94. Aggravating Cicumstances People vs. LadjaalamG.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 200PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:The trial court found the appelant guilty of maintaining a drug den, an

offense for which was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The trial court also convicted appellant of direct assault with multiple

counts of attempted homicide. It found that “[t]he act of the accused [of] firing an M14 rifle [at] the policemen[,] who were about to enter his house to serve a search warrant x x x” constituted such complex crime. Aside from finding appellant guilty of direct assault with multiple attempted homicide, the trial court convicted him also of the separate offense of illegal possession of firearms under PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, and sentenced him to 6 years of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor.

ISSUE:Whether or not appellant can be convicted separately of illegal

possession of firearms after using said firearm in the commission of another crime.

HELD:NO. The appealed Decision was affirmed with modifications. Appellant

is found guilty only of two offenses: (1) direct assault and multiple attempted homicide with the use of a weapon and (2) maintaining a drug den.

The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that “no other crime was committed by the person arrested.” If the intention of the law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should [the courts].

Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, “unless no other crime was committed”. Furthermore, if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.

95. Celino vs. Court of AppealsG.R. No. 170562June 29, 2007Justice Carpio- Morales

Facts: Petitioner Angel Celino Sr. Was charged in two separate information ls for violation of the Comelec gun ban and violation of RA 8294 or illegal possession of firearm. The informations were based on the act of petitioner of carrying his armalite rifle colt m16 during the election period which also turned out to be unlicensed. The petitioner, in a motion to quash alleged that the information charging him with illegal possession of firearm cannot propser as he was also charged of having committed another crime which is the violation of the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts.

Issue: whether the information for illegal possession of firearms should be quashed.

Held: No. RA 8294 provides that the accused can be convicted of illegal possession of firearms, provided no other crime was committed by the person arrested. The word "committed" necessarily implies a prior determination of guilt by final conviction resulting fro successful prosecution or voluntary admission. When the other offense involved is one of those enumerated, any information for illegal possession of firearms should be quashed because the illegal possession of firearms would be tried together with such offense. Conversely, when the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated under RA 8294, then a separate case for illegal possession of firearm should constitute to be prosecuted. In this case, the accused is only or has only been accuses of committing a violation of the Comelec gun ban. There is yet no showing that petitioner did in fact commit the other crime.

96. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORO RODILG.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981MAKASIAR, J.

FACTS:At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa and Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang market. While they were eating, they saw, through the glass panel of the restaurant, appellant outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their attention having been drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt. Masana then in civilian clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out of the restaurant, approached appellant and asked the latter, after Identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had a license. Instead of answering the question of Lt. Masana appellant moved one step backward and attempted to draw his gun. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately grabbed appellant's gun from appellant's waist and gave it to Lt. Masana After that, Lt. Masana told the appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant occupied a separate table about one and one-half meters from the table of Lt. Masana's three companions — Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica. After the two were already seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt. Masana pulled out a piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote thereon the receipt for the gun, and after signing it, he asked appellant to countersign the same, but appellant refused to do so. Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him. Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling, the latter that they would talk the matter over in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to stand up, appellant suddenly pulled out a double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several times, on the chest and stomach causing his death several hours thereafter.

ISSUE:Whether the crime committed murder or homicide complexed with assault upon an agent of authority

HELD:NO, it cannot be considered as a complex crime but only as a generic aggravating circumstance. While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim, who was in civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority; he cannot be convicted of the

complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, for the simple reason that the information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority. The information simply alleges that appellant did attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official duties, ..." Such an allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential averment to justify a conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the graver offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven, would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle, the attack on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be considered only as aggravating, being "in contempt or with insult to the public authorities" (Par. 1, Art. XIV of the Revised Penal Code), or as an "insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, ..." (par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code). The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that the victim, PC. Lt. Masana Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim.

While it is true that in some cases, this Court ruled that the term public authority refers to a person in authority and that a PC lieutenant or town chief of police is not a public authority but merely an agent of a person in authority; there is need of re-examining such a ruling since it is not justified by the employment of the term public authority in aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 instead of the term person in authority which is specifically used in Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no extended reasoning of the doctrine enunciated in the previous cases why the phrase public authority should comprehend only persons in authority. The lawmaker could have easily utilized the term "persons in authority" in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 in much the same way that it employed the said phrase in Articles 148 and 145. The lawmaker must have intended a different meaning for the term public authority, which may however include, but not limited to persons in authority.

98. G.R. Nos. L-40367-69 August 22, 1985

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.PACITO STO. TOMAS, accused-appellant.

CUEVAS, J.:

FACTS:

Tragedy struck at the residence of the GRULLAS Donsol, Sorsogon. After the smoke of gun fire had cleared, two (2) persons were found dead inside the house of the Grullas bathed in their own blood, namely: SALVACION GRULLA, wife of the herein accused-appellant who lay prostrate on the floor at the sala; and appellant's mother-in-law CONSOLACION BELMONTE VDA. DE GRULLA who appeared seated motionless on a chair with her body reclining on a table. The third victim NATIVIDAD GRULLA, younger sister of Salvacion, nearly escaped death but likewise suffered gunshot wounds necessitating hospitalization for al-most a month.

Three Criminal Cases were filed against appellant PACITO STO. TOMAS. One for PARRICIDE for the death of Salvacion Grulla; another one for MURDER for the death of appellant's mother-in-law Consolacion Belmonte Vda. de Grulla; and the third one for FRUSTRATED MURDER for the near fatal shooting of Natividad Grulla, appellant's sister-in-law.

After trial, following a plea of NOT GUILTY entered upon arraignment, accused was convicted.

ISSUE:

Whether the aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be considered.

RULING:

YES.

Anent appellant's submission that the trial court erred in considering dwelling

as an aggravating circumstance, we find the same bereft of any legal support. There is no dispute that the place where the crimes herein involved were committed is the house of Consolacion Grulla. It is there where she lives with her daughter, Natividad Grulla (the other victim) and where Salvacion Grulla was temporarily staying in order to escape from the brutalities of the appellant brought about by the latter's jealousy. The fact that Salvacion's stay in the said place may be considered as a temporary sojourn adds no validity to appellant's stance on this point. As we earlier held in People vs. Galapia, 8 the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is present when the appellant killed his wife in the house occupied by her other than the conjugal home. Similarly, dwelling is aggravating where the offended party was raped in a boarding house rented by her.

100. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANTONIO GARCIA Y CABARSE alias "TONY MANOK" and REYNALDO ARVISO V REBELLEZA alias "RENE BISUGOG.R. No. L-30449October 31, 1979ABAD SANTOS, J.:

FACTS: The legal verdict hinges on the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution, Mrs. Corazon Dioquino Paterno, sister of the deceased, Apolonio Dioquino, Jr.

Before the incident which gave rise to this case, Corazon's husband informed her that he saw Apolonio engaged in a drinking spree with his gang in front of an establishment known as Bill's Place at M. de la Cruz Street. Pasay City. Corazon surmised that her husband must have been painting the town red ("nag good time") in that same place. Upon learning this information from her husband, Corazon obtained permission to leave the house at 3:00 a.m. so she could fetch her brother. At that time, she had not been aware that Apolonio was in Pasay City; she had been of the belief that he was with his family in Pampanga. She went to fetch him because she wanted him to escape the untoward influence of his gang. In explaining the rationale for her noctural mission, she employed in her sworn statement the following language: "Dahil itong si Junior ay meron na kaming nabalitaan na naaakay ng barkada niya sa paggawa ng hindi mabuti."

On her way, as she rounded the corner of P.C. Santos Street, Corazon saw her brother fleeing a group of about seven persons, including the two accused, Antonio Garcia and Reynaldo Arviso. She recognized the two accused because they were former gangmates of her brother; in fact, she knew them before the incident by their aliases of "Tony Manok" and "Rene Bisugo, " respectively.

Corazon saw that the chase was led by the two accused, with Antonio carrying a long sharp instrument. When she ventured to look from where she was hiding, about 20 meters away, she saw the group catch up with her brother and maltreat him. Some beat him with pieces of wood, others boxed him. Immediately afterwards, the group scampered away in different directions. Antonio was left behind. He was sitting astride the prostrate figure of Apolonio, stabbing the latter in the back with his long knife. Corazon was not able to observe where Antonio later fled, for she could hardly bear to witness the scene.

When Corazon mustered the courage to approach her brother, she saw that he was bathed in a pool of his own blood.

ISSUE: WON nocturnity (nighttime) is an aggravating circumstances?

HELD: YES. The offense took place at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It may therefore be said that it was committed at night, which covers the period from sunset to sunrise, according to the New Civil Code, Article 13. Is this basis for finding that nocturnity is aggravating? The Revised Penal Code, Article 14, provides that it is an aggravating circumstance when the crime is committed in the nighttime, whenever nocturnity may facilitate the commission of the offense. There are two tests for nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance: the objective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitates the commission of the offense; and the subjective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely sought by the offender. These two tests should be applied in the alternative.

In this case, the subjective test is not passed because there is no showing that the accused purposely sought the cover of night time. Next, we proceed and apply the objective test, to determine whether nocturnity facilitated the killing of the victim. A group of men were engaged in a drinking spree, in the course of which one of them fled, chased by seven others. The criminal assault on the victim at 3:00 a.m. was invited by nocturnal cover, which handicapped the view of eyewitnesses and encouraged impunity by persuading the malefactors that it would be difficult to determine their Identity because of the darkness and the relative scarcity of people in the streets. There circumstances combine to pass the objective test, and the Court found that nocturnity is aggravating because it facilitated the commission of the offense. Nocturnity enticed those with the lust to kill to follow their impulses with the false courage born out of the belief that they could not be readily Identified.

102. Evident PremeditationPeople vs Discalsota[G.R. No. 136892. April 11, 2002]

PANGANIBAN, J.:

FACTS:Herbert, along with his friends Jenny, Pedro and Rowell visited del

Rosario. While inside del Rosario's house, a group of men started shouting at them from the outside asking them to get out and threatening to kill them. They called the police for help. Four tanods came and escorted the four teenagers outside of the house. The group threatening them were still outside the house when they came out. Upon reaching the main road, they boarded a pedicab. The pedicab had not yet left when Rowell saw someone running towards them. The four jumped out of the pedicab. The man managed to overtake Herbert and thrusted his knifke on Herbert's back. Discalsota was positively identified as the assailant.

ISSUE:WON the crime committed was attended with evident premeditation.

HELD:NO. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be proof,

as clear as the evidence of the crime itself of the following elements thereof, viz: (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination, and (c) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow himself to reflect upon the consequences of his act.”

In this case, the first two elements of evident premeditation are present. As found by the RTC, the time appellant determined to commit the crime was when he started shouting at the victim and the latter’s companions: “You, there, get out and we will kill you!” By staying outside the house and following the victim’s companions when they came out, he manifestly indicated that he clung to his determination.

As for the third element, the prosecution evidence shows that appellant started shouting outside Mrs. del Rosario’s house at 3:30 p.m.When the victim’s group left the house, it was not yet dark; it was only past four o’clock in the afternoon.The police received information on the stabbing incident at 4:30p.m. on the same day. It took less than an hour from the time appellant evinced a desire to commit the crime, as manifested by his shouts outside the house, up to the time he stabbed the victim. The span of less than one hour could not have afforded the former full opportunity for meditation and reflection on the

consequences of the crime he committed. Where no sufficient lapse of time is appreciable from the determination to commit the crime until its execution, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated

103. United States vs. BaluyotG.R. No. L- 14476November 6, 1919Justice Street

Facts: The accused Jose Baluyot was charged with the crime of murder qualified by Aleviosa. The accused and the deceased Conrado Lerma were competitions in the governatorial race in Bataan. The deceased won in the election. However, a feeling of personal rancor was developed in the mind of Baluyot. One day, the accused went to the governor's officr. According to the witness' testimony, the first shot was fired within a few seconds after the accused reentered the governor's office. The inference is conclusive that immediately upon asking the governor about his revolver and discoverinf that he was unarmed. The accused draw his own and fired upon the deceased.

Issue: whether treachery is present in the crime committed.

Held: yes. Treachery will be found present if, at the time the fatal blow is struck, the deceased is helpless and unable to defend himself. In this case, the words which Baluyot directed to Governor Lerma immediately before the fatal attack were intended to discover whether Lerma was in fact unarmed. Upon discovering that the governor did not have his revolver at hand, the accused at once drew his own weapon and fired. The accused knew that the governor is unarmed and defenseless.

104. PEOPLE vs. JUAN GONZALES ESCOTE, JR.G.R. No. 140756 April 4, 2003CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS:At past midnight on 28 September 1996, a Five Star passenger bus with plate No. ABS-793, bound for Bolinao from Manila, stopped at the Balintawak junction to pick up some passengers. Six passengers, among them victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, boarded the bus. Escote seated himself on the third seat near the aisle while Acuyan took the mid-portion of the vehicle beside the bus conductor.

Along the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, passengers Escote and Acuyan suddenly stood up, took their positions and declared a holdup. Escote fired his gun upwards, jolting to consciousness the sleepy and dozing passengers. The duo promptly divested the passengers of their valuables. The bus conductor, Romulo Digap, was dispossessed of the fares he earlier collected from the passengers. When the two repaired to the rear end of the bus, they came upon SPO1 Jose C. Manio, a passenger on his way to Angeles City. The felons demanded that Manio show them his identification card and wallet. Manio took out his identification card and his service gun. At this point, the duo told the hapless law officer: "Pasensya ka na pare, papatayin ka namin, baril mo rin ang papatay sa iyo." Ignoring his pleas for mercy, the robbers mercilessly and repeatedly shot Manio to death. The two then proceeded to the driver's seat. Rodolfo Caciatan, the driver, overheard one of the felons boast: "Ganyan lang ang pumatay ng tao. Parang pumapatay ng manok." The other said: "Ayos na naman tayo pare. Malaki-laki ito." After warning Caciatan not to report the incident to the authorities, the two alighted at an overpass in Mexico, Pampanga. The bus driver and the bus conductor reported the incident to the police authorities in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The lifeless body of SPO1 Manio, Jr., was brought to a nearby funeral parlor where Dr. Alejandro D. Tolentino performed an autopsy.

Less than a month later, on 25 October 1996, about midnight, SPO3 Romeo Meneses, the team leader of Alert Team No. 1 of the Tarlac Police Station, and SPO3 Florante S. Ferrer were at a checkpoint along the Tarlac national highway. The police officers were diverting the traffic flow to the Sta. Rosa Road because of the temporary closure of the Bambang-Concepcion bridge to motorists. Meneses stopped the driver of a white-colored taxicab without any plate number. The driver turned out to be Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. Escote introduced himself to be a police officer. When asked to present his identification card, Escote at once produced the card issued to and in the name

of SPO1 Manio. Meneses became suspicious after noticing that the card had already expired. When asked to produce a new pay slip, Escote was not able to show any. Amidst intensive probing, Escote finally confessed that he was not a policeman. Meneses forthwith brought Escote to the police station where five live bullets of a 9-millimeter firearm were confiscated from him. Escote owned responsibility for the highway robbery committed aboard the Five Star passenger bus and for the death of SPO1 Manio, Jr. Escote was turned over to the custody of the Plaridel Police Station where the bus conductor, Romulo Digap, later identified Escote as having been one of the two robbers. A further investigation on the case led to the arrest of Victor Acuyan in Laoang, Northern Samar.

The trial court found Juan Escote and Victor Acuyan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and meted upon each of them the penalty of death.

ISSUES:1.Whether treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime2. Whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide3. If in the affirmative, whether treachery may be appreciated against Juan and Victor

HELD:1. YES. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of the coup de grace. In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear, one on the shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of the sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he pleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close range, thus insuring his death. The victim was on his way to rejoin his family after a hard day's work. Instead, he was mercilessly shot to death, leaving his family in grief for his untimely

demise. The killing is a grim example of the utter inhumanity of man to his fellowmen.

2. YES. This Court has ruled over the years that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in the felony of robbery with homicide, a special complex crime and at the same time a single and indivisible offense. In the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of "homicide" and not to the constituent crime of "robbery" of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against property or as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery is appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any generic mitigating circumstance. In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide when the victim of homicide is killed by treachery.

3. YES. Article 62, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which was taken from Article 80 of the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870, provides that circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein. The circumstances attending the commission of a crime either relate to the persons participating in the crime or into its manner of execution or to the means employed. The latter has a direct bearing upon the criminal liability of all the accused who have knowledge thereof at the time of the commission of the crime or of their cooperation thereon.

BUT be that as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated against Juan and Victor in the case at bar because the same was not alleged in the Information.

G.R. No. 134362 February 27, 2002

106. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.EMELITO SITCHON y TAYAG, accused-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:

FACTS:

Appellant Emelito Sitchon was convicted for murder for beating to death the son of his common-law wife, MARK ANTHONY FERNANDEZ y TABORA a minor, 2 ½ years old, by mauling and clubbing him on the different parts of his body with the use of a steel hammer and a wooden stick, approximately 18 inches long, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

During trial, appellant clarified that the killing of the boy was "accidental." He reiterated that he was under the influence of drugs, which he had taken one after the other. He was a drug dependent. He said he was conscious when the incident happened but he simply did not realize that he had hit the child hard with the broom’s wooden handle. He denied having hit the boy with a hammer or having banged his head against the wall.

ISSUE:

Whether the killing was attended with treachery.

RULING:

YES.

The killing in this case was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.18 It is beyond dispute that the killing of minor

children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected to put up a defense, is treacherous.

108. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO ALFANTAG.R. No. 125633December 9, 1999VITUG, J.:

FACTS: On August 26, 1995 at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, offended party Nita Fernandez was asleep in the residence of a friend at AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio, Makati city. A man, accused Rolando Alfanta, whom she had not seen before suddenly entered the house where she was sleeping, pulled her, boxed her jaw and put his hand on her mouth, and told her that if she will not obey him, he will kill her. She resisted, but could not do anything. Thereafter, she was forced to climb a fence. Because of fear, as the man was holding a bolo, she followed. After climbing the fence, the man instructed her to go to a vacant house. She followed, as instructed. While at the vacant house, she was told to undress, she did because of fear, as the man was holding a bolo. Thereafter, the man embraced and kissed her. Then she was told to lie down and told to separate her legs. The man inserted his penis into her vagina. After inserting the man’s penis to her vagina, she was told to lie face down. She complied, thereafter, the man inserted his penis into her anus. After inserting the man’s penis into her anus, she was told to turn around face up. All these acts of the man hurt her. After turning around face up, the man inserted his fingers in and out into her private part. After the man had finished inserting his fingers in and out of her private part, she was told to go near him and lie beside him, and not to dress up as he was going to take a rest and at the same time telling her not to tell what happened to others saying that ‘lahat ng nirape ko ay pinatay ko dahil sa ayokong may magsumbong.’ All the time the man was inserting his penis and fingers into her private part and into her anus, she was shouting: ‘tulungan po ninyo ako,' but nobody responded. Noticing that the man was already sleeping, she suddenly got the knife at waist of the man and stab the man on his chest. The knife broke. She suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack the man several times. Thereafter, she put on her dress, got hold of the bolo and ran to the signal office of soldiers. When she arrived at the signal office of soldiers, she told the persons she met that she killed a man. The bolo was taken from her by the soldiers. With, soldiers, they went to the place where she was raped. They found the man lying down still alive. The man was brought to the hospital.

ISSUE: WON the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy are present in the instant case?

HELD: YES, both were present. Nighttime is said to be that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk and ending at dawn. The law defines nights as

being from sunset to sunrise. By and of itself, nighttime would not be an aggravating circumstance unless it is specially sought by the offender, or it is specially taken advantage of by him, or it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender’s immunity from capture. As an ordinary aggravating circumstance, nighttime can be so considered provided it is duly proved although not alleged in the information. The Court entertains no doubt that appellant has specially taken advantage of the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime without being recognized. Accused-appellant has abducted his victim, brought her to an abandoned and unlit house and then unleashed his carnal desire on her, assured of the stillness of a sleeping world. The Court has long held that this aggravating circumstance can be considered when an accused takes advantage of the silence and darkness of the night to ensure impunity from his illegal act.

With respect to ignominy, the victim testified that after appellant had inserted his penis into her vagina, appellant ordered her to lie face down and while in that position had his penis into her anus. Thereafter, he ordered her to lie down again and this time he inserted his finger inside her.

Article 14, paragraph 17, of the Revised Penal Code considers to be an aggravating circumstance any means employed or circumstance brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act. The circumstance, it is said, "pertains to the moral order [and] adds disagree and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. The Court, cited the case of People vs. Saylan:

The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e. male superior, female inferior, but also ‘the same position as dogs do’ i.e., entry from behind. The appellant claims there was no ignominy because ‘The studies of many experts in the matter have shown that this ‘position’ is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation.’ This may well be if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.

110. Principals (Conspiracy)People vs PelagioG.R. No. L-16177 May 24, 1967

PER CURIAM:

FACTS:

Pelagio went to the house of Guico to borrow money. Manalang who was also in the house of Guico invited Pelagio to the robbery he was planning with other friends. In the first meeting, Guico was present. However in the second meeting, he was not there. The group carried out the robbery without Guico.

ISSUE:

WON Guico is also liable as a cospirator.

HELD:

NO. There is ample and positive evidence on record that appellant Jose Guico was absent not only from the second meeting but likewise from the robbery itself. To be sure, not even the decision under appeal determined otherwise. Consequently, even if Guico's participation in the first meeting sufficiently involved him with the conspiracy, such participation and involvement, however, would be inadequate to render him criminally liable as a conspirator. Conspiracy alone, without the execution of its purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special instances (Article 8, Revised Penal Code) which, however, do not include robbery.

Under the circumstances and under a policy of liberal consideration for timely retreat or repentance, he may be deemed to have desisted voluntarily from the conspiracy before the contemplated crime could actually be carried out and therefore, free from penal accountability.

111. People vs. FedericoG.R. No. 99840August 14, 1995Justice Davide, jr.

Facts: Rogelio Fernando, Pastor Escala one Artemon and a certain Jun were in front of a bakery. Marcelo Gallardo saw appellant Rodolfo Federico and his cousins Francisco and Ruben Mediona emerged from an alley going to the direction of the bakery then change direction. Not long after, the reappeared and proceeded towards the bakery. Francisco bought bread, suddenly he stabbed Rogelio. Rodolfo and Ruben stayed behind Fernandos group. Then, Francisco turned to Pastor and stabbed him. The latter died. The accused was charged and convicted of the crime of murder. It should be noted that prior to the incident Rogelio and Francisco had an altercation. On appeal, Federico contends that he is not liable for the death of Escala.

Issue: whether the appellabt is liable as a co principal under the circumstances of the case.

Held: No. In the absence of conspiracy, each of the participants is liable only for the acts committed by him. The appellant is liable not as a co principal but as an accomplice under Article 18 of the revised Penal Code. In this case, at the time Francisco stabbed Escala, Ruben remained standing in the same place where they were when Francisco stabbed Fernando and still had their slings and darts pointed at the people near the bakery. It is obvious then that at that particular instance, the appellant became aware of the intent of Francisco to kill Escala.

112. PEOPLE vs. EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON LAGLIBA Y ABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, accused, RENE GAYOT PILOLA, Appellant.G.R. No. 121828 June 27, 2003CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS:On February 5, 1988, at around 11:30 p.m., Elisa Rolan was inside their store at 613 Nueve de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City, waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer. Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived at the store. Joselito and Julian invited them to join their drinking spree, and although already inebriated, the two newcomers obliged. In the course of their drinking, the conversation turned into a heated argument. Edmar nettled Julian, and the latter was peeved. An altercation between the two ensued. Elisa pacified the protagonists and advised them to go home as she was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave, when Edmar and Odilon returned, blocking their way. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face. Elisa shouted: "Tama na. Tama na." Edmar and Julian ignored her and traded fist blows until they reached Aling Sotera’s store at the end of the street, about twelve to fifteen meters away from Elisa’s store. For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists to no avail. Joselito’s intervention apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled out his knife with his right hand and stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselito’s neck, and stabbed the latter. Ronnie and the appellant, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed Joselito. Elisa could not tell how many times the victim was stabbed or what parts of his body were hit by whom. The victim fell in the canal. Odilon and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after Julian and tried to stab him. Julian ran for dear life. When he noticed that Ronnie was no longer running after him, Julian stopped at E. Rodriguez Road and looked back. He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of hollow block and with it bashed Joselito’s head. Not content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more. Ronnie then fled from the scene. Joselito died on the spot. Elisa rushed to Joselito’s house and informed his wife and brother of the incident.

ISSUE: Whether prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Ronnie and Odilon in stabbing the victim to death

HELD:

NO. There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the act of one would be the act of all. Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the others.

Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which mediately or immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim. In such a case, it is not necessary that each of the separate injuries is fatal in itself. It is sufficient if the injuries cooperated in bringing about the victim’s death. Both the offenders are criminally liable for the same crime by reason of their individual and separate overt criminal acts.

Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment. However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice.

In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. The appellant and Ronnie were on the side of the street. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim with their respective knives. The three men simultaneously stabbed the hapless victim. Odilon and the appellant fled from the scene together, while Ronnie went after Julian. When he failed to overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie returned to where Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow block and a broken bottle. Ronnie then hurriedly left. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before, during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill the victim.

All things considered, we rule that Ronnie and the appellant conspired with Odilon to kill the victim; hence, all of them are criminally liable for the latter’s

death. The appellant is not merely an accomplice but is a principal by direct participation. Even assuming that the appellant did not conspire with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the victim, the appellant is nevertheless criminally liable as a principal by direct participation. The stab wounds inflicted by him cooperated in bringing about and accelerated the death of the victim or contributed materially thereto.

113. G.R. No. L-8187 January 29, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.PANGLIMA INDANAN, defendant-appellant.

MORELAND, J.:

FACTS:

The accused was at the time of the commission of the crime, the headman of Parang. He is al-leged to have committed the murder by inducement. The proofs tend to demonstrate that on the 24th day of March, 1912, the accused sent Induk to bring to the house of the accused one Sariol. The following day, Induk, in obedience to the orders, brought Sariol to the house, whereupon the accused ordered the witnesses, Akiran and Suhuri, to tie Sariol. They obeyed the order in the presence of the accused, who was at the time lying upon a bed in the room. This was about 4:30 in the afternoon. Sariol remained there with his hands tied behind his back until night, when the accused, in the presence of several witnesses, ordered Sariol to be taken to the Chinese cemetery and there killed, the accused asserting at the time that he had an or-der to that effect from the governor. He gave strict orders to Akiran that he should be present at the time that Sariol was killed, and that he should aid in killing him. To make sure of the work being well done, the accused ordered Akiran to take his (the accused's) bolo with which to assist in the killing. Sariol was taken to the cemetery, in an isolated spot a considerable dis-tance from the road and about 200 yards from the nearest house, and there killed. Kalyakan struck the first blow with his bolo, while Akiran joined in and assisted thereafter. The deceased at the time he was killed had his hands tied behind his back. On returning to the house of the accused after the death of Sariol, Unding told the accused that Sariol had been killed, where-upon the accused said that it was all right and appeared to be very much pleased.

The lower court convicted appellant of murder by inducement and ordered the penalty of death by hanging.

ISSUE:

Whether the appellant is liable for the murder of the victim by inducement.

RULING:

YES.

We are of the opinion that the domination of the accused over the persons who, at his orders, killed the deceased was such as to make him responsible for whatever they did in obedience to such orders.

In the case at bar, the words and acts of the accused had the effect of a command. There does not seem to have existed, however, any official relation between the accused and the persons

whom he induced to kill Sariol. While he appears to have been the headman of Parang, those whom he induced held no official position under him and owed him, legally speaking, no obedi-ence. According to tradition and custom, however, the headman seems to have been a person whose word was law and whose commands were to be obeyed. Moreover, the accused repre-sented to those who physically committed the crime that he had a warrant from the governor authorizing, if not requiring, the acts committed, and urged upon them, in effect, that all must obey the commands of the Government. This representation was false, but it produced the same effect as if it had been true. It cannot be doubted that the accused knew the representa-tion was false and purposely and intentionally made it as an additional factor going to insure obedience to his orders.

Even if there should happen to be lacking any element sufficient to bring the acts of the ac-cused within the definition of inducement by command, and we do not believe there is, there would still remain all of the elements necessary to qualify the crime as murder by inducement. As a general proposition that, where the inducement offered by the accused is of such a nature and made in such a way that it becomes the determining cause of the crime, and such induce-ment was offered with the intention of producing that result, then the accused is guilty by in-ducement of the crime committed by the person so induced. The inducement to the crime must be intentional on the part of the inducer and must be made directly for the purpose in view.

The verb "induce" is sufficiently broad, generally speaking, to cover cases where there exists on the part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation, as well as words or acts which are merely the result of indiscre-tion or lack of reflection and which carry with them, inherently, almost nothing of inducement or temptation. A chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to, crime in the mind of one for some independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed the act having any expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real intention that it produce a result. In such case, while the expression was imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he would not be guilty of the crime com-mitted. Therefore, in applying the principles laid down to concrete cases it is necessary to re-member only that the inducement must be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement must be the determining cause of the crime.

In the case before us, as we have seen, the accused falsely represented to the persons who ac-tually committed the crime that he had an order from the Government requiring the death of Sariol and that they were under obligation to carry out that order. It is clear from the evidence that this inducement was offered by the accused directly to the persons interested with the in-tention of moving them to do his bidding, and that such representation was the moving cause of the fatal act. While it may be said, and is true, that the personal commands of the accused were entirely sufficient to produce the effects which actually resulted and that such commands may be considered the moving cause of the crime, still there is no doubt, under the evidence, that the representation that the accused had in his possession an order from the Government commanding the death of Sariol was also of material influence in effecting the death; and where two fundamental causes work together for the production of a single result and one of those causes would lead to a conviction upon one theory and the other upon another, a con-viction is sustainable upon either theory.

114. G.R. No. L-42476 July 24, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, vs.KIICHI OMINE, EDUARDO AUTOR, LUIS LADION, and AGAPITO CORTE-SANO, defendants-appellants.

VICKERS, J.:

FACTS:

Defendant Eduardo Autor, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano were working on the hemp plantation of Angel Pulido under the direction of their co-defendant Kiichi Omine, who was the overseer or manager, with a compensation of ten per cent of the gross receipts. The four defendants lived together in a house on the plantation.

Kiichi Omine asked Angel Pullido for permission to open a new road through the plantation. According to the offended party he refused to grant this request because there was already an unfinished road. Kiichi Omine on the other hand contends that Angel Pulido gave him the permission requested and he began work. When Angel Pulido and his son, Hilario, accompanied by Saito Paton and a Moro by the name of Barabadan, were returning home from the cockpit that evening they noticed that a considerable number of hemp plants had been de-stroyed for the purpose of opening a new road. Angered by the destruction of the hemp plants, Angel Pulido and his party went to the house of the defen-dants, who had just finished their supper. The confrontation resulted to a blow in the chest of Angel Pulido. The offended party argues that the appellants con-spired in attacking Angel Pulido. Appellants argue that they did not.

The offended party received only one wound. Only one blow struck, and it was struck by Eduardo Autor.

The lower court convicted the appellants of frustrated homicide.

ISSUE:

Whether the other appellants induced Eduardo Autor in committing the crime charged.

RULING:

NO.

According to the witness for the prosecution, Hilario Pulido and Eduardo Autor had already struck each other in the face with their fists, and Eduardo Autor had received a blow in the right eye, and then struck Hilario Pulido with his bolo. Angel Pulido would naturally intervene in the fight between his son and Eduardo Autor, and if he did so, Autor, who had already drawn his bolo, would strike him without the need of any inducement from Omine. Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, even if it were satisfactorily proved that Kiichi Omine uttered the words in question, we are of the opinion that they would not be sufficient to make him a principal by induction, because it does not appear that the words uttered by Kiichi Omine caused Eduardo Autor to strike Angel Pulido. In the first place, as we have indicated, Eduardo Autor had already other reasons for striking Angel Pulido when Omine is alleged to have uttered the words of inducement. In the second place, the words in question were not in this particular case sufficient to cause Eduardo Autor to strike the offended party with his bolo. Although Eduardo Autor was working under the direction of Omine, apparently according to the testimony of Angel Pulido, he was being paid by Pulido. It does not appear that Omine had any particular influence over Eduardo Autor.

116. US vs. LINO EGUIA LIM BUANCO (alias LIM BUANCO) and LUCIANO DE LOS REYESG.R. No. L-5241 November 19, 1909ELLIOTT, J.:

FACTS: The defendants, Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim Buanco) and Luciano de los Reyes, were charged with and convicted of the crime of estafa.

For at least 3 and ½ years, Luciano de los Reyes was employed in the Banco Español-Filipino as bookkeeper and check registry clerk. During that time he was in charge of certain current account books of the bank, and it was his duty to inspect certain checks presented to the bank for payment, including those drawn by Lim Buanco; to examine the account of the maker of each of said checks, and to determine whether or not the drawer of the check had a sufficient balance to his credit to require the payment of the check. In the performance of these duties Reyes was required to indorse upon each check, if it was entitled to payment, the words "Corriente, P. O. Luciano de los Reyes." After the check was marked in this manner it was passed to the cashier of the bank, who, in reliance upon the indorsement, paid or ordered the same to be paid.

Lim Buanco had an account with the bank, and drew large sums of money therefrom, by means of checks signed by him, and inspected and indorsed by Reyes. During this time a conspiracy existed between the defendants Lim Buanco and Reyes for the withdrawal of funds from the bank by Lim Buanco, regardless of whether he had any funds in the bank to his credit, and in furtherance of this conspiracy, the entries in the accounts of Lim Buanco on the books of the bank were fraudulently and illegally manipulated by Reyes in such a manner as to make the books show an apparent credit balance, when in fact Lim Buanco was owing to the bank a large sum of money.

Lim Buanco drew a check on the Banco Español-Filipino for the sum of 1,000 pesos, and this check was through the agency of another bank in which it was deposited by Lim Buanco, presented in due course of business to and paid by the Banco Español-Filipino. Before the check was thus paid, Reyes, acting in his capacity as an employee of the bank, indorsed thereon the words "Corriente, P. O. Luciano de los Reyes," although at the time this indorsement was made, Lim Buanco had no actual credit balance in the bank, and no permission had been given him by any officer or officers in authority of said bank to overdraw his account. In this manner the defendants Lim Buanco and Reyes, in furtherance of the conspiracy to cheat, deceive, and defraud the bank, secured the payment

of said check, although they both knew at the time that the defendant Lim Buanco had no credit balance in said bank, but was in fact indebted to the bank in the sum of more than 300,000 pesos, which had previously been withdrawn from the bank by means of similar checks drawn by Lim Buanco, and fraudulently indorsed as correct by Reyes.

ISSUE: WON there was indispensable cooperation?

HELD: YES, there was. The substance of the allegation in each case is that the money was obtained from the bank by means of the fraudulent cooperation of Lim Buanco and Reyes under circumstances which constitute the deceit necessary to constitute the crime of estafa, and of the crime only the defendants were convicted. (U. S. vs. Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim Buanco) and Luciano de los Reyes, No. 5240.) It is true that by the same methods, and by means of other checks drawn, certified, and their payment secured in the same fraudulent manner, a large sum of money in the aggregate was withdrawn from the bank, but nevertheless each act constituted a separate crime.

The preparation, approval, and payment of numerous checks under such circumstances cannot be considered as one continuing offense. Each separate fraudulent obtaining of money from the bank by means of such methods constituted a distinct crime, and a conviction of one such crimes can not be pleaded in bar to a prosecution for another.

118. People vs. Tamayo

[G.R. No. 138608. September 24, 2002]

CORONA, J.:

FACTS:

Fuentes was having dinner with her husband, Leodegario, and their six children in their house, when they heard the dogs barking. Leodegario was about to check why the dogs were barking when three persons whom she identified as Rolando Tamayo, Julio Tamayo and Florencio Patalinghug, Jr., suddenly barged into their house through an unlocked kitchen door. Rolando came first, followed by Julio who was holding a flashlight and Florencio who entered last. Julio focused the flashlight on Leodegario’s face and seconds later, Rolando shot Leodegario on the chest. After shooting Leodegario, Rolando fired his gun again, this time hitting Renante, 18-year old son of Leodegario and Lilia. Overcome with fear, Lilia embraced her other children who were crying. She saw Rolando aiming his gun at them. She heard three clicks from the gun but fortunately the gun did not fire. Thereafter, Rolando, Julio and Florencio left, dragging Renante out of the house. Lilia then gathered the rest of her children and, while going down the stairs of their house, Lilia saw Natividad Tamayo, the wife of Julio, hurriedly walking away from their house. Lilia and her children went to the house of their neighbor, Helen Ambos, to seek refuge. After an hour, they proceeded to the house of Amalia Fuentes, Lilia’s niece, and stayed there until the morning of the following day.

ISSUE: WON Tamayo should be convicted as an accomplice.

HELD:

YES. Though accused-appellant’s presence was not enough to prove conspiracy, he was definitely not an innocent spectator either. He was at the scene of the crime to aid or abet the commission thereof. This made him not a conspirator but an accomplice. An accomplice is one who knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would be committed just the same.To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must be present: (1) the community of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose and (2) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.

It is significant to note that the plan to kill the Fuenteses could have been

accomplished even without accused-appellant’s participation. It should be noted further that he was unarmed that night. The prosecution evidence has certainly not established that accused-appellant was part of the conspiracy to kill the victims. The lack of such complete evidence of conspiracy impels this Court to impute to him a milder form of responsibility, i.e., guilt of a mere accomplice.

119. People vs. RealonG.R. No. L- 30832August 29, 1980Justice Guerrero

Facts: At the Athletic Bowl more than 40 teachers were rehearsing a song. The accused Soliven seated himself somewhere higher up the steps of the grand stand while waiting for his co accused Realon. When the latter pulled out of the formation, shortly thereafter, a loud explosion was heard. The people ran in different directions. The accused left the grand stand in haste, one following the other. Immediatelyafter the loud explosion, Vicente Ramos, one of the teachers fell. It turned out that he was shot at the upper portion of the nape. He died, thereafter. During the investigation it was found that the accused ran together after the shooting and on the way Realon passed the fatal gun to Solive who quickly dumped it in a garbage barrel.

Issue: whether the accused Soliven may be held criminally liable as principal in the crime of murder.

Held: No. He is only liable as accessory. Conspiracy must be shown by positive and convincing evidence as clearly as the commission of the offense itself, although direct proof is not necessary. From the circumstances of the case, Soliven's actuations immediately subsequent to the shooting up to the time of appellant's apprehension it is apparent that he has incurred criminal liability as an accessory. Soliven witnessed his friend Realon commit the crime and that having done so, Soliven assisted in Realon's escape by concealing the instrument used in the perpetration of the offense in the obvious effort or attempt to prevent its discovery.

120. PEOPLE vs. LUDOVICO C. DOCTOLERO alias "ECOY," CONRADO C. DOCTOLERO alias "CONDRING," and VIRGILIO C. DOCTOLERO alias "VERGEL"G.R. No. 34386 February 7, 1991REGALADO, J.

FACTS:It is undisputed that on the evening of November 8, 1970, Epifania Escosio and Lolita de Guzman were killed in the house of Marcial Sagun in Sitio Binday, municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, where they were living. Jonathan Oviedo, 1 1/2 year old child of Lolita de Guzman, was on the same occasion, slightly injured while being fed on the breast of his mother. On the road, a few meters from the house of Marcial Sagun, Marcelo Doctolero, 81 years old, was fatally injured. He was taken to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital but he died on the way.

The evidence for the prosecution tend to show that the three (3) accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, were responsible for the deaths of Epifania Escosio and Lolita de Guzman, and in inflicting physical injuries on Jonathan Oviedo. And immediately thereafter, with their father and co-accused, Antonio Doctolero, they hacked Marcelo Doctolero, with their bolos which caused the death of the latter.

At about 6:30 in the evening on November 8, 1970, Marcial and his wife, Maria Oviedo-Sagun and Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo (sister-in-law of Maria Oviedo-Sagun) were on their way home to Barrio Binday. They came from the field where they bundled their harvests. Upon reaching a crossing of the road in Bo. Binday they met the accused Ludovico Doctolero who, without warning and without cause or reason, held the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun with his left hand and struck Marcial Sagun with a bolo. The latter evaded that blow and wrestled with Ludovico Doctolero for possession of the bolo of the latter. Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo became frightened when Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun were wrestling for the possession of the bolo of the former, so she ran away in the direction of the house in Sitio Binday.

Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial Sagun) testified that while she was cleaning palay in the yard of her uncle, the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, she saw the accused, Ludovico. Conrado and Virgilio (all surnamed Doctolero) throw stones at the house of Marcial Sagun. While throwing stones, Ludovico allegedly shouted for the man in the house to come out. Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy went towards the house of Marcial Sagun and saw the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, coming down from the house going towards her. She told them: "Why can't you be patient and forget?" But she was asked

not to interfere. At about that time, Marcelo Doctolero, half-brother of Antonio Doctolero, and uncle of the three accused was going towards the house of Marcial Sagun, when he met the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio. Marcelo Doctolero told them why they can't be patient and forget, but the three accused replied "Vulva of your mother, we will also kill you." Then they struck Marcelo Doctolero several times with their bolos. And when their father Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo on the head. Marcelo Doctolero fell and then all the accused ran away.

ISSUE: Whether Conrado Doctolero participated as an accomplice in the commission of the crimes charged

HELD:YES, he, along with Virgilio, participated as an accomplice. We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in staying outside of the house while the others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice.

There is no question that while the three appellants were still stoning and hurling challenges at the house of Marcial Sagun, they must have already heard the two women thereat protesting what they were doing and shouting back at them, after which all the three appellants went up the house. Under these facts, it is impossible that both appellants Virgilio Doctolero and Conrado Doctolero did not know or were not aware when their brother Ludovico was brutally killing the two women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and Epifania Escosio and wounding the child Jonathan Oviedo inside the room of said house. Furthermore, from the nature, number, and locations of the many wounds sustained by the two women and child, it could not have been possible for Ludovico's two brothers Virgilio and Conrado (assuming that they did not go inside the house) not to hear either the screams of pain of their brother's victims or the contact between the blade of his bolo and their bodies when their brother Ludovico was ruthlessly hacking them several times. . . . Under these circumstances, it is obvious that appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves knew what was going on inside the room of the house at the time, but they just stood by and did nothing to stop their brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his women victims to death. It is, therefore, reasonable to believe that the two appellants, Conrado and Virgilio, merely stood by as their brother Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the two deceased women, ready to lend assistance. Indeed, there is no question that the presence of these two appellants upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their brother Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to proceed as he did proceed, in committing the heinous crimes against two defenseless

women and a child.

123. G.R. No. 85204 June 18, 1990

JORGE TAER, petitioner, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respon-dents.

SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS:

Emilio Namocatcat alias Milio, Mario Cago, Jorge Taer and Cerilo Saludes were charged with the crime of Theft of Large Cattle in Valencia, Bohol. The complaint alleged that they took, stole and lead away two (2) male carabaos with the total value of P4,000.00, belonging to and owned by Tirso Dalde and Eladio Palaca.

After proper proceedings and trial, Saludes and Cago were acquitted but Taer and Namocatcat were convicted.

Only Jorge Taer appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, find-ing the evidence of the prosecution that conspiracy indeed existed between Emilio Namocatcat and Jorge Taer, affirmed in toto the decision appealed from. But the affirmance did not affect Emilio Namocatcat because, as ad-verted to earlier, he did not appeal his conviction by the Regional Trial Court.

Taer tells the court that what he told Dalde and Palaca upon going to the for-mer’s place was that the carabaos were brought to his place by the accused Namocatcat who asked him to tell anybody looking for them that they just strayed thereat. Taer further argues that there was no conspiracy between him and Namocatcat.

ISSUE:

Whether Taer is liable for the crime as a co-conspirator with Namocatcat.

RULING:

NO. TAER IS ONLY LIABLE AS AN ACCESSORY TO THE CRIME COMMITTED.

Mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without coopera-tion or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy absent the intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

At most the facts establish Taer's knowledge of the crime. And yet without having participated either as principal or as an accomplice, for he did not participate in the taking of the carabaos, he took part subsequent to the commission of the act of taking by profiting himself by its effects. Taer is thus only an accessory after the fact.

125. RAMON C. TAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 134298August 26, 1999PARDO, J.:

FACTS: Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries, located at 301 Jose Abad Santos St., Tondo, Manila, engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers or spare parts for boats. Manuelito Mendez was one of the employees working for her. Sometime in February 1991, Manuelito Mendez left the employ of the company. Complainant Lim noticed that some of the welding rods, propellers and boat spare parts, such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws were missing. She conducted an inventory and discovered that propellers and stocks valued at P48,000.00, more or less, were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy, uncle of Manuelito Mendez, of the loss. Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he admitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the complainant’s warehouse some boat spare parts such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws. Manuelito Mendez asked for complainant’s forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought the stolen items and who paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they split the amount with one another. Complainant did not file a case against Manuelito Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop.

ISSUE: WON the prosecution has successfully established the elements of fencing as against petitioner?

HELD: NO. Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is ‘the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon things. The crime of theft is committed if the taking is without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things.

The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft.

Before the enactment of P. D. No. 1612 in 1979, the fence could only be prosecuted as an accessory after the fact of robbery or theft, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty was light as it was two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for the principal.

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: 1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; 3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.

In this case, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime of robbery or theft has been committed. Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole those items and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of theft.

There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of another’s property. True, witness Mendez admitted in an extra-judicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had pilfered from complainant to petitioner. However, an admission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given in evidence only against the person admitting or confessing. Even on this, if given extra-judicially, the confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise, the admission would be inadmissible in evidence against the person so admitting. Here, the extra-judicial confession of witness Mendez was not given with the assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness. Neither may such extra-judicial confession be considered evidence against accused. There must be corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt. Corpus delicti means the “body or substance of the crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed.

127. Viño vs People

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:

Ernesto heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying that he had been shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away so he switched on the lights of their house. Ernesto, together with his wife and child, went down to meet Roberto who was crying and they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbor responded by turning on their lights and the street lights and coming down from their houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one driving the bicycle while Salazar was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.

ISSUE:

WON Vino's conviction as an accessory may be maintained considering that the principal was acquitted.

HELD:

YES. The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal.

Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant was Salazar, as two witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the separate trial of the case of Salazar, as above discussed, he was acquitted as the trial court was not persuaded that he was positively identified to be the man with the gun riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the case against Vino, wherein he did not even adduce evidence in his defense, his liability as such an accessory was established beyond reasonable doubt in that he assisted in the escape of the assailant from the scene of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no material significance for the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant can not be identified the responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable.