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This paper examines conflict resolution approaches implemented in ex-Yugoslavia conflict.
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Al Akhawayn University
Conflict Resolution approaches implemented in Yugoslavia conflict
INS 5313
Conflict Management and Resolution
Dr. Bouzidi
Prepared by: Ismail khejjou
Monday, March 16, 2009
1
The emergence of Conflict Resolution is traced back to the era
after the Second World War. As an academic discipline, conflict
resolution has contributed to the management and settlement of post
Cold War conflicts through a range of processes and approaches.
Among these processes are mediation, facilitation, negotiation and
conciliation. The objective of this paper is to explore the conflict
resolution approaches that have been implemented/ adopted during
the war in Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) or simply
Yugoslavia as it is called today. the paper`s emphasis is on countries in
which peacekeeping missions took place and how the peace operations
were carried out. Before going directly into the topic, it is important to
go briefly over some of the sources of the conflict that plunged
Yugoslavia into one of the most inhuman and vicious wars in history.
As a starting point, it is important to note that the death of Josip
Broz Tito marked, to some extent, the beginning of a new era
characterized by ethnic tension, massive economic disruption, and
political turmoil. All these factors led to the second disintegration of
Yugoslavia and the creation of its most troubled history. Politically
speaking, relations among the republics started to decline and the
inability of the political reforms to resolve the national problem of
different interests and ideologies. Civil Wars and the severe economic
crisis worsened the social situation and left the country at strong
2
turmoil. The ethnic dimension of the Yugoslavia crisis should not be
ignored at this point in that it sparked fierce conflict among different
group divisions which, in turn, challenged the stability of the country at
large.
As it became clear that the situation was getting worse in
Yugoslavia, the call for the international community to intervene was
critical since Slovenia and then Croatia declared their independence.
The conflict in these countries was mainly triggered by the rise of
nationalism which, to some degree, contributed to the dissolution of
Yugoslavia. According to Mihailo Crnobrnja, “The essence of their
[Slovenia and Coratia] nationalism was not towards Yugoslavia but
away from it.” (107) As a note, the withdrawal of Slovenia from the
federal republic was not as destructive as that of Croatia which was
prolonged and devastating. This intention of reducing the federal
authority brought Croatia to a serious confrontation with the Yugoslav
National Army, and it was this first conflict that strongly called for a
serious involvement of the international community. According to
Nambiar, the first initiative that the international community took was
“to set up the Badinter Commission, whose task was to establish
whether or not the newly emerging states fulfilled the primary
requirement for recognition by the community.” (170)
3
Initially, the war was between the Socialist Republic of Croatia
and Serbian minority who opposed its independence. The ethnic
tension between these groups escalated the conflict to the point that
the Yugoslav People's Army supported Serbia for fighting Croatia. It is
true to say that nationalism was the driving force that motivated the
Serbs to revolt against Croatia`s declaration of independence from the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In the midst of increasing
diplomatic negotiations to contain the conflict, a mediation approach
was primarily carried out by “Mr. Cyrus Vance who was sent to
Yugoslavia on 8 October 1991 as the personal envoy of United Nations
Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar.”(Bercovitch, 177) On the
basis of “Security Council Resolution 740 of 7 February and 743 0f 21
February 1992” (Baletic et al), UNPROFOR was the first peacekeeping
operation to be set up in Croatia to maintain conditions for conflict
settlements and the demilitarization of armed forces. The efforts of
the mediation process put emphasis on securing the cease-fire
agreement that the two parties agreed to sign as well as the
implementation of the United Nations plan for peacekeeping mission.
James Gow makes this point crystal clear when he says:
UNPROFOR came into being on 21 Februray 1992 for an initial period of twelve months (six months longer than the customary initial period for UN peacekeeping forces), having been created to underpin the ceasefire between
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Serbian and Croatian forces in Croatia. Although its primary aim was to strengthen the 2 January ceasefire agreement negotiated by the UN Secretary-General`s special Envoy, Cyrus Vance (the Vance Plane), it also had the secondary aim of providing a symbolic presence in neighboring Bosnia and Hercegovina which it was hoped would be sufficient to prevent the outbreak of armed hostility there. (102)
In the context of conflict resolution approaches, the UN
peacekeeping operation in Croatia had a significant role in the sense
that it helped alleviate the conflict and gradually forced the Yugoslav
army forces to withdraw from the country as it was stated in the Vance
plan which will be addressed later. In analyzing the situation in
Croatia, it is clear that the deployment of UNPROFOR created a space
for security and negotiations that would bring an end to Yugoslavia
crisis in general. Interestingly enough, another important aspect of the
UN forces was, among other things, to ensure that that the United
Nations Protected Areas “remained demilitarized, to protect the
indigenous population from ‘fear of armed attack’ and to help return
displaced persons to their homes.” (Gow, 103). In addition to this, UN
peacekeeping forces performed other mandates, such us keeping the
conflicting parties separated, protecting of civilians and, most
importantly, facilitating communication. The involvement of the
European Community Monitoring Mission was an approach of
resolution in the Serbo-Croatia war. It is certainly important to bear in
5
mind that the EC response to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, was, to
some extent, instrumental in the sense that it was relatively able to
limit the conflict. Gow, asserts that
While the 300-strong ECMM no doubt helped to limit the scope of the conflict in some parts of Croatia, as well as ensuring some local cease-fire agreements which resulted in implementation, and successfully accomplished their mission resulted in Slovenia, perhaps its most significant achievement was to negotiation the withdrawal of the JNA from the Prevlaka in September 1992. (106)
The EC was among the leading regional organizations that
enhanced the role and position of the United Nations regarding its
conflict management in Yugoslavia. In addition to the peace mission,
the EC had a significant role in consolidating peacekeeping in order to
encourage negotiations and dialogue in Yugoslavia. It should be noted
that the EC involvement in Yugoslavia crisis came after war broke out
in Slovenia with the objective of securing a cease-fire. The Slovenia
conflict, although it lasted only for ten days, received a serious
response from the European Community which sent “troikas” to
negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Negotiation was an
effective policy approach that the European Community used in the
crisis which compelled Yugoslavia to agree on the “Brioni Accord on
08th July 1929.” (Terrett, 74) Achieving a cease-fire in Slovenia was,
as seen by many, a real action and timely international response to the
6
Crisis. But, it became clear that the EC`s increased effort to resolve the
conflict in Croatia was far from being realistic in terms of attainable
goals and was thus unsuccessful. It remains to be said whether the
failure of the EC was because of the the hold out against Serbia or if it
was due to other significant reasons. Spyros Economides and Paul
Taylor assert that
This followed the failure of the EC`s efforts to end the crisis in Croatia, in part because it was now seen, not as an unbiased mediator, but an opponent of Serbia. The EC also made mistakes in concluding and administering ceasefires: it did not have the mechanisms or experience of the UN in such matters. (70)
The underlying idea that Spyros Economides and Paul Taylor
assert is that the European Community effort to mediate a peaceful
solution of the break-up of Yugoslavia, especially in Croatia, lacked the
important mediatory techniques among which are impartiality and
neutrality. On a more serious note, the inability or the weaknesses of
the European Community to completely carry out its mediation mission
sprang from the fact that it did not give serious attention to the root of
conflict.
The dissolution of The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
came as an outcome of the Cold War and the emerging concept of
7
“the new world order” (Michael Clarke, 11). The mounting of conflict in
the three states, Slovenia, Croatia and later Bosnia called for a strong
and urgent international response. As a result, the focus here is on the
international response and policy approaches of the United Nations
towards Bosnia, as it was the third country to break up. As the conflict
escalated and extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation
started to deteriorate which inevitably led to the outbreak of a bloody
Civil war among the country`s Muslims, Serbs and Croats. The
deployment of UNPROFOR troops, which was reserved for Croatia, had
to move to Bosnia and Herzegovina to negotiate the possibility for a
ceasefire which relatively seemed unachievable at the outset.
The international efforts were unable to bring about a peaceful
resolution to the conflict until later when the Security Council decided
to impose economic sanctions on Yugoslavia as an attempt “to
encourage a settlement of the conflict.” ( Terrett, 75) Another
prominent UN policy was the embargo on supplies of weapons to
Yugoslavia to reinforce the view that the use of force to resolve
internal political conflicts is illegitimate. In Bosnia, and elsewhere in
the former Yugoslavia, the U.N.-led Protection Force was mainly
designed to assist humanitarian aid missions and, most importantly,
support and reinforce the effort of the international community to
establish peace and security essential for negotiations. These
8
concerns to bring an end to the Bosnia and Herzegovina conflict
proved difficult especially because the situations became hostile which
then called for the International Community to consider peace
enforcement measures. This muscular approach was encouraged by
the Security Council resolution 816 which called for using “all
necessary measures” under the mandate of UNPROFOR.
A further active involvement in Yugoslavia crisis was undertaken
by the Western European Union (WEU). In essence, the WEU played a
major role in supporting the activities that significantly called for
respect for humanitarian missions and other peacekeeping and
enforcement missions which were initiated by Commission on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), for example. Furthermore, the WEU
contributed to the unity of Bosnian and Croat parties and it was “The
only mission coming close to the functions of a peace-keeping force …
to Mostar in 1994, incorporating 150 military and civilian personnel.”
(Terrett, 102) In addition to the peace support objectives of
UNPROFOR, a peace plan was initiated by the European Community
and the United Nations in 1992. This plan was carried out in a form of
a mediation and negotiation approach by “David Owen, on behalf of
the EC, and Cyrus Vance, on the behalf of the UN, [and they]
attempted to negotiate a diplomatic solution to the worsening Bosnian
crisis.”(Terrett, 95) This Vance-Owen peace plan was reached through
9
the International Commission on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) which
essentially called for and ensured respect for human rights as well as
national communities and group minorities.
In relation to this, the involvement of the international
community in Bosnia was also seen through the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as an intervention
approach to provide humanitarian aid to civilians in the areas torn by
humanitarian atrocities in the country. As an effective approach,
UNHCR played a significant role in the sense that it “attempted to
coordinate an inter-agency programme of action on humanitarian
issues in Yugoslavia and played an active role on the Humanitarian
Issues Working Group within the ICFY.” (Terrett, 98)
Closely connected to this is the Dayton peace agreement which
came up as a result of the three-year civil war and the acts of violence
in Bosnia. Signed on November 21, 1995, this agreement was mainly
enforced by North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) under the
arrangement of the United States which, at the last stage, became
involved in the Bosnia Crisis. The Dayton agreement was signed in
order to strengthen the implementation of peace that Bosnian
president Alija Izetbegović, Serbian president Milošević, Croatian
president Franjo Tudjman, agreed upon. Specifically, this accord called
for the reintegration of Bosnia`s ethnic groups as well as the
10
importance of promoting human rights standards and the rebuilding of
the economic sector. Interestingly enough, the involvement of the
NATO in Bosnia had a positive role in the performance and
enforcement of the peace accord particularly under UN-SC Resolution
770 which called for monitoring the cease-fire and the “delivery of
humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia.”
(Terrett, 100)
It should be noted here that the conclusion reached through the
Dayton peace agreement brought a relatively peaceful resolution to
Bosnia crisis. Equally, it is clear that the American intervention
initiative participated in fostering not only peace and security in Bosnia
but it also its development in the long-run. Clarke says “It [U.S]
facilitated the creation of a partially coherent policy to resolving the
conflict by creating a broader consensus within the international
community as to what ought to be done.” (15) Attempts to address
Yugoslavia conflict were significantly taken by other international
institutions and organizations such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) which “created a Commission to trace missing
persons and mortal remains as well as assisting in the evacuation of
refugees in areas which had been ‘ethnically-cleansed’.” (Terrett. 102)
While the international community was trying to maintain peace
in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, new ethnic tensions erupted in
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Kosovo. The growing nationalism and separatism, as said mentioned
before, ultimately paved the way to conflict between Serbs and
Albanians. With the escalation of violence, the international
community was urged to intervene in order to take substantial action
to quell hostilities which resulted in a great number of refugees in the
county. At the outset, the United Nations Security Council passed a
“Resolution 1160 which placed an arms embargo on the region.”
(Scorgie, 28)
As the conflict continued to escalate, the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC) called for a cease-fire by the conflicting parties which
partly resulted in an agreement of limiting the Serbian forces in Kosovo
as apparently agreed on by Milosevic Slobodan. However, the
agreement did not last in the sense that Milosevic did not stick with the
disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) that led to the
resuming of conflict again. As a result, ‘Renewed international efforts
were made to give new political impetus to find a peaceful solution to
the conflict… It was agreed to convene urgent negotiations between
the parties to the conflict, under international mediation.’ 1 The
mediation approach at this point was taken by the Contact Group (The
United State, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) at
Rambouillet in order to bring the Serbs and Kosovo representatives to
negotiate a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Another international
1 NATO's role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm12
response was that of US ambassador to UN Richard Holbrooke who
started negotiations with Milosevic threatening him with NATO air
strikes, but the effort was not effective. In essence, this situation left
NATO with one choice and that was to start its bombing mission. After
that, the involvement of NATO brought the conflict to an end and,
interestingly, “Peace was formally instigated on June 10 by UN Security
Council Resolution 1244.” (Scorgie, 29)
Up to this point, it is interesting to see that the international
responses to Kosovo War took a primarily non-violent approach to the
settlement of the conflict. But, it appeared that while negotiations and
diplomatic measures were used as instrumental means to arrive at a
peaceful resolution, nothing impressive had been achieved. Although
the Kosovo case was, to some degree, characterized by neglect from
the international community, initiatives that called for a peaceful
settlement were undertaken by a NGOs and Track initiatives, “for
example, a significant dialogue developed among student groups in
Belgrade and Pristina.” (Maill, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 126). On
a more serious note, this leaves us with the view that, although it was
aggressive, NATO`s military approach was effective because its
mission, after all, was to quell a humanitarian crisis in the country.
Although the international community tried to stop the spread of
war to all the Yugoslavia republics, violent conflict flared-up in
Macedonia; however the conflict was not as fierce as that of Croatia 13
and Bosnia. Of particular interest is that Macedonia`s ethnic unrest,
economic difficulties, and the rise of nationalism were the same factors
that significantly led to the outbreak of the war in the other Yugoslavia
republics, namely, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia. However, the
international response to the conflict in Macedonia showed the active
involvement and the serious concern of the international community to
suppress the violence in fear of its extending to neighboring countries
and cause further threat to security and stability of the region at large.
In their book, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Ramsbotham,
Woodhouse and Miall assert that “While the international community
failed to prevent the spread of violent conflict from Croatia to Bosnia, it
made great efforts in Macedonia to significant effect.” (127)
Interestingly enough, this worry about the situation compelled
the international community to take timely, effective preventive
measures to contain conflict between ethnic Albanians and the
majority Macedonian Slavs. Initially, the UN Security council took a
leading role in establishing UNPROFOR as a “preventive deployment
mission to provide security along Macedonia’s borders.” (Julie Kim) This
preventive peacekeeping mission played a prominent role in the sense
that it preserved the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Macedonia.
Moreover, the involvement of the United States and EU mediation
approach helped the disputants arrive at a peaceful resolution to the
14
conflict. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall make this point crystal
clear when they say
With the help US and EU mediators, the Albanians and Macedonian parties signed the Ohrid agreement, which provided for new elections, arms to be collected by NATO troops, a revision of the constitution to give more rights to Albanians, and civilian monitors to assist the return of refugees. (128)
Through their international diplomatic efforts, it should be noted
that the United States and the European Union both had a significant
role in bringing conclusion to Macedonia conflict. In broader terms,
the US and EU mediatory activity paved the way to NATO forces for
disarmament mission of the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army
(NLA). Furthermore, the US military response to the conflict was a
strategic approach which significantly reinforced the UNPROFO
mandate. In addition to the symbolic presence and support of the
United State for a peaceful resolution, the EU envoy Javier Solana
mediatory activity maintained a cease-fire and fostered peace
implementation in the country. The voice of mediation was strong in
the conflict hand and it turned out to be a real success. According to
Bruce W. Hamilton
The common explanation is that, in contrast to the international response to Croatia and Bosnia, timely
15
initiatives by the United Nations and other third parties towards Macedonia prevented the outbreak of violent ethnic conflict. These efforts are held up as a model of effective international preventive diplomacy. (173)
It is noteworthy to add that the United Nations and other
international actors including Non-Governmental Organizations have
taken preventive measures to aid conflict resolution. More importantly,
the economic development of Macedonia was essentially an approach
that the international community took to help bring the quick
settlement of the country and to foster the co-existence of the ethnic
groups. Linked to this is the leading role that NGOs undertook to help
bring an end to the ethnic conflict between the Albanians and Serbs.
Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse say that “The Catholic Relief
Services, the Center for Inter Ethnic Relations and Search for Common
Ground” were examples of NGOs which had a major role in reducing
tension between the conflicting ethnic groups (122). Related to conflict
resolution, it should be understood that such international organization
are effective in terms of the measures they use to promote and foster
meaningful communication among the parties concerned. The case of
Serbia and Montenegro is another scene to be considered although the
involvement of the international community was less than that of other
republics discussed before. Montenegro got its independence in June 3,
2006 and its history was inextricably linked to that of Serbia. Although
16
there was not sever violent conflict in Montenegro, peacemaking
efforts were undertaken to assist and maintain the stability of the
country. These peace operations were sat in Montenegro to support
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) whose aim
was to monitor and reinforce the “effective implementation of
international human rights standards”
This paper has examined major conflict resolution approaches
applied to the conflict in Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Whether under the umbrella of the United Nations, regional
organizations or Non-Governmental Organizations, it should be
acknowledged that international peace operations were, to some
extent, effective in bringing a peaceful end to the war in Yugoslavia. It
is noticeable that negotiation and mediation were among the most
non-violent approaches adopted by the international community to
accomplish a peaceful settlement of the war. However, it must be
emphasized that, in addition to enhanced peacekeeping mission,
peace enforcement measures were significantly used as an alternative
and appropriate policy approach to maintain security and impose
settlement in Yugoslavia. With regard to all this, it should be said that
the United Nations and NATO played a critical role in that they
reinforced the legitimacy of the international intervention in violent
17
conflict especially in Bosnia which represented the center of the
Yugoslavia war.
Bibliography
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