Regionalization amidst 'State-Shrinkage' [p.p. 5-28]

1

The Romanian Review of European Governance Studies Vol.3, No.5, June 2011

Articles: Vassilis Petsinis – Regionalization amidst ‘state skrinkage’: the case of Vojvodina

Corina Turşie & Ciprian Niţu – The role of National Parliaments in the European decision-making process after the Treaty of Lisbon. The EU-early warning system for subsidiarity control Eleanor Zeff & Ellen Pirro -The transport success story: Europeanization in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania Ştefana Ignea-Prospects on European citizenship

Book reviews: Simona Piattoni, The theory of Multi-Level Governance. Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges, Oxford, 2010. Reviewed by Oana-Andreea Ion Anne Mette Kjaer, Guvernanţa, CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2010. Reviewed by Sergiu Mişcoiu Alessandro Vagnini (ed.), The Rise of Nations, Nationalities, Minorities and the Fall of Habsburg Empire, Edizioni Nuova Cultura, 2010. Reviewed by Maria Ruggero

Vol.3, No.5, June 2011

ISSN 2066 - 4885

2


The Romanian Review of

European Governance Studies Vol.3, No.5, June 2011

About us The Romanian Review of European Governance Studies is a double blind open access journal, edited on a biannual basis by the Altiero Spinelli Center for the Study of European Governance of Babes-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca. The review covers a wide range of topics from the field of International Relations and European Studies, like: governance and multi-level governance, theories of European integration, European policies, civil society and case studies on Central and Eastern Europe. The review is addressed to specialists from the academic world and general public and seeks to provide an important contribution to the academic debate.

The Romanian Review of European Governance Studies is indexed in Ulrichsweb, Index Copernicus, Open J-Gate, DOAJ and EBSCO Open access policy: Our journal provides immediate open access to its content on the principle that making research freely available to the public supports a greater global exchange of knowledge RREGS articles are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial -No Derivate Works 3.0 Romanian License

http://www.ulrichsweb.com/ulrichsweb/ulrichsweb_news/uu/newTitles.asp?uuMonthlyFile=uu201003/new_titles.txt&Letter=P&navPage=9&#PUBLICADMINISTRATION

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ro/

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ro/

3


Editor in chief

Adrian Ivan, Jean Monnet Chair professor, Babeş-Bolyai University

Executive editors Natalia Cugleşan, Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

Dacian Duna, Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

Dorin Dolghi, University of Oradea

Book review editors

Claudia Iov, Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

Claudiu Ţabrea, Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

Editorial board Andrei Marga, Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

Michael Shafir, Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

Gheorghe Ciobanu, Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

Mihaela Luţaş, Jean Monnet Chair professor, Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

Sergiu Mişcoiu, Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

Ioan Horga, Jean Monnet Chair professor, University of Oradea, Romania

Beatrice Giblin, Institute francaise de geopolitique, Paris, France

Barbara Loyer, Institute francaise de geopolitique

Pierre Chalvidan, University Paris XII, France

Fabienne Maron, International Institute of Administrative Sciences, Belgium

Antonello Biagini, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy

Giovana Motta, Sapienza University of Rome

Luigi Moccia, Jean Monnet Chair professor, University of Roma Tre, Italy

Thibault Lahalle, University Paris XII, France

Andrea Carteny, University of Teramo, Italy

Giordano Altarozzi, Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

Basil Germond, University of Central Lancashire, UK

Iordan Bărbulescu, National School of Political Sciences and Administrative Sciences, Romania

Yves Palau, University Paris XII, France

Bogdan Dumbrăvescu, University Paris XII, France

Editorial assistant

Alin Nicula, Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

Language Editors

Ioana Strat, Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

Maria-Cristina Olt, Babeş-Bolyai University, Romania

4


Contents:

REGIONALIZATION AMIDST ‘STATE-SHRINKAGE’: THE CASE OF VOJVODINA 5

Vassilis Petsinis, Centre for Baltic and East European Studies, Södertörn University, Sweden

THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AFTER THE TREATY OF LISBON THE EU EARLY-WARNING SYSTEM FOR SUBSIDIARITY CONTROL 29

Corina Turşie & Ciprian Niţu, West University of Timişoara, Romania

THE TRANSPORT SUCCESS STORY: EUROPEANIZATION IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC, SLOVAKIA AND ROMANIA 48

Eleanor E. Zeff & Ellen B. Pirro, Drake University, Iowa State University, USA

PROSPECTS ON THE CITIZENSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 77

Ştefana Ignea, Babeş-Bolyai University Cluj Napoca, Romania

SIMONA PIATTONI, THE THEORY OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE: CONCEPTUAL, EMPIRICAL, AND NORMATIVE CHALLENGES, OXFORD, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2010 89

Reviewed by: Oana-Andreea Ion, NicolaeTitulescu University, Bucharest, Romania

ANNE METTE KJAER, GUVERNANŢA(GOVERNANCE), CA PUBLISHING, CLUJ-NAPOCA, 2010 92

Reviewed by: Sergiu Mişcoiu, Faculty of European Studies, Babeş-Bolyai University Cluj-Napoca, Romania

ALESSANDRO VAGNINI (ED.), THE RISE OF NATIONS. NATIONALITIES, MINORITIES AND THE FALL OF HABSBURG EMPIRE, EDIZIONI NUOVA CULTURA, ROMA, 2010 94

Reviewed by: Maria Ruggero, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy

5


Regionalization amidst ‘state-shrinkage’: the case of Vojvodina

Vassilis Petsinis Centre for Baltic and East European Studies

Södertörn University, Sweden

E-mail: [email protected] http://webappo.sh.se

Received: 8 February 2011 Accepted: 17 March 2011

Abstract The advent of the third millennium saw rapid and radical changes in Serbia‟s constitutional landscape. One of the debates has been the restitution of certain competencies to the assembly of Vojvodina. Since 2000, the Vojvodinian debate was overshadowed by other domestic and foreign policy priorities until it kicked off again by the end of the third millennium‟s first decade. Correspondingly, by the end of November 2009, the assembly of Vojvodina and the Serbian parliament jointly adopted the new statute for Vojvodina. In this work, I focus on the political significance of the new statute for Vojvodina, as part of the broader process to set Serbia‟s regionalization on novel foundations. What I try to demonstrate is that the new statute is compatible with the „European‟ guidelines and standards on contemporary regionalization. It also comes to fill in certain gaps and ambiguities in the 2006 Serbian Constitution.

Keywords: Serbia, Vojvodina, regionalization, regionalism, European integration

Introduction

The advent of the third millennium saw rapid and radical changes in Serbia‘s constitutional landscape. By June

2006, Montenegro declared its independence thus terminating the loose federation between Serbia and

Montenegro which was established in 2003. Meanwhile, by February 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared its

independence and received international recognition by a number of powerful states. This served as a

definitive indication that Kosovo had been de facto placed beyond Serbia‘s constitutional and administrative

framework. Since the beginning of the third millennium, Serbian policy-makers concentrated their endeavours

on elaborating a formula for maintaining Kosovo within the bounds of the Serbian republic. This emphasis on

Kosovo kept debates about Serbia‘s regionalization salient. The main ‗secondary‘ debate has been the

restitution of certain competencies to the assembly of Vojvodina. Vojvodina is situated in the north of Serbia

(Map 1). This is part of the geographic area where the Balkan Peninsula meets Central Eastern Europe. For

centuries, this zone was the frontier that separated two conflicting realms; the Ottoman and the Habsburg. In

addition to this, a series of mass- migrations have rendered Vojvodina one of Europe‘s most richly multiethnic

regions. While the Serbs constitute the local majority in 32 out of the 45 municipalities, the province‘s ethnic

diversity has had a definitive impact upon shaping Vojvodina‘s regional physiognomy (see table 1). This

region‘s ethnic plurality, in combination with its different historical heritage in comparison to Serbia proper,

http://webappo.sh.se/

6


has been the driving wheel behind the elaboration of various models for managing Vojvodina‘s ‗regional

particularities‘. The most notable of these models has been Vojvodina‘s establishment as an autonomous

province within the bounds of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. By late 1988, Vojvodina‘s

autonomy was brought to an end as result of Slobodan Milošević‘s anti-bureaucratic revolution.

The question of restituting administrative competencies to Vojvodina came back to the fore, as soon as Milošević fell from power (October 2000). This resulted, at a first instance, in the inauguration of the Omnibus law for Vojvodina in February 2002. In the years to come, the Vojvodinian debate was overshadowed by other domestic and foreign policy priorities until it kicked off again by the end of the third millennium‘s first decade. Table 1 The ethnic structure of the autonomous province of Vojvodina according to the 2002 national census

Serbs 1,321,807 65.05 percent

Montenegrins 35,513 1.75 percent

Yugoslavs 49,881 2.45 percent

Albanians 1,695 0.08 percent

Bosnjaks 417 0.02 percent

Bulgarians 1,658 0.08 percent

Bunjevci 19,766 0.97 percent

Vlachs 101 0.00 percent

Goranci 606 0.03 percent

Hungarians 290,207 14.28 percent

Macedonians 11,785 0.58 percent

Muslims 3,634 0.18 percent

Germans 3,154 0.16 percent

Roma 29,057 1.43 percent

Romanians 30,419 1.50 percent

Russians 940 0.05 percent

Slovaks 56,637 2.79 percent

Slovenes 2,005 0.10 percent

Ukrainians 4,635 0.23 percent

7


Croats 56,546 2.78 percent

Czechs 1,648 0.08 percent

Ruthenes 15,626 0.77 percent

Others 5,311 0.26 percent

Non-declared 55,016 2.71 percent

Regional affiliation 10,154 0.50 percent

Unknown 23,774 1.17 percent

TOTAL 2,031,992 100.00 percent Source: Konačni rezultati popisa 2002, Saopštenje, broj 295, god. LII, Republika Srbija, Republički Zavod za Statistiku, Beograd, 24.12.2002

Correspondingly, by the end of November 2009, the assembly of Vojvodina and the Serbian parliament jointly adopted the new statute for Vojvodina. The background behind the inauguration of this document once again highlighted the cleavage between the proponents of asymmetric regionalization and centralists in Vojvodina and Serbia as a whole. In this work, I focus on the political significance of the new statute for Vojvodina, as part of the broader process to set Serbia‘s regionalization on novel foundations. What I try to demonstrate is that the new statute is compatible with the ‗European‘ guidelines and standards on contemporary regionalization. It also comes to fill in certain gaps and ambiguities in the 2006 Serbian Constitution. Prior to this, it is essential to: a. make some terminological distinctions; b. set in context the particularities of regionalism and regionalization in Central and Eastern Europe; c. provide a short overview of the various contents that autonomy for Vojvodina has acquired through time.

Centralization

As a matter of fact, there exist a number of patterns for the territorial arrangement of the state. For the purposes of this work, I prefer to treat these patterns as processes instead of final constitutional arrangements. Therefore, attention is paid to the processes of centralization and regionalization with specific reference to the European space. Of particular help is to rely on the treatises of these processes by Rokkan and Urwin (1982), Elazar (1979) and Keating (1988, 1998). Starting with centralization, this can be understood as the endeavour, by the governing elites, to equalize the administrative competencies of a state‘s constituent regions in relation to a predominant centre. As parts of the centralization process, regions are not viewed as territories with a residual political character but, rather, as administrative units that must be granted equal jurisdiction. The ultimate objective of the centralization process is to culminate into a unitary structure. Within an ‗ideal‘ unitary state, the centre is politically and economically preponderant and pursues a, more or less, undeviating policy of administrative standardization (Rokkan and Urwin, 1982:5). Therefore, one might argue that, with regard to the administrative competencies of the peripheries within the unitary state, centralization aims at a symmetric arrangement. Proponents of centralization throughout the Continent have tried to legitimize their endeavours through reference to theoretical as well as functional considerations. Theoretical considerations have been conditioned by the ‗ethnic versus civic‘ divide, as far as the notions of nationhood are concerned. On the one hand, centralist elites promoting the ethnic variant have viewed the centralization process as conterminous with the concept of the (ethno-culturally) homogeneous nation. Meanwhile, centralists adhering to the civic variant have tried to legitimize centralization through reference to the classical liberal model of the state. In this light, centralist elites add overriding importance to the principles of common citizenship, individual rights and equality of all citizens before the law. Correspondingly, they reject the endowment of regions with ‗special‘ administrative competencies on the

8


grounds of their ethno-cultural particularities or distinct historical heritage(s). Lastly, most centralists have

aspired to legitimize centralization on functional grounds. In other words, they regard the equalization of the peripheries‘ jurisdiction in relation to the centre as an efficient path towards the execution of governmental policies which is neither time-consuming nor financially over-demanding.

Regionalization: Asymmetric and symmetric

The most intriguing manifestation of the unitary state‘s transformation in order to accommodate regional demands is regionalization. At this point, it is of primary importance to clarify the terminological distinction between regionalization and regionalism. The latter notion, as it has become manifest throughout the Continent, refers to a variety of grass-roots and political movements aiming towards the concession of ‗special‘ administrative competencies to certain regions within a state. The popular bases of support, as well as the legitimization sources, of regionalist initiatives are remarkably diverse and have depended on the constitutional framework, the political history and the ethno-cultural heterogeneity (or homogeneity) of each state. On most occasions, regionalist entrepreneurs demand certain degrees of fiscal autonomy and/or more freedom in managing questions of vital concern for their region. As part of this process, regionalist elites and intelligentsias utilize distinctive socio-cultural stigmata and historical heritages as a means for legitimization and mass mobilization1. Where the elements of geography, efficient economic lobbying, cultural distinctiveness, powerful regional institutions and territorial mobilization combine in space, regionalist movements are particularly strong (e.g. Catalan regionalism – Keating, 2004: Introduction). Although it frequently intercedes with regionalism in the political sphere, regionalization is a more multifaceted

process engineered at the macro-political level. In these states where regionalization has been implemented, it

was triggered by the necessities for: a. modernization and more efficient planning at the regional level; b.

effective integration of the ethnically heterogeneous parts of the state; c. the legitimization of democratic

transition(s) in certain regions (e.g. the Spanish case, with regard to Catalonia and the Basque country, in the

1980s). These states, where regionalization has been implemented, are formally designated as unitary by their

constitutions (e.g. Article 5 of the Italian and Article 2 of the Spanish Constitution). However, at the same

time, some other constitutional provisions recognize the specifics of certain regions, thus preparing the soil for

the concession of ‗special‘ competencies with regard to: a. the use of regional or minority languages in public

administration, education and public information; b. varied degrees of fiscal autonomy (e.g. Article 151 of the

Spanish Constitution); c. legislative (sometimes partly judicial, too) capacities at the regional level. Therefore,

regionalization has more or less been an informal process entrenched within the constitutional structure of

formally unitary states. Regionalization must not be confused with functional decentralization. Within a unitary

state, functional decentralization is orientated towards the local self-government level and is mostly triggered

by practical concerns. Correspondingly, functional decentralization has assumed a mainly ‗technical‘ and

infrastructural dimension in the states where it has been implemented (i.e. the management and improvement

of local infrastructure by the local self-government units).

Contemporary regionalization is subdivided into asymmetric and symmetric. Asymmetric regionalization has consisted in the concession of ‗special‘ competencies to selected regions, as juxtaposed to functional decentralization towards the local self-government level in the other parts of the state. In Italy, asymmetric regionalization has resulted in the concession of autonomy to 5 regions2 with regard to: a. the management

9


of income from regional taxes (Keating, 1988: 133); b. the enactment of regional legislation (Keating, 1998: 61-62; 1988: 230-234); c. the public use of regional or minority languages (Wöelk, 2001: 107-128). In symmetric regionalization, a greater number of regions gradually acquire a comparable status to the ‗special‘ ones. The most typical example of symmetric regionalization is the Spanish case. Since the mid-1980s, many other regions have managed to obtain a roughly comparable status to the Basque country, Catalonia and Galicia. Nowadays, 17 comunidades autonomas/autonomous regions operate in Spain (Escobalherrero, 2001: 40). Symmetric regionalization is also a process that takes place within the bounds of a formally unitary state. Therefore, it should not be confused with federalization which advocates a polycentric arrangement (Elazar, 1979: 13-57; Keating, 1998: 114). In both asymmetric and symmetric regionalization, the competencies allocated to regions are much higher than those of local self-government units in unitary states. This is particularly the case with regard to regional legislation, regional taxation and financial autonomy per se3. Nevertheless, the autonomy of regions in symmetric regionalization is normally lower than that of federated units. Especially the legislative and judicial capacities of the former are considerably weaker than that of the latter4.

Regionalism and regionalization in Central and Eastern Europe

Regionalism and regionalization in Post-Communist Europe have been two context-specific phenomena. For the purposes of this work, attention is paid to Central and Eastern Europe thus excluding the Post-Soviet space. During the Communist era, regional and ethnic identities were subordinated to the overriding principle of Socialist internationalism. Collective rights were allocated to minority groups but no regionalization processes were undertaken in most Central and East European states. The striking exception was the establishment of the Socialist autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina in SR Serbia, within SFR Yugoslavia. More on this issue is said later. The end of Communist rule was soon accompanied by two parallel trends. The one was the attempt by the new elites to re-nationalize their states, by promoting the language, culture, economic flourishing and political hegemony of the nominally state-bearing nations (Brubaker, 1995: 109-112). As part of this process, the new elites frequently opted for the centralization of the state‘s administration. The other trend was external pressures towards the democratization of the political order, mainly within the context of European integration. These pressures also called for well-organized administrations capable of translating central government policies into action at the regional and local levels (Batt and Wolczuk, 2002: 8-9). The European Commission has regarded the enhancement of administrative capacities, at the regional level, as an efficient medium for managing the anticipated transfers from the Structural Funds. In this light, regionalist entrepreneurs throughout Central and Eastern Europe have sought to legitimize their endeavours through references to the need to: a. oppose centralizing and nationalizing projects; b. counter-propose more efficient and regional alternatives which, at the same time, are compatible with ‗European‘ standards and the EU guidelines5. To these one might add the endeavours by ethnic minority entrepreneurs towards the concession of ethno-territorial autonomy for their communities (e.g. the ethnic Hungarian parties throughout the Carpathian basin). Especially the persistence of ambiguities over questions with ethnic implications, plus the ongoing interest of kin-states in their minorities in neighbouring countries, have often rendered states in this macro-region: a. rather insecure over their territorial integrity; b. quite suspicious towards regional autonomy and regionalization as such (Keating, 2003: 14-16)6. Therefore, an essential particularity of territorial politics in Central and Eastern Europe is that they have been subject to the political heritage(s) of the Communist era, Post-Communist nationalization processes and European integration.

10


This theoretical discussion is particularly relevant to the case of Vojvodina. Alongside Kosovo, Vojvodina was a region endowed with a substantial degree of autonomy within SFR Yugoslavia. The 1990s saw an attempt by the new Serbian elites to re-nationalize Vojvodina, as well as their endorsement of centralization. Since the end of Milošević‘s rule, the cleavage between centralists and proponents of asymmetric regionalization (namely Vojvodinian regionalists) has been a frequent occurrence. As part of this dichotomy, both sides have made several references to the application of centralization and asymmetric regionalization in Western Europe. The pro-centralists, in particular, have also tried to anchor their argumentation in the necessity to safeguard Serbia‘s territorial integrity in the midst of its apparent ‗state-shrinkage‘. In all of this, Serbia‘s accession to the EU is a process which has: a. enhanced the argumentation of Vojvodinian regionalists in favour of a more ‗asymmetric‘ status for their region; b. rendered Belgrade more positive towards the concession of ‗special‘ competencies to Vojvodina‘s assembly. Most important, regionalism and the application of regionalization in the case of Vojvodina has been a rather fascinating subject. First of all, Vojvodina is an interesting case where a high degree of ethno-cultural plurality coincides in space with a positive state of inter-group relations. This gains particular weight, always considering the volatile atmosphere throughout the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Moreover, Vojvodina is a space where calls for the concession of ethno-territorial autonomy, by minority interest-groups (namely, the two ethnic Hungarian parties), have coexisted with Vojvodinian regionalism but, on certain occasions, have also come into conflict with it. Setting in context regionalism, the variants of regionalization and their particularities within Western and Post-Communist contexts helps: a. comprehend the employment and operation of these concepts in Vojvodina and Serbia as a whole; b. clarify how and why the new statute for Vojvodina is compatible with the European standards on contemporary regionalization.

Vojvodina’s autonomy through the ages

In the previous section, I defined the concepts of regionalism, regionalization and centralization. This was a theoretical introduction to the empirical discussion of the recent developments with regard to Vojvodina‘s status within Serbia. Nevertheless, in order to fully grasp the significance of these developments, a brief summary of the historical evolution of the various contents that autonomy for Vojvodina has acquired through time is required. Throughout the late 18th and early 19th century, the Serbs living within the bounds of the Habsburg Monarchy had been lobbying to Vienna for the concession of ethno-territorial autonomy. The Serbian elites initially accomplished this aim when Emperor Franz Joseph granted them Vojvodstvo Srpsko (i.e. the Serbian Vojvodina) in a patent of 6 November 1849 (Kahn, 1983: 430; Vucinich, 1967: 5-6). This was the reward for Serbian support towards the suppression of the 1848 Hungarian revolution. Serbian Vojvodina, with its administrative centre in Temeszvar, comprised Baranja, Srem, part of Bačka and most of the Banat with the exception of the Military Frontier. Nevertheless, Serbian autonomy was short-lived. As consequence of the Ausgleich process with the Hungarians, the Emperor abolished Vojvodstvo Srpsko and gave its territory back to Hungary (29 December 1860). Throughout the second half of the 19th century, Vojvodina evolved into the heartland of the Serbian national movement until it became part of the ‗Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes‘ (4 June 1920). In the long term, a combination of developments such as the incompetence of the Belgrade bureaucrats, the failure of the agricultural reform and the imposition of the royal dictatorship (6 January 1929) prepared the soil for the emergence of proto-regionalist tendencies. Correspondingly, by 1935, the Vojvođanski Front (Vojvodinian Front) started functioning as an umbrella for Vojvodinian regionalists. The Front underlined that Vojvodina, comprising the sub-regions of Bačka, Baranja, Srem and the Banat, must gain the status of a

11


unit in a federal Yugoslavia. All units would be equal, enjoy legislative and budgetary autonomy and their assemblies have some main areas under their jurisdiction (e.g. regional administration, education and the regional judiciary) (Končar, 1995: 88-92). Although the Front‘s endeavours were short-lived and had little impact, still its political symbolism was not negligible. On that occasion, some prominent circles among the Vojvodinian Serb bourgeoisie appealed for autonomy not to an alien power but to their fellow-nationals in Belgrade. This was the first time that Vojvodinian Serbs voiced demands of autonomy on a regional and not a national basis, as was the case prior to the establishment of royal Yugoslavia. Yugoslav Communists embedded Vojvodinian autonomy in novel foundations. According to Article 2 of the 1946 Yugoslav Constitution, Serbia would comprise the autonomna pokrajina (i.e. autonomous province) of Vojvodina and the autonomous oblast (i.e. district) of Kosovo and Metohija. The carving out of the autonomous provinces in Serbia was justified on grounds of their ethno-cultural heterogeneity. Vojvodina and Kosovo were two regions inhabited by a multitude of ethnic groups. Therefore, the most effective way, the Party officials contended, to safeguard the collective rights of all groups resident in these regions was to promulgate the administrative autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo (Popov, 1974: 411). However, this decision should be viewed in line with the establishment of SR Macedonia and SR Montenegro as republics: Both policies aimed at weakening the political status of Serbs within Yugoslavia and allaying fears of ‗renewed Serbian predominance‘ in the other republics and among other ethnic groups. During the 1950s, both provinces were little more than administrative divisions of Serbia (Kovačević, 1973: 114-116). The status of the provinces in the 1950s may be interpreted as consequence of the drive towards the integral (i.e. more centralized) version of Socialist Yugoslavism. The status of the autonomous provinces was upgraded with the transition from integral to organic (i.e. further devolved) Socialist Yugoslavism, since the mid-1960s. By the early 1970s, the Kosovan and Vojvodinian statutes were upgraded to constitutions. The new Yugoslav Constitution (1974) enabled Vojvodinian and Kosovan assemblies to implement regional legislation without previously consulting the Serbian parliament. SR Serbia, on the contrary, could not enact republican legislation without the previous assent of the vojvodinian and kosovan assemblies7. by the late 1980s, slobodan milošević‘s ‗anti-bureaucratic revolution‘ and its calls for the recentralization of authority in Serbia gained powerful support. Consequently, by late 1988, the Vojvodinian elites were forced to resign as result of mass protests. Two years later, the new Serbian Constitution (28 September 1990) stripped Vojvodina and Kosovo of their legislative and judicial competencies. From that point onwards, the main competencies of the Vojvodinian and Kosovan assemblies were to appoint executives to the regional assemblies and enact sub-legal acts of a regional jurisdiction, always in accordance with republican legislation8.

Restitution of competencies: new beginnings Vojvodina during the 1990s

The termination of autonomy was met with dissatisfaction by a variety of interest-groups in Vojvodina, throughout the 1990s. Political groupings operating among the province‘s ethnic minorities perceived the new constitutional framework as a peril to their rights and freedoms (most notably, the ethnic Hungarian elites). Meanwhile, a variety of regionalist initiatives and projects mushroomed in Vojvodina. The most significant were political parties such as the League of Vojvodina‘s Social Democrats (led by Nenad Čanak) and the smaller Reformist Party. Nevertheless, a variety of allegations such as poor staffing, internal authoritarianism and suspicious links to the reformist branch of the old Vojvodinian League of Communists

12


rendered these parties a not particularly popular option. Therefore, their popular appeal and political impact has never been very crucial. The calls for the restitution of certain competencies to Vojvodina, at a massive scale, were the outcome of a more complex process. This requires a short retrospective overview. As already stated, Vojvodina is a richly diverse region. Within the context of this diversity, Vojvodina‘s Serbian majority is internally fragmented too. Vojvodinian Serbs are subdivided into the starosedeoci/‘old settlers‘, the kolonisti/‘colonists‘ and the izbeglice/refugees from the latest wars in the other parts of the former Yugoslavia. Although nowadays it is practically impossible to distinguish who is precisely an ‗old settler‘ and who is a ‗colonist‘, the ‗old settlers‘ lineage is said to stretch back to the first waves of Serbs who settled in the Habsburg lands in the late 18th century. The ‗colonists‘ are the descendants of migrants who moved to Vojvodina from other parts of the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Montenegro) in the course of a state-sponsored colonization process, after the Second World War. With the exception of the refugees who, as result of their traumatic experience are keener on nationalist options9, a variety of political standpoints can be observed among the other two segments10. This also touches upon the ‗pro-autonomy versus anti-autonomy‘ dichotomy with regard to Vojvodina‘s status within Serbia11. Vojvodina‘s minorities, on the other hand, have always seen Vojvodina‘s administrative autonomy as a guarantee for the safeguard of their collective rights and freedoms. This is understandable, taking into consideration the extensive rights that they enjoyed in SAP Vojvodina since the 1970s. With regard to the grass-roots level, the 1970s and 1980s saw a remarkable decrease in occupational and residential segregation along ethnic lines. This was accompanied by the widespread contraction of mixed marriages between ‗old settlers‘ and ‗colonists‘ and, most important, Serbs and non-Serbs in urban and rural settlements alike12. This positive state of inter-group relations at the grass-roots level provided a common trans-ethnic substratum for all group identities in Vojvodina13. The 1990s was Serbia‘s ‗lost decade‘ and this had a negative impact on Vojvodina too. First of all, the UN embargo and domestic mismanagement resulted in the worsening of the socioeconomic situation (see table 2). Owing to its agricultural wealth, a disproportionate percentage of Vojvodina‘s revenues were spent in order to subsidize poorer regions. The same decade also saw the relative deterioration of ethnic relations and the emergence of inter-group cleavages. This occurrence was prompted by: a. Belgrade‘s subtle promotion of Serbian political hegemony in Vojvodina and the endeavours by minority interest-groups (e.g. the ethnic Hungarian parties) to resist it; b. the echoes of the war in neighbouring Eastern Slavonia and other parts of the former Yugoslavia (Petsinis, 2008: 264-270).

Table 2 Vojvodina’s economic decline in the early and mid-1990s Year Number of

employed Number of

unemployed

Gross domestic material product

National income

Realized investment

in fixed assets

1989 643,286 101,101 14,813 million dinars

12,344 million dinars

1990 627,707 127,962 13,515 million dinars


1991 619,159 159,927 12,300 million dinars


1,473.050 dinars

1992 598,620 188,052 8,694 million dinars


999,498 dinars

1993 583,601 201,894 5,889 million dinars


617,690 dinars

1994 572,261 212,002 5,989 million dinars


549,626 dinars

Source: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku (1986), Statistički Godišnjak 1996.godine, pp.92, 96, 128 and 156.

13


Nevertheless, these cleavages did not result into large-scale segregation and the instances of ethnic violence were not as pronounced as in the other multiethnic regions of ex-Yugoslavia (Golubović, 1995: 248-252; Obradović, 1999: 494). The aggregate of these adverse developments embittered many in Vojvodina. Local pro-autonomy workshops, constitutional and legal theorists soon drafted a number of proposals which advocated the restitution of certain competencies to Vojvodina with regard to the regulation of questions of vital concern. Most of these proposals converged in Vojvodina‘s: a. entitlement to legislative, executive and partially judicial powers; b. economic autonomy with regard to the regional sources of income (i.e. an autonomous tax system); c. entitlement to more regionalized mechanisms for the management of ethnic relations ‗at the spot‘ (Pihler 2000; Komšić 2001). Meanwhile, public surveys, conducted in the late 1990s and the beginning of the third millennium, indicated a strong preference on the Vojvodinians‘ behalf, towards asymmetric or highly-devolved solutions (see table 3a).

Table 3a What should be Vojvodina’s administrative status?

A similar degree of autonomy to what was the case according to the 1974 constitutional arrangement

33.1 percent of the respondents

The same as it is today


More autonomy within Serbia but less than it was the case according to the 1974 constitutional arrangement


Republic within FR Yugoslavia 6.4 percent of the respondents

No autonomous jurisdictions whatsoever 6.3 percent of the respondents

Independent state 4.2 percent of the respondents

Something else 4.5 percent of the respondents

I do not know 5.2 percent of the respondents

Source: Puzigaca Milka and Molnar, Aleksandar (2001), Istraživanje javnog mnenja: Autonomija Vojvodine, Novi Sad: SCAN, pp.1-19 (Sample size: 1,422 respondents).

Soon this trend was communicated to the political structures. At a first instance, the ‗Platform of the Serbian Democratic Opposition‘ (3 March 2000) included a clause according to which: ‗…a new Serbian Constitution must be inaugurated where the elaboration of forms of administrative autonomy for Kosovo and Vojvodina, on the grounds of the two provinces‘ historical and cultural particularities, is ensured‘ (Boarov, 2001: 240). The culmination of the entire process was the participation of Vojvodinian regionalists (the League and the Reformists), the Democratic Alliance of Vojvodina‘s Hungarians-VMSZ and Vojvodinian representatives of Serbian mainstream parties (Democratic Party-DS and Democratic Party of Serbia-DSS) in the October 2000 elections, under the umbrella of Demokratska Opozicija Srbije (Serbian Democratic Opposition).

The Omnibus law

The restitution of administrative competencies to Vojvodina immediately became one of the victorious coalition‘s policy debates. This debate brought back to the fore the cleavage between centralists and proponents of an asymmetric status for Vojvodina. The DS, led by the late Zoran Đinđić back then, stood on the fence and endorsed the devolution of part of the state‘s authority to Vojvodina in a number of areas (e.g. fiscal administration and management of minority issues), as long as these functions did not resemble the attributes of a state14. The League and the Reformists proposed a variety of projects whose common denominators were: a. the restitution of certain legislative and judicial competencies to the Vojvodinian

14


assembly; b. the concession of extensive fiscal autonomy to the province (LSV, 1999: 1-4; Radosavljević, 2001: 151-156). Vojislav Koštunica‘s DSS maintained a rather complicated stance. In principle, this party favoured centralization with some space for functional decentralization to the local-self government level (Mitrović 2002)15. Nevertheless, the DSS‘ ‗Basic Principles for the New Constitution of the Republic of Serbia‘ envisaged the formation of 6 regions with equal administrative competencies (Vojvodina included). These regions would be entitled to: a. have a say over which taxes should remain local and which should be directed towards the republican coffers; b. veto certain governmental measures that might infringe upon the jurisdiction of the regions (DSS 2001). Although the boundaries of the regional competencies were not precisely defined, still this proposal left plenty of space, at least on the programmatic level, for Serbia‘s symmetric regionalization. The DSS proposal, at that time, should be seen as part of a bargaining process inside DOS. Its objective was to counterbalance the Vojvodinian regionalists‘ insistence on the strengthening of their region‘s asymmetric status as well as the regionalists‘ intention to enhance their political capital in Vojvodina. Indeed, Vojvodinian regionalists viewed the DSS proposal with suspicion and interpreted it as an attempt to ‗disguise‘ a centralization project into symmetric regionalization. The joint inauguration of the Omnibus law by the Vojvodinian assembly and the Serbian parliament (4 February 2002) signified an attempt to bridge these conflicting standpoints. This document strengthened the Vojvodinian assembly‘s decision-making capacities in certain areas but in no way did it amount to a separate constitutional charter for the province. In this text, I briefly outline the law‘s provisions in the fields of fiscal autonomy and the management of minority issues. The Omnibus law enabled the Vojvodinian assembly to fund most of its projects in the fields of education, minority education and agriculture partially from the provincial and partially from the republican budget (Articles 12.7, 13.11, 17 and 42). The same document authorized the provincial organs to issue textbooks in the languages of the national minorities16 and allow for the arrangement of teaching programmes in the languages of ethnic minorities (Articles 12.4, 12.5, 12.8, 13.6 and 13.11). Meanwhile, the law authorized the provincial organs to guarantee the official use of the recognized languages and their alphabets throughout the province (Article 18, paragraphs 1 and 2). Nevertheless, the provisions of the law must always be implemented in compliance with the Serbian Constitution and the republican legislation (Articles 1, 2 and 3)17. The inauguration of the Omnibus law did not satisfy the entirety of Vojvodina‘s political spectrum. The League and other regionalist circles assessed that little would change with regard to the central government‘s control over Vojvodina‘s economic potential (Dnevnik, February 5th, 2002). Meanwhile, the Vojvodinian branch of the DSS reiterated that that the Vojvodinian question must be resolved within the bounds of a new Serbian Constitution and not separately (Ibid). In all of this, the importance of the Omnibus law lies in the following: It was the first time, since 1990, that the Vojvodinian assembly‘s executive council submitted a legal text on its administrative jurisdiction to the Serbian parliament and that text was approved.

The new Serbian Constitution and Vojvodina’s status

As stated in the Omnibus law‘s explanatory section, this document simply signified a step towards the inauguration of the new Serbian Constitution and the definitive settlement of Vojvodina‘s status18. In practice, however, this objective became entangled in the fuzzy and multifaceted web of geopolitics in the ex-Yugoslav space. The main areas of concern were: a. the redefinition of Serbian-Montenegrin relations; b. Kosovo‘s locus within Serbia since 1999. Especially with regard to the latter, Serbian policy-makers

15


concentrated their efforts on negotiations with the international community, hoping to secure Kosovo‘s maintenance within Serbia - while pending the definitive settlement of the province‘s status. Correspondingly, Serbian constitutional theorists and policy-makers started favouring centralized options for Serbia‘s regional restructuring with only some room for functional decentralization and limited financial autonomy (Radović, 2000: 30-48; Bačić, Mijatović, Simić and Radović, 2003). This dominant trend among Belgrade‘s political circles was also reflected in the new Serbian Constitution, which was inaugurated on 8 November 2006. At this point, it should be added that the period prior to the inauguration of the new Constitution also saw the drafting of certain proposals for Serbia‘s symmetric regionalization. For the purposes of this work, attention is paid to Pavle Nikolić‘s recommendations (Dnevnik, February 2nd, 2004). Nikolić, a constitutional theorist at Belgrade University, advocated for the dissolution of the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo and the establishment of 13 regions with equal competencies. As part of this arrangement, Vojvodina would be divided into the sub-regions of Srem, Banat and Bačka. Nikolić contended that symmetric regionalization would ensure the administrative autonomy of all Serbian regions whereas, on the contrary, asymmetric regionalization would generate inequalities and tensions. Especially the existence of the two autonomous provinces in Serbia was judged, by the author, as an out of date reminder of the 1946 arrangement. In a similar vein to the DSS proposal (2001), Nikolić called for the concession of an equal degree of fiscal autonomy to all regions plus their entitlement to veto certain governmental decisions that might prove detrimental to their jurisdiction. However, as result of functional considerations, the author proposed the formation of 13 regions instead of DSS‘ six. Nevertheless, the Serbian policy-makers‘ top objective remained the formal affirmation of Kosovo‘s locus (within its existing limits) inside the bounds of the Serbian republic. This amounted to no room for such ‗symmetric‘ considerations. Indeed, the Preamble of the Constitution defines Kosovo and Metohija as ‗an integral part of the territory of Serbia with substantial autonomy‘19. In addition to this, Part VII designates Kosovo, together with Vojvodina, as one of Serbia‘s autonomous provinces with all the rights and obligations prescribed (Articles 182-187). With specific regard to Vojvodina, Article 184.3 dictates that ‗the budget of the autonomous Province of Vojvodina shall amount to at least 7 percent in relation to the budget of the republic, bearing in mind that three-sevenths of the budget of the autonomous province of Vojvodina shall be used for financing the capital expenditures‘. This provision signifies a departure from the 1990 Constitution and establishes the preconditions for regulated fiscal autonomy. Nevertheless, Article 184 does not make it explicitly clear whether the autonomous provinces are allocated a right of taxation or not. In addition to this, Article 177 specifies that ‗local self-government units (opštine) shall be competent in those matters which may be realized, in an effective way, within a local self-government unit, and autonomous provinces in those matters which may be realized, in an effective way within an autonomous province‘. However, nowhere in the new Constitution are the relations within the triangular nexus that comprises the republican government, the autonomous provinces and the opštine precisely defined and regulated. This leads to the conclusion that the new Constitution informally strengthens local self-government in an attempt to counterbalance any potential aspirations by the autonomous provinces (namely Vojvodina) to enhance their status. The strengthening of local self-government has often formed part of the political bargaining, on the national governments‘ behalf, with the objective to place a check upon larger regional institutions (e.g. Spain in the 1980s). In the case of the new Serbian Constitution, this argument gains greater weight if the previous articles are read in combination with Article 97 which places the jurisdiction and operation of both autonomous provinces and opštine under the auspices of the republican government (once again, though, not clearly defined). Lastly, Article 182.3 allows for the establishment of new autonomous provinces if so

16


decided in a referendum. At this given moment, though, it is hard to predict how this clause might bring about a long-term ‗symmetricization‘ of Serbia‘s regionalization. In an overall assessment, the 2006 Serbian Constitution relatively enhances Vojvodina‘s control over its revenues but not Vojvodina‘s asymmetric status as such. In practice, the 2006 Constitution favours decentralization over asymmetric regionalization.

The new statute for Vojvodina and its significance

Rapid developments

As stated in the Omnibus law, Vojvodina‘s definitive status was to be settled by the new Constitution. Nevertheless, the 2006 Constitution informally favoured decentralization towards the local self-government units without clearly regulating the balance and the interrelations among different levels of authority (i.e. the republican government, the autonomous provinces and the opštine). This caused dissatisfaction among a variety of interest-groups in Vojvodina. As expected, this was particularly the case with the League of Vojvodina‘s Social Democrats and other regionalist groupings. As already stated, neither the League nor any other autonomaši (i.e. pro-autonomy) parties have been particularly popular in Vojvodina. This also became evident in the results of the May 2008 Vojvodinian elections, which were held simultaneously with the Serbian parliamentary ones ( see table 4). Table 4 The results of the May 2008 elections for Vojvodina’s assembly

Parties/Coalitions/Leaders Votes Percentage % For a European Vojvodina (DS and G17)-Boris Tadić

354,198 33.7

Serbian Radical Party-Tomislav Nikolić 310,559 29.6

Together for Vojvodina- Nenad Čanak 86,653 8.2

Hungarian Coalition-Istvan Pasztor 77,390 7.4

Democratic Party of Serbia & New Serbia-Vojislav Koštunica

59,248 5.7

Socialist Party of Serbia-Ivica Dačić 57,093 5.4 Liberal Democratic Party-Čedomir Jovanović

45,313 4.3

Civic Group ‘Maja Gojković’ 20,937 2.0 Vojvodina is Serbia’s Strength-Igor Kurjački

6,996 0.7

Turnout: 1,720,818 eligible voters Source: http://www.cesid.org

Nevertheless, the year 2008 saw radical realignments at the governmental level in Serbia. Since the early 1990s, Serbian elite politics have been dominated by short-term interests and characterized by a high degree of fragmentation and instability. Numerous coalitions have been formed and swiftly dissolved as result of conflicting standpoints, disagreements in decision-making and/or personal antipathies. This is what happened when Boris Tadić‘s and Vojislav Koštunica‘s positions on Kosovo‘s unilateral declaration of independence (17 February 2008) clashed; a disagreement which brought about the May 2008 elections. The fear of losing the elections to the Serbian Radical Party-SRS rendered the DS flexible even to alliances with the League and the Sandžak regionalists. The League‘s participation in the governing structures after May 2008, enhanced this party‘s bargaining potential with regard to the reinforcement of Vojvodina‘s asymmetric

http://www.cesid.org/

17


status. To this objective, Čanak and his associates were also encouraged by indications that the popular mood in Vojvodina has been constantly swinging towards asymmetric or highly-devolved options (NVO Diferentija Niš, 2009: 14; Lazar, 2007: 51-60).

Serbia’s regionalization and the EU

Moving to the ‗external front‘, Serbia‘s path towards the EU has always been paved with obstacles. Since 2000, the pressures on the Serbian government to cooperate with the Hague Tribunal have generated tensions between the two sides. This led to the suspension of the EU-Serbia negotiations (3 May 2006). Radovan Karadžić‘s arrest (21 July 2008) reopened the way to Serbia‘s accession to the European structures. This culminated with the country‘s formal application to the EU (22 December 2009). EU advisors have not exerted overt and intense pressures on Serbia with regard to Vojvodina‘s status and regionalization per se. As a matter of fact, no universally agreed-upon and binding ‗European‘ guidelines on regionalization are in force at the first place. In 1997, the Council of Europe issued the Draft European Charter on Regional Self-Government. This signified an attempt to introduce some universal standards on the implementation of regionalization and the allocation of administrative capacities to regional authorities. Nevertheless, this draft charter was never officially approved due to the objections, by certain COE and EU member-states, to its prerogatives. So, it has simply maintained a ‗framework value‘. In spite of this, though, the Council of Europe and certain bodies operating under the umbrella of the EU have highlighted the necessity for European states to: a. devolve part of their authority towards the regional and local self-government levels, in a balanced and coordinated manner; b. reach a modus vivendi over the percentage of the regional revenues channeled towards the central coffers. With specific regard to Vojvodina, these guidelines gain particular significance considering that Vojvodina is a rich agricultural region which has been participating in a number of EU-sponsored cross-border cooperation schemes (e.g. the Banat Euro-region – Petsinis, 2007). Despite the absence of any serious pressures on Belgrade, the EU‘s informal engagement with regard to Serbia‘s regionalization and Vojvodina‘s status has been rather active. EU advisors held a series of meetings with their Serbian counterparts. In the course of these sessions, the former outlined to the latter the benefits of enhancing Vojvodina‘s administrative competencies in the light of Serbia‘s accession to the European structures. EU advisors particularly highlighted that the extension of the province‘s capacities can contribute to the more efficient management of ethnic relations ‗at the spot‘. They stressed that, at this given moment, this can also facilitate Vojvodina‘s fruitful participation in a number of EU-sponsored cross-border cooperation schemes. Lastly, they underlined that, in the long term, the strengthening of the administrative institutions in Vojvodina can operate as an efficient medium towards the management and distribution of the Structural Funds. Coming back to the ‗internal front‘, a number of DS policy-makers in Belgrade and Novi Sad started regarding allegations over ‗secessionist‘ trends in Vojvodina as rather exaggerated. Unlike Kosovo or Montenegro, no projects towards the appropriation of a core Vojvodinian identity, antagonistic to the Serbian one, were ever engineered in Vojvodina. Neither did the ethnic Hungarian demands for ethno-territorial autonomy ever reach the stage of radicalization20. This encouraged DS policy-makers to adopt a more positive outlook on the restitution of certain competencies to the Vojvodinian assembly, in an attempt to: a. placate the EU and enhance Serbia‘s prospects for accession to the Union; b. respond to the popular demands in Vojvodina for the reinforcement of the province‘s status. With regard to the former objective,

18


the more favourable disposition, on the Belgrade bureaucrats‘ behalf, towards the restitution of autonomous competencies to Vojvodina has been greeted with satisfaction in Brussels. This is reflected in the positive remarks that Serbia‘s regionalization process has received in the recent EU progress-reports (European Commission, 2009 and 2010).

The new statute The outcome of the intersection between domestic and external catalysts was the inauguration of a new statute for Vojvodina. The draft version of this document was ready, as early as mid-August 2008 (Dnevnik, August 21st, 2008). The drafting board comprised Vojvodinian DS-affiliates, local academics and constitutional theorists involved in pro-autonomy workshops (e.g. the Novi Sad Centre for Regionalism). The Vojvodinian assembly approved this document after a heated session on 15 October 200821. As Bojan Pajtić, a DS-member and president of the executive council at Vojvodina‘s assembly, stated: ‗The Communist-era system of autonomies was embedded in an one-party state structure….The new statute brings about a novel concept of autonomy, always considering that Vojvodina aspires to become a European region and have more effective control over its resources‘ (Građanski List, October 15th, 2008). Nevertheless, not everybody shared this state of euphoria. A number of DSS and SRS deputies voiced their dissatisfaction with the draft statute and regarded it as ‗unconstitutional‘ and a document which builds up a ‗state within a state‘ (Politika, October 15th, 2008; Radio-televizija Vojvodine, October 15th, 2008). As a matter of fact, the objections by a considerable segment of Belgrade‘s political elites (including some DS-affiliates too)22 to the draft statute delayed this document‘s ratification by the Serbian parliament for nearly a year. The approval process commenced on 24 November 2009, and the statute was finally approved by the Serbian parliament on 30 November23. Of all amendments, a number of amendments proposed by the Socialists were accepted (Radio-televizija Srbije, November 30th, 2009). The statute was officially proclaimed on 14 December 2009, in Novi Sad and put into force on 1 January 2010. In accordance with Article 185 of the Constitution, this document is formally designated as a statute and not a separate constitutional act. In practice, however, the new statute concedes numerous competencies to the Vojvodinian assembly. In this text, I single out the crucial innovations that the new statute introduces. Article 33 designates the Vojvodinian assembly as the ‗highest organ and the institution with norm-setting powers in the autonomous province of Vojvodina‘. Article 47 designates the government at the Vojvodinian assembly as the highest executive organ. The use of the term government instead of ‗executive council,‘ which was in force until recently, implies an upgraded status – if only at the symbolic level. Article 34 authorizes the assembly to have its say on constitutional amendments that can have an impact on Vojvodina. Article 18 authorizes either the Vojvodinian assembly or government to appeal to the Constitutional Court in the event that a republican law infringes upon the statute. Although Article 34 does not concede separate legislative competencies to the assembly (except issuing the statute plus certain declarations and resolutions of regional significance), the two aforementioned provisions are of great significance since they safeguard the premises of the province‘s autonomy. Another significant provision is the provincial ombudsman with the task to supervise the proper implementation of the statute and other relevant legislation (Article 61). As far as judicial autonomy is concerned, Article 34 authorizes the assembly to organize the network of courts throughout Vojvodina. A question of vital importance has been the financial one. Article 62 reiterates the clause with regard to the ratio between the Vojvodinian and the republican budget, as stated in Article 184.3 of the Constitution. Article 63 enables Vojvodina to: a. finance projects within its territory from the provincial budget; b. have

19


its own taxation system. Nevertheless, the same article dictates that it must be implemented in accordance with a special law on Vojvodina‘s finances. This law, which has not been in force yet, is to be adopted jointly by the Vojvodinian and the republican assemblies. In principle, Articles 62 and 63 provide plenty of space for financial autonomy (especially if read jointly with Article 11 on provincial property and Article 12 on agricultural produce). Nevertheless, the cleavage between regionalists and centralists is always likely to resurface and, as happened with the statute, delay the ratification of the special law on finances. Coming back to the statute, an additional financial provision of major importance is Vojvodina‘s authorization to establish its regional bank (Articles 29 and 34). Moreover, Article 16 specifies that Vojvodina can: a. sign agreements on financial cooperation with foreign agents in its own right; b. have its representatives in Brussels24 and other European regions. The former clause reads like a ‗reformulated reminder‘ of certain provisions in the 1974 Vojvodinian Constitution which also enabled the province to arrange financial deals with foreign agents. The new statute significantly enhances the protection of minority rights and enables provincial organs to manage this issue ‗at the spot‘. The statute‘s preamble upgrades the collective status of national minorities to that of national communities (nacionalne zajednice). Articles 6 and 7: a. reaffirm Vojvodina‘s multiethnic physiognomy and equality among all ethnic groups; b. provide for the implementation of positive discrimination with the aim to safeguard minority identities. Article 23 reaffirms the dual dimension of minority rights (i.e. individual as well as collective), whereas Article 26 safeguards the use of minority languages in education and public information. An institutional provision of major importance is the establishment of a Council for National Communities at the assembly (Article 40). This 30-member body is to: a. consist of representatives of the largest minorities in Vojvodina; b. concentrate on the implementation of the clauses on minority education, cultural activities and the official use of minority languages. Similar provisions were included in the Law for the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities which was inaugurated in February 2002 within the framework of the Serbian-Montenegrin loose federation (Petsinis, 2003: 8-11). Therefore, it seems that the statute‘s drafting committee modified and incorporated certain of this law‘s guidelines to their document. Finally, Article 17 sets the preconditions for the establishment of the Vojvodinian Academy of Sciences-VANU. Throughout this arrangement, the statute stresses its locus within Serbia‘s constitutional framework and reaffirms Vojvodina as an indivisible part of Serbia (Articles 1 and 64)25. As one might expect, the new statute did not leave everybody satisfied. In the one end of the spectrum, DSS and SRS representatives, as well as certain constitutional theorists, interpreted the statute as a document which concedes Vojvodina nearly the attributes of a state (Glas Javnosti, November 25th, 2009). Particularly bitter were the reactions of pro-centralists with regard to Vojvodina‘s designation as a ‗European region‘ (Article 1), its authorization to cooperate with other European regions, fiscal autonomy and the establishment of VANU. Nevertheless, all these allegations are exaggerated. The designation ‗European region‘ implies that Vojvodina is a region where European civic values prevail; not a separate entity within Europe. Moreover, there is nothing unconstitutional with Article 16 on foreign cooperation since the very same provision is included in Article 181 of the Constitution. As far as financial autonomy is concerned, public surveys indicate that this is a demand shared among almost the entirety of Vojvodina‘s citizenry and not exclusively the regionalists. This is not hard to grasp, taking into consideration the mismanagement of the province‘s revenues, by the central government, during the 1990s. Lastly, regional academic associations operate in various European states; whether unitary (France), federal (Germany) or ‘regionalized‘ (Italy). In the opposite end of the spectrum, the League and other autonomaši complained that the new statute does not really touch on legislative and judicial powers; neither does it resolve the financial question (Dnevnik,

20


October 16th, 2009). As a matter of fact, the 1974 system of autonomies still serves as a compass for many Vojvodinian autonomists albeit not openly admitted. Nevertheless, the ideological keystone of the 1974 arrangement was Marxist historicism and the Yugoslav Communists‘ conviction that national affiliations would wither away as soon as a classless society was set up. Correspondingly, Vojvodinian autonomy was legitimized through ambiguous references to a variety of collectivities such as ‗the working people‘, ‗the nations and nationalities‘ and ‗the self-managed communes‘, all of which are now out of date. The concession of extensive legislative and judicial powers to Vojvodina, along the lines of the 1974 arrangement, might lead to Serbia‘s confederalization. The introduction of such parallel structures is not something that a small and not particularly wealthy state like Serbia could afford. This argument gains greater weight, considering Serbia‘s ‗state-shrinkage‘ after the dissolution of the Serbian-Montenegrin state union and the apparent loss of Kosovo. As it occurred in Spain during the 1980s, there is also serious possibility that such an option would anger other Serbian regions who might protest that Vojvodina gets much more than it deserves.

General assessment and compatibility with European standards

In an overall assessment, the new statute comes to fill in the aforementioned gaps and ambiguities in the 2006 Constitution. In other words, it precisely stipulates the limits of Vojvodina‘s legislative and judicial jurisdiction as well as the boundaries of its financial autonomy. It also sets in context the qualitative differences between regional autonomy, as applied in Vojvodina‘s case, from decentralization to the local self -government level in the rest of Serbia. The joint adoption of the statute and other relevant legislation (e.g. the law on finances), by the Vojvodinian and the republican assemblies, enhances the status of the former. So do the safeguards from any infringement, by the central government, upon the Vojvodinian assembly‘s jurisdiction (Articles 18 and 34). The new statute‘s clauses for the protection of minority rights set up a more ‗regionalized‘ infrastructure for dealing with ethnic issues ‗at the spot‘. Moreover, the regulation of certain financial and infrastructural issues by the provincial organs acquires a higher importance within the framework of Vojvodina‘s participation in EU-sponsored cross-border cooperation schemes. Indeed, centralized decision-making has been one of the additional reasons to account for the malfunction of numerous Euro-regions throughout Central and Eastern Europe. The new statute is compatible with the European standards on contemporary regionalization. For the purposes of this work, attention is paid to the guidelines of the Draft European Charter on Regional Self-Government (Council of Europe, 1997). This may not be a legally-binding document but still has a ‗framework value‘ for setting up some basic standards on the devolution of authority towards the regional level within the European space. For a start, the new statute is consistent with the draft charter‘s clauses which: a. affirm the locus of regional institutions within the administrative and constitutional frameworks of the state that they belong to (Draft European Charter on Regional Self-Government, Preamble, Article 8); b. encourage inter-regional cooperation throughout the Continent (Ibid, Preamble, Article 11). In accordance with Article 1.2 of the draft charter, the new statute precisely defines the scope of regional self-government for Vojvodina. This is equally the case with regard to the designation of the regional competencies, the affirmation of their free function and assignment to the regional bodies responsible (Ibid, Articles 4, 12.1 and 12.2). Furthermore, the new statute: a. authorizes Vojvodina to participate in decision-making processes of vital interest, at the macro-political level (Ibid, Article 9.1); b. guarantees its representation in the relevant European institutions (Ibid, Article 10.1). As far as finance and the management of regional resources is

21


concerned, the new statute: a. precisely specifies the boundaries of Vojvodina‘s financial autonomy (Ibid, Article 14); b. establishes a regional taxation system (Ibid, Article 15). Lastly, the new statute safeguards the boundaries of Vojvodina‘s autonomy and the regional ombudsman functions as an adequate supervisory mechanism (Ibid, Articles 16, 17 and 19). At this point it is useful to add that, with specific regard to the protection of minority rights, the new statute is consistent with the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Council of Europe, 1995). This is particularly the case regarding: a. the designation of minority rights as both individual and collective (Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Article 3.2); b. the statute‘s clauses on the provision of education in minority languages, at all levels (Ibid, Articles 12.1-2 and 14.2); c. the free function of media in the minority languages (Ibid, Articles 6.1 and 9.3). Especially Article 40 of the new statute and its authorization for the formation of the minority council at Vojvodina‘s assembly can bring about fruitful results if this body coordinates its activities properly with larger institutions at the republican level (i.e. the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights, or the National Minorities‘ Council at the Serbian parliament).

Instead of a conclusion

The new statute for Vojvodina was drafted and came into force with a rather long delay, amidst what has been seen as Serbia‘s ‗state-shrinkage‘. As has been the case in other European states, the statute concedes a number of competencies to the province within a formally unitary constitutional structure. With regard to the extent of autonomous jurisdictions, one might argue that the new statute somewhat resembles more closely the arrangement for the ‗special‘ Italian regions. In principle, this document strengthens Vojvodina‘s asymmetric status within Serbia and comes to fill in certain ambiguities in the 2006 Constitution. It is also consistent with the European standards and guidelines on the devolution of state‘s authority to the regional level (e.g. the Draft European Charter on Regional Self-Government). The traumatic experience of the 1990s has rendered the safeguard of Vojvodina‘s autonomous jurisdiction an imperative. Furthermore, it is essential that the Vojvodinian assembly inaugurates legal measures of direct importance to the province (e.g. its statute and other relevant legislation) jointly with the republican parliament and not under full subordination to the latter. Especially the concession of fiscal autonomy to Vojvodina is an urgent necessity, in order to reverse the aftermath of economic mismanagement during the 1990s. This is equally valid with regard to the management of minority issues on a more regionalized basis and ‗at the spot‘. As already stated, the new statute is also consistent with COE‘s Framework Convention on the Rights of National Minorities. Provisions such as the Council for National Communities at the Vojvodinian assembly can operate as a viable and effective alternative for the coordinated resolution of questions with ethnic implications on a neutral ground. This provision can function even more effectively, if implemented jointly with Article 63 of the Serbian Law on Local Self-Government (2002) and its authorization for the formation of the ‗councils for interethnic relations‘ in ethnically-mixed localities26.If properly implemented, this medium can sideline the demands for ethno-territorial autonomy as these have been voiced by Vojvodina‘s ethnic Hungarian parties. Indeed, the implementation of the ethno-territorial option in a richly multiethnic region such as Vojvodina could, in the long term: a. jeopardize relations between ethnic Hungarians and Serbs (also, other groups); b. result in the formation of ‗ethnically-clean zones‘ and the disappearance of intercultural cohabitation27. Public surveys have demonstrated that the establishment of ethno-territorial

22


autonomy for ethnic Hungarians in Northern Bačka is not met with approval by Vojvodina‘s national minorities; including a considerable percentage of Vojvodinian Hungarians too (see table 5). Lastly, the regulation of financial and infrastructural issues by the provincial organs can prove beneficial to Vojvodina‘s participation in EU cross-border cooperation projects – thus enhancing the province‘s contribution towards Serbia‘s ‗return to Europe‘. In all of this, it is an imperative that the clauses of the new statute are implemented properly. Especially the inauguration of the special law on Vojvodina‘s finances must not be delayed. Therefore, it is essential that the proponents of centralization in Serbia adopt a more moderate stance. As earlier outlined, centralization is one more pattern of regional organization which has been applied all over the Continent. Nevertheless, the implementation of a strictly centralized arrangement with regard to Vojvodina would prove counterproductive; always considering the province‘s recent political experience and its present needs. The new statute certainly does not concede ‗state attributes‘ to Vojvodina and allegations over separatist trends in the province are exaggerated. Unlike, say, Montenegro, in Vojvodina we never had to do with the attempt by regional elites to engineer and institutionalize a distinct ‗Vojvodinian‘ pattern of group-identification for the inhabitants of the province. Table 5 What do you think of the initiative to establish ethno-territorial autonomy for the Hungarians resident in the municipalities of Ada, Bačka Topola, Bečej, Čoka, Kanjiz, Mali Idoš, Subotica, Kneževac and Senta?

National affiliation This is a bad initiative

This is a good initiative, provided that it focuses specifically on the equality of the Hungarian community in Vojvodina

This is a good initiative

I do not know

Serbs 81.6 percent of the respondents




Croats 51.6 percent of the respondents




Hungarians 33.9 percent of the respondents




Montenegrins 68.2 percent of the respondents



Slovaks 55.1 percent of the respondents




Romanians 41.2 percent of the respondents




Ruthenes 33.3 percent of the respondents



Others 67.7 percent of the respondents




Source: Puzigaca and Molnar, (2001), p.16.

Finally, it is of primary importance that regional institutions operate with transparency. In other words, the Italian precedent of political clientelism propagated via regional institutions (especially in the south) must serve as an example not to follow. As an epilogue, this study can contribute valuable material to academic research on regionalization within the European space. First and foremost, the lion‘s share of the research on contemporary regionalization has concentrated on the Western part of the Continent. Moreover, even this research that has been carried out on Post-Communist Europe has mainly focused on the ethno-

23


territorial dimension of regional autonomy (e.g. Buček 2003). In this light, the findings of this study can be of particular interest to academics engaged into research in regionalization in Central and Eastern Europe, especially considering that calls for regional autonomy in Vojvodina have been essentially voiced on a trans-ethnic regional basis. In addition to these, the findings of this study are particularly useful in the light of Serbia‘s accession to the EU. In other words, this work demonstrates how and to what extent a Post-Communist country aspiring for EU membership conforms, at least on a normative basis, to European standards on regionalization (also, protection of minority rights). This, in turn, can add its contribution to comparative projects between cases of regionalization in different parts of the Continent whose political experience has not been the same.

Notes 1 Within certain contexts, regionalism has been conterminous with mini-nationalism. This has been the case in Spain (e.g. Catalonia) and France (e.g. Corsica and Brittany). 2 These regions are Sicily, Sardinia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Aosta Valley and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. For more on the origins of Italian regionalization, see: Segre, 1979: 133-142. 3 In Spain, Madrid concedes 30 percent of regionally-raised income to the Basque country and Catalonia, since the mid-1990s. 4 On the competencies of the federated Länder in Germany, for instance, see: Keating, 1998:113. 5 On the case of Istrian regionalism in Croatia, see Ashbrook, 2006. 6 On the case of Slovakia, for instance, see: Buček, 2003. 7 On this issue, see also Article 292 of the Vojvodinian Constitution as cited in: SAP Vojvodina 1974. 8 On these issues, see: Articles 109-112, in ‗Ustav Republike Srbije‘, Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, broj 1/90. 9 Interview with the manager of Novi Sad-based refugee NGO, (12 March 2001). 10 With regard to the ‗colonists‘, the wars in the ‗ancestral territories‘ of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina saw the emergence of nationalistic

trends within this segment, during the first half of the 1990s. A notable percentage of ‗colonists‘ joined the regular as well as the irregular Serbian units in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. For more on the nationalist orientation among ‗colonists,‘ see: Vrkatić, 2000: 129; Interview with SRS functionary in Novi Sad (1 April 2002). Nevertheless, as consequence of their Communist Partisan origins, a considerable percentage of ‘colonists‘ embraced the Communist Party principles on Vojvodinian autonomy. For instance, many leading Vojvodinian regionalists (e.g. Nenad Čanak himself) come from a ‗colonist‘ background and public surveys have demonstrated powerful pro-autonomy tendencies in certain

‗colonist‘ parts of Novi Sad (Interview with historian at the University of Novi Sad, 13 March 2001; Interview with representative of Vojvodina‘s Reformists, 20 March 2001). 11 According to a micro-survey, only 2 out of the 28 anti-autonomy narodni mitinzi (‗people‘s meetings‘) were held in Vojvodinian localities with a majority ‗old settler‘ population during the ‗anti-bureaucratic revolution‘. On this issue, see: Kerčov, Radoš and Raić 1990. This, however, does not mean that there were not any anti-autonomy tendencies within this segment. On this issue, see: Vrkatić 2000: 129. Also, see certain excerpts in Popov, 1991: 66-70. Čedomir Popov is an ‘old-settler‘ historian with a particularly negative outlook on the system of autonomies within the old Yugoslavia. 12 On the increase of intermarriage between ‗colonists‘ and ‗old settlers,‘ since the late 1950s, see: Đurić, 1960: 17-18, 33-34, 77, 90; Živkov, 1974: 152-154. Also, by 1991, 8.4 percent of Vojvodina‘s inhabitants would identify themselves as ‗Yugoslavs‘, still the highest percentage throughout the crumbling federation. Many ‗Yugoslavs‘ were the offspring of ethnically-mixed marriages. Especially in 8 municipalities, individuals declaring that identity made up 10 percent or more of the local population. On this issue, see: Savezni Zavod za Statistiku 1992. 13 Interview with sociologist, University of Belgrade; (18 November 2005). 14 For some information about the DS‘ stance on Vojvodina‘s status up to date, see the party‘s programme at: http://www.ds.org.rs/dokumenti/ds-program.pdf. 15 Some further information over this issue was disclosed to the author in the course of his field research in Vojvodina (Interview with DSS functionary in Novi Sad, 15 March 2001). 16 The minority languages with a recognized legal status in Vojvodina are the following: Hungarian, Slovak, Romanian, Croatian and Ruthene/Rysyn. 17 For a full text-version of the Omnibus law (including an explanatory section), see: http://www.vojvodina.com/prilozi/omnibus.html . 18 On this issue, see: ‗Razloži za Donosenje Zakona i Ciljevi koji se Ostvaruju‘, Omnibus Zakon, December 14th, 2001. 19 For a full text-version of the 2006 Serbian Constitution, see: ‗Ustav Republike Srbije‘ in Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, br. 98/06. For a commentary on the Constitution, see: Venice Commission 2006.

http://www.ds.org.rs/dokumenti/ds-program.pdf

http://www.vojvodina.com/prilozi/omnibus.html

24


20 Since the early 1990s, both the VMSZ and the Democratic Community of Vojvodina‘s Hungarians-VMDK, have been lobbying for the concession of ethno-territorial autonomy to 10 opštine in Northern Bačka where the ethnic Hungarian concentration is particularly dense. On this issue, see: VMDK 1992; VMSZ 1996. 21The 89 deputies of the DS-spearheaded governing coalition at the Vojvodinian assembly voted in favour of the new statute. Meanwhile, the 21 DSS and SRS deputies voted against. On this issue, see: BBC Srpski, October 15th, 2008. 22 On this issue, see: Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia Briefings, no 51, December 2009 (http://www.helsinki.org.rs). 23 The 137 deputies of the ruling coalition voted in favour of the new statute, whereas 24 deputies from the DSS and New Serbia voted against. The SRS deputies abstained from the procedure. On this issue, see: Večernje Novosti, November 30th, 2009. 24 It should be borne in mind that, since 2002, Vojvodina has been participating in the Assembly of European Regions in Brussels. This is an independent network and interest-association of regions. 25 For a full text-version of the statute, see: ‘Statut Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine‘ at: http://www.vojvodina.gov.rs . 26 On this issue, see the English-language version of the law at: http://www.osce.org . 27 Interview with sociologist, University of Belgrade; (18 November 2005).

References Ashbrook, J. (2006). „Locking Horns in the Istrian Political Arena: Politicized Identity, the Istrian Democratic

Assembly and the Croatian Democratic Alliance.‟ East European Politics and Societies 20(4): 622-658. Buček, Jan (2003), ‟Balancing Functional and Ethnic Regionalization: The Case of Slovakia‟, in Michael Keating and

James Hughes (eds.), The Regional Challenge in Central and Eastern Europe: Territorial Restructuring and European Integration, Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang.

Bačić Zoran, Mijatović Boško , Simić Aleksandarand Radović, Zorica (2003), Regionalizacija Srbije, Belgrade:

Centar za Liberalno-demokratske Studije Publikacije. Batt, Judy and Wolczuk, Kataryna (2002), Region, State and Identity in Central and Eastern Europe, London-

Portland: Frank Kass. Boarov, Dimitrije (2001), Politička Istorija Vojvodine, Novi Sad: Matica Srpska. Brubaker, Rogers (1995), „National Minorities, Nationalizing States and External Homelands in the New Europe‟,

Daedalus, 124, 2, pp.107-132. Council of Europe (1997), Draft European Charter on Regional Self-Government, Brussels. Council of Europe (1995), Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Brussels. Demokratska Stranka Srbije (2001), Osnovna načela za novi Ustav Republike Srbije, Belgrade. Dnevnik, October 16th, 2009: A statement by Nenad Čanak on the new statute for Vojvodina. „DS: Novi statut Vojvodine,‟ Dnevnik, August 21st, 2008. „DSS i SRS nude svoje verzije Statuta,‟ Radio-televizija Vojvodine, October 15th,2008. Đurić, Vladimir (1960), Najnovije naseljavanje Bačke kolonistama iz Hrvatske, Novi Sad: Matica Srpska. Elazar, Daniel J. (1979), „The Role of Federalism in Political Integration‟, in Daniel J. Elazar (ed.), Federalism and

Political Integration, Jerusalem: Institute for Federal Studies.

http://www.helsinki.org.rs/

http://www.vojvodina.gov.rs/

http://www.osce.org/

25


Escobalherrero, Patricia (2001), „Territorial Organisation of the State‟, in Open University Subotica, Essays on Regionalization, Subotica: Agency for Local Democracy.

European Commission, Serbia 2009 Progress Report, SEC (2009) 1339. European Commission, Serbia 2010 Progress Report, SEC (2010) 1330. Glas Javnosti, November 25th, 2009: A statement by Slobodan Samardžić (DSS vice-president) on the new statute

for Vojvodina. Golubović, Zagorka (et al) (1995), Društveni karakter i društvene promene u svetlu nacionalnih sukoba, Belgrade:

Filip Višnjić. Kahn, R.H. (1983), The Multinational Empire: Nationalism and National Reform in the Habsburg Empire (1848-

1918), vol. 2, New York: Octagon. Keating, Michael (2004), Regions and Regionalism in Europe, Cheltenham: Elgar. Keating, Michael (1988), State and Regional Nationalism, Cheltenham: Elgar. Keating, Michael (2003), „Territorial Restructuring and European Integration‟, in Michael Keating and James

Hughes (eds.), The Regional Challenge in Central and Eastern Europe: Territorial Restructuring and European Integration, Brussels: P.I.E.-Peter Lang.

Keating, Michael (1998), The New Regionalism in Western Europe, Cheltenham: Elgar. Kerčov Sava, Radoš Jovo and Raić, Aleksandar (1990), Mitinzi u Vojvodini 1988. godine – rađanje političkog

pluralizma, Novi Sad: Matica Srpska. Komšić, Jovan (2001), „Unitary or Asymmetric Regionalism? – An Insight into the Autonomy of Vojvodina within

the Concepts of Regionalization in Serbia‟, in Open University Subotica, Essays on Regionalization, Subotica: Agency for Local Democracy.

Končar, Ranko (1995), Opozicione partije i autonomija Vojvodine 1929-1941, Novi Sad: Matica Srpska. Kovačević, Milivoj (1973), „Normativna Funkcija Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine u Razdoblju 1945-1968 Godine,‟

Zbornik za Društvene Nauke, 58, pp.87-118. Lazar, Zsolt (2007), Vojvodina amidst Multiculturality and Regionalization, Novi Sad: Mediterran Publishing. „Lažni legalizam je pobedio: Intervju s Pavlom Nikolićem,‟ Dnevnik, February 2nd, 2004. Liga Socijal-Demokrata Vojvodine (1999), Republika Vojvodina: Put mira, razvoja i stabilnosti, Novi Sad. Mitrović, Milovan (2002), ‟Politika Demokratske Stranke Srbije u Vojvodini‟, at: http://www.dssns.org.rs . „Novi Statut Vojvodine,‟ BBC Srpski, October 15th, 2008. „Novi statut Vojvodine-novo jutro ili nova država?‟ Politika, October 15th, 2008. NVO Diferentija Niš (2009), Istraživanje o stavovima građana regiona Srbije prema toleranciji, suočavanju s

prošlošću, decentralizaciji, i prepoznavaju osnovnih demokratskih vrednosti, Niš. Obradović, Marija (1999), „Vladajuća stranka: Ideologija i tehnologija dominacije‟, in Various authors, Srpska strana

rata, Budapest: CEU Press.

26


Petsinis, Vassilis (2008), „Serbs and Ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina: Ethnic Conflict Placed within a Framework beyond Groupism,‟ Slovak Sociological Review, 40, 3, pp.258-277.

Petsinis, Vassilis (2007), „The Banat Euro-Region: Prospects and Obstacles,‟ in New Europe College and Goethe

Institute Bucharest, The Borders of Europe, Bucharest: University of Bucharest Publishing. Petsinis, Vassilis (2003), „Vojvodina‟s National Minorities: Current Realities and Future Prospects,‟ Spaces of

Identity, vol. 3[1].2, pp.1-37. Pihler, Stanko (2000), „Autonomija Vojvodine u Regionalizovanoj Evropi i Demokratskoj Srbiji,‟ in Centar za

Regionalizam, Ustavno-Pravni Okvir Decentralizacije Srbije i Autonomije Vojvodine, Novi Sad: Centar za Regionalizam Publikacije.

Popov, Čedomir (1991), Autonomija Vojvodine – Srpsko Pitanje, Novi Sad: Matica Srpska. Popov, Jelena (1974), „Glavni narodnooslobodilački odbor Vojvodine 1939-1945,‟ Istraživanje, 4, pp.405-413. „Poslanička većina podržala statut Vojvodine,‟ Građanski List, October 15th, 2008. „Prošla autonomija,‟ Večernje Novosti, November 30th, 2009. Radović, Zorica (2000), „Srbija kao država regiona‟, in Forum za Etničke Odnose, Prinčipi ustavne deklaracije,

Belgrade: Forum za Etničke Odnose Publikacije. Rokkan Stein and Urwin, David (eds.) (1982), The Politics of Territorial Integrity: Studies in European

Regionalism, London: Sage. SAP Vojvodina (1974), Ustav Socijalističke Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine, Belgrade: Savremena Administracija. Savezni Zavod za Statistiku (1992, Nacionalni sastav stanovništva po opštinama, Belgrade. Segre, D.V (1979), „Regionalism in Italy – An International Conflict Internalised‟, in Daniel J. Elazar (ed.),

Federalism and Political Integration, Jerusalem: Institute for Federal Studies. „Ustav Republike Srbije,‟ Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, broj 1/90, January 1990. „Ustav Republike Srbije,‟ Službeni Glasnik Republike Srbije, br. 98/06. „Usvojen statut Vojvodine,‟ Radio-televizija Srbije, November 30th, 2009. Venice Commission (2006), Opinion on the Constitution of Serbia. VMDK (1992), Memorandum on Self-Administration of Hungarians Living in the Republic of Serbia. VMSZ (1996), Proposal for an Agreement on the Self-Organization of Hungarians in Vojvodina (The Concept of the

Alliance of Hungarians in Vojvodina). „Vojvodina je dobra vest za Srbiju,‟ Dnevnik, February 5th, 2002. „Vojvodina‟s statute: First major step towards modernization and decentralization‟ in Helsinki Committee for Human

Rights in Serbia Briefings, no 51, December 2009. Vrkatić, Lazar (2000), „Srbi u Vojvodini i njihov državno-pravni osnov‟, in Sociološki Pregled, XXXIV, 3-4, pp.109-

131 Vucinich, Wayne S. (1967), „The Serbs in Austria-Hungary‟, Austrian History Yearbook, 3:2, pp.3-47.

27


Wöelk, Jens (2001), „From Ethnic Minority Protection to Cohabitation,‟ in Open University Subotica, Essays on

Regionalization, Subotica: Agency for Local Democracy. Živkov, Sava (1974), „Oblici socijalne integracije u dva kolonistička sela u Banatu: Stajićevo i Lukićevo‟, in Various

authors, Priloži za poznavanje naselja i naseljavanja Vojvodine, Novi Sad: Matica Srpska, pp.107-167.

Internet websites http://www.ds.org.rs : The DS website. http://www.dssns.org.rs : The website of the DSS Novi Sad branch. http://www.helsinki.org.rs : The website of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. http://www.lsv.org.rs : The website of the League of Vojvodina‟s Social Democrats. http://www.spacesofidentity.net : The website of Spaces of Identity (an electronic journal of Central East European interest – published jointly by the University of Vienna and York University in Canada). http://www.osce.org : The website of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. http://www.venice.coe.int : The website of the Venice Commission at the Council of Europe. http://www.vojvodina.com/prilozi /omnibus.htm: A full text-version of the 2001 Omnibus law on Vojvodina at: http://www.vojvodina.com (a website of general Vojvodinian interest). http://www.vojvodina.gov.rs : The website of the assembly of the autonomous province of Vojvodina.

Appendix Table 3b What kind of status should Vojvodina enjoy?

The existing status 13.9 percent of the respondents

Economic, political and cultural autonomy within the Republic of Serbia


Republic within the State‘s Union of Serbia and Montenegro


Independent state 0.8 percent of the respondents Source: Lazar Zsolt and Stepanov, Radivoj (2003), ‗Odnos Vojvođana prema ustavnopravnom statusu Vojvodine‘, in Kultura u proćesima razvoja, regionalizacije i Evrointegracije Balkana, (unpublished paper), University of Niš (Institute of Sociology), (Sample size: 516 respondents).

28


29


The role of national parliaments in the European decision-making process after the Treaty of Lisbon

The EU early-warning system for subsidiarity control

Corina Turşie1 & Ciprian Niţu West University of Timişoara, Romania

E-mail:

[email protected]

[email protected]

Received:15 March 2011

Accepted:20 May 2011

Abstract: The Lisbon Treaty introduced an early-warning mechanism for subsidiarity control, which formally gave an institutional procedure to enforce the subsidiarity principle. This mechanism has been developed as a way to increase the national parliaments input in the European system of governance, but, beyond that formal competence, the system proves to be of little practical relevance because it presents some weaknesses and does not bring a relevant shift inside the traditional institutional triangle designed for making decisions for the EU. The method used to reach such a conclusion is the analysis of the early-warning system for subsidiarity along four key elements of an efficient mechanism of risk prevention.

Keywords: Early-Warning System, European Union, national parliaments, subsidiarity

Introduction

Being the current functioning framework of the European Union (EU) the Treaty of Lisbon: ―will reinforce the democratic nature of the European Union. First, thanks to the efforts of the European Parliament, there is now a clear definition of what European citizenship means. Second, The Reform Treaty also gives legal force to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which will be a central part of the system of checks and balances in our Union of law. Third, the European Parliament will have a greater role in the legislative process of the Union. The fourth democratic advance introduced by the Reform Treaty regards the rights of national parliaments, which will reinforce the principles of accountability and subsidiarity.‖2

The innovations described above seem to have in common the idea of giving power to the European people, either directly, either mediated through national parliaments and European Parliament (EP). Today, European Union derives its legitimacy from two sources: a direct one, coming from the European demos who elect the European Parliament, and an indirect one, coming from national parliaments who manifest their confidence in their own national governments. The functioning of both legitimacy sources have been criticized in the framework of the debates over the democratic deficit of the EU, associated with a process of de-legitimation of the EU:

mailto:[email protected]


30


―It is clear: the European Union suffers from democratic deficit. Its institutional system is too complex, too far from the citizens, too disconnected from day to day life. Its decision-making mechanisms are advantaging the executives over the legislatives and over local and territorial collectivities.‖3

The democratic deficit debate has been connected to the thesis of de-parliamentarisation: not only have national parliaments a minor role in EU affairs, though they are directly elected democratic institutions who represent the peoples of Europe but also, EP, the EU institution that should represent European people as a hole, has been long time considered a week and powerless institution. The ‗people and parliaments empowerment‘ trend, confirmed in the Lisbon Treaty, comes as a solution to the democratic deficit problem. Over the years, theoreticians have developed a ‗de-parliamentarisation‘ thesis to describe the evolution of national parliaments within European integration. It has been argued that national parliaments, by ratifying deeper European integration, are paradoxically the political institutions that lose the most power: ―European Community (EC) severely restricts formal participation in decision-making by most domestic actors other than the executive. Issues that were once handled by domestic parliaments and publics are

―bargained in secret sessions of the European Council, employing domestic constitutional procedures designed to handle "high politics" issues of traditional foreign policy. The so-called "democratic deficit" (…)is not a coincidental characteristic of the EC; it is an integral part of the EC's institutional design. In this sense, the EC strengthens the state.‖4

The thesis of de-parliamentarisation argues that ―national parliaments suffer from a lack of authoritative power over transnational policymaking‖5, in other words, national parliaments cannot influence decisions taken at the EU level. These scholars consider that EU transnational policymaking is dominated by intergovernmental institutions, that determined national parliaments to lose ground: while the general political course of European integration is largely dictated by decisions made in the European Council, a body composed of the heads of state, the main decision-making body has been for a long period of time the Council, composed of Member States‘ ministers. Scholars and observers alike agreed that the European Union has weakened national parliaments, because they ―must accept EU law, which is mandatory and superior to national law, without having participated in its formulation.‖6 According to these views, the essential deliberative role of national parliaments has been annulled in EU affairs, by the fact that the only contribution permitted to them is the transposition of EU directives into national law. The de-parlamentarisation thesis7 consists of two ideas: first of all, legislative powers of the national parliaments have been reduced due to the constant transfer of policy competencies to EU institutions. Secondly, the national parliaments do not have direct access to EU decision-making process, this opportunity being conferred only indirectly to them, through the mechanism of parliamentary control over the national executives. As a consequence, a situation of asymmetry of information results from here. The core of de-parliamentarisation theory, that considered national parliaments the ―victims‖ of European integration, having no real power compared with the national governments, was criticized in the light of democratic evolutions of the EU following the Maastricht Treaty. The question is no longer whether national parliaments have a role in EU decision-making process, but what are the conditions for performing this role, and how efficient are national parliaments‘ scrutinies over their governments in EU affairs: ―While national parliaments have certainly been late adapters to integration, there is no doubt that they exercise

31


tighter scrutiny of their governments over EU matters more than before.‖8 Comparative empiric researches were performed for debating national parliaments‘ activity in EU affairs.9 In the light of democratic novelties introduced in the Lisbon Treaty, some theoreticians even spoke about an opposite trend: the parliamentarisation of the EU. This thesis was defined as a complex process composed of three elements: increase in the EP‘s power, evolution of EP-Commission relations and democratization of the EU10. The role of the national parliaments in the EU re-emerged following the Lisbon Treaty, as one of the main themes on the future shape of the European Union.11 The formalization of the possibility that national parliaments carry out subsidiarity checks on legislative proposals initiated by the Commission, through the mechanism called Early Warning System (EWS), should increase the importance of the national parliaments in the EU decision-making process and should represent a step further towards the democratization of the EU. The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that EWS is increasing the powers of the national parliaments and to evaluate the efficiency of the system. We will start with a discussion over the subsidiarity principle as the general framework for the EWS mechanism and we will point out the categories of competencies of the EU according to the Lisbon Treaty, in order to circumscribe the areas where EWS is applicable; then we will present the role of the national Parliaments before and after the Treaty of Lisbon and we will describe the functioning of the EWS, and finally we will construct an analytical framework in order to evaluate the efficiency of EWS.

Who does what? EU competencies and the subsidiarity principle

The divisions of policy responsibilities between the European Union‘s institutions and Member States (MS) have always been a subject of discussions in the general context of EU decision-making process. In the 1950s the European Economic Community started with four first policy areas, stipulated in the Treaty of Rome: Common Agriculture Policy, Transportation Policy, Trade Policy and Competition Policy. If since then, the European policy areas expanded, so did the debates on EU-MS competencies. The European construction had to face the challenge of identifying equilibrium between centralization and de-centralization, a pendulum of relations between European institutions and national, regional and local institutions. Building Europe cannot progress if EU involvement remains marginal, but also, expanding EU competencies should be done without losing the contact with the people, considering the fact that the primary scope of European integration was building a ―closer union among the peoples of Europe‖12. Should Europe have been built top-down or bottom-up? What competencies should be conferred by MS to the EU without losing the support of people? Norway is the perfect example for the failure of European integration generated by discontent at the bottom level: it rejected joining EU, in two different occasions – referendums in 1972 and 1994 – because the Norwegian people feared that it would affect farm subsidies and fishing rights. Moreover, when Denmark rejected the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on 2 June 1992, one of the EU‘s answers was a Declaration underlining a new Protocol on subsidiarity, included in the Treaty.

32


Over the last decade, subsidiarity became one of the key issues in the EU. In a broader sense, ―this principle speaks to the empowerment of democratic institutions; of which individuals ought to be included in decisions relating to the exercise of public power. It is a principle about the functioning of democracy.‖13 The concept of subsidiarity stipulates that political decisions should be made by competent authorities at the smallest level possible. When applied in the context of the EU, the principle of subsidiarity serves to regulate the exercise of the Union‘s powers. Most obviously, the European principle of subsidiarity is concerned with ―the allocation of powers to pre-existing institutions: for instance, whether a decision should be taken within the institutions of the European Union or should be allocated to the Westminster Parliament.‖14 In other words, this principle is confined to the allocation of power between two levels of governance: the MS and the EU‘s institutions. Subsidiarity constantly gained importance since it was introduced in the Maastricht Treaty15. It does not concern areas which come under the exclusive competence of the Union, nor those that remain the exclusive competence of the Member States: ―The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. (…) Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. (…) Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.‖16

It is often said that the EU lacks a clear allocation of powers, and there are now no statutory guarantees for the powers of national or local governments — there is no ―Competence Catalogue‖17.The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon is providing a clearer demarcation of the powers conferred on the EU. Part One, Title I of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) classifies the competences of the Union into three categories (exclusive, shared and supporting) and identifies the areas covered by the three categories. The principle of subsidiarity only applies to shared competencies policy area (the second column in the table 1). Table 1. EU‘s ―Catalogue of Competencies‖, following the Lisbon Treaty. EU exclusive competence

SHARED COMPETENCIES EU-MEMBER STATES

MS COMPETENCIES and EU support

(a) Customs Union; (b) Establishment of competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market; (c) Monetary policy for member states which use the euro; (d) Conservation of the biological resources of the sea as part of the common fisheries policy; (e) Common trading policy

(a) Internal market; (b) Social policy with regard to specific aspects defined in the Treaty; (c) Economic, social and territorial cohesion; (d) Agriculture and fisheries except for the conservation of the biological resources of the sea; (e) Environment; (f) Consumer protection; (g) Transport; (h) Transeuropean networks; (i) Energy; (j) Area of freedom, security and justice; (k) Joint security issues with regard to aspects of public health (l) Research, technological development and space (m) Development cooperation and humanitarian aid

(a) Protection and improvement of human healthcare; (b) Industry; (c) Culture; (d) Tourism; (e) Education, professional training, youth and sport (f) Civil protection; (g) Administrative co-operation.

33


Ensuring respect to the principle of subsidiarity has practical significance for the relations within the EU decision-making institutional triangle: the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission, in particular. The Lisbon Treaty also conferred new powers on national parliaments as regards subsidiarity issues. According to Follesdal, ―the application of the principle of subsidiarity is by sub-units enjoying veto powers.‖18 Do national parliaments have veto power? We will discuss next the role of the national parliaments in strengthening the subsidiarity principle before and after the Lisbon Treaty.

The role of the national parliaments before and after the Lisbon Treaty

The role of national parliaments became an important topic in the study of the EU system of governance in the mid-1990 in connection with the problem of the EU‘s democratic deficit19. At the question ―how to minimize the democratic deficit in the EU?‖ one answer was ―by increasing the role of national parliaments‖. As we have already seen, national parliaments have much less influence than governments in the EU decision-making process. The reduced influence of national parliaments can be explained by the following reasons. First, national parliaments have no formal powers for direct control over the EU policies and legislation. Parliaments exert, in the best case, an indirect control through their governments. But, although governments normally reflect the composition of their legislatures and depend on their confidence, direct parliamentary control over the government activity is a quite different matter, especially in connection with EU affaires20. Second, the prominent area of influence of national parliaments is advising on EU ‗secondary‘ legislation, which means that ‗tertiary‘ (administrative and technical) legislation remains largely outside the main sphere of influence of national parliaments. During the first decades of European integration process, national parliaments played no significant role. Their role increased after mid-1990 along the following direction: 1. there has been a growing interest of MP‘s for European affairs since then; 2. national parliaments have established arrangements for better dealing with EU affaires such as examining proposed EU legislation, tighter scrutinizing the performances of their governments, and producing reports on EU affaires and developments; 3. there has been a consolidation of inter-parliamentary cooperation; 4. a mechanism for subsidiarity control was created which gives national parliaments new powers21. There are of course a lot of differences between member states regarding the first two directions. Today, all national parliaments have established an EU committee, but in some cases that committee works as the main body for dealing with EU affaires, whereas in other cases it has the role of a coordinating organism between specialized committees. Also, the cases in which ministers with EU responsibilities come before national assemblies to be questioned vary considerably from state to state. Finally, some parliaments have established strong relationships with their conational MEP‘s, while others have not22. Regarding inter-parliamentary cooperation, it is important to mention that the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the EU annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty had already provided for the transmission of Commission‘s policy and legislative proposals to national parliaments and their involvement in the inter-parliamentary consultative forum through the Conference of the Community and European Affaires Committees of Parliaments of the European Union (COSAC). The biannual COSAC meetings bring together delegations from the Europeans Affairs Committees of the national parliaments and the European Parliament. COSAC decides by consensus, but in the case of non-binding decisions (named contributions), these decisions are taken with ¾ of the votes cast, which has to represent at last half of all

34


votes. The Treaty of Amsterdam had provided for the possibility that COSAC to „address to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission any contribution which it deems appropriate on the legislative activities of the Union, notably in relation to the application of the principle of subsidiarity‖23. Despite this opportunity, COSAC never submitted any contributions on subsidiarity24. The major change seemed to be the creation of a mechanism for subsidiarity control. As we have already seen, the Maastricht Treaty formally introduced the subsidiarity principle as a means to counterbalance the tendency of centralization of competences in the European Union. The new formally introduced principle lacked, however, an institutional procedure to enforce it. The European Convention‘s Draft for a European Constitution made some progress through the introduction of a procedure that allows national parliaments to submit ‗reasoned opinion‘ if they consider that policy and legislative proposals are not consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. This is a ‗yellow card‘ procedure, described in article 1, point 11 of the Constitutional Treaty and two protocols attached to it. The procedure requires that all policy and legislative proposals initiated by the Commission or other institutions to be forwarded to national parliaments, which in turn will consult (within six weeks) the relevant authority whether proposed legislation respects subsidiarity. This ‗yellow card‘ procedure for subsidiarity control was certainly introduced to increase the role of national parliaments in the governance system of European Union, but, whereas it was ―certainly a good idea to entrust the national parliaments with the task of watching over centralization in the European Union, because neither the Commission, nor the Council, nor the EU Parliament, has an interest in stopping the process of centralization, which has contributed so much to their power […], the Convention and its Presidium have, however, only gone half way. They have not dared to grant decision-making power on subsidiarity to an institution such as the ‗Chamber of Parliamentarians‘ as proposed by the European Constitutional Group. Merely creating a consultative procedure as laid down in a protocol is not enough‖25.

After the failure of the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty, an enhanced mechanism for subsidiarity control was incorporated in the Lisbon Treaty. Before describing this mechanism it is important to underline that the role of national assemblies increased with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty: national parliaments are now mentioned for the first time in the main text of the treaty (not in the Protocols or Declarations attached to the treaties); national parliaments have now some rights referred to in article 12, such as a stronger role in Treaty revision through both simplified revision procedure and the institutionalisation of the Convention procedure; and, of course, national parliaments may now play a role regarding the subsidiarity control (see the two protocols attached to The Lisbon Treaty, namely the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the EU and the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality). The real novelty of the Lisbon Treaty is its ‗early-warning mechanism‘ for the subsidiarity control, which is detailed in the following. Article 4 of the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality says that EU institutions (primarily the Commission)26 shall forward their draft legislative acts and their amended drafts to national parliaments, and article 6 states that any national parliament or any chamber of a national parliament may, within eight weeks from the date of transmission of a draft legislative act, send a reasoned opinion stating why it considers that the draft in question does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. In doing so, parliaments may consult, where appropriate, regional parliaments with legislative powers. Article 7, point 1 of the Protocol states that each national parliament has two votes, and in the case of bicameral parliaments, each of the two chambers has one vote, whereas point 2 of the same article states that if reasoned opinions on a draft legislative act represent one third (or a quarter in the case of draft legislative act on the area of freedom, security and justice) of all the votes allocated to the national parliaments, the draft must be reviewed. Once this threshold is reached, the reasoned opinion will function

35


as a ‗yellow card‘ shown to Commission. After the review Commission (or appropriate institut ion) may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft and reasons must be given for decision it takes. Under the ordinary legislative procedure (co-decision), the mechanism for subsidiarity control is significantly altered. As article 7, point 3 states, if reasoned opinions represent at least half of the total votes allocated to the parliaments, the proposal must also be reviewed, and, after reviewing, the Commission may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the proposal. Now, the reasoned opinions of the national parliaments will function as an ‗orange card‘ because, if the Commission decides to maintain the proposals, both the opinions of national parliaments and the motivations of Commission will have to be submitted to the Union legislator (the European Parliament and the Council). If 55% of the members of the Council or a simple majority in the European Parliament agree that the proposal is not compatible with the principle of subsidiarity, it shall not receive further consideration. Article 8 of the Protocol gives the member states the possibility to action on behalf of their parliaments and to bring a case before the European Court of Justice, where the national parliaments believe that the adopted law contradicts the principle of subsidiarity. Letting aside the fact that the subsidiarity control mechanism applies only to shared EU-MS competencies, not to exclusive EU competencies (see Table 1 above), which limits the applicability of the mechanism, we will try to see if early-warning system is an efficient mechanism as such. What is the impact of early-warning system? Does it give real power to national parliaments or remains largely an inefficient mechanism?

The efficiency of the Early Warning System for subsidiarity control

In order to judge the early-warning system as a subsidiarity control mechanism at the EU level, we must broaden the perspective and make some considerations on Early Warning Systems in general. We want to point out from the beginning that it is uncommon to use the name early-warning system for a mechanism whose purpose is not disaster risk reduction, in terms of natural hazards. In more plastic words, at the EU level, breaking the subsidiarity principle can be seen equivalent to a natural disaster and it should necessary be prevented using early-warning system. The risk that early-warning system is trying to annihilate is splitting EU-MS competences by hazard, when all should be precisely circumscribed in areas of competences and levels of appropriate action. If the main purpose of the subsidiarity principle is to bring EU decision-making as close to the citizens as possible, then early-warning system can be labeled as people-centered early warning. For the purpose of evaluating the efficiency of EU subsidiarity early-warning system, we borrowed the United Nations check-list for an efficient people-centered natural hazards early warning system27 and adapted it. The elements to be examined are as follows:

36


Figure 1. EU Subsidiarity Early Warning System – Checklist.

Knowledge of the risk

As we already mentioned, the ‗risk‘ is represented by the possibility that EU legislates and acts where national, regional or local authorities should do so. In order to react to this risk, national parliaments can perform subsidiarity checks for every draft of legislation initiated by the Commission, that fall into shared competences EU-MS. National parliaments were not always interested in EU affairs and, as the data below will show, some of them are not interested even today. The first national parliament to set up a European affairs committee (EAC) was the German Bundesrat in 1957. It was followed by the Belgian Chamber of Representatives and the Italian Senate, in 1962 and 1968 respectively. The parliaments of the first accession countries: United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, due in part to more Eurosceptical electorates and traditionally strong parliaments, quickly established EACs to scrutinise European affairs.28 Today all national parliaments have EAC but still there is a lot of diversity in how national parliaments approach EU affairs. The function of these EAC is ―to influence and control national decision-making on individual pieces of legislation‖29, but their power varies from country to country. In the UK, both House of Commons and the Senate have EACs that examine closely Commission‘s legislative proposals in order to state their position. In the Government, Minister vote as they wish. In France also, parliament‘s opinion in EAC‘s is not mandatory for ministers30. In Austria, Germany and Denmark, on the other hand, EACs have ―the right to issue binding voting instructions to government representatives.‖31 In Austria and Germany, this right is seldom exercised, but in Denmark it has a real use.32 Raunio also underscores the fact that the exact roles

37


and legal powers of these committees vary, though EACs perform broadly similar functions throughout. The status of EACs appears to vary significantly between the Member States: while in the Nordic countries the EAC is a fairly prestigious committee, the opposite is largely the case in the Mediterranean countries33. One explanation for this phenomenon is the existing parliamentary culture. Some parliaments prefer to engage in more document-based, supportive or consensual processing of EU matters while other legislatures emphasise more the mandating cabinet members. The different scrutiny models were divided by COSAC in two categories by examining what national parliaments choose to focus on as part of their scrutiny procedures. ―Some chambers have chosen a ‗document-based‘ system, which focuses on scrutiny of documents emanating from the EU institutions. Others have developed procedures which focus on scrutiny of the EU decision-making process, often concentrating on their government‘s position in the Council. This system, which can be termed a ‗procedural‘ system, includes instances where a European affairs committee is empowered or required to give a direct mandate to a national government before a minister can give agreement to proposed legislation in Council meetings. In practice, most systems can be seen as hybrids, containing elements from both the document-based and the procedural models.‖34

According to COSAC, the classic example of this document-based model is the scrutiny system adopted by both chambers of the UK Parliament in 1974. The parliaments of Czech Republic, Cyprus, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, the Belgian Senate, the Netherlands Eerste Kamer, and (since January 2006) the Luxembourg Chambre des Députés have established similar document-based scrutiny systems. The Bulgarian Narodno Sobranie's EU scrutiny system can also be classified as document-based. If the question is formulated as ―what is under scrutiny?‖, the parliaments of Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands (Eerste Kamer), Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and the United Kingdom all answer that they concentrate primarily on the scrutiny of documents emanating from the EU institutions. On the other hand, COSAC consider that the parliaments of Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland (Sejm), Slovakia, Slovenia and Sweden belong to the class where the European affairs committee systematically mandates the government. The governments in these countries are all in principle obliged to present a negotiating position—in writing or orally—to the competent committees on all items to be adopted by the Council. These parliaments have developed different ways of filtering the legislative proposals before them, so as to avoid spending time on proposals which are considered less important. If the question is presented in the form ―what is under scrutiny?‖ the parliaments of Denmark, Finland, Greece, Malta, Poland (Sejm), Slovenia and Sweden name the government‘s position as the main focus of scrutiny. Some systems, like the parliaments of Estonia, Hungary and Lithuania and the Dutch Tweede Kamer would appear to be the most obvious cases of mixed systems which combine elements of both a document-based and a procedural system (combined with a power to mandate the government.35 The system of the Romanian Camera Deputatilor was also classified as being a mixed system. This review of literature has so far emphasised similarities between the national parliaments, but there remains significant cross-national variation to be explained. The Treaty of Lisbon gave all national parliaments equal full access to European legislation, because, according to the Treaty, the Commission has to send every legislative initiative to national parliaments for the subsidiarity check, before sending them to the EP and the Council. This mechanism was partially introduced informally by the Barrosso Commission in 2006, as a courtesy to national parliaments, inviting them to react and to engage in a dialogue on its proposals. These measures intend to annihilate the

38


assimmetry of information that characterise the relations between national legislatives and executives: the latter enjoys direct access to information through the Council, while the former reaches the information indirectly, through the mechanism of democratic control. We may question whether national parliaments are really acknowledging the subsidiarity risks and are taking advantage of the opportunity of direct political dialogue with the Commission. Regarding this political dialogue, the Commission considers that ―In the course of the last five years, the Commission‘s relations with national Parliaments have fundamentally evolved, becoming closer and more substantial. (…) In this way, the national Parliaments will quickly become an integral part of the decision making processes at EU level.‖36 But national parliaments are not a unitary actor in this decision-making process. They vary in the degree of participation to the political dialogue with the Commission. The first proposals falling under the scope of the subsidiarity control mechanism were adopted and transmitted to national parliaments only at the beginning of February 2010, which is the official start of the subsidiarity control mechanism. During 2010, 65 Commission proposals were scrutinized under the subsidiarity control mechanism.37 Because available data is an issue here, we can use data before February 2010 instead. We could use Commissions Reports from 2009 backwards, when the Lisbon Treaty was not into force, but the political dialogue between national parliaments and the Commission under the 2006 Commission initiative can be a valuable preview of the inter-institutional relations. As a result of the ―Barroso Initiative‖, the political dialogue between the Commission and the national

parliaments has intensified since 2006 (see table 2-Appendix). Up to the end of 2009, the Commission had

received 618 opinions from 35 national assemblies (out of 40 national parliamentary chambers) between

September 2006 and December 2009. In 2009, national Parliaments sent 250 opinions to the Commission

compared to 200 in 2008, 115 in 2007 and 53 and 2006, which confirmed the clear upward trend.38 Between

2006 and 2009 the volume of exchanges between the European Commission and national chambers rose five

times. The 2009 Report show that there has been a group of particularly active chambers and that 12

assemblies were responsible for around three quarters of all national Parliament opinions received in 2009.

Letting aside Portugal, second chambers seem to be more active than first chambers: the French, Czech,

German, British and Italian second chambers issued almost 40 per cent off all reasoned opinions. Sweden and

Denmark, which are unicameral parliamentary systems, have also issued an important number of opinions.

We can also observe that all these countries are unitary political systems (with a single exception, Germany,

and, possibly Great Britain that some authors refer to as a multicultural federalism). So a commonality seems

to detach: members that are unitary states and have a bicameral parliament are more interested in scrutinizing

European executive. Probably, a cooperative quasi-federal system (such as EU), where executive is better able

to represent legislative interests, makes issuing of parliamentary opinions less necessary. Since 2006, five

assemblies have not participated at all in this dialogue – the lower and upper assemblies in Spain and Romania,

and the Slovenian upper chamber (Državni svet).

However, most of the opinions state their consent to the Commission document. This fact partially explains the surprising activity of the Portuguese parliament. Issuing a total 131 opinions between 2006 and 2009, the Assembleia da República accounts for almost a quarter of all opinions. This may be due to a ―Barroso effect‖, given the nationality of the Commission President José Manuel Barroso and the fact that the Portuguese parliament has been considered to be one of the weakest scrutinizers.39

39


The 250 opinions issued by national parliaments in 2009 concerned 139 Commission documents. Out of these 139, only ten documents received comments by four or more assemblies.40 Out of 250 opinions received in 2009, less than 25 expressed subsidiarity related concerns. The vast majority of opinions were in general positive, welcoming the Commission initiatives commenting mainly on the broader content of the proposal, with relatively few opinions containing remarks on the legal base or the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. This can be explained, as we saw above, by the quasi-federal nature of EU. The evaluation of the opinions sent by national parliaments in 2009 show that those policy fields on which national Parliaments mostly focused their attention were Justice, Liberty and Security (83 opinions), Health and Consumer Protection (38), Transport and Energy (22), Education and Culture (14), Environment (12) and Enterprise (10). The conclusion of this section is that though the dependency of national parliaments on government information has clearly been reduced – all national parliaments receive all documents directly from the European institutions and they have a minimum time to formulate an opinion – not all the parliaments are actually interested in formulating an opinion. So, they are not really acknowledging the risks that they are supposed to prevent. The Commission‘s 2006 initiative offered national parliaments a direct channel for communication with the European Commission without having to consider their governments‘ opinions, but some parliaments preferred the governments leading role in EU affairs. The Commission explains this phenomenon: ―in most of the cases where the chambers participate less actively in the political dialogue, they do so deliberately, as they define their role in European affairs rather via the scrutiny of their respective governments than of the Commission.‖41 If national parliaments consider that their opinion is not important in the EU decision-making process they annul the whole logic of the subsidiary principle, and this represents from the start a minus for the efficiency of the early-warning system.

Dissemination and communication

The Early Warning System is a mechanism of collective action. It is not enough that one national parliament gives a negative opinion on a Commission‘s draft initiative; its opinion should be backed by others, in order to obtain the conditions for the yellow and orange cards. An efficient early-warning system would be one in which the members communicate with each other, share their opinions and communicate the risks perceived. The statistics pre-Treaty of Lisbon are not very encouraging. The 250 opinions issued by national Parliaments in 2009 concerned no less than 139 Commission documents. Out of these 139, only 10 documents were commented on by 4 or more assemblies. How can then be achieved a simple majority of parliaments opinions, or even a 1/3 or 1/4 be achieved? National parliaments have sought to act collectively, mainly through the creation in 1989 of the Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees (COSAC). COSAC organizes coordinated subsidiarity exercises as an impulse for collective action. In 2009 the Commission received several opinions adopted by the national Parliaments in the context of three COSAC coordinated subsidiarity tests: the first one on the directive on standards of quality and safety of human organs intended for transplantation, launched in December 2008; the second on the framework decision on the right to interpretation and to translation in criminal proceedings, launched in July 2009; and the third on the regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law,

40


recognition and enforcement of decisions and authentic instruments in matters of succession, launched in October 2009. In all three exercises, a very large majority of participating chambers confirmed the proposals‘ compliance with the subsidiarity principle. As regards the first case, only the Austrian Bundesrat issued a negative subsidiarity opinion; in the second exercise, the Austrian Bundesrat was joined by the Irish and Maltese Parliaments in contesting subsidiarity compliance, with 11 other chambers finding the Commission's justification in its explanatory memorandum not entirely satisfactory; and with respect to the last proposal, only the Belgian Senate indicated a breach of subsidiarity.42 Though the efforts of coordinating the activity of national parliaments exist through COSAC, the results are less efficient. The Commission delivers replies to the parliamentary opinions but, so far, ―there is no evidence that the Commission significantly altered its initial positions, but it did deliver additional clarification and justification of its proposals following the parliamentary comments.‖43 After all, it‘s the EU legislator, not the national parliaments, that have the final word, and this is a delicate assumption for the efficiency of the early-warning system the Treaty of Lisbon hopes to institutionalize.

Capability to react to risk

Before answering the question if there is capability to react to risk, we should naturally try both to ask the question if the risk is perceived as such, and to see, once the riske is acknowledged, how national parliaments cooperate with each other. As we have seen (4.1, 4.2), establishing a procedure for conducting subsidiarity control ―do not automatically imply active use of the early-warning mechanism‖44: national parliaments are not quite ready to make active use of this mechanism. Similarly, communication and cooperation between parliaments through organizational structures such as COSAC prove not to be very effective. But, presupposing that the actors recognize the risk of violations of subsidiarity principle, and that they are able to effectively cooperate, do they have enough time for an effective response? In this paragraph, we discuss the problem of time management for best results. National parliaments have eight weeks to signal a risk. This is a rather narrow time window within which national parliaments have to respond and may be argued that it is very restrictive in terms of effective undertaking a full series of actions such as: examination of the draft legislation by the national assembly, examination of the draft legislation by the regional assemblies, communication between these two levels of government, and realizing an effective information exchange with other national assemblies. In a discussion paper issued by the European and External Affairs Committee of the National Assembly of Wales, the time management issue is very well outlined: ―Given the short time window (8 weeks) within which each House will be able to respond, and the important issue of who should in practice respond in the name of each chamber, the procedure presents Parliament with significant timetabling issues. The way in which these are ultimately resolved will have a knock-on effect on how the Assembly (and the other devolved legislatures) can participate in the process. But whatever the outcome it is inescapable that the window within which the Assembly will be able to feed its concerns into any reasoned opinion will be even narrower than the 8 weeks available to the two Houses of Parliament. [...] In the view of the Assembly‘s Head of Legal Services, the narrowness of the Assembly‘s window of opportunity makes it of acute importance to resolve the questions of: a) how the Assembly is to become aware of pieces of draft Union legislation which may give rise to subsidiarity issues; b) who, on behalf of the Assembly, is to examine the draft legislation and to feed any case for a reasoned opinion into the Parliamentary process; and c) what arrangements, if any, can be devised for co-ordinating responses as between the three devolved legislatures and the two Houses of Parliament. Whilst there will be issues which will be of concern

41


only to one or more chamber, there may be others where there is a common concern which would lend itself to a joint approach.‖45

It is important also to observe that the 8-week window in which the national Parliament may respond on matters concerning the Subsidiarity Protocol is just one aspect of the EU scrutiny process of the national parliaments. The national parliaments consider and report on every EU document, both legislative and non-legislative, and examine a lot of aspects, not just subsidiarity, so the 8-week time window becomes more restrictive and proves not to be enough for conducting a complete subsidiarity check.

Responsibility in front of the risk

Once national parliaments have issued a warning that there is a violation of the principle of subsidiarity, how much liberty of action in relation with an early-warning does the Commission (or other institutions) has? Are there formal means to make the Commission to take into account the parliaments‘ reasoned opinions or the Commission can be made accountable through other means, not directly related to the rules of the early-warning mechanism? If so, the mechanism for subsidiarity control turns out to be irrelevant. The answer to these questions is that the Commission – in the problem that concerns us, i.e. subsidiarity – does not have too much autonomy in its action, but this limited autonomy is not necessarily a consequence of the rules of the early-warning mechanism. It appears, as we are trying to show below, that the early-warning mechanism does not play an independent role in explaining why Commission‘ proposals are consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. It is likely that the logic behind the early-warning mechanism for subsidiarity control (for control of the executive‘s initiatives) is not quite proper for a cooperative quasi-federal system such as the EU (see also paragraph 4.1). In cooperative federal systems the executive is better able to represent legislative interests, making parliamentary opinions less necessary. This can provide also an explanation for why parliaments infrequently comments. Even if national parliaments could reach the required amount of votes needed for a ‗yellow card‘, the Commission still can ignore the national parliament‘s reasoned opinions. However, it is very likely that the Commission would want to avoid to be blamed for violating the subsidiarity principle. T. Raunio observes a broad consensus among national MPs that the overwhelming majority of the Commission‘s legislative proposals have not been problematic in terms of the subsidiarity principle, view also supported by the empirical record of national governments and parliaments not signaling the Commission‘s initiatives as breaching the subsidiarity principle. The Commission is fully aware of the „dangers involved in national parliaments or governments publicly criticising its initiatives for violating the subsidiarity principle. Particularly, the more Eurosceptical media would have an interest [...] fuelling perceptions of the Commission (and the EU) misusing their powers.‖46 So, either the Commission ignores the ‗yellow card‘ or the Commission‘ proposals are not problematic in terms of subsidiarity principle, it render the early-warning mechanism irrelevant. Under the ‗orange card‘ procedure the parliaments‘ reasoned opinion will also depend on the Council and the European Parliament, which have the last say. This procedure certainly decreases, formally, the role of the Commission, but it is not followed automatically by the support of the national parliaments view. Again, the independent factor does not appear to be the parliaments‘ view, but Council‘s and the EP‘s. Probably, giving parliaments the possibility to show a ‗red card‘ (i.e. the power of veto) would provide stronger

42


incentives both for the Commission to take early-warning system seriously and for the MP‘s to involve in EU affaires. However, it is easy to understand why ‗red card‘ solution was not chosen: it would provide national parliaments a very powerful tool, with potentially negative effects on European integration. The direct formal involvement of national Parliaments in the law-making process of the Union would threaten the effectiveness of its action, and it can be argued that ―the reliable way of improving the democratic control without adverse side-effects remains addressing the problem at its source: to intensify the meaningful dialog of national Parliaments with the Governments on the basis of tasks and principles of their implementation‖47. It seems therefore that the functioning of the early-warning mechanism largely depends on the degree of the Commission‘s voluntary opening to the parliaments‘ opinions and on its will to accommodate these opinions, on the one hand, and on the wish of avoiding publicly criticising its initiatives, on the other hand. So, the early-warning mechanism is not quite a powerful mechanism as such.

Conclusion

The Treaty of Lisbon formalizes the possibility for national parliaments to carry out subsidiarity checks on legislative proposals submitted by European Union institutions (primarily by Commission), through the mechanism called Early Warning System. This mechanism is another tool, besides others, that are developed with the aim of minimizing democratic deficit at European Union level and increasing the national parliaments input in European governance system. However, our article showed that this mechanism is not a very innovative or powerful mechanism for the subsidiarity control because it presents weaknesses along all the four elements of an effective ―early-warning mechanism‖ and, also because it does not bring a relevant shift inside the institutional triangle (Commission, EP and Council) designed for making decisions inside European Union. This is not to say, however, that the early-warning system is a political mechanism elaborated by Europhiles to reply to Euroskeptics‘ arguments and fears of breaching subsidiarity only. We are not saying that the early-warning mechanism is a clever trick that permits Europhiles to continue the European integration project. The aim this mechanism serves is undoubtedly very important, but its efficiency has to be improved.

Notes 1 Beneficiary of the project “Doctoral scholarships supporting research: Competitiveness, quality, and cooperation in the European Higher Education Area”, co-funded by the European Union through the European Social Fund, Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources Development 2007-2013 2 Jose Manuel Barrosso, President of the European Commission, Speech at Strasbourg, 23.10.2007, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/649&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, (consulted in March 2011). 3 Paul Magnette, Europa politică, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2003, p.53. 4 Andrew Moravscik, ―Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation‖, in: Center for European Studies, Working Paper Series, no. 52, 1994, available online http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/Moravcsik52.pdf (consulted May 2011). 5 Vivien, Schmidt, ―European ‗Federalism‘ and its Encroachments on National Institutions‖, in: Publius, vol. 29, no. 1, pp. 19–44 and p.25.

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/649&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/649&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/Moravcsik52.pdf

43


6 Francesco Duina and Michael J. Oliver, ―National Parliaments in the European Union: Are There Any Benefits to Integration?‖,

in: European Law Journal, Vol. 11, No. 2, March 2005, pp. 173–195 and p.174. 7 John O‘Brennan, Tapio Raunio, ―Deparliamentarization and European integration‖, in: O‘Brennan, J., Raunio, T. (eds). National parliaments within the enlarged European Union. From ‘victims’ of integration to competitive actors?, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, pp. 1-26. 8 Tapio Raunio, ―National Parliaments and European Integration: What We Know and Agenda for Future Research‖, in: The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol.15, No.4, December 2009, pp.317–334 and p.318. 9 These studies documented empirically diverse hypotheses related to the factors that influence national parliaments scrutiny over government in EU affairs, such as : executive-legislative relations, constitutional distribution of power, parliamentary culture, parliamentary workloads, the nature of the party system, the ideological composition of parliaments, the role of parliamentary committees, public opinion regardin EU integration. See: Christine Neuhold and Rik de Ruiter, ―Out of reach? Parliamentary Control of EU Affairs in the Netherlands and the UK‖ The Journal of Legislative Studies , 2010, vol. 16, nr.1, pp.57-72; Phillip Norton, (ed) National parliaments and the European Union, London, Frank Cass, 1999; Torbjorn Bergman, ―National parliaments and EU Affairs Committees: notes on empirical variation and competing explanations‖, Journal of European Public Policy, 1997, vol. 4, nr. 3, pp. 373-387. 10 Olivier Costa, Florent Saint Martin, Le Parlament européen, Paris, La Documentation francaise, 2009. 11 Victor Cuesta Lopez, ―The Lisbon Treaty's Provisions on Democratic Principles: A Legal Framework for Participatory Democracy‖, in: European Public Law, 2010, vol. 16, no. 1, pp.123-138, Fabio Tronchetti, ―National parliaments as guardians of subsidiarity: A feasible task or an utopist chimera?‖, in: Journal of US-China Public Administration, 2010, vol. 7, no. 9, pp.15-26; Petra Guasti, ―The Europeanisation of Parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe‖, in: RECON Online Working Paper Series, 2011, Issue 11, pp. 1-20. 12 European Economic Community, ―Treaty establishing the European Economic Community‖, Rome, 1957, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ro/treaties/dat/11957E/word/11957E.doc, (consulted in March 2011). 13 Nicholas Barber, “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity‖, in: European Law Journal, 2005, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 308–325, p.308. 13 Ibidem, p.308. 15 For a discussion over the definition of subsidiarity at Maastricht, see John Peterson, ―Subsidiarity: A definition to suit any vision?‖, Parliamentary Affairs, 1994, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 116-133. 16 Official Journal of the European Union , ―Consolidated Version on the Treaty on European Union‖, C115/15, Bruxelles, 9.5.2008, art. 5, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF (consulted in March 2011). 17 Andreas Follesdal, ―Survey Article: Subsidiarity‖, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 1998, vol.6, no. 2, pp. 231-259, section IIIA. 18 Andreas Follesdal, ―Survey Article: Subsidiarity‖, lit.cit., section IV, A. 19 Tapio Raunio, Destinated for Irrelevance? Subsidiarity Control by National Parliaments, 19 pag., 2010, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng, (consulted in March 2011). 20 Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, New-York, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2006, p. 530. 21 See Tapio Raunio, op.cit., p. 3, also Neill Nugent, op.cit., p. 531. 22 Neill Nugent, op.cit. 23 Official Journal, C 340, 10.XI.1997, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html, (consulted in March 2011). 24 Raunio, op.cit., note 13. 25 Charles B. Blankart and Dennis C. Mueller, ―Bringing the European Union Closer to Its Citizens‖, in: Charles B. Blankart and Dennis C. Mueller (eds), A Constitution for the European Union, Cambridge-Mass., The MIT Press, pp. 245-6. 26 Member States (the Council), European Parliament, European Court of Justice, European Central Bank or European Investment Bank shall also submit their draft legislative acts to national parliaments. 27 ―Developing Early Warning Systems. A Checklist‖, United Nations 3-rd International Conference on Early Warning, From concept to action, 27-29 March 2006, Bonn, http://www.ewc3.org/upload/downloads/checklist.final_pdf.pdf, (consulted in March 2011). 28 John O‘Brennan, Tapio Raunio, ―Deparliamentarization and European integration‖, in: O‘Brennan, J., Raunio, T. (eds). National parliaments within the enlarged European Union. From ‘victims’ of integration to competitive actors? Routledge, London and New York, 2007, pp. 1-26. 29 Tapio Raunio, Simon Hix, ―Backbenchers Learn to Fight Back: European Integration and Parliamentary Government‖, West European Politics, 2000, vol. 23, nr. 4, pp. 142–168 and p.155. 30 Maria Valeria Agostini, ―The Role of National Parliaments in the Future EU‖ apud Francesco Duina, Michael Oliver, National Parliaments in the European Union: Are There Any Benefits to Integration?, op.cit. p.175. 31 Tapio Raunio, Simon Hix, ―Backbenchers Learn to Fight Back: European Integration and Parliamentary Government‖, op.cit., p.155.

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ro/treaties/dat/11957E/word/11957E.doc

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ro/treaties/dat/11957E/word/11957E.doc

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF

http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html

http://www.ewc3.org/upload/downloads/checklist.final_pdf.pdf

44


32

Francesco Duina, Michael Oliver, National Parliaments in the European Union: Are There Any Benefits to Integration?, op.cit. p. 175. 33 Tapio Raunio, ―National Parliaments and European Integration: What We Know and Agenda for Future Research‖, op.cit., p.319. 34 ―Eighth bi-annual report: Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny‖, Prepared by the COSAC Secretariat and presented to: XXXVIII Conference of Community and European Affairs Committees of Parliaments of the European Union, 14-15 October 2007, p.8 available online http://www.cosac.eu/upload/application/pdf/f51d6748/8th_Bi-annual_Report_EN.pdf (consulted mai 2011). 35 ―Eighth bi-annual report: Developments in European Union Procedures and Practices Relevant to Parliamentary Scrutiny‖, doc.cit., p.9. 36 European Commission, ―Annual Report 2009 on the Relations between the European Commission and National Parliaments‖, COM (2010) 291 final, Bruxelles, 2.06.2010, pp. 9, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0291:FIN:EN:PDF (consulted in March 2011) 37 See IPEX Subsidiarity list, January 2011 38 The Commission launched in may 2009 a dedicated website on Europa, on which it publishes all opinions received from national Parliaments in the context of the political dialogue, as well as the replies from the Commission. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/relations/relations_other/npo/index_en.htm 39 Aron Buzogány, Andrej Stuchlík, Paved with good intentions: Ambiguities of empowering parliaments after Lisbon, 17 pag., 2011, http://www.uaces.org/pdf/papers/1102/stuchlik.pdf (consulted in May 2011); see also note 39. 40 Ibidem. 41 European Commission, ―Annual Report 2009 on the Relations between the European Commission and National Parliaments‖, COM (2010) 291 final, Bruxelles, 2.06.2010, p.3. 42 Ibidem , p.5. 43 Theo Jans, Sophia Piedrafita, ―The Role of National Parliaments in European Decision-Making‖, EIPASCOPE, European Institute of Public Administration, 2009, no. 1, pp.19-26. 44 Tapio Raunio, op.cit., p.5. 45 European and External Affairs Committee (National Assembly for Wales), Discussion paper: Implications for the National Assembly for Wales of the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality (Protocol no.2) contained in the Lisbon Treaty, 12 January 2010, http://www.cynulliadcymru.org/en/bus-home/bus-committees/bus-committees-previous-committees/bus-committees-second-eur-home/bus-committees-second-eur-agendas.htm?act=dis&id=165407&ds=2/2010 , (consulted in March 2011). 46 Tapio Raunio, op.cit., p.6. 47 Jiři Zemánek, ―Improving the Union‘s Democratic Legitimacy: The European Parliament and National Parliaments‖, in: Ingolf Pernice, José Maria Beneyto Pérez (eds.), The Government of Europe - Institutional Design for the European Union, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 2003, p.116.

References

Barber, Nicholas, “The Limited Modesty of Subsidiarity”, European Law Journal, 2005, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 308–325. Barrosso, Jose Manuel, President of the European Commission, Speech at Strasbourg, 23.10.2007, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/649&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, (consulted in March 2011). Blankart, Charles B., and Dennis C. Mueller, “Bringing the European Union Closer to Its Citizens”, in Charles B. Blankart and Dennis C. Mueller (eds), A Constitution for the European Union, Cambridge-Mass., The MIT Press, pp. 237-255. Bergman, Torbjorn, “National parliaments and EU Affairs Committees: notes on empirical variation and competing explanations”, Journal of European Public Policy, 1997, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 373-387. Buzogány, Aron and Andrej Stuchlík, Paved with good intentions: Ambiguities of empowering parliaments after Lisbon, 17 pag., 2011, http://www.uaces.org/pdf/papers/1102/stuchlik.pdf (consulted in May 2011).

http://www.cosac.eu/upload/application/pdf/f51d6748/8th_Bi-annual_Report_EN.pdf

http://www.cosac.eu/upload/application/pdf/f51d6748/8th_Bi-annual_Report_EN.pdf

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0291:FIN:EN:PDF

http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0291:FIN:EN:PDF

http://www.uaces.org/pdf/papers/1102/stuchlik.pdf

http://www.cynulliadcymru.org/en/bus-home/bus-committees/bus-committees-previous-committees/bus-committees-second-eur-home/bus-committees-second-eur-agendas.htm?act=dis&id=165407&ds=2/2010

http://www.cynulliadcymru.org/en/bus-home/bus-committees/bus-committees-previous-committees/bus-committees-second-eur-home/bus-committees-second-eur-agendas.htm?act=dis&id=165407&ds=2/2010

45


Costa, Olivier, and Florent Saint Martin, Le Parlament européen, Paris, La Documentation francaise, 2009. Cuesta Lopez, Victor, “The Lisbon Treaty's Provisions on Democratic Principles: A Legal Framework for Participatory Democracy”, European Public Law, 2010, vol. 16, no.1, pp.123-138. Duina Francesco, Oliver, J. Michael, “National Parliaments in the European Union: Are There Any Benefits to Integration?”, European Law Journal, Vol. 11, no. 2, March 2005, pp. 173–195. “Developing Early Warning Systems. A Checklist”, United Nations 3-rd International Conference on Early Warning, From concept to action, 27-29 March 2006, Bonn, http://www.ewc3.org/upload/downloads/checklist.final_pdf.pdf, (consulted in March 2011). European and External Affairs Committee (National Assembly for Wales), Discussion paper: Implications for the National Assembly for Wales of the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality (Protocol no.2) contained in the Lisbon Treaty, 12 January 2010, http://www.cynulliadcymru.org/en/bus-home/bus-committees/bus-committees-previous-committees/bus-committees-second-eur-home/bus-committees-second-eur-agendas.htm?act=dis&id=165407&ds=2/2010, (consulted in March 2011). European Commission, “Annual Report 2009 on the Relations between the European Commission and National Parliaments”, COM (2010) 291 final, Bruxelles, 2.06.2010. Follesdal, Andreas, “Survey Article: Subsidiarity”, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 1998, vol.6, no. 2, pp. 231-259, section IIIA. Guasti, Petra, “The Europeanisation of Parliaments in Central and Eastern Europe”, RECON Online Working Paper Series, 2011, Issue 11, pp. 1-20. Jans,Theo and Sophia Piedrafita, “The Role of National Parliaments in European Decision-Making”, EIPASCOPE, European Institute of Public Administration, 2009, no. 1, pp. 19-26. Magnette, Paul , Europa politică, Institutul European, Iaşi, 2003. Moravscik, Andrew, “Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation”, Center for European Studies, Working Paper Series, no.52, 1994, available online http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/Moravcsik52.pdf (consulted May 2011). Neuhold, Christine, de Ruiter, Rik, “Out of reach? Parliamentary Control of EU Affairs in the Netherlands and the UK” The Journal of Legislative Studies , 2010, vol. 16, no.1, pp.57-72. Norton, Phillip, (ed.) National parliaments and the European Union, London, Frank Cass, 1999. Nugent, Neill, The Government and Politics of the European Union, New-York, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2006. O’Brennan, John and Tapio Raunio, “Deparliamentarization and European integration”, in: O’Brennan, J., Raunio, T. (eds). National parliaments within the enlarged European Union. From ‘victims’ of integration to competitive actors? Routledge, London and New York, 2007, pp. 1-26. Oficial Journal of the European Union , “Consolidated Version on the Treaty on European Union”, C115/15, Bruxelles, 9.5.2008, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0013:0045:EN:PDF (consulted in March 2011). Peterson, John, “Subsidiarity: A definition to suit any vision?”, Parliamentary Affairs, 1994, vol. 47, no. 1, pp. 116-133.

http://www.ces.fas.harvard.edu/publications/docs/pdfs/Moravcsik52.pdf

46


Raunio, Tapio, Destinated for Irrelevance? Subsidiarity Control by National Parliaments, 19 pag., 2010, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng, (consulted in March 2011). Raunio, Tapio, “National Parliaments and European Integration: What We Know and Agenda for Future Research”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, Vol.15, no.4, December 2009, pp.317–334. Raunio, Tapio, and Simon Hix, “Backbenchers Learn to Fight Back: European Integration and Parliamentary Government”, West European Politics, 2000, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 142–168. Schmidt, Vivien, “European ‘Federalism’ and its Encroachments on National Institutions”, Publius, vol. 29, nro 1,pp. 19–44. Tronchetti, Fabio, “National parliaments as guardians of subsidiarity: A feasible task or an utopist chimera?”, Journal of US-China Public Administration, 2010, vol. 7, no. 9, pp.15-26. Zemánek, Jiři, “Improving the Union’s Democratic Legitimacy: The European Parliament and National Parliaments”, in Ingolf Pernice and José Maria Beneyto Pérez (eds.): The Government of Europe - Institutional Design for the European Union, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 2003, pp. 113-117.

Appendix

Table 2. Communications between national parliamentary chambers and the European Commission, 2006-2009

Chamber Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2006-2009

Assembleia da República Portugal 0 19 65 47 131

Sénat France 18 22 13 12 65

Bundesrat Germany 6 15 18 16 55

Riksdagen Sweden 0 17 16 18 51

Senát Czech Rep. 2 9 11 27 49

House of Lords UK 4 14 12 14 44

Folketinget Denmark 2 10 11 12 35

Senato Italy 0 0 8 17 25

Tweede Kamer (jointly EK)* Netherlands 2 1 5 15 23

Camera dei Deputati Italy 1 0 6 9 16

Bundesrat Austria 0 0 4 10 1

Dáil Éireann / Seanad Éireann** Ireland 0 1 7 6 14

Vouli Ton Ellinon Greece 0 0 3 10 13

Bundestag Germany 1 2 2 3 8

Chambre des Députés Luxembourg 2 0 2 3 7

Seimas Lithuania 2 1 0 3 6

Sejm Poland 1 0 5 0 6

Sénat / Senaat Belgium 2 0 2 2 6

Országgyülés Hungary 1 1 0 3 5

Riigikogu Estonia 2 0 2 1 5

47


Saeima Latvia 0 0 2 3 5

Assemblée Nationale France 1 1 0 2 4

Chambre des Représentants Belgium 0 1 1 2 4

Eerste Kamer* Netherlands 0 0 0 4 4

Nationalrat Austria 0 0 0 4 4

Državni Zbor Slovenia 1 0 0 2 3

House of Commons UK 1 1 1 0 3

Narodno Sobranie Bulgaria * 0 1 2 3

Poslanecká Sněmovna Czech Rep. 1 0 1 1 3

Vouli Antiprosopon Cyprus 0 0 2 1 3

Eduskunta Finland 1 0 0 0 1

Národná Rada Slovakia 1 0 0 0 1

Il-Kamra Tad-Deputati Malta 0 0 0 1 1

Senat Poland 1 0 0 0 1

Camera Deputatilor Romania * 0 0 0 0

Congreso de los Diputados Spain 0 0 0 0 0

Državni Svet Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0

Senado Spain 0 0 0 0 0

Senatul Romania * 0 0 0 0

53 115 200 250 618 * Until 2009, both chambers sent the opinions jointly. ** Both chambers sent the opinions jointly. (Source: Annual Reports 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 on relations between the European Commission and National parliaments)

48


The Transport Success Story: Europeanization in The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania

Eleanor E. Zeff & Ellen B. Pirro Drake University, Iowa State University

E-mail:

[email protected] [email protected]

Web:

http://www.drake.edu/ http://www.iastate.edu/

Received: 17 June Accepted: 29 June

Abstract: This paper explores the nature of success in EU transport policy implementation in three of the newer eastern member states, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania, to see how their governments and administrations are integrating with the European Union. It utilizes the concept of Europeanization (as used by the European Union) to examine how multi level governance works for this one sector of policy implementation. In particular, we focus on supra national, national and regional inputs and development to explain how these nations are integrating their transport sectors within their nations and with the European Union. Our case histories show three different stages of transport sector development: the great progress in the Czech Republic; the plans and programs created by Slovakia with the European Union which should bring notable success within the next five years; and the initial stages of Romania‟s efforts in the transport area. Key words: European Union, multi-level governance, Romania, Slovakia, transport policy,

Introduction

The transport sector of the European Union has been notably successful and remains one of the main engines

for economic development. This is occurring despite the worldwide financial downturn and European

financial upheavals, and despite the wide diversity of goals and interests among the 27 Member States (MS).

This paper explores the nature of this success story by considering EU transport policy implementation in

three of the newer eastern member states to see how their governments and administrations are integrating

with the EU to tackle problems and implement policy in the field of transport. While there are many areas of

concern, we narrow the focus of this research to roads and consider only three of the EU‘s newer member-

states, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania as cases to examine how recent transport policy is

functioning in these newer member states. These three new MS had similar authoritarian and communist pasts

and centralized administrations. They are now all decentralizing and desire better internal and external

transportation links to give their citizens more equal opportunities with the western European states. Thus,

49


these three states have significant similarities to make them comparable, but they also represent the EU‘s

diversity in language, terrain, history and culture, even in the new members. Two of the states, the Czech

Republic and Slovakia joined the EU in 2004 and Romania joined in 2007. Slovakia has joined the Euro club;

the other two states have not.

How To Explain Transport Policy Implementation Successes and Failures?

There are several theories that may have some explanatory value when examining transport policies in the

EU‘s new member states. The EU and early theorists used Neo-functional and federalist explanations to justify

their original plans for accession to the EU. These concepts were useful when the formation of the EU

concerned combining the national governments of European states and there was a lot of politics involved at

the national level in order to justify and legalize the transfer of power to the supranational level. As the

European Union has evolved, and the supranational level institutions have developed more competencies and

authority to make policy, EU governing bodies have gained power, at the expense of national governing

structures. This transferring of power from the national level to the supranational level of governance in the

EU is part of the process of Europeanization. The term, ―Europeanization‖ has many different definitions;1

here we utilize the term in its European Union policy meaning: According to McCormick, ―Europeanization

can be defined as the process by which national policies and government structures have been changed and

brought into alignment by European laws and policies,‖ and further, ―policy in the member states now

develops in response to developments at the European level as well as in response to independent national

decisions and judgments.‖ 2

Assessing the impact of Europeanization on various member states and policies has been an important topic

of research, but has not led to any overall conclusions about either the extent of Europeanization or its effects.

There is some evidence that there has been both convergence and divergence or according to Cowles,

Caporoso and Risse, ― domestic adaptation with national colors‖.3 Vivien Schmidt notes that Europeanization

has had a major impact on the member states‘ governing and policy-making activities.4 She states that the

―EU‘s indirect effects ‗depoliticize‘ national politics through the Europeanization of more and more policy

sectors, which effectively removes them from the national political arena.‖5 Clearly there are many pressures

on policy making in the European Union and in the member states, and it is hard to distinguish ―the effects of

these pressures from the effects of Europeanization.‖6

Multi-level governance (MLG) is another approach to explaining the policy-making process as it moves

through the various governmental levels of the EU. It ―describes the dispersion of authoritative decision

making across multiple territorial levels.‖ 7 MLG evolved as a response to inter-governmentalism, where

research focused on the nation-state, and EU policy was viewed simply as the product of national decisions.

MLG acknowledges that within the EU, decisions are taken and implemented at different governmental levels

not just at the nation-state levels. In particular, MLG offers the idea that researchers also need to consider the

supra national level (the EU institutions), and regional levels along with the national levels. A number of

50


scholars in this area especially Hooghe and Marks, Weiner and Dietz, and Ginsburg,8 have worked to extend

MLG to the policy arena. The advantage of this model is that it incorporates the regions as governance units.

Thus, the nation-state is no longer the center of all policy. Its role is shared with the regions, which under the

EU can have direct contact with the EU. Today, regions often have offices in Brussels, lobby the EU directly

for funds, and incorporate EU directives without reference to their nation states.

Both the concept of Europeanization and the Multi-level governance explanation emphasize policy-making

and examine the devolution of power from national governing units to supranational and regional levels of

governance. These approaches appear to have promise as we try to explain some of the successes occurring in

transport policy contrary to global and national trends.

Multi-Level Governance Revisited

MLG allows researchers and practitioners to explore in depth the complexities of EU policy-making and

implementation. First, it is apparent that the supra national level no longer ―speaks with one voice.‖ Indeed,

while the Commission still initiates EU policy, there are many EU institutions, and outside agencies that advise

the Commission and try to influence its policy decisions, for example, which policies it considers, how it

frames various policy areas, and even the policy decisions it initiates in the transport area. Also, the other major

EU institutions, the European Council and the European Parliament similarly have committees and external

agencies, which provide guidance and try to influence transport policy. Each of the major institutions of the

EU has its own policy goals for the transport policy area and these goals may differ. EU policymaking has

become a very complex process.

Second, at the EU level, a number of agencies have been created to monitor and supervise policy

implementation. Where transport crosses borders, a supra national agency is often the best way to ensure

uniformity of process. So agencies like Galileo and the Rail Authority fall directly under EU supervision rather

than the nations, which are members and end users. And there have been a number of NGO‘s, which have

been created to provide vital services such as safety programs and research to agencies in the transport sector.

Third, the line between supra national and other levels blurs in the initiation of policy, agenda setting, as well

as implementation areas. The EU Transport Council holds regular meetings where stakeholders from Cabinet

Ministers to NGO‘s bring forth their concerns. These concerns are often transmitted to the Commission and

the Directorate Generals for translation into policy initiatives, which later come before the Council and

Parliament as directives. So national agencies, and sub national units as well as non-governmental concerns can

have a direct impact on the policy making process. Some of this same multiplication of decision-making has

been occurring at the nation-state level as well. Most of the member states have created new agencies within

Transport Ministries to implement EU transport directives. These agencies, although reporting to the nation-

state, are often in direct contact with the EU because they receive funding from the EU for various projects.

51


Transport Policy: A Short Look at EU Evolution

Transport has long been an important EU mandate s an early target for Europeanizing efforts. ―The EU

considers mobility, facilitated by good transport networks, to be essential for continued European integration

and economic development. The EU believes that economic growth is inextricably linked to expansion of

transport ties.‖9 From its early beginnings in the 1958 Treaties of Rome, the idea of a united Europe

envisioned a common economic marketplace, which included the elimination of trade barriers and a common

transport policy to facilitate union. Moving people and goods cheaply and efficiently was always a crucial

variable for the establishment of a dynamic economy and a cohesive European entity (union). Although the

early founders (see Article 74 of the EEC Treaty) envisioned a common transport policy, an actual CTP does

not exist despite the fact that cross-border transport and other common transport policies have supported and

contributed to the success of the Single Market. Functional and Liberal Market approaches drove and were

used to explain much of this development. Despite its slow start, progress towards the EU‘s CTP was

underway even before the 2004 Enlargement. Attention to common transport goals (interoperability,

improved linkages) facilitated advances in Europeanizing transport policy such as: encouraging member states

to develop and complete major transport projects, or Trans European networks (TEN-T); harmonizing transit

documents and drivers‘ hours; authorizing trucks from one country to pick up and deliver goods in another

country (cabotage); reducing emission levels and improving safety records.

The European Union lays out its transport goals in White Papers, published every ten years. The 2000, White

paper was entitled ― European Transport Policy for 2010: Time to Decide.‖ 10

In the area of road transport,

the White Paper listed several objectives, including: improving quality in the road transport sector, creation of

Community drivers‘ licenses and harmonization of driving hours and licensing rules, improving mobility

throughout the Union, continued development of the Trans-European Network-Transport (TEN-T),

improving road safety, adopting a policy on effective charging for transport such as alignment of the principles

for charging for infrastructure (eurovignettes), interoperability of road transport with other means of transport

and improving cabotage, the carriage of goods in a country by haulers whose vehicles are registered in another

country.

In 2011, Europeans enjoy great personal mobility and open national markets, thanks largely to the elimination

of physical and technical barriers promoted in the EU‘s Common Transport Policy (CTP). By 2010, the EU‘s

transport sector provided more than 10 million jobs. 11

The success of the EU‘s transport policy is putting

enormous strains on transport systems throughout the EU, especially in the newer member states where young

governments are trying to catch up to Western European states. Increased mobility has often resulted in higher

levels of pollution, traffic congestion, large budget expenditures and higher fuel consumption, all of which can

ultimately reduce economic efficiency. As the number of autos increases, cross border travel expands, and the

major needs of lorries traveling across Europe continues to grow, a significant number of issues ranging from

licensing to haulage concerns have to be handled at the supra national level, because the MS no longer controls

policy in these areas. The most recent White Paper: ―Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area- Toward

a Competitive and Resource Efficient Transport System‖, issued in March 2011, emphasizes ―Sustainable

Mobility‖. The roadmap envisions a new decade that continues to grow a competitive transport system,

increase mobility, remove remaining barriers and fuel growth and development, while at the same time

reducing Europe‘s dependence on imported oil and cutting carbon emissions.

52


The Supra National Level: EU Governance

The Commission:

The Commission‘s Directorate-General (DG) for Mobility and Transport12

(DG TREN) is responsible for the

EU‘s transport policy. In February 2011, the EU‘s Commissioner for Transport is European Commission

Vice-President Siim Kallas. The Commission‘s newly reformed transport policy goals for 2011 and beyond

stress the need for a more sustainable future for transport, including better integration of all forms of

transport, greater use of technology and systems that are more user- friendly.13

The Commission will promote

transnational regulations that can stimulate environmentally friendly and socially responsible transportation.14

Along with the White papers, the Commission also has developed ―Green papers‖, ―action plans‖ on key

transport issues, such as urban transport, freight transport logistics and promoting greener transport policies.

The Commission also has the power of initiating and overseeing the EU‘s budget and it is also the oversight

body for five agencies, each responsible for one aspect of transport policy implementation. The Maritime

Safety Agency (EMSA), and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) have oversight responsibility for

safety measures in their respective areas. The European Railway Agency (ERA) handles all European rail

networks. The European Agency for Competitiveness and Innovation (EACI) provides funds for

development of transport links as well as other improvements. TEN-TEA (Trans European Networks)

promote European networks through linkage projects, which the EU funds. In addition, there are several

programs, which also have transport components. Marco Polo funds green development and has undertaken

projects which will make transport less polluting. ITS is an Action Program to provide Intelligent Transport

information to those using the transportation systems throughout Europe.15

The Council of Ministers:

The Treaty of Rome established the basic content of the common transport policy to include the

establishment of common rules, the conditions under which non-resident carriers could operate within the

member states and measures to improve safety. EU policy must be initiated in the Commission, but the

Council can petition the Commission to take up various policies, if necessary. In the Council of Ministers,

transport issues and policy are handled in the Transport, Telecommunications and Energy (TTE) Council,

which meets every two months in different configurations. The Council acts by qualified majority voting and,

even before the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, both the Council and the Parliament considered transport

issues under co-decision (now considered ordinary legislative) procedures. The Council continues to work n

establishing and implementing common rules that apply to international transport affecting the MS, improving

and adding to the transport networks (TENs), as well as upgrading transport safety and other services. It is

also committed to promoting a more sustainable policy for the future.

53


The European Parliament:

The European Parliament meets in full sessions and also in special committees, such as the Committee on

Regions, to work on and pass Transport issues. Transport issues are mainly handled in the TRAN Committee

before they come to a vote on the Parliament floor. Brian Simpson chaired this committee during the

Hungarian Presidency of January to June 2011. In order for a transport policy to become European Law, it

must pass both the Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The European Parliament, also has its own

Permanent Committee for Transport, Public Works and Water Management, which meets on a regular basis to

discuss transport policy objectives and co-decision issues on transportation.

While the Parliament is less an initiator than other EU institutions, it is still concerned with safety on all

transport methods, passenger rights, and security. The EU Parliament has also been working closely with the

regions to better utilize the EU‘s Structural Funds to promote growth. This has involved developing transport

links for more remote areas (Mountain and Island policy). It is also currently developing ―A Strategy for the

Danube Region‖ which will try to integrate different modes of transportation to better develop this EU area of

200 million EU citizens. Since the Lisbon Treaty went into effect in 2009, the Parliament also has more

oversight power regarding the budget, and it is taking this role very seriously and using its ―discharge

authority‖ to make sure that structural funds are well spent at the member state and regional levels.

Parliament‘s new authority, especially its oversight of the budget, can be seen as an attempt to use multi level

governance procedures and supranational institutions to overcome governance problems at state and regional

levels.

The Court of Justice of the European Union:

The recently renamed Court of Justice of the European Union is actually two tribunals (The Court of First

Instance and the Administrative Tribunal) dealing with all aspects of EU regulation and disputes. There are

three areas of interest for transport policy. First of all, the former European Court of Justice established the

dominance of EU law over the national law of member states. Thus, EU directives are to be carried out even

when they contradict domestic state law. Second, the Court in 1979 definitively established the principle of

Free Movement of Goods throughout the European Union. Finally, in a series of cases beginning in 1993, the

court has been and is continuing to establish the principle of free movement of people. One of the Court‘s

main functions is to enforce compliance with EU directives. The Commission refers offenders to the Court, so

that the Court can determine the legitimacy of the complaint. If the member state is found to be non-

compliant, it can be fined. Both the Czech Republic and Slovakia have had recent or have pending cases

before the Court regarding transport issues. Court actions reinforce the primacy of EU law in the transport

area, and demonstrate the Europeanization of many transport policies as well as the need to think about EU

policies from a MLG perspective.

54


European Agencies:

Besides the Commission‘s special agencies there are also a number of other transport-related agencies and

centers that are playing a growing role in transport policy, at the EU level as well as in the member-states at the

national and regional levels of government. These bodies help with policy from initiation, to regulation to

implementation. One such center is the Transport Research Knowledge Centre (TRKC), which provides an

overview of research activities at European and national level. The European Road Safety Observatory

(ERSO) is a website for all European road safety professionals. ERSO is the gateway into a central resource of

European road safety data, knowledge and links. This pilot website is one of the final results of SafetyNet,

which is an integrated project funded by DG-TREN Transport and Energy) of the European Commission.

The objective of the project was to build the framework of a European Road Safety Observatory, which would

house data and knowledge on road safety.

The Committee of the Regions: The Committee of the Regions is the EU's assembly of regional and local representatives. The mission of its

344 members from all 27 EU Member States is to involve regional and local authorities and the communities

they represent in the EU's decision-making process and to inform them about EU policies. The European

Commission, the European Parliament and the Council are obliged to consult the Committee in policy areas

affecting regions and cities. The Committee can appeal to the EU Court of Justice if its rights are infringed or

it believes that an EU law violates the subsidiarity principle or fails to respect regional or local powers. This

committee works closely with other EU institutions and agencies on Transport issues. The committee issued

its response to the new White Paper and has also issued a recent report on Road Safety (March 2011). This

committee works closely with other EU institutions and agencies on transport issues because of the impact

transport ha on town and country planning and the delicate matter of external costs.

The EU Budget and Financing of Transport Policies and The Court of Auditors

Currently the EU is operating under the 2007-2013 Budget, but planning for the 2013-2020 EU Budget has

already begun. For each budgetary period, the EU puts a cap on the amount of spending that can occur. The

Commission has traditionally had control over the budget. It proposes the budget and puts it into action.

Recently, the Lisbon Treaty has given more power to the Council and the Parliament to oversee EU spending,

modify budget proposals, and the EP can now even reject the proposed budget. The European Commission

and member state authorities jointly manage 80% of the structural funds but, in reality, the Commission has

very few resources to monitor EU spending on national projects and initiatives. Since the Lisbon Treaty has

given the Parliament more control over the budget, it has been flexing its muscles, and its Budgetary Control

Committee is demanding more assurances from the European Commission that action will be taken against

55


EU states that mismanage EU money. The EU‘s Court of Auditors is still another watchdog over the budget,

and it annually monitors how the EU Structural funds are spent. In 2009, it reported that 95% of the funds

were correctly reported. 16

These coveted Structural Funds include the European Regional Development

Fund (ERDF), which is the largest fund in terms of volume.17

In addition to these structural funds, the EU

has set up Cohesion Funds, which are intended for the financing of major events in the field of environment

and transport. Cohesion funds are intended for all EU countries whose GNP is less than 90% of the EU

average.18

Because transport infrastructure is important for achieving the EU‘s goals of free movement for goods and

services, the EU, through the Commission and its Mobility and Transport DG, supports and heavily funds the

TEN-T (Trans-European Networks-Transport) projects. These transport infrastructure projects are examples

of how EU funding, and especially the structural funds, are used to facilitate better connections between the

member states. In 2006, EU 27 had 5.000.000 km of paved roads, out of which 61.600 km were motorways

(the largest roads). Total EU investment on Transport infrastructure for the period 2000-2006 was € 859

billion.19

Transport expenses are continually increasing, but the TEN-Ts are also growing and improving.

Many new road projects were completed in 2010. The roads receiving the bulk of EU funds, however, are the

roads that connect two or more member states together, rather than the smaller, internal roads.

Transport in the Czech Republic: Successes and Failures

Background:

Both Europeanization and MLG governance help explain Czech successes in transport policy implementation.

The Czech Republic has been trying to balance the supra-national goals of the EU with its own national goals,

and also to disperse some power to its newly developing regional authorities. On the one hand, there are the

EU directives on safety and pollution and the need to integrate into the EU‘s main transportation routes. On

the other hand, there are the aspirations of the Czechs for economic development and well being for its

citizens. Even before accession into the EU in 2004, the Czech Republic recognized the need to develop new

laws and grow its economy in order to improve public transport services and establish better transport

infrastructures to fulfill the growing transport demands of a member-state. The Sustainable Development

Strategy of the Czech Republic, based on Government resolution No. 1242 of 8 December 2004 set forth an

overarching program for transport development. The Czech Republic is located in the heart of Europe and as

such is a natural transit route for roadway transportation in both directions: to and from Scandinavia, Poland

and Germany in the north to Austria, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece in the South; as well as to and

from France and the Benelux countries in the west to Slovakia, Hungary, and the non-EU countries of

Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia in the east. Almost immediately upon candidacy, Czech roadways began to see

great increases of transit traffic. At the time of accession there were only 518KM of expressways and 127,672

km of paved roads.20

In July 2005, the Czech Ministry of Transport proposed the current Transportation Policy for 2005 – 2013,

setting forth its first national strategic objectives for transport as a member state. The national goals reflected

56


both the EU‘s overall objectives for sustainability and regionalization and Czech national goals for growth and

development. At the same time, the Czech Republic needed adequate financing to enhance transport safety

and security and support transport development in the various Czech regions.21 While some regional and

financing goals differ, both the EU and the Czech Republic concur that achieving certain planned transport

goals would promote economic development, within the individual states as well as throughout the EU. By

2011, the Czech Republic had developed a good system of roads and public transport, with 7 highways

crossing the country and more being constructed. It is noteworthy that in the Czech Republic, there are now

excellent transportation routes of two types: transit routes through the nation to other EU members and

routes in and around Prague and Brno, which are the industrial hubs of the country. Notably lacking are good

roadways through the more rural and eastern areas of the nation.

Political Instability - The Czech Republic National Government

With a multi party system containing at least 5 major parties, each election raises new concerns about

governmental stability and operation. Many elections end in stalemates, with no coalition or single party able to

form a government. The summer and fall of 2006 were occupied with the domestic political crisis rather than

policy-making. The Czech Republic did not have an actual Government until January 2007, when Mirek

Topalanek finally formed a government. The next election cycle showed similar instability. Another problem

occurred when the Czech Republic assumed the EU Presidency but without the support of its president, who

remained anti-EU throughout the 6 month term. Furthermore, during this Presidency, the Czech Government

fell yet again, leaving both the country and national policy-making in jeopardy. Indeed, the Czech Republic

missed a golden opportunity to take advantage of its Presidency to press for Czech priorities. The continuing

instability of the government restricts the development of policy making at the national level. For example, it

has handicapped the emergence and operation of national policy networks, which are composed of ―stake-

holders‖ in various areas including transportation. To handle many transport issues, lorry companies work

with the EU in Brussels over Prague, so advances in EU mandated policies might continue despite national

governance problems. Vivien Schmidt notes this trend in her book, Democracy in Europe: The EU and

National Polities.22

There are four major areas where there have been other notable successes in the transport sectors in the Czech

Republic: administration, roads, financing and regionalization.

Administration: Transformation in the Czech Government Agencies with Responsibilities for Transport

One of the biggest problems facing the Czech Republic before its 2004 accession was its lack of trained and

experienced bureaucrats and an overly centralized and corrupt administration. The EU Commission expressed

concern right before accession at the lack of administrative capabilities to handle necessary changes and added

57


responsibilities for the transport sector. 23

For example, in 2004, the EU allotted Structural Fund money to the

ten new member states to help them improve their transportation and other infrastructure systems by 2007.

The EU Commission thought that the states would use all the funds by the fall of 2006, but in September

2006, more than half of the money had not been spent due to the new members‘ inability to administer their

allotted funds. The Czech Republic fared especially badly, spending less than one-third of the money by fall

2006.24

The threat of EU funds reverting to the EU if they were not spent has spurred the Czech Republic to

action. As of 2010, 90% of all funds had been spent.25

Since 2000, there has also been notable improvements and streamlining of the Czech bureaucracy. The

Transport administration within the Czech Republic has been expanding rapidly. Within the Ministry of

Transport itself, there are five major departments, which handle the various demands of business, the public

and the EU. Each in turn has several sub-departments. The Department of Driver Administration has the

Road Safety Authority. The Department for the Road Network includes departments for Motorways, Roads

and Bridges, Road Administration and Maintenance, and Transport Engineering. Vehicle Approval and

Regulations includes departments for Regulations and Vehicle Registration and Vehicle Approval. The

Department for Road Transport includes Freight Transport and International passenger transport. Finally

there is the Department of Public Transport to oversee bus and tram transport domestically. At the national

level, the Ministry of Transport, a Cabinet level position headed by Vit Barta in the new Government elected

in May 2010, is in charge of transport in the Czech Republic. This Ministry handles both national and regional

transport issues, although regional and EU level authorities also have both financing and oversight abilities.

Corruption is a constant worry and the newly elected, rightist, Czech government came to power on an anti-

corruption drive. The Ministry supervises both national and regional transit policies and also works with the

European Union on these policies.

Roads

The Road and Motorway Directorate of the Czech Republic (RMD CR) administers and manages the road

divisions of national transport, and was founded by the Ministry of Transport and Communications in 1997.

Highways in the Czech Republic are called either motorways or expressways, with motorways the larger road.

In 2010, the Road and Motorway Directorate had 1700 employees.26

The organization has its headquarters in

Prague and is divided into four sections consisting of internal affairs, construction, operations and commercial,

and economic. The Directorate also oversees the new regional divisions in the country. There are two

motorway divisions in Prague and Brno and 13 regional investment and road/rail administrations in Prague,

Ceské Budejovice, Plzen, Karlovy Vary, Chomutov, Liberec, Hradec Králové, Pardubice, Jihlava, Brno,

Olomouc, Zlín and Ostrava.27

Before accession in 2003, the regions took control of the maintenance and

construction of 2nd and 3rd class roads. Motorways and 1st class roads remained under the control of the

Directorate of Roads and Motorways at the national level. Since 2004, ecological and green groups there have

been increasing their opposition to building new roads and motorways. Despite opposition from these national

groups, the number of roads has increased and overall citizen mobility has improved. Because much transport

policy is now mandated at the EU supranational level, individual states must follow these directives in order to

receive funding, and these motivations often override national political objections.

58


To help implement and formulate transport policies, the Czech Republic also has a Transport Research

Centre. The CDV is the only state research institute under the responsibility of the Ministry of Transport. It

provides scientific research and technological development activities in all transport fields. Both local and

national authorities use results of CDV-wide activities and they contribute to transport development in

significant ways. 28 There is also the Government Council for Road Safety, which operates independently from

the BSIP.

Road transport is one of the most improved areas in the Czech transport sector. However, two trends

combine to create problems on the roadways. First, the strong economic growth rates in the Czech Republic

mean increased lorry traffic on the roadways, and lorry transit from other EU members as well. It is well

known that lorries take a much harder toll on roadways than automobiles. Second, the Czech Republic has one

of the highest rates of auto purchase in the EU. As economic conditions improve, many families are buying

vehicles and using the roadways both for work and for recreation. Heavy road use is leading to increased

pollution, and severe traffic congestion especially around the capitol, Prague. But often thanks to EU

monetary support, by 2010, there were many plans in place in the Czech Republic to improve the situation.

Some new roads and motorways have recently been or are nearing completion (including the TEN-T

Katowice-Brno/Zilina and Brno-Wien motorways). 29 These roads should help cope with growing

international road transport and improve congestions on existing roads. Reconstruction and maintenance of

existing national and regional roads should also ensure improved network capacity and lower levels of energy

consumption to protect the environment.30

To relieve the severe congestion in the capitol and ease transit for international travel, the Government

planned a major project, the ring road, to provide both access to major arteries and take much of the auto

traffic off Prague streets. In 2010, the Road and Motorway Directorate of the Czech Republic (RSD) opened a

major part of the ring road encircling the country‘s capital. The much-anticipated section connecting the D5

motorway from Plzeň and Germany, and the D1 from Brno and Slovakia took a long time to complete. This

new motorway will benefit all drivers, not just around, because the new section provides for better traffic

management and connects the motorway network between the country‘s western and eastern parts. The new

section should alleviate the current unacceptable traffic volume in the south of the capital, as it will accelerate

traffic and relieve the Jižní spojka and Barrandovská spojka roads of transit traffic, so the Central Bohemian

region as a whole will benefit.31

Financing Czech Transport

Because funding for roads is an important consideration for the success of the Common Transport Policy, the

EU has contributed considerable funds, from several sources, to the newer East Central European states, both

before accession and continuing through the present budget (2006-2013) allocations. Before accession, the

Czech Republic received funding from the EU‘s Phare program for both projects and technical assistance, as

well as from the ISPA contributions and ERDF sources and the Cohesion fund. Phare funding mostly

benefited road transport and not so much rail transport. ―The contributions received from EU funds helped

significantly to extend the investment in the Czech transport infrastructure, especially in rail corridors,

59


motorways and major roads. Special attention was dedicated to the improvement of infrastructure in

regions.‖32

In one study in 2005, it was estimated that road construction accounted for 4.6% of employees in the Czech

Republic every year, so financing in this sector is important to the whole Czech economy. 33

Since 2007, the

Czech Republic has been operating under a new program: its Operational Program, "Transport" for 2007-

2013. The Czech Transportation Policy for 2005 – 2013 has several goals for infrastructure pricing: fair

charging of the infrastructure use covering all costs incurred; from 2006 onwards, a performance-based road

toll system gradually introduced to cover costs linked with operation; maintenance and renewal of road

infrastructure; compensation for damage caused by transport to the environment; and public health

compensation for congestion and for damage from transport accidents. The exact investment activity for

motorways is guaranteed at divisions in Prague and Brno and for first class roads at the 13 regional investment

road administrations.

However, the Czech Republic could not pay for these projects without help from the EU. Financing transport

improvements is an ongoing problem in the Czech Republic. Funding comes from many sources, including

the EU as well as from national and private sources. The European Investment Bank (EIB) is lending CZK 14

billion (approx. EUR 530 million) to finance priority transport projects covered by the Operational Program

for Transport of the Czech National Strategic Reference Framework for the period 2007-2013.34 The Prague

Ring projects, (the 512 D1 – Vestec and the 513 Lahovice – Slivenec) have been proposed for co-financing

from the EU‘s Cohesion Fund within the Operational Program ‗Transport‘. The Czech Government has

applied for a non-refundable EU contribution as part of Priority Axis 2, which concerns the construction and

upgrading of the TEN-T Motorway and Road Network. ―Road infrastructure in the Czech Republic is one of

the most significant fields to make effective use of EU funding. Total allocations from the Operational

Program "Transport" in the 2007-2013 budget period for projects by the Czech Road and Motorway

Directorate amount to more than 70 billion crowns. The second half of 2008 was especially important: During

this period, the Ministry of Transport approved an additional 15 projects involving EU funding‖. 35

Within designated parameters, these projects will be funded from the Cohesion Fund or from the European

Fund for Regional Development up to 85% of their total approved costs. Total allocations from EU funds for

the Czech Road and Motorway Directorate in 2007-2013 amount to 2,658,713,468 Euros. The State Fund for

Transport Infrastructure and various EIB loans must cover the remaining expenses.36

Road infrastructure in the Czech Republic is partially paid by users through motorway vignettes, road tax and

excise tax on mineral oils. The State Fund of Transport Infrastructure invests in infrastructure, construction

and maintenance, the latter by about (9.1%). The rest of the infrastructure cost is covered by a state subsidy.

The Ministry of Finance funds road projects through a two-tier process. Private companies are working with

the government on setting up and maintaining these toll systems.37

This scheme is just one of many new ideas

that the EU is encouraging to promote some public and private cooperation in funding projects (Public-

private partnerships, PPPs), so the states will not be so dependent on the EU for transport funding.

The joint financing of many transport projects in the Czech Republic highlights some of the interactions of the

EU with the member-states, but also the dependence of these states on not only EU support but also on EU

60


funding. This kind of mutual cooperation does not fit easily into the MLG model, but does encourage

Europeanization where decisions are taken at the supranational level. Project 514 Lahovice – Slivenec was co-

financed by the EU from the Cohesion Fund as part of the 2004-2006 programming period. The EU‘s

contribution provided in the form of non-refundable aid under the EC resolution amounted to EUR

77,550,300 (CZK 1,976,223,535), or about 30% of the eligible project costs. The total cost of all three new

projects was CZK 18.3 billion exclusive of tax.38

In many cases, without EU funding, transport projects could

not be or would not have been accomplished.

Table 1: Approved Funding for Czech Transport Projects

Project name Amount of EU financing (in CZK)

I/34 Česká Bělá obchvat 358 798 534

I/11 a I/56 propojení spojka S1 v Opavě 691 917 704

I/28 Dobroměřice - Odolice 372 917 894

R7 MÚK Bítozeves - MÚK Vysočany 560 516 231

R7 Sulec obchvat 472 032 319

I/21 Nová Hospoda - Kočov přeložka 580 453 095

I/16 Řepov - hr.okr. Jičín 177 985 782

I/14 Jablonec nad Nisou - Tanvald 338 052 122

I/16 Hr.okr. JC a MB - obchvat Sobotky - Samšina - Ohařice - křiž. Lochov 128 269 088

I/38 Habry - Havlíčkův Brod obnova živičného krytu 166 252 322

I/11 Hrádek - průtah ( SŽDC) 813 601 651

I/27 Třemošná - přeložka 810 926 843

I/49 Zlín - Malenovice II. 313 614 953

I/38 Jihlava obchvat jih 204 796 135

I/11 Český Těšín obchvat 439 837 848

Total projects approved in second half of 200839 6 429 972 521

A current problem for Czech transportation, however, is the precarious economic situation in Europe and in

the Czech Republic. The sluggish economy diminishes the absorption capacity of the country and its ability to

use European funds efficiently and without delays, e.g.: high deficits of the State budget (2003: 12.5% of GDP;

2004: 3.0% of GDP), and causes tensions in the expense side. A very high level of mandatory and quasi-

mandatory (indispensable) expense (2004: 89% of total State budget revenue) has often restricted the state‘s

ability for co-financing, and the public debt (2004: 36.8% of GDP), especially the indebtedness of some

municipalities becomes a hurdle in drawing or raising EU funds. Another problem is the relatively low quality

of projects, which leads to a high rejection rate at the EU level. Also, there have been complications in

preparing the construction process, which adds to the limited ability to absorb allocated funds40

, but these

problems are gradually diminishing as Czech expertise in project development improves. Despite setbacks,

improvements in Czech transport are apparent in the growth of the number of roads and the improved

programming.

61


Table 2: Structural/Cohesion Funds Allocation (2007-2013 Budget in €s)41 Total Allocation Czech Republic Slovakia

% of Transportation €26,303 €11,361

in total allocation

28.6% 30.2%

% of TEN-T in total 14.9% 19.7%

Regionalization in the Czech Republic

Transport in the Regions and Rural Areas: Public Transport (PT) in the Czech Republic

A primary purpose for enlarging the EU was to decentralize governments and administrations in the former

East European states. One approach to decentralization was to divide states and services into several regional

administrative districts. For statistical purposes, Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union (EU)

established an administrative division for all European member countries, which is called the Nomenclature of

Territorial Units for Statistics or NUTS. The reasoning for NUTS is to have uniform divisions throughout

Europe, so that it is possible to compare data among the member countries. The NUTS division has existed

since 1988. Geodan (geographical data catalog) has a data set consisting of 4 NUTS levels: NUTS 0 to NUTS

3. LAU1 refers to another category of regional units belonging to the first level (formerly known as NUTS

4).42

Decentralization was an important part of EU policy making. Once regionalization went into effect many

road transport policy decisions were taken at the regional level depleting national power over transport at two

levels.

Thus the new mandate for regionalization affected Transport services. Services provided by public transport

(PT) are considered to be a key attribute of the quality of life in rural areas43

. Commuting to work, school or

basic services is an important condition for living in the Czech rural areas at micro-regional level.44

The

Regional Authorities took over the responsibility for PT organization45

while the District Authorities ceased to

exist as public administration bodies as of January 1, 2003. The Regional Authorities acquired competences for

basic transport services in the region. The era of the totally state owned enterprise was over. 46

Integrated

transport systems (ITS) were established under the competence of Regional Authorities (NUTS3), which often

take over the role of a so-called ITS coordinator.

Furthermore, as part of the Accession agreement, the Czech Republic was required to adopt the EU legislation

related to the organization of PT within common transport policy guidelines. ―This fact increased the pressure

on a more reasonable financial management, and enhanced transparency (at least in the sector of bus

transport) during the quantification of provable losses incurred by operators of specific lines (or even

connections).‖47

This positive decentralization of competences from the national to the regional level

increased the degree of Regional Authorities‘ emancipation. However, a consequence of this situation has been

the growth of some regional disparities in the supply of PT services in the Czech Republic, because of the

heterogeneous approach to PT organization (economic, spatial, modal, integrated) at the level of NUTS3.48

62


New legislation, pertaining to transport services in the regions, went into effect in 2009 and will be mandatory

for all EU Member States, in the field of public services for passenger transport(See table 3-Appendix), and

from the perspective of the Czech legislation they will significantly modify the institutional view and assure

more PT services in regions.49

The Slovak Republic: Successes and Failures in Road Transport

Background

Slovakia is the gateway to the east for the EU with major border crossings into the Ukraine (former Soviet

Union), and surrounded by Austria and other new EU members (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary).

Another issue for Slovakia is that its eastern regions are more remote from central Europe and border on non-

EU states (Ukraine), so there is less available EU funding for development of these regions, and, in addition,

the tendencies toward centralization remain strong in Slovakia. For example, roads and railways in the Eastern

parts of the country remain underdeveloped. On the other hand, in the western regions of the country some

regional progress in transport networks is apparent. Transport in the region of Bratislava is progressing well

with new bridges and feeder roads to nearby cities.50

Slovakia inherited poor roadways, and recognizes it needs to develop its transportation systems in order to

fully participate in the benefits of EU membership. Its accomplishments have not been as great or as quickly

realized as those in the Czech Republic, but Slovakia is poised to make great strides in the area of transport

with the aid of the EU.

In 2006, shortly after accession, there were 42,717 km of roadways in the country, and 313 km of expressways.

In 2010, the expressways had risen to 704.7 km with 43 km more under construction. In addition, in 2009, 4

bridges and 17.8 km of roads were repaired and 9 intersections had collision points removed (all from the 2009

report).51

64


Slovakia has 37,500 km paved highways and 500 km unpaved highways. The highways in Slovakia are divided

into motorways and expressways. As of 2005, the state-owned, National Motorway Company of Slovakia

(NDS) has been managing these roads. The first modern highway in Slovakia was the motorway towards

Prague whose construction was started at the dawn of the automobile age on May 2, 1939, but never

completed until recently. NDS is currently managing and maintaining 225.25 km of motorways and 97.86 km

of expressways. The government passed five roadway acts in 2009 to be funded through the use of tolls.

Slovakia currently has both a motorway sticker and is building electronic toll collections. Roadways are the

major place where MTPT has requested additional funds from the government budget to fulfill various

projects. Three major roadway construction projects are underway. D1, D2 and D3. In addition there are plans

to by-pass the heavily travelled Danube corridor. Also needed is relief of congestion around Bratislava. As of

January 1, 2010 the situation was:53

Table 4: Expressways and Motorways Expressways Motorways

Total length 704.7 1214.61

In Operation 377.8 225.81

Under construction 43.4 17.60

In stage of preparation 283.5 971.20

In 2009, some construction had to be cancelled for two reasons. First was a lack of funding. Second, in several

cases there were also problems encountered in construction. The latter might have been avoided with better

planning and surveying.

Regionalization There are eight administrative regions in Slovakia. These regions are: Banska Bystrica, Bratislava, Kosice, Nitra,

Presov, Trencin, Trnava, Zilina. The Act of 4 July 2001, on the self-government of the ―higher territorial

units‖ is the basic statutory regulation of the Slovakian regions. The Act was amended several times in 2003,

2004 and 2005. The Act depicts the HTU as ―autonomous territorial self-government and administrative unit

of the Slovak Republic‖. The Act establishes eight HTU: the region of Bratislava, with the seat in the city of

Bratislava; the region of Trnava, with the seat in the city of Trnava; the region of Trencin, with the seat in

Trencin; the region of Nitra, with the seat in the city Nitra; the region of Zilina, with the seat in Zilina; the

region of Banska Bystrica, with the seat in Banska Bystrica; the region of Kosice, with the seat in Kosice; and

the region of Presov, with the seat in the city of Presov. 54

Regionalization has progressed more slowly in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. There are a few possible

explanations for this slower development. One of Slovakia‘s development problems has been its ability to use

the EU funds that it has been allocated. During and even after the accession period, around 2004, the Slovak

infrastructure for implementing policies was not well developed. This weakness was especially apparent when

it came to planning technical projects such as roadways. To tackle this problem, in November 2010, The

European Commission and Slovakia have launched a Joint Road Map (JRM) to assure a timely absorption and

more effective use of European Regional Development Funds (ERDF) and the Cohesion Funds (CF) in

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slovakia

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Motorway

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Expressway

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prague

65


Slovakia. Investment in transport infrastructure accounts for 30.5% of the total allocation.55

The Joint Road

Map shows that more effective collaboration between the European Commission and the Slovak authorities is

possible. 56

Dirk Ahner, Director General of the European Commission‘s Regional Policy Department, said:

"The adoption of the Joint Road Map shows the commitment of the European Commission to continue to

work closely with the Slovak government and partners to address any bottlenecks identified in programme

delivery and target those investment priorities which have so far performed more slowly." 57

Map 1: Location of Individual Regional Centers in Slovakia 58

The EU has pushed to develop stronger regional policies and to take more decisions at lower levels of

government: the subsidiarity principle of taking decisions at the lowest possible level. This policy emphasis

seemed to make a lot of sense as it diffuses power and takes pressure off the EU institutions and the national

governments, and it gives local areas more power to decide what is best for them, rather than having policy

forced upon them. It would seem that the regions, in many cases, would be able to make more appropriate

decisions for themselves, as they know the conditions best for their regions. Also, regionalization is a safety

wall against the excessive centralization that existed under the former Communist regimes. The goals for

regionalization were to empower more people and help democratize the state and equalize opportunities

among the regions. In reality, regionalization has also made policy making in the EU even more complex than

before, and it is taking longer to accomplish than previously envisioned. The EU is also failing to advance

regionalization when it funds projects in regions that are centrally located rather than in all regions or in

regions that are more remote.

66


Financing Slovakian Transport

It is noteworthy that Slovakia failed to spend all the Cohesion funding from the EU provided for developing

the transport system prior to accession. The funds were to run from 2004 – 2006. Several extensions were

made. One final extension was made due to the ―global financial crisis‖ but the funds were ―closed out‖ in

2009. 59

On 13 September 2007, the European Commission approved an Operational Program for Slovakia for the

2007-2013 period. The Operational Program ― Transport ‖ falls within the Convergence Objective framework

and has a total budget of around €3.8 billion. Community investment through the European Regional

Development Fund (ERDF) amounts to some €877 million, and through the Cohesion Fund to around €2.3

billion. This funding represents approximately 29.4% of the total EU investment earmarked for Slovakia under

the Cohesion Policy for 2007-13.60

The priorities of the Operational Program are:

Priority 1: Railway infrastructure [approximately 24.4% of total funding]

Priority 2: Road infrastructure TEN-T [approximately 30.3% of total funding]

Priority 3: Intermodal transport infrastructure [approximately 3.2% of total funding]

Priority 4: Infrastructure for integrated transport systems [approximately 14.7% of

total funding]

Priority 5: Road infrastructure (expressways and first-class roads) [approximately 23.1% of total funding]

Priority 6: Public railway passenger transport [approximately 2.8% of total funding]

The Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications in Slovakia is the managing authority for the

Operational Program.61

Table 5: Breakdown of finances by priority axis 62

Priority Axis EU Contribution Nat’l Public Contribution Total Public contribution

Railway infrastructure 782,746,878 138,131,802 920,878,680

Road Infrastructure, TEN-T 972,333,473 171, 588,260, 1,143,921,733

Intermodal transport infrastructure

102,620,947 18,109,579 120,730,526

Infrastructure for integrated transport systems

471,794,2000 83,257,800 555,052,000

Road Infrastructure 740,794,961 130,728,523 555,052,000

Public railway passenger transport

8, 510,567 88,510,567 177,021,134

Technical assistance 48,103,569 8,488,865 56,592,434

During 2009, EU funds were drawn upon, 207,594,717 while the Slovak Republic utilized 70,058,207 from its

budget. A number of significant projects accounted for these fund including two new railway stations at

Poprad and Presov; electrification of the tracks in areas surrounding Bratislava, and maintenance and repair of

bridges and road sections on the border with the Czech Republic. PPP (Public Private Partnership) projects

begun in 2009 include the D1 motorway cited above, an expressway, R1, and the D2 motorway, which began

construction in 2010.

67


Successes and Failures in Road Transport. The case of Romania

Background

Like the Czech Republic, Romania occupies a strategic position bordering a number of other countries. It is

surrounded by other EU members and potential members and also has borders with the eastern nations of

Ukraine and Moldova. Thus, when it comes to transport Romania is a logical transit route. However, despite

increases in traffic since accession, Romania‘s poor infrastructure leads many shippers to seek alternate routes.

In effect, Romania is still in the initial stages of developing its roadways with two major goals: l. to modernize

and upgrade all routes and 2. to integrate its roadways with the European Union.

Romania acceded to the EU getting extensions for much of the work on roadways. Because of the poor

condition of the road infrastructure and the considerable financial resources needed for road modernization

and development,63 Romania requested a transition period until December 31st 202264 regarding the

implementation of the EU Council Directive 96/53 concerning the maximum authorized dimensions and

weights in international traffic for certain road vehicles circulating within the EU space.

In 2008, there were 80,893 km of roadways. Of these only 5983 km were ―European‖ roads (freeways). 22,042

were ―modernized‖ roads (paved) while much of the rest remained gravel, dirt or unpaved. It is noted that

statistics available from 2004 – 2008 show little to no change in these numbers. Romania continues to face

serious problems regarding road infrastructure especially with respect to three aspects65: a. limited capacity to

absorb increased internal, regional, and international traffic; b. poor quality of the pavement and low bearing

capacity of the infrastructure; and c. lack of adequate urban bypass routes and the existence of more than 400

railway crossings (which lead to traffic bottlenecks). Many bridges are inadequate to handle the increase in

traffic occurring throughout the country. Between 2003 and 2006, international traffic doubled. From 2006 to

2008 national traffic increased 66%. 66

The European Union has stepped in to assist Romania. As in Slovakia, the EU and Romania have developed

a 2007-2013 program for transport development, the Sectoral Operational Programme for Transport (SOPT).

It is through these new programs that the EU is trying to continue the process of Europeanization begun

during the accession period. Under this program, Romania has prioritized transport projects and worked with

the EU to utilize structural funding to achieve transport objectives. The most recent data comes from 2009, in

a report titled Romanian Transport Infrastructure – Present and Future. In fact, this report details more plans

than progress.

Administration Romania has experienced considerable difficulties in developing its administrative capacity in the transport

area. Although the EU has been working with Romania through training programs and structural funding

projects, Romania‘s ability to follow through with EU mandates in road transport remains limited. ―There is a

growing acknowledgement on the part of both public sector bodies themselves and external commentators

68


that administrative capacity weaknesses could constitute a major barrier to Romania successfully absorbing EU

assistance and implementing its transport investment programmes over the coming years.‖ 67

Since this report was issued in 2006, Romania has done considerable work in the administrative area. The

Ministry of Transport, originally a part of a larger department handling energy, tourism, construction and a

variety of other sectors, was reconstituted with the primary focus on transport. The Government reorganized

its other sectors so they would be handled in more specialized bureaus, as was being encouraged and facilitated

by the EU in neighboring EU states. Despite improvements in administrative decentralization, transport in

Romania remains quite centralized. For example, instead of regional organizations handling local transport

issues, there is a bureau of rural transport, under the Ministry of Transport, which does this work.

Roads

The priority of the Romanian government has been the development of a solid road infrastructure that would

serve as the main catalyst for the development of the internal market and domestic economic growth. A clear

illustration of the fact that Bucharest is focusing on national road transportation plans rather than on larger

European transportation goals is the projected 260-mile Transylvania highway68

, which will connect the

economic hubs of Brasov-Sighisoara-Targu-Mures-Cluj-Napoca-Oradea. Not only is this highway to be built

primarily with domestic funds, but also the contractor in charge of this project, one of the largest

infrastructural projects in Europe, is the US-based Bechtel Company. The Romanian Government preferred

this arrangement69

to other EU contractors.70

This highway, currently under construction is the largest

motorway project in Europe with a length of 588 km from Bucharest to Oradea (near the Hungarian border).

This project is projected to be completed by 2013. 71

Other motorways projects under construction include: Cernavoda–Medgidia (19 km) and Medgidia–

Constanţa (32 km), part of the A2 (Autostrada Soarelui) motorway. 72 Timişoara–Arad (32 km) and Arad's

ring-road (12 km), part of the A1 motorway (Bucharest–Nădlac) are another projects originally to be

completed in 2011 but now optimistically looking at 2012. In the same year, Constanţa's ring-road should be

ready.73

In order to complete another 100 km of motorway by end of 2010, Romanian Government struggled to

allocate the necessary funds for 55 km motorway, part of the Bucharest–Ploieşti motorway (from a total of

62 km). Sibiu ring road (17,5 km) and another 27.4 km from Autostrada Transilvania were also targets for 2010

government's agenda, but are now scheduled for 2012. Overall, progress has been disappointing. The

economic downturn in 2008 has delayed Romanian contributions to many of the projects. Other road projects

have taken far longer than forecast to plan and realize. Like Slovakia, Romania has the potential to achieve

much before the end of the 2007-2013 program, but it is going to be difficult to make that deadline.

69


Financing Roadways

Romania has faced considerable difficulties financing modernization of its infrastructure. While the first two

years after independence saw considerable economic growth rates (7.9% in 2006 and 6% in 2007), the

economic downturn of 2008 has reversed the situation leaving Romania in bad shape during 2009 and 2010.

Some of the roadway projects have been halted for lack of funding. Others are delayed and some have yet to

be started. There is also an issue of corruption, which has been an ongoing issue with respect to Romania and

the EU, and which makes Europeanization more problematic. The European Union‘s funds constitute three

fourths of the budget for the transport modernization. The total budget of the SOPT over the programming

period 2007 – 2013 is estimated at about 5 billion Euros. Out of these, 4.0 million Euros represent the

Community financial support (Cohesion Fund and European Regional Development Fund), while national co-

financing will amount to about 995 million Euro.74

Regionalization

Romania is organized into 41 counties. This large number of counties has proven difficult to administer,

especially with Romania‘s short history of decentralization and a liberalized administration. There are too many

units to effectively administer. As yet nothing has been done to consolidate counties. Instead, most

administrative functions, evening the smaller units remain centralized in Bucharest.

Transport development is very uneven throughout the country. The National focus is on the major roadway

described above but this project comes at the expense of other projects and regions in the country. The

eastern regions, bordering Ukraine and Moldova have poor roadways and lack connections to main highways.

The mountainous central portion of the nation is in a similar backward situation, and little is being done to

address problems in these areas. Notably lacking in the Romanian situation is effective regionalization and

regional administrations. Furthermore, Europeanization in Romania lags behind the Czech and Slovakia cases.

Conclusions This paper has used three of the newer EU member states as case studies to study the successes and failures

occurring in the road transport sector since they decided to join the EU. We see each of these states struggling

to develop more stable and responsive governments and more efficient administrations in order to improve

the lives of their citizens. In the past, states have worked alone to improve their lot, but the idea of the EU is

that working together will be faster, more effective ad yield better results. The three states here are each at

different stages of development in transport policy and implementation. The Czech Republic is the furthest

along in transport development with Action Plans successfully accomplished and strategies in place for the

next stage of development. With help from the EU, Slovakia is also making progress in transport, and

70


especially in road transport policy and has a Strategic Plan for 2007-2014 in operation. Romania is still at the

starting gate, but with help from the EU expects to have its 2007-2013 plan underway soon.

We acknowledge that successes and failures are somewhat subjective ideas. What the EU considers to be a

success, development of transport infrastructure and an increase in roads, may be thought to be less successful

to the nation state as it losses some of its traditional powers to direct policies in transport areas or as pollution

levels increase. While accepting these nuances, it is still possible to recognize that road travel has notably

improved in the Czech Republic and Slovakia and even in Romania to a lesser extent, so how do we explain

these kinds of advances.

Both the Czech Republic and Slovakia have increased and improved their road infrastructures despite

government instability and limited national funding. Progress continues, in some sectors, despite the backdrop

of financial crises, frequent changes in governments at the national level, and the worldwide economic

downturn. Europeanization, where certain kinds of policy decisions are taken at the supranational level, seems

to work well in sectors such as transport, where there are clear objectives (build and modernize more roads

and bridges) and obvious benefits (increased mobility and job creation) to common policies. It is clear that

Europeanization has been a major factor in transport policy implementation in all three nations. In the Czech

Republic and Slovakia, EU mandated policies and funding have encouraged these states to develop their

transport sectors, and the EU mandate has helped take the politics out of road policies, and thus ease

implementation. By contrast, in Romania, where the EU is less visible, there has been more politicking at the

national level and less effective policy implementation in road transport. These nation states cannot achieve

transport goals alone and all three member states depend on the European Union level for goal setting, and

planning and especially, as we have shown in this paper, for funding. Without EU financing, many of the

transport projects would not have been possible.

Multi-level governance also seems to have helped explain the successes and failures seen in the three case

studies discussed here. Multi-level governance, as used in this discussion, means decentralizing administrations

and regionalizing policy implementation and funding. In the cases of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where

regionalization, although still flawed, has made notable progress, we see greater improvements in the field of

road transport than we see in Romania where regionalization is less developed. The regional level of

governance appears to have contributed much to the achievement of road transport goals. It is the regional

authorities, which receive the structural funds to upgrade and modernize local roads and help link them to

urban centers thus providing development and jobs for otherwise backward regions.

Road transport policy is a vital area of development and one where Europeanization and multi-level

governance have played significant roles in contributing to the successes and in explaining the differences in

several of the newer member states. It will be important to follow what occurs in this sector over the next

several years to determine whether the trends seen in this research are valid and can be extended to other

states and in order to further examine and explain policy development in the European Union.

71


Notes 1 Ellen Pirro and Eleanor Zeff, ―Europeanization, European Integration and Globalization,‖ The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Vol. VI, No.1, Winter-Spring 2005, pp. 209-217. 2 McCormick, ―Policy Making in the EU,‖ in: Eleanor Zeff and Ellen Pirro, Eds. The European Union and the Member States, Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, CO.: 2006, p.21. 3 Cowles, Caporoso and Risse Transforming Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001, p.1. 4 Vivien A. Schmidt, Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Polities, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006. 5 Vivien Schmidt, op.cit., p. 166. 6 McCormick, op.cit.,p. 22. 7 Lisbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, Multi-Level Governance and European Integration, Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2001, xi; Antje and Thomas Diez, European Integration Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 8 Roy Ginsberg, Demystifying the European Union, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2010. 9 Eleanor Zeff and Ellen B. Pirro, ―Mobility or Safety‖, Paper delivered at the International Studies Association meeting, New York, February 2009. 10 European Commission. White Paper: European Transport Policy For 2010: Time to Decide. Brussels: Commission of the European Union, 2001. Available at: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/energy transport/en/lb en.html 11 Europa – Gateway of the European Union. Policy Areas – Transport (2011). http://europa.eu/pol/trans/index_en.htm 12 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/transport/index_en.htm 13 See Priorities for the EU Transport and Mobility policy during the Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2010 (Belgium) for a sample of Commission meetings and issues. 14 European Commission, Activities of the European Union: Transport. http://europa.eu/pol/trans/index_en.htm 15

Commission web site, Europa, accessed March 1, 2011. 16 Reseuropa. ―EU Structural and Cohesion Funds need root and branch reform,‖ Friday, January 28, 2011: http://reseuropa , See also Ginsberg (2010) on the Budgetary Process, p. 179. 17 D. Charvatova, and Z. Charvat. ―The Importance and Use of European Structural Funds in the Czech Republic‖, World Academy of Science, Engineering and Technology 49, 2009. 18 Ibidem. 19 First Intermediate Report "Evaluation of cohesion policy programme 2000-2006, Work package transport", August 2009. 20 Statistics are official and are found at the CIA Factbook site and in Czech and EU official reports (Eurostat National Statistics) 2006. 21 Study on Strategic Evaluation on Transport Investment Priorities under Structural and Cohesion funds for the Programming Period 2007-2013. No 2005.CE.16.0.AT.014, Country Report Czech Republic Final, Client: European Commission, DG-REGIO, ECORYS Nederland BV, Rotterdam, October and Czech Republic, National Reporting for CSD-18/19, Thematic profile: Transport 22 Vivien Schmidt, op.cit.. 23 Milada Vachudová discusses this problem of administration in ―The Czech Republic: The Unexpected Force of Institutional Constraints,‖ Alex Pravda and Jan Zielonka, Eds. Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 24 The Economist, July 20, 2006. 25 EU Financial Report, The Economist, 2010. 26 Road and Motorway Directorate of the Czech Republic: http://www.rsd.cz/Organisation-RSD, February 2011. 27 Road and Motorway Directorate of the Czech Republic: http://www.rsd.cz/Organisation-RSD, February 2011. 28

Transport Research Centre, Czech Republic. 29Road and Motorway Directorate of the Czech Republic: http://www.rsd.cz/Organisation-RSD, February 2011. ―Today, 16 September 2010, the Czech Road and Motorway Directorate is opening a new 6km section of the R4 high-speed road, which connects Prague and Strakonice. The new section being opened is the stretch of road between Mirotice and Třebkov near Písek.‖ 30 Ibidem. 31 Czech Department of Transportation. 32 Ibidem.The ERDF sources for the OP Infrastructure period 2004 – 2006 totalled EUR 989.06 million and the Cohesion Fund contributed with further EUR 2,720 million.

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/doc/2009_intermediate_report_dg_regio.pdf

72


33 Road and Motorway Directorate of the Czech Republic, ―State Investments into the Development of Roads and Motorways Give Work to Around Two Hundred Thousand People‖, February 27, 2011, http://www.rsd.cz/doc/Information-service/state-investments-into-the-development-of-roads-and-motorways-give-work-to-around-two-hundred-thousand-people ―Financial funds, invested every year into the development of traffic infrastructure, give employment to approximately 220,000 people. This figure comes from a survey of Road and Motorway Directorate of the Czech Republic and several design offices. According to the outcome of this survey, every hundred million Crowns of investments from the state budget give employment to approximately 330 persons working (directly or indirectly) in the field of construction and development.‖ 34 Europa Press Releases. Czech Republic: CZK 14bn for priority transport infrastructure projects, Dec. 12, 2007. 35 Road infrastructure greatest recipient of EU funding‖ http://www.rsd.cz/doc/Information-service/road-infrastructure-greatest-recipient-of-eu-funding, Feb. 19, 2011. 36 ―Road infrastructure greatest recipient of EU funding‖ http://www.rsd.cz/doc/Information-service/road-infrastructure-greatest-recipient-of-eu-funding, Feb. 19, 2011. 37 Professor Ales Lisa, School of Economics (VSE) Prague, CZ. January 2006, and Lucie Horova 38 Ministry of Transport, Sept. 20, 2010, http://www.rsd.cz/doc/Road-projects/otevirame-jizni-cast-prazskeho-okruhu, Feb. 19, 2011. 39 Ministry of Transport, the Czech Republic 40 Ibidem. 41 European Commission, ―Key Issues on the Implementation of TEN-T Priority Projects,‖ Background and Questions for discussion at the Informal Transport Council of May 6, 2008. 42 Eurostat, Europa.com, accessed February 24, 2011. 43 Kvizda et al., 2007 44 Tomáš Boruta and Igor Ivan. ―Public Transport in Rural Areas of the Czech Republic‖—Case Study of the Jesenik, Vol. 18, 2/2010 Moravian Geographical Reports, p. 10. 45 Smítal et al., 2007; Boruta, Ivan, 2008. 46 ČSAD – Československá automobilová doprava (Czechoslovak Automobile Transport) 47 Boruta and Ivan, p. 12. 48 Ibidem. 49 Drdla, P. (2009): ―Změna legislativního rámce veřejných služeb pro přepravu cestujících‖. Perners Contacts, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 67–73. 50 Ministry of Transport, Slovakia, ―Report of the Ministry of Transport- 2009‖, Bratislava, January 2010. 51 Ibidem. 2009 Report 52 Slovakian website: http//netwatch.jrc.ec.europa.eu/NW/index.cfm/info/org/orgid/6A855A017074530CE440003BA06A43D: accessed June 13, 2011. 53 Ibidem. 54Daniel Michniak, ―Direct International Public Transport Connections of Regional Centres in Slovakia‖, Europa XXI, 2007, 16: 87-100 (p.88). 55 European Commission, Regional Policy, Inforegio Newsroom ―European Commission and Slovak authorities adopt Joint Road Map on implementation of European regional funds.‖ http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/newsroom/pdf/ip_slovakia_012011.doc 56 European Commission, Regional Policy, Inforegio Newsroom http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/newsroom/pdf/ip_slovakia_012011.doc 57

Dirk Ahner, speech at the Commission, European Commission and Slovak authorities adopt Joint Road Map on implementation of European regional funds. 58 Michniak, p. 88. 59 Ibidem. 60 Regional Policy, European Union: Slovakia, ―Operational Programme ―Transport‖‘, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_en.htm, Accessed, February 2011. And Ministry of Transport, Slovakia, ―A Strategy of the Department of Transport of the Slovak Republic Until 2020‖, 2010. 61 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_en.htm, Accessed, February 2011. 62 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/index_en.htm, Accessed, February 2011. 63 Only for the period 2000-2007, the estimated amount necessary for roads improvement exceeded $7 billion. Source: The Romanian Government. 64 The deadline is indeed illustrative of the scope of the necessary road development that needs to be carried out in the short and medium term.

73


65 Romania‘s Revised Position Paper: Chapter 9- Transport policy. Conference on Accession to the European Union, Brussels, 2001. Official position of the Romanian government. 66 Research Study: ROMANIAN ROAD TRANSPORT – SECTOR PROFILE: Prepared for the ILO by Roxana Radu, February 2009 67 European Union Commission COUNTRY REPORT – ROMANIA, 2006, p.38. 68 The completion year for the highway is projected to be 2013. 69 The social-democratic government awarded the contract to Bechtel in 2003 without an open and public tender, a decision, which has led to fierce domestic and international criticism. The reformist government in 2005 renegotiated the contract, with Bechtel agreeing to reduce its charges by 126 million Euros. Source: Romanian Ministry of Transport, Construction, and Tourism: http://www.mt.ro/bechtel/contract%20bechtel.pdf. 70 Such as Bouygues SA (France), Strabag AG (Germany), or HBG (the Netherlands). 71 http://wikipedia.org.wiki_transport_Romania#cite_note-2 72 http://wikipedia.org.wiki_transport_Romania#cite_note-zf.ro-5 73

Ibidem. 74

Study on Strategic Evaluation on Transport Investment Priorities under Structural and Cohesion funds for the Programming Period 2007-2013: No 2005.CE.16.0.AT.014, Country Report Romania.

References(selection) Cowles, Maria Green, Caporoso, James. A & Risse, Thomas, Transforming Europe, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001. European Commission. White Paper: European Transport Policy For 2010: Time to Decide. Brussels:

Commission of the European Union, 2001. Available http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/energy transport/en/lb en.html

Ginsberg, Roy, Demystifying the European Union, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

2010. Hooghe, Lisbet & Marks, Gary, Multi-Level Governance and European Integration, Boulder, CO:

Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2001. McCormick, John, “Policy Making in the EU,” in: Eleanor Zeff and Ellen Pirro, Eds. The European

Union and the Member States, Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, CO.: 2006, pp.18-46. Pirro, Ellen and Zeff, Eleanor, “Europeanization, European Integration and Globalization,” in: The

Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, Vol. VI, No.1, Winter-Spring 2005, pp. 209-217.

Schmidt, Vivien A., Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Polities, Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2006. Vachudová, Milada, “The Czech Republic: The Unexpected Force of Institutional Constraints,” in:

Pravda, Alex & Zielonka, Jan (eds.) Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Wiener, Antje & Diez, Thomas, European Integration Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004

http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/energy

74


Apendix

Table 3: Czech Transport Statistics by Regioncxlix

ČR, kraje CR, regions

Provozní délka želez- ničních tratí Length of operated railway lines

Délka silnic a dálnic Length of roads and motorways

v tom

dálnice Motorways

silnice I. třídy Class I

z toho rychlostní silnice incl.: Expressways

silnice II. třídy Class II

silnice III. třídy Class III

Česká republika Czech Republic

9,578 55,719 729 6,199 370 14,623 34,169

Hl. m. Praha 248 73 11 32 22 30 -

Středočeský 1,278 9,617 194 795 140 2,372 6,255

Jihočeský 981 6,126 15 661 - 1,637 3,813

Plzeňský 710 5,129 109 420 - 1,502 3,098

Karlovarský 494 2,051 - 227 15 471 1,353

Ústecký 1,020 4,203 53 494 14 907 2,750

Liberecký 553 2,427 - 332 22 487 1,608

Královéhradecký 715 3,773 17 443 - 893 2,420

Pardubický 542 3,604 9 462 3 912 2,221

Vysočina 622 5,089 93 419 - 1,637 2,941

Jihomoravský 783 4,494 134 447 28 1,474 2,439

Olomoucký 601 3,582 33 441 91 923 2,185

Zlínský 358 2,122 8 342 3 574 1,199

Moravskoslezský 674 3,428 54 684 32 803 1,888

cxlix

Czech Statistical Office, http://www.czso.cz/eng/redakce.nsf/i/home

75


Map2: Trans-European Transport Network Outline Plan (2020 horizon)

76


Map 3

77


Prospects on the citizenship of the European Union

Ştefana Ignea Babeş-Bolyai University Cluj Napoca

Romania

E-mail:

[email protected]

Received:24 June

Accepted:29 June

Abstract: It has been two decades since Citizenship of the European Union was enforced by the Maastricht

Treaty, in 1992. Throughout these years, it has evolved from an economic perspective to a more complex form,

which stands as a guarantee for political, economic and social rights. The European Union has improved through

the enforcement of a EU citizenship and has grown to a more democratic and modern “political object” or “form”,

but it still faces great challenges concerning this aspect. An important part of the Justice and Home Affairs area is

still controlled by the member states, including the granting and withdrawl of EU citizenship. The general

guidelines and the directives submitted by the EU are still weakly implemented within the member states and this

is one of the reasons why the EU citizens face difficulties when excercising their rights on a supranational

level.Recent Eurobarometres have shown that less than half of the EU citizens are familiar with their status and

rights within the EU. This problem, being a two-way road, is why both institutions and citizens are to blame for

it.First step: aknowledging there Is a problem. Next step: solving it. Citizenship of the European Union needs to be

rebranded and get a better support for its understanding and implementation. This paper is about the chalenges,

both old and new, the EU citizenship has faced since its enforcement and, mainly, since the last enlargement wave

in 2007.

Keywords: citizenship of the European Union, European rights, participation, awareness,

Eurobarometer

Citizenship in a global era; identity-nationality-citizenship in the 21st century

In the past few decades citizenship studies have emerged as a particular field within the social studies, because it has been known that, along with globalization and with the claim of new rights by various groups, it will become a key issue in the 21st century politics. New questions have been raised concerning the shift in meaning from the traditional concept of citizenship towards the new, modern one. What is the new framework for analysing citizenship in the modern, global times? What are the defining issues for citizenship in the 21st century? How many types of citizenship are there? Is citizenship a purely legal concept or is there more to it?


78


Numerous questions have motivated scholars to rethink the theoretical and practical dimensions of citizenship soon after the 1990s. What seems to be a constant key issue when analysing citizenship is its connection to identity and nationality. The three concepts have always been interconnected elements when describing the relation between people and states. More recent sociological studies claim people have multiple or hybrid identities, gathered within one self identity. Moreover, it is considered that identity is not an attribute, but rather a resource that people use in different situations (Jamieson, 2002:2)1. It has been said the European identity was built upon the common cultural heritage from Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome, upon the common religion of Christianity, upon the common history and development of sciences. However, this rather broad definition does not completely clarify who is European and who is not. Moreover, a distinction between the European Union identity and the European identity is necessary in such an analysis. Throughout its evolution, the European Union has built several symbols which mark a European (Union) identity: the European currency, the passport, the standardized European drivers licence and, of course, the flag, the anthem and Europe‘s day. To these, we could add several cultural initiatives, such as the European City of Culture and also the European institutions, which stand for a United Europe and a People’s Europe. Nationality is considered to be one of the fundamental rights granted to people and this has been stated in Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.2 Nationality is defined as the membership of a nation or a state, based on shared values, culture, ethnicity and partially on a shared language or religion. It stood as a fundamental concept during the formation of national states in the modern times, conditioning the drawing of the borders and the unification of people within these borders. Citizenship, in broader terms, may be defined as a regulated national identity. In its traditional meaning, it has been thought of as a rather legal concept describing the formal relation between a person and a state. Citizenship comes with a set of rights and duties granted by a state to its citizens and it represents the means people use in order to legitimize their government and the way their country is led. The changes society has been through in the past decades have led to a reconceptualization of citizenship. It is not only a purely legal term anymore, but it stands for political and social recognition and also for economic redistribution (Isin, Turner, 2002: 2). New divisions of citizenship have emerged due to these claims, such as the political, economic, social, cultural, ecological or cosmopolitan ones. Four meanings of citizenship can be identified throughout its evolution as a concept. The oldest one, dating back to ancient times, was the statute of people with political rights, the ones who were allowed to vote, to be elected and to participate in political public debates. Citizenship also means a legal status given equally to all the members of a sovereign state. This status grants them a set of rights protected by the government and is dependent on one‘s nationality. In the modern times, citizenship got to represent the status of any person belonging to a community or to a group. This led to a rather non-political understanding of the term, because one can hence be citizen of a club or an association. The forth meaning of this concept is actually a merger between the first and third from above-mentioned and is formulated as ―good citizenship‖. A good citizen is not only the one who is a member of a community or an association, but the one who emebraces this status, along with the responsibilities that come with it. This is why honerous awards are given to certain members who represent good examples of proper conduct (Smith, 2002:106). Depending on each state, citizenship can be residential or intergenerational. The residential citizenship is given by the state and city where one resides in and can be acquired when moving from one place to another, in most of the cases after having completed several legal formalities. This translates the Latin

79


expression ius domicilii. The intergenerational citizenship is acquired through birth or naturalization and can be lost through withdrawl, not just by moving from one state to another. Citizenship is either inherited from one‘s parents (ius sangvinis) or automatically given by the state where one is born (ius solis). Based on these brief considerations on the general meaning of citizenship and its connection to identity and nationality, citizenship of the European Union at a glance is build on modern patterns. The question is whether it is indeed capable of meeting the chalenges of the modern, globalized world.

The citizenship of the European Union When defining the citizenship of the European Union, a necessary step is defining the Union and establishing its legitimacy to grant and withdraw citizenship. Although we can no longer say, as Jacques Delors once affirmed, that the EU is an ―unidentified political object‖, politicians and academia still conduct heated debates when it comes to defining the Union in a common manner. The great political theories and theories of the European integration have debated ever since its formation as the European Economic Community and did not reach a consensus, other than the one that the EU is a sui generis political system or a new political form, as Jean Monnet once described it.

Numerous researchers3 have debated upon the idea that the European Union is a multilevel governance, where power is distributed not hierachically, but on a horizontal level, between all the factors involved in the decision-making process. The concept of governance shifts from a centralized authority controlling everything to the creation of more centers of power distributed on supranational, national, regional and local leveles. The idea comes to support the belief that some regional and local issues can be successfully solved at their own level, without further assistance from the central authority. Three principles stand at the core of the European multilevel governance: autonomy, subsidiarity and proportionality and they all come to support effectiveness and good communication between levels of governace: supranational, national, regional and local. On Hooghe and Marks‘ framework of multilevel governance, researchers have established a similar pattern for citizenship. That comes not only to support the standard definition of a citizen as a member of a community or a state, but also to explain a distribution of rights to citizens on different levels of authority.

Hence we have a supranational, EU citizenship, a national one and a local one, plus the regional citizenship, in the case of some countries. In broad traditional terms, this would mean rights protected and responsibilites collected at each level of governance. Multilevel citizenship is often discussed in referece to the electoral rights of the citizens. The fact that citizens are allowed to vote and stand cadidates in local elections and elections for the European Parliament in the member state where they reside, without having to be nationals of that state4, is the perfect example of multilevel distribution of rights and competences. As statuated by the treaties, the citizenship of the European Union is a supranational, derivative, complementary citizenship. It is supranational because nationals of all member states use it to gain a set of

rights when being abroad, it is derivative because it is conditioned by citizenship in a member state of the

80


EU and it is complementary to the national citizenship, because, as the Amsterdam Treaty states, it does not replace the later, but adds more substance to it. It can only be aquired by obtaining citizenship of any of the member states of the EU, and the conditions for obtaining it differ from one member state to another. Citizenship of the European Union is not only a political and judicial attribute, but it also represents a political identity (Costa, 2004:207).

The European citizenship in the European Treaties The idea of a People‘s Europe is not as old as the 1990s, although that is when it was first stated in a treaty. The Rome Treaty gave workers the right to move and reside freely in other member states of the European Community, but this was strictly an economic right. In 1974, during the European Council‘s meeting in Paris, there has been discussed the possibility of granting special rights to the citizens of the European Community‘s member states. The report of the meeting was mentioning several measures meant to consolidate the European conscience through Community values and actions such as the alignment of passports or abolition of customs. Although these measures were not then implemented, the meeting represents a turning point in shaping European citizenship. In 1976, the European Parliament was elected through universal elections, hereby being fulfilled one of the core values of citizenship, the participatory democracy. After the European Council meeting in 1984 there has been established a Committee for a Citizen‘s Europe within the European Commission: ―The European Council believes it to be necessary that the expectances of our European citizens concerning measures of strengthening and promoting the European identity to be fulfilled by the Community‖.5 In preparing the intergovernmental conference for the reform of the European treaties, one of the main topics on the agenda was the establishment of the European citizenship. The Maastricht Treaty is the first international treaty to regulate the European citizen statute. Article 8, also called ―Citizenship of the Union‖ is institutionalizing the European citizenship for all the citizens of the Member States, who are delegated common rights and responsibilities at a Union level:

- The European citizens have the right to move and reside freely within the European Union‘s territory, in respect of the conditions stated by the treaty (Article 8a).

- The European citizens have the right to vote and stand as candidates in local elections in the member state where they reside, under the same conditions as nationals of that state. Also, they can vote and stand as candidates in elections for the European Parliament within the state they reside in. (Article 8b).

- The European citizens have the right to be protected by consular authorities of any Member State of the Union in third countries where their own country is not represented (Article 8c).

- The European citizens have the right to petition the European Parliament and also to apply to the Ombudsman (Article 8d)6.

81


The European Institutions have the obligation to enact these rights granted to European citizens. Despite the novelty of these articles, the Maastricht Treaty was criticized for being a minor step in the evolution of the European citizenship. For starters, European citizenship was derivative and it only made sense under the national law. Moreover, the citizenship stayed economic, rather than following the traditional sense of the concept, because the rights that have been granted to Europeans were still freedom of movement and generally workers rights. However, it was not specified a certain frame of European rights for when citizens were travelling from one member state to another so they had to subscribe to rights granted by the member state where they resided in.

The Maastricht Treaty did not have a very clear exclusive view towards the third countries nationals and in some respect they had the same rights as European citizens (political rights, freedom of movement etc) (Lehning, 2005: 174-176).

The Amsterdam Treaty was amending the Treaty on European Union and The Rome Treaty, without replacing them. It concerned four main topics: the area on freedom, security and justice, the European citizenship, the common foreign and security policy and the institutional reform. The Maastricht Treaty generated a certain fear among some Europeans that the European citizenship might replace the national one. This is why the Amsterdam Treaty stated that the two are complementary and one does not exclude another. Amsterdam made solid steps into strengthening the European citizenship through measures meant to involve citizens in common matters for all Member States such as employment, environmental preservation or consumer protection. The enforcement of this treaty allowed European citizens to access official documents emitted by the European institutions and to communicate with them in any official language of the Union. The Schengen Convention strengthened the freedom of movement and extended the Union‘s jurisdiction in fighting discrimination. The Nice Treaty came as a big success for enforcing the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, although it did not receive treaty status. Germany pushed for an intergovernmental conference to clarify the Charter‘s statute. This Treaty created a feeling of distrust among European citizens toward the Union and its institutions. However, it prepared the Union for its enlargement by decreasing the competence of the unanimity vote in favor of the qualified majority one and redistributing the voting weights within the Council (Ocana, 2003). The Lisbon Treaty came to extend, but at the same time limit the European citizens‘ powers. In the second Title of the Treaty on European Union, ―Provisions on Democratic Principles‖, the eighth article is attributed to strengthening the citizenship of the Union, by enhancing the European Parliament‘s competence and by strengthening the concept of participatory democracy. Their purpose was to bring citizens, civil society and NGOs closer to the legislative process in the European Union. According to the new treaty, the Council of the European Union‘s meetings became public, resulting in a more transparent decision making process and in more informed citizens.

82


One of the greatest innovations of this treaty was the fact that citizens were granted the right to initiate legislative proposals to the European Commission if they collect one million signatures from ―a significant number of member states‖. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights got treaty status, so the European citizens may file complaints if any of these rights is not respected in the 24 member states who signed the Charter (the United Kingdom, Poland and the Czech Republic got opt-outs from enforcing the Charter)7. The Lisbon Treaty comes to strengthen the European Parliament, by extending the co-decision procedure in almost 50 areas. Moreover, the Parliament is the one to vote the President of the European Commission, after him being proposed by the European Council. This way it has been intended to increase citizens‘ participation in the European political life and in the elections for the European Parliament (The European Parliament is the only institution elected directly by the citizens)8.

Rights for European citizens

Aside from the rights stated and protected by the European treaties, there is another document that contains an extensive list of rights granted to the citizens of the European Union. The European Charter of Fundamental Rights was proclaimed in 2000, being the first official document of the European Union to reunite all the political, economic, civic and social rights of its citizens. This charter did not enforce new rights, but gathered all the existing ones in a single act, making them all more visible to citizens. The Charter states the general rights granted to European citizens and it applies directly to the union law, and not to the national one. Starting with 2009 it got treaty status, so it became part of the European law. It is to be distinguished between the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights. The latter was signed in 1950 by the Member States of the Council of Europe and applies to the courts in the 47 members and to The European Court of Human Rights. The Charter might be considered an extension of the Convention, adding to it the economic, social and cultural rights of the European citizens9. The Charter is structured on six titles, as follows:

- I (Articles 1-5) – dignity – states the rights to life and prohibition of death penalty, human integrity, including the abolition of the reproductive cloning of human beings, prohibition of human torture.

- II (Articles 6-19) – freedoms – states the rights to liberty, security, respect for private life and family life, protection of personal data, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, freedom of expression, freedom to conduct business and the right to property.

- III (Articles 20-26) –equality– the equality in front of law, non-discrimination, gender equality and the rights of the child.

- IV (Articles 27-38) – solidarity – include the workers‘ rights to information and consultation, the right of collective bargaining and action, fair and just working conditions, health care rights and consumer protection.

83


- V (Articles 39-46) – citizen‘s rights – state the political rights granted to European citizens, such as

the right to vote and stand as candidates at EP and municipal elections within the member states in

which they reside, the right to good administration, the right of movement and residence within the EU and the right to diplomatic or consular protection by the authorities of any member state in a third country where its own country is not represented.

- VI (Articles 47-50) – justice – state the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, the presumption of innocence and the right of defense, the one to adherence to the principles of legality and proportionality of criminal offences and penalties10.

The European Charter of Fundamental Rights is considered to be the first European official document to reunite all the rights granted to European citizens, in appliance to European Law. Adding to the European Convention for Human Rights, which recognizes all the civic and political rights, the Charter enforces social, economic and cultural rights, along with ―third generation rights‖ such as the right to good administration or the right to live in a clean environment. Amid the rights granted by the EU to its citziens, the newest and most controversial is the Citizens‘ Legislative Initiative Right. According to the Article 8 from the Lisbon Treaty: Not less than 1 million citizens who are nationals of a significant number of Member States make take the initiative of invit ing the European Commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union is required for implementing the Treaties. In November 2009, a Green Paper on European Citizens‘ Initiative was launched, followed by a public consultation and a proposal for resolution submitted to the Parliament and the Council by the European Commission. These documents established the framework within which the Citizens‘ Legislative Initiative would function. A great debate has been developed around this particular right. Questions have been raised, such as who benefits from this right and whether it diminishes the democratic crisis the European Union is accused of. It is true, it does enhance the supranational character of the European Union and, in theory, brings the citizen closer to the decision making-process. It further formally admits the right citizens have to be involved in the EU politics and, at the same time, it unites people with shared ideas and values, favoring cross-border communication. However, the framework within which it functions is rather rigid and confusing. The process for submitting a legislative proposal is lenghty and it does not assure the ones who supported it of success. Furthermore, it does not seem designed to be accessed by regular citizens, who would not have the time and the capabilities to collect such a great amount of signatures. It might be an instrument more easily accesible by interest groups, organizations and associations.

Prospects given by the European Commission

In October 2010 the European Commission released a report concerning the progresses made by the enforcement of the European Union citizenship. ―EU Citizenship Report: Dismantling the obstacles to EU citizens’ rights‖11 is a critical report of the existing gaps between the European law stated by the treaties and their

84


enforcement among citizens. The numerous complaints filed to the European Court of Justice and to the European Commission, the recent Eurometres, European citizens consultations and input provided by academia and researchers have shown that the European system of political, economic and social rights is still ineffective, both because of the lack of knowledge coming from the citizens and from a weak implementation framework.

This report came as a follow-up to the one submitted by the European Parliament in March 2009 concerning the ―Problems and Prospects of European Citizenship‖, through which the EP was inviting the European Commission to investigate the main obstacles standing in the way of full enforcement of the European citizenship and to take action to reducing these obstacles. At the same time, the European Commission launched another report as well, concerning the obstacles met by Europeans when acting as elements of the Single Market (workers, consumers, producers). This way, the Commission wanted to stress the importance of immediate actions for raising awarness among European citizens regarding their legal status within the EU. The creation of a new portfolio, ―Justice, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship‖, curently held by Commissioner Viviane Reding stresses the importance of the issue at a European level. The Commission had identified 25 key obstacles met by Europeans when exercising their rights as ―private individuals, consumers of goods and services, students and professionals and as political actors‖. When acting as private individuals, European citizens confront with uncertainty regarding their property when it comes to marrying another member state‘s national because it is hard to establish which courts have jurisdiction in case of divorce and which laws are aplicable to specific situations. They also may encounter difficult formalities when it comes to cross-border recognition of their civil status and thus have a more difficult access to justice. There have been several cases when suspected and accused persons in criminal proceedings, but also victims of crime were not given enough protection, both at a national level and in cross-border situations. Cross-border taxation is another important problem for private individuals who buy or receive properties and goods in another member state other than the one where they reside, because the mechanism of collecting is inefficient and confusing and often it happens that more than one member state collects taxation for the same good or property. Another important issue European citizens deal with is cross-border healthcare, mostly because of weak information regarding their rights when travelling abroad. Also, it has been proved that the right to consular protection is not fully effective because there has not been established a set of agreements between member states concerning the methodology and enforcement of measures for protecting other member states‘ citizens.

The Commission analysed European citizens as consumers and realized there is a large amount of people who are not familiar with their rights when traveling as tourists or buying goods and services from other member states. Moreover, there is not a single set of rules for consumer protection applicable to all member states and the means for redress often work ineffectively. The freedom of movement is often hindered by confusing and lasting bureaucratic and administrative processes, such as delays in granting registration certificates or the amount of money somebody should have in order to be allowed to live in another member state. Students and graduates often meet difficulties in getting their academic diplomas and professional qualifications recognized by other member states when they seek to enroll in an academic program abroad or wish to work in another member state. The fact that

85


in the EU there is no common social policy makes it difficult for citizens to request social security in a country where they are not nationals. The political rights European citizens have are also hindered by national requirements and legislation. In some countries, people cannot vote or register within a party if they do not posess a national identity card, which is given based on citizenship. That keeps them from exercising their right to vote or stand as candidate in local elections and elections for the European Parliament. The reverse of the medal is that there is no effective mechanism to check who votes in which country. Sometimes, that results in people living abroad being able to vote twice for European elections. The European Commission engaged to solve these 25 obstacles by 2013 through solid measures for enactment of legislation. Its purpose is to ―guarantee that citizen‘s rights are fully enforced‖, ―ease citizens‘ daily life by making the exercise of individual rights simpler‖ and ―raising citizens‘ awarness about their rights‖.

Prospects given by the European citizens

Analysis of recent Eurobarometers Surveys conducted since the last enlargement wave show an increased awareness of the EU citizenship and the rights associated with it, a stronger sense of European identity, but also a general feeling of distrust among Europeans concerning the Union‘s influence on their lives, the effectiveness of its institutions and strenght of its core values.

When asked about their opinion on the existence of a shared set of European values, 61% of the citizens surveyed believed Europe has a more distinct set of common values, as compared to the other continents. However, the average of people who believe this in the candidate states (Croatia, Former Yugoslavic Republic of Macedonia and Turkey) exceedes this percentage. The most known and appreciated such values were peace (45%), respect for human rights (42%) and respect for human life (41%). The other shared values, such as democracy, freedom, solidarity, rule of law, equality etc did not exceed 30%.12

When asked about what the European Union does mean to them, personally, 45% of the ones interviewed said it represents the freedom to travel, work and study anywhere within the member states, 40% said it means the euro currency and around 20% claimed its values such as democracy (19%), peace (24%) or cultural diveristy (21%). Around 20% would define the EU negatively, saying it means a waste of money (23%), loss of national cutural identity (12%) or bureaucracy (21%).13

The attachement to European values and symbols reveals a relatively narrow, but growing identification of the citizens to the European identity. The number of people who are aware of the term ―citizenship of the European Union‖ and their rights within this statute is increasing as well. Almost 80% of the citizens surveyed between 2007 and 2010 are familiar with the term, out of which more than a half claim they know exactly what it means. 75% of the ones questioned know that a citizen of a member state automatically receives the EU citizenship and they do not have to ask for it, 90% are aware of the complementarity between the two levels/types of citizenship and

86


72% know they cannot withdraw from their EU citizenship for as long they have a member state national citizenship. When it comes to their rights though, a little more than 30% of the ones interviewed are aware of the fact they have rights as EU citizens and partly know which those are. Out of the people aware of their rights as EU citizens, over 85% know about the right to reside in any member state of the EU (89%) and to be treated equally to the national citizens (85%) and about the right to file complaints and petitions to the European Commision, the European Parliament and the Ombudsman (87%). 79% of them are aware of their right to diplomatic protection in third countries where their own country is not diplomatically represented and 68% have heard of the right to participate in a citizens‘ initiative14. These results are concerning because they do not legitimize the rights and the way they are allocated and moreover, it does not have prospects for improvement because of the low feedback coming from the

population.

Conclusions

The citizenship of the European Union is still shaping and adjusting to the new European Union post-Lisbon.

The project for a single, supranational citizenship seems a genuinely right answer to the challenges of

globalization, but it is still subject to member states decisions and preferences and this is mainly why it is hard

to be enforced in the day to day life.

The general tendency in the European Union is to distrust both national and supranational leading and this is

one of the main reasons why the EU is accused of suffering of a democratic deficit. Moreover, even though

EU citizens are guaranteed a number of political, economic and social rights, they still feel they are not in

control of the events happening both at supranational and national level.

This phenomenon is not only a result of bad enforcement, but also a consequence of the lack of information

among citizens. The freedom to travel, move, work or study abroad has been the most popular right citizens

were granted, and this is why the EU citizenship risks to be seen as a touristic citizenship, rather than as

political and social recognition.

Although citizenship of the European Union is active whether member states citizens are aware of it or not, it

reaches its true meaning only when it is used by them in situations where the Union can help and protect

them.

The EU citizenship needs to be rebranded both by the EU and the EU citizens. It needs to be better presented

to people in all its aspects. Mainly because we live in a People‘s Union, in our Union as it has been said. And

we can help and also push the European institutions to a better enforcement and implementation of the rights

it has granted us.

87


Notes 1 For detailed analysis of the concept of identity see Brubaker, R. – Cooper: 2000; Hall, S. – DuGay , P.: 1996, Williams, R.:2000 2 Full text of the Declaration is available on the UN website at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml 3 For references, see Hooghe, L. – Marks, G.: 2001; Sorensen, E. – Triantafillou, P.: 2009; Kjaer, A.M. 2004 and also European Governance. A White Paper, document available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf 4 Article 20 (2.a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:EN:PDF 5 passage from European Union – Annual Report by the Commission, 1984, January, 4 1985 available at http://aei.pitt.edu/2829/01/012.pdf 6 Treaty on European Union, 1992 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/11992M.html 7 Treaty of Lisbon: which progress has been made in terms of citizenship available at http://beingcitizen.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=77%3Apractical-card-treaty-of-lisbon-which-progress-in-terms-of-citizenship&catid=10%3Ala-citoyennete-en-europe&Itemid=4&lang=en 8 Robert Schuman Foundation, The Lisbon Treaty available at http://www.robert-schuman.eu/doc/divers/lisbonne/en/10fiches.pdf 9 Introduction to EU Charter of Fundamental Rights available at http://www.eucharter.org/home.php?page_id=66 10 full text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf 11 Citizenship report by the EC 2010; full text of the Report is available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/citizenship/docs/com_2010_603_en.pdf 12 See Eurobarometer Standard 69, November 2008 13 See Eurometer Standard 73, September 2010 14 See Flash Eurobarometer 294, 2010

References Bellamy, Richard et. alt. (2004) Lineages on European Citizenship, Palgrave MacMillan: New York Isin, Engin and Bryan Turner (2002) Handbook of Citizenship Studies, Sage Publication: London Hadenius, Axel (2001) Institutions and Democratic Citizenship, Oxford University Press: Oxford Nugent, Neill (2010) The Government and the Politics of the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010 Lehning, Percy B. (2005) “European citizenship: A mirage?” in Citizenship, Democracy and Justice in the New Europe, Taylor and Francis Library, pp. 174-176

Online articles Introduction to EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (2004), at http://www.eucharter.org/home.php?page_id=66 Jamieson, Lynn (2002) “Theorising Identity, Nationality and Citizenship: Implications for European

88


Citizenship Identity”, published in Sociologia, vol. 34, no. 6, pp. 507-532 Ocana, Juan Carlos (2003) The History of the European Union. The European Citizenship, at http://www.historiasiglo20.org/europe/ciudadeuropea.htm Robert Schuman Fondation (2007) The Lisbon Treaty, at http://www.robert-schuman.eu/doc/divers/lisbonne/en/10fiches.pdf Treaty of Lisbon: which progress has been made in terms of citizenship, at http://beingcitizen.eu

Treaties and official documents

European Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000), at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf Green Paper on a European Citizens‟ Initiative (2009), at Sursa: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/citizens_initiative/consultation_en.htm Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Citizens‟ Initiative (2010), at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/citizens_initiative/docs/com_2010_119_en.pdf Annual Commission Report (1985), at http://aei.pitt.edu/2829/01/012.pdf Maastricht Treaty http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm Amsterdam Treaty http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm Nice Treaty http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm Lisbon Treaty http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm Treaty on the European Union http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm EU Citizenship Report 2010 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/citizenship/docs/com_2010_603_en.pdf Eurobarometres 69, 73, 294 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm

89


Simona Piattoni, The Theory of Multi-level governance: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010

354 p., ISBN 978-0-19-956292-3

Price: £55.00

Reviewed by: Oana-Andreea Ion, Ph.D Lecturer University Nicolae Titulescu Bucharest, Romania

Within the contemporary academic literature on different aspects of the EU governance, Simona Piattoni is a well-known presence. As a famous Political Science professor at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, and as a member of different prestigious scholarly associations or editorial boards, her EU-related publishing activity consists of a significant number of works where – as author or co-author – she incisively approached particular features of the EU politico-institutional construct, such as the informal or territorial implications of governance1. The book to be reviewed here – The Theory of Multi-level Governance. Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges – subscribes to the same endeavour of analyzing the EU governance, this time in its multi-level form. The subject of the book is largely debated within the EU studies, especially in the last decade, as many scholars continued Gary Marks‘ initial work and brought valuable contributions to this field through studies oriented either towards some general characteristics of the multi-level governance (MLG) or to its specific manifestations within the EU system2. The importance of Simona Piattoni‘s work lies in her effort to systematise these different meanings and approaches of MLG through a three-dimensional based study (theoretical, empirical and normative), whose red thread is the aim to argue in favour of a theory of multi-level governance. The MLG vulnerability caused by the fact that it is too often perceived as a ―catch-all‖ concept in cases related to the multiplication of decision levels or types of actors, has determined Piattoni‘s methodological choice to address the MLG issue through a deep investigation of the before mentioned aspects. Firstly, the theoretical dimension, with important questions regarding the intension and extension of the MLG concept and, in particular, the proximate genus (governance) and the specific difference from the other notions of its type. The analysis is complex and covers the first years of the coinage of this notion, the development of MLG in theoretical and factual terms (politics- and policy-connected viewpoints), as well as the latest turn towards the polity dimension: in other words, the rediscovery of several general questions regarding the EU‘s evolution. Piattoni‘s innovation here lies in an ingenious graphic description of the analytical space covered by MLG and determined by the plans that appear from the intersection of three dimensions (centre-periphery, domestic-international, state-society): (a) the plan ―Europe and the Regions‖, (b) the plan that deals will issues regarding the mobilization of transnational groups and (c) the plan that investigates ―varied governance arrangements‖ between actors and decision levels. Secondly, the empirical test of MLG run in specific situations chosen in order to check its applicability area in aspects concerning the number of different decisional levels ―simultaneously involved in policy-making‖ (more than two in order to speak about MLG, argues Piattoni), the variation of the types of actors present in these decisional structures (the compulsoriness to have non-state actors acting at different jurisdictional levels) and the new relations patterns (emphasizing their non-hierarchic character) established between decisional levels and actors (p. 83). The author selected three case studies in order to run the empirical

90


relevance test of MLG: the cohesion policy, the environmental policy and the higher education policy. There is a significant difference between these items and, besides the cohesion policy – a classic example for a MLG test - the other two cases are not intuitive first options to check for MLG marks and, therefore, they are valuable choices. The analysis revealed a significant variation within the structure of the policymaking process of these policies. Moreover, even if the MLG characteristics were obvious in all these three cases, few conclusions could be drawn regarding a general predominant decisional level or type of actor; in other words, even within a single policy, its policy stages experienced different patterns of decision levels or actors involved, as well as different types of interactions between them. Finally, the normative aspect or, otherwise said, the legitimacy and efficiency of MLG in comparison to other decisional offers, in the context of the domestic and global challenges that the nation-state is currently facing. Putting it in Piattoni‘s words, the stake was now how to prove the diminishing of the ―normative force‖ of state sovereignty seen as ―autonomy vis-à-vis other states, unity vis-à-vis subnational entities, specificity vis-à-vis society‖ (p. 183); the author‘s intention was to reveal the advantages of MLG in aspects regarding the particular input legitimacy (―authorization, representation, and participation‖) and output legitimacy (―transparency, responsiveness, and accountability‖) of the EU governance, as well as their aggregated effort translated into the ―contribution that MLG gives to EU democracy‖ seen as ―public control with political equality‖ (p. 190-191). The findings of this part revealed that, on the one hand, MLG enhances the representative and participative dimensions, but the authorization varies according to national determined criteria. On the other hand, MLG is seen as supporting all the items attached to the output legitimacy dimension. Putting together the identified characteristics of the input and output legitimacy, Piattoni argues that the EU democracy benefits from the presence of MLG in three specific ways: the empowerment of the ―peripheries‖, the efficiency of a decisional process cured from the ―veto power‖ effects, the ―creation of more organic ties between subnational authorities and their local societies‖ (p. 246). The investigation of this theoretical-empirical-normative axis was built on some specific premises that indicated the causes, the evolution and the possible consequences of some processes relevant for the current MLG discussion: (a) polity (institutional configuration) - the redesign of the state sovereignty – both in terms of political mobilization and policymaking, on the domestic-international axis; (b) politics (political mobilization) - the redefinition of national solidarity (more specifically, the state-society relations); and (c) policy (authoritative decision-making) - the transformation of territorial structure (the topic is here the centre-periphery relation, as well as the opening of the policymaking process to different types of actors having different functions). The scope of this structure was to properly address the EU architecture as comprehensive as possible that is – in politics, policy and polity terms – to fully understand, firstly, the challenges from above (supranational), from below (subnational) and from within (intra-national) faced by the EU member states and, secondly, the answer that MLG offers to these challenges. The value of a MLG theory would consist in pointing not only the politics, policy and polity-related changes, but in underlying the relations and mutual dependence between these dimensions; moreover, in the EU context, the value can also be determined by a wide policy applicability area and by the subnational modifications, a level where one could observe ―subnational authorities and civil societies end up sharing some of each other‘s defining traits‖ (p. 259). Nevertheless, Piattoni carefully notes that subscribing to the MLG explanations could be less based on sound arguments and more an act of adhesion to the credo of an epistemic community. One can see here some resemblance to Thomas Kuhn‘s concept of paradigm and it is hard to affirm if the idea of incommensurable paradigms can reveal in this case the diversity within the landscape of European integration theories or it is just an attempt to save this approach from severe critics.

91


It has to be said here that, indeed, the numerous qualities of Piattoni‘s work are obvious; however, some criticisms may be addressed. For example (as the list could be larger), in the first place, the full theoretical statute of MLG can be contested, as there are plenty of significant other analyses pointing to different – solid – interpretations of MLG as an analytical method, analytical model, normative concept or, at most, theoretical approach. Indeed, nowadays, MLG is the most viable alternative to the classical statocentric perspectives of the EU area and there are arguments supporting its neofunctionalist genealogy. Nevertheless, in order to apply for the full theory status, MLG has to perform some specific features of any classic political theory, in general, and theories of European integration, in particular. If MLG successfully fullfils requirements regarding (a) the explanation of the phenomena that determined the EU and the national levels in terms of politics, polity and policy and (b) the description and analysis of the current trends, there is still some confusion linked to a third requirement, the normative one. Usually, this is one of the most criticized features of MLG and, even if Piattoni carefully elaborates her analysis on this dimension, the delicateness of the balance between the input and output legitimacy can still generate consistent contestations, according to the visions supported by any specific lecturer. Besides this aspect, in second place, the value of this book would have been larger if the author had succeeded in properly connecting her work to the reforms introduced or facilitated by the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in December 2009. However, the references to the Treaty are marginal and, sometimes, anachronic, as they point to its ―future‖ coming into force (see p. 130) or to EU‘s pillar-based structure. Despite the minor possible criticisms mentioned above, Simona Piattoni significantly contributes with this volume to the current debates about the theoretical potential of some specific EU governance manifestations, in this case the multi-level one. With its theoretical, empirical and normative structure, strengthened by adequate examples from the contemporary EU socio-political processes, this book has to be a compulsory lecture for students from advanced EU studies programmes.

1 For example, see Christiansen T., Piattoni S. (eds), Informal Governance in the European Union. Cheltenham, UK-Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar, 2003, or Bukowski J., Piattoni S., Smyrl M. (eds), Between Europeanization and Local Societies. The Space for Territorial Governance in Europe. Boulder, Co.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 2 For example, see Bache, I., Flinders, M. (eds), Multi-level Governance, New York: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2004, or Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Multi-level Governance and European Integration (Governance in Europe), Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.

92


Anne Mette Kjaer, Guvernanţa(Governance), CA Publishing, Cluj-Napoca, 2010

272p., ISBN 978-606-92680-4-9

Price: 27,00 RON Reviewed by: Sergiu Mişcoiu, PhD Lecturer Faculty of European Studies Babeş-Bolyai University

Among some other recent concepts, ‗governance‘ seems to be particularly problematic and, for some researchers, even undetermined. The wide range of its meanings, from a rather administrative one – a specific way of insuring an efficient management – to a philosophical one – the articulation of public policies with a more abstract ideological view over the world, reinforce the following legitimate concern: is ‗governance‘ an in-exact term or rather an an-exact one (meaning, according to Deleuze, a precisely and deliberately inexact concept that escapes all clear definitions and becomes in this way the object of a hegemonic investment)?1 Out of the numerous books and articles about this tricky concept of ‗governance‘, Anne-Mette Kjær‘s

Governance: key concept (translated by Natalia Cugleşan as Guvernanța and published with a foreword signed by Adrian Ivan) has the remarkable merit to be clear and useful. Constructed more like a handbook than like a PhD thesis, this book is a cohesive and readable collection of theoretical debates and empirical applications of the concept of ‗governance‘ in a variety of fields, from national administration to international relations. In fact, Kjær‘s book is structured in eight chapters that follow in an intuitive manner the general and the specific uses of the concept of governance. If the author analyses various facets of governance, it is because she clearly identifies the origin of the increasing preoccupation around this concept in the emergence of the so called ‗New Public Management‘, based on the internalization by the public institutions of the principles and norms that are specific to private companies. The starting point of this turn towards the ‗privatization‘ of the rules is without any doubt the so-called ‗conservative revolution‘ acted by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan who tried to impose not only an austerity cure to their gigantic state apparatuses but also some thorough reforms of them. Like ‗globalization‘, ‗governance‘ appears in this neo-liberal economic enthusiastic period of the mid-eighties, when decentralization and tax cuts went hand in hand with de-bureaucratization, return to simplicity and to the fundamental rules of the free markets. Although Anne-Mette Kjær acknowledges the inevitable ideological dimension of ‗governance‘, she does not follow a critical analysis of the further developments of this concept‘s application into the other major fields. This might be one of the unsatisfactory aspects of her approach; but one should temper such a critique by noticing the ability of the author to attain an almost perfect dosage of ingredients when combining theoretical conceptualizations, analytical observations and empirical studies. This is the case of the chapter where she studies governance within the international relations system. Starting from the first conceptualizations proposed by James Rosenau and Robert Keohane, Kjær extends the logic of governance to this field that allegedly escapes the attempts of institutionalization and remains anarchic. But the author shows clearly that we are in the presence of a series of developments that make international relations not only increasingly domesticated but also more and more ‗governable‘, despite an entire range of resistances. The case-study of the World Bank that enjoys a separate treatment in a whole chapter of this book puts a

93


revelatory light on the way ‗governance‘ should work. It is nevertheless regrettable the author did not try to approach also some other international institutions (such as the World Trade Organization or the International Monetary Fund) in a comparative perspective. When showing that ‗governance‘ means ‗legitimacy, accountability, efficiency and democracy‘, Anne-Mette Kjær settles a very high standard for those who dare to claim that they embrace this concept in their current political or merely analytical demarches. Indeed, who can nowadays evaluate our decision-making systems and our public policy implementation processes in these terms, while demagogy, populism, clientelism and corruption are increasingly present, especially in an era of crises? Kjær‘s answer seems that we have to search for a way out of this unbearable situation by following models of best practices (such as the European Union, that she deals with in the forth chapter) and by imposing strict and consequent criteria for weighing the quality of our governing procedures (that she sketches by the end of the sixth chapter and in the eighth conclusive one). Natalia Cugleşan‘s translation of this book is accurate and coherent. As the original text poses some problems with respect to the variety of the semantic and linguistic registers (that correspond to the various disciplinary approaches embraced by the author, from philosophy to political economy and environmental aspects of globalization), it cannot be said that the translator had an easy task. This explains some minor approximations (in fact, very few) in rephrasing the original text, especially in the third chapter (on governance in the international relations) and the sixth chapter (on governance in comparative politics), where Kjær‘s formulations are themselves heavier and sometimes ambiguous. All in all, Ann-Mette Kjær‘s book is a very valuable tool for approaching governance, a fashionable but rarely thoroughly analyzed concept. It is though more than welcome to have its Romanian translation that we should consider as a major but only first necessary step in the academic study of this particularly complex and interdisciplinary field.

1 Gilles Deleuze, Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, Londres, Verso, 1988, pp. 362-371.

94


Alessandro Vagnini (ed.), The Rise of Nations. Nationalities, Minorities and the Fall of Habsburg Empire, Edizioni Nuova Cultura, Roma, 2010

166p., ISBN 9788861344846 Price: 11 Euro

Reviewed by: Maria Ruggero Eastern European History Cathedra, Sapienza University of Rome

The analysis of the singular political and social experience of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and, above all, of its different national components before, during and after the World War I: is the leit motiv of the volume that focuses the attention on the developments of the nationality problem that determined the passage from the political form of the empire to the birth of new states formed from its ashes. The authors recall meticulously this excursus underlining all the impasses that these national components had to confront, exploring the most significant moments: from the warning signs of dissatisfaction and general discontent of the oppressed ethnic components who aimed at establishing their independence and their national identity to the vain attempts to safeguard the integrity of the Empire. The book explores the complete decline, breaking down and the aftermath of the fall of the 600century-old Habsburg dynasty and the different territorial European map of the post-war period. It is divided into six chapters, written by various authors: each one deals with different aspects of the nationality matter in the Empire, its implications and how it was eventually resolved. Through a general historical introduction, Vagnini, the author of the first chapter, writes about the weakness of the Empire before and during the First World War and how despite the attempts to strengthen and to preserve it, the status quo in the 19th and 20th century was impossible to maintain. He cites the main cause as being the determination and the radicalism of the national movements continually growing, reaching their apex during the war: all signs contributing to the finis Austriae. As a matter of fact, the book plays on this evident contrast: the futile attempt to protect in some way outdated values related to the idea of pluri-nationality and control of territories against peoples‘ freedom. In this case, the Great War can be considered as a watershed from an old world to a completely new one. Becherelli and Motta dwell upon the particular situation of the formation of two independent states: Croatia and Bosnia, neuralgic countries where the difficulties involved in the separation from an empire were added to other internal stirrings. These crises were due to the idea of the creation of all Southern Slavs state and to religious minorities problems, as it was demonstrated with Bosnia. They were helped by other nations, promoters of principles like independence and peoples‘ self-determination, ideals protected especially by the USA‘s President, Woodrow Wilson. Effectively, the author of the fourth chapter, Carteny, writes about the important Congress of 1918, where the oppressed nationalities received the support of the Entente Powers who assured them protection and help against collapsed empires that still exalted obsolete and absolutistic principles. Although the groups who were part of the Empire became independent, the immediate political, social and economic life of these nearly born countries was not certainly thriving: some of them were states that, before, had not even existed on the territorial map. The post-dissolution period is deepened in the last two chapters: the post-war period panorama was strewed with conflicts in order to obtain disputed territories: this is the last image that the book offers us about this process of dissolution and new creation. The last pages, written respectively by Vincelli and Vagnini, describe an Austria that had to pay for the mistakes of the Habsburg dynasty but which was able to be born again thanks to the humanitarian help of Italian General Roberto Segre, who succeed in resolving territorial controversies between Austria and Hungary. At the end of the war, they were not nucleus of the empire but separate states, in contrast because

95


of coinciding territorial interests that were settled with the new liberal methods of democracy and in relation to the ideal of protection of the religious minorities. Lots of authors have written about the breaking down of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, from Joseph Roth, the most important historical writer about this issue, who looked with melancholy at the dissolution of a broad multiethnic and multinational mosaic, to contemporary historical writers. But, the main characteristic of ―The Rise of Nations, Nationalities minorities and the fall of Habsburg Empire‖ is not to dwell upon the end of an era, the sunset of an empire which lasted more than 600 years or to express their regret towards a multinational entity that in the past was one of the strongest. Effectively, all the different authors are linked by the predisposition to deepen the other face of this process, that is the dawn of a new day, a new historical period probably not easy but certainly characterized by the victory of democratic principles. The title of the book indicates to us readers that the authors are more interested in analyzing the phenomenon of nation-building and each step of this insidious construction rather than in the process of the dissolution of an empire: Motta, in fact, points out that ―the process of nation-building showed not to be a dead phenomenon‖. For the author, it is necessary to understand how these nations had been able to create a national identity, how a national consciousness was born, how it developed and how much was influenced by religion, history, culture and literature. One needs to consider that in the Empire there were some minorities without a previous national culture and history before and, for this reason, it is natural to ask how they created their own. The book plays on these themes, exploring the iter of discovery or rediscovery of its own sense of nationality and the way to assert oneself. For all these reasons, it can be considered a detailed work in the historical context, not only to help us understand the rise of nationalities in Eastern and Central Europe. Generally, it can be valued as a useful book which deepens our understanding about how a whole nation was able to separate from an empire, how it creates itself and its cultural identity and, above all, how was born that ―healthy‖ nationalism that some years later, in a near country, became extremely dangerous with the transformation into chauvinism.

96

Documents

Regionalization amidst 'State-Shrinkage' [p.p. 5-28]