I. Concept of Criminal LawA. PurposeMagno vs. C.A G.R. No. 96132 June 26, 1992Paras, J.:

Facts:Petitioner was in the process of setting up a car repair shop but did not have the complete equipment to make his venture workable nor the necessary funds for that purpose. Private complainant together with LS Finance agreed to set up the necessary expenses and equipment. The arrangement required petitioner to pay 30% of the total amount of the equipment as a warranty deposit. Lacking funds thereof, he requested the private complainant to look for a third person to furnish the amount which the Vice President of LS Finance proceeded to do so. The equipment was thus delivered to petitioner who then issued Six postdated checks. Four of the checks issued were returned for the reason account closed. Upon complaint petitioner was convicted by the RTC.ISSUE:W.O.N. petitioner should be convicted of violation of B.P. 22HELD:To charge the petitioner for the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not withdraw as it was not his own account, it having remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an unjust "debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not receive the amount in question. All the while, said amount was in the safekeeping of the financing company, which is managed, supervised and operated by the corporation officials and employees of LS Finance. Petitioner did not even know that the checks he issued were turned over by Joey Gomez to Mrs. Teng, whose operation was kept from his knowledge on her instruction.Thus, it behooves upon a court of law that in applying the punishment imposed upon the accused, the objective of retribution of a wronged society, should be directed against the "actual and potential wrongdoers." In the instant case, there is no doubt that petitioner's four (4) checks were used to collateralize an accommodation, and not to cover the receipt of an actual "account or credit for value" as this was absent, and therefore petitioner should not be punished for mere issuance of the checks in question.Under the utilitarian theory, the "protective theory" in criminal law, "affirms that the primary function of punishment is the protective (sic) of societyagainst actual and potential wrongdoers." It is not clear whether petitioner could be considered as having actually committed the wrong sought to be punished in the offense charged, but on the other hand, it can be safely said that the actuations of Mrs. Carolina Teng amount to that of potential wrongdoers whose operations should also be clipped at some point in time in order that the unwary public will not be failing prey to such a vicious transactionB. Enactment of penal statutes (Constitutional limitations)

Romualdez vs. COMELEC G. R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008 *****CHICO-NAZARIO,J.:Facts:Petitioners were charged for the violation of the Omnibus Election Code, committed by knowingly representing themselves as a resident of a different City. They assail the penalty provision of the said law is void for vagueness as it fails to point a particular provisions which it punishes.Issue:W.O.N. the term violation of this Code is void for vagunessHeld:No, The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged.Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge.The rationale is obvious.If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes maybe hampered.No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised.A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative.It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. Thus, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness.Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. This Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. In the case of People vs. Gatchailan the Court held that This Court ruled that the law by legislative fiat intends to punish not only those expressly declared unlawful but even those not so declared but are clearly enjoined to be observed to carry out the fundamental purpose of the law.

Southern Hemisphere vs. Anti-Terrorism Council G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2011CARPIO MORALES,J.:

Facts: Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism, otherwise known as theHuman Security Act of 2007. They claim that the said statute is facially invalid more particularly they assail that it is intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad in the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts. Issue: W.O.N. A facial validation may lieHeld:No, The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.A statute or act suffers from the defect ofvaguenesswhen it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.Theoverbreadthdoctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.

Distinguished from anas-appliedchallenge which considers onlyextantfacts affectingreallitigants, afacialinvalidation is an examination of theentire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost alwaysunder situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.

Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 148560 November 19,2011Bellosillo.,J:Facts:Petitioner wishes to assail RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) as constitutionally infirm on grounds that it suffers from the vice of vagueness, more particularly the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms"combination"and"series" in the key phrase"a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word"pattern"in Sec. 4.Theseomissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.Issue: W.O.N. the law is void due to its vaguenessHeld:No, A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them. the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible"chilling effect" upon protected speech.This is under the theory that, the possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes.Criminal statutes have generalin terroremeffect resulting from their very existence, and,if facial challenge is allowedfor this reason alone,the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct.In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.It has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid."As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.However, statutes found vagueas a matter of due processtypically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant. People vs. Dacuycuy G.R. No. L-45127 May 5, 1989Regalado, J.:Facts:Respondents were charged for the violation of R.A. 4670. They filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition on grounds that under the said law, the term of penalty remained unfixed thus leaving unbridled discretion to the court. Sec. 32 thereof states upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos,or by imprisonment, in the discretion of the courtIssue:W.O.N. the said law is voidHeld: Yes, Section 32 of Republic Act No. 4670 provides for an indeterminable period of imprisonment, with neither a minimum nor a maximum duration having been set by the legislative authority. The courts are thus given a wide latitude of discretion to fix the term of imprisonment, without even the benefit of any sufficient standard, such that the duration thereof may range, in the words of respondent judge, from one minute to the life span of the accused. Irremissibly, this cannot be allowed. It vests in the courts a power and a duty essentially legislative in nature and which, as applied to this case, does violence to the rules on separation of powers as well as the non-delegability of legislative powers.

2. Characteristics of Criminal LawA. Diplomatic Immunity

Minucher vs. C.A. G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003VITUG,J.:

Facts:Petitioner, a Labor Attache of Iran, was charged with the violation of the Dangerous Drug Act. He filed a counter claim alleging that the charges filed were merely trumped up by Scalzo, a special agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration, who accompanied the narcotic agents during the buy bust and became the principal witness against petitioner. He then filed a motion to dismiss on ground of Diplomatic Immunity.Issue: W.O.N. Respondent is immune from suitHeld:Yes, Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others.However, while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit. While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.

Liang vs. People G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:Facts:Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal. The MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal processIssue:W.O.N. Petitioner is immune from suitHeld:No, the mere invocation of the immunity clause does notipso factoresult in the dropping of the charges. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated.Furthermore, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.

B. Retroactivity

People vs. Lacson G.R. No. 149453 May 28, 2002Facts:The case arose from a shootout between the members of the PNP and the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. 11 informations were filed against the PNP as they claim that what happened was a summary execution instead of a shootout. During the pendency of the appeal of conviction, the case was revived and a new provision in the Rules of Court under Rule 117 authorized the prescription of provisional dismissalIssue:W.O.N. Rule 117 shall be applicable to the case at barHeld:Yes, like any other favourable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected.Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable.The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.It has been held that a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure. However, as to the time bar rule, The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar.It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule.

Go vs. Dimagiba G.R. No. 151876 June 21, 2005 **Read for B.P. 22 casesPANGANIBAN,J.:Facts:Respondent issued to petitioner 13 checks which were subsequently dishonoured for the reason account closed. He was then prosecuted and imprisoned for the violation of B.P. 22. While serving sentence he filed a writ of habeas corpus which was granted, the judge invoking SC-AC 12-2000 which allegedly required the imposition of a fine only instead of imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent, thus applying it retroactively.Issue:W.O.N. the circular should order the release of respondentHeld:No, SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment, it being left to the discretion of the judge. The claim of retroactivity has no basis, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment. Furthermore the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline for the trial courts, it does not confer any new right in favor of the accused, much less those convicted by final judgment.C. TerritorialityU.S. vs. Bull G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910ELLIOTT,J.:Facts:Respondent was charged for negligence in transporting 677 cattles and carabaos. A motion to quash was filed contending that the information did not state that it was sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands, as in fact the vessel was registered under Norweigan Laws.Issue:W.O.N. the Philippines has jurisdictionHeld:Yes, No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable.The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper political agency. This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line which determines these waters theStandardmust have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters. The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction.People vs. Wong Cheng hehehehe G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922ROMUALDEZ,J.:Facts:Respondent was charged for smoking opium aboard a vessel of English nationality anchored two and a half miles away from Manila Bay. He filed a motion to demurrer based on lack of jurisdiction which was approvedIssue:W.O.N. our courts has jurisdictionHeld:Yes, the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed. Disorder which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. Mere possession is not considered a disturbance of public order, thus not triable by our courts, however, to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our territory.

People vs. Look Chaw December 16, 1910 G.R. No. 5887ARELLANO,C. J.:Facts:Respondent was charged with unlawful possession of opium, some of which were landed from the port, were found in a cargo of the vessel , of English Nationality, while porting in Cebu. The defense moved to dismiss on grounds that the Philippines lack jurisdictionIssue:W.O.N. the courts has jurisdictionHeld:Yes, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.People vs. Lol-Lo and Saraw G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922MALCOLM,J.:Facts:Respondents are chaged with piracy for foraging a Dutch boat, attacking their men and raping their women. All of the people were then kept in the boat with holes on it, with the idea that it would submerge, which it did not. The crime was committed within the 3 mile radius of a foreign state.Issue:W.O.N. the courts have jurisdictionHeld:Yes, Pirates are in lawhostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes."

3. Article 3 definition of FelonyA. Dolo vs. Culpa People vs. Ah Chong G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910Facts: sabi nila bading daw si ah chong Respondent was employed as a cook where he shared his residence with the house boy. He was charged for crime of assassination of his room-mate while under the assumption that the intruder in their room was a robber or a thief. During trial, he admitted the authorship of the death of his roommate but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self-defense.Issue:Is Respondent liable? W.O.N. malice or criminal intent is an essential element of the crimes of homicide or assassinationHeld:No, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged "cancels the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence;Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."

People vs. Oanis G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943MORAN,J.:Facts:The appellant policemen received an order to capture an escaped convict dead or alive. They proceeded to go to the house of the convicts paramour Irene and when they were at her room, thus seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, they simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. It turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal but a peaceful and innocent citizen.Issue:W.O.N. respondents are liable for homicideHeld: Yes, the maxim isignorantia facti excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed. Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm, yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise.

The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence, and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence to support a plea of mitigated liability.They are thus liable for murder with treason mitigated with incomplete performance of a lawful duty

People vs. Pugay G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988MEDIALDEA,J.:Facts:The Respondents in conspiracy with each other were charged for the crime of Murder in setting ablaze one retarde, thus burning his body and resulting to his death. Gabion on of their friends happened to be on the seen while the event took place and was charged as a participator thereinIssue:W.O.N. Gabion should be held liableW.O.N. The two other conspirators are liableHeld:No, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the crime.

Yes, Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides,inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were stunned when they noticed the deceased burning

People vs. Reyes G.R. No. 153591 February 23, 2004YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:Facts:Respondent was charged with the crime of murder owing from an accident. The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation as after he bumped the deceased, he deliberately ran her over. Appellant admitted having ran over the victim, but claimed that it was an accident.Issue:W.O.N. criminal liability attatchesHeld:YES, In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place. Furthermore, appellants act of bringing the victim to the hospital despite numerous opportunities to flee from the scene is more compatible with a state of mind devoid of criminal intent.

Garcia vs. C.A. G.R. No. 157171 March 14, 2006QUISUMBING,J.:Facts:Petitioners were charged for the violation of RA 6646 for wilfully and unlawfully decreasing the votes received by Senatorial Candidate Aquino Pimentel from 6998 to 1921. They contend that they cannot be held liable on the basis of good faithIssue:W.O.N. good faith is a defenseHeld:YES, while generally,mala in sefelonies are defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemedmala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that aremala prohibita, the criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy.Clearly, the acts prohibited in Section 27(b) aremala in se. For otherwise, even errors and mistakes committed due to overwork and fatigue would be punishable. Given the volume of votes to be counted and canvassed within a limited amount of time, errors and miscalculations are bound to happen. And it could not be the intent of the law to punish unintentional election canvass errors. However, intentionally increasing or decreasing the number of votes received by a candidate is inherently immoral, since it is done with malice and intent to injure another. Criminal intent is presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear. Thus, whoever invokes good faith as a defense has the burden of proving its existence.

Manuel vs. People G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005CALLEJO, SR.,J.:Facts:EDUARDO was found guilty by the RTC of bigamy. Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted because of his first wifes 20-year absence. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage.Issue:W.O.N. intent is immaterialHeld:Yes, for one to be criminally liable for a felony bydolo,there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent.Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony bydolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law.Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. People vs Delim G.R. No. 142773.January 28, 2003Facts:Respondents seized the deceased victim and killed him. They were charged and convicted for the crime of Murder but the lower courts differ as to the opinion on the crime charged in the information whether one of Murder or KidnappingIssue:W.O.N. Kidnapping or murder?Held:Murder. In determining what crime is charged in an information, the material inculpatory facts recited therein describing the crime charged in relation to the penal law violated are controlling.Where the specific intent of the malefactor is determinative of the crime charged such specific intent must be alleged in the information and proved by the prosecution.If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the victim, the incidental deprivation of the victim's liberty does not constitute the felony of kidnapping but is merely a preparatory act to the killing, and hence, is merged into, or absorbed by, the killing of the victim.The crime committed would either be homicide or murder.Specific intent is not synonymous with motive.Motive generally is referred to as the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity.Motive is not an essential element of a crime and hence the prosecution need not prove the same.As a general rule, proof of motive for the commission of the offense charged does not show guilt and absence of proof of such motive does not establish the innocence of accused for the crime charged such as murder.The history of crimes shows that murders are generally committed from motives comparatively trivial. Crime is rarely rational.In murder, the specific intent is to kill the victim. In kidnapping, the specific intent is to deprive the victim of his/her liberty.If there is no motive for the crime, the accused cannot be convicted for kidnapping. In kidnapping for ransom, the motive is ransom.Where accused kills the victim to avenge the death of a loved one, the motive is revenge. There is no allegations in the complaint that the offenders intended to deprive the victim of his liberty.

Ivler vs. San Pedro GR No. 172716 November 17, 2010Facts:Appellant was charged and convicted of the crimes of (1) Reckless imprudence resulting in Slight physical Injuries and (2) Reckless imprudence resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property. Appellant pleaded guilty to the first charge and was meted out the penalty of Public censure and on the second charge he moved to dismiss on grounds of double jeopardy.Issue:W.O.N. there is double jeopardyHeld:YES,In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses.Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, andcan not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court

MALA IN SE VS. MALA PROHIBITA

People vs. Bayona G.R. No. L-42288 February 16, 1935Facts:Appellant was inside the fence of the polling place when he was arrested and charged for carring a revolver. He claimed in his defense that he could not leave his gun in the car in which he was driving because he might lose it and incur criminal responsibilities. The solicitor general agrees with thte defendant that there is no crime as he claims it would in effect prohibit people within the area from even cleaning their gun inside their residences. Issue:W.O.N. there is a crimeHeld:YES, The law which the defendant violated is a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not intend to intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way, but when he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence surrounding the polling place, he committed the act complained of, and he committed it willfully. The act prohibited by the Election Law was complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise with the election is not made an essential element of the offense.The rule is that in actsmala in sethere must be a criminal intent, but in thosemala prohibitait is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. ..."The cases suggested by the Solicitor-General do not seem to us to present any difficulty in the enforcement of the law. If a man with a revolver merely passes along a public road on election day, within fifty meters of a polling place, he does not violate the provision of law in question, because he had no intent to perpetrate the act prohibited, and the same thing would be true of a peace officer in pursuing a criminal; nor would the prohibition extend to persons living within fifty meters of a polling place, who merely clean or handle their firearms within their own residences on election day, as they would not be carrying firearms within the contemplation of the law

U.S. vs. ChicoG.R. No. 4963September 15, 1909Facts:Appellant, in violation of the law at that time, displayed in his windows and one of the show cases in the store a number of medallions, in the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate and identify those in armed insurrection against the United States, which he purchased in an auction sale. He rests his defense on his absence of criminal intent.ISSUE:W.O.N. there is a crime committedHeld:YES, It is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with the criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. In many cases the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect which the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the act is good or bad. The display of a flag or emblem used particularly within a recent period, by the enemies of the Government tends to incite resistance to governmental functions and insurrection against governmental authority just as effectively if made in the best of good faith as if made with the most corrupt intent. The display itself, without the intervention of any other factor, is the evil. It is quite different from that large class of crimes, made such by the common law or by statute, in which the injurious effect upon the public depends upon the corrupt intention of the person perpetrating the act.In the case at bar, however, the evil to society and the Governmental does not depend upon the state of mind of the one who displays the banner, but upon the effect which that display has upon the public mind.

ARTICLE 4People vs. Iligan Facts:The three appellants attacked the deceased-victim with a bolo through the head in the national highway and thereafter being weakened by the blow, sent him to the highway was hit by a carIssue:W.O.N. is the appellant liable even if the final blow was not dealt by himHeld:YES, Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability shall be incurred "by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." Based on the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused), the essential requisites of Article 4 are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender.Under these circumstances, we hold that while the hacking might not have been the direct cause, it was the proximate cause of the latters death. Proximate legal cause is defined as "that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom." In other words, the sequence of events from Iligans assault on him to the time Quiones, Jr. was run over by a vehicle is, considering the very short span of time between them, one unbroken chain of events. Having triggered such events, Iligan cannot escape liability.

People vs. Mananquil G.R. No. L-35574 September 28, 1984Facts:The defendant poured gasoline hidden in a coffee bottle, onto his husbands face, due to an argument and the fact that he has been keeping a mistress. Thereafter, she lit a match and set her husbands polo on fire. He was afterwards brought to the hospital where he died due to pneumonia and burns. She set up her husbands pneumonia as a defense to her liabilityIssue:W.O.N. defendant is liable for the deathHeld:YES, The evidence shows that pneumonia was a mere complication of the burns sustained. The fact that other causes contribute to the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility. He would still be liable "even if the deceased might litem recovered if he had taken proper care of himself, or submitted to surgical operation, or that unskilled or improper treatment aggravated the wound and contributed to the death, or that death was men."If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in a manner as to put life in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of this felonious and wicked act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal result.Quinto vs. Andres G.R. No. 155791March 16, 2005Facts:Three stupid boys were playing by this really fab drainage culvert. One of the boys just sat outside while the two were playing inside if you know what I mean. Then one of the guys left without a word. And the loser guy went in to find the dead other guy dead. Upon autopsy it was found that he died by a strike by a blunt object and drownedIssue:W.O.N. is there criminal liabilityHeld:No, there was no showing of any unlawful act of the accused nor did they adduce evidence that the respondents hit the deceased with any weapon which might have cause their death. It was dark and the Court of Appeals did not rule out the probability that the deceased slip and fell. A person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended Natural refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while logical means that there is a rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. There must be a relation of cause and effect, the cause being the felonious act of the offender, the effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The cause and effect relationship is not altered or changed because of the pre-existing conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim (las condiciones patologica del lesionado); the predisposition of the offended party (la predisposicion del ofendido); the physical condition of the offended party (la constitucion fisica del herido); or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al herido); or the conditions supervening the felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:(a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or (b)the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.People vs. Quianzon *****Urbano vs. IAC G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988Facts:Urbano demanded restitution from the victim because he opened the irrigation canal causing his crops to be wet A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg. When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking Javier. 22 days thereafter Javier was rushed to the hospital because of his condition which later turned out to be tetanus and thereafter died. Appellant was thereafter charged with the crime of homicideIssue:W.O.N. Urbano is liable for Javiers deathHeld:NO, The evidence on record does not clearly show that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound was infected is not clear from the record. If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd dayafterthe hacking incident ormore than 14 daysafter the infliction of the wound. Therefore, theonset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died on the second day from theonset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incidentImpossible CrimesIntod vs. C.A. G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992Facts:Due to a land dispute, appellant together with 4 others conspired to kill a certain Palangpangan. Thereafter they went to the his house and fired at his room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was not home and no one was injured by the bullets fired. He was charged with attempted murderIssue:W.O.N. there is an impossible crimeHeld:YES, Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.16One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty.The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to accomplish his end. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility.Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.

People vs. Domasian G.R. No. 95322 March 1, 1993Facts:Appellant was charged of kidnapping for abducting a boy for three hours. It was shown by the evidence that the appellant tried to take away the boy but during a tricycle ride he aroused the suspicion of the surrounding people and was apprehended. The boy got away and a ransom note was received by the parents of the boy. They were charged with the crime of kidnapping and appellant, whose participation therein was to write the ransom note, stated that the crime of sending a ransom was an impossible crime due to the release of the boyIssue:W.O.N. there was an impossible crimeHeld:NO, under Art. 4. Criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty.

Article 6Subjective and Objective PhaseU.S. vs. Eduave G.R. No. L-12155 February 2, 1917Facts:Appellant tried to kill the girl who chaged her with the crime of rape. That the accused is guilty of some crime is not denied. The only question is the precise crime of which he should be convicted. It is contended, in the first place, that, if death has resulted, the crime would not have been murder but homicide, and in the second place, that it is attempted and not frustrated homicide.Issue:W.O.N. the crime is Attempter or FrustratedHeld:The crime cannot be attempted murder. This is clear from the fact that the defendant performedallof the acts which should have resulted in the consummated crime andvoluntarilydesisted from further acts. A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside cause from performingallof the acts which should produce the crime. In other words, to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it is his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the consummation of the crime andvoluntarilydesists from proceeding further, it can not be an attempt. The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performingallof the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.To put it in another way, in case of an attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes before the subjective phase is passed.On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes the subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causes independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to something beyond his control.The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act whichbeginsthe commission of the crime and thelastact performed by the offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward the phase is objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control that period between the point where hebeginsand the points where hevoluntarily desists. Ifbetweenthese two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated.

RapePeople vs. Orita G.R. No. 88724 April 3, 1990Facts:Appellant with the use of a knife, forced the victim to have carnal knowledge with him. However, he could not penetrate him fully and only a small part of his penis inserted his vagina. Upon examination, her vaginal orifice was so tight that the fingers of the examiner could barely get through and her hymen was still intact. The trial court was of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the victim and thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only.Issue:W.O.N. there is frustrated rapeHeld:No, The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will.in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished.Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime.Thus, the felony is consummated. For the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction.Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ

People vs. Campuhan G.R. No. 129433. March 30, 2000Facts:Appellant was alleged to have rape herein victim a four year old. The testimony of the mother stated that when she entered the room he was holding his penis while his other hand was trying to spread the victims legs. The child shouted the words aray ko aray ko but upon examination stated that she did not feel any pain and that she merely did not like what was happening. There was no showing of any penetration. He was convicted with rapeISSUE:W.O.N. there is rapeHeld:NO, We have said often enough that in concluding that carnal knowledge took place, full penetration of the vaginal orifice is not an essential ingredient, nor is the rupture of the hymen necessary; themere touchingof the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge.But the act oftouchingshould be understood here as inherently part of the entry of the penis into thelabiasof the female organ andnot mere touching aloneof themons pubisor thepudendum. A review of the records clearly discloses that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge itsonusof proving that Primos penis was able to penetrate Crysthels vagina however slight.TheftValenzuela vs. People G. R. No.160188 June 21, 2007Facts:Accused loaded dozens of detergent of the Tide brand into a taxi. The security guard hailed the taxi and upon asking for a receipt the accused fled on foot but was subsequently apprehended. He was charged with consummated theft but appellant claims the crime he committed was frustrated.Issue:W.O.N. there is frustrated theftHeld:NO, The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft. It finds no support or extension in Article 308, whether as a descriptive or operative element of theft or as themens reaoractusreusof the felony.Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of ones personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.NeitherDionorFlorescan convince us otherwise. Both fail to consider that once the offenders therein obtained possession over the stolen items, the effect of the felony has been produced as there has been deprivation of property. The presumed inability of the offenders to freely dispose of the stolen property does not negate the fact that the owners have already been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the taking.RobberyPeople vs. Lamahang G.R. No. L-43530 August 3, 1935Facts:Theaccused was caught in the act of making an opening with an iron bar on the wall of a store of cheap goods located on the last named street. He had only succeeded in breaking one board and in unfastening another from the wall, when the policeman showed up, who instantly arrested him and placed him under custody. He was charged and convicted of attempted robberyIssue:W.O.N. there is attempted robbery Held:NO, It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. There is no doubt that in the case at bar it was the intention of the accused to enter Tan Yu's store by means of violence, passing through the opening which he had started to make on the wall, in order to commit an offense which, due to the timely arrival of policeman Tomambing, did not develop beyond the first steps of its execution. But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Thus, in case of robbery, in order that the simple act of entering by means of force or violence another person's dwelling may be considered an attempt to commit this offense, it must be shown that the offender clearly intended to take possession, for the purpose of gain, of some personal property belonging to anotherPeople vs. Salvilla G.R. No. 86163 April 26, 1990Facts:Appellant with three others staged a hold-up in a lumber yard which resulted in a hostage and ransom situation, serious physical injuries were inflicted. The police and military surrounded the area but they refused to surrender. Appellant on appeal claims that he tried to convince his co-conspirators to give up. He was charged and convicted of the crime of robbery. Upon appeal he claimed that the crime was merely attempted and that he spontaneously desisted. Appellant insists that while the "giving" has been proven, the "taking" has not. And this is because neither he nor his three co-accused touched the P5,000.00 given by their hostages.Issue:W.O.N. there was consummated robberyHeld:YES, It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused had no opportunity to dispose of the personalities taken. That fact does not affect the nature of the crime, From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete. The crime is consummated when the robber acquires possession of the property, even if for a short time, and it is not necessary that the property be taken into the hands of the robber, or that he should have actually carried the property away, out of the physical presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should have made his escape with it"MurderEpifanio vs. People G.R. NO.157057 June 26, 2007Facts:The victim together with his cousin were walking back home, when they split up the victim was stabbed in the back by a bladed weapon by the accused. The accused then tried to stab the victim another time but only hit his left arm. The cousin hearing the cries of the victim went to him and saw the accused which turned out to be their uncle. The victim was then rushed to the hospital were he was confined for three weeks. The accused was charged and convicted of frustrated murder. He claims however the crime was only attemptedIssue:W.O.N. there is attempted or frustrated murderHeld:Attempted. In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical intervention or attendance. If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim; or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim.Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries were inflicted by him on the victim.In the present case, the intent to kill is very evident and was established beyond reasonable doubt through the unwavering testimony ofCrisaldoon the manner of execution of the attack as well as the number of wounds he sustained.Crisaldowas stabbed from behind by petitioner. WhenCrisaldoturned around, petitioner continued his assault, hittingCrisaldoon the left arm as the latter tried to defendhimself. The treacherous manner in which petitioner perpetrated the crime is shown not only by the sudden and unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting victim but also by the deliberate manner in which the assault was perpetratedNonetheless, petitioner failed to perform all the acts of execution, because Allan came to the aid ofCrisaldoand petitioner was forced to scamper away.He did not voluntarily desist from stabbingCrisaldo, but he had to stop stabbing when Allan rushed to helpCrisaldoand recognized petitioner.Thus, the subjective phase of the crime had not been completed.People vs. Sy Pio G.R. No. L-5848 April 30, 1954Facts:Defendant-appellant entered a store and once inside he started firing a .45 caliber pistol that he had in his hand. The first one shot was Jose Sy. Tan Siong Kiap, who was in the store and saw the accused enter and afterwards fire a shot at Jose Sy, asked the defendant-appellant, "What is the idea?" Thereupon defendant-appellant turned around and fired at him also. The bullet fired from defendant-appellant's pistol entered the right shoulder of Tan Siong Kiap immediately ran to a room behind the store to hide. From there he still heard gunshot fired from defendant-appellant's pistol, but afterwards defendant-appellant ran away. The victim was confined in the hospital for 9 days and received further treatment for ten days. He was charged and convicted of the crime of murder. Upon appeal he contends that he is only liable for less serious physical injuriesIssue:W.O.N. the crime is Frustrated murderHeld:No. It is attempted. The wound inflicted was not necessarily fatal, because it did not touch any of the vital organs of the body. As a matter of fact, the medical certification issued by the physician who examined the wound of the offended party at the time he went to the hospital, states that the wound was to heal within a period of fourteen days. the defendant-appellant fired at his victim, and the latter was hit, but he was able to escape and hide in another room. The fact that he was able to escape, which appellant must have seen, must have produced in the mind of the defendant-appellant that he was not able to his his victim at a vital part of the body. In other words, the defendant-appellant knew that he had not actually all the acts of execution necessary to kill his victim. Under these circumstances, it can not be said that the subjective phase of the acts of execution had been completed. And as it does not appear that the defendant-appellant continued in the pursuit, and as a matter of fact, he ran away afterwardsPeople vs. Ravelo G.R. No. 78781-82 October 15, 1991Facts:The accused were charged with kidnapping with murder and kidnapping with frustrated murder against the victims who were alleged to be NPA members and were tortured in order to confess their affiliation. They were convicted of only murder and frustrated murder. As to the frustrated murder, the basis of the frustrated murder was the manifestation made by the accused 16 hours prior that he would next after his deceased-companion was killed who was burned hanging upside down. He however, escaped sustaining only minor injuries from his manhandlingIssue:W.O.N. there is frustrated murder

Held:No, In a crime of murder or an attempt or frustration thereof, the offender must have the intent or the actual design to kill (US v. Burns, 41 Phil. 418 [1921]) which must be manifested by external acts. A verbal expression that Lugatiman would be killed sixteen (16) hours after such statement was made is not sufficient to show an actual design to perpetrate the act. Intent must be shown not only by a statement by the aggressor of the purpose to kill, but also by the execution of all acts and the use of means necessary to deliver a fatal blow while the victim is not placed in a position to defend himself. In fact even the victim was not sure whether or not he would be killed. The accused were sentenced only for slight physical injuriesHomicidePeople vs. Kalalo G.R. Nos. L-39303-39305 March 17, 1934Facts:Accused together with other succeeded in killing the two deceased-victim. One of the victims at the scene fled in order to save his life, to which the apellants reacted by drawing a pistol and shooting at the fleeing victim. Four successive shots were fired but none found its mark. Thus a complaint was filed and they were charged and convicted of frustrated homicideHeld:zThe fact that the said appellant, not having contended himself with firing only once, fired said successive shots at the victim, shows that he was then bent on killing him. He performed everything necessary to commit the crime that he determined to commit but he failed by reason of causes independent of his will, either because of his poor aim or because his intended victim succeeded in dodging the shots, none of which found its mark. The acts thus committed by the said appellant Marcelo Kalalo constitute attempted homicide with no modifying circumstance to be taken into consideration, because none has been established.EstafaU.S. vs. Domiguez G.R. No. 17021 February 23, 1921Facts:Appellant was the salesman of a bookstore, after having sold four copies of a book instead of delivering the amount to the cashier, took it for himself. While he was attempting to go outside the bookstore, the cashier grabbed him by the arm and upon being asked he stated that a woman bought a book and failed to pay. Nonetheless, he turned over the proceeds of the books to the cashierHeld:The court held that the appellant is guilty of the frustrated offense ofestafa, inasmuch as he performed all the acts of execution which should produce the crime as a consequence, but which, by reason of causes independent of his will, did not produce it, no appreciable damage having been caused to the offended party, such damage being one of the essential elements of the crime, due to the timely discovery of the acts prosecuted.BriberyPozar vs. CA G.R. No. L-62439 October 23, 1984Facts:The appellant was convicted of a crime and upon conviction thereof, he applied for probation. During the application he sent together with the envelope containing the requirements for his application, a hundred peso bill which he claimed in his defense as advances for the expenses on photocopying. The probation officer attempted to return the one hundred peso bill, but not being able to do so he kept it and included it in the post investigation report in his application for probation. He was charged again for corruption of a public official.Held:The trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of Corruption of Public Official as consummated offense for it is clear from the evidence of the prosecution as recited in both decisions of the trial and appellate courts, that the complainant Probation Officer did not accept the one hundred peso bill Hence, the crime would be attempted corruption of a public official. (Appellant was acquitted by the SC here)ArsonPeople vs. Hernandez December 5, 1929 G.R. No. 31770Facts:Appellant set fire to the house of the victim. Only the roof of the house was burnt thus he was convicted of only frustrated arsonHeld:The appellant did in fact, set fire to the roof of the house, and said house was in fact partially burned. With this, the crime of arson was consummated, notwithstanding the fact that the fire was afterwards extinguished, for, once the fire has been started, the consummation of the crime of arson does not depend upon the extent of the damage cause.U.S. vs. Valdez December 10, 1918 G.R. No. 14128Facts:Held:The crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all the acts conceive to the burning of said house, but nevertheless., owing to causes independent of his will, the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense committed cannot be classified as consummated arson by the burning of said inhabited house, for the reason that no part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the piece of sack and the rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near partition of the entresol, the partition might have started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time.

6. Article 10

Ladonga vs. People G.R. No. 141066 February 17, 2005AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Facts:Petitioners were charged and convicted of violation of B.P. 22 for the issuance of a worthless check issued pursuant to a loan agreement. Upon appeal they contend that it was erroneous for the court to consider the application of conspiracy as B.P. 22 is a special law.Issue:W.O.N. conspiracy may be applied to special lawsHeld:YES, some provisions of the Revised Penal Code, especially with the addition of the second sentence in Article 10, are applicable to special laws. B.P. Blg. 22does not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it.

People vs. Simon G.R. No. 93028 July 29, 1994REGALADO,J.:

Facts:Appellants were charged and convicted for the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act and was made to suffer life imprisonment. Upon appeal they question the penalty imposedIssue:W.O.N. life imprisonment may be imposedW.O.N. indeterminate sentence may be appliedHeld:Yes, In imposing the penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks ofprision correccional,in its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to determine theperiodsof the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty bydegrees,in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty beyond or lower thanprision correccional. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. (Mas mababa pa eh aabot na ng public censure)Yes, Drug offenses arenot included innor has appellant committedany actwhichwould puthim within the exceptions to said law and the penalty to be imposed does not involve reclusionperpetua to death.The Indeterminate Sentence Law is a legal and social measure of compassion, andshould be liberally interpreted in favor of the accused

5. Art. 11 Justifying CircumstancesA. Self Defensei. Unlawful AggressionPeople vs. Manaban G.R. No. 150723 July 11, 2006CARPIO,J.:Facts:Respondent a security guard at a bank was on duty when he saw the deceased-victim hitting and trashing at an ATM which retrieved his card and did not produce any money. He tried to pacify him but to no avail, thus he fired a warning shot and after which he fired at the deceased. Manaban was charged for murder for killing Bautista. He claimed self-defense claiming that the deceased had a gun and when he turned his back on him, he thought he was drawing his gun and shot at himIssue:W.O.N. there is self defenseHeld:No, Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite of self-defense. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a person. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful aggression,unless the threat is offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury.There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which puts the defendants life in real peril. In this case there was no unlawful aggression as the respondent was already pointing his gun at him when Bautista proceeded to turn his back on him.

People vs. Alconga April 30, 1947 G.R. No. L-162HILADO,J.:Facts:The deceased-victim visited the respondent during work in order to confront him about a game they were playing the night before wherein he found out he lost because respondent was cheating. A fight ensued and both the respondent and the deceased drew out their weapons. Having sustained several wounds, the deceased withdrew to a distance of 200 meters wherein he was overtaken and another fight ensued which therein the fatal struck to the cranium from respondents bolo was delivered. Issue:W.O.N. there is self-defenseHeld:NO, there were two stages in the fight between appellant and the deceased. When the deceased retreated he was no longer acting in self-defense, there being then no more aggression to defend against, the same having ceased from the moment the deceased took to his heels. appellant's plea of self-defense in thesecond stageof the fight cannot be sustained. There can be no defense where there is no aggression. Although the defendant was not the aggressor, he is not exempt from criminal liability for the reason that it is shown that he struck several blows, among them the fatal one, after the necessity for defending himself had ceased, his assailant being then in retreat.People vs. Genosa G.R. No. 135981. January 15, 2004PANGANIBAN,J.: Facts:Respondent the lawful wife of the deceased killed the latter with a gun and was charged and convicted of parricide. It was shown during that night that they had a quarrel and the deceased beat up the respondent. She claimed that she killed her for her own protection and in order to vindicate the life of her unborn child. Respondent after being interviewed by specialists, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.Issue:W.O.N. there is self-defenseHeld:NO, A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights. the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self-defense, he rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face areal threaton ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must beimminent and actual, not merely imaginary (this is the case that prompted the legislator to create the battered woman syndrome)

Sonja vs. People G.R. No. 160341 October 19, 2004CALLEJO, SR.,J.:Facts:The deceased-victim appeared at the nipa hut of petitioner who were drinking with his friends at that time. He was brandishing his bolo and looking for his brother. They attempted to calm him down and afterwards when he was walking away petitioner hacked at him and proceeded to kill him

Issue:W.O.N. there was a real and imminent perilHeld:NO, the test should be: does the person invoking the defense believe, in due exercise of his reason, his life or limb is in danger?Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.Hence, when an inceptual /unlawful aggression ceases to exist, the one making a defense has no right to kill or injure the former aggressor.After the danger has passed, one is not justified in following up his adversary to take his life.The conflict for blood should be avoided if possible.An assault on his person, he cannot punish when the danger or peril is over.When the danger is over, the right of self-defense ceases.His right is defense, not retribution.ii. Reasonable necessityPeople vs. Razon G.R. NO. 158053 June 21, 2007

Facts:Petitioner a taxicab driver was allegedly held up and poked with a knife at the base of his neck by three people including the deceased, He was able to wrestle the knife from them and proceeded to chase them. He was even able to go back to his taxi to get his own knife. Issue:W.O.N. reasonable necessity is presentHeld:No, The defense employed by petitioner also cannot be said to be reasonable. The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.The nature or quality of the weapon; the physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor as well as those of the person who invokes self-defense; and the place and the occasion of the assault also define the reasonableness of the means used in self-defenseEsteban vs. People ** CANNOT FIND

People vs. Luagaue G.R. No. L-43588 November 7, 1935Facts:The deceased-victim tried to have carnal knowledge with the appellant while her husband was absent from the house. The former drew a knife to which he used to threaten her to death and when he was preparing to have carnal knowledge with the appellant, he put down the knife and the appellant stabbed and killed him with the very same knifeIssue:W.O.N. self defense may be appreciatedHeld:YES, appellants act constitute self-defense which as stated aside from the right to life on which rest the legitimate defense of our person, we have the right to party acquired by us, and the right to honor which is not the least prized of man's patrimony." The acts of attempting to rape a woman constitute sufficient aggression "inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, of her very existence; this offense, unlike ordinary slander by word or deed susceptible of judicial redress, in an outrage which impresses an indelible blot on the victim, for, as the Roman Law says:quum virginitas, vel castitas, corupta restitui non protest(because virginity or chastity, once defiled, cannot be restored). It is evident that a woman who, imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal liability provided by this article and subsection since such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her honor from so great an outrage."People vs. Dela Cruz March 30, 1935 G.R. No. 41674Facts:During a wake, the deceased-victim grabbed the appellants breasts and her private parts causing her to use a pocket knife which she had in her coat, which she uses in her profession as a fruit vendor. The victim grabbed her from behind and refused to identify himself. Her nearest companions were two brazas(??) Away from her and she stabbed him only once thus showing that she desisted as soon as he released herIssue:W.O.N. defense of honor may be appreciatedHeld:YES, taking into consideration that it was a dark night and that the deceased grabbed her from behind without warning and without making himself known and refused to say who he was, and in the struggle that followed touched her private parts, and the fact that she was unable to free herself by means of her strength alone, we are of the opinion that she was justified in making use of the pocket-knife in repelling what she believed to be an attack upon her honor, since she had no other means of defending herself.People vs. Jaurigue C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946Facts:The victim was spreading rumours that the appellant and him laid and that if he did not marry her she would commit suicide. During a religious service inside a chapel equipped with bright lights, the victim sat beside the appellant and placed her hand on her upper right thigh. The appellant reacted by stabbing the victim in his neck, with a pocket knife in her possession which turned out to be a mortal wound thus killing him within minutesIssue:W.O.N. defense of honor may be appreciatedHeld:YES, but appellant may not be totally exempted from her actions. A beautiful woman is said to be a jewel; a good woman, a treasure; and that a virtuous woman represents the only true nobility. And they are the future wives and mothers of the land. Such are the reasons why, in the defense of their honor, when brutally attacked, women are permitted to make use of all reasonable means available within their reach, under the circumstances. However, the said chapel was lighted with electric lights, and there were already several people, about ten of them, inside the chapel, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the organization; and under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her being raped.Sufficient ProvocationPeople vs. Oriente G.R. No. 155094 January 30, 2007Facts:The deceased-victim was killed by the appellants during an altercation. They claimed that they killed him in self-defense which the lower court found untenable. Upon appeal they claimed that it was erroneous that the court did not appreciate in their favour the provocation by the deceased as it was preceded by a heated argument.Issue:W.O.N. there was provocationHeld:NO, Provocation is defined to be any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone. In order to be mitigating, provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act. Provocation is sufficient if it is adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity. That the provocation must immediately precede the act means that there should not be any interval of time between the provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime by the person provoked. The fact that a heated or intense argument preceded the incident is not by itself the sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party as contemplated by law.

People vs ApolinarFacts:The accused, armed with a shot gun, was looking over his land. He noticed a man carrying a bundle on his shoulder. Believing that the man had stolen his palay, the accused shouted for him to stop and as he did not and started to flee, the accused fired in the air and then at him, causing his death.Issue:W.O.N. there was self-defenseHeld:NO,"Defense of property is not of such importance as right to life, and defense of property can be invoked as a justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with the property."

U.S. vs. Bumanlag December 23, 1909 G.R. No. 5318Facts:The appellant was found to be missing 40 bundles of palay and upon searching thereof, he found it in an inclosed pla