house) and in the abduction of Yasumitsu (i.e., Jovel S. Apole went back to Surigao City to secure the

release of the ransom money while Renato C. Apole and Rolando A. Apole stayed in Tubajon toguard Yasumitsu). The Court concurs with the RTC that “all these acts were compl imentary to one

another and geared toward the attainment of a common ultimate objective to extort a ransom of

three (3) million in exchange for the Japanese[’s] freedom.

The alleged inconsistencies or conflict in the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies wer e

already rejected by the Court of Appeals for the same only pertain to minor details which have

inconsequential significance. In People v. Delim, the Court further pronounced that a truth-telling




Page 273 of 299

witness is not always expected to give an error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the

treachery of human memory. What is primordial is that the mass of testimony jibes on material

points, the slight clashing of statements dilute neither the witnesses’ credibility nor the veracity ofhis testimony. Variations on the testimony of witnesses on the same side with respect to minor,

collateral, or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their united testimony to the prominent

facts. Inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken thecredibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WELVIN DIU y KOTSESA, and DENNIS DAYAON y TUPIT

G.R. No. 201449 , April 3, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,

with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery

must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the

robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes

or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into

consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple

negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must beconsummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of

homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from

the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on

the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the

robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide.

Facts:

Perlie testified that she and her sister Nely Salvador (Nely) were employed as waitresses at

Angeles City. As the sisters were walking home from work along Colorado Street, they saw accused-appellants and De la Cruz about two to three meters away. The three men were facing the wall,

urinating. As soon as the sisters passed by the three men, the latter accosted the former. Accused-

appellant Diu embraced Perlie while accused-appellant Dayaon and De la Cruz held on to Nely.

Perlie was able to break loose by elbowing accused-appellant Diu, but accused-appellant Diu

grabbed Perlie’s bag. Perlie ran away to ask for help from people nearby.

Meanwhile, accused-appellant Dayaon and De la Cruz were embracing Nely from behind. As

she tried to go near Nely, Perlie saw accused-appellant and De la Cruz stabbing Nely, passing a knife

to each other. Perlie described the knife as double bladed and approximately seven inches long.

After the stabbing, Nely was left lying face down on the ground, covered in blood. The entire

incident took place within two minutes. Two men then helped Perlie bring Nely to the Ospital Ning

Angeles, where Nely was pronounced dead on arrivalFor the defense, accused-appellants Diu and Dayaon themselves took the witness stand.

They denied their culpability and participation in the incident, and mainly laid the blame on their

co-accused De la Cruz, who remained at-large.

RTC found that Perlie’s testimony was more credible. Thus, accused-appellants and De la

Cruz were convicted in the commission of the crime Robbery with Homicide which was affirmed by

CA.




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Issue:

Whether or not Diu and Dayaon are guilty for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Ruling:

Yes. They are guilty for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the

confluence of the following elements:

(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;

(2) the property taken belongs to another;

(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and

(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit

robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent tocommit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during

or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the

circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to

be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless

imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery and

homicide, must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of

homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside

from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason

or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of

the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by oron the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies

committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible

felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus,

includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.

Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of

personal property. When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt,

conviction of the accused is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in

court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by

the robber or recovered by the owner. The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of

the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount

in the possession of the victim is of no moment because the motive for robbery can exist regardlessof the exact amount or value involved.

When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took

part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible

felony of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it

clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.




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If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery,

he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit

robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained

from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-

conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.

Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for

instance, it was committed to (a) facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve

the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery;

or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between

the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of

the robbery.

In this case, based on Perlie’s testimony, as she and Nely were walking along Colorado

Street, accused-appellants and De la Cruz were all facing the wall, appearing to be urinating. When

Perlie and Nely had passed them by, accused-appellants and De la Cruz accosted them at the same

time, with accused-appellant Diu embracing Perlie and taking her bag, and accused-appellant

Dayaon and De la Cruz holding on to Nely and stabbing her as she fought back. The actuations ofaccused-appellants and De la Cruz were clearly coordinated and complementary to one another.

Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission

of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility.

As the RTC declared, "the actions of the three accused, from the deprivation of the

eyewitness Perlie of her personal belongings by accused Diu to the stabbing of the victim Nely by

accused Dayaon and De la Cruz, Jr., are clear and indubitable proofs of a concerted effort to deprive

Perlie and Nely of their personal belongings, and that by reason or on the occasion of the said

robbery, stabbed and killed victim Nely Salvador." The absence of proof that accused-appellants

attempted to stop Nely’s killing, plus the finding of conspiracy, make accused-appellants liable as

principals for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

B.P. 22

LIBERATA AMBITO and BASILIO AMBITO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 127327, February 13, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) making, drawing, and issuance of any check to

apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue

he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full

upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of

funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered

the bank to stop payment.

Facts:

Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito were the principal owners of two rural banks in the

province of Iloilo namely, the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc., in the municipality of Leon, and

the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. in the municipality of Banate. In addition, the spouses Ambito were

the owners of Casette [Kajzette] Enterprises, a commercial establishment in Jaro, Iloilo City engaged




Page 276 of 299

in procuring farm implements intended for the use of the agricultural loan borrowers of the said

banks.

Spouses Ambito transacted business with Pacific Star, Inc. whereby they purchased Yanmar

machineries and spare parts from the said company allegedly for the use of the loan borrowers of

their banks. In these transactions, the spouses made down payments in their purchases either incase, in checks or in certificates of time deposit issued by the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the

Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. However, when the Manila Banking Corporation (Manila Bank)

checks issued by Basilio Ambito as down payment of their purchases were presented for payment

by the drawee bank, the same were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

At the time the spouses made purchases of farm implements from the Pacific Star, Inc., the

general manager of the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. was Liberata Ambito herself and the cashier.

Liberata forced the cashier of the Rural Bank of Banate, Marilyn Traje, to sign several blank

certificates of time deposit and to give the same to her alleging that she needed the said certificates

in connection with some transactions involving the bank. Marilyn Traje followed, afraid that she

would lose her job.

The same thing happened to Reynaldo Baron, the cashier of the Community Rural Bank of

Leon, Inc. Reynaldo Baron was at first hesitant to accommodate the request of the Ambitos but due

to their persistence, he signed the certificates of time deposit in blank and gave the same to the

Ambitos. When Baron asked for the duplicate copies of the certificates, he was told that they were

still negotiating with Pacific Star, Inc. Later, the Ambitos told Baron that the transaction was

cancelled and that he should just cause the printing of similar blank certificates by the Apostol

Printing Press in Iloilo City. Baron got scared and objected to the idea vouched to him by the

Ambitos until finally he resigned from his job because he could no longer withstand the pressure

exerted on him involving transactions he believed were anomalous. When the Central Bank

investigators came and conducted examination of the records and transactions of the bank, Baron

reported the anomalies to them.

The blank certificates of time deposit of the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. obtained by the

spouses Basilio and Liberata Ambito from Marilyn Traje were filled up with the amounts of deposit

and the name of the Pacific Star, Inc. as depositor and used by the spouses as down payments of the

purchase price of the machineries and spare parts purchased from the Pacific Star, Inc. The said

certificates of time deposit supposedly issued by the Rural Bank of the Banate, Inc. and the

Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. were unfunded and not covered by any deposit so that when

presented for redemption by the Pacific Star, Inc., the same were not honored. As a consequence,

Pacific Star, Inc. suffered actual damages. On complaint of Pacific Star, Inc., the Ambitos were

charged of violations of B.P. Blg. 22. In view of the anomalous transactions entered into by the

Ambitos, both the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. became

insolvent. The RTC convicted the spouses which decision was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a violation of Batas Pambansa 22

Ruling:




Page 277 of 299

No. The elements of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) making, drawing, and issuance of any

check to apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the

time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of

the check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee

bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer,

without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making or issuing a

worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-

payment of an obligation which the law punishes.

In light of the foregoing, petitioners contention in the lower court that the subject checks

were only issued as mere guarantee and were not intended for deposit as per agreement with PSI is

not tenable. Co-petitioner Basilio Ambito would be liable under B.P. Blg. 22 by the mere fact that he

issued the subject checks, provided that the other elements of the crime are properly proved.

With regard to the second element, we note that the law provides for a prima facie rule of

evidence. A disputable presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or credit with thebank is assumed from the act of making, drawing, and issuing a check, payment of which is refused

by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds when presented within 90 days from the date of issue.

However, such presumption does not arise when the maker or drawer pays or makes arrangements

for the payment of the check within five banking days after receiving notice that such check had been

dishonored. In order for the maker or drawer to pay the value thereof or make arrangements for its

payment within the period prescribed by law, it is therefore necessary and indispensable for the

maker or drawer to be notified of the dishonor of the check.

Under B.P. Blg. 22, the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a check that

was subsequently dishonored. It must also establish that the accused was actually notified that the

check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within five (5) banking days from receipt of the

notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for itspayment. Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a prosecution for violation of the

Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper. The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an

accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution.

In the case at bar, there is nothing in the records that would indicate that co-petitioner

Basilio Ambito was given any notice of dishonor by PSI or by Manila Bank, the drawee bank, when

the subject checks were dishonored for insufficiency of funds upon presentment for payment. In

fact, all that the OSG can aver regarding this matter is that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito had been

notified of the fact of dishonor since PSI filed a collection case against petitioners more than three

(3) years before the same filed the criminal cases before this Court.

The notice of dishonor of a check may be sent to the drawer or maker by the drawee bank,the holder of the check, or the offended party either by personal delivery or by registered mail. The

notice of dishonor to the maker of a check must be in writing.

While, indeed, Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 does not state that the notice of dishonor be in

writing, taken in conjunction, however with Section 3 of the law, i.e., that where there are no

sufficient funds in or credit with such drawee bank, such fact shall always be explicitly stated in the

notice of dishonor or refusal, a mere oral notice or demand to pay would appear to be insufficient




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for conviction under the law. The Court has previously held that both the spirit and letter of the

Bouncing Checks Law would require for the act to be punished thereunder not only that the

accused issued a check that is dishonored, but that likewise the accused has actually been notified

in writing of the fact of dishonor. The consistent rule is that penal statutes have to be construed

strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused.

Due to the failure of prosecution in this case to prove that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito was

given the requisite notice of dishonor and the opportunity to make arrangements for payment as

provided for under the law, we cannot with moral certainty convict him of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.

However, Basilio Ambitos acquittal for his violations of B.P. Blg. 22 for failure of the prosecution to

prove all elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt did not entail the extinguishment of his

civil liability for the dishonored checks.

ESTAFA

JUDE JOBY LOPEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 166810. June 26, 2008, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The receipt by the drawer of the notice of dishonor is not an element of the offense. The

presumption only dispenses with the presentation of evidence of deceit if such notification is received

and the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3)

days from receipt of the notice of dishonor of the check.

Facts:

On March 23, 1998, Lopez issued and postdated a check with a value equivalent to the sum

of P20,000.00 which he obtained from Efren. He accomplished deceit when he led Efren to believe

that, prior to, or simultaneous with, their arrangement, the subject check is good upon its maturity

on April 30, 1998. However, the check turned out to be worthless because, when Efren deposited it

with the Legaspi Savings Bank, the same was dishonored due to “Account Closed.”

In his Motion for Reconsideration, Lopez, citing the case of Pacheco v. Court of Appeals, (G.R.

No. 126670, December 2, 1999, 319 SCRA 595), argued that Efren knew at the time of the issuance

of the check that accused had no funds in the bank and therefore, the element of deceit was absent.

The said Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the trial court. The CA rendered its Decision

affirming in toto the decision of the trial court.

Lopez argued that no presumption or prima facie evidence of guilt would arise if there is no

proof as to the date of receipt by the drawer of the said notice “since there would simply be no way

of reckoning the crucial 3day period” from receipt of notice of dishonor of the check within whichthe amount necessary to cover the check may be done as provided by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315

of the Revised Penal Code, as amended

Issue: Can the accused be convicted of estafa if there is no proof as to the date of receipt by him of

the notice of dishonor?

Ruling:

Yes




Page 279 of 299

The receipt by the drawer of the notice of dishonor is not an element of the offense. The

presumption only dispenses with the presentation of evidence of deceit if such notification is

received and the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check

within three (3) days from receipt of the notice of dishonor of the check. The presumption indulged

in by law does not preclude the presentation of other evidence to prove deceit. It is not disputed by

petitioner that, as found by the CA, respondent Ables “called” up petitioner to inform him of thedishonor of the check. Moreover, when petitioner issued the check in question on March 23, 1998,

he knew that his current account with the DBP was a closed account as early as January 27, 1998.

Assuming that petitioner did so, Lopez could not escape culpability because he was not in a

position to make good the check at any time since his current account was already closed. This fact

petitioner failed to disclose to respondent.

The absence of proof as to receipt of the written notice of dishonor notwithstanding, the

evidence shows that petitioner had actual notice of the dishonor of the check because he was

verbally notified by the respondent and notice whether written or verbal was a surplusage and

totally unnecessary considering that almost two (2) months before the issuance of the check,

petitioner’s current account was already closed. Under these circumstances, the notice of dishonorwould have served no useful purpose as no deposit could be made in a closed bank account.

Pertinently, Section 114(d) of the Negotiable Instruments Law provides:

“Sec. 114. When notice need not be given to drawer.—Notice of dishonor is not required to be given

to the drawer in either of the following cases:

xxx

d. Where the drawer has no right to expect or require that the drawee or acceptor will honor the

check.”

Since petitioner’s bank account was already closed even before the issuance of the subjectcheck, he had no right to expect or require the drawee bank to honor his check. By virtue of the

aforequoted provision of law, petitioner is not entitled to be given a notice of dishonor.

LIBERATA AMBITO and BASILIO AMBITO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 127327, February 13, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The elements of Estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or

concealment, are the following (a) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent

means; (b) That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed

prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (c) That the offended party must haverelied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with

his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (d) That as a

result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

Facts:

Basilio Ambito and Liberata Ambito were the principal owners of two rural banks in the

province of Iloilo namely, the Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc., in the municipality of Leon, and




Page 280 of 299

the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. in the municipality of Banate. In addition, the spouses Ambito were

the owners of Casette [Kajzette] Enterprises, a commercial establishment in Jaro, Iloilo City engaged

in procuring farm implements intended for the use of the agricultural loan borrowers of the said

banks.

Spouses Ambito transacted business with Pacific Star, Inc. whereby they purchased Yanmarmachineries and spare parts from the said company allegedly for the use of the loan borrowers of

their banks. In these transactions, the spouses made down payments in their purchases either in

case, in checks or in certificates of time deposit issued by the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and the

Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. However, when the Manila Banking Corporation (Manila Bank)

checks issued by Basilio Ambito as down payment of their purchases were presented for payment

by the drawee bank, the same were dishonored for insufficiency of funds.

At the time the spouses made purchases of farm implements from the Pacific Star, Inc., the

general manager of the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. was Liberata Ambito herself and the cashier.

Liberata forced the cashier of the Rural Bank of Banate, Marilyn Traje, to sign several blank

certificates of time deposit and to give the same to her alleging that she needed the said certificates

in connection with some transactions involving the bank. Marilyn Traje followed, afraid that shewould lose her job.

The same thing happened to Reynaldo Baron, the cashier of the Community Rural Bank of

Leon, Inc. Reynaldo Baron was at first hesitant to accommodate the request of the Ambitos but due

to their persistence, he signed the certificates of time deposit in blank and gave the same to the

Ambitos. When Baron asked for the duplicate copies of the certificates, he was told that they were

still negotiating with Pacific Star, Inc. Later, the Ambitos told Baron that the transaction was

cancelled and that he should just cause the printing of similar blank certificates by the Apostol

Printing Press in Iloilo City. Baron got scared and objected to the idea vouched to him by the

Ambitos until finally he resigned from his job because he could no longer withstand the pressure

exerted on him involving transactions he believed were anomalous. When the Central Bank

investigators came and conducted examination of the records and transactions of the bank, Baronreported the anomalies to them.

The blank certificates of time deposit of the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. obtained by the

spouses Basilio and Liberata Ambito from Marilyn Traje were filled up with the amounts of deposit

and the name of the Pacific Star, Inc. as depositor and used by the spouses as down payments of the

purchase price of the machineries and spare parts purchased from the Pacific Star, Inc. The said

certificates of time deposit supposedly issued by the Rural Bank of the Banate, Inc. and the

Community Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. were unfunded and not covered by any deposit so that when

presented for redemption by the Pacific Star, Inc., the same were not honored. As a consequence,

Pacific Star, Inc. suffered actual damages. On complaint of Pacific Star, Inc., the Ambitos were

charged of Falsification and Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document. In view of the

anomalous transactions entered into by the Ambitos, both the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. and theCommunity Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. became insolvent. The RTC convicted the spouses which

decision was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:

Whether or not Spouses Ambito were guilty of Falsification and Estafa through Falsification

of Commercial Document




Page 281 of 299

Ruling:

Yes. The elements of Estafa by means of deceit, whether committed by false pretenses or

concealment, are the following (a) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent

means; (b) That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executedprior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (c) That the offended party must have

relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with

his money or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (d) That

as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.

In the prosecution for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the RPC, it is

indispensable that the element of deceit, consisting in the false statement or fraudulent

representation of the accused, be made prior to, or at least simultaneously with, the delivery of the

thing by the complainant.

The false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously with the

commission of the fraud, it being essential that such false statement or representation constitutesthe very cause or the only motive which induces the offended party to part with his money. In the

absence of such requisite, any subsequent act of the accused, however fraudulent and suspicious it

might appear, cannot serve as basis for prosecution for estafa under the said provision.

In the case at bar, the records would show that PSI was given assurance by petitioners that

they will pay the unpaid balance of their purchases from PSI when the CCTDs with petitioners

banks, the Rural Bank of Banate, Inc. (RBBI) and/or the Rural Bank of Leon, Inc. (RBLI), and issued

under the name of PSI, would be presented for payment to RBBI and RBLI which, in turn, will pay

the amount of deposit stated thereon. The amounts stated in the CCTDs correspond to the purchase

cost of the machineries and equipment that co-petitioner Basilio Ambito bought from PSI as

evidenced by the Sales Invoices presented during the trial. It is uncontroverted that PSI did not

apply for and secure loans from RBBI and RBLI. In fine, PSI and co-petitioner Basilio Ambito wereengaged in a vendor-purchaser business relationship while PSI and RBBI/RBLI were connected as

depositor-depository. It is likewise established that petitioners employed deceit when they were

able to persuade PSI to allow them to pay the aforementioned machineries and equipment through

down payments paid either in cash or in the form of checks or through the CCTDs with RBBI and

RBLI issued in PSIs name with interest thereon. It was later found out that petitioners never made

any deposits in the said Banks under the name of PSI. In fact, the issuance of CCTDs to PSI was not

recorded in the books of RBBI and RBLI and the Deputy Liquidator appointed by the Central Bank

of the Philippines even corroborated this finding of anomalous bank transactions in her testimony

during the trial.

The pronouncement by the appeals court that a complex crime had been committed by

petitioners is proper because, whenever a person carries out on a public, official or commercialdocument any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC as a necessary means

to perpetrate another crime, like Estafa, Theft, or Malversation, a complex crime is formed by the

two crimes.

Under Article 48 of the RPC, a complex crime refers to (1) the commission of at least two

grave or less grave felonies that must both (or all) be the result of a single act, or (2) one offense

must be a necessary means for committing the other (or others). Negatively put, there is no




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complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are committed, but not by a single act; or (2)

committing one crime is not a necessary means for committing the other.

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing

Estafa, because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of

Falsification has already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being anelement of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words, the

crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or

commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of

Estafa, not by the falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or

commercial document is only a necessary means to commit the estafa.

In the case before us, the issuance by petitioners of CCTDs which reflected amounts that

were never deposited as such in either RBBI or RBLI is Falsification under Articles 171 and 172 of

the RPC. The particular criminal undertaking consisted of petitioners, taking advantage of their

position as owners of RBBI and RBLI, making untruthful statements/representations with regard to

the existence of time deposits in favor of PSI by issuing the subject CCTDs without putting up the

corresponding deposits in said banks.

Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the RPC, the elements of falsification of public documents

through an untruthful narration of facts are: (1) the offender makes in a document untruthful

statements in a narration of facts; (2) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the

facts narrated; (3) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (4) the perversion of

truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third person.

As earlier discussed, the issuance of the falsified CCTDs for the sole purpose of obtaining or

purchasing various machinery and equipment from PSI amounts to the criminal offense of Estafa

under Article 315 (2) (a) of the RPC. The petitioners falsified the subject CCTDs, which are

commercial documents, to defraud PSI. Since the falsification of the CCTDs was the necessary

means for the commission of Estafa, the assailed judgment of the appeals court convictingpetitioners of the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents is

correct.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. VIRGINIA BABY P. MONTANERG.R. No. 184053, August 31, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

It is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative

and self-serving evidence which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses

who testify on affirmative matters.

Facts:

This is an appeal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Decision of the

RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. The RTC found appellant Virginia Baby P. Montaner guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa as defined and penalized under paragraph 2(d), Article 315

of the Revised Penal Code.

The parties’ evidence was summarized by the trial court, as follows:




Page 283 of 299

The evidence for the prosecution disclose that on May 17, 1996, accused Virginia Baby P.

Montaner, in exchange for cash, issued to private complainant Reynaldo Solis in his house, ten (10)

Prudential Bank checks, all postdated June 17, 1996, each in the amount of P5,000.00 all in the total

amount of P50,000.00. Montaner represented to complainant Solis that the checks were fully

funded.

When private complainant Solis deposited the checks for encashment, they were

dishonored for the reason "account closed". Solis, verbally and thru a demand letter formally

demanded that accused settle her accounts. Despite receipt of the demand letter, accused Montaner

failed to pay the value of the ten (10) checks, thus private complainant Reynaldo Solis filed the

instant complaint for estafa.

Accused Virginia Baby P. Montaner denied the allegations that she issued ten (10) checks in

Solis' favor claiming that the ten (10) checks were borrowed from her by one Marlyn Galope

because the latter needed money. She gave the ten checks to Galope, signed the same albeit the

space for the date, amount and payee were left blank so that the checks cannot be used for any

negotiation. She told Galope that the checks were not funded. When she learned that a case was

filed against her for estafa, she confronted Marlyn Galope and the latter told her that money will notbe given to her if she will not issue the said checks. She has no knowledge of the notice of dishonor

sent to her by private complainant and claimed that her husband, who supposedly received the

notice of dishonor left for abroad in July 1996 and returned only after a year, that is, in 1997.

The RTC convicted Montaner for the crime of estafa as defined and penalized under

paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Can the court a quo gravely erred in finding Montaner guilty beyong reasonable doubt of thecrime of estafa?

Ruling:

No, the court a quo correctly ruled that Montaner is guilty of the crime of estafa based on

the circumstances.

Paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means

mentioned hereinbelow x x x:

x x x x

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or

simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

x x x x




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(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no

funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the

check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check

within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said

check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit

constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.

The elements of estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1)

the postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check

was issued; (2) lack of sufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee.

In the case at bar, the prosecution sufficiently established appellant ’s guilt beyond

reasonable doubt for estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. According

to Solis’s clear and categorical testimony, Montaner issued to him the 10 postdated Prudential Bank

checks, each in the amount of P5,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00, in his house in exchange for their

cash equivalent. It was evident that Solis would not have given P50,000.00 cash to Montaner had it

not been for her issuance of the 10 Prudential Bank checks. These postdated checks were

undoubtedly issued to induce Solis to part with his cash. However, when Solis attempted to encashthem, they were all dishonored by the bank because the account was already closed.

Solis wrote Montaner a demand letter dated October 13, 199611 which was received by

Montaner’s husband to inform her that the postdated checks had bounced and that she must settle

her obligation or else face legal action from Solis. She did not comply with the demand nor did she

deposit the amount necessary to cover the checks within three days from receipt of notice. This

gave rise to a prima facie evidence of deceit, which is an element of the crime of estafa, constituting

false pretense or fraudulent act as stated in the second sentence of paragraph 2(d), Article 315 of

the Revised Penal Code.

As for Montaner's claims that she merely entrusted to Galope the blank but signed checks

imprudently, without knowing that Galope would give them as a guarantee for a loan, the Courtviews such statements with the same incredulity as the lower courts.

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it

must be credible in itself – such as the common experience and observation of mankind can

approve as probable under the circumstances.

Montaner wishes to impress upon the Court that she voluntarily parted with her blank but

signed checks not knowing or even having any hint of suspicion that the same may be used to

defraud anyone who may rely on them. Verily, appellant ’s assertion defies ordinary common sense

and human experience.

It is elementary that denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negativeand self-serving evidence which has far less evidentiary value than the testimony of credible

witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. We agree with the lower courts that appellant ’s bare

denial cannot be accorded credence for lack of evidentiary support. As aptly noted by the trial

court, appellant ’s failure to produce Galope as a witness to corroborate her story is fatal to her

cause. In all, the Court of Appeals committed no error in upholding the conviction of appellant for

estafa.




Page 285 of 299

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANGELITA I. DAUD, HANELITA M. GALLEMIT and RODERICKGALLEMIT y TOLENTINO


It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment and

Estafa. Roderick’s contention that he cannot be convicted of estafa because the element of deceit is

lacking is without merit, as private complainants were able to establish, through their positive and

credible testimonies, that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused to mislead private

complainants into believing that appellant and his co-accused, for a fee, can deploy private

complainants abroad for employment.

Facts:

Angelita I. Daud, Hanelita M. Gallemit, and appellant Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino were

charged before the RTC with illegal recruitment in large scale. That on or about February 5, 2001 to

August 2001, in the City of Parañaque, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract,enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully,

unlawfully and feloniously, for a fee, recruit and promise employment abroad to

complainants Marcelo De Guzman, Evangeline Relox, Maricel Rayo, Brigida Rayo, Gina Decena,

Nenita Policarpio, Myrna Crisostomo and Francisco Poserio, without first securing the required

license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment thus deemed committed in

large scale and therefore amounting to economic sabotage. Eight more Informations charged Daud,

Hanelita, and appellant before the RTC with eight counts of Estafa, committed separately upon eight

private complainants, namely, Marcelo I. De Guzman, Evangeline I. Relox, Marcelo E. Rayo, Brigada

A. Rayo, Gina T. Decena, Nenita F. Policarpio, Myrna S. Crisostomo and Francisco S. Poserio,

respectively.

Only Roderick was apprehended, while his co-accused Daud and Hanelita eluded arrest and

remained at large. The nine criminal cases against appellant before the RTC were consolidated.

When arraigned, Roderick pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. Thereafter, joint trial of

the nine criminal cases ensued. The prosecution offered as evidence the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration (POEA) Certification stating that Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and

Consultancy, operated by Roderick and his co-accused, is not licensed to recruit workers for

overseas employment. Of all the private complainants, only De Guzman, Decena, and Poserio

testified against Gallem it. Evidence for the defense consisted solely of appellant’s testimony.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 15, 2007 finding

appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa on three (3) counts. Considering

that accused Angelita i. Daud and Hanelita m. Gallemit remain at large for more than six (6) monthssince the issuance and delivery of the warrant of arrest to the proper police or peace officer. Let an

alias warrant of arrest be issued against them. Following the denial of his Motion for

Reconsideration by the RTC, Roderick filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. All three

complainants positively identified appellant in court. The Court of Appeals affirmed Roderick’sconviction by the RTC

Issue:




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Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the Roderick of Estafa despite the

absence of the element of deceit.

Ruling:No, the trial court did not err in convicting Roderick of Estafa.

We likewise affirm the conviction of Roderick for three counts of estafa committed against

the private complainants, based on the very same evidence that proved appellant’s criminal liability

for illegal recruitment. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal

recruitment under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article

315, paragraph 2(a)of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused

defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice

capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person. Appellant contends

that he cannot be convicted of estafa because the element of deceit is lacking. He insists on the

absence of proof that he made any false statement or fraudulent representation to private

complainants. Private complainants were able to establish, through their positive and credible

testimonies, that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused to mislead private complainants

into believing that appellant and his co-accused, for a fee, can deploy private complainants abroadfor employment.

Appellant also argues that the second element of estafa, which is prejudice or pecuniary

loss, was not established during trial as the prosecution was unable to present any receipt signed

by Roderick proving that he received money from private complainants. We reiterate that when

conspiracy has been established, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. Again, there is no cogent

reason for us to disturb the finding of the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that both elements

of estafa are present in Criminal Case Nos. 03-0123, 03-0127, and 03-0130. Thus, we sustain

appellant’s conviction for estafa, punishable under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal

Code. It is not the issuance or signing of receipts for the placement fees that makes a case for illegal

recruitment, but rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the necessary license or

authority. The absence of receipts to evidence payment is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’scause. A person charged with the illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the

testimony of the complainants, if found to be credible and convincing.

ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GRACE CALIMON AND AIDA COMILAJanuary 29, 2009, G.R. No. 175229, J. Leonardo-De Castro

To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale three (3) elements must concur: (a) the

offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in

recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the

meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Art. 13, par. (b), of the Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the same Code (now Sec. 6, RA 8042); and, (c) the

offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.

There are three ways of committing estafa under the above-quoted provision: (1) by using a

fictitious name; (2) by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,

agency, business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by means of other similar deceits. Under this class

of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable.




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Facts:

Sometime in 1998, Lourdes Lo persuaded private complainants to apply for a job in Italy through

the services of accused-appellants Grace Calimon and Aida Camila. Lo introduced them to accused-

appellant Calimon who represented herself as a sub-agent of Axil International Services andConsultancy (AISC), a legitimate recruitment agency. Calimon showed a job order of factory

workers purportedly issued by an Italian firm. Devanadera called up AISC to verify Calimon’s

representation. The person who answered the phone readily confirmed accused-appellant

Calimon’s claim. Thus, when accused Calimon asked P10,000.00 from each of the private

complainants to cover expenses for medical examination and processing fees for travel documents,

both Devanadera and Agramon readily parted with their money, as evidenced by receipts duly

signed by Calimon. They likewise gave their respective passports, birth certificates, NBI clearances,

resumes and other documents. Thereafter, Calimon brought them to St. Martins Clinic for medical

examination. Complainants also paid recruitment fees.

At one time, in the course of following up the status of her overseas employment

application, Calimon introduced complainant Devanadera to accused-appellant Comila who showedher file and informed her of the need to secure a visa with the Italian Embassy. Calimon then asked

for more money to secure the visa, but Devanadera refused to pay. Private complainants’ follow upswith Calimon were just met by repeated assurance that they will be deployed immediately once

their papers are completely processed. Finally, in January 1999, Calimon gave private complainants

their supposed individual employment contracts as factory workers in Italy. However, the contracts

did not indicate an employer. The three proceeded to the POEA to verify the status of their contract

where they discovered that while AISC was a licensed recruitment agency, Lo and accused-

appellants Calimon and Comila were not among its registered employees. An information was filed

with the RTC, charging Lo and accused-appellants with illegal recruitment in large scale and

estafa. The RTC rendered a decision convicting the appellants of the crimes charged. On appeal, the

CA affirmed the decision with modifications.

Issues:1. Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of illegal recruitment;

2. Whether or not accused-appellants are guilty of estafa

Ruling:

1. The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 8042 state:

SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,

enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring,

contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when

undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) ofPresidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines:

Provided, that any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee

employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. x x x

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)

or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large

scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. x x x




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In a litany of cases, we held that to constitute illegal recruitment in large scale three (3)

elements must concur: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable

him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of

the activities within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Art. 13, par. (b), of the

Labor Code, or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the same Code (nowSec. 6, RA 8042); and, (c) the offender committed the same against three (3) or more persons,

individually or as a group.

Here, we are convinced that the three elements were sufficiently proved beyond reasonable

doubt. First , accused-appellants, undoubtedly, did not have any license to recruit persons for

overseas work. This is substantiated by the POEA, Licensing Branch which issued a Certification to

this effect and the testimony of an employee of the POEA, Corazon Cristobal. Second , accused-

appellants engaged in illegal recruitment activities, offering overseas employment for a fee. This is

supported by the testimonies of the private complainants, particularly Devanadera who

categorically testified that accused-appellants promised private complainants employment and

assured them of placement overseas. Third , accused-appellant Calimon committed illegal

recruitment activities involving at least three persons, i.e., the three private complainants herein.On the part of Comila, this third element was not proved and thus, she was properly convicted of

simple illegal recruitment only.

2. This Court is likewise convinced that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that

accused-appellants are guilty of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code:

ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). .

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed

prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by

means of other similar deceits.

There are three ways of committing estafa under the above-quoted provision: (1) by using a

fictitious name; (2) by falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,

credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; and (3) by means of other similar deceits. Under

this class of estafa, the element of deceit is indispensable. In the present case, the deceit consists of

accused-appellants false statement or fraudulent representation which was made prior to, or at

least simultaneously with, the delivery of the money by the complainants. To convict for this type of

crime, it is essential that the false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause

or the only motive which induces the complainant to part with the thing of value. Accused-

appellants led private complainants to believe that they possessed the power, means and legal

qualifications to provide the latter with work in Italy, when in fact they did not. Private

complainants parted with their hard-earned money and suffered damage by reason of accused-

appellants deceitful and illegal acts. The elements of deceit and damage for this form of estafa are

indisputably present, hence their conviction for estafa was proper.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOLORES OCDENG.R. No. 173198, June 1, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro




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The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the

accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the

accused is crucial for conviction.

Facts:

Dolores Ocden was charged of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and six (6) counts of estafa.

All seven cases were consolidated. Ocden pleaded not guilty in all the cases.

Jeffries C. Golidan, Howard C. Golidan, Karen M. Simeon, Jean S. Maximo, Norma Pedro,

Marylyn Mana-a, Rizalina Ferrer and Milan Darling are the private complainants in these cases.

They alleged that they were recruited by Dolores Ocden to work as overseas factory workers in a

stuffed toy factory in Italy. They were required to submit bio-datas, their passports and pay

70,000.00 pesos as placement fee. They were also obliged to undergo medical examination in

Zamora Medical Clinic in Manila where they paid 3,500.00 pesos as their fee.

Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio were supposed to be included in the first batch of workers to besent to Italy. In preparation for their flight to Italy, the three proceeded to Manila. In Manila, they

were introduced by Ocden to Erlinda Ramos (Ramos). Ocden and Ramos then accompanied Ferrer,

Jennilyn, and Alipio to the airport where they took a flight to Zamboanga. Ocden explained to

Ferrer, Jennilyn, and Alipio that they would be transported to Malaysia where their visa application

for Italy would be processed.

Sensing that they were being fooled, Ferrer and Jennilyn decided to get a refund of their

money, but Ocden was nowhere to be found. Ferrer would later learn from the Baguio office of the

Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) that Ocden was not a licensed recruiter.

Ocden denied recruiting private complainants and claimed that she was also an applicant

for an overseas job in Italy, just like them. Ocden identified Ramos as the recruiter. Ramos held aseminar in St. Theresa’s Compound, Navy Base, Baguio City. As many applicants were not able to

attend the seminar, Ocden asked Ramos to conduct a seminar at her house. After said seminars,

Ramos designated Ocden as leader of the applicants. As such, Ocden received her co-applicants’

applications and documents; accompanied her co-applicants to Manila for medical examination

because she knew the location of Zamora Medical Clinic; and accepted placement fees in the

amount of P70,000.00 each from Mana-a and Ferrer and from Golidan, the amount of P140,000.00

(for Jeffries and Howard).

On July 2, 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Ocden guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale and three counts of estafa. On appeal, the appellate

court affirmed Ocden’s conviction but modifying the penalties imposed upon her for the three

counts of estafa.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Ocden is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in a

large scale

2. Whether or not Ocden may be held liable for both Illegal Recruitment and Estafa for the same act




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Ruling:

1. Yes. There is nothing in the records that warrant a reversal of the rulings of the RTC and CA.

It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gavecomplainants the distinct impression that he had the power or ability to send complainants abroad

for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed.

It is not necessary for the prosecution to present a certification that Ocden is a non-licensee

or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Section

6 of Republic Act No. 8042 enumerates particular acts which would constitute illegal recruitment

"whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of

authority." Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic Act No. 8042, is the "[f]ailure to

reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing

for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without

the worker’s fault."

Since illegal recruitment under Section 6(m) can be committed by any person, even by a

licensed recruiter, a certification on whether Ocden had a license to recruit or not, is

inconsequential. Ocden committed illegal recruitment as described in said provision by receiving

placement fees from Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s two sons, Jeffries and Howard, evidenced by

receipts Ocden herself issued; and failing to reimburse/refund to Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s two

sons the amounts they had paid when they were not able to leave for Italy, through no fault of their

own.

In People v. Hu, we held that a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based

on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons, whether individually or as

a group. While it is true that the law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial,

nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the offense wascommitted against three or more persons. In this case, there is conclusive evidence that Ocden

recruited Mana-a, Ferrer, and Golidan’s sons, Jeffries and Howard, for purported employment asfactory workers in Italy.

2. Yes. The very same evidence proving Ocden’s liability for illegal recruitment also established her

liability for estafa.

It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment

under Republic Act No. 8042 in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph

2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

It is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convictedseparately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the

Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal

intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the criminal

intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does

not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under

par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment




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under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily resultin his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSARIO "ROSE" OCHOAG.R. No. 173792, August 31, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or

by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the

offended party or third person. Both elements are present, Ochoa’ s deceit was evident in her false

representation to private complainants that she possessed the capability to send said private

complainants to Taiwan/Saudi Arabia for employment. Clearly deceived by Ochoa’ s words and actions,

private complainants were persuaded to hand over their money to Ochoa to pay for their placement

and medical fees. Sadly, private complainants were never able to leave for work abroad, nor recover

their money.

Facts:

The Information filed before the RTC and docketed as Criminal Case No. 98-77300, chargedOchoa with illegal recruitment in large scale, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the period of February 1997 up to April 1998 Rosario Ochoa (Ochoa) did

then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit Robert Gubat, Junior Agustin, Cesar

Aquino, Richard Luciano, Fernando Rivera, Mariano R. Mislang, Helen B. Palogo, Joebert

Decolongon, Corazon S. Austria, Cristopher A. Bermejo, Letecia D. Londonio, Alma Borromeo,

Francisco Pascual, Raymundo A. Bermejo and Rosemarie A. Bermejo for a consideration ranging

from P2,000.00 to P32,000.00 or a total amount of P124,000.00 as placement fee which the

complainants paid to Ochoa without the accused having secured the necessary license from the

Department of Labor and Employment.

Three other Informations were filed before the RTC and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303, this time charging Ochoa with three counts of estafa, committed

separately upon three private complainants Robert Gubat (Gubat), Cesar Aquino (Cesar), and Junior

Agustin (Agustin). The Information in Criminal Case No. 98-77301 accuses Ochoa of the following

acts constituting estafa:

That on or about March 3, 1998, Ochoa did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously recruit and promise employment in Taiwan to one ROBERT GUBAT for a consideration

of P18,800.00 as placement fee, knowing that she has no power, capacity or lawful authority and

with no intention to fulfill her said promise, but merely as scheme or excuse to get and exact money

from said complainant.

The two other Informations for estafa were similarly worded as the Information, except asto the name of the private complainants and the amount purportedly collected by Ochoa from them,

particularly:

Docket No. Private Complainant Amount Collected

Criminal Case No. 98-773025 Cesar Aquino P19.000.00




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Criminal Case No. 98-773036 Junior Agustin P32,000.00

As prayed for by the State Prosecutor, all four criminal cases against Ochoa before the RTC wereconsolidated.

Ochoa stated that she was employed by AXIL International Services and Consultant (AXIL)

as recruiter and was paid on a commission basis. AXIL had a temporary license to recruit Filipino

workers for overseas employment. She admitted recruiting private complainants and receiving

from them substantial amounts as placement and medical fees. Ochoa claimed though that she

remitted private complainants’ money to a person named Mercy, the manager of AXIL, but AXIL

failed to issue receipts because the private complainants did not pay in full.

On April 17, 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision finding Ochoa guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Case No. 98-77300) and three

counts of estafa (Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, 98-77303).

The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision affirming the appealed RTC decision. Ochoa

filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the People opposed for being bereft of merit.

In its Resolution dated August 6, 2003, the Court of Appeals declared that it had no

jurisdiction over Ochoa’s appeal, ratiocinating thus:

While neither the accused-appellant nor the Office of the Solicitor General representing the people

ever raised the issue of jurisdiction, our second look at the suit proved worthwhile because we

came to realize that we mistakenly assumed jurisdiction over this case where it does not obtain.

It was error to consider accused-appellant ’s appeal from a trial court judgment imposinglife imprisonment in Criminal Case No. Q-98-77300 for illegal recruitment in a large scale.

Consequently, the judgment we rendered is null and void.

Despite its lack of jurisdiction over Ochoa’s appeal, the Court of Appeals did not dismiss the

same and merely ordered its transfer to us: While the Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 directs the

dismissal of appeals filed before the wrong court, the Supreme Court has in practice allowed the

transfer of records from this Court to the highest court. In which case, we shall subscribe to this

practice in the interest of substantial justice.

Issue:

Can the court a quo erred when it ruled that Ochoa is guilty of illegal recruitment in largescale and estafa?

Ruling:

No, We find no reversible error in the assailed Court of Appeals decision.

Illegal recruitment in large scale




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Ochoa was charged with violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042. Said provision

broadens the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and provides stiffer penalties,

especially for those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., illegal recruitment in large scale and

illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate.

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 defines illegal recruitment as follows:

SEC. 6. Definition. - For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,

enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring,

contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when

undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of

Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines:

Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a

fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise

include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder,

licensee or holder of authority:

x x x x

(m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation

and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take

place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large

scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3)

or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large

scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

It is well-settled that to prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that appellant gavecomplainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send complainants abroad

for work such that the latter were convinced to part with their money in order to be employed. All

eight private complainants herein consistently declared that Ochoa offered and promised them

employment overseas. Ochoa required private complainants to submit their bio-data, birth

certificates, and passports, which private complainants did. Private complainants also gave various

amounts to Ochoa as payment for placement and medical fees as evidenced by the receipts Ochoa

issued to Gubat, Cesar, and Agustin. Despite private complainants’ compliance with all the

requirements Ochoa specified, they were not able to leave for work abroad. Private complainants

pleaded that Ochoa return their hard-earned money, but Ochoa failed to do so.

Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 clearly provides that any person, whether a non-licensee,

non-holder, licensee or holder of authority may be held liable for illegal recruitment for certain actsas enumerated in paragraphs (a) to (m) thereof. Among such acts, under Section 6(m) of Republic

Act No. 8042, is the "failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his

documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does

not actually take place without the worker’s fault." Ochoa committed illegal recruitment as

described in the said provision by receiving placement and medical fees from private complainants,

evidenced by the receipts issued by her, and failing to reimburse the private complainants the




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amounts they had paid when they were not able to leave for Taiwan and Saudi Arabia, through no

fault of their own.

Ochoa further argues in her defense that she should not be found personally and criminally

liable for illegal recruitment because she was a mere employee of AXIL and that she had turned

over the money she received from private complainants to AXIL.

We are not convinced. Ochoa’s claim was not supported by any corroborating evidence. The

POEA verification and presented by Ochoa during trial, pertains only to the status of AXIL as a

placement agency with a "limited temporary authority" which had already expired. Said verification

did not show whether or not Ochoa was employed by AXIL. Strangely, for an alleged employee of

AXIL, Ochoa was not able to present the most basic evidence of employment, such as appointment

papers, identification card (ID), and/or payslips. The receipts presented by some of the private

complainants were issued and signed by Ochoa herself, and did not contain any indication that

Ochoa issued and signed the same on behalf of AXIL. Also, Ochoa was not able to present any proof

that private complainants’ money were actually turned over to or received by AXIL.

Under the last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042, illegal recruitment shall beconsidered an offense involving economic sabotage if committed in a large scale, that is, committed

against three or more persons individually or as a group. Here, there are eight private complainants

who convincingly testified on Ochoa’s acts of illegal recruitment.

In view of the overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution, we uphold the verdict

of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that Ochoa is guilty of illegal recruitment

constituting economic sabotage.

Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that the penalty of life imprisonment and a

fine of not less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000.000.00 shall be imposed when the illegal

recruitment constitutes economic sabotage.

Estafa

We affirm as well the conviction of Ochoa for estafa committed against three private

complainants in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303. The very same evidence

proving Ochoa’s criminal liability for illegal recruitment also established her criminal liability for

estafa.

It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment

under Republic Act No. 8042, in relation to the Labor Code, and estafa under Article 315, paragraph

2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. We explicated in People v. Cortez and Yabut that:

In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may becharged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par.

2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum

where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is malum in se

where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the

Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction

for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal




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recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa will not

necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.

Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code defines estafa as:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the meansmentioned hereinbelow x x x:

x x x x

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or

simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications,

property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.

The elements of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by

means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to theoffended party or third person.

Both elements are present in Criminal Case Nos. 98-77301, 98-77302, and 98-77303.

Ochoa’s deceit was evident in her false representation to private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and

Agustin that she possessed the authority and capability to send said private complainants to

Taiwan/Saudi Arabia for employment as early as one to two weeks from completion of the

requirements, among which were the payment of placement fees and submission of a medical

examination report. Ochoa promised that there were already existing job vacancies overseas for

private complainants, even quoting the corresponding salaries. Ochoa carried on the deceit by

receiving application documents from the private complainants, accompanying them to the clinic

for medical examination, and/or making them go to the offices of certain recruitment/placement

agencies to which Ochoa had actually no connection at all. Clearly deceived by Ochoa’s words andactions, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and Aquino were persuaded to hand over their money

to Ochoa to pay for their placement and medical fees. Sadly, private complainants Gubat, Cesar, and

Aquino were never able to leave for work abroad, nor recover their money.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the present appeal for lack of merit and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court

of Appeals.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANGELITA I. DAUD, HANELITA M. GALLEMIT and RODERICKGALLEMIT y TOLENTINO


It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove that Roderick himself received the placement

fees from complainants and issued receipts for the same, given the finding of the existence of

conspiracy among Roderick and his co-accused Hanelita and Daud to convict Roderick of Illegal

recruitment in large scale. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It

may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the

acts of the accused which point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of




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interest. And Between the categorical statements of the private complainants, on the one hand, and

the bare denial of appellant , on the other hand, the former must perforce prevail.

Facts:

Angelita I. Daud, Hanelita M. Gallemit, and appellant Roderick Gallemit y Tolentino werecharged before the RTC with illegal recruitment in large scale. That on or about February 5, 2001 to

August 2001, in the City of Parañaque, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract,

enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully,

unlawfully and feloniously, for a fee, recruit and promise employment abroad to

complainants Marcelo De Guzman, Evangeline Relox, Maricel Rayo, Brigida Rayo, Gina Decena,

Nenita Policarpio, Myrna Crisostomo and Francisco Poserio, without first securing the required

license or authority from the Department of Labor and Employment thus deemed committed in

large scale and therefore amounting to economic sabotage. Eight more Informations charged Daud,

Hanelita, and appellant before the RTC with eight counts of Estafa, committed separately upon eight

private complainants, namely, Marcelo I. De Guzman, Evangeline I. Relox, Marcelo E. Rayo, Brigada

A. Rayo, Gina T. Decena, Nenita F. Policarpio, Myrna S. Crisostomo and Francisco S. Poserio,

respectively.

Only Roderick was apprehended, while his co-accused Daud and Hanelita eluded arrest and

remained at large. The nine criminal cases against appellant before the RTC were consolidated.

When arraigned, Roderick pleaded not guilty to all the charges against him. Thereafter, joint trial of

the nine criminal cases ensued. The prosecution offered as evidence the Philippine Overseas

Employment Administration Certification stating that Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and

Consultancy, operated by Roderick and his co-accused, is not licensed to recruit workers for

overseas employment. Of all the private complainants, only De Guzman, Decena, and Poserio

testified against Gallem it. Evidence for the defense consisted solely of appellant’s testimony.

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision dated January 15, 2007 finding

appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa on three (3) counts. Considering

that accused Angelita i. Daud and Hanelita m. Gallemit remain at large for more than six (6) months

since the issuance and delivery of the warrant of arrest to the proper police or peace officer. Let an

alias warrant of arrest be issued against them. Following the denial of his Motion for

Reconsideration by the RTC, Roderick filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. All three

complainants positively identified appellant in court. The Court of Appeals affirmed Roderick’s

conviction by the RTC

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in convicting the Roderick of large-scale illegal

recruitment despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

No, the trial court did not err in convicting Roderick.

Republic Act No. 8042 broadened the concept of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code

and provided stiffer penalties, especially for those that constitute economic sabotage, i.e., Illegal

Recruitment in Large Scale and Illegal Recruitment Committed by a Syndicate. Illegal recruitment is




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deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring

or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three

(3) or more persons individually or as a group. To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three

elements must concur: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable

him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) of the Labor Code, or any of

the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code; and (c) the offendercommitted the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group. Both the RTC and the

Court of Appeals ruled that all the foregoing elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are

present in the case at bar. First, neither the agency "Green Pastures World Wide Tours and

Consultancy" nor appellant himself had a valid license or authority to engage in the recruitment and

placement of workers. This was established by the POEA certification stating that the said agency

located in that apartment was not licensed to recruit employees for abroad. Second, despite not

having such authority, Roderick, along with his co-accused, nevertheless engaged in recruitment

activities, offering and promising jobs to private complainants and collecting from them various

amounts as placement fees.

Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced

from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of theaccused which point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.

Conspiracy exists where the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and

coordination as unmistakably to indicate a common purpose or design in committing the crime. The

testimonies of the complainants on the matter are affirmative in nature and sufficiently

corroborative of each other to be less than credible. We agree with the trial court that accused-

appellant engaged in recruitment of workers which was illegal and in large scale. Illegal

recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three or more persons

individually or as a group. In this case, three complainants testified against appellant’s acts of illegalrecruitment. The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the findings and conclusions of the

RTC and the Court of Appeals. The prosecution witnesses were positive and categorical in their

testimonies that they personally met Roderick; that they knew Roderick was associated with Green

Pasture Worldwide Tour and Consultancy; and that Roderick had performed recruitment activitiessuch as promising employment abroad, encouraging job applications, and providing copies of job

orders. The private complainants’ testimonies are consistent and corroborate one another onmaterial points, such as the amount of the placement fees asked, and the purported country of

destination and nature of work. It was not necessary for the prosecution to still prove that appellant

himself received the placement fees from private complainants and issued receipts for the same,

given the finding of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals of the existence of conspiracy among

Roderick and his co-accused Hanelita and Daud, appellant’s wife and mother-in-law, respectively.

Furthermore, without any evidence to show that private complainants were propelled by any ill

motive to testify falsely against appellant, their testimonies deserve full faith and credit.

LIBEL

ISAGANI M. YAMBOT, LETTY JIMENEZ-MAGSANOC, JOSE MA. D. NOLASCO, ARTEMIO T.ENGRACIA, JR. and VOLT CONTRERAS vs. Hon. ARTEMIO TUQUERO in his capacity as

Secretary of Justice, and ESCOLASTICO U. CRUZ, JR.G.R. No. 169895, March 23, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the

reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable




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harm. Malice is present when it is shown that the author of the libelous remarks made such remarks

with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to the truth or falsity thereof.

Facts:

On May 26, 1996, the Philippine Daily Inquirer reported an article alleging that a mauling

incident took place between respondent Makati RTC Judge Cruz and one Robert Mendoza who was

then an administrative officer of the said RTC Branch.

Contending that the article to be false and malicious, particularly the part in the report

wherein it was alleged that there was a pending case of sexual harassment filed against him with

the Supreme Court, respondent Judge Cruz initiated a Complaint for libel with the City Prosecutor

of Makati.

Finding probable cause against herein petitioners and Mendoza, the City Prosecutor filed an

Information for libel against them. On appeal, then Secretary of Justice, herein respondent Sec.

Tuquero, sustained the resolution of the City Prosecutor finding probable cause against petitioners

and Mendoza. The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by

petitioners. In ruling as such the appellate court held that since the Information had already beenfiled with the trial court, the primary determination of probable cause is now with the latter. Hence,

this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not there is probable cause to charge petitioners with libel.

Ruling:

No, there is none.

Libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or

imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to discredit or cause thedishonor or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

Consequently, the following elements constitute libel: (a) imputation of a discreditable act or

condition to another; (b) publication of the imputation; (c) identity of the person defamed; and, (d)

existence of malice. The glaring absence of maliciousness in the assailed portion of the news article

subject of this case negates the existence of probable cause that libel has been committed by the

PDI staff.

As previously stated, Judge Cruz initiated the complaint for libel, asserting the falsity and

maliciousness of the statement in a news report that "(a)ccording to Mendoza, Cruz still has a

pending case of sexual harassment filed with the Supreme Court by Fiscal Maria Lourdes Garcia,

also of the Makati RTC." It can be easily discerned that the article merely reported the statement of

Mendoza that there was allegedly a pending case of sexual harassment against Judge Cruz and thatsaid article did not report the existence of the alleged sexual harassment suit as a confirmed fact.

Judge Cruz never alleged, much less proved, that Mendoza did not utter such statement.

Nevertheless, Judge Cruz concludes that there was malice on the part of the PDI Staff by asserting

that they did not check the facts. He claimed that the report got its facts wrong, pointing to a

certification from the Deputy Court Administrator attesting to the pendency of only two

administrative cases against him, both of which bear captions not mentioning sexual harassment.


