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Regionalization of Conflict in South Sudan

Samuel Zewdie Hagos

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Table of Contents

Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... 2

1. The Root causes of the South Sudanese Conflict.................................................................................. 2

1.1. Structures ...................................................................................................................................... 2

1.2. Actors ............................................................................................................................................ 8

1.3. Dynamics .................................................................................................................................... 10

2. Regionalization of the South Sudanese Conflict from a Realism Perspective .................................... 13

3. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................... 14

4. Reference ............................................................................................................................................ 15

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Abstract

The state of South Sudan is less than four years old, but the world's newest nation now tops the

ranks of failed states worldwide. After decades of civil war between south and north Sudan, it

was meant to be a dream come true for South Sudanese. This dream elapsed shortly after a

conflict erupted in mid-December 2013, and quickly transformed into a national, political and

ethnic crisis.

With the objectives of finding out the underlying causes of the conflict in South Sudan as well as

the characterizing geopolitics, this research was conducted. More specifically, the paper raises

two central questions: What are the root causes of the South Sudanese conflict? And which

international relation theory characterizes the geopolitics affecting it? The essay draws a picture

based on the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) model supported by systematic literature

review.

The writer argues that not only political struggles among ruling elites have been pitting different

ethnic groups against each other but various interconnected social, political and economic roots

fueled the conflict. This argument will be taken on in the parts “structure”, “Actors” and

“Dynamics”. In the face of the current situation the country has become an arena where powerful

neighbors maneuver for regional influence. Hence, the regionalization of the conflict can – with

the words of the realism theory - be best described by anarchy rather than cooperation. This idea

will be followed in the part 3 before last part outlines the conclusion that the stability of the

country also depends to a large extent on the commitment of its neighbors for peace and

cooperation.

1. The Root causes of the South Sudanese Conflict

1.1. Structures

This section is concerned with the long-term factors as well as the socio-economic factors

underlying the conflict in South Sudan through a study of the historical background.

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In 1946 the southern region of Sudan which is predominantly inhabited by Christians and

traditional religion believers had been merged with the north, predominantly inhabited by

Muslims into a single administrative region as part of the strategy of the British colonial power

in the Middle East (Suliman, 1994, pp. 99-121). According to Leach, the people living in the

south began to feel the pain of an incompatible marriage from the beginning as they had been

alienated from the political and economic dividends. This led to heightened tensions in the mid

1950s. In the similar vein, the writer notes that leadership consisting of predominantly

representatives from the north, besides controlling all the political structures of the South, was

backing away from commitments to create a federal government that would give the south

substantial autonomy (Leach, 2012, pp. 12).

May argue the country was thrown into full scale civil war because of fermentations of

discontents of an incompatible marriage of 1946. Civil war and insecurity in the south of Sudan

can be traced back to the formation of a military splinter group a year before the Sudanese

independence from the British Empire in 1955. Suliman (1994) states, in August 1955 a number

of mutinies broke out in the barracks of the Sudanese army in the southern regions. Douglas

notes that social and political marginalizations as well as the quest for autonomy were at the

heart of the first civil war in the southern part of Sudan (Douglas, 2011).

Leach asserts that the so called Addis Ababa agreement of March 1972 signaled the end of the

first civil war that lasted for 17 years. However, the agreement that ended the first Sudanese civil

war in 1972 failed to completely dispel the tensions that had originally caused it, leading to a

relapse of the north-south conflict during the second Sudanese civil war, which lasted from 1983

to 2005(Leach, 2012, pp. 178).

Many link the second civil war to the then regime’s failure to embrace diversities. In 1981, the

Sudanese leader from 1969 to 1985 Gaafar Muhammad an-Nimeiry began a dramatic shift

toward Islamist political governance. According to Childress, in 1983, the president imposed the

Islamic Sharia law throughout the country — alienating the predominantly Christian and

traditional religion believers in the Southern part of the country. Many writers denote that

religious grievances coupled with the inter-alia conditions of dissolution of the South Sudanese

administration against the backdrop of the Addis Ababa accord and the annexations of the oil

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rich southern unity state to the north, angered southern politicians (Childress, 2010, p. 44;

Sliman, 1994, pp. 99-121). African Watch Committee attributed the flaring of the second civil

war in 1983 to regime’s failure to embrace diversities (Africa Watch Committee, 1990; pp. 254-

255).

The then Lieutenant Colonel John Garang of the Sudanese armed force who went to quell the

mutinies in Bor in the southern part of Sudan quit with the army and joined the mutinies to form

a rebellion movement in the south. Instead of ending the uprising, Garang encouraged mutinies

in other garrisons and set himself as the head of the rebellion against the Government in

Khartoum. Many affirm that Garang played pivotal role in formation of the Sudanese People

Liberation Army (SPLA) in 1983 (Mawut, 2011, p.254-255; Suliman, 1994, pp. 99-121; Africa

Watch Committee, 1990, pp. 254-255).

SPLA successfully waged a civil war against the Sudanese regime in Khartoum until the early

1990s. The SPLA's momentum came to a halt after political and power struggle broke out among

its top leadership in 1991. The split among the leaders of SPLA is considered a historical

moment by many writers that prolonged the civil war and lead to the militaralization of the

southern part of Sudan (Madut and Hutchinso, 1999, pp. 125-145). The split in the SPLA had

simmered since the late 1990, as Riek Machar, from the Nuer ethnic group, had begun to

question Garang's1 leadership (Hutchinson, 2000). It was made public on August 28, 1991 in

what became known as the Nasir Declaration. The dissidents called for a democratization of the

SPLA and a halt to human rights abuses. Moreover, they aimed for an independent South Sudan

in contrast to the SPLA line of creating a united and secular Sudan. The fight between the two

factions continued until Machar mended ties with Garang and rejoined the SPLA as a senior

commander in 2002 (Madut and Hutchinson, 1999, pp.125-145).

As mentioned above the second civil war between the southern and northern part of Sudan

continued until 2005. In the same year marathon negotiations talks in Kenya had led to a

breakthrough and an agreement between the southern rebel groups and the Sudanese government

was signed. In January 2005, North-South Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) ends civil

1 Dr. John Garang, who hailed from the Dinka ethnic group, was the chairman of South Sudanese People Liberation

Army (SPLA) from 1983 – 2005.

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war; the deal provides for a permanent ceasefire, autonomy for the south, a power-sharing

government involving rebels in Khartoum and a South Sudanese referendum on independence in

six years' time (Justin, 2012, pp. 136-147). The civil war that brought about destructions and

deaths of roughly two million people came to an end with renewed hope of peaceful dividends,

social, political and economic transformation. In the same year former Southern Sudanese rebel

leader John Garang was sworn in as first vice-president. A new Sudanese constitution which

gave the south a large degree of autonomy was signed (Justin, 2012; Douglas 2011, pp. 36–37).

The birth of the Republic of South Sudan was the culmination of a six-year peace process which

began with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 (Nistri, 2012, pp.

21). After six years of sporadic war and skirmishes between North and South Sudan, the

referendum of South Sudan ended peacefully. In July 2011 the people of South Sudan voted in

favour of full independence from Sudan. On this day, South Sudan became the newest country in

the world after a referendum (Ibid).

On the eve of the referendum, the international community extended its commitment to help the

post conflict stabilization process in South Sudan. When adopting resolution 1996 (2011) on 8

July 2011, the Security Council determined that the situation faced by South Sudan was still

volatile and continued to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region. For

that reason the United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) was

established to consolidate peace and security and to help enable conditions for development.2

Apart from the long standing conflict between the north and the south, there have been various

factors that contributed to conflicts within the south of Sudan. Some of them have been and still

are cattle raids and conflicts over pastures and water resources between the Dinka and Nuer

ethnic groups as cattle plays an outstanding role for many of the ethnic groups of the region. The

Dinka and Nuer are South Sudan’s two largest ethnic groups and conflicts between the two have

a long history. Traditionally, cattle raids are a livelihood sustaining practice, which allows

restocking herds after droughts. At the same time it has an important cultural function, as it

provides the means for young men to get married. Furthermore, access to water and pastures is

2 United Nation Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011), 8

th of July 2011.

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central for local communities in South Sudan. During the dry season, different sections of the

Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups have to migrate in search for wetter places, often infringing on

land claimed by other communities, which gives both pretext and opportunity for resource

conflicts and cattle raiding. Over the past 30 years this dynamic has been amplified by

progressive global warming and more frequent droughts in South Sudan (Richardson, 2011).

Because of the aforementioned cultural and historical reasons, many writers were skeptical about

the sustainability of peace in South Sudan from the beginning. Douglas argues that while the

independence of South Sudan has resolved the long-running dispute over southern self-

determination, sustaining peace depends on the implementation of democratic governance,

accountability, equality, justice and respect for all citizens. The assessment of Douglas is vitally

important for understanding post independence challenges in South Sudan. From the beginning

the transitional government faced many obstacles with respect to effective governance, such as

internal security and public service delivery amid high poverty levels. Considering the SPLM3's

dominant position in South Sudanese politics, the party is expected to play a decisive role in

overcoming these obstacles and establishing a climate of inclusive governance and political

pluralism (Douglas, 2011).

According to Hutchinson (2012) generally, political instability and violent conflict in South

Sudan materialise in different forms, namely shifting alliances and successive changes within the

government, recurrent ethnic fighting and the consequent redefinition of sources of entitlement

among local actors, mainly the Dinka and the Nuer. Many writers averred that the conflict in

South Sudan can be attributed to a weak institutionalized political system; unrepresentative real

and perceived political arrangements, a sense of alienation and marginalization, the presence of

weak political parties, including their political exploitation of ethnic differences, and weak

conflict management institutions and mechanisms (Small Arms Survey, 2012).

Political wrangles between different sects of South Sudanese politicians occurred on the eve of

the referendum. In April 2013, President Salva Kiir from the Dinka ethnic group issued a

presidential ordered suspension of a proposed national reconciliation conference, until he had

3 South Sudanese People Liberation Movement (SPLM) is the political wing of South Sudanese Liberation Army

(SPLA)

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formed his own committee that would prepare for the event after issuing a controversial order on

revoking unspecified delegated power from his deputy Riek Machar.

July 4th

of 2013 signaled the struggle for leadership within the SPLA structures. After the

withdrawal of power from South Sudanese vice-president, Machar, spoke about “time for

change" and a need to avoid "authoritarianism”, while indicating his desire to become South

Sudan’s next president. Machar specifically said Kiir had failed to tackle rampant corruption,

rising tribalism, overwhelming insecurity, dwindling economy, poor international relations and

that the South Sudanese ruling party (SPLM) was losing vision and direction4. The tension

further aggravated after the president dismissed his deputy. According to the report from the

International Coalition of Responsibility to Protect on July 23th, 2013, South Sudan’s president

sent shock waves throughout the two-year old nation by issuing a presidential decree on firing

his longtime vice president and dissolving the entire cabinet. The dismissal of the cabinet in July

2013, heightened tensions and fostered a sense of exclusion in sections of South Sudanese

society5.

The top party leadership of South Sudanese Liberation Movement (SPLM) expressed their

concern over delays in convening SPLM meetings to settle the crisis within the party. According

to the Sudan Tribune, on December 6, 2013, senior leaders of SPLM had given the country’s

president and party chairman, Kiir , an ultimatum to put things right or else they could resort to

the party constitution and act accordingly. The leaders also publically accused their chairman’s

leadership style saying it was characterized by corruption and deviation from the party’s vision

as well as encouraging regionalism and ethnicity.

In his report as part of African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Mamdani notes that in

December 2013 the fighting which apparently started as a political squabble between the

president's guards and soldiers loyal to the former deputy president, Machar, had developed into

an acute ethnic division that threatens to destroy the state along ethnic lines (Mamdani, 2014).

4 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/04/south-sudan-two-years-on

5 http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-south-sudan

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Investigators of the African Union (AU) found no evidence of a coup attempt as claimed by

president Kiir but instead concluded that a gunfight within the presidential guards was the

immediate trigger for further violence in which members of the Dinka ethnic group of the

presidential guard and other security forces targeted soldiers of the Nuer ethnic group and

civilians. According to the report President Kiir fought it out with rebels allied to Machar and

both sides committed atrocities, including massacres, forced cannibalism (mainly by government

soldiers) and gang rape (African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 2014).

Messner and Lawrence (2013) note various interconnected reasons including: prevalence of

violence, insecurity and armed conflict; corruption; failure to build institutions in spite of cash

inflows from donors; food insecurity; inability to cope with flows of returnees and refugees;

resource conflicts like land, cattle rustling and oil transports to Sudan; poor human rights record

including accusations of gross human rights violation and restricted space for media and civil

society as factors driving the conflict in South Sudan (African Union Commission of Inquiry on

South Sudan, 2014; Messner and Lawrence, 2013).

1.2. Actors

This part focuses on the analysis of the external and internal actors of the conflict and their

respective interests.

Beginning from 1983 the Ethiopian regime extended strong military, moral and strategic support to

the SPLA. Guarek avers that the Ethiopian government's decision to support the nascent SPLA was

an instrument of exacting revenge upon the Sudanese government for its support of Eritrean rebels

(Guarak, 2011, pp.252-253). Many writers also indicate that most of the East African states had

been embroiled in a debilitating tit for tat proxy war during the second and first Sudan civil war

(Sorensen. et. al., 1994; Lionel Cliffe, 1999, pp. 89- 111; Sliman, 1994, pp. 99-121). Ethiopia,

Uganda, and Eritrea have supported the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) against

Khartoum during the second civil war while Khartoum has supported the Lord Resistance Army

(LRA) against Uganda and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) against Ethiopia (Lionel Cliffe,

1999, pp. 89 - 111).

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Cliffe, (1999) notes that the situation of the civil war in South Sudan changed in early 2000,

when international pressure, based on the 1997 US sanctions regime – influenced by the notion

that Sudan was supporting terrorist organisations and destabilising the region – led to a north-

south peace process. As described above after extensive peace talks, the Comprehensive Peace

Agreement (CPA) was signed by the SPLM and Bashir’s National Congress Party (NCP) in

2005. Thus, the roles of international community and regional neighbors have been very critical

since the first civil war in South Sudan.

Looking at the internal actors of the current civil war, some former rebels including South Sudan

Liberation Army (SSLA) switched their alliance to South Sudanese president Salva Kiir and are

at present fighting alongside government soldiers in Unity State, one among ten states of South

Sudanese regions. At the same time, new rebel groups are recently formed and joined South

Sudan’s armed opposition block.6 This opposition currently consists of a large number of former

military units and militias like the White Army, defected soldiers, and other ethnic based

militias; some not necessarily under Machar's direct control (Small Arm Survey, 2015).

A report released on 8th

of May 2014 by the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

on the human rights situation, revealed that Sudanese rebels, namely Darfur’s Justice and

Equality Movement (JEM)7, has been providing military support to government troops by

fighting rebellions alongside South Sudanese government force8. Similarly, according to Mesfin

(2015), the newest state in the Horn of Africa has become an arena where powerful neighbours

maneuver for regional influence. So far, Uganda has been fully supporting the government in the

fight against the rebel groups led by Machar. The interest of Egypt to provide military support to

South Sudan government is also expected to drag the Nile riparian countries into the South

Sudanese conflict in pursuit of their national interests. Mesfin further avers that hydro-political

issues are expected to be at the hearts of a regional conflict and the competitions among these

riparian countries could plunge the region into chaos (Mesfin, 2015).

6 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/11/conflict-persists-south-sudan-peace-deal-151120033514547.html

7 The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) is a Sudanese rebel group

8 http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51051

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1.3. Dynamics

This part of the analysis focuses on long-term trends of the conflict that triggers increased violence

as well as on the capacities of institutions for managing the conflict. Further, it addresses likely

future conflict scenarios. This chapter includes an analysis of changes over time from an ethnic

conflict to issues that contributed to negative change like access to weapons.

Many believe that the fall of the communist regime in Ethiopia in 1991 caused a major set-back

for the SPLA. For 17 years the Ethiopian government had provided the SPLA with military

supplies, training facilities and safe-military bases. Sorensen and others note that this vintage

also was the turning point of unity within SPLA leadership. As mentioned in the previous

section, this situation plunged the rebel movement into deep internal fights among its leadership

(Sorensen. et. al., 1994, p25). Suliman and other writers reiterate that internal dissent in the

SPLA reached a crisis point in August 1991, when a break-away group - the 'Nasir faction9' -

called for the overthrow of Garang and for a separate South, abandoning all ambitions for a

unified secular state (Sorensen. et. al., 1994, p. 25; Sliman, 1994, p11).

According to the proponents of the splinter group, the mainstream SPLA led by Garang wanted

to quell the splinter groups demand for reform through military means. In contrast, the Nasir

faction took decisive measures to push back the mainstream SPLA through military means

(Johnson 2003, pp.97-98). At the end of 1991, following attacks and counter attacks by the Nasir

faction, at least two thousand civilians of the Dinka ethnic group were killed and tens of

thousands displaced (Human Rights Watch, 1994, pp.90-239). The plan backfired on Machar

completely as the targets were primarily civilians including women, children and the elderly.

Consequently, Machar lost both international and domestic supports for his faction. To this day,

Machar’s involvement in the event that is known as the Bor Massacre still defines him among

large parts of the population. It further marks the start of a cycle of retaliatory attacks by both

sides against civilians and is perceived as the beginning of the legitimization of civilians as

targets of war (Hutchinson, 2000).

9 In 1991 SPLA splintered into Nasir factions lead by Machar and Torit faction led by Dr. Johan Garang (Douglas,

2003:97).

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After the 1991 splits between SPLA, some writers accused the SPLA for a siege on government

controlled areas; human right abuses and dictatorial tendencies including obstruction of relief;

cattle raiding, destruction and looting of villages and forced requisitions of food from rural areas

(Sorensen, et. al., 1994, p.27).

Hutchinson claims that ever since the leadership struggles within the Sudan People’s Liberation

Army (SPLA) split the movement into two warring factions in 1991, rural Nuer and Dinka ethnic

communities in the south have been grappling with an expanding regional subculture of

ethnicized violence. The violence characterized by atrocities of civilians particularly purposeful

slaying of children, women and elderly. Brutalities against civilians were committed by both

factions against the previous backdrop of the cultures of Sudanese from the south. Before the

incidence of 1991, killings of vulnerable groups were universally perceived not only as cowardly

and reprehensible but, more importantly, as a direct affront against God as the ultimate guardian

of human morality (Hutchinson, 2000).

External factors have also been affecting the dynamics of the ongoing conflict in South Sudan.

As to subsequent reports of United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) on the human

rights situation revealed that Sudanese rebels, JEM, has been providing military support to

government troops by fighting rebellions alongside South Sudanese government force10

. Besides,

Uganda armed force has been fighting the rebel forces alongside the government. Uganda’s

military involvement has given the conflict a dangerous outlook and regional dynamics (Sørbø,

2014). Some Medias cited South Sudanese officials to indicate that Uganda starts buying

weapons and other military hardware for South Sudan’s government under an agreement signed

in October 2014, sparking fears of an escalation of fighting between government forces and

rebels11

. Likewise, in 2014 Bloomberg reported that the Chinese government has continued to

supply ammunition to the South Sudanese government. As to the report, ‘China is selling

missiles worth of $38 million, grenade launchers, machine guns and ammunition to South

10

http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article51051

11 http://www.nyamile.com/2014/10/18/uganda-to-supply-south-sudan-weapons/

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Sudan’s government, even as it pledges to help end a civil war in the country now on the brink of

famine’12

.

In addition to the above, other factors at the hearts of the South Sudanese conflict linked with

traditional socio-cultural factors. Many note that cattle riding have a long history in South Sudan.

But the vast supply of small arms in civilian hands has led to the situation where cattle rustling

becoming more violent in recent years. Tadesse avers that the act of cattle raiding is an almost

primordial practice tied to initiation rites into manhood and marriage. However, with the

introduction of guns, what was hitherto fought with spears and sticks has become an all the more

lethal practice (Tadesse 2007). In remote areas of South Sudan police service lacks the capacity

to protect communities and so many cattle herders keep arms to defend themselves (Small Arms

Survey, 2012; Reach Resource Center, 2014).

Access to water and pastures is central for local communities in South Sudanese regions like

Jonglei State. Some of the ethnic groups including Nuer, living in water poor areas; they are

forced to move into the territories of other groups during the dry season, which can give both

pretext and opportunity for conflicts over shared resources and cattle raiding. Over the past 30

years this dynamics has been amplified by progressive global warming and prolonged dry

seasons in South Sudan, which have frequently brought different ethnic groups in close

proximity for search of grazing lands (Richardson, 2011).

From the above review one can conclude that lack of institutional capacities to manage and

resolve conflict, inabilities of the government to have strong hold on means of violence, the roles

of external actors in providing ammunitions and direct military involvement, mushrooming of

assault rivals in the hands of civilians and resource based conflicts have been changing the

dynamics of conflicts in South Sudan.

12

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-08/norinco-sells-south-sudan-arms-as-chinese-government-

talks-peace

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2. Regionalization of the South Sudanese Conflict from a Realism Perspective

Many writers attempt to explain ethnic conflict by employing the ‘security dilemma’, a realist

concept typically used to explain interstate war. For instance, Pose argues that the security

dilemma accurately captures the special conditions that arise when different ethnic groups find

themselves in anarchic situation where they are responsible for their own security (Posen, 1997,

pp. 103). Anarchy is a condition under which ethnic groups, like states in the international

system, fear for their basic survival; their overriding interest is to enhance their capabilities for

self-defense (Posen, 1997, pp.103; Walt, 1992, pp. 321).

Likewise, Waltz noted that modern realism which is known as neo-realism takes the view that

the structure in which states exists in international relations is anarchic due to the absence of an

overarching authority. He further asserted that states serve their own interests in the international

system by following a strict code of self help due to the absence of any authority above them.

Moreover, as all states exist in a state of anarchy in the international arena of politics, they all

pursue self interest and try to acquire power to secure themselves and ensure their survival

(Waltz, 1979, p.104). One can argue that in such a situation, no state can trust another therefore

cooperation is limited and unstable when it occurs. Many writers who elaborate on realism note

that states function on a zero-game principle because they are present in a structure which

compels them to seek security which results in competition between states and creates the

possibility of state’s cheating their way out of an alliance to gain more power and security

(Mearsheimer, 1994, p.11; Waltz, 1979, p.106).

The Sudd institute also theorizes that inability of the government to weld over means of violence,

proliferations of assaults weapons and the mistrust among South Sudanese politicians have been

forcing many ethnic groups to resort towards self-protection. The absence of central government

to offer security, enforce agreements, or prevent the use of violence has been fueling the conflict

and ethnic rivalries in South Sudan (The Sudd Institute, 2014). Many writers also indicated that

most of the East African states had been embroiled in a debilitating tit for tat proxy war during

the second and first Sudan civil war. Most recently, South Sudan also has become an arena

where powerful neighbors maneuver for regional influence. Uganda armed force has been

fighting the rebels forces alongside the government. Along the same line, the interest of Egypt to

14

provide military support to South Sudan government is also expected to drag the Nile riparian

countries in to South Sudanese conflict in pursuit of their national interests. Rebels also have

been receiving supports from Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Mesfin further explains that hydro-

political issues is expected to be at the hearts of regional conflict and the competitions among

these riparian countries could plunge the region into chaos (Mesfin, 2015; Sørbø, 2014). Hence,

the region can be more described with mistrust and rivalries rather than cooperation. Thus, one

can argue that realism can best describe the situation in South Sudan and the geopolitics of the

region.

3. Conclusion

From the above review, one can argue that the political struggles among ruling elites that have

been pitting different ethnic groups against each other have roots in social, political and

historical contexts. Hence, in order to understand the ongoing conflict in South Sudan, it is

essential to discuss the political, economic and social factors underlying the conflict. The

dynamics of the conflict in South Sudan has been also affected by many layers of actors and

weak institutional capacities. Lack of institutional capacities to manage and resolve conflict,

inabilities of the government to have strong hold on means of violence, the roles of external

actors in providing ammunitions and direct military involvement, mushrooming of assault rivals

in the hands of civilians and resource based conflicts have been changing the dynamics of the

conflicts in South Sudan

In ongoing conflict, South Sudan also has become an arena where powerful neighbors maneuver

for regional influence. Hence, the regionalization of the conflict can be best described by anarchy

(Realism) rather than cooperation. Therefore, the stability of the country also depends on the

commitment of its neighbors for peace and cooperation.

Hence, international community not only need to help the government of South Sudan to address

the social, political and economic factors underlying the conflict but also need to focus on trust

building and regional cooperation.

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4. Reference

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December 2015].

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