UNClASSifiED

__ .....--....,.SOURCES AND HETHODSOF INFORNATION CONTROLLED.___.

killCommit-tee"is coopera-

have established Operation Condor to find andterrorist.sof the II Revolutionary Coord inatingin their own countries and in Europe. Brazilting short of murder operations.

operate in the territory of one another's countrie~in pursuit of "subversives~';

now coordinate intelligence activities closely;

on the other by the hostility of the un~omprehendingindustrial democracies misled by Marxist propaganda.

on one side·by international Marxism and~itsterrorist exponents" and

The military regimes of the southern cone of SouthAmerica see themselves as .embattled:

"

AM - Harry W. Shlauderoan<~~1-V!'lARA Monthly Report (Jull)

"Third ~vorldWar" and South AmericaThe

,The Secretary

.AU\)'~ \'~~?

(Ao ¢~3~~,;r') FROel:

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In response they are banding together in what may wellI 1 become a political bloc-pf some cohesiveness. But, more~ ~

la I\signifi.cantly, they are joining forces to euadicate IIsubversion" ,~ a word which increasingly translates into non-violent djssentS from the left and center left. The security forces of the.r· southern cone' ,,..

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~ ~l·~it··i...~ ~ 0 _ This siege mentality shading into paranoia is perhapsvi ,!jQ x '""! J,he natural result of the convulsions of recent years in which~~()~O'-' ~he societies of Chile, Uruguay and Argentina have be~n badly

shaken by assault from the extreme left. But the military'leaders, despite r.eaz decimation of the Harxist left in Chileand Uruguay, alonS'with accele~ating progress toward that goalin Argentina, insist that the threat remains and the war mustgo on. Some talk of the "Third t']orldtvar",with t.he countriesof the southern cone as the last bastion of Christian civiliza­tion.

r·, '-/XGDS-2\'iARNING NOTICE: SENSIT~TELLIGENCEINVOLVED. DISSEHINATION AND EXTRACTIONBY ORIGINATOR.

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To bring the potential bLoc+membe r s back-intoour cognitive unive~s~ through systematicexchanges.

• <to

_':,-:_

To oppose rhetorica2 exagSirations of the"Third'-\'lorld-\';ar"type.

-- To depcliticize human rights.

..

To ernohas i ze the differences bet'·.'een the six}. .' ,countr .::_(:sat- every oppor t.unat:'l.

This -mont.h I s trends' I_)2lpe:c &tt.em.p·ts for the first.time t~ focus on long-tern dangers of a right-wing b!oc·~Our :i.~.~~ial· policy recl)~;'h:;nc~2.tionsare:

---_ ,- ~--~.....-_. .. ----.- ..- ....~-.--- ".._--. -.. -_--- .. -._ ----- ..

~he broader implications ~ t~ and for future trend§in the hemisohere are disturbing. The 0se of bloody counter-t.e r ro r i :-----~ ...-- ~.. ., 1 .errori sm by these regl.:':','2:5 tnre2.-C~nstr1e:Lr .increasanq .aac ati.cnfrom the 'i'lest and the cpeninq of ¢eep .ideoLoqi.ca-l divisionsamong the countries of the hemisphere. An.outbreak of PLO-tYP8terror ism on a worLdw.ide scale in-response is c?!so.a possLbi Lity.The· indus ':.rial- democracies vrcuLd be the bat.t.LefLeLd, :

• ::''''0:· '. ":~

The result of this DentaJ j t:l... interna'llXr is tomagnify the isolation 6£ the military institutions fromthe civilian sector, thus na.rr ow.i.nq the range 'of politicaland economic options.

they believe that the criticis:n f~om democracies ~of their war on terrorism reflects a double standard.

they consider their counter-terrorism ever y bi-t asjusti.fied as ·Israeli···actions against Palestinian ....__>'•••• '

terrorists; and

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Somewhat more ratic~ally,

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It emphasizes the international and institutionala..sp-ec't, the~eb~1 j1".!.stif~/ir:g the cxc z-c.i.cc 'of PU\~.;-2Lbeyond national borders.

It justifies harsh and st!.ee.ping "warcLme "measures.

iUruguayan Foreign Minister Blanco one of the··br ighter and norma Ll.y steadier members or the group -­was the first to describe the campaign against terrorists25 a "Third vlorld tva.I:"." The description is interestingfor two reasQns:

Nature of the Left-Extremo Threat : AThe

The problem -bsqins' \'lith the oezi.nr.caon o'f' ..subversion"never :themost preci se of t.erras, One reporter wzi,tes

tha t subver sion "h~s qrown to inc1ude near 19-anyone vILlOopposes gov-¬ ::rnm2:;-~tpolicy." In countries \·.1nereeveryoneknows tliat subversives can 0ind up eead or tortured,educa-1::e-d people have an urid erst.ande.bLe concern ai:::.outthe boundaxi.e s of dissent. The concern doub Les whent.hore is a chance Of...p81:."3GCl.lt:ionby foreign police. iiacting on' indirect, unknown infor!.\at i.cn . NumerousUruguayan refug2es have been murde.:ced in ArS8ntina,and there~a~e widesnread accu5~tions that Araenti~epolice are doing their Uruguayan colleagues a-favor.These accusations are ~E'least credible,wbether ornot they are exact.

There is extensive cooperation between the security/intelligence ooetations of six covernments: Araentina,Brazil. Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. J Theirintelligence. serviCeS hold formal meetings to plan'"Operation Condor." It will include extensive FBI-typeexchanges of information on shacy characters. Thereare plans for a special cozrrnuni ca+Lon s net.wozk , Thesedetails are still secret, but broad security cooperation.is net. Officials in Paraguay and Argentina have toldus that they find it necessary to cooperate with eachother and their neighbo~s against internationally-fundedterrorists and "SUbversives."

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Security Cooperation is a Fact

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Neverthelesst it is 2.1S0 'true t hac , b z o ad LyspeakInCj..both i.:errori.sts 2,DC1 tl!.·~ P02..c(~::ulleft havefai,led. rfhi:; is true even .i,n ·theminds- 0'::: studic'-Us'revolutionaries. Che Guevarafs rOIT'.antic fiasco c:;:-ushedhopes for rural revolution. Allende' 5 fall is taKen.(perhaps pessimistically) as proving that the ·electoralroute cannot work. ur ban guerrillas coLl.apsed- Ln ..Brazil with Ca~los Marighela and in Uruguay with theTupanaros. The Latt.e.rrepresented a hi.qh+wat.er mazk,Their solid, efficient str uccur e posed a real "t'Jartimathreat:. Prob~bly t.he mi.Li tary be'lieve that torturewas indispensable to crack this structure.

Th2.re is a +ez ro.r+c.ri.errted "RevolutionarvCoordin.::tir:.g Junta", po ss i.bLy he.J.dq':.Ht"te~e.din Paris, which is both a counterpart of andan incentive fOl: ·coopere.tion bet,'leengovernments;;·:.:

They still poss a serious threat in A~gentinaand -- arguably -- u lesser pr obLem in b·.!Oor three othiS.CCOuntries.

Tr..'~yhave provoked repres si ve .r.eact i.ons t

including torture and quasi-governmentald~ath squads. (The guerrillas typicallJclaimed to vlelcOI~'.2 r ep r-e s s i.on , but. \:.;e V:fonde:t:if -they really 1Lke ""hat they got.)

At one time or other, urban and ruralg:..1.erril1-c.:.shave creat.ed ssvere problemsfor a Irao s t; every South P..ri12:Lican government,including those where democxecy is stillsurviving.

Even by objectiv~ standards, the terrorists havehad substanfial accomplishments over the years:

The threat is not imaginary. It may be exaggerated.This is hard to suggest to a man like Blanco, who believes-- probably correctly -- that he and his fanily aretargeted. One must admire his ·personal courage.

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EconOluic dev~lopment is -a pressing need anda public demand. Disciplined military estab­Li.shmen ts can work \'lith tech~ocrats to pxodu ceeconomic developme~t. In the countries weare con s i.der inq , the military is always 'thestrongest nccicriaL in'st.itut.ion -- somet.Lmes

,.The vision of nac i.on has been a s e f f ec tLvein South Amer Lca as it vra s in Eur ope , (It mayyet turn out to be as destructive; this'pap~~looks only briefly at the potential for cqnflictsbetween Latin nations and blocs.) Militaryes tabli shrr.eri ts , traditional procec tors ofboundaries a~d national integr~tYI ai~ in-a posi-tion to profit from the nf.?l'.7 nationalism.

is also an_,'ideoloq.y t~;~<:~::i s ~£F') pos i tiV(~,t;ha i: 0f c 2. ~~loni:~1 (2 '3t.~?:::e n 1.: <

There.in orlc:rin:

\IThese governments -2-_rereactive.: they derived th.-ei:t

initial leg i c i.macy ~_i11" a reaction aerain s t; .tGrrot~ism. -Lefc+e xti r em.i.rsm , Lnst.abi.Li.t y , and (Qs~'i:hey see i·t) r

Ha.rxism. Thus, "c_nti·-:,'la:c:x.isn'(.i;s a mcre L and l)olit:.ical-'---- -----"- ._.

r1"hat the Right-~·iing !-',egirres Ea.ve i~ COIT:.Ilion

t'lhat ~.'iill remain. i s a chain of goverrul1en·ts t startedby Brazil in 1964, whose origin was in battle againstthe extreme left. It is important to their ego, theirsalaries, and their equiornent-budaets to believe ina Third World War. At b~st, uh8n~Argentina stabilizes,we can hope to convince them that they have already won. \T'h"" '. r r i.o r t"~ll nc t Li.ke t.h i.s '"'.l.J-.C\T a Lr e ad v s n.i.cke rt:! "i.'.Ta ~..l_ s. v.'..L ..\_j c, ..!..-:;'" "',_ L. ........ 1':'~.... a...LJ_ -( ......~. :'l !_,_v,:·.. ,.:_.!~

at us for being wor r iad about kid stuff like drug­smuggling when t.he r e is a real military caripa iqn goingon. They accuse_us of ~pplauding the defeat pf terrorismin Entebbe but not in: Montevideo. Our differingpercenticns of the threat are raisi!".S" st<spi~ons-abol]_tour "reli.:tbili!.'L:...."

There is still a major campaign in Argentina.We expect the military to pull. up .t.hei r socks and wi n .They have precedents to guide them, a~d the terroristshave no handy r0fuge in neighboring countries.

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Insecure, repressive govern.r:-:entsneverthelessaLl.ow substantial "democratic" freedoms rincluding varying degrees of f::-eedom.ofexp r e s s i.on , The amhiente is rnor e likeHashi:1gton than Moscm"l.. Yo;; can buy a goodnewspaper~ a pair of ae~a~~ntly-flQweredblue jeans: a girlie magazir..e, or a. modernpainting.

No other inst.itution is a Ll.ov.ed to challengemilitary pow~r, yet politicel parties ~ndcourts often exist and perf'orm some validfunctions. Brazilts tootbless parliarneni,for example, does cautiously articulatepublic opinion and provide a dor3ant alter­native to military rule.J:

In. practice r . the mili tary regirr:est.end i;.o befull of the same inconsistencies that characterize.rion-militarj,' pragreaticr non-ideolcgical regimes.

National dGvelopmen-talism ha s obvious andbothersome pClr.3_11els to L\1'(!ticnal SociaLi.era . Opponcnt.sof the military regimes call them fascist. It is an "effective pej6rative, the more so tscause it can basaid to be t~chnically apcurate. But it is a pejorative.These days, to call a man fascist is not primarily todescribe 'his econom i,c v i.ews ,

Local political institutions are (reas6nablylconsidered to have been a failure, and it issucraes ced tha"t- "democrac,.r dcesrr r·c "i"lor;~ for U2.• "Le;2ers want t~ build mo~e efficient institutio~~;­to organize the.ir !:Oocieticos E::1tirelydifferer::-t.ly:-..Yet there is, at some level of consciousness, .an accei?::a.ncetha.t democracy is the idealeventually to be sought.

National developmentalism is t!~erefore real medicine r:closer to r.10st citiz8!1S then. trendy left o}-:"riaLl ..t-,·jing •causes. '1'o.this ex ten t , milit~ry power can fi~d a --popuLaz base.

.'" .... -:-:;

almost the only one. It has, typically,saved the nations from civilian C:haos •.. ,.:

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The front-burner cases are Arg-entinar ChiLejandUruguay.

In discussing the gene.ral characteristic~ of.,the southern military regimes, we have ffiadesomeindefensibly broad generalizations. The followingis an attempt to corrstt the worst disiortions,country-by-country. It is important to be clearabout the differences because, for reasons vIe shalldevelop later, our ooLi.cv shOl1.1.d h8 t-Q (:>.p1ph2.siz,= T,rhatthe countries _do not hav;;in common rat.berthan ',.;hatthey do,

But ,There Are Also Leading Differences.

He do not suggest that ther8 is a hopoLessLy ~vicious circle. Since some of these re~irnes are -producing really solid economic successe~ Theofficers may everrcual.Ly' trust c Lvi.Li.ans to';succeedthem and providG an honorable. exit. So fai, themilitary has found it easier to ride the tiger thanto dismount. {'lhen an altern,J.'c:Lvs governmenteventually has to be found, it'ICight be that theonly one ava Ll.abLe ~-lill08 at t}).(2.' far left.

"'- -:..... ~::'. ,.~.

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No more eLec t Loras for d whi Le ,

From the stand!;)ointof our policy, the Ulostim,,?ortant long-term c;;i.ract.~r i,stic of tl:ese rE:gi!TIESmay be precisely th.atthey are reversib12, in boththeory and practice. They know it. But they do uotknow what to co about:it. -Political and socialdevelopment lag. Long after left-wing threatsare squashed, the regimes are still terrified of them.Fighting ,the absent pinY..osremains a central goalof naticnal security_ ,Threats and plots are discovered.Some "rni st.ake s " are m2.a.e by the t.oz tur e.rs , who havedifficulty finding logical vi.cti.ms. t1urder s"qua.dskill harmless people and petty thie<,,-es. t':hen _eLec t i.ons are held, the per ver se clectorateshoVlsa desire tG put the rnilita~y out of ~ower. officers,see the trend ending.with their 'own bodies on therack. -

. .~

These military regimes do not expect to la~tforever.' There is' no thought-of 'a-'Thousand~'---~-:-'­~ear Reich, no pretense of having arrived atultimate Marxist-style truth. ~

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UNCLASSIFIED

. Uruguaz is the third p.ressih-g ca se ("lithArgentina and Chile). Foreign l'~irliste::::- Blanc;:) wasthe first, to t.el k about the "'J~hird~',Torld ~";ar/" and­he still: insists that. the t.hzea t; corrt.Lnuc s highin his oouncr y , Given -this picture 1 Urv.guay Ls 1

of course, eager to coop~ra~e with its neighborsin defensive measures. Nevertheless, unlike theChileans, the Uruguayans have maintain~d some"sense of proporticn about human righ~s and inter­national publi.cop i.ni.ori, Civilians az e up fJ.:on1::,in the gove1:'!lmsnt,.:;:rivethe militar:y sub scanc i.aLsupportl and interact relatively well.

,

Chile has been. the subject of so much ac t.i.onlatelykhaL you probably do not need to hear anymore. The Chileans have smashed the Left almostas t.horouchLv ,'5 th,---B;~"''74'';a''''',·. but tl:e repzessiV0ap' ~:::.r=' 't- '(.1c- ;;".1:5-';' ",.~: -'~1 r;-:o-.~~ u-:n~.::::; "1'~~ .1','1;;; - r.-' '!:'v. ". ,:;, «l_V. Il ~.t.:: " ... c....'-._....! __ • l.L1ere J..S noone at the top Li.ke Go;;isel who.even S8f~H1S to'i'lisl1to modcr;J.te h;'m.::tn-:!:'ights e.buse s ~,: Th~ S?.ntia.goregif.1.2 pz ov i.dc s the arcLl:::tYf):S of the reasoningthat cr ic i.ci sm of tOi:-tJ)1:8' can corne oriLy fromin~ernationEl Marxist plotters. The militarysee~ particularly insecure and isolated, evenwith respect to the Chilean public.

Argentina l's the most. interesting r .both".because....,.,-....-­it is important and because the directions of the newregime are not clear~ The Argentines are politicallysophisticated like the Brazilians, but unlike theBrazilians, the Argentines lack social and evenmili t.ary uni.t y , To recover economically r ·they rnustbreak the power of traditional structures, and esp~cial­ly of the labor movement. Th~re is also a genuinechallenge from left-wing terrorists and right-wingcourrce r-cce r z o r • The pro hLem appr o ac he s c Lv i L-wa rdi.mens i.ons , 'Ne believe that the 3razilian. modelwill prevail. In the Lcnq r'un , thus, we think themili t.az y wi.Ll,wi n , Vide·la -- or his successor "": '\-.'illhave more trouble with hard-line nilita.ry officersand rigl1t-Hing terror than with the Lef t ,. Fo::ecesprobably connected to t.he :regii-r;;; have already beenkilling exiles arid priests, among ot.hers . __ I

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! pe._rEl.guav is marching to "i.:.b.esame tunc· as Lt.sria igh.bo!::;-rn~t.is a mU_8 behi.nd, Thi_s is the kind ofni!leb~2nth--:,::c!.i.ltury mili tary regir(le t;"'at looks good en. the cartoon paae. Par aquay , howeve z , has eminentlysou~d reason3 ior being ba~~ward'~nd is not in theleast apologetic. The ParaguCty2..D.Sremember that,in the Chaco v:ar f they ~C1J..gh.toff the maasi.veLysuperior armed forces of three neighbors for aridiculousl...., long time. Pride was saved. if rrothinc~ ~ ( ~else. There is no derncc r e t.Lc t:r:2.dit.ion; whace ve r ,The governmen·t has reacted to fea~c of the left ratherthan the kind of specific challclge posed in the othcrco un t.r Le s ,

Yet

Boli~ia is an interesting case but not a hotproblem. 'l'his is the scene of one of the t!treegenuine soc:l_al zevoLuui.on s in La·tin· Ar,~erLea -- \·;hichmakes ii all the more puzzling th~t Che Guevarathough~ he had a contribution to make. Despite hisfailure, he ieft lasting worries. Tha Ecli~ians still _cori ai.de r U;_a~ Che r s ~.=-,.i:h 2al:2~'3 thE:::1 a t.0.:::get. ofrevGnge for Lnt.eznat.LonaL tsrroris·ts" ~.:.2.cannotqui te perceive the sarne menace ~.. In :soli vi an "i:er:msIthe govern~ent is notably st~bl~ and economicallysuccessful. It has been mcdo:J:'D_t_(~ on human rights.

..

Brazil: We c~n and should relate to Brazil asan emerging world power rather than as a trouble-spot.

! its 1964 "revolution" is the basic modeL for itsneighbors. The biggest problem is that, despite re-'.markable successes I the Brc_zilD:m .armed services stillcannot find a wa.y to relax their held on powez, on "the other hand, they are not much worried about it.They have been able to tao civilian talent for economicpurposes. ~he Left is sm~shed. but it i6 not clear

. ftlhe·ther the President can control the zeal of hissecur ity forces. F_ttemp·ts at polit.ical distensa.ohave largely flopped. (The word carries both theEnglish sense of "distending", or enlarging authorityfrom a narrO'l:l militarv bese , and the French sense offlrelaxingll. Better than' detente?) Brazil,· like theother large countries, does see itself as & worldactor, and this inhibits extremism.

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To predict a political bloc ~ould still bespeculative. Commonsense could assert it.self. Thereis plenty of it available in these coun trLes a.ndevensome in their arrai.es. \:'12 do t.h i.nxthat t.netrendtoward bloc thinking is present, clear, and trouble­somG.

There are a few inhibitions on formation of'a bloc. Nationalistic thinking is the obvious one~Traditional feuds have largely shaped the sense ofnation. Nith the excep-:'ionof the PerU/Chile ·tension ..howcver , border di sputes ~are n.o longe~ an. oveir idingfactor in the southern conc.

ExoLus ion by t.he rn.iLi,tcLry of the civilian rdernoczet Lc interplay vzhich helps to maLntaLna sense of proportion.

Resentment of human -righ·t~.:;critici ;-;;n, w!'J.,icil,is often taken as just·one Dore sign of the:commie encirclement.

Irnproved .transport and commun Lcati.on9<?tt:,reenneighboring count~ies,-which previously hadbetter links wi.t.hthe U~S. and Euro~ tha!lwith each other.

...~.

Highly cornJatib~e philosophies and politicalobjectives in.other respects.

The conviction that an international leftist:threat. amounts to a "VJo::cltl~';arHand hencerequi::ccisan allianc~.

A suspicion tb<!teven t.he U.S. has "lost i·t.svrill" -to stand firm a.gainst communi.sm baceuceof Vie t-I-tC'.m, detente: and social decay'~

. .,'·_·····_--··r-f·-poTiEe::fype coo'peration ··evolves'~-i'nfO"fOi:matlon·c------:---~-of a political bloc, our interests will b~ involved inways that are ne\'l for South P.m~riea. Such a blcc is"not her:e 'let.. The conditions for its l:o:!,.""Ti:o,'\:ionarelargely pres·~nt:

.A Political Bloc In Formation?

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Eventually, ~·.'C could even see ser ious,_s t.ra i.n swith the democracies f'a r cher north. OriLla hastold us that he thinks a confrontation ispossible. U1:'uguayand Vene~uela have justbroken zeLaLions over c:~c Lnc.i.dcnt; involvingpolitical asylum. A precedent?

We:wo~ld like to ~hare_with, say, the Brazilia~~a perception that we are. natural allies.Brazilian participation in a right-~ing blo6'wcuLd make t.hi s unlikely.

Chile' s blac~~-she(::p s-ta'cus has already m.:".ae­trouble for ib, economic recovery. The fa1:'the.rto the right the ..drift goes in o,ther, count r i es,the more difficulties' we can exp~ct in oureconomic links with them.

iI

HUITl.o.!'1 ::cigh'l.:sabu ses 1 as you kuovr, are e:cs,3_ i:.ingmore and more p.robLenis of conscience, la~'i( a'~~(rd i.p Lome.cy c ........,.

More ~roblems are on the seh~dule:':..::

But we would e~pect a range of growirig problerns~86me are already with us. Internationally; the Latingenerals look like our guys. We are especially iden­tified ,·lith Chils=. It .cannot do us any good._. L:.n:opeansrcertainly, hate Pinochet ,& Co~ with a passion thatrubs off on us. __'".. '-

\

'In the e3.r~,y stages r ~·!e~,;illbe a "casue L bene':':'fie iary" (as one reporter put.s it) for reasons t~o,tare too obvious to need elaboration here. On the mainEast-~~st stage, .right-wing regimes can hardly tiltt.oward the Soviets and Cubans. The fact that we are;an. apparent benefi.c iaxy can ezs i Ly lull us into trouble ras has hLst.or a.caI Ly bG8n the case in this henri spher e .

If a Bloc Dces Form.

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Brazil has the weight, sophistication, andv.'Orld- perspect.i.ve to share l,~2.n'yof our concexns .

co:-aparablen -.J ....... 1. '-' I...

r emnant.s ofsubs t.arrti.e Linterpla.y,is

Uruguay, wit.h itsmilitary/civilianto cnile.

11..rg-8ntina, "lith. its virtual civil we:c , fa.cBsa pr ob Lera much diffcl:Gn':_ from its nei'}htors.

. .~

, 1) Distinguish bet0een cou~~ries with special ..care. If He treat:-Eh8lT:-asa "\I)11:")].e( we "Jill be encoU):':c,ging'them to view therns~lves as an e~battled bloc. In ourdealings with each country and in Congression~l testimony,we should, for example 1 reflect reccgnition t.tla"t :..

.,. Till now, though we have t~ied to exercise amode;:'ai:ing i.nfh!enC8, we have not. c aken a long-:t.err~stzateg ic vi.evr of tl1epr-obJ.emst.hat. a r ight-\·.'ing b],oc .would create. This priperhas "tried for ~ sharper focus.Voi'e sbaJ.l ha \7.2 raoze recorr::n~ndation5 in monchs to corao,but. th0 following are a fair stnrt:

The next sten mic~t be for the terrorists to under-M .J

take a worldwide-attack' on embassi~~· and interests ofthe six hated regi.r:-:es.The FLO has shown the. t·lay. H2can pi.ct.ure s ou+h ]'.neric8.D activitiss on a e-errpa.:;:-ablescale I agai.,;;"1using the industrial dernocz-ac i es as abattLefield. The impossibility .of ~eaceful change~'ill.rad LcaLize exile's who might, in earlier days,'have looked forward to returning h028 peacefully.

The South funerican regimes kno~ about this. Thevare p Lannincr -the i:c 0(\'11COu.:l·/:.:.er::'tcr::::or oce ra t ion s in--' - --. .' . -___,--:--;---.,;-EuropG.. Argsrd.:ine., Cni,le, and UruSi2ai are in the lead;Brazil is wary but is providing so~e technical support. \

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Over the horizcn, there is a chance of seriousvlorld-scale t.rouble. This is .ape cu Lat.Lvejbut; ..nq...Lon....ger._._. __ ._ridiculous. The Re~.rolutionaryCoordinating Junta now ....seems to have its headquarters in Paris, plus consi~er-able activity in other European capitals. With ter~0ristfubeing forced out of Argentina, their concentration inEuropa (and'possibly the U.S.) will increase.

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4} ~l: i....::_~.._!:~~8ml...J<}.(;];: to our C00!1j- ti \-,,2 ~ni ve.~..~.g_."_ EUi:how? OUJ:" Er:,.oas s v .i ~1 Let I?2.Z has n~co:,;.!,:(::r~d.eclthat. 'de. - '.excb ano e in'cellig-C:l-..ce· briefiJ:cgs ·v.:1:th the Bolivians.This might provide a I'lay to reach sc spi.c i.ou s militaryofficers and voxk on their "Third Forld \')'ar" syndro~T'.e•. But the ire <3..':-ehazards. \\12 wouLd fail to produce illfcr­mation sustai~ing their t)ls4_is: and t.hey mighi:::-cOl"~:clud~t!1a t we ";erebadly inforined or uncoope re"t:iire. Instead i

we think we sno u Ld t'lcrk on systeraa"i:.ic rn Ld+LeveJ, e xc he.nqe s-- something rr.or e +han exc hariqe s of info:cmat~,-o~J.onterrorists. ~';eneed to achieve a pe rc epc i.on that ne i t.Ler'detente ncr distens~o is a threat to the legi~im~cy offrien~ly r8SJS~S.

In Congressional testimony he~e, stress thatthe threa.t is rea.lfor a cour.try like' ArgE:n'tina.

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-- l·iake c lea r if'.....~ou:c Sou·tll AI;K:r i.c2.11. de a Li.nq s i1t.ha t the "Third 1901.:-2.d 'i7a:;:-" ic.c.::l .is ove r dz-awn.artd leads to dangarous cons2~~c~ces~ -

2) . Try t.o get the T?oli_~ics an? ideology ou··:.:·of.humar; :ciCjh"(:~.;·. Tilis obj ec·ti ve ,·.'ill be il~r.d ·to :r~econcilew.i.·th the equally pressing need to rauLt.Lla ter aLi.ze ourconcern. To. a.void charges of "int0rvention, II "\·:emusc .i.ncr ea s i.r.e-Ly \-lark i:h.l.:-ough the I:lter-J. ..mer i.can HumanRiS'hts Comm.iss ion . The countries ·the:t support us . .,there, however, will tend to be democracies (and perhapsone or tvlO zad i caL Car ibJ?ean governments). Righ t-v;ingregirG.cs vri.Ll, feel cesieged.. Idc:ally: vie should k0t::l?one or mor e of them with us. If th2.:: is .imposs i.bLe(as now se:ems lik121y),we sl'~2ul.d t;;.ke spe c i a L "'care tomake clear that authoritari~n regimes of the righth.;:>.ve no r:!c;:<?.~")ol'[_~ abl1.se S~ (You::: S,"t::.tiagQ~p~ec hhad the rig~t balance).

Our military-sales programs nay also;provide anopportunity for distinction. Aid no longer providessignificant.leverage. Thereis vast interest in overalleconomic rela tions -- but not much freedom ();; movemenc ,

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III

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8/2/76

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In time, perhaps we"can, convince them that a ThirdWorld War is undesirable .

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